Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25775 April 26, 1968
TOMASITA BUCOY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
REYNALDO PAULINO, ET AL., defendants,
REYNALDO PAULINO and EUFEMIA BERNARDO CRAMER, defendants-appellants,
LEOPOLDO PAULINO, intervenor-appellant,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL and INDUSTRIAL BANK, intervenor-appellee,
TINIO LUMBER CO., INC., intervenor-appellee.
Celestino Ocampo and Victoriano David for plaintiff-appellant.
Zoilo A. Andin, Dakila Castro and Associates for defendants-appellants.
Benjamin C. Reyes for intervenor-appellant.
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for intervenor-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy and defendant Reynaldo Paulino were married on October 29, 1956. The husband
occupied himself with the business of buying and selling PX goods, second hand cars and household
appliances with the help of his wife. With their savings, they acquired seven parcels of land in Angeles,
Pampanga: six lots, Lots 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, in 1960; and lot, Lot 10, in 1962 all from Severina
Realty Corporation, on installment basis.
In 1961, the spouses commenced the construction of Pauline's Motel on the six lots. This motel was
opened for business in July of 1962, was in full operation with 33 equipped rooms by August of the same
year. As funds were not sufficient, some materials in the construction as well as the motel furnishings were
obtained on credit. Amongst the creditors was intervenor Tinio Lumber Company, Inc. The couple, too, had
to draw additional funds from intervenor Leopoldo Paulino, father of Reynaldo. Reynaldo also had to
borrow from his co-defendant Eufemia Bernardo.
On the seventh lot (Lot 10) beside the motel, intervenor Leopoldo Paulino put up a bar, Pauline's Cavern,
with his own money. Pauline's Cavern opened for business in January of 1963.
In the latter part of 1957, defendant Reynaldo Paulino was following up his father's loan with the GSIS in
Malacaang. There, he met defendant Eufemia Bernardo, heretofore mentioned, single, who was a college
student taking the foreign service course in the University of the Philippines, at the time social secretary to
the First Lady. Soon, relations between Reynaldo and Eufemia became intimate. Eufemia and Reynaldo
even went to Hongkong, brought back articles which were disposed of at a profit. Eufemia ingratiated
herself to the parents and relatives of Reynaldo, who obtained favors from her. As early as 1958, Eufemia
knew that Reynaldo was a married man. She did not mind playing second fiddle to the legitimate wife. In
February of 1963, she, however, did stop the tracks of another woman who appeared to show interest in
Reynaldo.
Back to the spouses Tomasita Bucoy and Reynaldo Paulino. Following their marriage, they took up
residence in Cavite City. Apparently by reason of their buy-and-sell business, Reynaldo frequented Angeles
City, while Tomasita remained in Cavite City. Reynaldo had varied interests. He was an actor in the
movies, became a lawyer in 1957, at one time a BIR investigator, and in the late 1962 entered movie
production through Pauline's Productions, Inc. It was only in 1959 that Tomasita started staying in Angeles
City, although she made trips to Cavite City.
Through remarks made by friends of Reynaldo, Tomasita became aware of the extra-legal relationship
between her husband and Eufemia Bernardo. She, too, came upon a letter dated May 1, 1961, addressed
by Eufemia to Reynaldo with a complimentary close "I love you Femy".
On August 23, 1962, the Torrens title (TCT 30215-R) to the six lots (Lots 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16) was
obtained in the name of Reynaldo Paulino, following registration of the deed of sale of the same date
executed in his favor by Severina Realty Corporation.
With the help of Eufemia Bernardo who is known to the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB),
Reynaldo Paulino obtained from said bank two real estate mortgage loans with the six lots (TCT 30215-R)
as collateral: The first for P200,000 on December 12, 1962; and the second on January 2, 1963 for
P50,000. On May 3, 1963, a third mortgage for P50,000 was executed on the seventh lot (Lot 10) covered
by TCT 32919-R issued to Reynaldo Paulino on April 4, 1963.
Upon the release of this third loan on May 6, 1963, the entire amount thereof was credited by PCIB to the
account of Eufemia Bernardo. Reason for this is that for the construction of the motel, Reynaldo borrowed
from Eufemia a total of P105,000. And, the amount of P50,000 (proceeds of the third loan) was added to
the P55,000 theretofore paid by Reynaldo to Eufemia, to liquidate the said P105,000 loan.
Tomasita Bucoy took part in the management of Pauline's Motel. She kept tab of the daily receipt since the
motel opened for business in July, 1962 until February, 1963.
It was in this month February, 1963 that Tomasita Bucoy saw Eufemia Bernardo inside Pauline's
Motel
1
and learned that she was occupying a room therein with the consent of her husband, Reynaldo
Paulino. Tomasita left for Cavite City and resided with her parents.
From here on, events happened in rapid succession. Reynaldo Paulino was beset by troubles. He had to
pay numerous creditors. There was the quarrel with his wife to cope with. He decided to dispose of the
properties. He turned to Eufemia Bernardo to look for buyers. A power of attorney in her favor was drafted
in May, 1963. This remained unsigned. Because Eufemia decided to purchase the properties herself.
Meanwhile, Eufemia stayed in the motel, received its income when Reynaldo was not around.
So it is, that on June 18, 1963, two deeds of absolute sale were executed by Reynaldo Paulino in favor of
Eufemia Bernardo: one, covering the six lots, recites a consideration of P470,000; and the other, the
seventh lot, for P25,000, both including the improvements thereon. In these two conveyances, a common
provision appears:
That the vendee do (es) hereby accept this Deed of Absolute Sale, and agree to all the conditions
provided herein, and further, binds herself to assume any and all existing obligations which herein
vendor has at the time of the execution of this deed pertaining to the property subject matter of this
instrument.
2

