V.

Characteristics
A privilege, not a matter of right

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against
respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering
his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his
good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him
to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and
adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia
each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted
upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises
Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing
respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and
maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without
merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said
cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon
in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that
they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his
oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December
1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his
actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR
Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a
Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the
undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral
character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP
testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief
Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any
certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of
Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is
willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle
him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT
on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August
1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware
of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might
be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the
Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal,
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del
Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have
secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The
mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by
its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of
CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal
has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case
against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by
the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive
Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM
44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that
there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER
the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this
Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his
"Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal
and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was
Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against
him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar
as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become
a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend
him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at
a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a
comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated
thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which
raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and
obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality
of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change
or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the
foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and
dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming
change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having
availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of
the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already
considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between
the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural
Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of
public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining
from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan
to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29
January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment
on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus
Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court
and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8
June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on
the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29
August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is
no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September
1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his
show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the
civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a
certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a
mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He
did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986.
The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus
certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the
Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession
by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was
instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983
and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have
known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character.
It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the
termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence
was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out,
the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have
known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land
at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was
eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to
reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he
was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against
him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good
moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have
not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection
to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does
of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard
for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally
interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including
at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's
Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.



A.M. No. 1892 July 7, 1989
ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, respondent.
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is a motion filed by the respondent seeking a reconsideration of the decision of this
Court dated July 29, 1988 suspending respondent indefinitely from the practice of law until such time
when he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume the practice of law.
The following grounds are recited:
I
Respondent did not wittingly or willingly promote or sue in behalf of his poor and
unlettered client for money or malice in the subject civil cases against a very wealthy
public land applicant from San Juan, Metro Manila, but after being convinced in good
faith that his said client's cause seeking for justice is lawful, true, just and valid under the
facts and existing law on social legislation and public policy on giving public land to the
landless and not groundless suits.
II
Respondent in good faith and fidelity took up the challenge of handling of the cause of
the poor unlettered landless client as this is his duty as dictated by his conscience and
conviction.
III
Respondent-movant herein has only a few more months remaining for him to serve in the
prosecution arm of this present dispensation. His only remaining aspiration at present is
to redeem his name, honor and integrity against these charges of alleged perjury and
delay of justice coming from the adverse party counsel before his life ends for, without
honor is, for him, equivalent to untimely death as a member of the bar, as provincial fiscal
and as a citizen.
In the said decision, the Court found respondent guilty of unethical practices in: (1) causing his client to
perjure himself, (2) that he lacks candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts; and (3) that he
had been abusive of his right of recourse to the courts.
On the first charge, the Court found that respondent filed a verified complaint for ejectment docketed as
Civil Case No. 192 in the Municipal Court of Los Baos Laguna wherein it is alleged that in the early part
of 1960 defendant Julian Estolano dispossessed plaintiff Glicerio Aquino of a portion of the property in
question, while in an amended complaint it is alleged that Estolano deprived Aquino of a portion of said
property in the early part of 1973 to enable the inferior court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent now argues that he filed the said pleadings in good faith and that he had no intention to
cause his client to commit perjury. He stressed that Aquino had been a bonafide occupant of the property
in question even before 1958 and that his right was recognized by the Director of Lands in a decision
dated August 13, 1962; that said property is an alienable portion of public land known as Camp Eldrige at
Barangay Bambang, Los Baos Laguna which is disposable under Republic Acts No. 274 and 730, with
preferential right expressly given to actual occupants as Aquino; and that all he did was to exert his
utmost and relentless time and effort in defending the cause of his poor, oppressed and unlettered
landless client.
On the second and third charges for lacking candor towards his adversary and the courts and for abusing
his right of recourse to the courts, respondent asserts that he only did his duty to protect the interests of
his client.
The antecedents are the following:
Respondent filed an ejectment case in the Municipal Court of Los Baos, Laguna against Estolano on
April 13, 1974, docketed as Civil Case No. 192. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by
the trial court on May 21, 1974 restoring Aquino in the possession of the property upon his filing a bond.
On May 15, 1974, respondent as counsel of Aquino, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna an
action for the annulment of the title of Estolano docketed as Civil Case No. 179-C. It was denied on April
26,1976 for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
In the meanwhile, on June 15,1974, Estolano filed an action for recovery of possession of the property
against Aquino also in the CFI of Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 183. This case was resolved in
favor of Estolano and was appealed by Aquino to the Court of Appeals where it is still pending.
On January 5, 1977, the Municipal Court dismissed Civil Case No. 192 for lack of jurisdiction and the writ
issued was dissolved. Said judgment was not executed as Aquino appealed to the CFI. Nevertheless, the
appeal was dismissed. After the judgment had become final and executory, Estolano filed an ex
parte motion for the execution of the same. Respondent filed an opposition stating that he filed a petition
for certiorari in the CFI of Laguna. In deference to the same, the Municipal Court held in abeyance further
action on the Estolano motion.
On July l, 1977, respondent filed in behalf of Aquino an action against the Director of Lands and Estolano
in the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in San Pablo, Laguna for a determination of the preferential
acquisitive rights and/or security of tenure of Aquino under Republic Acts No. 274 and 730 and
Presidential Decrees No. 27 and 152 and Land Administrative Order No. 29. The case was docketed as
CAR Case No. 7043. Upon an ex parte motion of respondent, the CAR issued a restraining order on July
2, 1977 enjoining the Director of Lands and Estolano from enforcing an earlier decision of the Director of
Lands dated May 27, 1964 recognizing the prior right of Estolano to the questioned property and
reversing his decision dated August 13, 1962 awarding to Aquino the preferential right to the property.
However, this case was also dismissed on May 18,1979 for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, said decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1981.
Respondent argues that in all these cases that he filed in court his primary interest was to defend what he
believes is the lawful cause of his client Glicerio Aquino. He asserts that he filed the ejectment case
inasmuch as Aquino's possession and preferential right to the property had been upheld in the decision of
the Director of Lands dated August 13, 1962. Although the Director of Lands, in a subsequent decision
dated May 27, 1964, reversed himself and sustained the claim of Estolano over the property, respondent
alleges that said decision is null and void on the ground that the same is against public policy and that it
was procured through deceit, fraud, corruption and undue influence. He also refers to Resolution No. 9,
S-72 dated February 24, 1972 of the Presidential Action Committee on Justice and Agrarian Reform
which in effect set aside said decision as it ordered a relocation survey of the property to determine once
and for all the conflicting claims of Aquino and Estolano.
Respondent explains that these are the reasons why he filed the action for annulment of the title of
Estolano. He states that he filed the complaint in the agrarian court also to enforce the right of Aquino as
a tenant tilling the land who is given preferential right to the property under the law. He emphasizes that
he did not deceive the CAR when he sought the issuance of a restraining order against the enforcement
of the decision of the Director of Lands inasmuch as the parties had submitted their controversy to
arbitration by then Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs,
1
but Estolano
reneged on this agreement. Respondent concludes that Estolano and his counsel are responsible for the
protracted litigation.
In March, 1988, an order of execution was issued by the trial court pending appeal of Civil Case 183-C.
Thus, Aquino was effectively dispossessed of the property in question.
The filing of this administrative complaint on April 2, 1978, notwithstanding, respondent went on with his
practice of law for several years. Most of his clients were poor/landless and indigent tenant-farmers from
Laguna and Cavite, and from Paraaque, Bayumbong, and Jala-Jala, Rizal.
2

