From Militancy To Clientelism PDF

From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in
Contemporary Chile
Author(s): Indira Palacios-Valladares
Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 73-102
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From
Militancy
to Clientelism:
Labor Union
Strategies
and
Membership Trajectories
in
Contemporary
Chile
Indira Palacios-Valladares
ABSTRACT
For the
past
30
years,
Chilean unionism has been
shrinking.
Through
a
comparison
of the
membership trajectories
of 26 unions
in two firms between 1990 and
2004,
this article
explains why
some
unions defied this trend and how their success affected overall
union
density
in their firms. It
argues
that the unions that
experi-
enced the most favorable
membership
outcomes were those
that,
at
key junctures
of firm
restructuring,
earliest or most
aggressively
established a
partnership relationship
with
management. However,
in a context of
great
labor
weakness,
these cases of union accom-
modation took the form of exclusive
patron-client exchanges,
which exacerbated collective action
problems
and further eroded
union
density.
considered one of the
strongest
labor movements in Latin
America,
Chilean unionism
has,
in the
past
three
decades, experi-
enced sustained
membership shrinkage.
The
largest drop
occurred
under
military rule,
when union
density
declined
by
almost half com-
pared
to the
early
1970s
(Angeli 1972, 45; Radrign 1999, 15). However,
the trend toward deunionization continued after the return to democ-
racy
in
1990: between 1991
and
2007,
union
density dropped by
a third
(Direccin
del
Trabajo n.d., 7).
Although
union
membership
decline was
initially
related to the
political repression
that
accompanied
the
1973
coup,
it became
entrenched after the
military regime's implementation
of neoliberal
structural reforms in the
1980s.
Unions' initial reaction to these reforms
fueled mass
opposition
to the
regime
and
helped reorganize
the labor
movement
(Campero
and Cortzar
1986). However, by increasing
union
fragmentation
and
job precariousness,
in the
long run,
the
1980s
reforms
weakened union
capacity
to recruit members. Modest
changes during
the democratic
posttransition
did not
substantively
alter this situation
(Cook 2007;
Frank
2004; Haagh
2002).1
Union
membership
decline has
significant implications beyond
unions. All
things being equal,
labor movements that
organize
a
large
proportion
of the workforce are
likely
to
impose significant production-
2010
University
of Miami
74 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 52: 2
stoppage
costs on
employers. Large
labor
organizations
also have a
strong potential
for electoral mobilization. This
explains why high
union
density
is
usually
associated with the
adoption
of
labor-friendly policies,
low income
inequality,
and the
early expansion
of
democracy
(Rueda
and Pontusson
2000; Rueschemeyer
et al.
1992).
The
contemporary
literature on Chilean unionism makes some
important
contributions to the
topic
of union
membership decline,
but
it is limited in two
ways.
For
one,
it focuses
heavily
on national
organ-
izations and
dynamics
while
devoting
little attention to the firm level.
This is an
important gap.
In
Chile,
firm-level unions
organize roughly
70
percent
of all unionized workers
(Direccin
del
Trabajo
n.d.).2
Fewer
than half of these workers are
organized
in unions that are
federated,
and
only
a little more than a
quarter participate
in unions that
belong
to a national confederation
(Arrieta 2003, 12).
Since there is also vari-
ance in union
membership
decline across and within sectors
(Salinero
B.
2006, 68),
a
stronger
focus on firm-level unions would
yield
a better
understanding
of Chilean unionism.
The second limitation of
contemporary
research on Chilean union
decline is its
strong emphasis
on structural causes. A number of studies
examine the effects of the
legal
framework and economic
restructuring
on
union decline
(Barrera 1998; Espinosa 1996;
Gonzlez Santibez
1998,
Montero
2002).
Others look at the broader
political explanations
behind
the
inability
of unions to
change
this context
(Cook 2007;
Frank
2004;
Haagh
2002).
Fewer studies examine union
strategy.
With the
exception
of Frank 2002 and
Rojas
and Aravena
1999,
the works that do discuss
union
strategy provide
rich
empirical description
but do not
study
the
roots or
impact
of
strategic
decisions in a
systematic
manner. In
contrast,
a number of
contemporary
studies about labor elsewhere in Latin Amer-
ica
put
a
strong analytical
focus on union
strategies
both at the firm and
suprafirm
level
(Anner 2003;
Armbruster-Sandoval
2003; Burgess 2004;
Frundt
2002; Levitsky
and
Way 1998;
Murillo
2001;
Williams
2003).
