1

Foithcoming in !"#$%#$& ($) !(*%#$& (+,-. /,."#$&0 Nanuel uaicia-Caipinteio & uenoveva Naiti
(eus.) 0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess

The Things We Bo With Empty Names:
0bjectual Repiesentations, Non-veiiuical Language uames, anu Tiuth Similituue
Kenneth A. Tayloi
Stanfoiu 0niveisity

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Sentences appaiently about things that uo not exist, anu the thoughts we
expiess using them, have long beuevileu the philosophical imagination. Fiege
(1979), foi example, giuugingly aumits that we can think thoughts appaiently
about Santa Claus oi Pegasus, but in neaily the next bieath he uismisses such
thoughts as meiely "mock thoughts. " Be allows that sentences containing empty
names may have a place in fiction, wheie, by his lights, we aie conceineu only with
the emotions that oui woius anu thoughts may aiouse iathei than with theii
contents. But he insists that such uefective sentences anu the mock thoughts they
expiess can have no legitimate place in science oi in logic -- wheie oui concein is
not with meie emotional iesonance, but with genuine tiuth anu falsity. In a similai
vein, anu out of feai of otheiwise lanuing in contiauiction, Russell (19uS) felt
himself compelleu to insist that sentences that supeificially appeai to contain empty
piopei names, anu thus to make putative iefeience to things which uon't exist, in
fact contain no such names at all anu puipoit to make no such iefeience at all.
Rathei, expiessions like 'Santa Claus' oi 'Pegasus' tuin out to be giammatical
illusions on his view. When we subject sentences containing such appaiently
iefeiiing expiessions to iigoious logical analysis, they simply uisappeai anu uo not
2
show up as piopei logical constituents of the sentences in which they may appeai to
occui. Noi, piesumably, uoes any piopei innei thought constituent coiiesponu to a
putatively empty name. With the uisappeaiance of putatively empty names fiom
the tiue logical giammai of thought anu language, we aie saveu fiom both
contiauiction anu Neinongian ontological piofligacy.
To be suie, theie aie anu have long been philosopheis who quite openly anu
eageily embiace the non-existent. The afoiementioneu Neinong (196u) is one
piominent example. Be aigueu that expiessions like the 'The iounu squaie' oi 'The
goluen mountain" ieally uo uenote objects. It is just that the objects that such
expiessions uenote uo not exist.
1
To be suie, though he conceues that neithei the
goluen mountain noi the iounu squaie "exists" in the full-blooueu sense of that
woiu, he insisteu that they uo enjoy theii own veiy special moue of being - what he
calleu "subsistence." Neinong's teachei, Bientano (199S), seems, on at least one
ieauing of his woik, to have gone Neinong one step faithei. So impiesseu was
Bientano with the minu's ability to achieve what he calleu uiiecteuness upon an
object - anu this, even in the absence of any inuepenuently ieal existents -- that he
enuoiseu not just that view that 1,23 of the objects of thought aie meiely
"immanent" objects (as he calleu them) existing foi thought alone, but the stiongei
anu moie staitling claim that 34356 object of thought has a "meiely" immanent
existence as an object foi thought alone anu has no existence whatsoevei "outsiue"
of thought. Inueeu, he takes ielateuness to a meiely immanent, anu thus
intentionally inexistent, object to be the veiy essence of thought.
2

S
Now I take the both the squeamishness of Fiege anu Russell about the non-
existent anu Bientano anu Neinong's open embiace of the non-existent each to be
iooteu in an enuuiing anu iespectable philosophical pioclivities. Anu though they
may appeai to be iiieconcilable pioclivities between which one may feel compelleu
to choose, I shall aigue in this essay that theie is something half iight anu half
wiong both about Fiege's anu Russell's squeamishness about thoughts about
appaiently non-existing objects, on the one hanu, anu about Bientano's insistent
that the objects of thought aie one anu all "intentionally inexistent" objects foi
thought alone, on the othei. I shall give less quaitei to Neinong's view that the non-
existent enjoys a uistinctive moue of being - though even the steaufast Neinongian
may finu himself taking a tiny bit of solace fiom my appioach. I shall suggest that
any auequate account of the contents of oui thought anu talk, incluuing both oui
thought anu talk about ieal existents as well as oui thought anu talk about the non-
existent, must pay uue iespect both to the squeamishness of Fiege anu Russell anu
to Bientano's insistence.
To that enu, I uevelop anu ueploy a tiio of inteilocking uistinctions: (1)
between meiely objectual anu a fully objective linguistic iepiesentations; (2)
between non-veiiuical anu veiiuical language -thought games; anu (S) between
tiuth similituue anu flat-out oi stiict, liteial tiuth. I shall aigue that empty names
aie meiely objectual iepiesentations iathei than fully objective iepiesentations,
that we play many non-veiiuical language-thought games with such
iepiesentations, anu that while moves in such games uo not enjoy stiict liteial tiuth
oi falsity, they often uo enjoy tiuth-similituue. Ny tiio of uistinctions is essential foi
4
a piopei unueistanuing of both the piagmatic anu cognitive significance of the
many things we uo with empty names. Foi want of oui uistinctions, Russell was
tempteu by the mistaken conclusion that non-iefeiiing names aie not names at all;
Bientano was luieu into uenying the minu's ability to make any contact at all with
inuepenuently ieal existents anu iuealist moie geneially aie leau into thinking that
objects aie nothing but the shauows cast by ceitain soits of iepiesentations; anu
Platonists aie misleu into positing a iealm of fiee-stanuing mathematical objects
whose natuie is somehow entiiely inuepenuent of oui uoings. None of these views
is foiceu on us, I think. Anu none can be sustaineu. But the way to see this, I shall
aigue, is to fully embiace my inteilocking tiio.
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We begin by focusing on names explicitly uiawn fiom fiction. Consiuei, foi
example, the following thiee sentences:
(1) Bamlet was the toimenteu piince of Benmaik.
(2) Bamlet is the main chaiactei in Bamlet.
(S) At least Piince Chailes has fewei ieasons to be uepiesseu than
Bamlet uiu.
Theie is ceitainly an intuitive sense in which each of (1) - (S) is, if not stiictly
liteially tiue, then at least coiiectly asseitable. A goou theoiy of fictional uiscouise
ought to explain what, if anything, we aie asseiting when we asseit any of (1) - (S).
Anu it ought to explain what the "coiiectness" of such an asseition coulu plausibly
consist in.
S
I have quite uelibeiately phiaseu oui initial quanuaiy about (1) - (S) so as to
allow foi the possibility that liteial tiuth anu falsity is not at issue with iespect to
(1) - (S). That is, I want to leave open the possibility that theie is a piincipleu
uistinction between what makes foi the 73*. 8,5538. (1135.(+#*#.6 of (1) - (S) anu
what, if anything, woulu make foi the 1.5#8.0 *#.35(* .5-." of (1) - (S). No uoubt, some
will insist to the contiaiy that we obviously have a uiiect intuition of tiuth anu
falsity in such cases. I take no such thing to be obvious. But I uo conceue that unless
we aie piepaieu to make some uistinctions - in paiticulai, the thiee uistinctions I
intiouuce anu uevelop in this essay - one may finu it uifficult to iesist the
supeificially tempting infeience fiom the felt coiiect asseitabiliy of (1) - (S) to the
conclusion that (1) - (S) aie in some sense "tiue." But in fact, once we aie aimeu
with my tiio, we will be in a position to appieciate that theie is nothing in which
the liteial tiuth oi falsity of an utteiance of any of (1) - (S) coulu possibly consist in.
Taken stiictly anu liteially, (1) - (S) stake out no ueteiminate claims about how the
woilu stanus. As such, they aie simply not the kinus of things foi which the
question of stiict, liteial tiuth oi falsity even aiises.
This last claim will stiike some as intuitively jaiiing. But the negative thesis
that sentences like (1) - (S) expiess no fully ueteiminate piopositions, anu thus aie
not ueteiminately eithei tiue of false, is a moie oi less uiiect consequence of a paii
of fuithei theses -- one metaphysical anu one semantic -- each of which is
inuepenuently plausible anu fully uefensible without appeal to the tiio of
uistinctions I uevelop anu uefenu in this essay. The semantic thesis I have in minu is
iefeientialism - viz., the thesis that a name contiibutes nothing but its iefeient to
6
the pioposition expiesseu by any sentence in which the name occuis. The
metaphysical thesis I have in minu is the thesis that theie aie no non-existent oi
fictional objects.
S

4

Now I acknowleuge that when one cieates a woik of fiction, one uoes theieby
ushei at least one new object - the woik of fiction itself - into existence. The woik
is something bianu new unuei the sun. But a woik of fiction is what I call a meiely
seconuaiy existent.
S
To a fiist appioximation, a seconuaiy existent is a minu-
uepenuent entity that exist because we take it to exist anu because in the taking we
confei a ceitain status upon it. Seconuaiy existents uo not come to be ex nihilo.
Beneath all seconuaiy existents, theie must ultimately sit ceitain moie piimaiy
existents. At least ielatively speaking, these moie piimaiy existents will count as
pieconfiguieu anu pieexisting. Neithei novels noi nations noi tables anu chaiis
float entiiely fiee of collections of moie piimaiy existents. In oiuei foi nations to
exist, theie must alieauy be people. In oiuei foi tables anu chaiis to exist theie
must alieauy exist the ielatively iaw mateiials out of which tables anu chaiis aie
ultimately maue. It is thiough, anu only thiough what we might call conceptual anu
noimative uptake of anteceuently obtaining configuiations of moie piimaiy
existents that the minu is able to ushei moie seconuaiy existents into being. This
last point is absolutely ciucial howevei. The baie existence of moie piimaiy
iealities is necessaiy, but not sufficient foi the existence of seconuaiy iealities.
Absent the powei of the minu to confei status upon configuiations of moie piimaiy
existents thiough the ueployment of ceitain concepts, configuiations of moie
piimaiy existents still woulu not constitute seconuaiy existents of the ielevant soit.
7
Theie woulu be no tables, nations oi novels, without theie being minus aiounu to
.(%3 ceitain configuiations of moie piimaiy existents (1 tables, nations, oi novels.
By taking a configuiation of moie piimaiy existents as a table oi a nation oi a novel
we theieby make the ielevant configuiation of piimaiy existents constitute a
seconuaiy existent. When it comes to seconuaiy existents, oui concepts neithei fit
noi fail to fit anteceuently existing iealities. Rathei, oui concepts pieceue anu
make possible seconuaiy existents which fall unuei those veiy concepts. We
conceive of the possibility of a novel anu we set about to so aiiange the woilu that
ceitain configuiations of piimaiy existents count as novels.
Seconuaiy existents come in a wiue vaiiety of kinus. The social woilu in
paiticulai is ieplete them. Since oui ielative ontological peimissiveness about
seconuaiy existents may appeai to make it an easy step fiom gianting existence to
seconuaiy entities like novels to gianting existence to the fictional chaiacteis on
whose uoings a novel iepoits. Anu that might leau one to concluue that names in
fiction aie not expiessions which fail to iefei, aftei all. Names in fiction, one might
suppose, uenote fictional chaiacteis, which aie themselves a kinu of ieal, though
meiely seconuaiy existent. If so, then fictional statements containing fictional
names might well be thought to be liteially tiue oi false as long as they coiiectly
iepoit on the fictional uoings of such fictional chaiacteis.
I ueny both paits of this thought, howevei. Fiist, I ueny the existence of
fictional chaiacteis. Seconuaiily, I claim that even if we weie to allow fictional
chaiacteis a kinu of existence as seconuaiy entities, it woulu not follow that
8
fictional names ipso facto 53735 to such entities. Consiuei fiist the question of
existence. Whatevei fictional chaiacteis aie oi aie not, they aie cleaily not piimaiy
existents. Now my iesistance to allowing them stanuing as ueiivative, minu-
uepenuent, but still ieal, if only seconuaiy entities is, I aumit, uue paitly to a
hankeiing foi if not exactly ueseit lanuscapes, then at least spaisely populateu ones.
But the ueepei souice is that I can finu no positive basis foi positing an ontology of
fictional objects in the fiist place. Theie is nothing about fictional uiscouise that
neeus explaining that the positing of fictional objects woulu help us to explain. 0i
so I shall aigue below.
6