On January 20, 1987, he represented the Laguna chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in
the Government/ NPC, Laguna Committee on Reconciliation and Ceasefire.
3
Thereafter, President
Aquino appointed him Municipal Councilor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
4

Upon recommendation of the then Minister of Justice and the officials and members of the Laguna
chapter of the IBP attesting to his probity, integrity, trustworthiness, exemplary life and
character,
5
President Aquino appointed him Provincial Fiscal of Laguna
6
which position he assumed on
February 9, 1987. Upon his suspension from the practice of law by this Court, he took an indefinite leave
of absence effective August 11, 1988.
Respondent points out that except for this administrative case, no complaint, whether civil or criminal, has
ever been filed against him. He also points out that he performed his duty as government prosecutor with
dedication so much so that he received an award of appreciation from the PC/INP Command of
Laguna.
7
Respondent adds that since 1978, he joined the Cursillo movement, the Christian Charismatic
Movement and the Christian Family Movement. It also appears that he is a YMCA director and life
member.
8

Respondent also contends that when he handled the case of Glicerio Aquino, his only motivation was to
defend him from oppression and to protect him against a rich landowner, and that he received no
monetary remuneration for his long and dedicated service except some tokens in the form of vegetable
crops as camotes, guavas, mangos, star apples, etc. He maintains that all his actuations were predicated
on good faith and the honest belief that they were proper.
After due investigation, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended a suspension of six (6) months
from the practice of law as penalty. Respondent has been suspended since August 11, 1988, or for a
period of about ten (10) months to date. He is due to retire as Provincial Fiscal of Laguna in July, 1989.
A careful reexamination of the records of the case shows that the acts of respondent may be attributed to
his extreme zeal and enthusiasm in prosecuting the cause of his client. There is no proof of any dishonest
motive or fraud, much less of any contemptuous act committed by him towards the courts or towards the
adverse party or counsel. While the courses of action he took tended to delay the disposition of the
controversy and were redundant, his suspension from the practice of law is sufficient disciplinary action
against him. Moreover, there is proof that the fault cannot be attributed entirely to the respondent.
Complainant and his counsel also contributed to the delay in filing Civil Case No. 183 for recovery of
possession, which is still pending appeal, and in failing to comply with the agreement to settle the dispute
by arbitration. Respondent and his client Aquino were willing to settle the problem but Estolano and his
counsel did not care to pursue this course of action which could have terminated the matter once and for
all.
The attestations of responsible persons in the public and private sector as to the integrity and good moral
character of respondent show that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve another chance to resume
the practice of law.
9

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED in that the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law is hereby lifted. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J .:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to
the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice
of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of
the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted
to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule)
1
in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be
known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of
law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January
9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics
or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.
2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
4
The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
5
authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did
so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by
a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise
of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional
for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
7
All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member.
8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of
a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the
respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
13
and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.
14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners
in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment
1
before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann")
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I
love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left
the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on
its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you
until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"
2

Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11
th
Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,
3
respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as
they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held
at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.
4
(Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and
that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally
married to Mary Anne Tantoco.
5
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a
"piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as
now they are.
6
(Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making
him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne
as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's
special friendship with Irene.
x x x x
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.
7
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted
8
paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).
9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as
a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.
10
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal
and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances
nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
11
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,
12
alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply,
as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth
13
bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS
14
dated January 10, 2003
from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached
to the complainant's Reply."
15
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil
case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.
16
Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.
17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
18
dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended
19
that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28,
2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.
20
(Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition
21
of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
139
22
of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-
word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment
23
on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.
24
The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted
an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of
the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of
their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19
of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with
respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent
was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship
with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation
regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.
25
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."
26
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies ishaving flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that
it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with
an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the
fact itself is admitted.
27
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
"lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in
the certificate
28
with her signature on the Marriage Certificate
29
shows that they were affixed by one and
the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit
30
which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.
31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other
32
which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.
33
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.
34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should
be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."
35
The case at
bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this
Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:
36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
x x x x
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
37
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:
38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
39
(Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."
40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation
41
on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's
petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review,
we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may
withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."
42
(Emphasis supplied by
complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.
43
As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
44
In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was
null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state thatbefore complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out
on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he
knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had
once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B,
11
th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she
had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was
in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential
house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It
was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit
a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical
Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate
of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the
point for bothrespondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that
Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.
45
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed
in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,
46
viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal case
47
(Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,
48
held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.