This article seeks to advance the
study
of
contemporary
labor
unions
by examining
the effects of firm-level union
strategy, particularly
union-management partnership strategies,
on the
ability
of
organized
labor to recruit members. In
doing
so it seeks to shed more
light
on sub-
national variation in Chilean
unionism,
and to contribute to a
growing
regional
literature on firm-level union
dynamics.
Chile offers a
great
opportunity
in this
regard
because its
high degree
of union
bargaining
decentralization has made the firm the
primary
locus of union
activity
in that
country.
In
addition, high
levels of union
competition
and
frag-
mentation make Chile an
interesting
case for
analyzing
the relative suc-
cess of different union
adaptations
to neoliberal reform.
The article
investigates
the causes of intrafirm variation in the mem-
bership trajectories
of 26 Chilean unions in two
large private
sector serv-
PALACIOS-VALLADARES: CHILE'S LABOR UNIONS 75
ice firms between
1990
and 2004. It answers two
questions: Why
were
some of these unions able to increase
membership?
Did their individual
success
help
boost union
density
more
broadly
in their firms? The
argument
this
study puts
forth is that differences in individual union
strategy
with
regard
to
management played
a
key
role in
shaping
intrafirm variation in union
membership trajectories. Specifically,
unions
that
grew
were those
that,
at critical
junctures
of firm
restructuring,
accommodated
management
demands earliest or most
aggressively,
effectively establishing
a kind of
partnership relationship.
In
doing so,
these unions secured a
privileged presence
in the
firm,
a
monopoly
over
firm-level
bargaining arrangements,
and exclusive
input
into the alloca-
tion of
job
losses or other
employment-related policies. Although
some
outcomes were later extended to all workers in the
firm, they
neverthe-
less demonstrated the unions'
capacity
to deal
effectively
with
manage-
ment. This
gave
more
accommodating
unions a
recruiting edge.
In a context characterized
by strong
firm
restructuring
and
great
union structural
weakness, however,
the same
strategies
that
helped
indi-
vidual unions
gain
members tended to undermine overall union
strength
in the firm.
Isolated,
more militant unions found themselves ineffective
and therefore vulnerable to union
raiding.
For their
part,
more accom-
modating unions, benefiting
from the outflow of members from the more
militant
unions,
did little to reach out to
unorganized
workers. The result
was a decrease in overall union
density, along
with
greater
union fac-
tionalism,
which dimmed the
prospects
for future coordination.
These
findings suggest
that even in a context of structural union
weakness like that of
Chile,
individual union
strategies may play
a
key
role in
shaping
favorable individual
membership
outcomes.
However,
they
also
suggest
that the character and
implications
of collaboration
with
management
are
highly dependent
on the broader
institutional,
political,
and economic context in which
they
occur.
This article will
proceed
to discuss the main
explanations
behind
union decline in Chile and to situate its own
arguments
in the relevant
literature. It then discusses the
logic
of the research
design
and the
rep-
resentativeness of the cases. A narrative account of union
membership
trajectories
in each of the firms under
study
is followed
by
an
analysis
of
the variables that influenced individual union
membership trajectories.
The
concluding
section discusses the broader
implications
of the
findings
for
questions
of income distribution and union revitalization in Chile.
Theoretical Perspectives on Contemporary
Union Membership Decline
A number of scholars have
pointed
out that the
elite-accommodating
character of the
1990
Chilean democratic transition loosened unions' ties
to
political parties
and the state while
strengthening
the
political
influ-
ence of business
(Frank 2004;
Garretn
1994;
Moulin
1997;
Silva
1997).3 Thus, although
the democratic transition
opened opportunities
for
organized labor, peak
labor unions like the Central Unitaria de Tra-
bajadores
(CUT)
had
difficulty shaping
the broader economic and insti-
tutional context of union
activity.
In
particular,
this meant that substan-
tial labor reform
stayed
off the
political agenda
(Cook 2007;
Frank
2004;
Haagh
2002).
As a
result, during
the democratic
posttransition,
Chilean unions
have continued to
operate
in a labor relations framework that tends to
weaken them
(Cook 2007; Haagh
2002).
For
instance,
the law allows an
unlimited number of union and
paraunion organizations
within each
firm and makes
suprafirm negotiations exclusively voluntary.
In addi-
tion, employers
can substitute and fire workers
during
strikes and can
declare
lockouts,
and workers can
drop
out of strikes. Research has
shown that these institutions hinder union
monopoly power,
invite
effective
employer opposition,
increase union
rivalry
and
fragmentation,
and are
generally
associated with union
membership shrinkage
(Ebbinghaus
and Visser
1999, 144-45, 151-54; Scruggs
and
Lange 2002,
138;
Western
1995, 186).