Upon the execution of these two documents, Eufemia Bernardo issued two checks purportedly as partial
payment: one for P50,000 in favor of Reynaldo Paulino; and another for P48,500 payable to Leopoldo
Paulino for the latter's advances in the construction of Pauline's Motel. To be noted is that at the back of
both checks, Eufemia Bernardo wrote the following condition: "This check shall be due upon the counter-
signature below of the maker." Both checks were never countersigned, never cashed.
On July 1, 1963, Eufemia Bernardo executed a real estate mortgage on all the seven lots in favor of PCIB
to guarantee a principal obligation of P195,000. Parenthetically, this mortgage was confirmed in a
"Confirmation of Real Estate Mortgage" executed by Eufemia Bernardo in favor of PCIB on March 23,
1964, long after the present suit was started.
After the July 1 mortgage for P195,000 was executed by defendant Bernardo, PCIB noted that both
documents of sale of June 18 aforesaid stipulated an assumption by Eufemia Bernardo of obligations in
favor of third parties and that the obligation in favor of PCIB was not clearly stated. Another deed, with the
bank's specifications, was thereupon prepared. The deeds of June 18, 1963 were not registered.
Accordingly, a new deed of sale with assumption of the PCIB mortgages over the same seven lots
described in the two June 18, 1963 conveyances, was executed by Reynaldo Paulino in favor of Eufemia
Bernardo on July 5, 1963, stipulating:
Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the total amount of Four Hundred Ninety Five Thousand
Pesos (P495,000), Philippine Currency, of which the One Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos,
(P195,000.00), Philippine Currency, is hereby acknowledged to have been received in cash by the
Vendor and the remaining balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), Philippine
Currency, to be in the form of Assumption of the Mortgages above-mentioned, the Vendor by these
presents, hereby sells, transfers and conveys unto and in favor of the Vendee, [her] successor and
assigns, the afore-described parcels of land together with the improvements thereon, free from all
liens and encumbrances, except [that] the Real Estate Mortgages which are annotated on the back
are assumed herein.
3

Both the real estate mortgage of July 1, 1963 executed by Eufemia Bernardo in favor of PCIB and the July
5, 1963 deed of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by Reynaldo Paulino and Eufemia Bernardo
were recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds on July 8 following. And, new transfer certificates of
title (No. 33899-R for the six lot, and No. 33900-R for the seventh) were issued to Eufemia Bernardo.
Recorded on these two titles, in addition to the three previous mortgages, is the mortgage of July 1, 1963
for P195,000.
On the same day July 8, 1963 Eufemia Bernardo married Richard Cramer, a serviceman in the
American armed forces. Elated at learning this, Tomasita Bucoy made a trip in August to Angeles City.
There, Tomasita learned of the sale of the properties.
All these events culminated in the filing by Tomasita Bucoy of a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga
4
on September 19, 1963 seeking annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgages
of July 5, 1963 and the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Eufemia Bernardo. Plaintiff predicated her
action upon Article 173 of the New Civil Code. Eufemia Bernardo and Reynaldo Paulino were made party
defendants.
Traversing the complaint, Eufemia Bernardo avers that she is a purchaser for value in good faith who relied
on the titles of Reynaldo Paulino; and that even on the assumption that the allegations of the complaint
were true, plaintiff, by availing herself of the proceeds of the contract, has ratified the transaction between
said defendant and her co-defendant Reynaldo Paulino.
Reynaldo Paulino, upon the other hand, filed a cross-claim against Eufemia Bernardo, his co-defendant. He
charges his co-defendant's refusal to pay the consideration, and fraud and misrepresentation, and seeks
rescission of the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963, and the annulment of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgages of July 5, 1963.
The following parties intervened: Leopoldo Paulino (and his wife, Virginia D. Paulino), alleging ownership of
"Pauline's Cavern" and part ownership of "Pauline's Motel"; Tinio Lumber Co., Inc., upon a prior money
judgment in its favor against Reynaldo Paulino; and PCIB, praying that defendant Reynaldo Paulino be
made to pay the loans secured by the four mortgages heretofore mentioned in the total sum of P495,000,
plus interests due, should the court "finally render judgment in favor of plaintiff."
On June 28, 1965, after trial, the lower court rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court orders:
(1) Plaintiff's complaint for annulment dismissed;
(2) Defendant Reynaldo Paulino's cross-claim for P182,000.00 against Eufemia Bernardo granted.
The latter shall pay the spouses Reynaldo Paulino and Tomasita Bucoy the said amount within
thirty (30) days after the decision becomes final;
(3) Failure on the part of defendant Bernardo to pay the spouses Reynaldo Paulino and Tomasita
Bucoy and the intervenor Tinio Lumber Company, Incorporated within the period of thirty (30) days,
the court orders the contract of sale dated July 5, 1963, Exhibit 6-Bernardo, rescinded; the parties
shall be restored to their status quo prior to July 5, 1963, without prejudice [to] the above-
mentioned real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank;
(4) That defendant Bernardo shall pay Tinio Lumber Company, Incorporated the sum of
P13,568.00 with twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum and twenty-five (25%) per cent of the
unpaid amount as attorney's fees within the same period of thirty (30) days;
(5) That the real estate mortgages of these properties in favor of the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank to secure the amount of P495,000.00 loan extended to Reynaldo Paulino and
Eufemia Bernardo are considered valid and subsisting on said properties;
(6) That Reynaldo Paulino shall pay Leopoldo Paulino the sum of P95,000.00 out of the unpaid
purchase price of P182,000.00 due from Eufemia Bernardo;
No pronouncement as to costs.
5

Upon motions for reconsideration filed by Tomasita Bucoy, Reynaldo Paulino, and Eufemia Bernardo, the
court, on September 29, 1965, issued a supplemental decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
Conformably to the foregoing considerations, the dispositive part of the decision dated June 28,
1965, is hereby supplemented to read as follows:
1. That defendant, Eufemia Bernardo, shall pay an interest of 6% per annum [on] the sum of
P182,000.00 from the date of the decision, June 28, 1965, until full payment to the spouses
Tomasita Bucoy and Reynaldo Paulino.
2. That the appointment of a receiver is hereby denied.
3. That status quo continues Bernardo continues the possession of the motel; Leopoldo Paulino
of the Cavern, until the latter shall receive the sum of P50,000.00 out of the P182,000.00, above-
mentioned when he vacates the Cavern in favor of Eufemia Bernardo, who will be placed in
possession of said Cavern;
4. That the defendant Eufemia Bernardo's bond shall expressly assume to pay the sum of
P182,000.00 together with the 6% interest if the decision is affirmed; defendant Bernardo shall file
said bond of P200,000
6
with sufficient and good surety to be approved by the Court within ten (10)
days from receipt of this supplemental decision.
7

From the foregoing decisions, plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy, defendant Reynaldo Paulino, and defendant
Eufemia Bernardo appealed.
1. The lower court properly found that the properties involved in this litigation are conjugal. The
lands were acquired and the improvements thereon were constructed during the marriage of
Tomasita Bucoy and Reynaldo Paulino. By Article 160 of the Civil Code, all the property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, "unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Defendant Eufemia Bernardo, who broached the
question regarding the nature of the properties in litigation in her answer to the wife's complaint,
failed to offer any evidence that would rebut the presumption that the properties are conjugal.
Registration alone of the properties in the name of the husband does not destroy the conjugal
nature of the properties.
8