A privilege burdened with conditions




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79,
Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

BELLOSILLO, J .:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material
fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.
1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re
Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the
inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to
be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter
formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found
guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment
as regional trial judge.
2
But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling
reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.
3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62
years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all
candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal
profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando,
Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San
Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology
Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-
Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino,
RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D.
Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City.
4
However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion.
5

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others
that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work,
especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his
incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an
unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what
he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."
6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not
condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into
its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment.
7

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I
realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely
following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for
it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife
and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I
am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law
profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back
to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . .
8

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement
It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been
struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give
me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing
whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession.
9

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.
10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly
punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my
wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they
bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment.
11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and
prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is
ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners.
Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly
warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining
a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty
as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .
12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is
therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is
effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.
1
Respondent, who was
already married with three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was
reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and
respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child as his
with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent started to refuse
recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and forgiveness
from this Court. He submitted certificates from government and civic organizations appreciating his
services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious groups, and certificates of good moral
character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro.
2

On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon.
3

On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003)
recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the suspension of
respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has shown integrity and moral uprightness in
the performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful
indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after taking his oath as member of the
bar.
4

The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August 15, 2003,
stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits the paternity of the
child and agrees to support her.
5

On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondents motion for
reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not supporting his
child.
6

On August 25, 2003, respondents wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that
respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with complainant,
such was only
because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case after
respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel respondent to sign the
affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers that respondent is the sole breadwinner
of the family and that their family will be gravely affected by his suspension.
7

On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts
acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then he
shall comply unconditionally.
8

On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyns letter.
9

On January 13, 2004, complainants counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her children,
respondent has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair the damage done to
them.
10

On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainants Comment, reiterated his willingness to
support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for the months of
March to December 2005 in the amount of P2,000.00 each.
11

On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her and
her three children that respondent had to support complainants daughter when it is not clear who the
childs father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where the paternity
of the child could be determined and not use the present administrative case to get support from
respondent.
12

On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with said office despite having
been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still connected
with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary and benefits; and that this was the first
time that they received communication concerning respondents administrative case.
13

Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties and
received salary and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for reconsideration
thus the case has not yet attained finality.
14

In view of respondents show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it just
and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years
suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension imposed
on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO YEARS suspension
effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainants further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper
case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillos record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of Justice
including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 4369 November 28, 1997
PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J .:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24,
1993
1
making it appear that some of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all three
were already dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on
August 22, 1992
2
while Leonardo P. Toledano died on November 1, 1992.
3
Edelina T. Bonilla allegedly
died on or about June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his
notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution. Satisfied with all of the above, it was only
then that he certified the document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had a complete turn-around and moved for the dismissal
of his complaint. He alleged that the instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment proceedings.
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document
is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or
any person authorized to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
4
Aside from being required
to appear before the Notary Public, it is similarly incumbent upon the person acknowledging the
instrument to declare before the same Notary Public that the execution of the instrument was done by him
of his own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale, respondent certified: "BEFORE ME, this 24th day of March,
1993 at Dumaguete City, Philippines, personally appeared . . . Jesus Bonilla; . . . Leonardo Toledano; . . .
. "
5
Respondent claims that as a Notary Public, he asked the signatories whether the signatures
appearing above their respective names were theirs, and whether they voluntarily executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In order to ascertain their identities, respondent asked for their respective residence
certificates.
Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death was not evidenced by a death certificate, respondent
certified in the acknowledgment that Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano personally appeared
before him. Respondent's acts require the presence of the vendors to be able to verify the authenticity of
their signatures, the identities of the signatories and the voluntariness of the execution of the Deed. It
defies imagination and belief how these could have happened. It would have been impossible, both
physically and legally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano to have personally subscribed and
sworn before respondent as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Sale as they had already
passed on to the Great Beyond prior to the execution of the said documents.
Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private document into a public document. By certifying the Deed,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the parties therein personally appeared before
him; (2) that they are all personally known to him; (3) that they were the same persons who executed the
instruments; (4) that he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.
6
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.
7

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties
which are dictated by public policy and, as such, impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.
8

It is for the above reason that this Court is most concerned about the explanation given by complainant
for withdrawing his complaint against respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss dated September 9, 1996,
complainant declares:
xxx xxx xxx
That he is now fully convinced that everything was in order, and that nobody was ever
prejudiced by the acts of the respondent. Herein complainant has realized that he
himself, or any other legal practitioner, would have done similarly as the respondent, if
confronted with such an urgent voluntary transaction in an emergency situation; . . . .
That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no
excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to
obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to promote
respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly disregarded the requirements and solemnities of the
Notarial Law simply to accommodate his clients. Not only did he commit an illegal act but also did so
without thinking of the possible damage or prejudice that might result from non-observance of the same.
As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under oath an instrument
fully knowing that some of the signatories thereto were long dead. This Court cannot countenance this
practice, especially coming, as it does, from respondent who formerly served as president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros Oriental Chapter, President of the Dumaguete Lions Club and
City Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed respondent had taken steps to verify the identities of the
signatories, he would have easily known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of
his former clients.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.
9
[M]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. There
being no lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior
and can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.
10

Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily required of lawyers to obey the Constitution and laws of the
land.
11
They must refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
12

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity.
13

Respondent's act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct. But this being his first
administrative offense, such should no warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct. Consequently, he is
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning
that another infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has
"good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent
1
to the practice of
law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of
grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
2