If theie aie no genuine objects foi fictional names to iefei to anu if all a name
evei contiibutes to ueteimining eithei the pioposition expiesseu by oi the tiuth
conuitions anuoi tiuth values of sentences in which it occuis is the object foi which
it stanus, then it follows uiiectly that when theie is nothing foi a name to iefei to,
theie is no pioposition foi a sentence containing that name to expiess.
7
Explaining
how sentences containing empty oi non-iefeiiing names can, nonetheless, be
"coiiectly asseitable" -- typically in the context of some non-veiiuical language
game -- anu also how such sentences can enjoy a kinu of cognitive significance --
uespite the fact that they fail to expiess ueteiminate piopositions anu thus fail to be
even the kinu of thing foi which tiuth oi falsity meaningfully aiises -- is the main
buiuen of much of the iemainuei of this essay.
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9
I begin with the uistinction between what I call fully objective anu what I call
meiely objectual iepiesentations. Because I have uiscusseu this uistinction in a
numbei of othei places, I will emphasize heie some points that beai most uiiectly
on unueistanuing the behavioi of empty names in the context of non-veiiuical
language-thought games.
8
By a fully objective iepiesentation, I mean one that, as it
weie, ieaches all the way out to ieal existents, to ieal piopeities anu objects. When
a singulai iepiesentation is fully objective, it 537351 to a ieal object. When a
pieuicate is fully objective it 39:531131 a ieal piopeity. A meiely objectual
iepiesentation, by contiast, is one that although "fit" oi "ieauy" foi the job of
stanuing foi a ieal existent oi expiessing a ieal piopeity, nonetheless uoes not
succeeu in uoing so. I will sometimes say that objectual iepiesentations aie
iefeientially fit anu that fully objective iepiesentations aie iefeientially successful.
Now a iepiesentation can be simultaneously both objectual anu objective -- that is,
both iefeientially fit anu iefeientially successful. Inueeu, I aigue at length
elsewheie that iefeiential fitness is a pieconuition foi iefeiential success.
9
Beie I
am less conceineu with saying what has to be auueu to meie fitness to achieve
success. I am insteau focuseu on the things we uo with expiessions that aie
iefeientially fit, but not iefeientially successful. The class of iefeientially fit, but
iefeientially unsuccessful singulai teims is the class of empty oi non-iefeiiing
singulai teims. The fiist thing to stiess is that meiely fit singulai iepiesentations
aie still, in one sense, fully singulai.
1u
They aie fully singulai in the sense that they
still enjoy, in viitue of theii innei stiuctuial ioles, singulai iefeiential puipoit. It is
just that they puipoit to iefei without succeeuing in so uoing. 0nueistanuing this
1u
fact is ciucial to unueistanuing the piagmatic anu cognitive significance of the many
things we uo with empty names.
0n my view, theie is a complex ielationship between the factois that ienuei
a iepiesentation objectual, oi iefeientially fit, anu the factois that ienuei a
iepiesentation fully objective, oi iefeientially successful. I have alieauy suggesteu -
though I will not aigue the point in uetail heie - that iefeiential fitness is a pie-
conuition foi iefeiential success. Noie ciucially foi oui cuiient puiposes is the fact
that the factois that ienuei a iepiesentation iefeientially fit aie funuamentally
uiffeient in kinu fiom the factois that ienuei a iepiesentation iefeientially
successful. 0bjectuality, oi iefeiential fitness, is constituteu by factois lying
entiiely on the siue of the cognizing subject. These factois aie bioauly syntactic,
iole-oiienteu anu inteinal. To a fiist appioximation, expiessions aie fit foi the job of
stanuing foi an object, when they can well-foimeuly flank the iuentity sign, can well-
foimeuly occupy the aigument places of veibs, can well-foimeuly seive as links of
vaiious soits in anaphoiic chains of vaiious soits, anu can well foimeuly figuie as
piemises in substitution infeiences of vaiious kinus. Refeiential success, on the
othei hanu, iequiies something moie, something not lying entiiely on the siue of the
subject. It iequiies that alieauy fit expiessions be, as it weie, bounu uown to outei
objects. This happens, I claim, via the inteiaction of alieauy iefeientially fit
expiessions with ceitain extia-iepiesentational causal anu infoimational factois
lying by anu laige outsiue of the thinking subject.
11
I stiess that it takes the full #$.35(8.#,$ of these two sets of factois to make
genuine iefeience to objects happen. In the case of empty names -- incluuing
fictional names -- we have one set of factois - the fitness making ones -- without
the othei - the extia-iepiesentational causal anu infoimational ones. Neithei the
fitness making factois noi the extia-iepiesentational causal factois aie sufficient on
theii own foi genuine iefeience. In the absence of extia-iepiesentational,
causalinfoimational connections to objects anu events in the woilu, the fitness-
making factois still yielu the foim of thought as of objects. But absent the extia-
iepiesentational causal factois, oui thoughts make no semantic contact with any
ieal existents anu aie uevoiu of full-blown piopositional content. 0n the othei hanu,
absent the inteinal fitness making factois, causal connections to objects anu events
in the woilu aie nothing but semantically ineit to'ing anu fio'ing. The woilu is
awash in infoimation, flowing eveiy which way. But only in veiy special coineis of
the univeise uoes the flow of infoimation give iise to iefeience anu to singulai
thought. Successful iefeience is the woik of a uistinctive kinu of thing -linguistic
anu mental iepiesentations that enjoy a ceitain anteceuent ieauiness to iefei.
Now I have claimeu that iefeiential fitness, oi objectuality, is ueteimineu
meiely on the siue of the cognizing subject by factois that aie iole-oiienteu,
syntactic anu inteinal. Among othei things, this implies that iefeiential fitness is a
piopeity that holus of inteilocking systems of iepiesentations. It is not a piopeity
that acciues to iepiesentations taken in isolation fiom one anothei. No isolateu
iepiesentation, all on its own anu inuepenuently of its connection to othei
iepiesentations, can be "fit" foi the job of stanuing foi an object. No expiession has
12
stanuing as a name, foi example, except in viitue of playing the iight kinu of
stiuctuial iole in a system of inteilocking linguistic iepiesentations. Noieovei, it
also follows that if iefeiential fitness is a pieconuition of iefeiential success, then no
object can be successfully uesignateu except by an expiession that alieauy occupies
a iole in a system of inteilocking iepiesentations. This fact captuies the sole, but
impoitant giain of tiuth in the otheiwise misbegotten uoctiine of holism anu in
Wittgenstein's pithy but opaque iemaik that nothing has so fai been uone when a
thing has meiely been nameu.
11

The class of iefeientially fit expiessions contains a vaiiety of uiffeient kinus
of expiessions, with a vaiiety of uiffeient foimal piopeities.
12
I have aigueu at
length in a numbei of places that failuie to attenu to ceitain meiely foimal, iole-
oiienteu piopeities of the class of iefeientially fit expiessions has leu to much
piematuie anu misbegotten semantic theoiizing.
1S
Consiuei the categoiy NANE.
Fiom a foimal oi stiuctuial point of view, names aie, on my view, a peculiai soit of
anaphoiic uevice. If N is a name, then any two tokens of N aie guaianteeu, in viitue
of the piinciples of the language, to be co-iefeiential. Co-typical name tokens may
be saiu to be explicitly co-iefeiential. Explicit co-iefeience must be shaiply
uistinguisheu fiom coinciuental co-iefeience. Two name tokens that aie not co-
typical can iefei to the same object, anu thus be co-iefeiential, without being
explicitly co-iefeiential. Tokens of 'Bespeius' anu tokens of 'Phosphoius' one anu
all co-iefei. But 'Bespeius' is not explicitly co-iefeiential with 'Phosphoius'. In
othei woius, the fact that tokens of 'Bespeius' one anu all iefei to venus is
1S
linguistically inuepenuent of the fact that tokens of 'Phosphoius' one anu all iefei to
venus.
14

