COURSE OUTLINE

SESSION 1
LTD
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PART III
5. Rule 6, Sections 1 to 13 of the Rules of Court
RULE 6
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Section

Sec.

1.

Pleadings

defined.

Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted
to the court for appropriate judgment.
2.
Pleadings
allowed.
The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)
party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him.
An answer may be responded to by a reply.

Sec.

3.

Complaint.

Sec.

The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and
residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
4.
Answer.

Sec.

An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.

5.
Defenses.
Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of
the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by
him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality,
statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way
of confession and avoidance.

Sec.

6.

Counterclaim.

Sec.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
7.
Compulsory
counterclaim.

Sec.

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of
the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
8.
Cross-claim.

Sec.

A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
9.
Counter-counterclaims
and
counter-cross-claims.
A counterclaim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.

Sec.

10.

Reply.

A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance
of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such
new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are
deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims
shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint.
Sec.

11.

Third,

(fourth,

etc.)

party

complaint.

Sec.

A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
12.
Bringing
new
parties.

Sec.

When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of
complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to
be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
13.
Answer
to
third
(fourth,
etc.)
party
complaint.

A third (fourth, etc.) party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims,
including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiff's
claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the
latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
6. Rule 7, Sections 5 and 5 of the Rules of Court.
7. Study Chapter III, Section 14 to 22 of PD 1529
CHAPTER III
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
I
ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
A. APPLICATIONS
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency
of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter
shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless
prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
Section 15. Form and contents. The application for land registration shall be in writing, signed by the
application or the person duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to
administer oaths for the province or city where the application was actually signed. If there is more than one
applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. The application shall
contain a description of the land and shall state the citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether
single or married, and, if married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if the marriage has been legally
dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall also state the full names and addresses
of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall state the
extent of the search made to find them.
The application, shall, in form, be substantially as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

Court of First Instance of _________________

The undersigned, ____________________________________________________________hereby applies

(or apply) to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree, and to have the title thereto registered and confirmed:
AND DECLARE . . . . .
1. That the applicants/s is/are the owners of the land (by virtue of inheritance or deed of sale or
conveyance and/or possession in accordance with Section 14 of said Decree), together with the
building and improvements thereon, with the exception of the
following:_______________________________________________________________________
___ which is/are the property of _________________________ residing at
_________________________ The said land, consisting of ____________________ parcel/s
is/are situated, bounded and described as shown on the plan and technical descriptions attached
hereto and made a part hereof, with the following
exception:___________________________________________________________________
2. That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at P ____, Philippine currency,
and the buildings and other improvements at P ___________, Philippine currency.

3. That to the best of my/our knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other person having any interest therein, legal or
equitable, or in possession, other than as follows:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_________
4. That the applicant/s has/have acquired said land in the following manner:
________________________________
(Note: Refer to Sec. 14 of said Decree. State also whether the property is conjugal, paraphernal or
exclusive property of the applicant/s)
5. That said land is occupied by the following person: _____________________________
______________________________________________
6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties, of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5, and of the persons shown on
the plan as claimants, are as follows:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_________________
7. That the applicant/s is/are single or married to ____________________ (Note: if marriage has
been legally dissolved, state when and how the marriage relation
terminated.)_________________________________________________________________
_____________________
8. That the applicant's/s' full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address/es is/are as
follows: ___________________________________________________________________
9. That (Note: If the land included in the application is bounded by a public or private way or road,
there should be stated in this paragraph whether or not the applicant claims any and what land
within the limits of the way or road and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or
road determined.) ________________________________________
___________________________
10. That the following documents are attached hereto and made a part hereof:
___________________________________ ________________________________
Signed at ___________________ this _____________________ day of ____________________,
in the year nineteen hundred and ______________________.

__________________________
Applicant

_________________________
(Post Office Address)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROVINCE (OR CITY) OF _______________

On this _______________ day of _________________________,19 ________ personally

appeared before me the above- named
__________________________________________________ known to me to be the person/s
who executed the foregoing application and made oath that the statements therein are true of
his/their knowledge, information and belief.
The Residence Certificate/s ______________________ of the applicant/s ______________
was/were exhibited to me being No. _________________ issued at ___________________ dated
____________, 19 __________.________________________

(Notary Public, or other Officer

authorized to administer oaths)
PTR NO. _________________
Section 16. Non-resident applicant. If the applicant is not a resident of the Philippines, he shall file with his
application an instrument in due form appointing an agent or representative residing in the Philippines,
giving his full name and postal address, and shall therein agree that the service of any legal process in the
proceedings under or growing out of the application made upon his agent or representative shall be of the
same legal effect as if made upon the applicant within the Philippines. If the agent or representative dies, or
leaves the Philippines, the applicant shall forthwith make another appointment for the substitute, and, if he
fails to do so the court may dismiss the application.
Section 17. What and where to file. The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the
application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the
Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
Section 18. Application covering two or more parcels. An application may include two or more parcels of
land belonging to the applicant/s provided they are situated within the same province or city. The court may
at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a severance
of the application.
Section 19. Amendments. Amendments to the application including joinder, substitution, or discontinuance
as to parties may be allowed by the court at any stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries or an increase in area of the land
applied for or which involve the inclusion of an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of
publication and notice as in an original application.
Section 20. When land applied for borders on road. If the application describes the land as bounded by a
public or private way or road, it shall state whether or not the applicant claims any and what portion of the
land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or
road determined.
Section 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. The court may require facts to be
stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may
require the filing of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary.
Section 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. After the filing of the application and before the
issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole
or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with

a subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof and the court,
after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to
whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
Case:
G.R. No. 150413

July 1, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDRA LAO, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which
affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case
No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad.
452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349)
square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma.
Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her
father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her
predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and
occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who
testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on
respondents purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag,
who assisted respondent in her application for registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale3 dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey
plan and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as
her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and
Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of
the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was
declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land
involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from
the survey plan covering the same property, as well as technical description and other documents
presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or
public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant
appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.4
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred
forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of

legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.6 Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF
TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.7
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS
OF POSSESSION.8
B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER
CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.9
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 10
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum
of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was
able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and
(b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced
the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law
became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession

remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141.
Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land
from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,11 we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto
de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was
retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141.
This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January
25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the
period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December
31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-ininterest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,12 thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, "Section 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As
amended Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an
owner, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents witnesses did not state the
exact period when respondents predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only
made sweeping statements to the effect that respondent had been in possession of the property for more
than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively determined whether respondent and her predecessorsin-interest have truly been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore,
respondent failed to show how the property was transferred from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera
and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of property was established. Consequently,
respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it
was owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim.
Respondent submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of
Edilberto. However, the earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the
required period. Respondents other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the
property since he was ten years old, which was in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On
cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his information on Edilbertos ownership of the land
on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later
on admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto was indeed the owner and possessor of
the property.13

Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of
the land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not
show the relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the
latter, where it was stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence,
respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most,
respondents possession can only be reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed
possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions
of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in
our Constitution,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land.15 All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.16 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.17 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.18
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,19 it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to
alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely
submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding
the classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is open for
disposition because no opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate government
agencies. She claims that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are
agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the
property involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land
being registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was
agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.20 Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,21 we
held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for
registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the
unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69)
governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State
cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.22
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the
government.23 It cannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over
Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land Registration
Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 27-33.

RTC Records, pp. 68-69.

Id., at 5.

RTC Records, pp. 68-69.

Id., at 69.

Rollo, p. 33.

Id., at 14.

Id.

Id., at 21.

10

Id.

11

G.R. No. 112172, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 96.

12

G.R. No. 116372, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 451.

13

TSN, April 19, 1996, p. 10.

14

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. xxx.
15

Seville v. National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 112,
120.
16

Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156 (2000).

17

Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 128, 139.

18

Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129682, 21 March 2002.

19

G.R. No. 135527, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 716.

10

20

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50260, 29 July 1992, 211 SCRA 868, 876.

21

G.R. No. L-68533, 23 May 1986, 142 SCRA 57.

22

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 606, 610.

23

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA 1, 9.

24

Pagkatipunan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.

8. Muniments of Title, Definition, Kinds, Evidentiary Value

MUNIMENTS. The instruments of writing and written evidences which the owner of lands, possessions, or
inheritances has, by which he is enabled to defend the title of his estate. Termes de la Ley, h.t.; 3 Inst. 170.
Muniments refers to chain of documents that indicate title to property, from the beginning to the present.

9. Chapter II-B, PD 1529- Publication, Opposition and Default

Cases:

G.R. No. 111715 June 8, 2000

MANUEL SILVESTRE BERNARDO and the HEIRS OF JOSE P. BERNARDO namely, TELESFORA
BERNARDO, ROBERTO BERNARDO, WILFRIDO BERNARDO, LUIS BERNARDO and MELCHOR
BERNARDO, petitioners,
vs.
CA, THE ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., EMBASSY TERRACES HOMES
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION and THE HEIRS OF VICTORIA D. SANTOS, namely, MIGUEL,
CARIDAD, MANUEL, TERESITA, ALICIA, ANTONIO MIGUEL and MA. LOURDES, all surnamed SANTOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112876 June 8, 2000
ANITA S. LIM, BENJAMIN A. TANGO and ANTONIO C. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., EMBASSY TERRACE HOMES
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, and HEIRS OF VICTORIA SANTOS namely, MIGUEL, CARIDAD,
MANUEL, TERESITA, ALICIA, ANTONIO MIGUEL and MA. LOURDES, all surnamed SANTOS,
respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari aim to reverse the August 19, 1993 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals that disposed CA-G.R. SP No. 30815 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 17, 1985 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 165, in LRC Case No. N-138, reconstituting Transfer Certificate of Title No.
12658 is declared Null and Void for lack of jurisdiction and in violation of the basic
requirements of due process. The reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12658, in

11

the name of Tomas Bernardo, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is likewise
declared Null and Void.
A writ is, hereby, issued permanently prohibiting respondent Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 88, from further conducting proceedings in Civil Case No. 92-12645,
except to dismiss the complaint, and receive evidence on the counter-claim of the herein
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
The instant controversy evolved from the following facts on record:
On July 16, 1985, Manuel Silvestre Bernardo, claiming to be the "legitimate son and only surviving heir" of
Tomas Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a verified petition for reconstitution 2 of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12658 that the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province issued in the name of Tomas
Bernardo. TCT No. 12658 allegedly covered an area of approximately three hundred thirty-four thousand
five hundred eleven (334,511) square meters in "Quezon City (previously part of Rizal Province)" designated
as Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate. Docketed as L.R.C. Case No. R-138, the petition alleged that the owner's
copy of TCT No. 12658 was in petitioner Manuel Bernardo's custody, stored with other "old papers," but
subsequent diligent search for it proved futile. When he verified from the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal,
petitioner Manuel Bernardo was allegedly told that the original copy of TCT No. 12658 had "likewise been
lost/destroyed and (could) no longer be recovered." He had not "pledged nor delivered to any person or
entity to secure any obligation or for any purpose whatsoever," the owner's copy of the title that was in his
possession. Neither was there any "transaction or document relating thereto" that had been presented for or
pending registration in the Register of Deeds office. Furthermore, TCT No. 12658 had not been "recalled,
cancelled or revoked" and hence it was "in full force and effect." Petitioner Manuel Bernardo also alleged
that since his deceased father died, he had "continuously exercised actual ownership and possession over
the property embraced in and covered by said title." He asserted that the "technical descriptions, boundaries
and area of the parcel of land" covered by TCT No. 12658 "are substantially the same as those indicated in
the official Technical Descriptions" attached to the petition and the officially approved survey plan that he
would present at the hearing. He indicated therein the properties adjoining the property covered by TCT No.
12658 as follows:
On the N., Lots 724 & 935 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by Far Eastern University,
Manila; on the E., Lot 933 (Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by San Pedro Estate
represented by Engracio San Pedro of 118 Kamias Road, Quezon City; on the S., Lot 706
(Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by San Pedro Estate, supra; and on the NW., Lot 705
(Piedad Estate) owned/claimed by Himlayang Pilipino, Quezon Blvd., Quezon City;
On the strength of the certification allegedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal stating that the
original copy of TCT No. 12658 was "on file and record under Reg. Book T-51" and that he could no longer
locate the owner's copy of TCT No. 12658, petitioner Manuel Bernardo contended that reconstitution of the
same certificate of title was "proper and necessary." Otherwise, he could not exercise his legitimate rights as
owner of the property.
On August 8, 1985, the Pasig RTC 3 issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on October 3, 1985 and
directing that its Order be posted at the bulletin board of the Halls of Justice in Pasig. It also directed that the
same Order be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Filipino Times as well as in the Official
Gazette, pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26. 4
At the hearing on October 3, 1985, the Pasig RTC found that petitioner Manuel Bernardo's mother, Perfecta
Blas, predeceased his father, Tomas Bernardo, who thereafter married Constancia Cruz. Tomas' second
marriage was without issue. Thus, when Tomas died in 1944, petitioner Manuel Bernardo became Tomas'
sole heir to the property covered by TCT No. 12658. Petitioner Manuel Bernardo took possession of the
property but when he wanted to exercise his proprietary rights thereon, diligent search in his aparador failed
to yield the owner's copy of the title.
On October 17, 1985, the Pasig RTC granted the petition for reconstitution of title. In the Order 5 it issued on
that day, the court said:

12

Petitioner's evidence, both oral and documentary, has likewise proved and established, to
the satisfaction of the Court, that the corresponding survey plan and technical description
of the property covered by TCT No. 12658, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands are still
intact; that the property is fully cultivated, planted to fruit trees and a farm lot constructed
thereon (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "O", "O-1"); that the requirements mentioned in the Order
(Exhs. "A" and "A-1"), with respect to posting and publication have been duly complied
with (Exhs. "B", "B-1", "G", "H", "H-1" to "H-4", "I", "I-1", "F"). No encumbrance of whatever
nature affect the realty covered by said title.
That Order having become final and executory, it was entered in the daybook of the Registry of Deeds on
November 21, 1985, together with the certificate of finality. 6
On December 12, 1985, the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration, through Ricardo F. Aranilla, filed a
manifestation 7 before the Pasig RTC. It stated that the Order of October 17, 1985 was issued by that court
before the Land Registration Commission could approve the plan and technical description of Lot No. 802 of
the Piedad Estate "as required by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26." The same manifestation stated that
the Commission was not furnished with the documents 8 required by LRC Circular No. 35 dated June 11,
1983. It thus prayed that in the meantime that petitioner Manuel Bernardo had not yet submitted the required
documents, implementation of the Order of October 17, 1985 should be held in abeyance.
Accordingly, on January 15, 1986, the Pasig RTC issued an Order requiring petitioner Manuel Bernardo to
submit to the Land Registration Commission the documents required by LRC Circular No. 35. 9 On January
23, 1986, the Acting Register of Deeds of Pasig forwarded to the Land Registration Commissioner the same
documents required by LRC Circular No. 35 "in relation to our letter on consulta dated November 25, 1985."
10

On January 31, 1986, Acting Commissioner Oscar R. Victoriano of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) issued a Resolution in LRC Consulta 1490 on account of the doubts
that the Pasig Register of Deeds entertained on whether or not he should proceed with the registration of the
Order of October 17, 1985. Said Register of Deeds had certified the records of the case to the NLTDRA with
these observations:
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12658 sought to be reconstituted is, according to
the records, Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate, situated in Pasong Tamo, Quezon City with an
area of 334,511 square meters.
Under the law, petitions for judicial reconstitution shall be filed with the proper Court of
First instance now Regional Trial Court (Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 26). The question may be
asked. Is it the Regional Trial Court in Pasig or the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City?
The original copy of the title appears to have been lost in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in
Pasig, but the property covered by the title is situated in Quezon City.
With due respect to the Court Order issued by the Honorable Regional Trial Court, we
elevated this matter en consulta to that Commission at our instance in view of our doubt
as to whether we may proceed to register the subject Court Order and issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title although the land covered is located in Quezon
City and not in Rizal. Is it the Register of Deeds of Rizal who should reconstitute? 11
Citing Bacalso v. Ramolete 12 and Ella v. Salanga, 13 Acting Commissioner Victoriano ruled that since
Quezon City and Pasig belonged to the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, either
branch may take jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution of title. Thus, the Pasig RTC had jurisdiction
to issue the Order reconstituting the title in question. On the issue as to whether it is the Register of Deeds
of Pasig or the Register of Deed of Quezon City who should register the Order of October 17, 1985, the
Acting Commissioner held that pursuant to Section 51 of P.D. No. 1527, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City should perform that task. Accordingly, he ordered the transmittal of the necessary documents to the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 14

13

On June 4, 1986 the Pasig RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the Order of
October 17, 1985. 15 The following day, the acting clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of Pasig accordingly
issued the writ of execution 16 that was served on the Register of Deeds of Pasig on January 26, 1987. 17
It appears that the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Ricardo F. Arandilla, the Chief of the Clerks of Court of the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), refused to execute the Order of October 17, 1985. Thus, petitioner
Manuel Bernardo filed a petition to cite them in indirect contempt of court. In his answer to that petition,
Arandilla admitted that said Order was elevated to the LRC "by way of consulta" but that the documents
required by LRC Circular No. 35 were submitted to the LRC not in virtue of that consulta but in compliance
with said circular. Arandilla alleged that he could not have submitted the required documents while these
were "pending examination and verification by the Commission" especially because "the findings of the
Chief, Department of Registration, show that said plan and technical description submitted by petitioner
overlaps other properties." On account of that finding, the Chief of the Department of Registration advised
the Bureau of Lands thereof and requested that verification be made on the overlapping parcels of land.
However, since the Bureau of Lands had not replied to the request, it would be improper for Arandilla to
forward the documents to the Register of Deeds. 18
Thereafter, with his report dated August 20, 1987, 19 Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the NLTDRA
submitted to the Pasig RTC the plan in tracing cloth and two (2) print copies of Lot 802, Piedad Estate, and
their corresponding technical descriptions on account of the following findings:
(3) Upon plotting of the technical description of Lot 802, Piedad Estate, on the municipal
index sheets of this Office, the same was found to overlap Lot 935-C, Psd-8994, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148176 issued in the name of Freeman Incorporated.
This finding is contained in the 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1987 20 of the Chief,
Department on Registration, this Administration, . . . .
(4) The extent of overlapping between Lot 802, Piedad Estate, and Lot 935-C, Psd-8994,
is graphically shown in Sketch Plan No. SK-86-053 where Lot 802 is drawn in black lines
while Lot 935-C is reflected in red lines. . . .
Nonetheless, it appears that at 1:05 p.m. on January 4, 1988, TCT No. 12658 in the name of Tomas
Bernardo was entered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. 21 Annotated at the back of the title are the
following inscriptions:
MEMO. This Certificate of title was issued pursuant to the Order (P.E. -453/T-12658) dtd.
Oct. 17, 1985, issued by the Court (RTC) Br. CLXV (165), Pasig, Metro Manila, LRC No.
R-138 Manuel Silvestre Bernardo, (Heir of deceased Tomas Bernardo), Petitioner, and by
virtue of the resolution promulgated in LRC Consulta No. 1490 dated January 31, 1986.
Quezon City, January 4, 1987 (sic).
SAMUEL C. CLEOFE
Register of Deeds 22
On July 3, 1992, armed with the reconstituted title, petitioner Manuel Bernardo and the Heirs of Jose P.
Bernardo filed before the Quezon City RTC, Civil Case No. Q-92-12645, a complaint for annulment of
certificates of title. Named defendants therein are persons and entities that petitioner Manuel Bernardo had
found to be in possession of certificates of title over property within that covered by his reconstituted title.
They are the following: Heirs of Burgos Pangilinan, Embassy Terraces Homes Condominium, Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Inc. and/or Bonifacio Subdivision, National Electrification Administration, A & E
Industrial Corporation, Paulino G. Pe and Milestone Development Corporation. Except for Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. (AIAI), these defendants filed their respective answers to the complaint. AIAI filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on these grounds: (a) plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to institute the action;
(b) lack of cause of action, and (c) plaintiff's cause of action, if any, had been waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished on the grounds of estoppel and laches. 23