In an Affidavit-Complaint
3
dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma
T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality,
abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-
851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit
relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time
respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus
forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant pointed out that
these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and legal obligation to be
a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order
4
requiring respondent to submit
his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer
5
on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with
the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence
and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after
eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were
residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for
their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%)
of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented
her evidence, both oral and documentary,
6
to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married
7
and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that time,
respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and
sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February
20, 1980,
8
October 14, 1981
9
and August 11, 1983,
10
respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs.
11
Sometime in
1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent
had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic
helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to
the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly
told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling,
and Christian Dave,
12
all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour
13
to prove
the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women.
Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a
womanizer.
14

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however,
submitted hisComment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude
the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings
15
on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already
presented her evidence.
16
Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003.
Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss,
which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,
17
he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he
argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite
18
filed against
him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
19
the instant administrative
case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant
its Report
20
and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.
21
The IBP recommended
that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.
22
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree
23
or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.
24

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,
25
we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely:
(i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A
writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
27
They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
28

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
29

In Toledo vs. Toledo,
30
we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,
31
we ruled that abandoning
ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,
32
that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.
33
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.
34
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.


A profession, not a business



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5830 January 26, 2004
MARY D. MALECDAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PERCIVAL L. PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW P. KOLLIN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
The instant case arose when Mary D. Malecdan filed a verified Letter-Complaint dated January 19, 2001
addressed to Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, with violation
of the lawyers oath, as they "committed acts not only prejudicial to [the IBP] but are in themselves in
violation of the oath that they have sworn to uphold as [a] condition for their admission to the bar."
1

The undisputed facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On November 25, 1999, the complainant entered into a deed of sale with the Spouses Washington and
Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
71030.
2
The complainant paid P10,000 as earnest money, and P2,600,000 as the full and final payment
of the consideration of the sale. The money was received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the account
of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that
the said lot was the subject of a controversy
3
between the former owners and the Fanged Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter, through
her new counsel respondent Atty. Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order with damages
4
against the complainant, Atty. Bustamante,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Washington Fanged on December 2, 1999.
5

Eliza Fanged and the respondents thereafter caused the filing of a Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion dated December 14, 1999.
6
It was prayed, among others, that an order be issued
directing defendant PCIB to transfer the amount of P30,000 from the account of Atty. Bustamante to a
joint account in the name of respondents Atty. Kollin and Atty. Pekas by way of attorneys fees. The
complainant was not a signatory to the compromise settlement, as she was in the United States at the
time. The money was then transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for in the compromise
settlement.
The Complainants Allegations
According to the complainant, respondent Atty. Kollin knew very well that the money entrusted to him did
not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. Yet, when the complainants duly authorized representative
Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused to do so, on the
pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter. The respondent, however, admitted that the
money was in his possession.
7
The complainant further averred that:
11. The said lawyers were aware that the money in the bank which was the subject of Civil Case
No. 4580-R was the consideration for a supposed sale between me and Eliza Fanged which did
not materialize because it could not be registered aside from the fact that it is void pursuant to the
decision in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew that the money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet,
despite this knowledge, they misled the court by making it appear that all the parties agreed to
the settlement by filing the manifestation of compromise settlement with motion (Annex "G")
knowing that I was abroad and could not have given my consent thereto.
12. Worse, they made it appear that I was copy furnished of the pleading when in truth and in fact
I never received the same as I was in the United States of America. My investigation of the matter
reveals that the sister of Eliza Fanged, Veronica Buking, received the pleading for me.
13. When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me that the money was actually entrusted to
respondent Atty. Matthew Kollin.
8

The complainant also alleged that she filed the complaint against the respondents because of the latters
connivance in causing the withdrawal of the money in the bank. She pointed out that while the
manifestation of compromise settlement does not bear the signature of Atty. Kollin, paragraph (b) of the
prayer clearly shows that the amount of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint account belonging to the
respondents by way of attorneys fees.
The complainant explained that respondent Atty. Kollin, as counsel for Eliza Fanged in Civil Case No.
4580-R, prayed that the sale of the property to her (the complainant) be declared null and void.
Proceeding from this premise, then, Eliza Fanged had no right to the money in the bank; the respondents,
likewise, had no right to withdraw the amount of P30,000 to answer for their attorneys fees. She further
averred that the respondents made it appear to the trial court that she (the complainant) was duly notified
of the purported settlement, when she was, in fact, not a party thereto as evidenced by the records. Thus:
[T]he records reveal that the person who received the copy of the document purporting to cover the
settlement intended for me is the very sister of his client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of Veronica Buking.
Veronica Buking is not and was never a resident of Dagsian, Baguio City, the location of my permanent
residence. Eliza Fanged could not have thought of this scheme.
9. But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that would ensue
as a result of this scheme. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion, he asked his co-
respondent, Atty. Pekas, to sign as counsel for Eliza Fanged. Atty. Pekas seem[ed] to be too willing to
extend assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money from the bank. However, in the actual release,
and the partition of the money, the respondents reportedly actively participated to insure their share
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Atty. Pekas did not stop there. As counsel for Eliza Fanged, he signed
the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999 with a misleading statement that "the parties have
extrajudicially settled this case amicably among themselves", when in truth and in fact, I was never
consulted.
9

The Respondents Allegations
The respondents denied the foregoing allegations in their respective answers.
Respondent Atty. Kollin admitted that he knew that the money in the bank was the complainants payment
for the land purchased from the Fanged Spouses. He pointed out, however, that it was unfair to state that
his client Eliza Fanged was not entitled thereto, since in the first place, she appeared as the vendor in the
deed of sale executed between her and the complainant. Furthermore, although Civil Case No. 4528-R
had already been decided by the trial court, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
10
and did not
become final and executory as erroneously stated by the complainant. Atty. Kollin also pointed out that he
was not the original counsel of the Spouses Fanged in the said case, but merely "inherited" the same
from Atty. Artemio Bustamante.
11