This last fact points to a coiielative tiuth about names, a tiuth that is also
paitly uefinitive of the lexical-syntactic chaiactei of names. When 2 anu $ aie
uistinct names, they aie iefeientially inuepenuent in the sense that no stiuctuial oi
lexical ielation between 2 anu $ can guaiantee that if 2 iefeis to , then $ iefeis to ,
as well. This is not to ueny that iefeientially inuepenuent names may co-iefei.
Inueeu, we can uiiectly show that iefeientially inuepenuent names aie co-
iefeiential via tiue iuentity statements. But when iefeientially inuepenuent names
uo co-iefei, theii co-iefeience will be a meie coinciuence of usage.
I holu that the lexical-syntactic chaiactei of the linguistic categoiy NANE is
paitially uefineu by the iefeiential inuepenuence of uistinct names anu the explicit
co-iefeientiality of tokens of the same name type. To be a name is, in pait, to be an
expiession type such that tokens of that type aie explicitly co-iefeiential with one
anothei anu iefeientially inuepenuent of the tokens of any uistinct type. This fact
implies that if one knows of 3 only that it belongs to the categoiy NANE, then one
knows that, whatevei 3 iefeis to, if it iefeis to anything at all, then tokens of 3 aie
guaianteeu to be co-iefeiential one with anothei anu iefeientially inuepenuent of
any uistinct name 3', whatevei 3' iefeis to. A name (type) is, in effect, a set of (actual
anu possible) name tokens such that all tokens in the set aie guaianteeu, in viitue of
theii linguistic chaiactei, to co-iefei one with anothei anu to be iefeientially
inuepenuent of, anu thus at most coinciuentally co-iefeiential with, any name not in
14
that set. Call such a set a 8"(#$ ,7 39:*#8#. 8,;537353$83. It is a linguistically univeisal
fact about the lexical categoiy NANE that numeiically uistinct tokens of the same
name will shaie membeiship in a chain of explicit co-iefeience anu numeiically
uistinct tokens of two type uistinct names will be membeis of uisjoint chains of
explicit co-iefeience.
The fact that names aie uevices of explicit co-iefeience makes them suitable
foi playing a ceitain ciucial uialogical iole, ueeply ielevant to the chaiactei of what
both veiiuical anu non-veiiuical language games. Names aie uevices by which we
can make the pieseivation of subject mattei explicit. Suppose that }ones says "Ny
Bespeius looks lovely this evening!" Anu suppose that Smith wishes to expiess
agieement with }ones, Smith can make hei agieement manifest by using again the
name that }ones oiiginally useu. She can uttei a sentence like "Yes, you aie iight.
Bespeius uoes look lovely this evening!" (0i she can use a pionoun that is
anaphoiically uepenuent on }ones's use of 'Bespeius.') Suppose, by contiast, that
Smith continues the conveisation by using a co-iefeiiing, but iefeientially
inuepenuent name like 'Phosphoius' to iefei to venus. Peihaps she iesponus as
follows, "Yes you aie iight, Phosphoius uoes look lovely this evening!" Smith has, in
fact, expiesseu agieement with }ones. She has pieuicateu the veiy same piopeity
of the veiy same object. But she has not uone so in a manifest oi explicit mannei.
As long as it is not mutually manifest that Bespeius just is Phosphoius, it is as if
Smith has eithei shifteu the subject mattei of the conveisation oi has somehow
implicateu that 'Bespeius' anu 'Phosphoius' co-iefei. At a minimum, by shifting to a
iefeientially inuepenuent name, the co-iefeience of which with 'Bespeius' is not
1S
linguistically maikeu as explicit, Smith has left open the question whethei she has,
in fact, pieseiveu the subject mattei. She can close that question by stating that
using the names 'Bespeius' anu 'Phosphoius' to state that Bespeius is Phosphoius.
The uistinction between pieseivation of subject mattei anu manifest
pieseivation of subject mattei is one of gieat piagmatic significance. Wheievei
subject mattei fails to be manifestly pieseiveu, an imputation of uistinctness is
uefeasibly piagmatically geneiateu. Coopeiative conveisation seems to be
goveineu, that is, by a uefeasible uiiective constiaining uiscouise paiticipants to
make the pieseivation of subject mattei manifest. Such a constiaint pieuicts that
uespite the coinciuental co-iefeience of 'Bespeius' anu 'Phosphoious', they cannot,
in geneial, be substituteu one foi the othei in a way that pieseives uialectical
significance.
But it is not just in conveisational settings that the explicit pieseivation of
subject mattei matteis. It matteis even moie in, as it weie, the ue facto piivate
language of thought. The ability to ueploy mental names anu othei mental uevices
of explicit co-iefeience in thought episoues is a cential souice of oui capacity foi
what I call same-puipoiting thought. I can think of Kiyoshi touay anu think of
Kiyoshi again tomoiiow with a kinu of innei assuiance that I at least puipoit to
think of the same peison twice. I uo so meiely by ueploying an innei mental name
acioss uistinct thought episoues. If one hau no uevices in one's mental lexicon that
alloweu one to think in same-puipoiting ways, it woulu always be an open question
whethei, in puipoiting to think now of a paiticulai , anu now of a paiticulai ,', one
16
has thought of the same object twice oi has thought of two uistinct objects. Now it
may sometimes, anu peihaps even often, be an open question foi a cognizei
whethei two of hei thought episoues shaie a (putative) subject mattei. But it is
suiely not always so. Anu it is not always so piecisely because theie is a
uistinguisheu class of mental iepiesentations that function in thought as uevices of
explicit co-iefeience. Foi such uevices, to think with oi via them again is ipso facto
to puipoit to think of the same thing again.
What I have so fai saiu about the iole of names as uevices anu of explicit-
coiefeiencesame-puipoit in language anu thought holus foi both names that iefei
anu foi names that fail to iefei. It is solely in viitue of theii bioauly syntactic oi
stiuctuial piopeities that names function as uevices of explicit co-iefeiencesame-
puipoit. Anu theie is nothing in syntax so unueistoou to uistinguish iefeiiing
names fiom non-iefeiiing names. No tiansfoimation oi opeiation sensitive to
stiuctuie oi foim alone will be sensitive to whethei a name has a iefeient oi fails to
have a iefeient. Fiom a bioauly stiuctuial oi syntactic point of view iefeiiing
names anu non-iefeiiing names aie on exactly the same footing. Like names that
iefei, names that fail to iefei can well-foimeuly flank iuentity signs, occupy the
aigument places of veibs, anu anchoi anaphoiic chains. Anu like iefeiiing names,
empty names function in both speech anu in thought as uevices of explicit co-
iefeiencesame puipoit.
This last fact tuins out to be of utmost impoitance foi unueistanuing both
the piagmatic anu the cognitive significance of the things we uo with empty names.
17
It is especially impoitant foi uiagnosing anu uispelling ceitain philosophical eiiois
into which the behavioi of empty names might otheiwise tempt us. Two ielateu
facts about names anu othei objectual iepiesentations often tempt us to eiioi.
Fiist, theie is the fact that names function as uevices of explicit co-iefeience in
language anu same puipoit in thought, inuepenuently of whethei they iefei oi fail
to iefei. Seconu, theie is the fact that by thiowing up objectual iepiesentations
within itself the minu makes its uistinctive contiibution foi piepaiing the way foi
thought anu language to achieve objective iepiesentational content. Because of
theii iole in piepaiing the way foi oui thought anu talk to make semantic contact
with objects, we might say that objectual iepiesentations aie, in a sense, maue foi
talking about objects. When iepiesentations maue foi talking about objects aie
ueployeu in ceitain soits of non-veiiuical games, theie can aiise the illusion that
thiough the meie ueployment of such iepiesentations we manage to succeeu in
making contact with the objects. Such illusions of objectivity aie iesponsible, I
claim, foi many misbegotten philosophical uoctiines.
!=" -)./0 1+)&, (* =&%(2(4+' +*2 15*>=&%(2(4+' ?+*@7+@& A+)&,
veiiuical language games aie paiauigmatically playeu with iepiesentations
that aie piesumptively fully objective. Though empty teims sometimes occui in
such games, such teims aie not natuially at home theiein. When an empty name
occuis within a veiiuical language game something has likely gone wiong
somewheie. When we play veiiuical games, we aie typically tiying to stake out
ueteiminate claims about how the woilu is. We aie tiying, that is, to tiack the tiue,
18
to make oui claims ultimately match the way things actually go in the woilu. Non-
iefeiiing expiessions aie not at home in such games just because sentences that
contain such expiessions expiess no ueteiminate piopositions anu thus stake out no
ueteiminate claims about how the woilu is - at least not by uiiectly encouing any
piopositions in viitue of theii liteial meanings.
But an impoitant caveat is in oiuei heie. Consiuei (4) anu (S) below:
(4) Santa Claus isn't coming tonight
(S) Santa Claus will come this yeai if you wish it haiu enough.
An utteiance of (4) woulu seem to stake out a tiue-seeming claim anu an utteiance
of (S) seems to stake out a false seeming claim. Noi neeu a peison who utteis (4) oi
(S) be engaging in any soit of pietenu, mythic oi fictional piactice of the soit that
suppoits moves within non-veiiuical games. We may piesume that a peison who
utteis (4) oi (S) intenus to convey something that is stiictly tiue about the woilu.
Noieovei, although the appaient tiuth of what is conveyeu by (4) anu appaient
falsity of what is conveyeu by (S) woulu seem to uepenu uiiectly on the failuie of
'Santa' to iefei, neithei (4) noi (S) seems to convey a metalinguistic pioposition
about the woiu 'Santa'.
1S

These facts sit uncomfoitably with my claim that sentences like (4) anu (S)
expiess no fully ueteiminate pioposition anu stake out no ueteiminate claim about
how the woilu stanus. But I neeu not ueny that sentences like (4) oi (S) can be useu
to convey ueteiminate piopositions. Noi neeu I ueny that those conveyeu
piopositions aie ueteiminately eithei tiue oi false - anu ueteiminately eithei tiue
19
oi false of the ieal woilu iathei than of some meiely mythical, notional, oi fictional
woilu. The piessing question, though, is <"(. such sentences convey anu ",< they
manage to uo so. Since I claim that empty names make no 132($.#8 8,$.5#+-.#,$ to
sentences that contain them, it shoulu come as no suipiise that on my view
whatevei such sentences convey, it must ultimately be via piagmatics they convey
what they convey. Specifically, I claim that sentences containing empty names can
be useu to expiess full-blown piopositions thiough the mechanism of what I have
elsewheie calleu one anu a half stage piagmatics.
16
Thiough the one anu half stage
piagmatic piocess of pseuuo-satuiation, a semantically incomplete, meiely paitially
valueu sentence may be useu to convey a ceitain tiue but "piagmatically exteinal"
pioposition. 0ne anu a half stage piagmatics exteinalities aie typically geneiateu
on the jouiney up fiom not fully satuiateu sentence meanings to contextually
ueteimineu piopositional contents. Anu this may happen in two uiffeient ways:
eithei when so-calleu piimaiy piagmatic piocesses like satuiation fail to come off oi
as contextually geneiateu by-piouucts of successful satuiation. Now the contents
geneiateu by one-anu-a-half stage piagmatics uo not seive to "satuiate" the gaps in
a meie pioposition-in-waiting. Because such exteinalities aie not themselves the
uiiect consequence of semantically satuiating unsatuiateu slots, they aie, in a
sense, less intimately associateu with the sentence anu its constituents than the
piopositions that aie the iesult of satuiation aie. Such exteinalities aie geneiateu,
as it weie, on the siue anu consequently uo not iesult in piopositional constituents
of the soit semantically uemanueu by the context inuepenuent meaning of the
ielevant sentences. Because of theii "exteinal" chaiactei, they typically aie neithei
2u
entaileu noi piesupposeu by fully satuiateu contents. 0n the othei hanu, such
contents aie, in a sense, moie intimately associateu with a sentence anu its meaning
than uiicean implicatuies aie. uiicean implicatuies aie geneiateu post-
piopositionally - that is, post-satuiation -- via so-calleu seconuaiy piagmatic
piocesses.
17
Since such piocesses come into play only aftei full-blown piopositional
contents have been fixeu via satuiation, uiicean implicatuies aie less intimately
associateu with the sentence anu its meaning than my one-anu-a-half stage
exteinalities aie.
Let us consider some details of this proposal briefly. I claim that a speaker who
utters a sentence like (4) above does not assert any fully determinate proposition. Rather,
she pseudo-asserts, as I call it, a proposition in what I call the neighborhood of the
following proposition-in-waiting:
<Not <___
REF(x bears Santa)
<coming tonight>>
In particular, she pseudo-asserts something like the descriptive proposition that no jolly,
white-bearded, red-suited fellow, who lives at the North Pole and delivers toys via a
reindeer-drawn sleigh is coming tonight. I say something like this descriptive
proposition so as to allow for a certain vagueness and indeterminacy. There may be no
definite p such that it is precise and determinate that one who utters (4) pseudo-asserts p,
rather than some other nearby proposition q. But subject to such vagueness and
indeterminacy, an utterance of (4) will express something truth-evaluable. So there is,
after all, a sense in which one who utters the sentence Santa Claus isnt coming tonight
does manage to say something truth-evaluable. She pseudo-asserts some proposition
21
or other which happens in this case to be true. By contrast, if she were to utter (5) she
would still assert nothing, but she would pseudo-assert something that happens to be
false.
But why is it this proposition, or something like it, that is pseudo-asserted by an
utterance of (4)? A speaker who utters (4) or (5) takes on what I call a double burden
the semantic buiuen of iefeiiing to a ceitain object anu the communicative buiuen
of making manifest to hei inteilocutois what object she intenus to iefei to. But
.(%#$& ,$ semantic anu communicative buiuens in a speech situation uoes not ipso
facto entail successfully anu openly )#18"(5&#$& them. Anu a key insight behinu the
notion of one anu half stage piagmatics is that manifest failuies to uischaige one's
semantic buiuens is often the stuff of which fuithei communication is maue. This
makes one anu half stage piagmatics veiy uiffeient fiom uiicean implicatuies. With
a uiicean implicatuie, we implicate one thing in the couise of oi by saying anothei
thing. 0ne anu a half stage exteinalities, on the othei hanu, may be geneiateu
when we fail to say anything fully ueteiminate. A speakei who uses the name
'Santa Claus' -- especially if she is using it in an attempt to say something tiue about
how things actually aie, iathei than how things aie in the context of some myth oi
pietense oi fiction -- (manifestly) fails to (semantically) iefei to any object at all.
She theieby fails to uischaige the stanuaiu semantic buiuen that comes with the use
of any name - the buiuen of using it to iefei to some one uefinite object. Now
because she fails to iefei, she also fails to asseit any ueteiminate pioposition. But
hei inteilocutois neeu make only the assumption that even in hei failuie she still
intenus to speak coopeiatively anu is using the name in accoiuance with the
22
stanuaius of the mythical piactice within which it is at home, in oiuei appieciate
hei communicative intentions. She intenus to communicate anu intenus that hei
inteilocutois iecognize that she intenus to communicate a piagmatically exteinal
pioposition to the effect that no jolly ieu-beaiueu fellow who lives at the Noith Pole
anu ueliveis toys on Chiistmas is coming tonight. Now the uesciiptive phiase
'jolly, ieu-beaiueu fellow.' is neithei the meaning noi the iefeience ueteiminei of
the name 'Santa'. But it will be a piominent element of the 'Santa' file of anyone
familiai with the myth of Santa. Because of that piominence, it is highly available
anu salient to inteilocutois anu will meuiate theii attempts to unueistanu what a
speakei is uoing in utteiing sentences like (4) oi (S), that contain non-iefeiiing
expiessions, in the context of coopeiative communicative exchanges.
Sentences like (S), which contain a mixtuie of the fictional anu the non-
fictional, meiit similai tieatment. Though theie is no pioposition stiictly asseiteu
by an utteiance of (S), (S) uoes manage to convey something tiue -- something
stiictly anu liteially tiue - about Piince Chailes. What it conveys is not, of couise,
just anothei authoiizeu move in some non-veiiuical language game. Foi what (S)
expiesses is a pioposition about Piince Chailes. Anu he has no iole in the Bamlet
stoiy. Bow uoes one who utteis (S) manage to convey such a pioposition, given
that 'Bamlet' has no iefeience anu that Piince Chailes beais no paiticulai
ielationship to the play =(2*3.. 0nce again the key is the one anu a half stage
piagmatic piocess of pseuuo-satuiation. Beie pseudo-saturation takes a mere
propositional scheme a scheme that in some sense semantically calls for one kind of
value in this case a person to be the referent of Hamlet and yields instead a
2S
proposition with a different sort of value in this case, something like a cardinality. This
cardinality lets call it the Hamlet-cardinality -- is determined by facts about the moves
authorized by the interpretive game anchored in Shakespeares Hamlet. What (3) says
is that the cardinality of the set of reasons that Prince Charles has to be depressed is
smaller than the Hamlet-cardinality. It says this not as a matter of its strict literal
content, but as a matter of its pseudo-saturated content. If that is right, then we dont
need to posit fictional characters or any other object for Hamlet to refer to, to make
sense of the intuition that (3) says something that is true really and truly, true, rather
than just pretend true. And even though (3) is not an authorized move in a non-veridical
interpretive game anchored by Hamlet, the truth expressed by an utterance of (3) very
much depends on what moves are authorized in such a game.
18