14

Thereafter, the plaintiffs (hereafter the Bernardos) amended their complaint to implead as defendants the
heirs of Dr. Victoria D. Santos. The amended complaint 24 alleged further that Manuel Bernardo and his
brother Jose, had been in possession of the property in question since their father died intestate on
November 29, 1944 but it was Manuel who was in possession of the certificate of ownership of the property.
After Jose's death on March 17, 1961, his heirs "assisted" Manuel in "the possession of the said parcel of
land." In 1979, Manuel searched his locker for the certificate of title that he needed for the relocation of the
property but despite exercise of due diligence, his efforts proved futile. He thus went to the Register of
Deeds in Pasig, only to find out that the original certificate of title was also missing.
The amended complaint stated that in 1982, Manuel sought the help of Attys. Julian F. Salcedo, Roberto
Nolasco and Antonio Gonzales in the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658, the relocation of the "actual
boundaries" of the land, and the settlement of the estate of Tomas. Because said lawyers failed to render to
him the desired professional services, Manuel retained only Atty. Antonio Gonzales and hired Atty. Benjamin
Tango. These lawyers were able to secure these documents: (a) certificate of sale; (b) certified plan of Lot
802, Piedad Estate "as prepared for Tomas Bernardo," and (c) technical description of the property. They
then filed the petition for reconstitution of title and, having obtained a reconstituted title, Manuel resumed his
"researches on the plan of the adjoining or boundary owners in order to effect the relocation survey" with the
help of a surveyor. The "researches" allegedly proved that "substantial portions if not all of the 33.4511
hectares have been landgrabbed or overlapped."
Attys. Juan Salcedo and Roberto Nolasco's filing of Civil Case No. Q-90-5784, a complaint for specific
performance against them, allegedly hampered the Bernardos' research efforts. Attys. Salcedo and Nolasco
wanted that eighteen (18) hectares of the land in question be sold to them. The Bernardos thus contracted
the services of another counsel and continued their "researches and verifications" . . . "for the purpose of
determining the exact boundaries of their said land." Such researches unveiled "dubious and intricate
manipulations and juggling of lot numbers through subdivisions to hide the landgrabbing." The complaint
particularized these acts as follows:
(a) The supposed first subdivision plan of Lot 802 . . . shows the designations of numbers
933, 934 and 935 to the subdivided lots which are the lot numbers of the adjoining parcels
of land of the said parcel (Lot 802 Piedad Estate) of the plaintiffs; hence, the location and
identity of those lots are different from the location or identity of said Lot 802 of Piedad
Estate of the plaintiffs;
(b) The said subdivision plan . . . bears the signature of then Director Jorge B. Vargas of
the Director of Lands which is different from the signature of Director Vargas affixed in the
Certificate of Sale . . . and from the signature of the same official affixed on proximate
dates in those assignment of Sale Certificates . . .; hence, the signature in the said
Subdivision Plan . . . is obviously falsified;
(c) To give semblance of authenticity to said subdivision plan . . . the name of deceased
Tomas Bernardo was made to appear as the owner of Lot 933 therein;
(d) The subsequent subdivision plans, . . .; show clearly the scheme to suppress the
original genuine Lot Number 802 of the land of the plaintiffs to avoid identifications in
violation of laws, rules and regulations;
The amended complaint thus alleged that the defendants' certificates of title were null and void as these
"originated from a non-existent and falsified subdivision plan . . . and from spurious subdivision plans . . .
and their predecessors-in-interest had not been purchasers or assignees of certificate of sale from the
Piedad Estate (or) any portion of said Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate thru the Bureau of Lands." Charging that
the defendants knew the defects in their titles, the Bernardos averred that defendants could not have been
holders of certificates of title in good faith.
The Bernardos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to observe the status quo and, after
due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued by the court to enjoin the
defendants from subdividing, developing and selling any portion of Lot 802 "or the parcel of land supposedly
designated as Lot Nos. 802-A; 933; 934 and 935 Piedad Estate." They also prayed that the Subdivision Plan
of Lot 902 Piedad Estate prepared for "Potenciano Guevarra; Antera Guevarra; Tomas Bernardo and

15

Cornelio Pangilinan" be declared as null and void ab initio, that defendants be declared as not buyers in
good faith, and their respective titles nullified. However, if the land covered by defendants' certificates of title
could no longer be recovered, the Bernardos prayed that the defendants should be ordered "to pay for the
market value of the portions of said Lot 802 plus the interest at the legal rate computed from the date of the
sale until full payment of the amount due the plaintiffs." They prayed further for damages of P700,000.00,
exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500,000.00.
Thereafter, Anita S. Lim, Benjamin A. Tango and Antonio C. Gonzales, filed a motion for intervention 25
alleging that they were co-owners of the land in question. In their complaint in intervention, 26 they alleged
that as the "only son and surviving legal heir" of Tomas Bernardo, Manuel Bernardo inherited the entire
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12658 through an affidavit of self-adjudication executed on March 21,
1989. Manuel later conveyed to them the following undivided portions thereof: (a) 10,000 square meters to
Anita S. Lim in consideration of the amount of P180,000.00; 27 (b) 90,000 square meters to Atty. Antonio C.
Gonzales as "contingent fee" for legal services rendered, 28 and (c) 90,511 square meters to Atty. Benjamin
A. Tango for his "financial assistance and . . . invaluable personal services in solving (Manuel's) problems
over said tract of land." 29 After these conveyances were made, Manuel and the intervenors entrusted the
owner's copy of TCT No. 12658 to Tango and appointed him as their representative in "initiating and
following up the administrative reconstitution of the Register of Deeds' Office copy of the title which has been
previously destroyed by fire." They thus intervened as "legitimate co-owners" of the property entitled to resist
"the illegal encroachments and usurpation(s)" therein, thus joining the plaintiffs' prayer for a declaration of
nullity of the subdivision plan and the Torrens titles issued to defendants. They prayed further that
defendants should be made to vacate the property and to relinquish the same in favor of Manuel and
themselves, and that they should be paid attorney's fees and actual damages.
In its motion to dismiss, 30 defendant AIAI averred that the Bernardos had no legal capacity to institute the
action. It alleged that since the photocopy of TCT No. 12658 attached to the complaint was questionable as
it did not have a back page and was not certified as a true copy, the filing of the complaint was premature.
Moreover, since the action was for annulment of certificate of title, the proper remedy would have been an
action for reversion that only the Solicitor General could file.
In alleging that the complainant did not have a cause of action, defendant AIAI contended that the Pasig
RTC gave due course to the petition for reconstitution of title even without the "usual Land Registration
Authority (formerly LRC) Report to pass upon the authenticity of the claim and alleged title of the plaintiffs."
Defendant AIAI stated that its properties are all inside the area claimed by plaintiffs and that OCT No. 614
from whence Tomas Bernardo derived his alleged title, was the same original certificate of title from where
the title of AIAI emanated. Hence, unless the plaintiffs could show a certified true copy of their title or a
confirmation of their title from the Land Registration Authority, plaintiffs had no right to invoke under their
alleged title.
Defendant AIAI asserted that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished on the ground of estoppel and laches. Because AIAI's title was registered under the Torrens
system of land registration, it could not be defeated by "adverse, open and notorious possession." Even if
the action would be considered as one to recover the property, the same had prescribed "as to titles
registered 10 years prior to the filing of this suit."
For its part, defendant Embassy Terrace Homes Condominium Corporation (ETHCC) filed an answer to the
amended complaint 31 alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. (360285) T19080 that was within the area covered by TCT No. 12658. It alleged that the same area covered by TCT
No. 12658 was already under the private ownership of more than a hundred persons who had titles either
jointly or individually and that, by reason thereof, the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for
reconstitution of title. Moreover, that court had no jurisdiction over such action because the actual occupants
of the land as well as the adjoining owners of land had not been notified of the hearing thereon as required
by Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 26. A verification of the records in fact showed the following jurisdictional
defects: (a) the petition omitted to state the names and addresses of actual occupants with their respective
titles; (b) while a few adjoining owners were mentioned with their addresses, there was no record that they
were notified of the hearing on the petition, and (c) Land Registration Circular No. 35 dated June 12, 1983
was circumvented. Furthermore, despite the numerous annexes to the petition for reconstitution, a "Deed of
Conveyance" executed by the Director of Lands evidencing that a certificate of title had been issued as
provided in Sec. 122 of the Land Registration Act, was not attached. Hence, defendant ETHCC prayed for

16

the dismissal of the complaint, a declaration of nullity of the Bernardos' title, and an award of damages in the
amount of P700,000.00.
Defendant ETHCC then filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on the grounds for the motion to dismiss
averred in its answer to the complaint. 32
In their answer to the complaint, 33 the heirs of Dr. Victoria Santos, echoed defendant ETHCC's allegation
that the land covered by TCT No. 12658 was already occupied and titled in the names of hundreds of
persons like them. They asserted that TCT No. 44838 in their name evidenced ownership of a parcel of land
allegedly encompassed by TCT No. 12658. They added that the certificate of sale relied upon by the
Bernardos in their petition for reconstitution of title was in fact "an agreement to sell conferring no right
whatsoever to plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, until and after the conditions therein contained are complied
with, established and proved." They claimed that Lot 802 of the Piedad Estate had been subdivided under
Subdivision Plan Psd 2118 into four parcels: (a) Lot 802-A to Lot 802-New (51,036 square meters
Cornelio Pangilinan); (b) Lot 802-8 to Lot 933 (50,001 square meters Tomas Bernardo); (c) Lot 802-C to
Lot 934 (79,592 square meters Potenciana Guevarra), and (d) Lot 802-D to Lot 935 (153,882 square
meters Antera Guevarra).
On November 13, 1992, the Quezon City RTC 34 issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss filed by
defendant AIAI. It considered as grounds for such denial the following: (a) the plaintiffs had alleged a cause
of action against defendants who had "transgressed" the former's title over the property in question, and (b)
laches, much less prescription, does not lie against a registered land. 35
On January 13, 1993, the same court also denied for lack of merit the motions of defendant ETHCC and
Milestone Development Corporation for a preliminary hearing. It held that the reason for the prayer for
dismissal of the action, i.e., prescription and laches, did "not appear to be indubitable" and therefore these
could be determined at the trial of the case. 36
Consequently, on April 27, 1993, all the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, naming as public respondents both the Quezon City
and the Pasig RTC, and as private respondents, the Bernardos and the intervenors. Docketed as CA-G.R.
No. SP-30815, the petition 37 alleged that it was only when the defendants were summoned in Civil Case No.
Q-92-12645 that they learned of the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 before the Pasig RTC. As such,
petitioner Manuel Bernardo's failure to name in the petition and to notify the actual occupants of the land and
the owners of the lots adjoining the area covered by the title to be reconstituted was a jurisdictional defect
that nullified the proceedings. Petitioner Manuel Bernardo also failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 142 of Republic Act No. 26 and LRC Circulars Nos. 35 and 364 and therefore, as the records
showed that the Register of Deeds of Pasig sought consultation with his higher-ups, the proceedings before
the Pasig RTC was so highly irregular that even the Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
commanded the Register of Deeds of Rizal to register the property that was located in Quezon City.
The petition noted that the certificate of loss of the original copy of TCT No. 12658 issued by the Pasig
Register of Deeds to buttress the petition for reconstitution did not even mention the material particulars of
the property that the title covered. The filing of the petition for reconstitution with the Pasig RTC forty (40)
years after the war when the certificate of title would have been transferred to the Register of Deeds in
Quezon City, was a "credible admission" on the part of Manuel Bernardo that the property was actually
located in Pasig. Moreover, there was no record in the Assessor's Office in Quezon City that a tax
declaration was ever issued in the name of Tomas Bernardo or his heirs. It was only after he filed Civil Case
No. Q-92-12645 that Manuel Bernardo applied for a tax declaration but defendants AIAI and ETHCC, as
regular taxpayers, opposed such application.
The petition alleged further that per the technical description of Lot 802 (Piedad Estate), the original survey
was conducted from July 1 to December 14, 1907. The Director of Lands approved the subdivision survey
thereon under Psd 2118 on June 21, 1927 upon the application of Potenciana Guevarra. The survey that
was conducted from December 5, 1925 to October 8, 1927 by private land surveyor Emilio P. Gutierrez
subdivided Lot No. 802 into four: Lots 802-A, 802-B, 802-C and 802-D which respectively became Lots 802New, 933; 934 and 935. Culled from the records of the Bureau of Lands, these facts indubitably showed that
the certificate of sale in favor of Tomas Bernardo that was executed on July 25, 1927 was fake and nonexistent. That the certificate of sale could not have covered the entire Lot 802 was borne by the fact that Lot
934 was the subject of a final deed of conveyance, Deed No. 22246 dated February 13, 1931, in favor of

17

Francisco Gaerlan, although that parcel of land was claimed by Antera Guevarra in Subdivision Survey Map
Psd 2118.
As regards the denial by the lower court of defendant AIAI's motion to dismiss, the petition before the Court
of Appeals claimed that a consideration of the proceedings leading to the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658
would lead the Court of Appeals to the inevitable conclusion that indeed such title was null and void and
hence, the Bernardos had no cause of action to file Civil Case No. Q-92-12654. However, to shorten
proceedings, the lower court should not have made an outright denial of their motion for preliminary hearing
on the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the Bernardos action was barred by laches as
against defendants-petitioners "who have paid taxes, introduced visible, expensive and permanent
infrastructures and buildings" and whose titles have been perfected by the Bernardos' long inaction.
On May 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals directed the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
Quezon City RTC Branch 88 "from further conducting any proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645." 38
In their comment on the petition, intervenors Anita S. Lim, Benjamin A. Tango and Antonio C. Gonzales
averred that since LRC Case No. R-138 had long become final and executory, the matter of reconstitution of
title was already res judicata. Furthermore, the question in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 of which of the
contending parties had the better title over some portions of the property covered by TCT No. 12658, was
properly within the jurisdiction of the Quezon City RTC, not the Court of Appeals. 39
Defending the propriety of their petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners AIAI, et al. contended in their
reply to said intervenors' comment that the Order for the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 having been
issued without jurisdiction for lack of notice to proper parties, res judicata did not attach. They asserted that
the Bernardos' having annexed to their complaint in Civil Case No. 92-12645 copies of defendants' titles was
a clear recognition of the latter's ownership of the property covered by their respective titles. They added
that the denial of their motion to dismiss by the Quezon City RTC in a way validated the Bernardos'
reconstituted title and hence, they were constrained to file the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
40

The Bernardos asserted the validity of the reconstitution of TCT No. 12658 in their comment on the petition.
41
They assailed the merger in the petition of what amounted to a complaint for annulment of the Order of
reconstitution of title and a petition to prohibit further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. They
questioned the genuineness of the petitioners' titles specifically that of A & E Industrial Corporation which
derived its title from Freeman. Inc., allegedly the owner of Lot 935-B that was actually located in Manila.
In the reply 42 to that comment, petitioners AIAI, et al. defended the propriety of the special civil action they
had filed, contending that an order of a court such as that granting reconstitution of title, if rendered without
jurisdiction, may be assailed at any time in any proceeding. It added the information that Milestone
Development Corporation had filed a petition before the Pasig RTC to nullify the Order of October 17, 1985
for lack of jurisdiction and for violation of the basic requirements of due process but such petition had been
denied on May 26, 1993. Asserting the validity of its title, petitioner AIAI assailed the Bernardos' "unkind
accusation" against Doa Josefa Edralin vda. de Marcos who had title and possession of a portion of the
property involved as early as 1952.
On August 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein questioned Decision. After receiving a copy of
that Decision, the Bernardos filed with this Court G.R. No. 111715, a petition for review on certiorari.
Meanwhile, the intervenors filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Decision. After the denial of that
motion on September 24, 1993, the same intervenors filed with this Court their own petition for review on
certiorari under G.R. No. 112876. On March 7, 1994, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two cases. 43
In G.R. No. 111715, the Bernardos presented the following arguments in support of their petition:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED TO HAVE RENDERED
THE QUESTIONED DECISION ON THE ACTION TO ANNUL UNDER SECTION 9,
PARAGRAPH 2, BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 THE FINAL ORDER OF
RECONSTITUTION RENDERED IN LRC CASE NO. R-139, BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL

18

COURT, PASIG, METRO MANILA BRANCH 165 AND THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO
DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE QUESTIONED ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 88,
QUEZON CITY ON THE WRONG ASSUMPTION THAT THE ISSUE OF VALIDITY OF
THE RECONSTITUTED TCT NO. 12658 AS WELL AS THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECONSTITUTION THEREOF POSES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 88 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON
CITY;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO AWFULLY ERRED FOR NOT BEING CONVERSANT
WITH THE RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT ON THE EFFICACY OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS UNDER THE FRIAR
LANDS ACT OR PUBLIC ACT NO. 1120; CONSEQUENTLY, THEY WERE MISTAKEN TO
HAVE ADOPTED AND QUOTED FROM THE PETITION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
THE WRONG CITATION OF THE RULING IN DELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ, 130 SCRA
666;
III
IN BOTH ACTIONS AS MERGED IN ONE PETITION THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION GATHERED AND COLLECTED
FACTS FROM THE BARE ALLEGATIONS AND THE ANNEXES THEREOF WHICH ARE
STILL CONTROVERTED AND NEITHER ESTABLISHED NOR ADMITTED BY THE
PETITIONERS; AND
IV
THUS, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS BASING ON THEIR UNSUPPORTED
FINDINGS ERRED FURTHER IN DEPRIVING COMPLETELY THE PETITIONERS OF
THEIR DAY-IN-COURT; WHEN THEY RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 1-92-12645 (sic) STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION; AND IN ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY AND WITH IGNOMINY HAS ORDERED THE RECEPTION OF THE
EVIDENCE ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
In G.R. No. 112876, the intervenors below allege that the following "questions of law" are involved in their
petition for review on certiorari:
1. Does the petition for certiorari, etc., (Annex E hereof), filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 30815 by
herein private respondents, constitute a violation of:
a. Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 date(d) September 3, 1991, prohibiting forumshopping?
b. Sec. 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court?
c. Sec. 4, Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court?
2. In rendering the questioned decision and resolution (Annex A and Annex B hereof), did
herein respondent Honorable Court of Appeals transgress:
a. Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 aforementioned?

19

b. Sec. 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court?

c. Sec. 4, Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court?
d. Sec. 8, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court?
e. Sec. 5, Executive Order No. 33 dated July 28, 1986 (published in O.G. August 4, 1986),
amending the second paragraph of Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
as amended?
f. Due process of law?
A preliminary issue that needs resolution in these consolidated cases is whether or not, under the Rules of
Court, the Court of Appeals may entertain and render a decision on a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with a two-pronged purpose: (a) annulment of an Order reconstituting a title, and (b) questioning
the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint for nullification of titles covering lots that overlap the area
covered by the reconstituted title.
The Court of Appeals took jurisdiction over the petition, specifically as regards the prayer for the annulment
of the Order reconstituting TCT No. 12658, pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 that vests it with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final decisions and orders of regional trial courts, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with, among others, the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 296." The Court of Appeals may thus resolve petitions for the annulment of final orders rendered by
a court without jurisdiction "at any time and in any proceeding by a party whom it is sought to be enforced." It
gave due course to the, petition for certiorari notwithstanding the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of
the denial by the lower court of the motion to dismiss filed by AIAI, because a "considerable delay" in the
lower court's resolution could leave the petitioners "without any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." Reasoning that "immediate resolution of the petition would prevent grave or
irreparable injury to the petitioners if their cause be meritorious," the Court of Appeals held:
We, therefore, uphold the propriety of the merging of the two causes of action in the same
petition for the reason that the issue of the validity of TCT No. 12658 in the name of
Tomas Bernardo as well as the validity of the reconstitution thereof poses a prejudicial
question to the issue before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As a matter of fact,
We have decided to resolve the whole controversy once and for all, considering that all
the facts surrounding the case are now before Us, and so as to prevent needless delay in
the disposition of this case. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners in G.R. No. 111715 assert that the Court of Appeals improperly "merged or joined" the action to
annul the final Order of reconstitution of title under its "original and exclusive jurisdiction," and the petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss which is under its "original
concurrent jurisdiction." They aver that such "merger" of issues in a special civil action is improper.
The issue that the Court of Appeals has to address in any petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In the particular petition before it, the Court of Appeals had to resolve the issue of whether or not
it could give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition that also prayed for annulment of
judgment. 44 We find that even as they prayed for annulment of the Order granting reconstitution of title,
private respondents invoked jurisdictional issues arising from the failure of the Bernardos to comply with
requirements in a petition for reconstitution of title. Hence, even if the object of the petition was for
annulment of the judgment of the Pasig RTC, still, the question of jurisdiction was involved.
As regards the private respondents' prayer for the reversal of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the
general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and hence, it cannot be questioned in a
special civil action of certiorari. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be subject of an appeal unless
and until a final judgment or order is rendered. However, that rule is not absolute. An exception is when the
Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction in

20

denying the motion to dismiss. 45 As we shall show later, the main thrust of the petition was to question the
trial court's jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
The "merger" of the two causes of action is thus justified. Since the controversy revolves around a land title
dispute, the pertinent laws thereon must be considered in determining the procedural aspect of the case.
Under the law, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens system and the one-year period
from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed without said decree being controverted by any
adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned. 46 The Bernardos' complaint was
aimed at nullifying private respondents' respective titles; the existence of such titles was therefore a
determinative factor as far as the matter of jurisdiction was concerned. Hence, the Bernardos' allegation that
the properties covered by said titles overlapped that covered by TCT No. 12658 created an indubitable
nexus between the reconstituted title and the titles of private respondents.
However, we cannot subscribe to the Court of Appeals' pronouncement that the validity of TCT No. 12658
and the proceedings for its reconstitution is a "prejudicial question" to the validity of private respondents'
titles to the same land. The phrase "prejudicial question" has a definite meaning in law. It "comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 47 As used by the Court of Appeals, the phrase "prejudicial
question" may only be understood as meaning that the validity of the reconstituted title is determinative of
the success of the complaint for annulment of the titles of private respondent.
Viewed from that light, there is a "unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved" 48 between the prayer for annulment of the judgment reconstituting TCT No. 12658 and that
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint for the annulment of titles of parcels of land
allegedly already covered by TCT No. 12658. The joinder of the two causes of action is mandated by the
need to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote an efficient administration of justice. In this regard, the
Court once said:
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5,
Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the
same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same
parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete
determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one
subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision
should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to
the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be
adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, with the end
in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage
joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs,
although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used
or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of
causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 49
It is undisputed that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of a judgment of a
Regional Trial Court. Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) explicitly
provides that the Court of Appeals (formerly the Intermediate Appellate Court), has "(e)xclusive original