This brings us to the question: Why were Torrens titles No. 30215-R covering the six lots and No.
32919-R for the seventh lot all in the name of Reynaldo Paulino alone is "single"?
It is to be recalled that during the time that Eufemia Bernardo and Reynaldo Paulino were having
their extra-marital relations, the former advanced to the latter sums of money totalling P105,000.
This is admitted by both defendants. To protect the loan of P105,000 given by Eufemia Bernardo,
and faced with a threat that she would not help Reynaldo Paulino procure loans with PCIB if in the
deed of sale dated August 23, 1962 executed by Severina Realty Corporation in favor of Reynaldo
Paulino the typewritten word "married" is not cancelled and substituted with "single", Reynaldo's
resistance broke down. He was prevailed upon to take out titles in his name as "single". Although,
of course, Eufemia Bernardo all along knew that Reynaldo Paulino was married to Tomasita
Bucoy.
It is well to remember that in the contracts to sell with the Severina Realty Corporation, the
documents were in the name of Reynaldo Paulino, married to Tomasita B. Paulino.
But, Reynaldo had to yield. Thus it is, that in the deed of sale executed by Severina Realty
Corporation on August 23, 1962 covering the first six lots, the typewritten word "married" after
Reynaldo Paulino had to be crossed out and substituted in ink with the word "single". Similarly, in
the second deed of sale covering the seventh lot executed by the same corporation on the 4th of
April, 1963, Reynaldo Paulino was there mentioned as single, in spite of the fact that the contract
to sell covering the same lot recited that he was "married to Tomasita B. Paulino." And finally,
when the mortgages in favor of PCIB and the deeds of sale in favor of Eufemia Bernardo were
executed by Reynaldo Paulino, he appeared as "single".
2. It is on the issue of estoppel that we next address ourselves. Specifically, we are asked to
reverse the ruling below that plaintiff is in estoppel to assail the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgages dated July 5, 1963 as against Eufemia Bernardo.
The trial court lined up against Tomasita Budoy the alleged fact that "plaintiff tolerated the
husband's name to remain in the titles" and "never lifted a finger to correct such titles."
9

Of course, plaintiff knew of the initial acquisition of the lands upon the two contracts to sell from
Severina Realty Corporation. But did she really have knowledge that the titles were taken out in the
name of her husband Reynaldo Paulino as "single"? It would seem unnatural for a wife who
already was aware of her husband's infidelity to give her assent to the Torrens titles to the
properties being taken in his name as "single." That is quite offensive to her intelligence; she is a
Bachelor of Music graduate. One thing, of course, is for a wife to suffer in silence the marital
indiscretions of the husband. As we weigh this behaviour of the wife in the scales of domestic
relations values, we perceive nothing wrong with it. But to say that she would permit her husband
to take the titles to their properties as single is another thing. She must either be stupid, which she
is not; or, she must be in collusion with her husband, which is not the case.
The truth of the matter is that it was quite impossible for Tomasita to know the exact wording in the
titles taken in the name of her husband, because after the deeds of sale of August 23, 1962 and
April 4, 1963 were executed and the titles taken out, those titles were immediately presented to
and deposited with PCIB, for purposes of securing the required loans. They were never shown to
the wife.
Nor is it proper to charge plaintiff with knowledge of the sale of the properties by Reynaldo Paulino
to his co-defendant Eufemia Bernardo. At that time, the relations between husband and wife were
already strained. Precisely, on the dates of the two documents of sale of June 18, 1963 and that of
July 5, 1963, plaintiff was already living with her parents in Cavite. We have no difficulty in saying
that no wife would consent to the sale of property worth a big fortune to her husband's paramour.
Tomasita's unrebutted evidence, we should add, is that she was only informed of the sale when
she went to Angeles City in August of 1963 after which she lost no time in verifying the information
resulting in the present suit.
The familiar elements of estoppel in pais are: (1) there must have been a representation or
concealment of material facts; (2) the representation must have been made with knowledge of the
facts; (3) the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (4)
it must have been made with the intention that the other party would act upon it.
10
Appropriately to
be considered here is Article 1437 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable property, one
of them is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real
estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all
these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the
party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as
misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation.
Plaintiff has concealed no material facts. She made no representation at all. And, even on the
assumption that plaintiff really knew that the titles were taken out by Reynaldo Paulino
as single and that the latter, as such, conveyed the properties to Eufemia Bernardo, no proper
legal conclusion may be drawn against her as one in estoppel. For, clearly there was no necessity
on her part to disclose or assert facts or rights to defendant Eufemia Bernardo. Because, said
defendant was not a trusting victim; she was not misled; she knew all along that her lover,
Reynaldo Paulino, was married to plaintiff. Her knowledge was not merely constructive; it was
actual. And if Reynaldo Paulino appears in the titles and deeds as single, this fact came about
because this defendant, who now claims estoppel, precisely wanted it to be that way for the
purpose of insuring payment of the loans totalling P105,000 she granted to her co-defendant.
In truth, with Reynaldo Paulino appearing as "single" in the titles, his wife was written off from the
transactions in connection therewith; it was quite an easy matter for Reynaldo alone to execute
as he did contracts on the proper ties to insulate Eufemia Bernardo from loss on her loans,
without the wife's intervention and to the latter's prejudice. In fact, after the third mortgage of May
3, 1963 was executed by Reynaldo Paulino, theentire amount of that loan P50,000
was credited by PCIB to the account of Eufemia Bernardo, in final payment of the total amount of
P105,000.00 borrowed by Reynaldo from her. There was no bad faith on plaintiff's part.
The net result is that as against defendant Eufemia Bernardo, plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy is not in
estoppel. On the contrary, this case is a prime example of a third party defendant Bernardo
who was not misled into dealing with an apparent owner.
11
She acquired the properties in question
in bad faith.
3. Adverted to elsewhere in his opinion is that plaintiff's suit against defendants is to enforce her
right upon the provisions of Article 173 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
As we go into the legal history of Article 173 of the Civil Code, we find a marked difference
between the same and its predecessor, Article 1413, paragraph 2, of the Spanish Civil Code, which
provides that:
Nevertheless, no alienation or agreement which the husband may make with respect to
such [conjugal] property in contravention of this code or in fraud of the wife shall prejudice
her or her heirs.
Where the old codal precept (Article 1413, par. 2, just quoted) speaks of prejudice to the wife or
her heirs in an alienation "in contravention of this code," such prejudice to the wife is eliminated in
Article 173 of the new Civil Code when it comes to a contract "entered into without her consent."
The obvious reason is that such consent is now required under Article 166 of the new Civil Code;
whereas, under the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code, the
husband, in addition to his power as manager, "may for a valuable consideration alienate and
encumber the property of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife." As the statute
now stands, the right of the wife is directed at "the annulment of any contract," referring to real
property of the conjugal partnership
12
entered into by the husband "without her consent."
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety,
executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation
should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast
the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of
First Instance correctly stated, "[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs.
Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Uy Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430," in which cases annulment
was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife.
13
The two deeds of sale of
June 18, 1963 and the deed of sale of July 5, 1963 are null and void in toto
14
as against
Eufemia Bernardo.
The necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of
the wife, is not without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the
provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many
obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even
subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the
payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, "should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." These are considerations that go beyond
the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to
be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more
fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack
of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.
Plaintiff's right to the annulment of the July 5, 1963 deed, as against Eufemia Bernardo, is on two
grounds:First. There is the fact that the sale was entered into by the husband without the wife's
consent. Second. That contract also "tends to defraud her" and "impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property." Right from the time Eufemia Bernardo prevailed upon her co-defendant
Reynaldo Paulino to place the titles to the conjugal property in the name of the latter as "single,"
through the three mortgages in favor of PCIB in which Eufemia Bernardo intervened and the two
sales of June 18, 1963, to the last sale of July 5, 1963, there was the deliberate intent to oust
plaintiff from her interest in the conjugal property.
It is true that defendant Bernardo asserted in her answer that even granting that the averments of
the complaint are true, plaintiff is not entitled to an annulment of the sale in question upon the claim
that plaintiff availed herself of the proceeds or benefits of the contract. But, there is no evidence
that plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy benefited in any way from that transaction.
Accordingly, we rule that plaintiff is entitled to annul in their entirety the sales in all the deeds of
sale executed by Reynaldo Paulino in favor of his co-defendant Eufemia Bernardo.
4. The argument that the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963, as well as the deed of sale of July 5,
1963, are all tainted with fraud and were executed without the payment of the consideration due
Reynaldo Paulino, to our mind, deserves careful scrutiny. For, written documents offer no shield
against the true and real intent and agreement of the parties. It ill behooves defendant Bernardo to
justify non-liability by reliance on the wording of the deed of July 5. Her argument collapses from
the ineluctable logic of the circumstances hereinafter to be recited.
It is conceded in all quarters that at the time the two deeds of sale for a total of P495,000 were
signed on June 18, 1963, no money crossed hands from vendee to vendor. The record discloses
that all along it was the intention of the parties that Eufemia Bernardo would produce an additional
loan of P195,000 from PCIB and turn over the proceeds thereof to Reynaldo Paulino, and to
intervenor Leopoldo Paulino who also had given out money for the motel project.
Paragraph 6 of the answer in intervention of PCIB stoutly lends support to this view. Says the
bank: 1wph1.t
6. It denies the allegations of par. 9 for the reasons stated in par. 4 hereof, answering
Intervenor further alleges that defendant Bernardo assumed the outstanding obligation of
defendant Paulino in the total sum of P300,000.00 in favor of answering Intervenor
and has obtained a further loan of P195,000.00 from answering Intervenor, likewise
secured by the properties subject matter of the complaint, the proceeds of which loan was
to pay the balance of the purchase price of the properties under the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
15