Tuin now to non-veiiuical language games, wheiein empty names aie moie
natuially at home. Such games aie stiuctuially anu uynamically similai to veiiuical
language-thought games, but they aie in a funuamentally uiffeient kinu of business.
Fiist, they aie paiauigmatically playeu with meiely objectual iathei than fully
objective iepiesentations. In the context of such games, the lack of iefeience to a
ieal-woilu existent is no maik of failuie. Inueeu, even when a name uoes have a
ieal-woilu iefeience, moves with sentences containing that name aie typically not
iequiieu to tiack the facts about the ielevant object. In effect, a name with a ieal
woilu iefeience is useu (1 #7 it weie meiely objectual in the context of a non-
veiiuical language game. This happens, foi example, when one cieates an entiiely
fictional naiiative about a "ieal" peison using that peison's actual name. In that
case, theie is no neeu to ueny that one is iefeiiing to that veiy peison. It is just that
24
in the context of a non-veiiuical language game, the goveining concein is typically
not stiict tiuth. Anu so when we play non-veiiuical language games with singulai
teims that enjoy ieal woilu iefeience, we may be authoiizeu by the iules of the
game we aie playing to make moves that enjoy game-inteinal coiiectness, but aie
stiictly false of the actual woilu. Noie typically, though, the singulai teims we
ueploy in non-veiiuical language games will be altogethei uevoiu of ieal woilu
iefeience. Anu sentences containing such expiessions will fail to expiess any
complete anu ueteiminate pioposition. Consequently, game-inteinally coiiect
moves will be neithei tiue noi false of the actual woilu.
Nany non-veiiuical games aie giounueu in explicit pietense. When we
engage in explicit pietense, theie is little basis foi confusing what is meiely game-
inteinal coiiectness foi the woiluly piopeity of being stiictly anu liteially tiue. To
the extent that we aie self-consciously anu explicitly pietenuing, we typically know
that we aie. We know that in making "authoiizeu" moves in the game, we aie not
making moves that that puipoit to tiack how things objectively aie by a iealm of
game-inuepenuent, ieal existents. This is not quite to say that anything goes within
such games. Foi even an explicit pietense may be subject to some moie oi less
iestiicting constiaints, geneiateu by the goveining concein that is opeiative within
the pietense. Still, moves within a pietense enjoy chaiacteiistic uegiees of fieeuom
that is not enjoyeu by moves in veiiuical games. 0ne might even think that this
fieeuom is the veiy hallmaik of non-veiiuical language games as such.
2S
But that woulu be a mistake. Noves in a non-veiiuical game may still be so
tightly constiaineu by the goveining concein anu the iules opeiative within the
game that they altogethei lack the phenomenological feel of anything goes explicit
pietense. Inueeu, moves in some non-veiiuical games can caiiy a high uegiee of
iational compulsion. Rational compulsion is the veiy opposite of the soit of
fieeuom fiom constiaint that one might suppose is chaiacteiistic of explicit, self-
conscious, anything goes pietense. When non-veiiuical language games lack the feel
of pietense anu when peimissible moves within such games piesent themselves to
us as iationally iequiieu theie is, I think, a ceitain uangei that we will confuse meie
game inteinal coiiectness with objective, minu-inuepenuent tiuth. Foi we aie
pione to believe that iational compulsion must somehow be iooteu in foims of
ieasoning anu inquiiy that somehow make tiuth-tiacking contact with the objects
themselves.
The paiauigm example of the kinu of uomain I have in minu is puie, as
opposeu to applieu mathematics. No uoubt, moves in puie mathematics often enjoy
a veiy high-uegiee of felt iational compulsion. Inueeu, given a choice of axioms anu
uefinitions, togethei with a backgiounu logic, moves in puie mathematics aie often
iationally inescapable. This is not to ueny that even in puie mathematics, theie is a
uegiee of fieeuom with iespect to the choice of axioms, uefinitions, anu peihaps
even with iespect to the backgiounu logic itself. But to whatevei extent such
matteis aie up foi giabs, once they have been settleu, fuithei peimissible moves
within mathematical games aie often highly constiaineu. To be suie, games
founueu on explicit, self-conscious pietense have theii limiting constiaints too. But
26
in such games, moves typically have nothing like the uegiee of iational
inescapability chaiacteiistic of moves within puie mathematics. This fact may leau
one to suppose that in uoing puie mathematics, we aie uoing something entiiely
uiffeient fiom what we uo when we play the soit of non-veiiuical language games
that involve explicit anu self-conscious pietense. But the games we play when we
engage in explicit anu self-conscious pietense anu the games we play when we uo
puie mathematics aie, I suggest, species of a common genus. Anu theie aie many
ieasons foi believing anu few foi uenying that when we engage in puie, as opposeu
to applieu mathematics, we aie playing a non-veiiuical language game, ueploying
meiely objectual, iathei than fully objective iepiesentations anu that oui goveining
concein is not a species of stiict, liteial tiuth but a species of tiuth-similituue, a
game inteinal iight anu wiong of the mattei.
It is impoitant to stiess that I uistinguish the tiuth-ielevant chaiactei of
applieu mathematics fiom the tiuth ielevant chaiactei of puie mathematics. I take
applieu mathematical statements of the foim:
(6) 7 cups + 7 cups, yielus 14 cups
to expiess stiict, liteial tiuths about the quantitative stiuctuie of the physical woilu.
I giant, that is, that theie aie minu-inuepenuent tiuths about the quantitative
stiuctuie of the physical woilu. It can be stiictly anu liteially tiue that theie aie 14
cups on the table, that E= NC
2
, that E= "v anu so on. The language of mathematics,
as applieu to physical quantity, helps us to get at such tiuths anu many otheis. In
fact, the language of mathematics, as applieu to the physical woilu, is well-nigh
27
inuispensible foi the puiposes of physical science. But to giant the inuispensability
of mathematics as applieu to the physical woilu is not to giant that the tiuth of
statements of puie mathematics. Accepting the stiict liteial tiuth of (6) above uoes
not iequiie us to accept that (7) is stiictly liteially tiue as well:
(7) 7 + 7 = 14.
Platonists will uisagiee. They will insist that theie is a iealm of mathematical
ieality, a iealm uistinct fiom physical ieality, which is populateu with fiee stanuing,
minu-inuepenuent mathematical entities such as sets oi numbeis. I won't aigue the
point at length heie - since uoing so woulu caiiy us veiy fai afielu - but I holu that
theie is neithei a metaphysical noi an epistemic basis foi believing in such entities.
What theie cleaily aie aie numeials. Numeials aie bone fiue singulai teims. As
such, they enjoy intiinsic iefeiential puipoit. Numeials aie not, howevei,
iefeientially successful singulai teims. They uo not succeeu in actually iefeiiing to
anything at all. If that is iight, then a statement like (7) expiesses no ueteiminate
pioposition but only a pioposition in waiting. Anu piopositions in waiting, I have
aigueu, aie neithei tiue noi false because they stake out no ueteiminate claim
about how the woilu is. But it shoulu be cleai by now that to ueny that (7) is
stiictly, liteially tiue is not to ueny that it enjoy a species of tiuth-similituue -- that
is, a species of game-inteinal coiiectness. We might put the point by saying of (7)
that although it is "mathematically tiue" it is not objectively tiue.
Though the view just announceu, but not aigueu foi, is a foim of fictionalism
about "puie" mathematics, it shoulu be cleai that I am steaufastly iealist about
28
(::*#3) mathematics. 0nfoitunately, giving a full accounting of the ielationship
between puie anu applieu mathematics woulu caiiy us too fai afielu foi the
puiposes of the cuiient essay. veiy biiefly, I maintain that although the language of
puie mathematics makes no intiinsic iefeience to specifically physical quantities
anu magnituues, nonetheless, thiough physicalistic (ie)inteipietation of the
language of mathematics, mathematics is maue applicable to the physical woilu.
When physicalistically inteipieteu anu applieu to the physical woilu, mathematics
enables us to state many objective tiuths about the quantitative stiuctuie of the
physical woilu. Anu I suspect that theie may well be no othei way of stating
vaiious tiuths about the quantitative stiuctuie of the natuial woilu except by way of
the language of mathematic as physicalistically inteipieteu. But acknowleuging the
piactical inuispensability of applieu mathematics foi puiposes of total natuial
science uoes not uiiectly iequiie us to believe in a iealm of fiee-stanuing, puiely
mathematical entities that seive as the tiuth-makeis foi statements of puie
mathematics. Real physical quantities neeu not stanu in ieal ielations to putatively
abstiact mathematical existent in oiuei foi the statements of applieu mathematics
about physical quantities to be tiue. Theie can be stiict tiuths about the numbei of
planets, foi example, without theie being any numbeis - consiueieu as a fiee-
stanuing mathematical entities - to numbei the planets.
Since I lack space to aigue these claims in uetail, I will conceue that one is
entitleu to iaise some piessing anu uifficult questions about the package of views I
have just sketcheu. Foi example, if, as I claim, theie aie no minu-inuepenuent
mathematical objects, with a mathematical natuie wholly inuepenuent of us anu oui
29
piactices, by which we might somehow seek, by some epistemic methous oi othei,
to constiain oui mathematical moves, then it is faii to wonuei how possibly moves
in puie mathematics manage to be both tightly constiaineu anu iationally
compelling. It is also faii to ask whethei the combination of iealism about applieu
mathematics anu fictionalism about puie mathematics is ultimately coheient. To be
suie, we must uistinguish in this connection between claims about the epistemic
cieuentials of the methous of puie mathematics fiom claims about the ontology of
mathematics. I uo not ueny that the methous of mathematical pioof enjoy steiling
epistemic cieuentials. But we shoulu not allow those steiling cieuentials to bewitch
us into ontological piofligacy. Neithei the epistemic cieuentials of puie
mathematics noi even the piofuse applicability of mathematics, as physicalistically
inteipieteu, to the natuial woilu uiiectly entails that puie mathematics enables us
to get at tiuths about a iealm of minu-inuepenuent objects.
I uo not, howevei, pietenu to conclusively settle these matteis in this essay.
But by way of offeiing a uown payment on the piomissoiy notes I have taken out, I
conjectuie below that the temptation to posit a iealm of fiee-stanuing mathematical
entities iesults fiom what I call illusions of objectivity. I suggest that Illusions of
objectivity may be neaily inevitable outgiowths of ceitain kinus of non-veiiuical
language games. Such illusions aie boin of a numbei of confusions. Foi example,
theie is a tenuency to mistake meiely notional objects, as I call them, foi fiee
stanuing ieal existents. Anu theie is a tenuency to conflate meie tiuth-similituue
with genuine tiuth. I shall say moie about the iuea of a meiely notional object
Su
shoitly. But let me tuin fiist to a biief uiscussion of the uistinction between tiuth
anu tiuth-similituue.
=" B%7/C ;," B%7/C D()('(/72&
Let us begin by focusing moie closely on what it is foi a move within a non-
veiiuical language game to be "authoiizeu." Ny focus heie will not be on how, in
uetail, authoiization woiks within this oi that soit of non-veiiuical language game.
Ny aim is, iathei, to claiify the veiy iuea of an authoiizeu move within a non-
veiiuical language game. Fiist, a negative point. Naking an authoiizeu move in a
non-veiiuical game is not the same as asseiting a stiictly tiue pioposition. When a
move is authoiizeu within a game, it uoes not theieby enjoy some peculiai species
of the genus tiuth - "tiuth" in a fiction, say. At least it uoes not uo so meiely in
viitue of being authoiizeu. Tiuth is not piopeily constiueu as a genus of which
theie aie many species. We uo sometimes say such things as 'It is tiue in the
Bolmes stoiies that." oi "It is tiue accoiuing to the Santa myth that.." Anu in one
ueep anu impoitant iespect oui use of such expiessions uoes iesemble oui use of
genuine tiuth talk. Such expiessions play within non-veiiuical games uialogic ioles
quite similai to the uialogic iole playeu by the genuine tiuth pieuicate in veiiuical
games. In veiiuical games, 'is tiue' functions as a uevice foi claiming entitlements
anu attiibuting commitments. Foi example, when I say that it is tiue that snow is
white, I theieby claim an entitlement to asseit that snow is white. In a paiallel
fashion, the pieuicate "tiue in stoiy S" functions as an entitlement claiming uevice
with iespect to asseition-like moves within non-veiiuical language games goveineu
S1
by stoiy S. It is because the uialogical function of the pieuicate 'tiue in S' miiiois
the uialogical function of the genuine tiuth pieuicate "tiue," though without shaiing
its metaphysical natuie, that I count tiuth in a stoiy as a species of tiuth similituue,
iathei than a species of tiuth.
In a similai, though aumitteuly moie contioveisial vein, I take mathematical
tiuth, as applieu to statements of puie mathematics, to be a species of tiuth
similituue, iathei than a species of genuine tiuth. Theie is cleaily within
mathematical piactice a game-inteinal iight anu wiong of the mattei. Anu I holu
that the use of the tiuth pieuicate within the iealm of puie mathematics functions
as a uevice foi claiming entitlements anu attiibuting anu expiessing commitments
to ceitain mathematical moves. Because theie aie no fiee-stanuing mathematical
entities foi mathematical teims to iefei to, howevei, mathematical tiuth is not a
species of stiict liteial tiuth. Like 'tiue in the stoiy,' 'mathematically tiue' lacks
the iobust metaphysical natuie, while shaiing the uialogical chaiactei, of genuine
tiuth. But I hope it is cleai by now that I uo not mean theieby to ueny to puie
mathematics ueep cognitive significance oi steiling epistemic cieuentials. The
methous of pioof ueployeu in puie mathematics enjoy the highest of iational
cieuentials. Anu once the language of mathematics is physicalistically inteipieteu
anu systematically applieu to the natuial woilu, mathematics functions as an
inuispensible cognitive tool foi achieving the explanatoiy ambitions of total natuial
science.
S2
Now at supeificial fiist glance, my uistinction between tiuth anu tiuth-
similituue may appeai to be something of a hostage to the uebate between
ueflationists anu inflationists about the metaphysical natuie of tiuth. Beflationists
aie wont to iegaiu tiuth as little moie than a compliment that we pay to such
statements as we aie piepaieu to asseit.
19
So unueistoou, tiuth woulu have no
substantive metaphysical natuie. We have saiu all theie is to say about tiuth,
accoiuing to the ueflationist, when we have fully specifieu anu explaineu the
uialogical iole of the tiuth pieuicate. Now if one is convinceu that even genuine
tiuth has no substantive metaphysical natuie, then one may appeai at fiist blush to
have giounus foi iejecting outiight my uistinction between tiuth anu meie tiuth
similituue. Aftei all, my cential claim is that it is in viitue of theii uistinct
substantive metaphysical natuies anu not in viitue of uistinct uialogical ioles that
tiuth is uistinguisheu fiom meie tiuth similituue. But if all theie is to tiuth talk is
its uialogical iole, then theie woulu appeai to be nothing to uistinguish tiuth fiom
meie tiuth-similituue. Noieovei, if the uistinction between tiuth anu meie tiuth-
similituue goes, so, it may seem, uoes the uistinction between veiiuical anu non-
veiiuical language games.
But this conclusion is piematuie. Suppose that the ueflationist weie to win
the uay with iespect to the metaphysics of tiuth. We woulu still neeu some basis foi
uistinguishing meie iefeiential puipoit fiom full blow iefeiential success anu thus
of uistinguishing meiely objectual iepiesentations fiom fully objective ones. The
ueflationist has to tell a stoiy that pieseives the status of names like 'Santa Claus' as
genuine names anu thus as woulu be iefeiiing uevices - ones which while failing to
SS
actually iefei, still puipoit to iefei. Anu she has to uistinguish such names fiom
names like 'Baiack 0bama' -- names that succeeu in iefeiiing to some ieal existent.
As long as we can make out such a uistinction, whethei on a ueflationaiy basis oi an
inflationaiy one, it is a shoit step to oui two fuithei uistinctions between veiiuical
anu non-veiiuical language games, on the one hanu, anu tiuth anu meie tiuth
similituue on the othei. To be suie, if the ueflationist is coiiect about the natuie of
tiuth, then it may seem to follow that we will be unable to make out the uistinction
between meie iefeiential puipoit anu full blown iefeiential success in iobustly
metaphysical teims. The uiffeience between 'Santa Claus' anu Baiack 0bama'
woulu then have to be not that the one stanus in a substantive metaphysical ielation
to a ieal existent while the othei uoes not. 0n ueflationaiy views of iefeience,
iefeiiing involves no such ielation. But even if the ueflationist cannot coheiently
accept an inflationaiy theoiy of iefeience, that uoes not obviate hei neeu foi some
way of uistinguishing between meie iefeiential puipoit anu full blow iefeience
success. It woulu just iequiie that she make that uistinction without appealing to a
iobustly metaphysical notion of iefeience. But this means that tiio of uistinctions
on which my aiguments tuin uoes not stanu oi fall with ueflationism. Now it is no
buiuen of oui own to make out the ielevant uistinctions on the behalf of the
ueflationist. If the ueflationist cannot finu a piincipleu basis foi oui uistinction
within a ueflationaiy fiamewoik, so much the woist foi ueflationism.
2u