21

jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." The rule on joinder of parties
is not violated by the institution of the action for annulment of judgment as the Bernardos themselves were
the petitioners in that action. The causes of action in the action for annulment of judgment and the special
civil action questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss arose out of the relation between the parties
both are holders of certificates of title that pertain to the same parcel of land.
Hence, contrary to the Bernardos' contention, the Court of Appeals correctly entertained the petition filed
before it by the private respondents. That the Court of Appeals is vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment and with original but concurrent jurisdiction over a special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition is immaterial. What is material is that the issues jointly raised before
the Court of Appeals pertain to the jurisdiction of the Pasig and Quezon City RTCs respectively, over the
reconstitution proceedings and the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. As this Court
has always stressed, the Rules of Court must be liberally construed 50 in the administration of justice. The
propriety of the Court of Appeals' action on each of the two (2) issues raised before it shall now be
discussed.
The Court of Appeals annulled the judgment in LRC Case No. N-138, principally on the ground of "lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the necessary parties" and for being "in violation of the basic requirements of
due process." It held that said court could not have exercised jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution
of title because it failed to observe the requirement in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26 that actual
occupants of the property must be notified of the proceedings. The Bernardos failed to notify private
respondents who are actual occupants of the land involved as, by the allegations in paragraph 10 of the
petition for reconstitution, they served notice of the reconstitution proceedings only upon the owners of the
lots adjoining the area covered by TCT No. 12658, i.e., Far Eastern University, San Pedro Estate and
Himlayang Pilipino. The Court of Appeals ruled further that "the pieces of evidence relied upon by the Pasig
RTC in granting reconstitution, i.e., a certification of loss of TCT No. 12658, technical description of Lot 802
by the Bureau of Lands, and certificate of sale of Lot No. 802 by the Director of Lands, do not meet the
requirements of the law."
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory judgment may be set aside through a
petition for relief from judgment within the period prescribed therefor. However, even beyond the period
prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 38, 51 a party aggrieved by a judgment may petition for its annulment on two
(2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it
has been obtained by fraud. 52 The nullity of a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only
by what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence
found in the records of the case and upon which such judgment is based. 53 We find that the record of this
case sufficiently warrants a ruling on the jurisdiction of the Pasig RTC over LRC Case N-1 38.
In order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of title, the following provisions
of Republic Act No. 26 must be observed:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
2(f), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance,
by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same
had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have
any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting
the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property
had been presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration thereof has not
been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto
and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be
further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved

22

by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Commission of Land
Registration), or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to
be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent,
by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named
therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and
service of the notice as directed by the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
The requirements of these provisions of law must be complied with before the court can act on the petition
and grant to the petitioner the reconstitution of title prayed for. 54 The requirement of notice by publication is
thus a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith is fatal to the petition for reconstitution of title.
55
However, notwithstanding compliance with that requirement, actual notice to the occupants of the property
is still mandatory. Thus:
Notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual
possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to
the effect settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors
of the land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition. 56
The indispensability of notice to actual possessors of the subject property was underscored in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Hen. Moya. 57 In that case, the Court held that failure to serve notice on a possessor of the
property involved renders the order of reconstitution null and void as said possessor is deprived of his day in
court. As such, the court upon which the petition for reconstitution of title is filed is duty-bound to examine
thoroughly the petition for reconstitution of title, and to review the record and the legal provisions laying
down the germane jurisdictional requirements. 58 It appears that the Pasig RTC failed to comply with this
judicial obligation.
The, petition for reconstitution of title 59 does not contain the "names and addresses of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property" as required by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26. Aside from
allegations pertinent to the Bernardos' claims, all that the petition contains is a description of its boundaries
with the names and addresses of the following owners of properties "adjoining the parcel of land embraced
in and covered by the subject" TCT No. 12658: (a) Far Eastern University, Manila; (b) Engracio San Pedro of
the San Pedro Estate, 118 Kamias Road, Quezon City, and (c) Himlayang Pilipino, Quezon Blvd., Quezon
City. No mention whatsoever was made as to actual occupants of the property.
Moreover, the Bernardos do not dispute private respondents' assertion that they were not served with notice
of the reconstitution proceedings. The veracity of that claim is bolstered by their filing of the action for
annulment of private respondents' title, alleging that only after TCT No. 12658 had been reconstituted did
they institute "researches" that showed who the actual possessors of the property were. Only after they had
found out that the property was occupied by and titled to private respondents did they institute Civil Case
No. Q-92-12645.
Nonetheless, the nullity of the reconstitution proceedings and the resulting reconstituted title does not
warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-92-12645. Without denigrating the titles of private respondents
that have become indefeasible over time, proceedings before the Quezon City RTC should continue on
account of an allegation on record that needs verification lest the integrity of the Torrens system of land
registration be sullied.

23

Private respondents ETHCC and the heirs of Dr. Victoria Santos both mention Subdivision Plan Psd 2118
that allegedly divided Lot 802 into four parts with one part thereof in the name of Tomas Bernardo. The
Bernardos and the intervenors assail the genuineness of that subdivision plan from which private
respondents trace their rights over their titled property. That material fact, which is beyond the ambit of this
Court's jurisdiction to consider, requires threshing out in the proceedings below in the interest of justice and
equity. It should be pointed out in this regard that the nullity of the reconstitution proceedings in the Pasig
RTC did not necessarily divest the Bernardos of proprietary rights over the property. The Torrens system of
land registration does not create or vest title; it has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership. 60 Reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly
lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. 61 As this Court said in Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
. . . . (Reconstitution of title) does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the
lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent
to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest
ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property. 62
The Court of Appeals obviously missed out on this point. In reversing the trial court's order denying the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-92-12645, the Court of Appeals held that the nullification of the
reconstituted title of the Bernardos left them with no cause of action as it was "foreclosed by the
indefeasibility of petitioners' authentic titles." In light of the aforesaid allegation in some of private
respondents' pleadings, this ruling should be overturned. While the grounds for the motion to dismiss thus
appeared to have some bases considering that private respondents are titled occupants of the property
involved, subsequent revelations such as their admission that a portion of Lot 802 as subdivided pertained
to Tomas Bernardo, mandate the continuation of the proceedings. The interest of proper administration of
justice therefore demands that the writ of prohibition issued by the Court of Appeals be set aside.
Civil Case No. Q-92-12645 should be considered as one of quieting of title which can proceed
notwithstanding the nullity of the reconstitution proceedings before the Pasig RTC. Even if the reconstitution
proceedings had not been instituted, the Bernardos are not precluded from establishing by other evidence,
such as the certificate of sale 63 allegedly issued to Tomas Bernardo, the requisite proof of validity of TCT
No. 12658. 64
We thus do not see any need to discuss further the allegations and contentions on procedural matters of the
petitioners in G.R. No. 112876. Suffice it to state that private respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping,
which is prohibited by Circular No. 28-91, when they filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. The established rule is that for forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the
same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. 65 In filing the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, private respondents
simply raised the issue of jurisdiction of the lower courts in the actions they took cognizance of.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED as far as it declares the nullity of the
proceedings in L.R.C. No. 138 as well as the reconstituted TCT No. 12658. The same Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE as far as it prohibits the continuation of proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-9212645. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to proceed with dispatch in the resolution of Civil
Case No. A-92-12645 with the purpose of quieting the various titles involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.1wphi1.nt
Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate
Justices Arturo B. Buena and Luis L. Victor.

24

2 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 236-240.

3 Presided by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa.
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 241-244.
5 Ibid., pp. 267-269.
6 Ibid., p. 67.
7 Ibid., p. 245.
8 These are: (a) a signed copy of the petition for reconstitution; (b) a signed copy of the
certification of the Register of Deeds concerned that the original copy of the certificate of
title on file in the Registry was either lost or destroyed; (c) the original and two duplicate
copies of the technical description of the parcel of land covered by the lost certificate of
title duly certified by the authorized officer of the Bureau of Lands; and (d) the plan in
tracing cloth, with two print copies thereof, prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer
who shall certify thereon that he prepared the same on the basis of a duly certified
technical description.
8 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 246.
10 Ibid., p. 247.
11 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
12 L-22488, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 519.
13 L-23826, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 86.
14 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 67-72.
15 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 248.
16 Ibid., p. 249.
17 Ibid., pp. 250 & 251.
18 Ibid., p. 253.
19 Ibid., p. 259.
20 Ibid., p. 260.
21 Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 30815, p. 179.
22 Ibid., back of p. 180.
23 Rollo of G.R. No. 111715, p. 4.
24 Ibid., pp. 58-69.
25 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 152.

25

26 Ibid., p. 155.
27 Ibid., p. 163.
28 Ibid., p. 164.
29 Ibid., p. 165.
30 Ibid., p. 166.
31 Ibid., p. 196.
32 Ibid., p. 211.
33 Ibid., p. 229.
34 Presided by Judge Tirso D'C Velasco.
35 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 234.
36 Ibid., p. 235.
37 Ibid., p. 73.
38 Rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 30815, p. 201.
39 Ibid., p. 214-215.
40 Ibid., pp. 219-231.
41 Ibid., pp. 239-263.
42 Ibid., pp. 297-313.
43 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, p. 389.
44 Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80892, September
29, 1989, 178 SCRA 178, 183.
45 Casil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121534, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 264, 271274.
46 Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. (COCLAI) v. Court of
Appeals, 324 Phil. 466, 479 (1996) citing Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1922),
Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791 (1927).
47 Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 490, 498-499 (1997).
48 Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 626 (1996).
49 Ibid., pp. 625-626.
50 Casil v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 280.

26

51 A petition for relief from judgment may be filed "within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six
(6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken.
52 Lapulapu Development & Housing Corporation v. Judge Rises, 330 Phil. 231, 240
(1996); Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76366, July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 153, 161.
53 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 275 (1997).
54 Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 66-67 (1997) citing Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals, 190 Phil. 311 (1981).
55 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127969, June 25, 1999 citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 317 Phil. 653 (1995) and Allama v. Republic, G.R. No. 88226, February 26,
1992, 206 SCRA 600.
56 Dordas v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 67 citing Alabang Development Corporation v.
Judge Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 261, 277 and Serra Serra
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34080, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
57 121 Phil. 1122, 1127 (1965) cited in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,
G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 484.
58 Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 343 Phil. 115, 125 (1997).
59 Rollo of G.R. No. 112876, pp. 236-240.
60 Heirs of Teodoro de la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117384, October 21, 1998,
298 SCRA 172, 180.
61 Stilianopulos v. City of Legazpi, G.R. No. 133913, October 12, 1999 citing Rivera v.
Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57, 64 (1995).
62 G.R. No. 126673, August 28, 1998, 294 SCRA 714, 726.
63 In Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83383, May 6,
1991, 196 SCRA 630, 639-640), the Court said: "The conveyance executed in favor of a
buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of
the property, subject only to the resolutory conditiion that the sale may be cancelled if the
price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the
issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to the cancellation thereof in
case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4
SCRA 849)."
64 Margolles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97,
110-111.
65 Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 590, 604 (1996).

G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980

FAUSTA FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
CA, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO (Substituted by JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO

27

GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS;

VIRGINIA GARROVILLAS, PACITA GARROVILLAS and LOPE GARROVILLAS), respondents.
Sumulong Law Office for petitioner.
Candido G. del Rosario & Associates for private respondents.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
37818-R, entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, applicants-respondents, vs. Fausta
Francisco, petitioner-appellee, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Land
Registration Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No. N-25140, wherein said trial court granted the petition for
review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after a virtually ex-parte hearing and judgment, and
ordered said previous decision and decree set aside and the land in question registered instead in the name
of now herein petitioner Fausta Francisco.
As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, the aforementioned trial
court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in dispute situated in Barrio Singalong,
Antipolo, Rizal, in the names of herein private respondents Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco,
which decision became final and executory, and on June 27, 1964 the order was issued to the Land
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree, which it did, No. N-99323 on July 13, 1964,
followed by the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 in their names.
According to the Record on APPEAL on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta Francisco, filed a petition for
review alleging under oath inter alia that:
2. She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for in this case, which is
situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and covered by
Plan Psu-1992781 and now embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
3. She and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, open, adverse, peaceful
and uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute since time immemorial.
4. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a Decree of Registration No. N99332 for the parcel of land in question through fraud. In their application dated October
29, 1963, they claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by possession. This is not
true. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco have never been in possession of the
parcel of land in question.
5. Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely, Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula,
Perfecta, all surnamed Francisco, with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia
Francisco Nepomuceno, residing in Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal, who are the adjacent
registered owners of the land in question, were not notified of any alleged survey of this
land nor of the present application for registration.
6. Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged survey nor of the present
application for registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in question.
7. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazzette but
herein petitioner does not read it.

28

8. The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for the applicants for reason
among others that when petitioner caused the recent survey of the same there were no
monuments found on this land.
Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining principally that:
4. That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the owner of the land covered by
the decree of registration but failed to state in said petition how she became the owner
thereof and under what color of title does she claim to be owner of the land; neither did
petitioner attached any instrument supporting her claim other than a supposed affidavit of
merit signed by her alone containing allegations amounting to the existence of intrinsic
fraud only; that assuming without admitting that there was indeed intrinsic fraud,
nevertheless said allegations even if true is not sufficient ground for reopening and review
of the corresponding decree of registration;
5. That petitioner's petition is not sufficient in form and substance and therefore should be
dismissed by the Honorable Court. In support of this contention, we most respectfully
quote the following doctrine:
The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree under
Sec. 38 of Act 496 is that it be made only by a person who has been deprived of land or of
any interest therein by virtue of the decree sought to be reconsidered. A mere claim of
ownership is not sufficient and the petition of any person whose interest in the land is
short of absolute ownership, lacks the essential requisite, and for that reason should not
be considered. Thus in the case of Broce vs. Apurado, 26 Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme
Court clearly and unequivocably said: "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 the
applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the
procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to
avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.' (Philippine Land
Registration Law, Vargas, Maalac & Manalac p. 284). (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-22.)
It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its opposition to herein
respondents' application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial judge, commissioned the clerk of court to receive
their evidence and subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast, when Judge Torres
gave due course to herein petitioner's petition for review, he held a trial and heard the evidence of the
parties himself, with private respondent Alejandro F. Santos and his former witnesses Lauro Cruz and
Eugenio Francisco as well as petitioners and her witnesses testifying in open court. After such trial, on April
5, 1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo Torres, rendered the new decision now in dispute
reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting aside the latter, the decree of registration and original certificate
of title of private respondents issued pursuant thereto and ordering in stead that the land under litigation be
registered in the name of petitioner. When Justice Mateo Canonoy prepared the first draft of the decision,
the other two members of the Division, Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with him.
Justices Juan F. Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the division of five
required by law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente and Justices Enriquez and
Barcelona concurring, the decision favorable to herein private respondents was promulgated. Justice
Serrano dissented in-art extended opinion pointing out the existence of actual fraud committed by private
respondents in securing the judgment in their favor and sustaining, with a careful analysis of the relevant
and material evidence, the contention of petitioner that she, by herself and thru her predecessor in interest
has been the one, instead of respondents, in continuous, open, adverse possession of the land in issue,
under a claim of title. In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. which was denied with the
same votation.
In reversing himself in the 'light of the evidence he himself had subsequently heard, instead of his clerk of
court, unlike in the original proceeding, Judge Torres reasoned out and made 'his findings thus:
Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and
Ramona Francisco obtained through fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the absolute
owner in fee simple of that parcel of land in question situated in Barrio Singalong,
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal described in Plan Psu-1992791 and embraced
in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal;

29

that she has been in possession of said land, together with her father who is her
predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely and continuously since time
immemorial On the other hand, applicants-respondents contend in their application for
registration that the land in question was owned by applicant Alejandro Santos' father,
Toribio Santos, and that upon the latter's death in 1922, he inherited the said parcel of
land. However in the presentation of his evidence in this petition for review, Alejandro F.
Santos testified that this land had no previous owner; that he merely occupied this land
sometime in 1920 and had been in possession of the same for more than thirty years.
The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud
Decree No. N-99332 and (b) Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of petitioner,
had occupied the parcel of land in question; that this land is a portion of a bigger parcel of
land with an area of fifty hectares which was occupied and possessed by Diego Francisco
since 1918. Comprising this fifty-hectare parcel of land are the land in question described
in Plan Psu-199278, Exhibit A, the land described in Plan Psu-199277, Exhibit B, and the
land described in plan H-1 14240, Exhibit C, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
23434, Exhibit J, formerly the homestead patent of Diego Francisco. The whole area of
fifty hectares is fenced with barbed wire and planted with mango trees, a portion planted
to palay and a bigger portion devoted to pasturing of carabaos. All these improvements
were introduced by petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego
Francisco, was able to obtain a title on a portion of this big parcel of land, now embraced
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in the names of petitioner Fausta
Francisco and her sister and brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia, Perfecta and Paula,
all surnamed Francisco.
The petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 and after his death,
petitioner continued to possess the land in question which was not embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession over said portion of the land is
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of
an owner. In 1964, petitioner had the land in question surveyed by a private land surveyor,
Jose de Guzman, who, upon inquiry from the Bureau of Lands, discovered that there was
already a survey plan in the name of the applicant in this case, Alejandro F. Santos.
Petitioner likewise discovered that this land is already titled in the name of the said
Alejandro F. Santos.
It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in question was not
notified of the alleged survey. The Surveyor's Certificate, Exhibit 6, with respect to notices
of adjoining owners cannot be given any credence. It could be seen from Exhibit 6 that
Jose P. Cruz, who is no longer the adjoining owner of the land in litigation and who is
admittedly dead was notified on October 29, 1962 and that said Jose P. Cruz appeared on
the date of the survey, although being dead, it was, impossible for him to appear on the
date of the survey. The Santol Creek was also allegedly notified but that it did not appear.
This is ridiculous. The Santol Creek is not a person or entity, and the one notified should
have been the proper government official or office. Similarly, it was made to appear by
applicants-respondents that Diego Francisco, petitioner's father, an adjoining owner, was
notified of the survey. Diego Francisco has been long dead, since 1941, and neither
petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters received the purported notice. By thus avoiding
the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other interested parties, applicants were
able to have the land in question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is likewise admitted that
neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as adjacent owners were notified of the
registration proceedings in this case. It was established thru the testimony of the petitioner
that she does not read the Official Gazzette, the publication where the notice of initial
hearing was published. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notice of initial hearing to
petitioner as adjoining owner and as actual owner and possessor of the land in question,
the applicants were able to obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor.
Furthermore, the Court is convinced by the evidence that it is petitioner and her father
before her, who have actually possessed and occupied the land in question, and not the
applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It was shown thru the testimony of
Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent owner across the

30

Santol Creek, that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this land in question
and that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession of this parcel of land
during his lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and
open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco
has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land. (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)
To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken discussion by distinguished
counsel of petitioner in his memorandum of December 13, 1973:
The true adjoining owners at the
time of the filing of application
When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their
application for registration on October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining
owners at the North, East, and West, of the land in question.
At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego Francisco, when in truth and
in fact, as they knew full well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead patent title
over the land at the North had been cancelled and transferred to his children-heirs namely
Fausta (petitioner herein), Anastacia, Paula, Perfects, Venancia, and Leoncio, all
surnamed Francisco (see TCT No. 23434 issued to the latter and marked as Exh. 'J').
At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when in truth and in
fact, as they knew full well, Jose P. Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent title over
the land at the East had been cancelled and transferred to Estela Angeles to whom his
children (Lauro Cruz and two others sold on January 1, 1954 (see TCT No. 32697 issued
to Estela Angeles marked as Exh. 'L-2'). On November 7, 1957, Estela Angeles sold the
land to Vicente Antonio who issued T. C. T. No. 32697 (Exh. 'L-3'). On August 31, 1959,
Vicente Antonio sold the land in favor of Antonio Astudillo (TCT No. 96527 (Exh. 'L-4'),
who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No. 100145 (Exh. 'L-5') who on May 22,
1962 sold the land to Pilar v. Romack who was issued T. C. T. No. 100146 on June 7,
1962.
At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in truth
and in fact, as they knew full well, at the time of the filing of their application, Paula
Francisco (sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual occupant and possessor
of the said parcel of land. The application for registration of the said land filed by Eugenio
Francisco in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was opposed by Paula Francisco and is to
be noted that Eugenio Francisco was not even present during the hearing and did not
continue presenting evidence. After Pauli Francisco had presented her evidence, the
Court of First Instance decided that the said land at the West should be registered and
decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which decision became final as Eugenio
Francisco did not appeal therefrom, resulting in the issuance of decree and OCT No. 6945
to Paula Francisco (see the said decision of the CFI Rizal attached to our motion for
reconsideration dated August 26, 1966 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals, Annex
'B' of Petition).
Motive of the Applicants in not stating the true adjoining owners
The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true adjoining co-owners at the
North were Fausta Francisco and her sisters and brother, was because they knew that
Fausta was the one occupying the land in question or at least that Fausta was claiming
the land in question to be hers, so if notice of their application for registration were sent to
her as an adjoining co-owner at the North, she would surely oppose their application for
registration.
The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that the adjoining owner at the
East was still Jose P. Cruz, when in truth it was already Estela Angeles, was because they