The respondent further averred that because Atty. Bustamante and the Fangeds failed to settle the
problem, he filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale, and not for the release of the money in Atty.
Bustamantes possession. According to the respondent:
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she was
swindled because of the said decision. However, the only problem between Dato and Fanged is the
determination of the actual balance and the payment thereof. Settle the balance with Mrs. Dato and
everything would be settled likewise. As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue is still "SUB
JUDICE" and complainant could not even be sure of the outcome of said case, although there is a
pending proposal for the eventual settlement of the case by the payment of the unpaid balance.
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the possession of the Complainant and could transfer said title
in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the complainant is saying is that the title could be transferred in her
name, however, a "notice of lis pendens" was annotated therein due to the filing of the case between O.
Dato and the spouses Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could transfer the title in her name and take possession of the
property although the "notice of lis pendens" will be transferred or be likewise annotated in her title.
Complainant knows very well that the problem between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is the actual balance to
be paid as per the first deed of sale;
12

Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that the amount of P30,000 was transferred by Atty.
Bustamante to their account, but averred that it was done voluntarily. He denied the allegation that they
misled the court by making it appear that the parties agreed to the compromise settlement with motion,
since, as can be gleaned from the compromise agreement itself, the complainant was not a party
thereto.
13
The respondent further alleged that:
20. As best as the respondent can recall, on the late afternoon of December 12, 1999, Atty.
Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the telephone. He was requesting for respondent to
attend a hearing of his case the following day, December 13, 1999, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. This was on the pretext that he has another out of town case on the
same date and cannot attend the hearing. As it is a common practice among lawyers, respondent
acceded to the request;
21. As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special
appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only
manifest submission of the matter for resolution;

27. That after Eliza Fanged and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story, respondent asked
about the settlement being proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged then expressed her
willingness to accept the counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to settle the case in the
amount of Two Million;
28. With the new development, respondent contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin to refer
the matter but was informed that the latter is still out of town. Respondent then advised that if
Eliza Fanged is willing, he can assist her in the settlement, to which advice Eliza Fanged
acceded;
29. Respondent contacted Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing to settle and the
details of the settlement were agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation and motion was
submitted to the Honorable Court for consideration and ultimately dismissal of the case;
31. That during the whole time that respondent participated in the resolution of the case, he never
committed any act involving deceit and machination. He acted in a way which he thinks is proper

14

Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a new and
young lawyer, there was no reason for him to risk his future for a measly sum, through dishonest
conduct.
15

The Proceedings Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline
On May 7, 2002, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan issued the following Order:
When this case was called for hearing, Atty. Percival Pekas appeared. Atty. Matthew P. Kollin failed to
appear despite the notice duly served on him.
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without counsel. She manifested that she is submitting her
case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified true copies of Annex "A" attached to her complaint, the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex "B" of her complaint in favor of
Mary Malecdan and the Decision Annex "D." Complainant is given ten (10) days from today to present
true copies of her documentary evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise manifested
that after he shall have filed his rejoinder he submits this case for resolution.
16

In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated that he acted in good faith, and did not commit any act
of deceit or machination. He also averred that Atty. Artemio Bustamante would have been a great help in
determining the truth, but unfortunately, the complainant chose not to implead him.
17

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-395, finding respondent
Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to respondent Atty. Pekas,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Atty. Matthew P. Kollins dishonesty to the
court with resulting damage and prejudice to the complainant, Respondent Atty. Kollins (sic) is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. The complaint against Atty. Pekas is
DISMISSED for there is no evidence on record to prove that he was aware of the defect in Eliza
Fange[d]s right to claim the sales proceeds with a WARNING that Atty. Pekas should be more
circumspect with respect to taking over other lawyers cases and handling sensitive matters such as the
compromise settlement in Civil Case No. 4580-R.
According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juans Report dated May 30, 2002, the main issue to be
resolved in the case was factual in nature: whether or not the respondents knowingly caused the
withdrawal from the bank of the purchase price of the lot in question, despite their knowledge of a defect
in their clients right to claim the said amount. The Commission found that respondent Atty. Kollin knew
that his clients title was defective, having represented her in Civil Case No. 4528-R. He should have
been mindful that his client had no right over the purchase price as paid by the
complainant.1wphi1 Respondent Atty. Pekas was, however, exonerated of the charges against him,
thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it should be noted that there is no evidence on record to
prove that respondent Atty. Pekas was aware of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim [t]he sales
proceeds. It is likely that respondent Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the hands of respondent Atty.
Kolin when he signed said Manifestation of Compromise Settlement.
18

In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent Atty.
Kollin alleged that contrary to the finding of the Commission, he was unaware of the defect in his clients
(Eliza Fangeds) right to claim the sales proceeds. He filed the case for nullification of contract with prayer
for the rescission of the sale between the complainant and his client on the ground that the latter would
be disadvantaged if Atty. Bustamante succeeded in taking a huge chunk of the money deposited in his
name. According to the respondent, if he was, indeed, interested in the money, he could have filed a case
to compel Atty. Bustamante to release the money to his client, and not a complaint for rescission of
contract. The respondent also reiterated that the reason why he requested respondent Atty. Pekas to
attend the hearing of the case as collaborating counsel was that he attended a hearing in Bontoc, Mt.
Province on December 14, 2002.
19

According to the respondent, the complainant should have filed the instant case against Atty. Bustamante
who was "the real architect in the release of the money and the execution of the compromise settlement
with motion." The complainant should have also questioned the order of the RTC judge concerned as to
why no notice was issued to her before the money was released.
The Ruling of the Court
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice of
law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service.
20
The practice of law is a profession and not
a money-making trade.
21
As they are an indispensable part of the system of administering justice,
attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics a duty more
than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice
of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor
in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not
synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.
22