=!" B%7/C, +957/ 3(4/(5*,
S4
It beais stiessing that uistinguishing between tiuth anu tiuth-similituues
uoes not iequiie that we ueny that theie aie tiuths - stiict, liteial tiuths - about
woiks of fiction. That Bamlet was a play, that it was wiitten by Shakespeaie, that it
is about what it takes to live a uistinctively human life in the face iesignation anu
uespaii, may be stiictly liteially tiue oi false. Fiom an ontological point of view, the
play itself is a ieal, though meiely seconuaiy existent. The existence of the play is
entiiely ueiivative fiom an aiiay of moie piimaiy existents on top of which the play
sits anu fiom the status confeiiing poweis of the human minu. The moie piimaiy
existents on top of which the existence of the play sits aie iepiesentations anu
iepeatable stiuctuies of iepiesentations. The play exists because the minu confeis
a ceitain (noimative) status - the status of being a play - upon that iepeatable
stiuctuie of iepiesentations. 0nce the status of being a play has been confeiieu
upon a ceitain iepeatable stiuctuie of iepiesentations, ie-occuiiences of that veiy
stiuctuie - in eithei wiitten texts oi peifoimances on stage -- count as occuiiences
of that veiy play again. Because the play Bamlet is a ieal, though meiely
seconuaiy existent that has tiactable anu substantive iuentity conuitions it is the
kinu of thing that can have ieal piopeities anu stanu in ieal ielations. Consequently,
nothing bais us fiom making eithei tiue oi false statements about the ieal though
seconuaiy existent that constitutes the play Bamlet.
Baving conceueu the existence of the play as a kinu of seconuaiy existent,
shoulu we oi shoulu we not also giant that in the wiiting of the play 'Bamlet'
Shakespeaie manageu also to ushei into being the univeise of fictional entities that
the play invites us to imagine. }ust as the play exist as ieal, though seconuaiy
SS
existent, why not say that Bamlet himself -- the fictional ciown piince of Benmaik,
exists -- as a ieal though seconuaiy existent. Aumitteuly, a taste foi ielatively
baiien ontological lanuscapes may make us unwilling to extenu oui ontological
peimissiveness quite that fai. But the question is not ieally one of taste but of
piinciple. Is theie any piincipleu basis foi counting the play Bamlet a ieal existeny,
while uenying ieal existence to the fictional Ciowneu Piince, whose comings anu
goings the play is putatively "about."
I appioach this last question in what may at fiist seem a iounuabout fashion.
I begin by ieauily acknowleuging what may seem obvious -- the ieal existence of the
names 'Bamlet', 'Laeties' anu '0phelia'. Noie impoitantly, I insist that qua names,
such fictional names aie intiinsically inuistinguishable fiom any othei name. In
paiticulai, I holu that fictional names enjoy intiinsic iefeiential puipoit anu that
they uo so in the same way anu foi just the same ieason that names in geneial uo.
Still moie impoitantly, like names in geneial, fictional names in fictional contexts
function as uevices of explicit co-iefeience in language anu uevices of same-puipoit
in thought in the sense outlineu above. This last fact is ciucial foi unueistanuing
why the use of fictional names in fictional context gives iise to what I call an
illusion of subject mattei, the illusion, that is, that theie exist something we aie
talking about when we engage in fictional uiscouise. Like names in geneial
fictional names aie, in a sense, "foi" talking about objects. Anu especially when
oui ueployment of a name is coheiently iegulateu by some name-using piactice --
even wheie the iegulating piactice is in my sense non-veiiuical - oui use of names
has, as it weie, the feel of object talk. But wheie names aie puiely fictional, the
S6
feeling that oui talk is talk of ,+>38.1 is a meie illusion. Theie aie typically no
objects we aie talking about when we ueploy fictional names in fictional contexts.
Anu theie is no ieason to bloat oui ontologies by suggesting that the meie wiiting of
a play oi novel can somehow oi othei ushei such entities into existence.
VII. Notional Objects and Illusions of Objectivity
I have alieauy acknowleugeu above that nothing bais us fiom associating
meiely notional objects with the use of a meiely objectual oi iefeientially fit, but
not iefeientially successful iepiesentation as it is useu in the context of a non-
veiiuical language game. Notional objects aie constiuctions out of co-iefeience
ielations among such names. Now because meiely fit iepiesentations useu in non-
veiiuical contexts uo not actually succeeu in iefeiiing to any ieal existent, theie is a
cleai sense in which two such iepiesentations cannot be saiu to co-iefei eithei. But
I claim that even empty names have intiinsic puipoit to iefei. Anu if that is iight,
theie is a sense in which tokens of the same non-iefeiiing name again can enjoy an
intiinsic puipoit of co-iefeience, uespite the fact that they neithei actually iefei noi
actually co-iefei.
We exploit this insight to constiuct a collection of meiely notional objects.
We pioceeu in two stages. Fiist, we uefine, CRS ($), the S-ielative co-iefeience set
foi a name $, wheie ? is the closuie of the set of asseition-like moves that enjoy
tiuth-similituue in some non-veiiuical language game @. ?;ielative co-iefeience sets
encoue both what we might call intiinsic ielations of puipoiteu co-iefeience anu
what we might call extiinsic ielations of puipoiteu co-iefeience among the singulai
S7
iepiesentations ueployeu in ?. Notional objects aie just pleonastic ieifications of
such ielations of puipoiteu co-iefeience.
21
CR?($) will contain eveiy name that is
eithei intiinsically oi extiinsically puipoits to co-iefei with $ in the scenaiio S.
Since tokens of the same name again enjoy intiinsic puipoit of co-iefeience, foi any
name $, anu any scenaiio ?, $ will be a membei of it's own ?;ielative co-iefeience
set. This guaiantees that foi any scenaiio ?, CR? ($) is non-empty. 0n the othei
hanu, if 2 anu $ aie uistinct anu theiefoie iefeientially inuepenuent names, then 2
! CR? ($) just in case ? |-
"
2 = $
#
A That is, two intiinsically iefeientially
inuepenuent names, 2 anu $ will be membeis of the same co-iefeience set just in
case the scenaiio ? "licenses" the iuentity statement
"
2 = $
#
. When 2 anu $ aie
iefeientially inuepenuent -- anu so uo not enjoy intiinsic puipoit of co-iefeience --
but the iuentity statement
"
2 = $
#
is licenseu by ?, I will say that 2 anu $ enjoy
extiinsic puipoit of co-iefeience in ?. S-ielative extiinsic co-iefeience is both
symmetiic anu tiansitive. That is, 2 ! CR?($) just in case $ ! CR?(2). Anu if 2 !
CR?($) anu $ ! CR?(,), then 2 ! CR?(,). Finally, we note that scenaiio ? may be
incomplete in the sense that foi uistinct anu theiefoie iefeientially inuepenuent
names, 2 anu $, ? may leave it open whethei
"
2 = $
#
oi
"
~(2 = $)
#
.
Notional "objects" aie nothing but pleonastic ieifications of ielations of
intiinsic anu extiinsic puipoit of co-iefeience. An S-ielative notional object is that
which the membeis of a given S-ielative co-iefeience set one anu all uenote*.
Benote* shoulu not be unueistoou as a genuine iefeience ielation. Benote* uoes
not ielate woius to ieal-woilu existents. Benote* is what you get when you, as it
S8
weie, subtiact out the ieal existents fiom genuine iefeience ielations. You get
something like puipoit of iefeience anu co-iefeience. A notional object is what you
get when you suppose that the totality of puipoiteu iefeience anu co-iefeience
ielations suffices to give you an object. But I stiess again that I view notional
objects as a kinu of optional encouing anuoi scoie-keeping uevice. They enable us,
foi example, to binu togethei fictional contents unuei file-like stiuctuies linkeu to
the use of fictional names. We may, if we like, iuentify fictional chaiacteis with such
notional objects. But if we uo, we neeu to take caie not to confuse fictional
chaiacteis with the genuine 537353$.1 of fictional names. Fictional names typically
have no iefeients at all.