31

were intending to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose P. Cruz) as their witness to testify, as he
did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the East
and as such knew that applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in
question since 1929 when the latter's father died.
The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true fact that both Eugenio
Francisco and Paula Francisco were claiming to be the owners of the land at the West,
was because they knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco, so if
notice of their application for registration were sent to Paula as one of the claimants to the
land at the West, Paula would surely tell her sister Fausta about it, and the latter would
surely oppose their application for registration. Moreover, applicants were intending to
utilize Eugenio Francisco as their witness to testify, as he did testify, before the Deputy
Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the West and as such knew that the
applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since 1929
when the latter's father died.
It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the
deliberate intention of preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent to
petitioner Fausta Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that way prevent
petitioner from appearing in the land registration case and file an opposition to their
application for registration. (Pp. 198-201, Record.)
Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately properly
notified of the application here under discussion? It is high time, the Court made it patently clear and
emphasized that it is the inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by themselves who are the occupants and
boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for purposes of registration. Beyond doubt, had the
surveyors of respondents complied with this simple and logical obligation imposed by the very nature of their
professional undertaking, the obvious anomalies extant in the instant case would not have happened. No
dead persons nor a creek could have been certified as duly notified by the Land Registration Office of the
application!
Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioner's memorandum, the boundary owner at
the north in 1963 when the application of respondents was filed could not have been Diego Francisco, for
the simple reason that said person had died twenty-one years before or in 1942. Factually, under ordinary
circumstances, if respondents were indeed in possession of the land in dispute, it stands to reason they
would have known of their neighbor's long demise. More, legally speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens
Title which was duly transferred subsequently in TCT 23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his children.
Registration under the Torrens System constitutes, at the very least, constructive notice to any boundary
owner of who is his neighbor.
The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former boundary owner in the
east. He had died in 1952, eleven years before the application, and the title he had acquired over his land
had been transferred several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela Angeles, T. C. T. 32697,
Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, T. C. T. No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio Astudillo, T. C. T. 96527, Exh. L-4;
to Arturo Rojas, T. C. T. 100145, E Exh. L-5; to Pilar V. Romack, T. C. T. 100146 on June 7, 1962. (See
Petitioner's memo pp. 1-2.) These facts have never been denied in any pleading of respondents.
Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the west could not have been
Eugenio Francisco, because it is judicial record that OCT No. 6945 was actually issued to Paula Francisco
who had opposed Eugenio's attempt to have the land registered in his name. (See Annex B of the petition.)
In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let alone her not having had
any chance to read or perhaps even know the Official Gazzette.
In the light of the foregoing, the matters that require Our resolution in the instant case may be said to be one
of mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than factual. Did respondents commit fraud of the nature
contemplated in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that would warrant the cancellation of the
decree of registration and Torrens Title already issued to them? The pole star jurisprudential
pronouncements in this respect are found, as every student of Land Registration knows, in Grey Alba vs. De

32

la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice Trent. Therein, it was declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is
one in rem and notice thereof by publication binds the whole world, inclusive of those who may be adversely
affected thereby, innocent factually as they might have been of such publication. Understandably, such a
rule could be the only way to give meaning to the finality and indisputability of the Torrens title to be issued.
It may be said that to a certain degree such a strict rule could result in actual injustice, considering not only
the rather irregular publication of the Official Gazzette and other publications, and, of course, the illiteracy,
not to speak, of the inaccessability to those concerned of such publications.
Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals decision under review, did as
entirely depriving victims of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree reopened. This is
clear in that decision itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M. Fernando, pointed out in Minlay
vs. Sandoval 53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing according to this leading Grey Alba decision" of
intention to deprive another of (his) just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud."
And in this connection, the Chief Justice went on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land
Registration Act commands that the applicant 'shall also state the name in full and the address of the
applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if
known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them (Section 21 of Act No. 496
[1902].) What can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court was not sufficiently mindful of what the law
ordains when it refused to hear petition petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty of fraud in
including in his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads thus:
SEC. 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be
administered by any officer authorized to administer oaths in the Philippine Islands. If
there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in
behalf of each. It shall contain a description of the land and shall state whether the
applicant is married; and, if married, the name of the wife or husband; and, if unmarried,
whether he or she has been married, and, if so, when and how the married relation
terminated. If by divorce, when, where, and by what court the divorce was granted. It shall
also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not
known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. It may be in form as
follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:
I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought
under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have my (or our) title therein
registered and confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are) the owner (or
owners) in fee simple (or by possessory information title) of a certain parcel of land with
the buildings (if any, if not, strike out the words 'with the buildings'), situated in (here insert
accurate description). (2) That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed
at ... dollars. (3) That I (or we) do not know of any mortgage or encumbrance affecting said
land, or that any other person has any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable in
possession remainder, reversion, or expectancy (if any, add 'other than as follows,' and
set forth each clearly). (4) That I (or we) obtained title (if by deed, state name of grantor,
date and place of record, and file the deed or state reason for not filing. If any other way,
state it (5) That said land is ... occupied (if occupied, state name in full and place of
residence and post office address of occupant and the nature of this occupancy. If
unoccupied, insert 'not'). (6) That the names and addresses so far as known to me (or us)
of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as
above.) (7) That I am (or we are) married. (Follows literally the directions given in the prior
portions of this section.) (8) That my (or our) full name (or names), residence, and post
office address is (or are) as follows:
.......................Dated this day ......... of ................... in the year nineteen hundred
and .........................

33

(Signature).............................
(SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Province (or city) of.................................. ...........................(date.
There personally appeared the above-named....................... known to me to be the signer
(or signers) of the foregoing application, and made oath that the statements therein, so far
as made of his (or their) own knowledge, are true and so far as made upon information
and belief, that he (or they) believe them to be true. The residence certificate................ of
the applicant (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited (or applicants, or
representative) was exhibited to me being No. ............... issued at..................
dated....................., 19 ....
BEFORE ME:
(Notary Public or other official authorized to administer oaths)

As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the names and addresses so
far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same
directions as above But more importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of the law requires not mere
statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners by also "what
search has been made to find them." As earlier indicated, respondents could not have escaped, if they had
"search(es)" as the law definitely mandates, the names of their "colindantes.", it being a fact that the latter's
lands were duly registered. Surely, they would have known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego
Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, whom they would name as boundary owners in their application in 1963 had
already been long dead and buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the Court for the failure of the
applicant to notify the acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was because, from the circumstances
known to them, it was evident that they were no more than their lessees and could have had no registerable
interest at all in the property, which is far from what happened in the instant case. Here, We cannot bring
Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, two persons long dead, as
boundary owners in their application, not to speak of the "creek", (who was also "proven" to have been
notified) does not constitute actual fraud. Petitioner's evidence of her own occupancy, considering it is
contradicted by respondents' evidence, need not be mentioned anymore. Anyway, the unrebuttable proof
alone is to Us sufficient by and large, to uphold not only the dissenters in the Court of Appeals but also the
trial judge who had heard the respondent Alejandro Santos and his witness Lauro Cruz somehow deviate
substantially and materially from their testimonies given before the clerk of court in the original proceeding.
In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.) "By fraud is
meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word 'fraud' in section 38
of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts intended to deceive and deprive another
of his right, or to in some manner injure him must be alleged and prove'.
We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals under review, cannot be
reconciled even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in that decision to the in rem character of land
registration proceedings and the broad legal significance of such kind of proceeding could not have by any
degree minimized the paramouncy of truth and justice itself in any actual case before the court. As Our Chief
Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The registration of (land) cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover
and shelter bad faith" (p. 12, 53 SCRA), just as it is reiterated therein what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37
Phil. 498, "it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a
third person." (taken from Nicolas vs. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our
considered opinion that in law, the better view is that of the distinguished dissenters in the Court of Appeals,
and We find no alternative but to uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force of a finding of fact of the

34

Court of Appeals, assuming the instant case were in any degree factual in nature, diminishes
correspondingly according to the number and content of the dissent, when there is or are any. In the case at
bar, it is Our conclusion that the majority's bases, much more its reliance in their purely literal understanding
of Grey Alba do not conform with the dictates of truth and justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, and the second decision of
Judge Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court
complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
Costs against private respondents.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12580

April 30, 1959

TOMASA AGUILAR, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
EMILIANO CAOAGDAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Primicias and del Castillo for appellees.
Maximino G. LLorente for appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Januario Hermitano, as grantee of original plaintiff Tomasa Aguilar, who died pendente lite, seeks to recover
from defendants the possession of the portions of land they are occupying, plus damages representing the
value of the produce of the land since he acquired it to the time they are surrendered to him. Alberta Aguilar,
as heir of Tomasa Aguilar, likewise seeks to recover from defendants damages representing the value of the
produce of the land from 1947, when defendants took possession thereof, until it was sold to Januario
Hermitano.
Plaintiff's action is based on the claim that the land in question originally belonged to Tomasa Aguilar to
whom was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10499 of the land records of the province of Tarlac; that
when Aguilar died on August 4, 1952, it was inherited by her only heir Alberta Aguilar; and that the property
was later sold to Januario Hermitano, who is now the present owner thereof.
Defendants seek to defeat the action of plaintiffs by claiming that the certificate of title issued to the
predecessor in interest of Januario Hermitano is null and void because it was issued by a court that had no
jurisdiction over the land and, therefore, the title upon which the action of plaintiffs is based is also null and
void.
The trial court overruled the claim of defendants and sustained the action of plaintiffs. It ordered defendants
to vacate the portions of land occupied by them and to pay plaintiffs damages representing the value of the
produce of the land since they took possession thereof in 1947 until its possession is actually surrendered to
Januario Hermitano.
The facts of this case are not disputed. They appear in the decision of the trial court as follows:
The registered land in question is the same identical property object of Registration Case No. 494
of this Court, G.L.R.O. Record No. 15951, filed in 1919, wherein the Director of Lands was the
principal oppositor claiming the land as part of the public domain. The applicants therein were the
spouses Simon Castro y Rufo and Tomasa Aguilar. In 1924, this Court rendered therein a decision
declaring the land in question a part of the public domain. However, on appeal by the applicants,
our Supreme Court, in 1926, reversed the decision of this lot covered by Plan Psu-15730, with the
exception of the Canoac Creek, in favor of the applicants. In 1927, the corresponding decree and
title was accordingly issued to the applicants (Original Certificate of Title No. 19960Exhibit "A";
Records of Registration Case No. 494Exhibit "L"). Said certificate of title was cancelled in 1936
and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10499 (Exhibit "B") was duly issued in the name
of original plaintiff Tomasa Aguilar, who died on August 4, 1952. Before she died, however, she sold

35

pendente life the land in question to plaintiff Januario Hermitano, and by virtue of said sale Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 10499 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15763 (Exhibit "C") was issued in favor of Januario Hermitano on April 8, 1953.
Sometime before the commencement of this case, the defendants had filed individual free
applications with the Bureau of Lands over several lots comprised within Plan Ps-84 (Exhibit "4")
covering a big mass of land situated in Mangatarem, Pangasinan. The Bureau of Lands, however,
in January to March, 1947, after due investigation and relocation of the registered property in
question, ordered the exclusion from the respective free patent applications of the defendants
(Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-31") of all portions thereof that where included by the Bureau of Lands
from the respective free patent applications of the defendants, containing a total area of 419,824
square meters, more or less, are part and parcel of the registered land in question, (Exhibits "D"
and "D-1"). Notwithstanding the aforesaid action of the Bureau of Lands, the defendants still insist
that the several lots applied for by them in their respective individual free patent applications are
part of the public domain. They also insist that the land applied for by them are actually situated
within the municipality of Mangatarem, Province of Pangasinan, and, therefore, outside the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is this alleged fact, on which the defendants based their
contention that this Court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction to decree the
original registration of the land in question, because the jurisdiction of the Court in registration
proceedings is confined and limited only to the territorial limits of this province. In contending that
the title to the land in question was procured by the original registered owners in bad faith, the
defendants claimed that they were not personally notified of the initial registration proceedings in
the aforementioned Registration Case No. 494 and that they were misled and deceived by the
pendency of another registration case filed by the applicants before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan over a bigger mass of land which includes the several portions now in dispute.
Appellants claim that the decree issued in Registration Case No. 4940 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
in 1919, which is more than 30 years upon the filing of the complaint, adjudicating the land in question to
Januario Hermitano's predecessor in interest is invalid for the reason that the court that had issued the
decree had no jurisdiction to act on the case. In support of this claim, appellants advance the following
reasons:
1. When the petition for registration of the land in question was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in 1919, there was already pending in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan another
registration case involving a bigger portion of land which embraces certain portion of the land
subject of the Tarlac registration case, it being the theory of applicants that the Pangasinan court
acquired original jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts with respect to the land covered by
the registration case;
2. Appellants or their predecessor in interest were not included in the notice of the initial of the
registration case pending in the Tarlac court and, therefore, were not personally notified of the
proceedings as required by law; and
3. A bigger portion of land which one Antonio Fuster sought to register in her name in a later
registration case before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and which happens to embrace
the portions now in dispute was subsequently declared public land by the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 40129.
The first ground has no merit. It appears that the Pangasinan court of first instance dismissed the
registration case originally filed by appellees when it found that the portions of the land covered by it which
are now the subject of this case were actually situated within the municipality of San Clemente, province of
Tarlac, and the dismissal was without prejudice. This dismissal has the effect of relinquishing the jurisdiction
originally acquired by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and of transferring it to the court of Tarlac
which is the proper court to take cognizance of the case. The fact that the registration case in Tarlac was
filed sometime before the dismissal of the Pangasinan case can have no legal adverse consequence. On
the contrary, it was rectification of an error committed as to venue for indeed the court that should take
cognizance of this registration case is that which has territorial jurisdiction over the property. This court is the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Thus, Section 10, Act No. 2347 provides that "all jurisdiction and power
heretofore conferred by Act Numbered Four Hundred and Ninety-Six and its amendments upon the Court of
Land Registration and upon the land registration Judges, are hereby conferred upon the Courts of First

36

Instance and judges thereof, of the provinces in which the land which is to be registered is situate."
(Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the second ground, it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the pendency of
the present registration case even if they were actually occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but
such procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because registration proceedings have the
nature of actions in rem. This Court has held time and again that lack of personal notice in a registration
proceeding to persons who may claim certain right or interest in the property cannot vitiate or invalidate the
decree or title issued therein because proceedings to register land under Act No. 496 are in rem and not in
personam.
A land registration proceeding is in rem, and therefore the decree of registration is binding upon
and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of
whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all interested parties are considered as
notified by the publication required by law. (Sorogon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil., 259: See also
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 20 Phil., 31; Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49; Alcantara, et al. vs. De la Paz, et
al., 92 Phil., 796; Sepagan vs. Dacillo, 63 Phil., 412; Castelo vs. Director of Lands, 48 Phil., 589.)
Moreover, it appears that appellants based their right to the land merely on the applications for homestead
patent they filed with the Bureau of Lands which were then under investigation when the registration case
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac wherein the Bureau of Lands was made party respondent.
This Bureau filed an opposition to the registration claiming that the land subject of the registration was a
portion of the public domain, but its opposition was overruled. As a result, the Bureau of lands ordered a
relocation of the portions covered by the applications of appellants and, once relocated, they were ordered
excluded from the land covered by the registration case. It can therefore be said that appellants were
already indirectly represented in the registration case by the Bureau of Lands because their interest in the
land can be considered as derivative of the Bureau's claim that it belong to the public domain.
But what makes the claim of appellants legally futile is that they are raising the nullity or invalidity of the
decree and title of appellees over the property in question after the lapse of more than 30 years, which
certainly can not be done considering the purpose of our Torrens system. As this Court has aptly said:
"When once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system and the time has passed within
which that decree may be questioned, the title is perfect and cannot later be questioned. . . . The very
purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a
second action for registration" (Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil., 791, 792).
As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff's Torrens certificate of Title and was registered in 1914,
the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice
to defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the
decree. Neither could the decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest
in, the land prior to the registration proceedings. (Sorogon vs. Makalintal, 45 Off. Gaz. 3819.)
(J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Quirino Bolaos, 95 Phil., 106).
We also find no merit in the third ground, considering the express provision of Section 45 of Act No. 496 to
the effect that land once registered shall be and always remain registered, title thereto becoming
indefeasible after the lapse of one year. As this Court has said: "No rule is better settled in this jurisdiction
than the one which prohibits the changing, altering or modifications of a decree in a land registration
proceeding under the Torrens system after the lapse of one year" (Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez David, 50
Phil., 797). Following this ruling we may say that the inclusion, perhaps inadvertently, of the portion of land
here in dispute in the Fuster case cannot have the effect of nullifying a decree issued in a previous
registration case giving to appellants a Torrens title to the land. This is more so considering what said
Section 45 provides: "The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be
regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title
that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts
amendatory thereof."
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

37

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A., and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-7402

October 27, 1955

DOMINGO NICOLAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ULYSES PRE, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Macario M. Peralta for appellant.
Magno B. Pablo for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On October 8, 1952, Domingo Nicolas filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a complaint praying that
the judgment rendered in Registration Case No. 15 (G.L.R.O. Record No. 199) declaring Ulyses Pre, et al.,
oppositors therein, owners of a parcel of land containing an area of 5 hectares and ordering its registration in
their name, be declared null and void for having been rendered in excess of its jurisdiction and in violation of
the Constitution.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that the action is barred by a prior judgment,
and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action. This motion was sustained and the court dismissed the
case without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiff brought this case on appeal directly before this Court on
the plea that the questions involved are purely legal.
On November 30, 1946, Domingo Nicolas, appellant, filed an application for the registration of a parcel of
land containing an area of 31 hectares, 21 ares and 18 centares located in Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. Ulyses Pre,
et al., appellees, opposed the application with regard to a portion of the land containing an area of 5
hectares, 17 ares and 70 centares claiming to be the owners thereof. The case was set for hearing on
August 6, 1948. On this date, appellant submitted his evidence. In the course of the presentation of
appellees' evidence, the parties agreed to have the hearing suspended to give them an opportunity to come
to an amicable settlement, to which the court acceded giving them 5 days within which to submit the
settlement. Six days thereafter, far from submitting the proposed settlement, appellant, through counsel,
moved to dismiss the registration proceeding, which was favorably acted upon. Taken by surprise by the
order of dismissal which was acted upon ex-parte, appellees moved to reconsider the order in order that
they may be given an opportunity to present their evidence to prove their claim of ownership with regard to
the 5 hectares covered by their opposition. The motion was granted and the case was set for the reception
of appellees' evidence with due notice to appellant's attorney, but on the date set neither appellant nor his
counsel appeared. In view of such non-appearance, the court designated its clerk of court to receive the
evidence. This was done, and after the clerk of court had received the evidence, the court, on January 27,
1950, rendered judgment declaring appellees owners in fee simple of the portion of land claimed by them in
their opposition. No appeal has been taken from this decision within the reglamentary period. The same
became final on April 7, 1950.
On April 21, 1950, appellant, through counsel, filed a petition to set aside the decision under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court alleging, among others, that said decision was null and void because it was rendered without
jurisdiction and in violation of sections 31, 36 and 37 of Act No. 496. Appellees vigorously objected to this
petition and the court sustained the objection in an order entered on May 25, 1950. From this order appellant
took the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals and on May 12, 1952, the latter court affirmed the order of
the trial court. The present case is but an outgrowth of this adverse decision of the Court of Appeals.
The issues raised by appellant in this appeal are:
1. Did the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in the exercise of its jurisdiction as Court of Land
Registration have the power or jurisdiction to enter the order of December 28, 1949 upon ex-parte
application of the appellant, to dismiss Registration Case No. 15, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 199, and that