And yet, the said documents of June 18, 1963 speak of the money "receipt of which in full is hereby
acknowledged and confessed to my entire satisfaction."
Likewise, in pursuance of defendant Reynaldo Paulino's desire to extricate himself from the
pressure of his creditors, it was specifically stipulated in the deeds on June 18, 1963 that the
vendee (Bernardo) was to assume all existing obligations of Reynaldo Paulino pertaining to the
property sold.
Eufemia Bernardo got the loan on July 1, 1963. But, the two deeds of sale of June 18 were not
registered. Because, as aforestated, PCIB objected to the assumption by Eufemia Bernardo, this
time its mortgagor, of other obligations, and the obligation in favor of the bank was not clearly
stated. Eufemia Bernardo asked the notary to destroy the June 18 documents. She went back to
see Reynaldo Paulino at the latter's office, Aurea Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of
July 5, 1963. After kissing Reynaldo, she told him to sign the new deed of sale (July 5, 1963) upon
the excuse that she wanted to save on insurance premium. She misrepresented Reynaldo that the
document of July 5 is substantially similar in terms to the two previous documents of June
18.
16
Reynaldo was then busy paying his employees. He did not have the chance to examine the
document carefully. He signed it on the strength of Eufemia's word.
The deed of sale of July 5, 1963 paved the way for the subsequent acts of Eufemia Bernardo. On
July, 8, 1963, she assured herself by recording that deed of July 5 and the July 1 mortgage, and
procuring titles in her name; then married Cramer on the same day July 8. Thereafter, in answer to
Reynaldo's letter of September 4, 1963 demanding payment of the balance of the purchase price
and reformation of the deed, Eufemia for the first time adopted a stiff attitude and wanted to pin
Reynaldo down to the terms of the deed of July 5, 1963, when she said:
. . . I have no desire to change the terms of our deed of sale because to do so would be
injecting conditions not previously agreed upon by us into the document. In the second
place the sale has been consummated with the delivery of the property to me and the
registration of the instrument of sale with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga and the
corresponding transfer of the titles to the property in my name. Therefore, there is nothing
more that could or should be done.
17

x x x x x x x x x
I am not a lawyer. I do not profess to know the law. But, will you not agree with me that
when an agreement is reduced in writing, the writing is the best evidence of that
agreement? Do you not agree that in this jurisdiction the document is always the best
evidence of all terms, conditions and stipulations precedent to or contemporaneous with
the execution of the document?
18