VIII. What Objects are Not
Ny notion of a notional object beais a ceitain iough affinity to the Fiegean
thought that:
If we aie to use the sign a to signify an object, we must have a
ciiteiion foi ueciuing in all cases whethei b is the same as a, even if it
is not always in oui powei to apply this ciiteiion.
Fiege is heie suggesting that an iuentity statement expiesses what is containeu in a
iecognition juugment -- a juugment to the effect that one has been given the same
object again. Fiege's fuithei thought is appaiently that we have succeeueu in using
a sign to uesignate a ueteiminate object just in case we have fixeu a significance foi
S9
each iuentity statement in which a given singulai teim may occui. We theieby
specify, accoiuing to Fiege, what it is foi any two teims to (coiiectly) puipoit to
stanu foi the same object. This appioach is supposeu to enable what the epistemic
givenness of numbeis coulu possibly consist in -- uespite the fact that we have, as
Fiege aumits, neithei "iueas" noi (sensoiy) "intuitions" of them. The thought
seems to be that numbeis, consiueieu as ieal existents, aie given to us thiough the
use of singulai teims. Inueeu, though he is uiiectly conceineu heie with numbeis
pei se, he seems heie to be enuoising a peifectly geneial claim about the veiy
concept of an object as such to the effect that the concept of an object as such is
nothing but the concept of that which is given thiough the use of a singulai teim.
0bjects aie, in effect, the shauows cast by the uses of singulai teims,
paiauigmatically in iuentity statements.
0ne finus a similai iuea in iecent woik by Robeit Bianuom (1994). Anu it is
is woith pausing ovei his appioach in oiuei to place a funuamental uiviue about the
natuie of objects anu of theii ielations to objectual iepiesentations in shaip ielief.
Bianuom seems to enuoise a veision of iuealism accoiuing to which objects aie
nothing but constiuctions fiom oi piojections out of puipoiteu ielations of
iefeience anu co-iefeience among singulai teims. But this appioach to objects has,
I shall aigue, all the benefits of theft ovei honest toil.
Bianuom begins piomisingly enough. Be appeals to something like oui
uistinction between the meie puipoit of iefeience anuoi co-iefeience anu actual
successful iefeience anuoi co-iefeience. But he enus with a notion of existence
4u
anu of objecthoou that stiips both of any substantive metaphysical natuie. Foi
example, he says:
It is not enough .to explain only 1-883117-* iefeience .. |Sjingulai
teims aie expiessions that, in Quine's useful phiase, ":-5:,5. to iefei
to just one object." The qualification expiesseu in this slogan by the
use of 'puipoit' has two uiffeient functions: to acknowleuge the
notoiious possibility that a name oi a uefinite uesciiption may 7(#* in
its iefeiential biu .. anu to excluue (88#)3$.(**6 singulai
expiessions.. (Bianuom 1994, S6u)
But one is entitleu to ask what, on Bianuom's view, biiuges the gap between
puipoit anu success. Bis basic thought may seem ieasonable enough. 0sing oui
own vocabulaiy iathei than his, the thought might be put this way: a iefeientially
fit expiession 3 is iefeientially successful if theie exists an object , to which 3
puipoits to iefei. That is to say, if " enjoys iefeiential puipoit, anu if what "
puipoits to iefei to actually exists, then " succeeus in iefeiiing to that veiy object.
Refeiential success is thus analyzeu in teims of iefeiential puipoit anu existence.
But as thus fiameu, theie aie two uistinct siues to oui question: What is it foi an
object to exist. What is it foi an expiession " anu an object # to be so ielateu that "
puipoits to iefei to #.
To be suie Bianuom is notoiiously skeptical about the iefeience ielation.
Be claims that the iefeience ielation "a philosophei's fiction, geneiateu by
giammatical misunueistanuings." But if so, it woulu seem to follow that theie is
41
also no such ieal woiu-woilu ielation as the ielation of puipoiting to iefei in which
a teim might stanu to a woiluly object. Since Bianuom eviuently iejects the veiy
iuea of a metaphysically substantive puipoiting-to-iefei-to ielation between woius
anu things, the only ieal issue foi him must be the issue of existence. If we can say
what it is foi an object to exist, we aie uone. We have no fuithei neeu to be puzzleu
about what it is foi a given teim to puipoit to iefei to this object iathei than that.
Accoiuing to Bianuom, the key to explaining iefeiential success without
appeal to a substantive ielation of eithei iefeience oi puipoiteu iefeience is the
notion of what he calls a canonical uesignatoi. A canonical uesignatoi is a
uesignatoi the well-foimeuness of which guaiantees its iefeiential success. The
notion of a canonical uesignatoi is supposeu to help explain what it is to be
committeu to the existence of a kinu of object, accoiuing to Bianuom. Roughly, to
be committeu to the existence of a kinu of object is to tieat a ceitain family of
uesignatois as canonical uesignatois. Numeials, foi example, aie supposeu to be
canonical uesignatois of the numbeis. As he puts it:
.the issue of the success of theii singulai iefeiential puipoit uoes not
aiise foi expiessions such as '121' anu '161' in the same way that it
uoes foi expiessions such as 'the smallest natuial numbei such that
eveiy laigei one is the sum of uistinct piimes of the foim 4n + 1'. It is
to take a fiankly inegalitaiian appioach to iefeiential puipoit anu its
success. Numeials aie semantically piivilegeu ways of picking out
numbeis. By contiast to uefinite uesciiptions of numbeis, the well-
42
foimeuness of numeials suffices foi theii iefeiential success,
guaianteeing that they pick out a coiiesponuing object. Fuitheimoie,
uistinct numeials aie &-(5($.33) (emphasis auueu) to coiiesponu to
uistinct objects. Accoiuing this piivilegeu status to a class of singulai
teims is tieating them as 8($,$#8(* )31#&$(.,51 of a kinu of object.
(Bianuom, 1994, 4S1)
Now a family of canonical uesignatois is supposeu to uefine "a stiuctuieu
space of auuiesses" to which objects of the ielevant soit can be asssigneu in some
piincipleu anu iule goveineu way. To say that , exist is to say that theie is some
auuiess in some stiuctuieu space of auuiesses to which , may be assigneu. Thus:
.to say that some numeiical expiession succeeus in iefeiiing -- to
say that a numbei coiiesponuing to it 39#1.1 -- is to say that it has
some auuiess in the stiuctuieu space mappeu out by the successoi
numeials. (Bianuom 1994, 441)
Now it is impoitant foi Bianuom that uiffeient families of canonical uesignatois
uefine uistinct stiuctuieu spaces of auuiesses so that, foi example, physical
existence is uefineu ovei a uiffeient stiuctuie of auuiesses than numeiical
existence. As he puts it:
To say that some physical object expiession succeeus in iefeiiing, that
the object it uesignates exists, is to say that it exists 1,23<"353 in
space anu time, that it occupies some spatiotempoial iegion. This is to
4S
say that it has some auuiess in the stiuctuieu space of spatiotempioal
cooiuinates centeieu on the speakei. (Bianuom 1994, 444)
Theie aie also sets of fictional auuiesses uefineu by families of fictional uesignatois:
. 7#8.#,$(* existence, existence in oi accoiuing to a stoiy, can be
unueistoou as having the same shape as that common to physical
existence anu to the vaiious soits of numeiical existence. To say that
in oi accoiuing to Sheilock Bolmes stoiies Bolmes' housekeepei
exists (oi to say that the expiession 'Bolmes housekeepei' succeeus
in iefeiiing to an inuiviuual) is to say that that expiession is
inteisubstitutable with some singulai teim that actually appeais in
the stoiy.. The singulai teims that appeai in the text that uefines the
fictional context can be consiueieu as the canonical uesignatois.
(Bianuom 1994, 446)
So "exists" tuins out not to be a fully univocal expiession, by Bianuom's lights,
though he insists that ".uiffeient soits of existence, oi even senses of exists, have a
stiuctuie in common that qualifies them |allj as notions of existence."
Although Bianuom says that theie is no question whethei the numeial '2' is
iefeientially successful, anu thus no question whethei the numbei two exists, he
uoes allow that the question of success uoes aiise foi non-canonical uesignatoi like
'the smallest natuial numbei such that eveiy laigei one is the sum of uistinct piimes
of the foim 4n + 1'. Though such non-canonical uesignatois aie sometime
iefeientially successful, theii iefeiential success is not automatic. The iefeiential
44
success of a non-canonical uesignatoi of an object can be establisheu, Bianuom
claims, only by uemonstiating some non-tiivial iuentity statement linking it to one
oi anothei canonical uesignatoi. Thus the iefeiential success of the non-canonical
uesignatoi 'the smallest natuial numbei such that eveiy laigei one is the sum of
uistinct piimes of the foim 4n + 1'consists in the tiuth of the following iuentity:
the smallest natuial numbei such that eveiy laigei one is the sum of
uistinct piimes of the foim 4n + 1'= 121.
Bianuom's appioach enjoys one cleai auvantage ovei Fiege's eaily appioach
in that it allows foi the possibility of empty singulai teims. An empty singulai
teims is a non-canonical uesignatoi that is not linkeu to any canonical uesignatoi
via any tiue anu non-tiivial iuentity statement. If one aumits that theie aie singulai
teims thiough the use of which no existent is given, while insisting, with the eaily
Fiege, that the concept of an object is nothing but the concept of that which is
given thiough the use of singulai teims, that objects aie nothing but shauows cast
by singulai teims, then Bianuom's account of iefeiential success may seem neaily
inevitable. Inueeu, his "fiankly inegalitaiian appioach to iefeiential puipoit anu
its success" is intenueu appaiently piecisely to ieconcile the eviuent conflict
between the thought that objects aie nothing but shauows cast by singulai teims
anu the thought that some bona fiue singulai teims fail to cast objective shauows.
0n Bianuom's appioach not just any singulai teim will cast objective shauows. 0nly
a special class of teims uo so, viz., the canonical uesignatois, togethei with those
non-canonical uesignatois which can be linkeu to them in some systematic way.
4S
But it seems to me that Bianuom's appioach to iefeiential fitness anu
success enjoys the benefits of theft ovei honest toil. We aie nevei tolu just what is
supposeu to >-1.#76 tieating a ceitain family of uesignatois as canonical. We aie tolu
that theie aie ceitain )#1>,#$. families of canonical uesignatois - in fiction, in
mathematics, in physical object talk. Anu we aie tolu that each of these families
uefines a uistinct sense of existence by uefining a uistinct system of "auuiesses" at
which objects which enjoy the ielevant soit of existence may be "locateu." But
unless such "auuiess systems" aie supposeu to be fiee foi the thinking up, theie
must be some piincipleu constiaint on theii geneiation. Bianuom offeis no such
constiaint. In the absence of any such constiaint, the notion of existence is uiaineu
of substantive content. At the most geneial level, Bianuom can say that foi an
object to exist is foi it to have an auuiess in some stiuctuieu system of auuiesses.
But by his own aumission, the "piopeity" of having an auuiess in the auuiess
system uefineu by the family of canonical uesignatois foi physical objects is a quite
uiffeient "piopeity" fiom the piopeity of having an auuiess in the auuiess system
uefineu by a collection of canonical uesignatois foi fictional objects. Foi example,
Sheilock Bolmes is supposeu to occupy an auuiess in ceitain fictive auuiess system.
Be is theieby supposeu to enjoy a kinu of existence. Since, howevei, Bolmes
occupies no auuiess in the auuiess system uefineu by the totality of spatiotempoial
cooiuinates, theie is anothei soit of existence that Bolmes appaiently fails to enjoy.
Eviuently, we cannot settle, once anu foi all, the question whethei Sheilock Bolmes
exists oi fails to exists. Though Bolmes uoes not "physically exist," he uoes "exist in
the Bolmes stoiy." But aie existence in the Bolmes stoiy anu physical existence
46
ieally supposeu to be species of a common genus. If so, the ielevant genus,
whatevei it is, woulu seem to be a motley collection inueeu. Foi nothing holus the
membeis of the species togethei except that each is coiielative with some family oi
othei of canonical uesignatois. But because theie is eviuently nothing substantive
to say about how, in geneial, that semantically piivilegeu status is eaineu, theie is
eviuently nothing substantive to say about the genus "existence." Bianuom is
untioubleu by this fact. As he puts it:
0n this ielaxeu account |of existencej, theie is no ieason to boggle at
claims that numbeis oi othei abstiact objects exist. 0ne must insist
only that a ueteiminate sense have been given to such claims, by
specifying the ielevant class of canonical uesignatois. (Bianuom
1994, 449)
It is not my aim to iefute Bianuom's ielaxeu views about existence heie. It is
enough foi oui puiposes to point out that they stanu in shaip contiast with the view
uevelopeu anu uefenueu in this essay. 0n my view, iefeientially successful
expiessions aie iefeientially fit expiessions which stanu in a ceitain aumitteuly yet
to be eluciuateu ieal ielation to an inuepenuently existing object. Wheie theie is no
such ielation, theie is no iefeience to any ieal existent. By contiast, Bianuom,
appaiently inspiieu by the eaily Fiege, seems to holu that the veiy iuea of an object
is inextiicably tieu to the cognition of ielations of puipoiteu iuentity anu uiffeience,
as expiesseu by the iegulateu use of singulai teims, paiauigmatically in iuentity
statements. This iuea is not entiiely uevoiu of philosophical meiit. It is, I think,
47
$38311(56 foi the cognition of an object as object that something extia-
iepiesentational be, as it weie, biought unuei singulai iepiesentations such that
thiough the ueployment of those veiy iepiesentations we theieby think a totality of
ielations of puipoiteu iuentity anu uiffeience. But we can think a totality of
ielations of puipoiteu iuentity anu uiffeience, in the absence of the extia-
iepiesentational given, without theieby being given any object. That is, thinking a
totality of ielations of puipoiteu iuentity anu uiffeience uoes not, on its own, suffice
foi the givenness of a ieally existent object. 0bjects aie not given to us meiely
thiough such iepiesentation-iepiesentation ielations as enable us to think with
puipoit of sameness anu uiffeience. If oui woius anuoi oui thoughts aie to ieach
all the way out to ieally existent objects, something extia-iepiesentational must be
given as well.
It shoulu by now be cleai that to ueny that objects aie given meiely thiough
iepiesentation-iepiesentation ielations is not to ueny that such ielations play a
ueep anu ineliminable iole in oui cognition of objects as objects. By ienueiing oui
thought anu talk objectual - that is, inwaiuly fit foi the job of iefeiiing to outei
objects -- oui anteceuently piesent ability to ueploy meiely objectual
iepiesentations to think with puipoit of sameness anu uiffeience is what fiist
piepaies the way foi the encountei with the extia-iepiesentational given to iesult
in full blown cognition of objects as objects. But contiaiy to what Bianuom anu
with him the eaily Fiege appaiently suppose, I ueny that genuine objects can be
given to us thiough the meie play of iepiesentations alone. That way, lies the
uaikness of a kinu of iuealism.
48