38

once the case had been dismissed, to amend, upon motion for reconsideration of the appellees,
the order of dismissal by allowing appellees to continue with the presentation of their evidence as
oppositors without at the same time reinstating the application of the appellant or without first
ordering the appellees to publish the subject matter of the opposition as provided in section 31 of
the Land Registration Law?
2. As such Court of Land Registration, did the Court of First Instance of Tarlac have jurisdiction to
render the decision in said Registration Case No. 15, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 199 on the basis of the
evidence of the appellant and part of the evidence of the appellees which was presented to the
Court previous to the order of dismissal of December 28, 1949, together with such evidence which
was taken before the Clerk of Court on January 11, 1950, as delegate of the Court without said
Clerk of Court giving previous notice to the appellant of the hearing and without making his report
on the evidence taken before him as required by section 36 of the Land Registration Law?
1. It should be recalled that in the course of the presentation of the evidence of appellees in the registration
case and after the parties had failed to settle the case amicably as they had proposed, appellant moved for
the dismissal of his application and the same was granted, but, on a motion for reconsideration, the court
decided to continue the hearing to give appellees an opportunity to present evidence to substantiate their
claim of ownership with regard to the 5 hectares they claimed in their opposition and, taking advantage of
this opportunity, they presented their evidence and on the basis thereof, the court decreed the registration of
said 5 hectares in the name of appellees. It is now the contention of appellant that this action of the trial
court was in violation of section 37 of Act No. 496 because, after having dismissed the registration
proceeding upon motion of appellant, the court could no longer continue the hearing without reinstating the
case or at least without requiring the appellees to file a new application for registration so that they may
comply with the law as regards publication as if it were an original application. And the court having failed to
follow this procedure, its ulterior proceeding is null and void, upon the theory that the court acted without
jurisdiction or in violation of the law.
We do not find merit in this contention as it ignores the amendment wrought in the registration law by Act
No. 3621. Before such amendment the purpose of an answer to a registration case was simply to disclose
the oppositor's objections to the application, or his reasons showing why the applicant should be denied the
relief applied for. The oppositor could not ask for any affirmative relief or that the land be registered in his
name in the same proceeding it being the sole purpose of the answer to prevent the registration of the land
in the name of the applicant. The power of the court was limited to determining whether the applicant had a
title proper for registration (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). However, when the law was amended in
1929, with the enactment of Act No. 3621, the procedure was changed in the sense of allowing the oppositor
not only to allege in his answer his objections to the application but to ask for any affirmative relief he may
desire. Under the amendment, an oppositor who claims ownership over the property covered by the
application, or a part thereof, may now claim in his answer that the land be registered in his name in the
same proceeding. This is clearly reflected in section 37 of Act No. 496, as amended by section 2 of Act No.
3621, wherein it is provided that "in case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the
conflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the
application if neither of them succeeds in showing that he has proper title for registration, or shall enter a
decree awarding the land applied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled thereto." The only condition
prescribed for this variation is that the court "shall order the adverse claimant to whom a portion of the land
applied for has been awarded to pay to the applicant such part of said expenses as may be in proportion to
the area awarded to said adverse claimant. "This is what the trial court has done. It ordered the oppositors
to pay to the applicant his proportionate share in the expenses. It is, therefore, evident that the claim of
appellant that the trial court acted contrary to law in acting on the adverse claim of the oppositors has no
legal basis.
2. With regard to the second issue, we find that the same has already been passed upon by the Court of
Appeals in the appeal taken by appellant from the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief
(CAG.R. No. 7329-R). Appellant is therefore prevented from asserting now the same question under the
principle of estoppel by judgment. Thus, on this point, the Court of Appeals said:
And when the applicant failed to appear at the hearing on January 11, 1950, despite their notice
thereof, had the lower court that authorized its Clerk to receive the evidence of the oppositors,
violated section 36 of the Land Registration Law, as supplemented by sections 9, 10 and 11 of the
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court? We believe not, because said section refers to a case where the

39

contesting parties or some of them appeared and an order of default is entered against those who
did not appear and answer. The situation obtaining in the present case is markedly different from
the situation contemplated in section 36 of Act No. 496, inasmuch as the applicant having asked for
the dismissal of his application, the oppositors ipso facto acquired the role of applicants on the
portion they claim without any opposition whatsoever. In the legal contemplation and strictly,
speaking, the applicant, as far as his application for registration was concerned, had already lost
his standing in court when the oppositors presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court, and
for his reason, his assault against the legality of the action of the court in authorizing its Clerk to
receive the evidence of the oppositors cannot now be sustained, especially if we take into
consideration that in spite of the fact that said applicant was notified thru his counsel of the hearing,
both abstained themselves from appearing thereat.
The foregoing considerations show that the lower court did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss filed
by appellees and, hence, the error assigned by appellant in this respect is without merit.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L.,
JJ., concur.
10. General and Special Default distinguish
11. Effects of an order of Default and the remedies available to a defaulted party.
Case:
G.R. No. 146262

January 21, 2005

HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 to reverse the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993. The appellate court affirmed the Resolution3 dated 21 May
1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") in Consulta No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of
lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable.
The Facts
Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. ("Ozaeta") filed an application for registration of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 ("land registration court"), docketed as Case No.
2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887 ("LRC No. N-18887"). The land registration court issued an
order of general default and hearings on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land registration
court granted the application. The decision became final and executory, and the land registration court
issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991.4
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma.
Salome Lao.5

40

On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis
("petitioners"), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion6 in LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that
Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September
1970. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale7 over
the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 ("PD 1529"),8 petitioners also prayed that the court
issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of
Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18 August 1998.10 The pertinent entries11 in the Decrees
read:
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May, 1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro,
Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaa, this
3rd day of July, 1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, Quezon City, this 20th day of
October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01 a.m.
(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration
Entered in the "Registration Book" for Marikina, pursuant to the provisions of section 39 of PD No. 1529, on
the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, at 1:16 p.m.
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds (Emphasis added)
Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644
and Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") Nos. O-1603 and O-1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs
show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he
assumed office on 8 July 1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaa issued the Order of 3 July 1998.12
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The
LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the inconsistencies in the dates in a letter13 dated 1
December 1998. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Quezon City
1 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City

41

Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 issued in Land
Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his
wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were prepared on October 20, 1977
pursuant to the decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and the order for issuance of decree dated August
24, 1993. Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic]
released therefrom on August 13, 1998. Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime between August
8 and 13 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what is reflected thereon because the undersigned
Administrator assumed office only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was
not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated October 20, 1977. It is therefore hereby clarified that
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and
not on October 20, 1997.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the motion for the issuance of the
decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the properties involved having been sold to him by the
applicants, is still pending with the court, it is informed that no copy of said motion nor of the order directing
this Office to comment thereon appears on file in the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not
have been taken into consideration in the issuance of the decrees. Had the Administration been apprised of
these incidents, perhaps the issuance of the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the court has
resolved the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that since the certificates of title
transcribed pursuant to said decrees have already been issued and released by the Registrar of Deeds
concerned, it is now beyond our authority to recall them unless duly authorized by the court.
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in your letter.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
Administrator
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that
petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604
void.14 Petitioners attached to the application a copy of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent
OCTs.
In a letter15 dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
15 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
Pasig City

42

Sir:
This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE.
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the name[s] of the parties, the court
where the action is pending, the date the action was instituted and a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to
determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original petition or compaint [sic] upon which this
office will base its action, is DENIED.
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the documents you submitted, elevate the
matter en consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to the Office of the Administrator, Land Registration
Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds
On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the
LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In its resolution16 dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question for resolution is whether a notice
of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with
the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section
24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a
notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA declared that petitioners are not
parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, an order of general
default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the
court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a
motion to lift the order of general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read:
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted, petitioners cannot be clothed
with personality as oppositors in said land registration case by merely filing a motion after a judgement has
been rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners
cannot be admitted for registration. To rule otherwise would preempt the judgment of the Court in so far as
the personalities of the movants as oppositors in the land registration case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so holds that the notice of lis
pendens is not registrable.
SO ORDERED.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the LRAs decision.
Petitioners filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
LRA Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.

43

The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling
that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal
personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS, and
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES
ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-18887 DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT.18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings filed by petitioners, public
respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General cite "more or less the same provisions of the laws as
applicable in support of their respective contentions but differ x x x only with respect to their interpretation
thereof."19 With this observation in mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and of PD 1529.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the
office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for
record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real
names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title
thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court
directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment,
and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against
persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action
or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof,
together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land
affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or
control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and
until final judgment.20

44

The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration of the lis
pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at
their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation.21
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment
by successive alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation
to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis
pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist.22
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the certificate of
title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail,
because the former is not bound by the property owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer
certificate of title.23 Thus, we have consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property
that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary
notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of
it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.24
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of a property, but also
with the use or occupation of a property.25 The litigation must directly involve a specific property which is
necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals26
enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.27

45

As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution of
an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis
pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered owner.l^vvphi1.net
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because "the application was bereft of
the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its action."28 In consulta to the LRA,
petitioners pointed out that they have complied with the requirements for the registration of the notice of lis
pendens, as follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez of
a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending which is "the registration
court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City." The date of the filing of the motion is shown on
the motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by the land registration court on November 25,
1998 is duly stamped;
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 are clearly
indicated in the notice;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of the Motion attached to
the Notice;
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void, dated November
25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal will base its action is attached
as Annex "A" of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)29
Petitioners enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and
the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants,
and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in
Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.
Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887 on 16 July 1997.
The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, which states that "xxx
in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of
a certificate of title xxx."
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As
a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not
with the land registration court.30 Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed
to an innocent third person for value.1awphi1.nt A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid
transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.31
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
In its comment,32 the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order of default includes petitioners.
Therefore, petitioners failure to move to lift the default order did not give them standing in the case. As

46

long as the court does not lift the order of general default, petitioners have no legal standing to file the
motion to declare void the decrees of registration issued to the applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides
thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court
shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and
require the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the notice "To All Whom It May Concern", all
the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order shall be entered against
persons who did not appear and answer.
Petitioners justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as opposed to filing a motion to
lift the order of general default, rests on two related assumptions. First, with the filing of the 16 July 1997
motion and giving of due course to the motion by the land registration court, petitioners assert that they
acquired legal standing in the registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into the
shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta when applicants sold the property to him. As
successors-in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are not strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of Section 22 of PD 1529 to Section 29 of
Act 49633 and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of Appeals.34
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.After the filing of the application and before
the issuance of the decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in
whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments
together with the subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof,
and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or
encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in the name of
the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating
thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of
title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may, however, present
such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the Register of
Deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court,
after notice to the parties shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x x
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals35 explains the procedure in cases of conveyance of the land subject of a
registration proceeding by an instrument executed between the time of filing of the application for
registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the
"person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer"
or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total
stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument
be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in
relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case xxx.361awphi1.nt
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land registration court. However, this
position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have the decree and the titles declared void.

47

Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles
brought about petitioners grave error in procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their motion to consider the deed of sale in the
registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion to have the decrees and the corresponding
certificates of title declared void on 25 November 1998. Petitioners filed both motions long after the decision
in LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory. Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom
they base their claim presented the Deed of Sale before the land registration court while the action was
pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion filed by petitioners is
insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of
a notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the LRA and the appellate courts observation that
petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of general default
should be filed before entry of final judgment. The land registration court granted the application for
registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed their
motion on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general default, the order
of default could not be set aside because the motion was filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,37 this Court explained the effect of an order of default to the party defaulted. A party
declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a party in default cannot
appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal
from the judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the
grounds provided in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the default order. Those who
did not file an answer should be considered as having lost their standing in court from that stage (Republic v.
Dela Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to set aside the order [of] default on the grounds
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of general default was deemed to have
been issued based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al.,
58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the order of general
default was lifted. Records disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of general default,
petitioners filed a motion to declare as null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default
is lifted by the court, petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants
whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the order
of default has not been lifted.38
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere interested parties prescribed
under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-oppositors to the land registration proceedings. It
is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of general default is required. It is only in the latter case
that the doctrine pronounced in Serrano v. Palacio,39 as repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is
applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion to intervene in the x x x land
registration case for the proper procedure would have been for them to ask first for the lifting of the order of
general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object being the registration
applied for, and not the determination of any right not connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37
Phil. 498).
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their motion to have the decrees and the
corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the role of oppositors to the application for land
registration.

48

The appellate court stated that "in as much as it would want to oblige to the plea of petitioners to hasten or
expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses on the part of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could
not."40 Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding41 and the strict requirements for a
notice of lis pendens. The facts in this case show that petitioners have not complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
55993 dated 29 November 2000.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
Footnotes
1

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and
Romeo A. Brawner, concurring.
3

Penned by Hon. Alfredo R. Enriquez, Administrator of the Land Registration Authority.

Rollo, p. 28.

Ibid., pp. 35, 50, 54; CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.

Rollo, pp. 42-45.

Ibid., pp. 46-47. See also Rollo, pp. 52, 56, 234-235. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Absolute
Sale states that Sandoval and Ozaeta warrant the "fil[ing] of the corresponding motion or
manifestation in Land Reg. Case No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., Applicants, in order that the original certificates of
title over the said property will issue directly in the name of EUGENIO LOPEZ, his heirs,
administrators, or assigns." However, Ozaeta later learned that their counsel, Atty. Tomas Trinidad,
never filed the appropriate motion.
8

Property Registration Decree.

Rollo, p. 58.

10

Ibid., pp. 50-57.

11

Ibid., pp. 50, 54. OCT No. O-1604 was issued by the National Land Titles and Deeds
Administration at 8:02 a.m.
12

Ibid., pp. 58-60. See also CA Rollo, pp. 42-48.

13

CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.

14

Rollo, pp. 64-65.

15

Ibid., p. 66.

49

16

Ibid., pp. 73-75.

17

Ibid., p. 75.

18

See ibid., p. 14.

19

Ibid., p. 36.

20

See 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens 1 (1948).

21

Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, 383 Phil. 729 (2000) citing Natao, et al. v.
Esteban, et al., 124 Phil. 1067 (1966), Bisaya Land Trans. Co., Inc. v. Cuenco, 131 Phil. 627
(1968), and Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69303, 23 July 1987,
152 SCRA 253.
22

See Po Lam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116220 , 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 86 citing
Somes v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 Phil. 432 (1935).
23

See Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21 citing Pino v. CA, G.R. No.
94114, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 434, Dino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95921, 2 September
1992, 213 SCRA 422.
24

Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60323, 17 April 1990,
184 SCRA 325 citing Heirs of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69303, 23
July 1987, 152 SCRA 253 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA
1.
25

Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21.

26

Supra note 24.

27

Amado D. Aquino, Land Registration and Related Proceedings 301 (1994).

28

Rollo, p. 66.

29

Ibid., pp. 69-70.

30

See Casillan v. Espartero, et al., 95 Phil. 799 (1954).

31

See Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., 92 Phil. 826 (1953); Narciso
Pea, Narciso Pea, Jr., and Nestor N. Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 132-134
(1994).
32

Rollo, pp. 87-91.

33

The Land Registration Act.

34

No. L-36637, 14 July 1978, 84 SCRA 67.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

37

80 Phil. 166 (1948).

50

38

Rollo, p. 89.

39

No. 15645-R, 31 August 1955, 52 O.G. 260.

40

Rollo, p. 40.

41

Section 6 of Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

12. Chapter II-C, PD 1529- Hearing, Judgement and Decree of Registration

Cases:
G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
Pedro M. Surdilla for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the
possession of her predecessors-in- interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
and "conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the issue to be resolved in the
instant petition for review.
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Pangasinan, an application 1 for registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843
square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles
or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. 2
After trial, the Court of First Instance 3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236, the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicants
over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby adjudicates the same in
the name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal
age, Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal
property.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.
SO ORDERED. 4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals),
which however affirmed the lower court's decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: 6

51

The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:

A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT
TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER ACT NO. 496, AS
AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO. 141, AS
AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);
B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELFSERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT THE
SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO REGISTRATION,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO
ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER,
STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOFWHICH MUST BE
CONCLUSIVEREQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;
D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW
THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND BELONGING TO THE STATE.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question
through documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her
testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question for more than 20
years; that said testimony, which petitioner characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight
and credence considering its spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined
her on that point to test her credibility; and that, the reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is
personally aware of facts showing that the land being applied for is a private land. 7
We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses Urbano
Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs. Laureana
Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr.
Espiritu sold their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the property
recorded for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on
March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same years.
At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had been in
possession of the subject area for about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to her possession
that of her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of Section 48 (b) of
commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,"
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-in-interest's possession is contained in a one-page
declaration given before a commissioner on December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows: 8
Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.
Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.

52

Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.

Atty. Surdilla:
Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee,
proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.
Q Are you the applicant in this case now?
A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.
Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration
now?
A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.
Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said
property?
A Yes, sir.
Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale
dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 30,
1963, what can you say to them?
A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by
Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2 portion of the property and the
deed of sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2
portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute
Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana
Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise the property sought by you to
be registered?
A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for more than 20 years.
Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
August 11, 1970, is this the sale adverted or referred by you?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as
Exhibit "H", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark it.

53

Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature

thereof?
A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession
tacked to that of our predecessors-in-interest is adverse, continuous,
open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your Honor.
Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?
A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos.
22253 and 24126, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1", respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?
A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March 25, 1975 be
marked as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",' respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private
person/persons?
A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.
That's all, your Honor.
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the
Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no
opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that the petitioner for the
registration of his land shag be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from
the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner,
in fee simple." 9
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of
title since July 26, 1894 10 or prior thereto. 11
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As enunciated in the case of Santiago vs. de los
Santos: 12
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of
real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.
Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever

54

classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
rights over the same as dominus . . .
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or
more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the
thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in
concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The
bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property
for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open,
public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by which she described her own possession in relation to that of
her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation.
That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the
burden is upon her to prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors' possession was
indeed adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner. Her bare allegation, without
more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for is
private land helpful to private respondent. Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which should
be convinced, by competent proof, of private respondent's registerable right over the subject parcel of land.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the
requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the part of
the lower court to have granted her application.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A", Petition, pp. 46-49, Rollo.
2 Annex "B", Petition, pp. 50- 51, Rollo.
3 Per Judge Modesto S. Bascos.
4 p. 55, Rollo.
5 The decision was penned by Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, and concurred in by
then IAC now Supreme Court Associate Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Associate Justices
Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado, pp. 56-59, Rollo.
6 pp. 102-103, Rollo.
7 pp. 144-149, Rollo.
8 pp. 25-28, Rollo.

55

9 Director of Lands vs. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227, citing Maloles and Malvar vs. Director of
Lands, 25 Phil. 548; De los Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420, 424; Roman Catholic Bishop
of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367, 376.
10 Now June 12, 1945, as amended by P.D. 1073.
11 Padilla vs. Reyes & Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, citing Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50
Phil. 380.
12 G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146.

[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000

MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by his Heirs,
OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA
LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE
MEDRANO,** petitioners, vs., ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land located in
Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters.
The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters whereas the other lot
(Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her application, private respondent presented
documents showing that when she was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from
Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the
Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From
1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in
her name. Notices of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies
thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons opposed the application of private
respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by the lower court on
June 16, 1950. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands) aver that their
lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. In support thereof,
they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by private respondent is not the
same land covered in her application for registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular
inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, however,
the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the Director of Lands opposition was denied for
failure to substantiate his claim that the subject lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the
oppositors other than the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to
present their evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for registration as
follows:
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a resident
of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with
an area of 210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance
in favor of the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same
plan, with an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.

56

After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the
corresponding title issue in accordance with law.
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing, among
others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular
inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the
case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection
of the land applied with a view to determine its identity, location and boundary limits
whether the latter have been included in Lot 1 of the applicants plan to warrant their
exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names of the oppositors who have
presented evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly
rendered.
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to conduct the
ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated
and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by
them personally or by their supposed representative, the results of which are clearly
shown in the accompanying sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the
corresponding names, area and dimensions.
That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and
Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the
original survey plan Psu-119561;
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio
Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio
Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear different
identifying names in the sketch Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex
"A" is 69,683 square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals
and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary
of the property of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on
the South and on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicants property sought to be
registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey.
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon a second ocular inspection was
ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered
judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with
an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of private respondent. The judge made the following
observations based on the ocular inspection:

57

The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a
visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is
represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan
between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the
extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as
boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into ricefields by Francisco
Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as
boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former
proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now
repudiate claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over
Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the
South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the
Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of
the applicant.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of
Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant
ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan
Valera of the same municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the
amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be
annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from
notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who
made the relocation survey.
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by the oppositors, some of whom
are now the petitioners in this case. They argue that the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they
claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in private
respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1
of appellees (private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated
in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom
the landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued by the
Court of Appeals. Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of
possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise
respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land registration case) and Crispin Baltar
(one of the oppositors). In an Order issued on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.
When her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25,
1981, private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said
two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby
REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:

58

1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the

landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R.
No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors
Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicantappellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal
the decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the
Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated and respondent was
required to submit her comment to the petition.
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous
discussions in the petition, the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of
proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to overcome the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain considering that the inclusion in a title of a
part of the public domain nullifies the title. Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one which is in rem
in character, so that the default order issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether
known or unknown, except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. In the
case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors
mentioned in footnote number 2.
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and Otilio
Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private
respondents name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable right over
their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that she be installed in
possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered
his opposition to private respondents application for land registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is
charged with knowledge of the application of private respondent since the notice was published in
accordance with law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession of that
portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private respondent had a
rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was excluded
by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial courts decision of April 23, 1956, the
applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded
on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that
the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. Allegations
of her predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving and the declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land
registration cases. Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing
evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require
further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real property,
the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing.
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some documents
enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of

59

the land therein referred to, inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains to the
correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of
land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing
the land and indicating its limits. Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private respondent
against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of ownership," the latters possession raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim of private
respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of
a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendants claim.
Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979 in CA GR
40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only to that area claimed
by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly
indicates that the land to be registered in private respondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the
sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the
oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas,
such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial
court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part; had some participation in court below.
** Some of the petitioners are already dead.
April 18, 1949.
The other oppositors aside from petitioners were: Nicolas Bergonia; the heirs of Ricardo Bersamira; Perico
Talape whose rights were transferred to oppositor Mateo Valera; Galingan; Manuel Magala later substituted
by his heirs represented by Louisa Magala Bayle; Agaton Pajo; Cornelio Bayubay substituted by his heirs
who are represented by Maria Bayubay and his widow Lourdes Sindon Bayubay, one of the petitioners;
Bonifacio Bringas; Matias Turdil; and Juan Medrano. See Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) - First Civil Cases Division before it was again renamed Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated March 26, 1984 penned by Justice Rosario Quetulio-Losa with Justices Ramon Gaviola, Jr.
and Eduardo Caguioa, concurring, p. 2; Rollo, p. 22; CA Rollo, p. 23;
Order of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Abra issued by Judge Zoilo Hilario.
Decision of the trial court dated April 23, 1956 penned by Judge Jose M. Mendoza; Rollo, pp. 23, 253-254.
CA Decision dated March 15, 1966 penned by Justice Salvador Esguerra with Justices Julio Villamor and
Ramon Nolasco; Record on Appeal, pp. 19-23; Rollo, pp. 26, 254.
Rollo, pp. 26-27.
Exh. "D".
Rollo, pp. 256, 269.
Court of First Instance (CFI) Decision dated August 28, 1967 penned by Judge Macario M. Ofilada, p. 6;
Rollo, pp. 27-28; 271; Record on Appeal, p. 29.