Respondent Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. He admitted this
much in the complaint he himself prepared in Civil Case No. 4580-R, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
I. BEFORE HEARING:
1. That it orders (sic) the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the manager
of the PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch, through its branch manager, Oscar
Aquino, to cease and desist from allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount
of P2,450,000.00 deposit in his account;
II. DURING HEARING:
1. That it orders the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendant
PCIBank or its agents from disbursing or allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the
amount of P2,450,000.00 deposited in his account;
III. AFTER HEARING:
1. To order defendants Atty. Artemio Bustamante and the PCIBank, Session Rd., Baguio
City branch, to release the amount of P2,450,000.00 in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic);
2. To order defendant Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees;
3. To order that the deed of sale executed between the Spouses Washington Fanged
and Eliza Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic) be declared null and void;
4. To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release the original owners copy of title no. T-
71030 of the registry of deeds of Baguio City to the complainant;
23

Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the reason why the prayer in the complaint included the
release of the money in favor of the complainant was that "his client realized that P600,000 would be too
much to be given to Atty. Bustamante as attorneys fees." The respondent is bound by this assertion in
his pleading,
24
which, as can reasonably be inferred, was made because he himself believed that his
client was not entitled to the money in question. The respondent cannot, likewise, find refuge in the fact
that his signature did not appear in the compromise agreement executed between the parties. As found
by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
[A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who signed the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with
Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is unbelievable that respondent Atty. Pekas would dare to sign said
Manifestation without the approval or consent of respondent Atty. Kollin, the counsel of record of Eliza
Fanged. As respondent Atty. Pekas himself stated his authority with respect to Civil Case No. 4580-R was
limited as follows: "As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a
special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only
manifest submission of the matter for resolution." If as respondent Atty. Pekas claims he was only
authorized by respondent Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R, why did he exceed
such authority by executing the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of Eliza Fanged,
respondent Atty. Kollins client?
The most plausible explanation in this matter is that respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized respondent
Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of his (respondent Atty.
Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order to pave the way for the release of the sales proceeds. This maneuver
was resorted to by the respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any responsibility for securing the release
of the sales proceeds to his client despite his knowledge that his client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto.
By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement, it was the intention
of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such pleading and claim no responsibility or
participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by his apparent knowledge of the defect in
Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client
Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured the release of the sales proceeds to the detriment
and prejudice of herein complainant.
25

Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in good faith
as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin, merely authorized him to attend the December 2, 1999 hearing of
Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas, in entering into a compromise agreement, overstepped the authority
he was purportedly given. He was only authorized "to manifest submission of the matter for resolution."
Furthermore, respondent Atty. Pekas himself claimed that the complainant could not question the
compromise agreement as she was not a party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus, knew that there was no valid
compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was absent at the time it was entered into. He
knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant, since the signatory to the notice of the
manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking.
26

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
27
A lawyer is expected, at all times, to
uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Whenever it is made to appear that a lawyer is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court
which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar to withdraw the
privilege.
28

A lawyer may legally apply a clients funds in his possession to satisfy professional fees which the client
owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amount thereof.
29
However, the fact that
a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the clients money in his possession or the circumstance that the client
owes him more than the clients funds in his hands may not excuse him from making an accounting nor
entitle him to unilaterally apply the clients money to satisfy his disputed claims.
30
In this case, the amount
of P30,000 which the respondents took for themselves as attorneys fees belonged to a third person, not
their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the
possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of
contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Thus,
the respondents could not, without a claiming partys knowledge, apply the amount of P30,000 for
themselves as attorneys fees. If there was someone liable for the respondents attorneys fees, it was
their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real "compromise" as to the manner in which
the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not present when the said
agreement was made.1wphi1
In the recent case of Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty. Michael
Dioneda,
31
we had the occasion to state, thus:
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter
disregard of their lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
32

An attorneys only safe guide is high moral principle, as the torch to light his way; his best shield is a clear
conscience and an unblemished personal record; and his just reward is to find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and
loyal citizen.
33
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique
position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and
confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only on the individual lawyer but also in the legal
profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to, at all times,
maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.
34

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Matthew P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years. Atty. Percival L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the
client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement
alleging the following:
"x x x x x x x x x
"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero
Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim
and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter
and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that
I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary
complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as
Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but
there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he
would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked;
and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not
yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building
at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor
at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes
with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of
Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of
the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of
my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee
for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
x x x x x x x x x.
1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,
2
respondent filed his Answer
3
vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being
totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the
former's law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against
Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the
business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter --
this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter
to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a
compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent
to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a
complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until
this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted
to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on
installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that
it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called
the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before
the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for
two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent
refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their
office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by
complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone
had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was
for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent
of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his
offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year."
4

The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint
on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the
former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by
complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense
of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests
of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of
the community for the legal profession.
5
Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.
6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is
not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.
7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees.
8
Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadreof a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to
complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had
agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the
client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not
neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
9
They owe
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's
rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld
from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant
on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the
office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating
payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one --
respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in
calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct
purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.
11
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.
12
The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration.
13
Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may
be attained without making much money.
14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued
by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful
in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
15
Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties
that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
16
It may be true that they have a lien upon
the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such
funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve
them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.
17
In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within
the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
18
Respondent fell
short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and
thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate
him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