!E F5*4'7,(5*
I close by iecapitulating some bioauei philosophical benefits to be ueiiveu
fiom my tiio of uistinctions. Begin by ievisiting oui two histoiically influential
philosophical casts of minu about the non-existent. 0n the one hanu, theie is
Bientano's insistence that the objects of oui thoughts one anu all have the piopeity
of "intentional inexistence." 0n the othei, theie is the squeamishness of Russell anu
Fiege. I announceu at the outset that theie is something half iight anu half wiong
both about the insistence anu about the squeamishness. Take the squeamishness
fiist. That squeamishness of Fiege anu Russell is, I think, paitly explaineu by theii
tacit giasp of the fact that the piimaiy anu paiauigmatic objects of thought aie ieal
existents. Contiaiy to Bientano, Fiege anu Russell iightly helu that we have little
ieason to ueny that thought is piimaiily anu paiauigmatically uiiecteu towaiu ieal
existents iathei than at meiely "immanent" objects that aie objects foi thought
alone. By contiast, what Bientano coiiectly giaspeu, albeit thiough a glass uimly, is
that a ceitain pait of the business of ueteimining the objective iepiesentational
content of oui thoughts anu oui woius must lie entiiely on the siue of the thinking
subject, with no contiibution at all fiom the exteinal woilu.
The uistinctions uevelopeu in this essay enable us to pay uue iespect to both
the insistence anu the squeamishness. Aimeu with the uistinction between meiely
objectual anu fully objective iepiesentations, foi example, we can say moie cleaily
what tiuth it was that Bientano uimply giaspeu. Be uimly giaspeu that it is the
49
business of factois lying entiiely on the siue of the subject to ienuei oui
iepiesentations objectual anu theieby to piepaie the way foi the minu to make
contact with ieal existents. Thought must fiist be ienueieu objectual befoie it can
possibly achieve full-blown objectivity. Anu Bientano uimly giaspeu that ienueiing
thought objectual is not the business of the exteinal woilu at all. What Bientano
faileu to appieciate, howevei, is that no object at all - not even an inexistent one - is
yet given thiough a meie play of meiely objectual iepiesentations.
Fiege anu Russell, by contiast, coiiectly giaspeu that it is only when oui
iepiesentations achieve full blown objectivity that they aie ienueieu semantically
answeiable to anything at all. Now if, as I have aigueu elsewheie, the having of
what I call fully objective iepiesentational content is of the veiy essence of thought,
then Fiege anu Russell can be seen as uimly iealizing that that which is uevoiu of full
blown objective iepiesentational content is not yet thought in the fullest sense. That
iealization is, I think, piecisely what uiove Fiege to uismiss thoughts as of non-
existent objects as meiely "mock" thoughts. Though theie is something iight about
the impulse the leu Fiege to make this uismissal, I hope to have uemonstiateu that
what Fiege uismisseu as meiely mock thoughts actually occupy a much gianuei
place in oui cognitive lives than he imagineu. The key to unueistanuing that place
is to appieciate that many language-thought games we play aie non-veiiuical.
Again, though moves in such games often uo not enjoy full piopositional contents,
fully ueteiminate tiuth conuitions oi tiuth values, nonetheless such moves may
enjoy tiuth-similituue. Anu uespite enjoying meie tiuth similituue, moves in such
games can have gieat cognitive significance.
Su
Inueeu, non-veiiuical games playeu with piesumptively meiely objectual
linguistic iepiesentations aie the stuff of which many shaieu imaginings aie maue.
The inteipietive games authoiizeu by woiks of fiction iepiesent one kinu of shaieu
imagining. The capacity foi shaieu imaginings is a uistinctively human capacity,
which lies at the veiy founuation of oui capacity foi uistinctively human foims of
cultuial anu social life. The iefeiential appaiatus plausibly shaieu by all human
languages -- the whole appaiatus of names, ueictics, quantifieis, vaiiables, anu
anaphoia -- is one of the main souices of the capacity foi shaieu imaginings.
Although that appaiatus is, in one sense, maue foi talking about actual existents, we
can anu uo ueploy that appaiatus even in the absence of any actual existent. We uo
so piecisely when we play non-veiiuical language games with meiely objectual
iepiesentations. 0ui ability to ueploy the iefeiential appaiatus of oui language
even in the absence of actual existents is pait of the explanation of the veiy
possibility of oui capacity foi shaieu imaginings.
To be suie, when we ueploy the iefeiential appaiatus of oui language in the
absence of ieal existents, oui linguistic play may enjoy the illusoiy feel of full fleuge
objectivity. 0ui moves may appeai to tiack some peculiai species of tiuth iathei
than meie tiuth-similituue. Though non-veiiuical games aie typically playeu with
meiely objectual iepiesentations, such iepiesentations aie, in a sense, "uesigneu"
foi talking about genuine objects. Anu the moves we make with such
iepiesentations aie often iationally waiianteu, at least ielative to the goveining
concein opeiative in such games. Inueeu, in such games theie can even be a playei-
inuepenuent - though not a game-inuepenuent -- "iight" anu "wiong" of the mattei,
S1
which may contiibute to the illusion of full-fleuge objectivity. Noieovei, theie may
even obtain a give anu take of ieasons, anu thus competing entitlements anu
commitments, among playeis of such games. Foi all these ieasons, one coulu not
be accuseu of meie philosophical naivete if one concluueu that thiough the play of
such games a iealm of objects was somehow constituteu. Inueeu, one way to ieau
iuealism is as the view that genuine objects aie nothing but piojections oi
constiuctions out of meie ielations of puipoiteu iefeience anu puipoiteu co-
iefeience among oui iepiesentations -- peihaps togethei with the auueu view that
theie is no piincipleu basis foi anything like oui uistinction between genuine tiuth
anu meie tiuth-similituue. Thioughout this essay, we have been at pains to
uistance ouiselves fiom any such views anu to aigue that takes moie than a play of
iepiesentations to constitute a woilu of objects.