When confronted, in the cross-claim of Reynaldo Paulino, with the transactions of June 18, 1963,
Eufemia Bernardo asserted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of her answer to the said cross-claim
19
that
what was prepared on June 18 was merely the "draft" of the contract of sale with assumption of
mortgage; that what was signed by the parties as the deed of sale of July 5, 1963 was the same
draft prepared on June 18, 1963; and that the deed of sale signed on July 5, 1963 was the
"only one (1) contract of sale with assumption of mortgage entered into between the cross-claimant
and cross-defendant."
20
In court, Eufemia Bernardo at first declared that "there was no definite
deed of sale before July 5, except that one."
21
Apparently confident that the deeds of June 18,
1963 were destroyed by the notary, she denied in court that there was ever any understanding
between her and Reynaldo about her assumption of the obligations to third persons. But when one
of the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963 the deed covering the six parcels was shown her,
she repeated that it was but a draft. It was, however, signed by her; it was notarized. And, she
admitted her signature thereon.
Other circumstances there are which would clearly indicate that Reynaldo Paulino would not have
parted with that property unless his obligations in reference to the same were all assumed by
Eufemia Bernardo. Before the deeds of June 18 were executed, Eufemia knew all along who were
Reynaldo's creditors. Her checks, Exhibits 20, 20-A to 20-D (Bernardo), issued by her in payment
of the obligations of Reynaldo to those creditors are sufficient evidence of that fact. The land and
building were assessed at more than P500,000.00. The loan value given by the bank is
P495,000.00. Surely enough, the sales price must have included not only the P495,000.00 but also
the obligations aforesaid.
It is clear then that the foregoing acts of Eufemia Bernardo were calculated to enable her to escape
from her liability under the arrangement to pay third parties. She really wanted the deed of sale of
July 5, 1963 to cloak such intent with a mantle of legality.
Upon the execution of the deed of sale of July 5, 1963, neither was the consideration
of P195,000.00 paid by Eufemia Bernardo to Reynaldo Paulino. Says the court below on this point:
Considering the established facts on record, the Court opines that defendant Bernardo has
not fully paid the remaining purchase price of P182,000.00 to her co-defendant Reynaldo
Paulino. These circumstances are the basis of such conclusion, to wit:
First, While Bernardo was issuing checks right and left in favor of Reynaldo Paulino,
she could not produce proof that she issued checks covering such remaining amount of
the purchase price in the sum of P182,000.00 in favor of Reynaldo Paulino;
Second, The records of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank could have been
produced to show whatever checks were issued by Eufemia Bernardo in favor of Reynaldo
Paulino if the former made efforts to bolster her contention. She did not make such move.
Third, Reynaldo Paulino signed that deed of sale (Exh. 3-Paulino) over the same
properties on June 18, 1963, without receiving the cash purchase price of P195,000.00. Is
it not also true that he signed the deed of sale, July 5, 1965, Exhibit 6-Bernardo, because
of the agreement that the P195,000.00 cash should be paid by Bernardo when she
obtained the same from the PCIB? This was the agreement between Paulino and
Bernardo at the time Exhibit 3-Paulino was executed or June 18, 1963.
If it were true that Bernardo paid in full the purchase price of P195,000.00 in cash on or
before July 5, 1963, when the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was signed by
Reynaldo Paulino, why did she not demand for the return of those two checks in the
amount of P98,500.00 from Paulino? Those checks are still in the possession of Reynaldo
Paulino, because the amount of P98,500.00 stated in those checks has not been delivered
to him.
Fourth, Leopoldo Paulino is still in the possession, enjoyment and use of the Cavern. If
it were true that the total amount of P195,000.00 was already paid, then Leopoldo Paulino
should have already received the sum of [P95,000.00] out of the purchase price as
admitted by his son, Reynaldo. The fact that Leopoldo is still in operation of the Cavern
built in one of the seven lots sold to Bernardo is a stubborn fact that the total purchase
price of P195,000.00 in cash has not been paid by Bernardo until now.
Fifth, No other credible witnesses wore presented by Bernardo during the trial to
corroborate that the payment of P195,000.00 in cash was already received by Reynaldo
Paulino. Instead the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank's records disclosed that an
amount of P194,500.00 was credited in her favor only beginning July 9, 1963, until October
24, 1963. These figures corroborated Reynaldo Paulino's testimony that Bernardo had
really no money when he signed the deed of sale, but they made it appear in the deed of
sale that the full amount of P195,000.00 in cash was received by the vendor Reynaldo
Paulino to enable Bernardo, the vendee, to obtain that loan of same amount from the
PCIB. If it were true that Bernardo obtained his loan of P195,000.00 to pay her creditors
who advanced the cash to her [to] pay Reynaldo Paulino, she could present those
creditors from whom she obtained the money or produced those checks she paid to them.
She did not present any witness to corroborate her testimony on this point and no checks
were presented during the trial.
The foregoing circumstances are cogent reasons to warrant the conclusion that the
P195,000.00 purchase price in cash was not fully paid by Eufemia G. Bernardo, the
vendee, to Reynaldo Paulino, the vendor until now.
22

In reality, on the question as to whether the P195,000.00 as stated in the July 5 deed was paid in
cash, Eufemia Bernardo was blowing hot and cold. First, her claim was that upon that deed the
consideration of P195,000.00 was "acknowledged to have been received in cash." She told the
court that after the July 5 deed of sale was executed, the P195,000.00
"was received by him [Reynaldo Paulino] in cash;" "[h]e received the P195,000.00 in cash."
23
Her
theory was that that cash was obtained by her from "friends and relatives." Asked if she could give
the names of the persons from whom she received the cash, her answer was: "I cannot give you
the exact names; I do not remember, because there are so many persons from whom I obtained
the loans."
24
Then, she amended her testimony to state that on July 5, 1963, she only paid him
"around P150,000.00, sir;"
25
afterwards, to say that she gave P35,000.00 in advance and
P160,000.00 "[a]round that date, around that month."
26
Queried as to where she gave Reynaldo
Paulino P160,000.00, she first declared [s]ome of it in our house, some of it in the bank."
27
But
even as to this P160,000.00, she gave conflicting answers. When asked where she got the
P160,000.00, her answer was, "some of it from my credit line in the bank."
28
And I notice this
answer of defendant:
Q. You mean to say, Mrs. Cramer, that all this P195,000.00, which you allegedly paid on or
before July 5, 1963, was borrowed from friends and relatives?
A. Oh, yes.
29

To cap these all, her answer to the complaint reads:
9. That the cross-defendant specifically denies the truth of the allegations of paragraph "9",
the truth being that as the document (Annex "A") states the amount of P195,000.00 was
paid by her in cash to the cross-claimant and therefore she could not have assumed to pay
any obligation in favor of the cross-claimant's father, Leopoldo Paulino."
30