REGALADO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-
08268
1
affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil
Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay its
attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the amount of
P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.
The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the above-
mentioned civil cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX
AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner.
2
The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of
sale, with damages.
The antecedental facts
3
which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder set
forth as found by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A certain
Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area
of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to
secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors
having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were issued by the
provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits against
Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.
It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister
corporation, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On
the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation
for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby mortgaged the
same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that private respondent, did
not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed
an urgent motion for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August
16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed
to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the,
Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and
were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein,
which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On December
29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of private
respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to 453099 of
the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit,
which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner
manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of
P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance,
including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private
respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent court,
granting payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (METROBANK) and Herby Commercial and Construction
Corporation
4
are hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and Associates the
amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these
cases.
5

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on February
11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was
denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.
The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1)
whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and
(3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties on aquantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in
the civil cases before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the
words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of
such judgments.
6

We agree with petitioner.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in
a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of
his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien
and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right
to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were
rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
7

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the
frill satisfaction of their claims."
8
The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made
any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This
being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is
flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an
ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.
In point is Morente vs. Firmalino,
9
cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movant-
appellant attorney sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for
injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by the
litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant for damages.
It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the defendant, herein
appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by appropriate action, collect
his fees as attorney.
Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of
whatever nature,"
10
relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares
11
and some
American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the proceeds
in whatever form they may be.
12

The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American
cases holding that the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on which
they are based and the factual situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said that
they are of continuing validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that legal
concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances upon adoption by other
jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly
declares that "in the absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule
is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to
the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his client thereto, recovered
title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully such client's right and title
against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack,"
13
as is the situation in the case at bar. This is an
inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in doctrinal
rulings of converse or modulated import.
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to
judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec
verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation.
14

Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law
despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al.,
15
the
Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil
vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al.,
16
the Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands
vs. Ababa, et al.,
17
we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for
delivery of real property as in the instant case."
Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent, there
was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in litigation."
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the adverse
party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not extend to land
which is the subject matter of the litigation.
18
More specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery
against his client as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and
the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to property already in the
client's
possession.
19

While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the
services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising his
action,
20
this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the
instance of private respondent's client but of the opposing party.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply
demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.
Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within
the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is
settled.
21
There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to determine
attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated.
22
These decisional rules, however,
apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the
authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action,
has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The persons who
are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their
propriety or amount.
23
Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter
in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the
lawyer.
24
These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of
decisions as pointed out by respondent court.
25
A determination of all these factors would indispensably
require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence to establish its
right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.
Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on private
respondent in collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of any other
right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules duly
observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be misunderstood to
be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation.
26

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court
of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to
establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
SO ORDERED.





G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J .:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than
not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure
questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy,
wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased into
a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the
petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
located in Quezon City.
1
Between 1977 and 1978,
2
he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following
his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to
enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief.
He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight,
the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private
respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with
interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to
attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court
3
approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself
concede
4
for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the
sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner
moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does
not appear that the sum was actually collected.
5

Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the
other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored"
6
him to redeem the said
properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the
money,"
7
provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage"
8
over the
properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are
inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to
redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent
alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market
project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already
registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been
falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee,
L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the
Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679 ...
9

whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . .
10

As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted
both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later,
a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment proceedings
before this Court against the petitioner
11
as well as various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification,
and "betrayal of trust"
12
with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an
action for reconveyance and reformation of document,
13
praying that the certificates of title issued in the
name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of
Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage."
14
He vehemently maintains that the
petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so
that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put
up on said property."
15
Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained of
did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights"
16
"to protect
and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;"
17
secondly, that the
petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of
Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right;
thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem
them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to
have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite,
since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality.
The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment
18
in
the respondent Court of Appeals,
19
praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over
the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order
directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December
8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying the
motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration.
20

Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure. Specifically,
he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF
TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G.
R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE
BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION.
21

The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari,"
22
disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged
legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed
orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the
nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have
had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained
inMacabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation :
23

xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that
can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as
extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of
the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent.
24

A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas
correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it.
Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the
proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court
will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions
and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent designs,
postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty.
Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did
not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the
questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest
petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to
conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan."
25
) Aside from being plain speculation, it is
no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in
law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal
26
and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ.
27
In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed.
28
In
the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance
of [a] [restraining] order. . ."
29
) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular
execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his
lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy
about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his
lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code
...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts.
30
The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely of the
bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot
overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of
procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all,
have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding."
31
If procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy."
32
It was almost eight
decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is,
rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits,
unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ...
33

It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity
was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties
and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment,"
34
a development
that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and
above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity
... to [his] clients."
35
The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice,
eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are
not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money."
36

It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at
the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births
are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which
enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for
which it is subject to State regulation.
37
Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules,
provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not
believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in
Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a
gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would
have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The
fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a
measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the
petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested
upon redemptioners.
38
To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction
of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less
the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not
make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To
this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas'
"legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed subsequently
on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court."
39
Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It
did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements"
40
due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the
issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find
this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can
indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private
respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us
beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he
had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of
the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the new
owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment."
41
To say that he did not
profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not
prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent sign
the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared
document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the
properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the
private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence
and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly
implored"
42
him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that
have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter
himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion that in
ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall the total loss of the
parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them
therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the
petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be
paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise Agreement,"
43
and if his sole
concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture
of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot
dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties.
44

But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted,
provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem"
45
the
properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer
"any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem,"
46
in his favor. He admits having entered
the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the questioned deed
with the Register of Deeds"
47
and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge
Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges.
48
To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an
alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed, why was it
necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of
adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it we
condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood"
49

This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to
the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state
as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them,
unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof,
or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of
which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government
experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller,
50
we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of
the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa
51
however, we said that the
prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment,
so that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been agreed
upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over
the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales.
52
It is noteworthy that in this
case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the
private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution
on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale
agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in
such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But
like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence,
53
which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value.
54

For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed.
While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his
petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been
conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty.
Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas
monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability for
payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at
the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate
debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private
respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the
redemption price of the properties,
55
in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We
order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he
earned from the resale thereof,
56
such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in
the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the
petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the
highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the
inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general
policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we
have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise
stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to
have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases
we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration
ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent
and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good
conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on
the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera,
the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for
violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.