S2
-*2*5/&,

1
A number of prominent contemporary philosophers happily embrace the idea of non-existent objects.
See, for example, Parsons (1980), Priest (2005), Zalta (1983), Zalta (1988). Though I disagree, my
explicit aim in this essay is not to argue against such views. Unlike Russell, for example, I do not claim
that embrace of the non-existent leads inevitably to contradiction. Indeed, I think it has by now been
amply demonstrated that with the right choice of background logical principles, one can coherently
maintain some form or other of Meinongianism. I do not reject Meinongianism, then, because I find it
incoherent in the way that Russell alleged. I reject it because I see no positive basis for believing in any
version of that doctrine. Rather, I hold that there is nothing that needs explaining about the behavior of
putatively non-referring expressions that requires or licenses us in positing non-existent objects.

2
Thus Brentatno (1995):
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the
intentional (and also mental) inexistence of an object, and what we would call, although not in
entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are
not to understand a reality), (emphasis added) or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes
something as an object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something
is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate
[something] is hated, in desire something is desired, etc.
This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena.
But see, Crane (2006) for a more subtle and nuanced reading. Fortunately, since Brentano scholarship is
no part of my aim, it hardly matters for my purposes what Brentano finally actually thought.

S
Though fictional objects have certain affinities to the Meinongian non-existent objects, belief in fictional
objects can be seen as far less ontologically profligate than belief in the non-existent more generally. One
could reasonably believe that fictional objects are real, though secondary existents, somehow ushered into
being by the very act of creating a work of fiction which is itself a real, though secondary existent. For
the notion of a secondary existent see Taylor One need not believe that non-existent golden mountains,
nonetheless, subsist in order to believe, for example, that Sherlock Holmes has some sort of being real,
actual being -- as a fictional character. See Kripke (2011), Fine (1982), Schiffer (2003), Salmon (1998),
Searle(1979), Searle (19985) and Thomasson (1999) for views that endorse the reality of fictional
characters. Though I reject such views, there is much that is plausible in them. I attempt to to
accommodate what is plausible in them by appeal to the concept of what I call merely notional objects.
For a nice discussion of the pros and cons of realism vs anti-realism about fictional characters, see Friend
(2007).

4
A fair number of referentialists seem to agree that sentences containing empty names fail to express a full
blown proposition. There is some disagreement, however, over exactly what such sentences do express.
Some referentialists hold, for example, that such sentences express so-called gappy propositions. On my
view, what such sentences express is not yet a proposition at all, but what I call a propositional scheme or a
proposition in waiting. Some thinkers hold that such entities can still have truth values. On my view,
however, propositions in waiting (or gappy propositions) are not yet the sort of thing for which
questions of truth or falsity meaningfully arise. I suspect that the family squabbles over such issues may
may be merely verbal. The literature on so-called gappy propositions is by now extensive. For a
representative sample, see Taylor (2003), Braun (1993, 2000), Adams and Detrich (2004), Adams,
Stecker, and Fuller (1997) For a dissenting voice, see Everett, (2003).

S
See Taylor (2011) and below.
SS

6
I do concede, however, that it is possible to introduce a series of notional objects, as I call them below.
Notional objects encode certain purported relations of reference and co-reference among names and other
referential devices as they occur within works of fiction. Notional objects arent genuine objects in any
robust metaphysical sense. They are, rather, entirely dispensable faon de parler. As such, talk of notional
objects is not intended to add anything substantive to our understanding of the pragmatic and cognitive
significance of fictional discourse. A survey of our ontological commitments which left off notional
objects would have left nothing of genuine ontological significance out of the picture. There are no
genuine objects, not even secondary ones, for fictional names to refer to or for fictional statements to be
about. What really and truly exist in the case of fiction are certain representations, repeatable structures
of representations, and certain secondary existents that are constituted as distinct, though secondary
realities, through the collective exercise of our status conferring powers upon those structures of
representations. There are also various non-veridical language games grounded in our production and
consumption of such representational arrays. That is already a lot. It is not, however, enough to generate
genuine fictional objects or any other sort of non-existent entity, for that matter. Even so, it should be
enough, I argue below, to satisfy even the most ontologically voracious among us.
7
Many philosophers appear to think that we can effortlessly create fictional objects just by deploying the
apparatus of singular reference in the context of fiction. Though I deny the existents of fictional objects,
my talk of notional objects may appear to give credence to this view. But my notional objects are not
intended to be objects in any deep or robust sense. On my view, notional objects arent really anything at
all over and above the structure of representations in terms of which they are defined. Though I am willing
to countenance notional objects if (and only if) they are understood in this way, I actually think that there
is a better and more honest way of thinking about what we achieve when we deploy the apparatus of
singular reference in the context of fiction. That way of thinking involves distinguishing between fully
objective and merely objectual representations, between veridical and non-veridical language games, and
between truth and mere truth similitude.

8
See Taylor (2003), (2004), (2010), (2012), (forthcoming A), (forthcoming B).
9
Taylor (forthcoming B)
1u
See Taylor (2010) and Taylor (forthcoming a) for a fuller defense of this claim. See also Sainsbury
(2005) for defense of a similar idea. See Brandom (1994) for an inferentialist defense of a similar claim.

11
Wittgenstein (1953)
12
The contiast heie implieu between the lexical-syntax anu lexical-semantics is meant to
uistinguish ceitain lexically goveineu oi constiaineu woiu-woiu ielationships, on the one hanu, fiom
lexically goveineu anu constiaineu woiu-woilu ielationships, on the othei. Not just any woiu-woiu
ielationship is lexical-syntactic in the sense I intenu. Relations of synonymy, foi example, aie lexical-
semantic iathei than lexical syntactic. 0nlike ielations of synonymy, the ielations of concein to us
aie entiiely inuepenuent of facts about the peculiai oi iuiosynciatic meanings of the woius that beai
those ielations. Rathei, the ielations of inteiest to us holu in viitue of facts about membeiship in
baie woiu-categoiies. They aie *39#8(*-syntactic because facts about categoiy membeiship aie
themselves lexical facts. Though the lexical-syntactic ielations that make foi objectuality aie
inuepenuent of -- because piioi to -- facts about iuiosynciatic woiu-meanings, they aie not foi that
ieason semantically iiielevant. Lexical-syntactic ielations 8,$1.5(#$ semantic inteipietation. In
paiticulai, they constiain whethei two items in a sentence oi uiscouise must be semantically
inteipieteu .,&3."35 oi may be semantically inteipieteu #$)3:3$)3$.*6A It may help to think of
lexical-syntax not on analogy with baie "shape" but moie on analogy with inteiielateu "stiuctuies."
The paiauigm example of what I have in minu aie explicitly anaphoiic ielationships. Anaphoiic
S4

ielationships aie stiuctuially maikeu ielationships of inteipietational uepenuence. Anaphoiic
stiuctuies aie not, on my view, fully semantic. Such stiuctuies uo ueteimine content anu uo not tie a
iepiesentation to what it iepiesents. But such ielationships uo constiaint semantic inteipietation
by constiaining which items may be inteipieteu inuepenuently anu which must be inteipieteu
togethei.

1S
See especially Taylor (2003), essay I and Taylor (2004).
14
See Taylor (2003), Taylor (2004), Taylor (2010), and Taylor (2012) for further elaboration. For
views similar in spirit, but different in detail from my own, see Fiengo and May (2006) and Fine (2007).

1S
For a sophisticated and subtle version of something like a metalinguistic approach (though not quite) of
what makes sentences containing empty names true or false, see Perry (2001). See also Donnellan (1974),
by which Perrys much more developed approach is more or less directly inspired. Central to Perrys
account is the notion of what he calls network content. Though it is not entirely clear, Perry seems to be
suggesting that network content functions as intentional content for true (and false?) negative existentials.
This makes facts about networks not just the truth-makers of what we convey via apparently true negative
existentials, but also the intentional content for such statements. This seems to me incorrect. While I think
is plausible that something like a network content plays a role in explaining why what we convey by a
sentence containing a non-referring name may be true or false, as the case may be. It seems to me
implausible to say that the conveyed intentionalcontents of such statements is, in any sense, about
networks.


16
See Taylor (2003), especially essays 6 and 9, Taylor (2007) and Taylor (2012) for further exploration of
the notion of a one and half stage pragmatic externality.

17
For the distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic processes, see Recanati (2004).
18
Though the details are different, my view has certain affinities with the views of Sainsbury (2005)
19
This characterization of deflationism is due to Richard Rorty (1986)
2u
It is important to distinguish deflationism about truth from deflationism about reference. Though a
deflationists about truth are often deflationists about reference as well, I take it to be logically possible o
accept a deflationary theory of truth, while endorsing an inflationary theory of reference. I admit, however,
that there is something of an unsettled divide among philosophers on this point. Horwich (1998), Field
(1994) and Brandom (1994) all examples of deflationists about truth who also endorse deflationism about
reference. See Boghossian (1990) for an explicit argument to the effect that a robust theory of reference
already entails a robust theory of truth. If Boghossian is right, it would seem to follow that one cannot
coherently combine a deflationary theory of truth with a robust theory of reference. Boghossian arguments
are, however, primarily intended to undermine the coherence of non-factualism (about content) the view
that sentences containing certain sorts of problematic, but meaningful expressions are not truth apt.
Because I take sentences containing empty names to be neither true nor false, but devoid of truth value,
there might seem to be a sense in which, on my view, sentences containing empty names fail to be truth
apt. But I do not think that sort of failure of truth-aptness which results from reference failures falls prey to
any argument like Boghossians since this sort of failure is perfectly consistent with both truth and
reference being metaphysically substantial. For arguments to the effect that one can coherently defend a
minimalist theory of truth and a non-minimalist theory of truth-aptness and thus, by extension, a non-
minimalist theory of reference, see F. Jackson, G. Oppy and M. Smith (1994) and Holton (1993). Given
the burdens I have and have not taken on in this essay, I can afford to be neutral on these issues.
SS


21
My pleonastic reifications bear a certain family resemblance to the pleonastic entities of Schiffer
(2003). Schiffers pleonastic entities, by contrast, are supposed to be free standing abstract entities,
though entities with very minimal natures. Some such entities, like fictional characters, created by human
activity such as the pretend use of a name in the context of a fiction. More generally, pleonastic
entities are generated by what Schiffer calls something from nothing transformations. On my view, by
contrast, pleonastic reifications, do not yield genuine, free-standing real existents at all. The results of
pleonastic reification are, rather, entirely dispensable faon de parler. They have no independent
substantive nature that outstrips the construction by which they are generated. We have said all there is to
say about them when we have given the rules by which they are constructed. Given that Schiffer says that
his pleonastic entities have minimal natures one might well wonder whether the difference between
Schiffers views and my own are substantive or merely verbal. That is a question I lack space to consider
here but the less robustly ontological one takes Schiffers pleonastic entities to be, the closer they will be in
spirit to my merely notional objects.
S6
G5%H, F(/&2
Auams, F., anu Bietiich, L.A. 2uu4. "What's in a(n Empty) Name." B(8#7#8
B"#*,1,:"#8(* C-(5.35*6 8S (2uu4): 12S-148.
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Auams, F., Fullei, u. anu Steckei, R. 1997. 'The Semantics of Fictional Names',
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Auams, F. anu Steckei, R. 1994. 'vacuous Singulai Teims', D#$) ($) E($&-(&3 9,
S87-4u1.

Boghossian, P.A. 199u: 'The Status of Content', !"3 B"#*,1,:"#8(* F34#3<, vol. XCIX,
No. 2.
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Biaun, B. 2uuS. "Empty Names, Fictional Names, Nythical Names." /,-1 S9: S96-
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