60

In addition to petitioners herein (except Flora Labuguen who was not included in the appeal), the rest of the
appellants in CA-GR 40796-R were Layao Galingan, Mateo Valera, Crispin Baltar, Louisa Magala Bayle and
Bonifacio Bringas. (See Annex "B" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 38).
Annex "B" of Petition - CA Special Former 8th Division. Decision promulgated April 30, 1979 in CA GR.
40796-R penned by Justice Simeon Gopengco with Justices Mama Busran and Lorenzo Relova, concurring
p. 13; Rollo, p. 48.
Per CAs Entry of Judgment, the April 30, 1979 CA Decision had become final and executory on September
22, 1979; Rollo, p. 244.
Record on Appeal, pp. 41-42.
Order dated September 14, 1981 issued by Acting Presiding Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella of the then CFI
Branch II, Abra. The dispositive portion of which states: "WHEREFORE, finding that there are no oppositors
on the land of the applicant-movant, because all landholdings of the oppositors as indicated in Exhibit H are
excluded, the motion is denied. SO ORDERED." (Record on Appeal, p. 43; Rollo, pp. 21, 258).
The dispositive portion of the Order dated November 25, 1981 provides: "Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated September 14, 1981 denying the issuance of a Writ of
Possession filed by the applicant and finding that the writ prayed is not in accordance with the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals because it covers landholding of the oppositors
which were clearly excluded in the decision, the motion is hereby denied. SO ORDERED." (Record on
Appeal, p. 48; Rollo, p. 21).
IAC First Civil Cases Division Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 promulgated March 26, 1984 penned by
Justice Quetulio-Losa with Justices Gaviola, Jr. and Caguioa, concurring, p. 15; Rollo, p. 35.
CA Resolution dated September 29, 1986 penned by Justice Jose Campos, Jr. with Justices Venancio
Aldecoa, Jr. and Reynato Puno, concurring; CA Rollo, p. 124.
SC Minute Resolution dated February 4, 1987; Rollo, pp. 64, 67.
Under Section 2(a), Rule 45 (now Section 4, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the petition shall set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the
allowance of the petition. Petitioners counsel (Marilyn Damasen Bontia) who signed the petition and
petitioners memorandum cannot be considered as having concisely stated her arguments. The said
pleadings were not prepared with proper attention and adequate preparation.
Gutierrez Hermanos v. CA, 178 SCRA 37 (1989).
Maloles and Malvar v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548 (1913); De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420 (1916);
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367 (1918); Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42
Phil. 227 (1921) cited in Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13 (1991).
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 244 SCRA 537 (1995); Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192
SCRA 296 (1990); Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71 (1990).
Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990).
Cacho v. CA, 269 SCRA 159 (1997); Moscoso v. CA, 128 SCRA 705 (1984).
Cachero v. Marzan, 196 SCRA 601 (1991).
Republic v. Lee, 274 Phil. 284, 291 (1991).

61

Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, 123 SCRA 516 (1983).

Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989).
Palomo v. CA, 266 SCRA 392 (1997); Rivera v. CA, 244 SCRA 218 (1995); Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216
SCRA 78 (1992).
Santiago v. CA, 278 SCRA 98 (1997).
Republic Cement Corporation v. CA, 198 SCRA 734 (1991); Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 367 (1938)
cited in Alba vda. De Raz v. CA, G.R. No. 120066, September 9, 1999.
Dichoso v. CA, 192 SCRA 169 (1990).
Article 433, Civil Code (NCC) reads: "Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property."
See also David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, November 19, 1999 citing Faja v. CA, 75 SCRA 441 (1977).
Civil Code, Article 434.
G.R. No. 116426. April 12, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. GERARDO
SODSOD, respondent. Chiefx
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court for review via appeal by certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the trial court ordering Lot No. 10367 of the Cadastral Survey of Oas, Albay to be registered and
confirmed in the names of Gerardo SodSod and Felicidad Rellores.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime prior to July 1973, the Director of Lands filed with the Court of first Instance of Albay, Ligao
cadastral proceedings for the coverage under the torrens system of the lands in Oas Cadastre, Oas, Albay.
On July 19, 1973, spouses Gerardo Sodsod and Felicidad Rellores filed an answer to the petition, claiming
ownership of Lot No. 10367, Oas Cadastre, consisting of 52,847 square meters, located at Tablon, Oas,
Albay, by virtue of their more than thirty (30) years possession including that of their predecessor-in-interest.
During the cadastral hearings, the lot was uncontested.
The evidence showed that respondent Sodsod and his predecessor-in-interest occupied and possessed the
lot in question in the concept of owner, openly, continuously, adversely, notoriously and exclusively since
1929, or for more than thirty (30) years.
On July 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Esmmis
"WHEREFORE, Lot No. 10367 of the Cadastral Survey of Oas, Albay more particularly
described in the plan and technical description thereof is hereby ordered registered and
confirmed in the names of the SPOUSES GERARDO SODSOD and FELICIANO
RELLORES, Filipinos, of legal ages, and residents of Tablon, Oas, Albay.

62

"Once this decision becomes final, let the decree and original certificate of title be issued
in their favor.
"SO ORDERED.
"Ligao, Albay, Philippines, July 27, 1990."
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
We deny the petition. The issue is whether respondent and his predecessor-in-interest possessed the land
in question for more than thirty years sufficient to vest in him registrable title over the same.
The issue is factual. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.
Nonetheless, looking into the facts of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent has fully
complied with the requirements under Section 48 (b), C.A. No. 141 for confirmation of title over the lot in
question. Ipso jure, respondent has acquired private ownership of the land by mere possession and
occupation for more than thirty (30) years under claim of ownership.
Since 1929 up to the filing of the cadastral case, respondent and his predecessor had been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the lot involved in the concept
of owners.
Hence, they have acquired private ownership of the land, and are entitled to confirmation of registrable title.
Msesm
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 29577.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

In CA-G. R. CV No. 29577, promulgated on July 25, 1994, Isnani, J., ponente, Purisima and Ibay-Somera,
J.J., concurring.
Regional Trial Court, Ligao, Albay, Branch 12, Judge Rafael P. Santelices.
Cadastral Case No. N-11-LV, LRC Record No. N-5545, Lot No. 10367.
Penned by Judge Rafael P. Santelices, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
Docketed as CA- G. R. CV No. 29577.
Rollo, pp. 45-47.

63

Filed on September 5, 1994, Rollo, pp. 7-22.

Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 247 (1998); Serna vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 124605, June 18,
1999.
Natividad vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 493 (1991); Pineda vs. Court of Appeals 183 SCRA 602 (1990);
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)
13. Res Judicata, concept and requisites
14. Remedies after judgement by the court before a decree is issued.
a. Motion for Reconsideration
b. Motion for New Trial
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting
the
substantial
rights
of
said
party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds
that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
c. Appeal Sec. 30 & 33 PD 1529
Section 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment
rendered in a land registration proceedings becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted
from the data of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as
in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration.
Section 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration
case are appealable to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner as in ordinary
actions:
d. Relief from Judgement Sec 1-7 Rule 38 Rules of Court
Section

1.

Petition

for

relief

from

judgment,

order,

or

other

proceedings.

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

64

Sec.

2.

Petition

for

relief

from

denial

of

appeal.

When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file
a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.
Sec.

3.

Time

for

filing

petition;

contents

and

verification.

A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Sec.

4.

Order

to

file

an

answer.

If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in which it is filed, shall
issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct, together with
copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits.
Sec.

5.

Preliminary

injunction

pending

proceedings.

The court in which the petition is filed, may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary
for the preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in favor of
the adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of issuance of
such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition; but such injunction shall not operate
to discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may have acquired upon the property of
the petitioner.
Sec.

6.

Proceedings

after

answer

is

filed.

After the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the court shall hear the petition
and if after such hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall be
dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or final order or
other proceedings complained of upon such terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand
as if such judgment, final order or other proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken. The
court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new trial or
reconsideration had been granted by it.
Sec.

7.

Procedure

where

the

denial

of

an

appeal

is

set

aside.

Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due course to
the appeal and to elevate the record of the appelaed case as if a timely and proper appeal had
been made.

f. Reconveyance Sec 55 Act 496 (Act 332)

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
15. Recovery of Damages
IV. Voluntary Dealings with Registered Land
A. General Principles
Sec 51 and 52, PD 1529

65

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such
forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties
and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice
to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Cases:
G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984
SOSTENES CAMPILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA DIAZ VDA. DE SANTOS, in her capacity as Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the late SIMPLICIO S. SANTOS, respondents.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for petitioner.
Buenaventura Evangelista for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 62842R issued on March 9, 1981, the only issue is whether who has a better right or title to the herein disputed
two (2) parcels of land Simplicio Santos who earlier purchased them in a private sale but failed to register
his sale, or petitioner Sostenes Campillo who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and
obtained a certificate of title.
The pertinent undisputed facts, may be summarized as follows: On February 27, 1961, Tomas de Vera and
his wife Felisa Serafico sold two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, designated as Lots 1 and 2 of
the consolidation and subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs. 888 and segregated from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
37277 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63559, to Simplicio Santos, now deceased and is represented
by his administratrix, Zenaida Diaz Vda. de Santos, the herein private respondent. Said sale was however
never presented for registration in the office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering
the property.
On January 27, 1962, petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against Tomas
de Vera in Civil Case No. 49060 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. That judgment became final and
executory, and petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ was issued on
April 4, 1962 and pursuant thereto, the City Sheriff levied on three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No.
63559 in the name of Tomas de Vera, including the two (2) parcels of land which the latter previously sold to
Simplicio Santos.
On June 26, 1962, notice of the sale of said lots was issued by the Sheriff and published in the "Daily
Record" and La Nueva Era."
On July 25, 1962, the three parcels of land were sold at public auction for P17,550.81 in favor of petitioner
who was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, the City Sheriff executed
the final deed of sale in favor of petitioner over the three (3) parcels of land levied and sold on execution. On

66

February 4, 1964, TCT No. 63559 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 73969 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of petitioner Sostenes Campillo. Upon petition by the latter, the
Registry of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 73969 and issued in hell thereof TCT Nos. 74019 and 74020 over the
disputed Lots 1 and 2, respectively.
Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of the previous sale to him by Tomas de Vera,
Simplicio Santos filed an action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final deed of sale
of Lots 1 and 2 in favor of petitioner Campillo, with damages. In resisting the complaint, the herein petitioner
as one of the defendants below, alleged that he is an innocent purchaser for value and that the supposed
previous sale could not be preferred over the levy and sale at public action because it was not registered.
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment sustaining the validity of the levy and sale at public auction
primarily because at the time of the levy and sale, the disputed properties were still registered in the name of
the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera. Besides, the trial court ruled, the sale to Simplicio Santos which was
not registered nor noted in the title of the subject lots, cannot bind third persons.
On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent, the respondent appellate court modified the
decision of the lower court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
(1) The dismissal of the amended complaint as against defendant Sostenes Campillo only
and ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit are set aside;
(2) Declaring the levy, sheriff's sale and sheriff's certificate in favor of defendant Sostenes
Campillo null and void and of no effect;
(3) Declaring plaintiff Simplicio Santos, now his estate, to be the owner of the two parcels
of land under litigation and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63559; and
(4) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
74019 and 74020 in the name of defendant Sostenes Campillo and to issue the proper
certificate of title in the name of the estate of Simplicio Santos.
The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. (p. 45, Rollo)
Rationalizing its stand, the appellate court said that the subject lots could not be legally levied upon to satisfy
the judgment debt of the de Veras in favor of petitioner because at the time of the execution sale, the
judgment debtor, having previously sold said properties, was no longer the owner thereof; that since the
judgment debtor had no more right to or interest on the said properties, then the purchaser at the auction
sale acquires nothing considering that a judgment creditor only acquires the Identical interest possessed by
the judgment debtor in the property which is the subject of the auction sale, and he takes the property
subject to all existing equities to which the property would have been subject in the hands of the debtor; and,
while it may be true that Simplicio Santos did not record or register the sale of the disputed lots, the levy on
execution does not take precedence over the unrecorded deed of sale to the same property made by the
judgment debtor anterior to the said levy since the judgment creditor is not a third party within the meaning
of the law and could not therefore be considered as purchaser for value in good faith.
After a conscientious review and scrutiny of the records of this case as well as existing legislations and
jurisprudence on the matter, We are constrained to reverse the judgment of the respondent appellate court
and rule in favor of the herein petitioner.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that a sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or
of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of its
registration. 1 Consequently, and considering that the properties subject matter hereof were actually
attached and levied upon at a time when said properties stood in the official records of the Registry of Deeds
as still owned by and registered in the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera, the attachment, levy
and subsequent sale of said properties are proper and legal. The net result is that the execution sale made

67

in favor of the herein petitioner transferred to him all the rights, interest and participation of the judgment
debtor in the aforestated properties as actually appearing in the certificate of title, unaffected by any transfer
or encumbrance not so recorded therein.
Section 51, PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or
other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be
made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
(Italics for emphasis)
As succinctly stated in the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207:
Whatever might have been generally or unqualifiedly stated in the cases heretofore
decided by this Court, We hold that under the Torrens System registration is the operative
act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a hen upon the land. A person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the
property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on
the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one
of the primary objects of the Torrens system. A bona fide purchaser for value of such
property at an auction sale acquires good title as against a prior transferee of same
property if such transfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction sale. (Italics for
emphasis)
The case of Leyson vs. Tanada, 2 invoked by the private respondent is not in point. In that case, a notice of
lis pendens was inscribed at the back of the certificate of title of the land subject therein before it was sold at
public auction. Necessarily, the purchaser at public auction is bound by the outcome of the pending case
referred to therein. Since it turned out that the judgment debtor is merely a co-owner of the property sold at
public auction, then the puchaser thereat is not entitled to the entirety of the land. As the Court held: "The
interest acquired by a purchaser in an execution sale is limited to that which is possessed by the debtor. If
there is more than one person owning property in common and an execution against one only is levied
thereon, the sale effected by the Sheriff under such execution operates exclusively upon the interest of the
execution debtor, without being in any wise prejudicial to the interest of the other owners. The result in such
case merely is that one new owner in common is substituted for the owner whose interest is alienated by
process of law."
While it may be true as stated in the aforesaid case of Leyson vs. Tanada, that purchasers at execution
sales should bear in mind that the rule of caveat emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not
warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him to place the
purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property and he is merely charged
with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title.
Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires
such right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not
noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby reversed and set aside,
and the judgment of the lower court is reinstated. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

68

Guerrero, J., concur.

Escolin, J., concurs in the result.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
In case of double sale of realty, the ownership passes to the vendee who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property (Art. 1544, Civil Code). Hence, the petitioner has the better right to the disputed parcels
of land because the sale in his favor was recorded.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The question posed in this case is which of the two sales of the two parcels of registered lands should be
accorded legal protection.
The voluntary sale to Simplicio Santos was made in 1961. The sale was not registered in the Registry of
Property.
The involuntary sale to Sostenes Campillo was made in 1962. The sale was registered in the Registry of
Property. In fact, Campillo was issued a transfer certificate of title and later two transfer certificates of title for
each of the parcels.
The contract of sale is a consensual contract, i.e. it is perfected by mere consent. But ownership of the thing
sold shall be transferred to the vendee only upon the actual or constitutive delivery thereof. (Art. 1477, Civil
Code). In other words, there must be tradition.
In the case of lands registered under Act No. 496, as amended, said law provides for a special kind of
tradition. Sec. 50 provides:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise
deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds,
mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in
law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and
as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act the registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds of the province
or provinces or city where the land lies.
Since the sale made in favor of the first vendee did not comply with the above-quoted provision, the
transaction was ineffectual as to third persons. And since the sale made in favor of the second vendee
complied with the relevant provision, the sale to him was good and should be protected.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman)
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:

69

In case of double sale of realty, the ownership passes to the vendee who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property (Art. 1544, Civil Code). Hence, the petitioner has the better right to the disputed parcels
of land because the sale in his favor was recorded.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The question posed in this case is which of the two sales of the two parcels of registered lands should be
accorded legal protection.
The voluntary sale to Simplicio Santos was made in 1961. The sale was not registered in the Registry of
Property.
The involuntary sale to Sostenes Campillo was made in 1962. The sale was registered in the Registry of
Property. In fact, Campillo was issued a transfer certificate of title and later two transfer certificates of title for
each of the parcels.
The contract of sale is a consensual contract, i.e. it is perfected by mere consent. But ownership of the thing
sold shall be transferred to the vendee only upon the actual or constitutive delivery thereof. (Art. 1477, Civil
Code). In other words, there must be tradition.
In the case of lands registered under Act No. 496, as amended, said law provides for a special kind of
tradition. Sec. 50 provides:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise
deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds,
mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in
law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and
as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act the registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds of the province
or provinces or city where the land lies.
Since the sale made in favor of the first vendee did not comply with the above-quoted provision, the
transaction was ineffectual as to third persons. And since the sale made in favor of the second vendee
complied with the relevant provision, the sale to him was good and should be protected.
Makasiar, J., (Chairman)
Footnotes
1 Campillo vs. Philippine National Bank, 28 SCRA 220.
2 109 SCRA 66.
G.R. No. L-6122

May 31, 1954

AURELIA DE LARA and RUFINO S. DE GUZMAN, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JACINTO AYROSO, defendant-appellant.
Lauro Esteban for appellants.
Alfonso G. Espinosa for appellee.
REYES, J.:

70

This is an action for foreclosure of mortgage.

From the stipulation of facts and the additional evidence submitted at the hearing the lower court found and
it is not disputed that the spouses Jacinto Ayroso and Manuela Lacanilao were the registered owners of a
parcel of land, situated in the municipality of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, their title thereto being evidenced by
Transfer Certificate No. 4203 of the land records of that province. The land had an area of a little over 3 1/2
hectares, but according to an annotation on the back of the certificate a large portion of that area a little
less than 3 hectares-had already been alienated, sold to the Pilgrim Holiness Church in 1940. The certificate
was kept in Jacinto Ayroso's trunk in his house in the poblacion of Cabanatuan, but somehow his daughter,
Juliana Ayroso, managed to get possession of it without his knowledge and consent and gave it to a man
whose name does not appear in the record. With the certificate in his possession and representing himself
to be Jacinto Ayroso, this man was able to obtain from the plaintiff spouses the sum of P2,000, which he
agreed to pay back in three months and as security therefor constituted a mortgage on Jacinto Ayroso's
interest in the land covered by the certificate, signing the deed of mortgage with the latter's name. At that
time, April 19, 1949, Jacinto Ayroso was already a widower, his wife having died on the 31st of the preceding
month. Neither Jacinto Ayroso nor the man who impersonated him was personally known to the plaintiffs,
though the latter believed in good faith that the two were one and the same person, the impostor being then
accompanied by Ayroso's daughter Juliana whom they knew personally and who also signed as a witness to
the mortgage deed. The mortgage was later registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
and annotated on the back of the certificate of title. Jacinto Ayroso never authorized anyone to mortgage the
land and received no part of the mortgage loan.
Upon the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the mortgage invalid, ordering the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the corresponding annotation on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4203 and dismissing the complaint with costs. From this judgment an appeal has been taken directly to this
court, and the question for determination is whether the said mortgage may be enforced by plaintiffs against
the defendant Jacinto Ayroso.
There can be no question that the mortgage under consideration is a nullity, the same having been executed
by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the interest mortgaged. Its registration under the Land
Registration Law lends it no validity because, according to the last proviso to the second paragraph of
section 55 of that law, registration procured by the presentation of a forged deed is null and void.
Plaintiffs, however, allege that they are innocent holders for value of a Torrens certificate of title, and on the
authority of Eliason vs. Wilborn (281 U. S., 457), De la Cruz vs. Fabie (35 Phil., 144), and Blondeau et al. vs.
Nano andVallejo (61 Phil., 625), invoke the protection accordedto such holders. But an examination of those
cases willshow that they have no application to the one before us.
In the case first cited, Eliason vs. Wilborn, the appellants, owners of registered land, delivered the certificate
of title to a party under an agreement to sell and the said party forged a deed to himself, had the certificate
issued in his name and then conveyed it to others, who were good faith purchasers for value. Upholding the
last conveyance, the U. S. Supreme Court said: "The appellants saw fit to entrust it (the certificate) to
Napletone and they took the risk ... . As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the
consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the
loss."
In the second case, De la Cruz vs. Fabie, the attorney-in-fact of the owner of registered land, having been
entrusted with the title to said property, abused the confidence thus reposed upon him, forged a deed in his
favor, had anew title issued to himself and then conveyed it to another, who thereafter was issued a new
certificate of title. This court held the purchaser to be the absolute owner of the land as an innocent holder of
a title for value under section 55 of Act No. 496.
It will be noted that in both of the above cases the certificate of title was already in the name of the forger
when the land was sold to an innocent purchaser. In such case the vendee had the right to rely on what
appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate to
be the registered owner. It should also be noted that in both cases fraud was made possible by the owner's
act in entrusting the certificate of title to another. And this should be emphasized because it is what impelled
this court to apply in those cases the principle of equity that "as between two innocent persons, one of whom