May not be restricted
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat
of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent,
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of
patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . .
that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office
which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which
similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has
also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No.
165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests
or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we
have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines
1
and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing
In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says
that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines
or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs,
legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent.
Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for
such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a
patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for
a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day
the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not
being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being
met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a
license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use
of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of
a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws,
legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which
a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the
Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is
the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial
function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law,
but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,
the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way
that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that
which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions
of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept
in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to
represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for
patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills
the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice
before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
x x x x x x x x x
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that
the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either
of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and
repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and
an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the
examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons
representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons,
agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons,
that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation
or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of
Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in
any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to
be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the
said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word,
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so
refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of
Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78,
Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within
the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code.
Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that
the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand
that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to
enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may
not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on
behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.


G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.
Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.
FERIA, J .:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the
respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine
Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from
the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to
which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the
Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the
Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be
financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office.
He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case
wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in
any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office. . . ..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in
the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the
General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted
provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in
any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because,
in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both
a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the
subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American
Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,
*
43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold
that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is
that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
"review on appealcertiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments
of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as
provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon
Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no
relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is
a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal.
As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the
absence of special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of
evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of
its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an the accused "without partiality,
favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its
"conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the
words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice.
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the
same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any
other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to
officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited
to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United
States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have
in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled
to as untrammeled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has
the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the
statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision
extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-
martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial
has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to
practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev.
115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by
the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the
character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty
must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles
of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106, of the
Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for
the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and
pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the
accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is
strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a
debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a
civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt.
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some
meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte
Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74;
Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol.
10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not
an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution
of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U.
S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgment of a
civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting our decision to the
above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for
the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime
of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be
subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution
in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not
more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts,
because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem
lex.
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the
respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions
formandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.

Reserved for lawyers
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint
1
dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez
charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The
complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken
advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their
counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their
authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte,
to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July
1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed
the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing
the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were
denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation
thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation
2
dated 21 June 1988.
In as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General
presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P
4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants'
Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said Real Estate Mortgage document,
however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was
P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said
document was a mere formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the
same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public
for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent.
Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as
payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months:
September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial
reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a
new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18,
records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated
August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P
10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate
Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing
him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay
their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new
contract to complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again
upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive
of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres
again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document
was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate
Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their
lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent
on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate
mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No.
3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by
respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979,
respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979
(see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case),
and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate
Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot
had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the
same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of
P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation,
hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed
from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a
sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total
indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's
own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their
hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October
5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears
on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan
of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the
truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to
complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that
he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to]
complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent
for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document.
Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from
the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that
the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April
1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original
loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the
conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in question was in
accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has
violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against
respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of
P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing
in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that
not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the
first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10%
monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November
30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of
the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six
(6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00
complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals
P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the
first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate
Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore,
there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the
terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following
cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the
pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes
wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages
covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when
the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made
the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of
the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties,
applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants
were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent
representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are
formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer,
should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of
the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants'
attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it
may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that
most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Respondent at least could
have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their
obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their
contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that
complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to
him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In
this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976,
considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not
enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation
of respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months
(December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and
that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free
from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was
free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate
Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00)
had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as
payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted
the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a
difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple
reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the
mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the
payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own
computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants
or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the
present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At
the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the
respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the
complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the
complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar,
complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity
between the status of the complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in
a better position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned,
complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done
to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the
version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the
respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the
complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample
evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money
at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but
common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their
counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused
Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their consent and
received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement,
without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said
settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with
the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo
Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage,
relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent,
as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely
interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to
accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of
P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried by the accused
Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34,
record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment,
perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00
before turning over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to
respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money
was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had
already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what
happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00
offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused
Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to
respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.)
showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion
before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their
counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in
testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from
Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed
that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case
wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the
accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal
issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by
the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the
accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged
by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as
advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by
the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for
the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount
was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as
their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really
true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement
they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they
resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private
prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the
respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended.
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859).
The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves, regardless
of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of
Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did
not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they
admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to
have them explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality.
Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status
of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost
to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis
supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.
3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6)
actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings
4
While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40)
resettings
5
were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants
presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel
for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined.
Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been
pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a
change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective
position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate
sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary
exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and
affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987,
which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the
complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the
hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having
been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the
complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-
submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right
to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been
violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses
which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the
proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to,
but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt
on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty
three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and
fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement
and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel
would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's)
right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17
December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to
confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to
complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan
extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and
inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for
purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before
effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage
had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed
property within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of
whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of
course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo
Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a
compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and
approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance
payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover,
did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa
case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed
complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner
Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did turn over to
complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without
special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim,
but the full amount in cash.
6
Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by
accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in
dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or
non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so
patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must
suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys.
7
The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on
the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar,
which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in
his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered
together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to
the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken
from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and
spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.


VI. Bar Examinations and Latest Updates
VII. Law Students Practice
VIII. Duties and Privileges of a Lawyer
IX. Continuing Legal Ed (MCLE)
X. IBP (In Re: Integration, right?)
XI. Selected cases on the code of professional responsibility