The evidence clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant thus demonstrated that
all the money that was received by defendant Reynaldo Paulino from his co-defendant Eufemia
Bernardo after the July 5 sale of the properties, as found by the court below was a total sum
of P13,000.00 "for the purchase of a car."
31

The pattern of conduct observed by defendant Bernardo in connection with the transactions
reveals unquestionably the intention to defraud. She saw to it that the title to the six lots be in the
name of Reynaldo Paulino as "single." On the strength of that title, she got herself paid with a
mortgage thereon. She got the deeds of June 18 from Reynaldo alone without payment. Except
of course the two checks totalling P98,500.00 which could not be as they were not cashed for
she had to countersign them, which she did not. These two checks obviously were but a deceitful
palaver. She told the notary to destroy the documents of June 18. Then, she repudiated her
covenant of June 18 to pay Reynaldo Paulino's obligations to third persons. She procured from him
the deed of sale of July 5, 1963. She sought refuge in that document of sale to throw overboard her
obligation to pay in full P195,000.00. When Reynaldo affixed his signature to this last document of
July 5, 1963, there was great probability that she had already made up her mind to junk him. For,
three days thereafter (on July 8), she did two things: (1) she assured herself of Torrens titles in her
name; and (2) married her present husband, Richard Cramer. Had Reynaldo on July 5 known that
Eufemia was soon to get married, unquestionably, he would not have trusted her with the future
payment of the P195,000.00 to be taken from the proceeds of a loan to be obtained from the bank.
A quondam lover, he could not have done so if only out of pride. The hurt of it all came with the
release by PCIB to Bernardo of the total sum of P195,000.00. Even with this money, Bernardo did
not bother she refused to pay. That refusal was coupled with her adamant attitude that, by
the wording of the deed of July 5, she could not be held to pay; so she did not. Certainly, she
cannot have the property and fraudulently refuse payment to the vendor. Fraus et jus nun-quam
cohabitant.
5. Flowing from the foregoing facts is the right accorded defendant Reynaldo Paulino by Article
1390 (2) of the Civil Code, to annul the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963 and the deed of sale of
July 5, 1963. For, his consent to those documents is vitiated by "undue influence or fraud." There
was no ratification of said contracts.
32
On the contrary, Reynaldo Paulino wants them stricken out.
6. On the assumption that there was no fraud, nonetheless, there is failure to pay the price agreed
upon. The deeds adverted to recite reciprocal obligations. The property sold was turned over to
defendant. Upon the broad principles set forth in the law of obligations, the right of Reynaldo
Paulino to rescind the contracts is implied. This he has chosen to seek in his cross-claim.
33

But, the lower court's decision gave defendant Eufemia Bernardo thirty (30) days, after the decision
becomes final, to pay the P182,000.00, failing which, the contract of sale of July 5, 1963 shall be
rescinded. The court implicity applied the third paragraph of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which
says that "[t]he court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period." The record, however, is bereft of a just cause.
And then, considering the fact that the sale involves real property, the specific provision in Article
1592 of the Civil Code governs. Says Article 1592:
Art. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that
upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of
right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no
demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a
notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.
There was a judicial demand; hence, "the court may not grant him a new term." Article 1582 is
an exception to the general rule set forth in the third paragraph of Article 1191. Where then, as
here, the sale involves immovable property, "it is not within the scope of article 1191, but is
subordinated to the stipulation made by the contracting parties and to the provisions of this article"
(1592).
34

7. We now come to the answer in intervention filed by PCIB. .
Nothing in the record would show that when the bank gave out money on the security of the three
mortgages amounting to P300,000.00, said bank had knowledge of the fact that the mortgagor,
Reynaldo Paulino, was married instead of single, the civil status which appeared in the titles given
as collateral. By accepting the mortgage of July 1, 1963 for the additional P195,000.00 executed by
Eufemia Bernardo in its favor, the bank is not to be tagged with bad faith. At that time, the bank
had before it the two deeds of June 18, 1963 executed by Reynaldo Paulino in favor of Eufemia
Bernardo covering all the seven lots then mortgaged to the bank. If later on those two deeds
became unacceptable to the bank resulting in the deed of sale of July 5, 1963 executed by the
same Reynaldo Paulino in favor of Eufemia Bernardo, this circumstance alone would not amount to
bad faith. For, as in the previous deeds, there was no change in the status of Reynaldo Paulino, as
appearing in his Torrens titles. In fact, the bank was careful enough not to release the amount until
after both the additional mortgage of July 1, 1963 and the deed of July 5, 1963 were recorded in
the Register of Deeds and annotated on the titles.
Correctly then did the trial court, in its decision, state that those mortgages amounting to
P495,000.00 in all are "considered valid and subsisting on said properties."
No pronouncement may be made on the bank's prayer that Reynaldo Paulino be made to pay the
loans in favor of the bank. There is no evidence on the amount due. At any rate, the bank itself, in
its brief, merely seeks affirmance of the judgment.
8. This leads us to the claim of the two sets of intervenors, Leopoldo Paulino and his wife, and
Tinio Lumber Co., Inc. Having reached the conclusion that the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963,
as well as the deed of sale of July 5, 1963 are null and void, it necessarily follows that defendant
Eufemia Bernardo is not liable for any claim by third parties on the properties covered thereby.
Both intervenors should then seek relief from Reynaldo Paulino.
35

9. Since the sales are annulled, the parties thereto are to be governed by Article 1398 of the Civil
Code whereunder they "shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter
of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with interest, except in cases provided by law." The
same precept is substantially embodied in Article 1385 in reference to rescission of contracts.
Accordingly, defendant Eufemia Bernardo shall return to her co-defendant Reynaldo Paulino and
his wife the seven parcels of land and the spouses' improvements thereon, in consequence of
which her titles thereto shall be cancelled and new titles issued in the name of said spouses,
Reynaldo Paulino and Tomasita Bucoy. Eufemia Bernardo, too, must restore the fruits of the
property. In turn, Reynaldo Paulino is under obligation to pay back to Eufemia Bernardo
P13,000.00 with interest.
In addition, Eufemia Bernardo shall pay PCIB the sum of P195,000.00 subject to the terms and
conditions of the mortgage she executed in favor of said bank on July 1, 1963.
10. Last to be considered is the indemnity equivalent to the value of the fruits under Articles 1385
and 1398 of the Civil Code. The fruits consist of the income of Pauline's Motel, now Diamond
Apartments. On this point, both cross-plaintiff Reynaldo Paulino and cross-defendant Eufemia
Bernardo are in agreement. Thus, paragraph 19 of Reynaldo Paulino's cross-claim reads:
19. That the cross-claimant will suffer damages in the amount of P8,000.00 a month in the
form of income of said motel during all the time that the cross-defendant is in possession
thereof and until the properties in litigation are returned to the cross-claimant.
36