71

must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence
must bear the loss."
In the present case the title was still in the name of the real owner when the land was mortgaged to the
plaintiffs by the impostor. And it is obvious that plaintiffs were defrauded not because they relied upon what
appeared in a Torrens certificate of title there was nothing wrong with the certificate but because they
believed the words of the impostor when he told them that he was the person named as owner in the
certificate. As the learned trial judge says in his decision, it was not incumbent upon plaintiffs to inquire into
the ownership of the property and go beyond what was stated on the face of the certificate of title, but it was
their duty to ascertain the identity of the man with whom they were dealing, as well as his legal authority to
convey, if they did not want to be imposed upon. That duty devolves upon all persons buying property of any
kind, and one who neglects it does so at his peril. It should be added that the appellee has not entrusted the
certificate of title to anybody, an element essential to the application of the principle of equity abovecited. It is
thus clear that the circumstances which impelled this court, in the cases cited to extend protection to the
innocent holders for value of the Torrens certificates, at the expense of the owner of the registered property,
are not present in the case at bar.
Nor could the third case cited, Blondeau et al. vs. Nano and Vallejo, serve as a good precedent for the one
now before us. That case, it is true, was also for foreclosure of mortgage, and the defense set up by the
registered owner was also forgery. But it should be noted that in that case this court found as a fact that the
mortgage had not been forged and in addition there was the circumstance that the registered owner had by
his negligence or acquiescence, if not actual connivance, made it possible for the fraud to be committed. It is
thus obvious that the case called for the application of the same principle of equity already mentioned, and
the decision rendered by this court was in line with the two previous cases. But that decision does not fit the
facts of the present case, where the mortgage is admittedly a forgery and the registered owner has not been
shown to have been negligent or in connivance with the forger. The contention that it was negligence on
appellee's part to leave the Torrens title in his trunk in his house in the poblacion when most of the time he
was in the farm, was we think well answered by the trial court when it said:
. . . it was not shown that the defendant has acted with negligence in keeping the certificate of title
in his trunk in his own house. That his daughter was able to steal it or take it from the trunk without
his knowledge and consent and was able to make use of it for a fraudulent purpose, (it) does not
necessarily follow that he was negligent. It is in keeping with ordinary prudence in common Filipino
homes for the owners thereof to keep their valuables in their trunks. It would be too much to expect
of him that he should carry said certificate with him to wherever he goes.
On the other hand the considerations underlying the decision in the case of Ch. Veloso and Rosales vs. La
Urbana and Del Mar (58 Phil., 681), cited by the appelle, would seem to be applicable to the present case.
In the case cited, the plaintiff Veloso, owner of certain parcels of registered land, brought action to annul
certain mortgages constituted thereon by her brother-in-law, the defendant Del Mar, using two powers of
attorney purportedly executed for that purpose by plaintiff and her husband Rosales, but which were in
reality forged, the forgery having been committed by Del Mar himself. How Del Mar obtained possession of
the certificate of title the report does not show, but the mortgages were duly registered and noted on the
certificates of title. In holding the mortgages void, this court said:
. . . Inasmuch as Del Mar is not the registered owner of the mortgaged properties and inasmuch as
the appellant was fully aware of the fact that it was dealing with him on the strength of the alleged
powers of attorney purporting to have been conferred upon him by the plaintiff, it was his duty to
ascertain the genuineness of said instruments and not rely absolutely and exclusively upon the fact
that the said powers of attorney appeared to have been registered. In view of its failure to proceed
in this manner, it acted negligently and should suffer the consequences and damages resulting
from such transactions. (P. 683.)
Appellants, however, contend that the doctrine laid down in that case has already been overruled by the
Blondeau case, supra. This is not so, and to show that it is still good jurisprudence, this court quotes it with
approval in Lopez vs. Seva et al. (69 Phil., 311), a case decided after the Blondeau decision.
We are with the learned trial judge in applying to the present case the principle underlying the decision in the
Veloso case, which, as His Honor well says, "is fair and just because it stands for the security and stability of
property rights under any system of laws, including the Torrens system," affording protection against the

72

dangerous tendency of unprincipled individuals "to enrich themselves at the expense of others thru illegal or
seemingly lawful operations." And as His Honor also says, "as between an interpretation and application of
the law which serves as an effective weapon to curb such dangerous tendency or that which technically may
aid or foment it, the choice is clear and unavoidable." For, as repeatedly stated by this court, although the
underlying purpose of the Land Registration Law is to impart stability and conclusiveness to transactions
that have been placed within its operations, still that law does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-13953

July 26, 1960

MONS. CARLOS INQUIMBOY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARIA CONCEPCION PAEZ VDA. DE CRUZ, defendant-appellee.
Mamerto N. Makapagal for appellant.
Conrado T. Reyes for appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This appeal brings up for the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.
The facts are: Plaintiff's Carlos Inquimboy was the registered owner of the disputed land located in
Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, as per T.C.T. No. 15600, Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Annex B). On October
31, 1941, he sold the land, together with another parcel described in T.C.T. No. 15599, for the sum of
P4,000.00 to Cenon Albea, who after making the down payment, promised to pay the balance in two
installments, that is, P500.00 in may, 1942 (Annex C). On two other registered parcels, to Pedro Cruz
(Annex D). This deed of sale was presented for registration on January 3, 1944. As to the two other piece of
land, registration was duly had, but with respect to the disputed land, registration was refused because the
land was still in the Inquimboy's name, Albea not having registered his deed of sale. On February 18, 1944,
the sale in Albea not having registered his deed of sale. On February 18, 1944, the sale in Albea's favor was
registered, Inquimboy's title was cancelled and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 20142 was issued to Albea (Annex
E).
On February 23, 1944, Inquimboy filed against Albea in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a
complaint alleging, inter alia, that Albea failed to pay him on November 15, 1941, the sum of P2,500.00 and
in May, 1942, the sum of P500.00 stipulated in the contract between them and therefore prayed that the
contract of sale be rescinded, and that Albea be ordered to returned to him T.C.T. Nos. 15599 and 15600
(Civil Case No. 93-J).
On May 26, 1944, T.C.T. No. 20142 in Albea's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 20584 was
issued to Pedro Cruz.
The civil case which Inquimboy had filed against Albea was passed upon by the lower court, then by the
Court of Appeals and finally by this Court, which in a decision rendered in May 19, 1950 (89 Phil., 1601; 47
Off. Gaz. [12] 131) ordered Albea to reconvey and deliver to Inquimboy the properties litigated therein (one
of which is now in litigation), unless within thirty days after final judgment he should pay the balance of the
purchase price and P500.00 as liquidated damages and attorney's fees (Annex A).
On October 11, 1957, Inquimboy instituted in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the present action
against Maria Concepcion Paez Vda. de Cruz, surviving spouse of the now deceased Pedro Cruz, seeking
annulment of T.C.T. No. 20584 and issuance of a new one in his name. The parties admitted the case in

73

stipulation of facts, which, together with the annexes thereto, disclosed the above-narrated facts. The lower
court dismissed the complaint.
Reversal of the lower court's decision is sought by plaintiff on three grounds, namely, (1) Pedro Cruz was not
a buyer in good faith; (2) Cruz was bound by this Court's decision in G. R. No. L-1601; and (3) appellant is
not guilty of laches in asserting his right.
Contrary to appellant's principal contention, Pedro Cruz was a buyer in good faith.
It is true that we have several decisions wherein we enunciated the general rule that one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith (Veloso and Rosales vs. La Urbana
and Del Mar, 58 Phil., 681 ; Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137; 46 Off. Gaz., 4258; Mirasol vs. Gerochi, 93 Phil.,
480; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 95 Phil., 185; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4838; Revilla and Fajardo vs.
Galindez, 107 Phil., 480). But in deciding the question of good faith , the legal environment of each case
must be considered. In all the instances where the above rule was followed, it should be noted that the
buyer never dealt with the registered owner, yet the certificate of title was transferred from the registered
owner directly to the buyer a fact which should have made the buyer investigate the right of his transferor
was not and never became the registered owner of the litigated land. Herein, the sale in favor of Cruz was
executed by Albea on December 20, 1943, when the land February 18, 1944, appellant's certificate of title
was cancelled and another issued to Albea. And May 26, 1944, Albea's title was cancelled and in lieu thereof
T.C.T. No. 20584 was issued to Cruz. Hence, while Albea may not have been a registered owner at the time
he executed the deed of sale of favor of Cruz, he nevertheless subsequently acquired valid title in his own
name which title he later transferred to Cruz. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells and
delivers it, and later the seller acquires title thereto, such tittle passes by operation of law to the buyer(Article
1434, New Civil Code).
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in such property and prays in full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, and before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property (Cui and
Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil., 612). This definition fits Pedro Cruz. At the time he brought the property from
Albea, he did not have knowledge, actual or imputable, of the right of another person on the property. His
transferor, Albea, had in his possession the proper deed of conveyance executed by appellant in his favor,
as well as appellant's certificate of title. So as between appellant and Albea, the land already belonged to
the latter (Section 50, Act 496). And the registration of the land in Albea's name effectively operated to
convey it to him. Albea's title was clean there was no lien or encumbrance annotated thereon. Of course,
Albea's title was cancelled and another issue to Cruz only on May 26, 1944, while as early as February 23,
1944, appellant had already instituted a suit against Albea for recovery of the land. But since appellant never
filed a notice of lis pendens, Cruz could not have known of the pending action, and consequently cannot be
bound by the result thereof (Section 79, Act 496).
Having found that Cruz' purchase of the land was characterized by good faith, we deem it unnecessary to
take up the other points raised by appellant.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Barrera, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47662

September 30, 1942

JOAQUIN V. BASS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESTEBAN DE LA RAMA and HIJOS DE I. DE LA RAMA, defendants-appellees.
Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
Herras & Concepcion for appellees.

74

OZAETA, J.:
Pedro Ferrer was the owner of an undivided one-fourth of a parcel of land of 5,047,014 square meters
situated in the municipality of Escalante, Province of Occidental Negros, under transfer certificate of title No.
2112. On July 16, 1920, he conveyed his interest our participation in said land to Hijos de I. de la Rama by
way of mortgage to secure the payment of P12,500 with interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum. The
mortgage was duly recorded in the office of the register of deeds and annotated on the certificate of title on
July 27, 1920.
On December 18, 1923, the provincial sheriff of Occidental Negros, at the instance of the herein plaintiff
Joaquin V. Bass, levied execution on the one-fourth interest of Pedro Ferrer in the said land by virtue of a
writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 19816, entitled "Joaquin V.
Bass vs.. Pedro Ferrer." Notice of the levy was presented to the office of the register of deeds and entered in
the day book on December 18, 1923, but was not annotated on the certificate of title. Pursuant to that levy,
the provincial sheriff advertised and sold at public auction the said one-fourth interest of Pedro Ferrer in the
land above mentioned, adjudicating it to the judgment creditor Joaquin V. Bass for the sum of P4,811,35,
which was the amount of the judgment plus interest, costs, and expenses of the sale. The certificate of sale
was presented to the office of the register of deeds and entered in the day book on April 9, 1924; but, like
the notice of levy, it was not annotated on the corresponding certificate of title. It does not appear that the
sheriff ever issued a final deed of sale in favor of Joaquin V. Bass after the lapse of one year. Neither does it
appear whether or not the execution debtor Pedro Ferrer exercised the right of redemption within said
statutory period.
In or before 1924 Juliana Fuentebella Vda. de Ferrer, Pedro Ferrer, and Francisco Ferrer instituted civil case
No. 2911 in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros against the Negros Coal Co., Ltd., Esteban de
la Rama, and Hijos de I. de la Rama; and by way of cross-complaint filed in said case on July 30, 1924, the
defendant Hijos de I. de la Rama foreclosed the mortgage executed by Pedro Ferrer as well as those
executed separately by his co-owners Juliana Fuentebella and Francisco Ferrer on the land described in
transfer certificate of title No. 2112. By virtue of the judgment obtained in said case by Hijos de I. de la Rama
against Pedro Ferrer and his co-owners, the provincial sheriff advertised and sold at public auction on
January 5, 1929, the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 2112, adjudicating it to the judgment
creditor Hijos de I. de la Rama for the sum of P50,000. Upon presentation of the certificate of sale to the
register of deeds of Occidental Negros, the latter, on January 7, 1929, cancelled transfer certificate of title
No. 2112 in the name of Juliana Fuentebella, Francisco Ferrer, and Pedro Ferrer and issued transfer
certificate of title No. 11411 in the name of Hijos de I. de la Rama. Subsequently the sheriff's sale was
confirmed by the court in an order dated July 27, 1929.
On the last-mentioned certificate of title are noted the following are subsisting encumbrances on the land in
question: (1) A mortgage of P400,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank, recorded October 24, 1935;
(2) another mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank to secure credit of P1,000,000 to P2,000,000,
recorded February 25, 1938; and (3) notice of lis pendens by the plaintiff in this case, recorded April 21,
1939.
The present action was instituted in or about April, 1939, by Joaquin V. Bass against Esteban de la Rama
and Hijos de I. de la Rama to obtain judgment ordering the defendants "to deliver the land in question to the
plaintiff and to pay to the latter damages in the sum of P1,220,700" claimed to be the value of the sugar
realized from the produce of one-fourth of the said land during the time it has been in the possession of the
defendants. That amount has been reduced in the prayer of appellant's brief to P353,365.98.
The theory of the plaintiff, as may be gathered from his complaint, is that by virtue of the certificate of sale
issued in his favor by the sheriff on February 15, 1924, which was entered in the day book of the register of
deeds on April 9 of the same year, he became the absolute owner of one-fourth of the land described in
transfer certificate of title No. 2112, equivalent to 127.9271 hectares, but that "the defendants illegally and in
bad faith and without the consent of the plaintiff appropriated and took possession of the whole land
described in said certificate of title from January 5, 1929, up to the present time, including the one-fourth of
the same which is the exclusive property of the plaintiff."
The defendants set up the following special defenses: (1) That the defendant Hijos de I. de la Rama
acquired a valid title to the land in question thru the foreclosure of its mortgages thereon and the subsequent
issuance to it of transfer certificate of title No. 11411; (2) that the plaintiff has no right or interest in the land in

75

question, for, if he ever had it, he transferred such right and interest in the land in question, for if he ever had
it, he transferred such right and interest to Gaspar Oliver, who in turn sold it to Alejandro Gamboa, and the
latter in turn donated it to his brother Antonio Gamboa; and (3) that the plaintiff has lost whatever right and
interest he may have had in said land by extinctive prescription.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the ground that whatever right he might have acquired by
virtue of the sheriff's sale have been lost thru his failure to redeem Pedro Ferrer's mortgage in favor of Hijos
de I. de la Rama before it was foreclosed. Plaintiff appealed.
Appellant acquired Pedro Ferrer's interest and participation in the land in question thru the sheriff's sale of
February 15, 1924, subject to the right of redemption of the execution debtor or his redemptioner within one
year and to the mortgage of P12,500, with interest at 12 per cent annum, in favor of Hijos de I. de la Rama.
In order to establish his claim of absolute ownership of one-fourth of the land in question, it was incumbent
upon appellant to establish that the title thereof had been consolidated in him. That he could show only by
proving (a) that Pedro Ferrer had failed to exercise the right of redemption and (b) that he and (appellant)
had satisfied the pre-existing mortgage in favor of Hijos de I. de La Rama. But that he did not even attempt
to do.
Thus we find that the equity of right acquired by the plaintiff in the land in question did not mature into
ownership. Does that equity still subsist? In order to determine that question it is necessary to pass upon
defendants' special defense.
1. Anent the first special defense, appellant assigns as error the failure of the trial to hold that appellees
should have made him a party in the foreclosure proceeding. It is intimated that by virtue of the sheriffs's
sale of February 15, 1924, appellant became a junior encumbrancer and as such have been impleaded as
cross-defendant in the cross-complaint of foreclosure of mortgage interposed by Hijos de I. de la Rama in
case No. 2911, as required by section 255 of act No. 190. In this connection the trial court held that the levy
on execution and the subsequent sale at public auction in favor of appellant, not having been noted on the
certificate of title, could not serve as notice to the whole world of appellant's equity in the land in question; in
other words, they were not binding against appellees. That holding of the trial court is also assigned as error
by appellant.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.. Aballe ([1934], 60 Phil., 986), this Court interpreting sections 51
and 56 of Act No. 496, held that the notation of a writ of attachment in the entry book of the register of deeds
is effective although no corresponding notation is made on the certificate of title. That doctrine was followed
in Director of Lands vs.. Abad ([1935], 61 Phil., 479). In the last mentioned case, Levy Hermanos, Inc.,
attached the right, title, and interest of one Crecenciano M. Torres in a parcel of registered land situated in
Bacolod, Occidental Negros. The notice of attachment was presented to the register of deeds on January
14, 1931, and noted in the entry book but not on the certificate of title. On August 14, 1931, Crecenciano M.
Torres mortgaged the said parcel of land to La Urbana, which registered the mortgage and caused it to be
noted on the certificate of title. On April 9, 1932, the register of deeds discovered his failure, through
oversight, to annotate the attachment on the certificate of title, and petitioned the court for authority to do so
and for an order to La Urbana surrender the said certificate of title. That motion was denied, but
subsequently Levy Hermanos, Inc., renewed it after having bought the property at public auction, and the
court granted the motion and ordered the annotation of the attachment with precedence over La Urbana's
mortgage. Following the decision in the Aballe case, this Court affirmed that order declaring:
When Levy Hermanos, Inc., delivered its notice of attachment to the register of deeds of Occidental
Negros and paid the corresponding fees, it had a right to presume that official would perform his
duty property. When its attachment was entered upon the entry book it was duly registered
according to section 56.
However, the Court also observed that when La Urbana presented its mortgage for registration, it had a right
to rely upon the presumption that the official duty of the register of deeds of Occidental Negros, as set forth
section 72 of Act No. 496, had been regularly performed. Continuing, the Court said:
... A person who in good faith acquires any right or title to land registered under the provisions of
Act No. 496 would not need to go behind the certificate of title if the register of deeds of the
province in which such land is situated performs his legal duty. If a certificate of title cannot be

76

taken at its face value the owner of land registered under the Torrens system will be greatly
handicapped in making sales thereof or borrowing money thereon. For instance, in the present
case La Urbana would have had to examine over 29,000 day book entries before making the loan
to Crecenciano M. Torres if it had been obliged to go behind the transfer certificate of title No.
13126.
Quoting from Quimson vs.. Suarez (45 Phil., 901, 906 ), the Court further said:
One of the principal features of the Torrens System of registration is that all incumbrances on the
land or special estates therein shall be shown, or, at least, intimated upon the certificate of title and
a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and
inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated.
It seems to us that these observations of the Court militate against the soundness of the ruling laid own in
the Aballe case above cited, and we deem it necessary now to reexamine it. The ratio decidendi in that case
is as follows:
Neither is his opposition with respect to lot No. 762 founded, notwithstanding the fact that the notice
of attachment had not been noted on the original certificate of title to this lot in the name of
Gervasio Ignalaga and Petra Maderazo or on the transfer certificate of title which was later issued
in his name, inasmuch as this notice of attachment was duly inscribed in the books of the registry of
deeds. According to section 51 of Act No. 496, the registration of the instrument in the books of the
registry deeds is notice to all as regards such document. It does not provide that it is the notation
thereof on the certificate of title. And section 56 of the same Act, in prescribing the form in which he
registers of deeds should keep their entry books and directing the entry therein, in the order of their
reception, of all deeds and other voluntary instruments and all copies of writs and other process
filed with them relating to registered land, noting therein the year, month, day, hour and minute
when they received them, provides the inscription or registration shall be regarded as made from
the time so noted. According to this, the notation of the attachment of this lot in the entry book of
the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription.
(60 Phil., 988.)
Section 51 of Act No. 496 reads as follows:
Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting
registered land which would under existing laws, if recorded, filed, or entered in the office of the
register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the
office of the register of deeds in the province on city where the real estate to which such instrument
relates lies, be notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.
This Court interpreted that section to mean that the mere entry in the day book of a document affecting
registered land is sufficient to the whole world. That would make it unnecessary for the register of deeds to
make a brief memorandum of said document on the certificate of title. We think such interpretation
disregards the provisions of section 52 of the same Act, which reads as follows:
No new certificate shall be entered or issued upon any transfer of registered land which does not
divest the land in fee simple from the owner or from some one of the registered owners. All
interests in registered land less than an estate in fee simple shall be instrument creating or
transferring or claiming such interest and by a brief memorandum thereof made by the register of
deeds upon the certificate of title, signed by him. A similar memorandum shall also be made on the
owner's duplicate. The cancellation or extinguishment of such interest shall be registered in the
same manner.
It will be noted that section 51 declares the effect of registration, while section 52 specifies the manner of
registration. The two sections are complementary to each other and should be interpreted together. To hold
that the mere entry of a document in the day or entry book, without noting it on the certificate of title, is
sufficient, would render section 52 nugatory and destroy of the principal features of the Torrens System of
registration, namely, that all encumbrances on the land or special estates therein shall be shown or at least
intimated upon the certificate of title so that a person dealing with the owner of the land need not go behind