And cross-defendant Eufemia Bernardo, in her answer thereto, confirms: 1wph1.t
18. That the cross-defendant specifically admits the allegations of paragraphs "18" and
"19".
37

Eufemia Bernardo, therefore, should restore to Reynaldo Paulino and his wife the fruits of the properties
from June 18, 1963, when she took possession, until said properties are returned.
Upon the record as it stands, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga of June 28, 1965
and its supplemental decision of September 29, 1965 are hereby modified; and another
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring null and void the two deeds of sale of June 18, 1963 and the deed of sale of July 5, 1963
executed by defendant Reynaldo Paulino in favor of his co-defendant Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia C.
Cramer);
(2) ordering said defendant Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer) to return to her co-defendant
Reynaldo Paulino and the latter's wife, plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy, the possession of the six lots (Lots 11, 12,
13, 14, 15 and 16) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33899-R, now in the name of Eufemia G.
Bernardo, and the seventh lot (Lot 10) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33900-R, also in the
name of Eufemia G. Bernardo, together with the improvements thereon, except Pauline's Cavern, which is
in the possession of Leopoldo Paulino;
(3) declaring valid and binding the following mortgages executed by defendant Reynaldo Paulino in favor of
the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, bearing dates of
(a) December 12, 1962;
(b) January 2, 1963; and
(c) May 3, 1963;
and likewise declaring valid and binding the mortgage executed by Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B.
Cramer) in favor of the said bank dated July 1, 1963;
(4) directing Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer) to pay the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank whatever remains unpaid on the loan secured by mortgage of July 1, 1963 for the sum of
P195,000.00; and, in the event said mortgage of July 1, 1963 on the properties subject of this action be
foreclosed and said properties be made to answer for any amount due thereunder, ordering Eufemia
Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer) to reimburse the spouses Reynaldo Paulino and Tomasita Bucoy any
amount the latter may be required to pay the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank on the aforesaid
mortgage of July 1, 1963; and in the event that by reason of the foreclosure of the mortgage of July 1,
1963, titles to the properties covered thereby be consolidated in the purchaser on foreclosure sale, the right
is hereby reserved to said spouses Paulino to sue Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer) for the
recovery of any and all damages which may result by reason thereof;
(5) directing the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 33899-R and
33900-R aforesaid and to issue in the name of the spouses, Reynaldo Paulino and Tomasita Bucoy, new
transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, subject to all liens and encumbrances annotated on the
memorandum of encumbrances of the titles to be cancelled, particularly the four mortgages aforesaid in
favor of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank;
(6) dismissing the complaints in intervention filed by Tinio Lumber Co., Inc. and Leopoldo F. Paulino and
his wife, Virginia D. Paulino;
(7) ordering defendant Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer) to pay plaintiff Tomasita Bucoy and her
husband Reynaldo Paulino damages at the rate of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) per month from
June 18, 1963, to the date the properties herein described are returned to the said spouses; and
(8) ordering defendant Reynaldo Paulino to pay to his co-defendant Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia C.
Cramer) the sum of P13,000.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the answer of
Eufemia Bernardo to the cross-claim of Reynaldo Paulino.
Costs in both instances against defendant Eufemia Bernardo (now Eufemia B. Cramer). So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
1wph1.t Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court,
1
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose
which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody
of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages.
2
(Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the
hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father,
Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed
to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant willown their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in
equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.
3
(Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent
shall be governed by therules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.
4

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition
of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of
the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.
5

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil
Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;
6
it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"
7
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."
8
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
9
or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.
10

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed
to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted
in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the
trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage
a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor
did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50,
51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,
12
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up
to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first
paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article
43,
13
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40
14
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to
do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41
15
and 42,
16
of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to
ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code
on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
SECOND DIVISION

JOHN ABING,
Petitioner,



- versus -



JULIET WAEYAN,
G.R. No. 146294

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 31, 2006

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:






In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision
[1]
dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet,
Branch 64, which affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in
an ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.

In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired
properties. Later, they parted ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.

The facts:

Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with
each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the
couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by
a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax
declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet.

On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John
who deposited the same in their joint bank account.

In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new
structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the
properties involved in this case.

In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store
while John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.

In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition
their properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 aMemorandum of
Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses
thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples dwelling with Juliet paying him the
amount of P428,870.00 representing Johns share in all their properties. On the same date October 7,
1995 Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance
of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John demanded of her to
vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file
an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.

In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his
own funds and thru money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the
structure was under his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure,
which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latters failure to pay the agreed balance
due him under the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.

In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their common funds and
that the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original
residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of them in common.

In a decision
[2]
dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction
of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter,
and accordingly ordered Juliets eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to
surrender possession thereof to John, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and
against the defendant (Juliet).

Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in
litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff
and turn over possession thereof to the latter.

Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum
of P2,500.00 a month from the time she withheld possession of the store in
litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over possession
thereof to the Plaintiff.

Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by
way of Attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.


On Juliets appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed that of the MTC.
Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24, 2000,
[3]
reversed that of the
RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is
entitled to possess the property and maintain therein her business.

SO ORDERED.


Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:

It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties
which must be divided between them upon the termination of their common law
relationship.

xx xxx xxx

. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code
on conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the parties share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during
their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.


To the CA, Johns evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction of the annex
structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be
evicted therefrom, adding that if ever, Johns cause of action should have been for a sum of money
because he claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension. According to the
CA, ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliets possession of the premises in dispute was not by
virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.

Hence, Johns present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in

1. not giving effect to the parties Memorandum of Agreement which should
have been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;

2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-
sari store) is owned by the two of them in common;

3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a
separate action for partition even as the community character of the subject
premises has not been proven.



We AFFIRM with modification.


Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the property subject
of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of the
two courts before it, the CA found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money spent for the construction
thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.

While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally eschews from,
yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the exception
[4]
to
the general rule and proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.

First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as husband and wife
from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991,
Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint
account. In fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.

Other than Johns bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his
relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names
of the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed
from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and
borrowed money in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain
Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated
in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With the
petitioners own admission that the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from
the latter went into the construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was
able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his
close relatives from whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came
forward to confirm petitioners tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
support petitioners self-serving allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put
up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration
covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove
ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership.
[5]
Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any
more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.
[6]
Neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.
[7]


In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.


The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in equal shares. Being herself
a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

True it is that under Article 487
[8]
of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action
for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a
common property. It bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish
Johns or Juliets exclusive ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession
thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne
by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of
her being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as
John.

We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of Agreement, being
unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between them.

It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the amount
of P232,397.66, as initial payment for Johns share in their common properties, with the balance
of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of
record that the Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that
the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding force or effect
between them, as evidently, Juliets initial payment of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the
parties had agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliets failure to pay John
the balance of the latters share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of
money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except that
portion thereof denying effect to the parties Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.




CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:




REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson



ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice



ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice


A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division


C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.



ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979
VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees,
vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants
and appellants.
Victoriano O. Javier and Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.
Luis Viscocho and Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr. for appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:
This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the
appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which
resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the
accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-
appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, decision was rendered, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
(4) In Civil Case No. SP-867 ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest from
date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit;
(5) In Civil Case No. SP-872, ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly
and severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita,
Nestor del Rosario Aonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00 for the life
of each of said deceased, with legal interest from date of complaint, and costs of suit. (pp.
47-48, Rello).
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as
it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. The lower
court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads:
When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which, as previously stated, certified the
same to Us, the question raised being purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error as follows:
The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo liable 'for damages
resulting from the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers' of the jeepney
registered in the name of Eugenio Jose, on the erroneous theory that Eugenio Jose and
Rosalia Arroyo, having lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage,
are co- owners of said jeepney. (p. 2, Appellant's Brief).
The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable
in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry, and (2) whether
or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for
damages with the registered owner of the same.
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. (Camporedondo vs. Aznar, L-11483, February 4, 1958, 102 Phil. 1055, 1068; Osmea vs.
Rodriguez, 54 OG 5526; Malajacan vs. Rubi, 42 OG 5576). Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to
Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the
aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to
the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which
figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by
its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to
any of the passengers therein. (De Peralta vs. Mangusang, L-18110, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 598; Tamayo
vs. Aquino, L-12634 and L-12720, May 29, 1959; Roque vs. Malibay Transit, L-8561, November 18,1955;
Montoya vs. Ignacio, L-5868, December 29, 1953).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for
damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION


EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029
Petitioner,

- versus -
Promulgated:
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent. February 6, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision
[1]
of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995
[2]
and
January 31, 1996
[3]
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-
3708; and its May 15, 1998Resolution
[4]
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce
[5]
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
[6]


On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian atWilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
[7]
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death onDecember 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration
[8]
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00
more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
[9]
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal
[10]
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
[11]
denying the two
motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition
[12]
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,
[13]
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[14]


Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
[15]
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256
[16]
of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
[17]
denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic
[18]
because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition
[19]
against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration
[20]
from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration
arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
[21]
granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,
[22]
the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested
[23]
that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14,
[24]
and June 20,
[25]
1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration
[26]
and for the disqualification
[27]
of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied.
[28]


Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994
are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
[29]


The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term place of
residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[30]
and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera.
[31]
It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that Article 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever. Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,
[32]
the Filipino
divorcee, shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws. For this reason, the
marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a bigamous
marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x
[33]


Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
[34]
which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
[35]
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted.
[36]


In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray
[37]
and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,
[38]
residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because
it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,
[39]
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the
time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
[40]
we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
[41]
(Emphasis
supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and
residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning.
[42]
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of
a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
[43]
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
[44]
dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements
[45]
from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association
[46]
and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
[47]
letter-envelopes
[48]
from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards
[49]
stating that his
home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial
address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
[50]
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3.
[51]
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[52]
involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity
of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife
after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
[53]


As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[54]
(Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
[55]
where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper
party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
[56]


Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
[57]
the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.
[58]
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
[59]
In Garcia v. Recio,
[60]
the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
[61]


In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
[62]
the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
[63]
(Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.
[64]
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15
[65]
and 17
[66]
of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
[67]
In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[68]
the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them.

x x x x

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
[69]


Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
[70]
the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
[71]


With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text
[72]
of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
[73]


Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6,
[74]
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
[75]


In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144
[76]
of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
[77]


Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but
are incapacitated to marry.
[78]
InSaguid v. Court of Appeals,
[79]
we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
[80]
The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

x x x x

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. x x x
[81]


In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration
is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.


CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:




MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice




MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice



ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of
court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
[1]

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura
and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus
attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust
Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of
this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the
amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the
herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.
[2]

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly supportpendente lite of their son
Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such
incident be set for oral argument.
[3]

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.
[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.
[5]

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack
of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.
[6]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
son.
[7]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
[8]
and the Petition for Certiorari
[9]
were ordered
consolidated by this Court.
[10]

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not
in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS
DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-
HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS
SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT
THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.
[11]

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING.
[12]

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT
OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.
[13]

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT
OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN
THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT
JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.
[14]

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS
SUPPORT.
[15]

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of
the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded
damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by
professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and
that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact
his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-
appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the
marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant
appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his
reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-
appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in
ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct
that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance
or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages
may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the
total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of
awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.
[16]

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219
[17]
of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need
that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages
were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to
stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36
of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the
Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. . . .
[18]

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award
of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
[19]

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the
defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court
deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)
[20]

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of
attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.
[21]

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award
of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock
in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership
in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the
declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking
through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art.
160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as
well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the
parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during
the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-
President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said bank in the
amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of
the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between
the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the
conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2)
share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated
July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually
intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had
allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has
chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was
ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was
transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant
husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and
the Provident Group of Companies.
[22]

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his
separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in
the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth,
their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of
said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a
number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the
same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was
married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
[23]

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,
[24]
this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil
Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of
the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership
in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the
trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage
a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters.
Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home"
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition
of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article
40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage,
the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims
to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for
the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to
ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2,
of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
[25]

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in
common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the
basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot
since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005
[26]
and has, therefore, attained the age of
majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be
moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age
of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and
costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far
East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
Provident Group of Companies issustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of
said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions
of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the supportpendente lite in favor of the
parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.