77

the certificate and inquire into transactions the existence of which is not there intimated. It will further be
noted that section 114 of the Land Registration Act provides for separate fees for the entry of a document in
the entry book and for the annotation thereof on the certificate of title. For each entry in the entry book,
including indexing, a fee of only fifty centavos is provided; but for each registration on the certificate of title a
fixed fee of one peso is charged plus an additional fee ranging from P3 to P100, depending upon the value
of the property or right involved. If the mere entry of a document in the entry book were sufficient, no one
would or should take the trouble of causing it to be annotated on the certificate of title and paying additional
fees. But that is unavoidable because section 56 provides "that no registration, annotation, or memorandum
on a certificate of title shall be made unless the fees prescribed therefor by this Act are paid within fifteen
days' time after the date of the registration of the deed, instrument order, or document in the entry book or
day book, and in case said fee is not paid within the time above mentioned, such entry shall be null and
void." It seems clear, therefore, that the mere entry in the day book is not sufficient. It is true that the same
section 56 also provides that the register of deeds shall note in the entry book the year, month, day, hour,
and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they are received, and that "they shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when made on the
certificate of title which it refers shall bear the same date. But this provision must be harmonized with the
other provisions of the Act, particularly sections 52 and 114, which require the annotation of such
instruments on the certificate of title as an indispensable requisite to accomplish registration. Only by so
doing may the prime purpose of the Torrens System be fulfilled: to facilitate dealings on land by means of a
certificate of title which shall show all encumbrances on the land or special estates therein so that a person
dealing on the land need not go behind that certificate. As a matter of fact, we find no ambiguity in this
statement of section 56: "They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument when made on the certificate of title to which it refers shall bear the same
date." The second clause of this sentence is explanatory of the first. It means that the effect of the
annotation of an instrument on the certificate of title shall retroact to the moment of the entry of the same in
the day book. (Fidelity and Surety Co. vs.. Conegero, 41 Phil., 396, 400.)
In view of these considerations, we are constrained to abandon the ruling laid down in Government of the
Philippine Islands vs.. Aballe, 60 Phil., 986, which was followed in Director of Lands vs.. Abad, 61 Phil., 479,
and to hold that the entry of an instrument in the entry book of the of the register of deeds produces no legal
effect unless a memorandum of such instrument is noted on the certificate of title. In the instant case the
notice of levy on execution and the sheriff's sale in favor of appellant of Pedro Ferrer's participation in the
land in question were never annotated on the certificate of title. Hence they were not binding against the
mortgage Hijos de I. de la Rama and it was not necessary for the latter to implead appellant as junior
encumbrancer in the foreclosure of its mortgage. As a result, the equity or right acquired by appellant in
Pedro Ferrer's participation in the land in question was wiped out by the foreclosure of the pre-existing
mortgage thereon.
2. Aside from the foregoing considerations, it also appears from paragraph V of plaintiff's complaint that the
defendant Hijos de I. de la Rama, which appears now to be the registered owner of the land in question, has
been in the adverse and exclusive possession of said land since January 5, 1929. Nevertheless plaintiff's
commenced this action and filed notice of lis pendens only in April, 1939, that is to say, more than ten years
after plaintiff's cause of action had accrued. Since, as we have shown, plaintiff's interest in said land has not
been registered, he cannot invoke section 46 of the Land Registration Act in his favor. It is clear, therefore,
that this action is barred by the statute of limitations.
In connection with plaintiff's laches, it may further be noted that previous to his filing of a notice of lis
pendens on the land in question the Philippine National Bank has recorded two mortgages on said land, the
first amounting to P400,000 and the second, at least P1,000,000. These encumbrances appellant cannot
ignore. Yet he makes no offer to satisfy them, nor even , for that matter, De las Ramas's original mortgage,
which was anterior to appellant's notice of levy on execution. That only goes to emphasize how untenable is
appellant's pretension.
3. We cannot close this decision without noting another phase of this case which affects the administration
of justice. One of defendants' special defenses is that the plaintiff had no more right or interest in the land in
question because he had transferred it to Gaspar Oliver. At the trial defendants presented Exhibit 8, a signed
carbon copy of the deed of sale executed on April 11, 1924, by Joaquin V. Bass in favor of Gaspar Oliver
before Notary Public Thos. Powell, of Iloilo, in the presence of two witnesses, L. G. Thomas and Pedro
Sandoval. To rebut that proof, the plaintiff presented Joaquin V. Bass who swore in open court that he forged
the signature of his uncle Joaquin V. Bass on Exhibit 8 because Gaspar Oliver gave him P400. He also
swore that he copied his uncle's cedula number from another document, and that he did not appear before

78

Notary Public Thos. N. Powell, nor did he sign his uncle's name on said document in the presence of said
witnesses. On the other hand, Attorney Thos. N. Powell testified by deposition that Joaquin V. Bass signed
said Exhibit 8 in his presence and personally showed him his (Joaquin's) cedula, the number of which
Powell swore he copied on the corresponding blank space in the notarial acknowledgment in his own
handwriting.
It is not necessary for us to determine whether or not Exhibit 8 is a forgery, in view of the conclusions we
have reached above; but we cannot overlook the glaring fact that crime was committed in connection with
the trial of this case. If the witness Joaquin V. Bass really forged Exhibit 8, he committed the crime of
forgery; and if he did not, he perjured himself when he testified that he did. In any event, this phase of the
case should be investigated in the interest of the administration of justice.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the provincial fiscals of Iloilo and Occidental Negros, who are hereby
directed to investigate Joaquin V. Bass in relation to Exhibit 8 and his testimony in this case and to take such
action as the result of their investigation may warrant.
Yulo, C.J. and Moran, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. The plaintiff-petitioner has lost title to the land in question after the registration of his
rights in the day book became a nullity by operation of law. A register of deeds is presumed to have
complied with his duties, one of which is to make on the certificate of title memoranda of all entries in his day
book upon payment by the interested party of the corresponding fee. If the fee is not paid within fifteen days
from the date of the entry in the day book., said entry automatically become null and void. (Section 56, Act
No. 496.) No memorandum having been made on the certificate of title involved in the present case, it can
be assumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the plaintiff-petitioner or his alleged assignees or
successors in interest did not pay the necessary fee, and this failure, in all probability, was due to the
considerable value of the property in question which made the fee corresponding high, and to the fact that
said property was encumbered by a heavy mortgage.
On the other hand, I cannot align myself with my colleagues in their attempt to enunciate a new doctrine on
what should be the act operates to convey and affect land registered under the Torrens system. Heretofore,
and as stated by the majority, citing the cases of Government of the Philippine Islands vs.. Aballe, 60 Phil.,
986, and Director of Lands vs.. Abad, 61 Phil., 479, the day book of the register of deeds has been
considered the operative act. While I am sticking to this rule, because it is based on sound practical reasons
and on the plain letter of the law, it being provided in section 50 of Act No. 496, that "the act of registration
shall be the operative act" and, in section 56 of the same statute, that all instruments or other process "shall
be regarded as registered from the time" they are noted in the day book, the majority is for its abrogation
and for the doctrine that actual inscription on the certificate of title should be the prevailing operative act.
There may be some good reasons for the latter view, but it is clearly against the law and will lead to
consequences certainly not to be desired.
By law, by tradition, and in practice, the office of the register of deeds is known to be the source of
information regarding titles, or other rights to real property, and is therefore the place where any one in
search of correct particulars about real estates goes. As will presently be illustrated, the certificate cannot
always be safely relied upon a warning that has resonant echo in the legal provisions that "all records and
papers relating to registered land in the office of the register of deeds shall be open to the public" (section
56, Act No. 496) and that "every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment order decree, instrument, or
entry affecting registered land which would under existing laws, if recorded, filed or entered in the office of
the register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates shall, if registered filed, or entered in the office
of the register of deeds in the province or city where the real estate to which such instrument relates lies, be
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or, entering" (section 51, Act No. 496 ). Such
records and papers, it is fair to assume, are kept and filed by the register of deeds with such system and

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care as to enable him to locate any wanted information with ease and speed, with the result that any
interested party need not worry about the necessity of examining voluminous records and papers.
In actual practice memoranda of transactions about or liens on land are made on the certificate of title days
after the filing of the necessary instruments in the office of the register of deeds; and this happens not only
because the interested party has fifteen days from the date of the entry in the day book within which to pay
the requisite fee, but because the register of deeds has to wait for the presentation of the owner's duplicate,
it being of course necessary to make such memoranda both on the original certificate of title and on its
duplicate.
Now, if the parties may depend chiefly on what is noted on the certificate of title, they will surely have
occasion to discover that, although it is free from all liens and adverse claims because none is registered
thereon, instruments creating the same may nevertheless have been filed in the office of the register of
deeds, in which case it becomes the legal duty of the latter in the day book the year, day, hour and minute of
the reception of such instruments, and to make of the certificate of title the corresponding memoranda,
which, when duly made, retroact to the day of the entry in the day book (Section 56 Act No. 496.) Under the
rule announced in the decision of the majority, the retroactive force thus expressly accorded by the law to
such entry is in effect nullified.
Suppose the plaintiff-creditor in a suit for the recovery of a sum of money, after finding in the office of the
register of deeds that a certain parcel of land is registered in the name of the defendant-debtor whose title
appears to be clear of all liens and adverse claims because none appears in the day book, attaches the land
in accordance with law and pays the corresponding entry fee. In such case, wherein the duplicate certificate
need not be presented at the time of registration (section 72, Act No. 496), the register of deeds necessarily
has to enter or register said attachment in his day book. The plaintiff-creditor, who has fifteen days within
which to pay the fee for noting the attachment on the certificate of title, does not pay the same until the tenth
day. On the same date, notwithstanding said attachment, the defendant-debtor, who is holding the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, sells the property to a third person who, relying simply on what appears thereon,
enters into a contract of purchase and sale which is filed in the office of the register of deeds. In this
example, even if the purchaser pays the required fees, the attachment levied at the instance of the plaintiffcreditor will still have to be noted on the new certificate of title, since its entry in the day book is prior, and the
purchaser must content himself with a title subject to the rights of the attaching creditor. If the attachment is
thus recognized, it must be for the reason that the registration in the day book is considered the operative
act that binds the land.
Conversely, suppose a person purchases a parcel of land with a clean title and all the necessary
instruments regarding the transaction are duly presented in the office of the register of deeds and entered in
the day book, but no new certificate of title has as yet been issued for nonpayment of the corresponding fee,
the purchaser having fifteen days within which to pay the same. In the meantime the plaintiff-creditor goes to
the office of the register of deeds and, finding that the certificate of title in he name of the defendant-debtor,
without reference to the day book, is free from all liens and encumbrances, causes the property to be
attached and the attachment to be noted on the certificate of title on the tenth day after the entry of the
purchaser's documents in the day book, but before the latter has paid the fees required for the issuance of a
new certificate of title. Under the theory of the majority, the right of the attaching creditor should prevail over
that of the purchaser simply because the former's right is already noted on the certificate of title. The
innocent purchaser, whose proprietary right was entered on a prior date in the day book, is thus put at a
great disadvantage, nay, penalized for his compliance with the law granting him fifteen days within which to
pay the fee necessary to perfect his title.
In other words, the theory of the majority is conducive to the possibility that the owner may in succession
negotiate his certificate of title to different person in fraud of one or the other, or of all, and he can be
stopped only when he is unable to continue to be the holder thereof. The benefit from the negotiability of the
certificate of title which the majority is zealous about, and which is more apparent than real, is thus entirely
erased by the evil resulting from such from such possibility.
The majority has also expressed excessive concern over the indefeasibility of the Torrens title. I am of the
opinion that, when a Torrens title is referred to as being indefeasible, the correct idea intended to be
conveyed is that all questions that led to its issuance in favor of the registered owner have been definitely
closed, but that subsequent transactions regarding the land covered by said title are not in themselves

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indefeasible and are subject to the rule of priority prescribed in section 56, in relation to section 50, of Act
No. 496.
BOCOBO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. Presumably, the required fee was never paid by the appellant; so the entry of the
sheriff''s sale in his favor became null and void according to section 56 of the Land Registration Act. This
nullity of said entry fully disposes of appellant's first special defense and it therefore becomes unnecessary
to abandon the doctrine laid down in the case of Government of the People of the Philippines vs.. Aballe,
which appears to be supported by writers on the subject. For example Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System" says on page 140:
The rule, that a purchaser may rely on the register to determine the status of the main title, is
subject to at least one practical exception. The acts provide for the filing of instruments dealing with
registered land, and for the notation thereon of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of such filing.
Many acts expressly provide for the relating back of the registration, when made, to the time of
filing of the instrument, and perhaps this is the legal effect of registration whether it is so declared in
the statute or not. A person dealing with land, therefore, must take notice of all instruments and the
contents of them, which have been received at the registry, and which have not yet been
registered. According to the English rule, "when a instrument purporting to be already executed by
a registered proprietor is delivered at the registry of registration, notice of the fact shall be sent to
him at his registered address; and unless the execution is admitted by him, the registration shall not
be completed until after the expiration of three clear days from the posting of the notice." It is
nowhere contemplated that the register shall be kept down to date, and an examination of the
instruments not yet registered must be made, since they take priority according to the order in
which they are received for registration.
Moreover, I believe that under said section 56, such instrument filed with the office of the Register of Deeds
but not yet noted on the certificate of title serves as notice to the world only within fifteen days if the required
fee is not paid within said period. This is so because in that case the entry on the day book becomes null
and void if the required fee is not paid. Therefore, anyone dealing with the land within that period is bound
only for fifteen days by said instrument so entered but not yet noted on the certificate of title. In this case,
nearly five years elapsed between the entry of the sheriff's sale to appellees; that is, between April 9, 1924
and January 5, 1929. If the sheriff's sale to appellees had been effected before or within fifteen days from
April 9, 1924, appellees would have been bound for fifteen days to take notice of the instrument concerning
the first sheriff's sale which was received at the registry on said date.
December 14, 1942
RESOLUTION
OZAETA, J.:
In his motion for reconsideration appellant contends that the registration of the certificate of sale made by
the sheriff in favor of the appellee Hijos de I. de la Rama on January 27, 1929, before the sale was
confirmed by the court, was not authorized by law and, therefore, the issuance by the register of deeds in
favor of said appellee of transfer certificate of title No. 11411 was null and void. Consequently, appellant
contends, the annotation on the day book of the certificate of sale made by the sheriff in his favor on April 9,
1924, should prevail.
We find no merit in appellant's contention, which he raises for the first time in his motion for reconsideration.
The preventive annotation or entry on the day book of appellant's certificate of sale ceased to have any legal
effect after the lapse of fifteen days without said document having been annotated on the certificate of title,
presumably due to appellant's failure to pay the statutory fees to the register of deeds. The irregularity in the
registration of the sheriff's deed of sale in favor of Hijos de I. de la Rama on January 27, 1929, before it was
approved by the court, was cured by the subsequent approval or confirmation of said sale by the court on
July 27, 1929, no third party having acquired a better right to the land in question during the intervening
period. If appellant had registered the deed of sale in his favor of Hijos de I. de la Rama was approved by
the court, his new contention might prevail.

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In a separate motion appellant announces his intention to present a certified copy of the sheriff's final deed
of sale supposed to have been executed on March 10, 1925, the original of which, according to him, was
delivered to his former attorney, Alejandro de Guzman. But said document, never having been registered,
could not in any way affect the rights of the appellee over the land in question. Hence the presentation of a
certified copy thereof to this Court would serve no useful purpose. It is also alleged in said motion that,
included in the price of P4,811,33 for which the interest and participation of the execution-debtor Pedro
Ferrer in the land in question was adjudicated by the sheriff to appellant, was an item of P50.58 "por los
derechos y honorarios" of the sheriff, and that said sum should cover not only the sheriff's fees but also the
registration fees. That has not been proved: but even assuming that to be true, it would not necessarily show
that the register of deeds actually received the corresponding fees. The fact, deducible from appellant's
motion, that he kept the sheriff's final deed of sale dated March 10, 1925, and delivered it to his first attorney
in the present case instead of filing in the office of the register of deeds accompanied by the necessary fees,
clearly shows that appellant failed to take the steps required by law to protect and perfect his right.
Regarding appellant's contention that this Court should not have considered the question of prescription of
appellant's action because that involved a question of fact which cannot be raised before this Court on
appeal, suffice it to say that this appeal was taken directly to this Court because the value of the property in
litigation exceeded P50,000, and in such a case this Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact and
of law.
Wherefore, appellant's motion for reconsideration is denied. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7614

May 31, 1955

CONRADO POTENCIANO (deceased) substituted by LUIS, MILAGROS, VICTOR, and LOURDES, all
surnamed POTENCIANO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NAPOLEON DINEROS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, defendants-appellants.
Tomas de Guzman and Policarpio Sangalang for appellees.
Emilio M. Javier and Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picaso for appellants.
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, annuling an execution sale.
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
On November 3, 1944, the Plaintiff bought from Gregorio Alcabao the parcel of land and house
object of this suit, as evidenced by a deed of sale. (Appendix "A" attached to the complaint). The
following day, November 4, 1944, the plaintiff presented the deed of sale and owner's certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds of Greater of Manila for registration. The entry was made in the day
book and the plaintiff paid the corresponding fees, amounting to P72.50 and evidenced by official
receipt. (Exh. C') In entering the transaction in the entry book, the clerk who made the entry
committed an error in copying the number of the certificate of title. As appearing in the entry, it is
numbered at (s) TCT No. 28436, when in fact the true number of the title is 18438. There is no
doubt, however, that the property sold to the plaintiff is the same as that described and covered by
TCT No. 28438. In the confusion arising from the bombing of Manila, the papers presented by the
plaintiff were either lost or destroyed and were not among those salvaged. Up to this time, no
certificate of title has been issued to the plaintiff. Sometime in April, 1946, the defendant sued
Gregorio Alcabao and his son for damages and judgment was rendered in favor of the present
defendant. When the complaint was filed against said Alcabao, a writ of attachment was issued and
the property in question was attached, it appearing that the property was still in the name of
Gregorio Alcabao. A third-party claim was filed by the plaintiff and the discrepancy in the numbers

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was explained, pointing out that the description of the property as contained in the deed of sale and
TCT No. 38438 tallies in every respect. The plaintiff's claim was denied, and so was his claim
during the execution sale. (Pp. 49-51, Record on Appeal.)
And the record further shows that when the attachment was levied on the property in question Potenciano
filed his third party claim thereto, whereupon the sheriff required Dineros to post a bond if he did not want
the property released. Dineros posted a bond, but later succeeded in having the court order the sheriff to
return it to him and to disregard the third party claims on the ground that Potenciano had no right to the
property attached because it was not the one purchased by him from Alcabao. When the property was later
ordered sold to satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of Dineros and against Alcabao in the main case,
Potenciano renewed his third party claim but, at the instance of Dineros, the same was dismissed and the
sheriff ordered to proceed with the sale without need of requiring a bond from Dineros. In compliance with
this order the property was sold at public auction, and, Dineros having submitted the highest bid, the sheriff,
on February 10, 1951, gave him his certificate of sale and this was noted on the corresponding certificate of
title two days later. Potenciano tried twice to have the proceedings in the court below annulled thru certiorari
but in both cases his petition was denied by this Court.
The Rules of Court provide that a purchaser of real property at an execution sale "shall be substituted to and
acquire all the right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto." (Rule 39, section 24.) In other
words, the purchaser acquires only such right or interest as the judgment debtor had on the property at the
time of the sale. (Cruz vs. Sandoval, 69 Phil. 736; Barrido vs. Barreto, 72 Phil. 187.) It follows that it at that
time the judgment debtor had no more right to or interest in the property because he had already sold it to
another than the purchaser acquires nothing. Such appears to be the case here, for it is not disputed that
years before the execution sale and even before the attachment the judgment debtor had already
deeded the property and delivered his certificate of title to another, who on the following day presented the
deed and certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. In other words, it was registered. And this act of
registration operated to convey the property to the buyer.
The judgment creditor contends that entry of the deed in the day book is not sufficient registration. Both
upon law and authority this contention must be rejected. Section 56 of the Land Registration Act says that
deeds relating to registered land shall, upon payment of the filing fee, be entered in the entry book also
called day book in the same section with notation of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of their
reception and that "they shall be regarded as registered from the moment so noted." And applying this
provision in the cases of Levin vs. Bass* etc., G. R. Nos. L-4340 to 4346, decided on May 28, 1952, this
Court held that "an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and in the
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents and files a duly notarized
and lawful deed of sale and the same is entered on the day book and at the same time he surrenders or
presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration
fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform."
The judgment creditor may not, as purchaser at the auction sale, invoke the protection accorded by law to
purchasers in good faith, because at the time of the auction he already had notice, thru the third party claim
filed by Potenciano, that the property had already been acquired by the latter from the judgment debtor.
We see no merit in the claim that the denial or dismissal of Potenciano's claim in the court below constitutes
a bar to the present action. Potenciano, it is true, did not appeal from the disapproval of his claim. But it
should be borne in mind that appeal is not proper in such cases. (Queblar vs. Garduo, 67 Phil., 316.) As
was said in that case, the appeal that should be interposed "if the term 'appeal' may properly be employed,
is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after the
sale at public auction, or a complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the sheriff." Such reivindicatory action is resurged to the third party claimant by section 15
of Rule 39 despite disapproval of his claim by the court itself. (Planas vs. Madrigal, 94 Phil., 754; Lara vs.
Bayona, G. R. No. L-7920, decided May 10, 1955), and it is the action availed of by Potenciano in this case.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

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91 Phil., 419.

84