The
political
and institutional context of unionism is
important
for
understanding general
trends in labor relations in
Chile,
but since it is
relatively
constant at the subnational
level,
it does not
explain
the vari-
ation this
study
is concerned with. Two other
explanations
of union
decline can
potentially explain
subnational variation in union member-
ship:
labor
restructuring
and union
strategy.
Chilean studies
emphasizing
labor
restructuring highlight
the
nega-
tive
impact
of
layoffs
and
job precariousness
on union
membership.4
The
general argument
builds on the idea that deindustrialization and the
growth
of the service sector have eroded unions' traditional constituen-
cies while
increasing
the size of
groups
with less tradition of unioniza-
tion
(Barrera 1998;
De la Maza
1999, 385-87;
Escobar
1999, 23-39;
Gonzlez Santibez
1998, 61; Radrigan 1999, 61).
More
specifically,
it
is
argued
that
employer responses
to the financial crises of the mid- and
late
1990s
triggered
massive
layoffs, which, by decreasing
the size of
firms,
left workers more vulnerable to
employer
intimidation or
pater-
nalism and therefore less
prone
to unionize
(Espinosa 1996, 48-49;
Montero
2002, 108; Rojas
and Aravena
1999, 140-46).
With
regard
to
labor
flexibility,
the
argument
is that more
atypical
forms of
employment
have led to a
lowering
in the
quality
of
employment arrangements,
greater
labor
turnover,
and an increase in
subcontracting
(Sehnbruch
2006).
Workers' fear of
unemployment
and the
precariousness
of
jobs
have made it more difficult for unions to overcome collective action
problems
(Aravena 1999;
Montero
2002, 103-6).
The literature
suggests
that there is subnational variation in firm-
level labor
restructuring.
For
instance, Etchemendy
and Collier
(2007)
contend that labor rationalization
(including layoffs
and labor
flexibility)
in
Argentina
varies within sectors.
According
to these
authors,
this vari-
ation
partly explains
differences in union
strength.
In the Chilean
case,
Herrera
(1995, 90)
finds intrasector and intrafirm variation in labor
restructuring. Therefore,
within and across
firms,
we should
expect
unions
organizing occupational groups
of workers who are more
affected
by
these trends to
experience higher membership
losses.
Another set of
explanations
deals with union
strategy. Campero
(1998),
Frias
(1998),
and Frank
(2002)
argue,
for
example,
that serious
divisions over
strategy
and
rigid organizational
structures made it diffi-
cult for
peak
labor unions to
pursue
an
agenda
that was coherent and
relevant to
contemporary
economic realities. The
implication
of this
argument
is that firm-level unions had to come
up
with their own
ways
of
coping
with
changes.
Given the
high fragmentation
of the Chilean
labor
movement,
we should
expect significant
variation in union strat-
egy
at the subnational level. No
systematic study
of firm-level union
strategies
has been
published,
however. In
contrast,
outside of Chile
there is a wealth of studies that focus on firm-level union
strategy.
This
literature has contributed
important insights
to our
understanding
of the
relative success of
particular
union
strategies, especially
union
organiz-
ing,
coalition
building,
internal
restructuring,
and
partnership
with
management.
Studies of union
organizing
show that individual unions that devote
significant
resources to
large grassroots campaigns
are better able to
reverse or contain declines in
membership
(Bronfenbrenner
and
Hickey
2004; Heery
and Adler
2004, 64). However,
such studies also
suggest
that
many
individual unions lack sufficient economic and human
resources to run
large
and sustained efforts at
organizing unorganized
workers
(Heery
and Adler
2004, 64;
Milkman and Voss
2004, 4)
and that
successful
organizing
of new constituencies
requires significant changes
in
decisionmaking structures,
which
many
union leaders resist
(Sharpe
2004;
Yates
2003, 236). Therefore,
it is not uncommon that individual
union
organizing campaigns target already
unionized
workers,
a
phe-
nomenon known as union
raiding
(Milkman
and Voss
2004, 6).
Other studies have examined union efforts at
forming community
and cross-national alliances with other unions or social movements. In
developed countries,
unions that have done this have made inroads into
new constituencies
(Kochan
et al.
2004).
In the Latin American
context,
studies confirm that coalition
building
allows unions to make conflicts
visible, gain
short-term
concessions,
and increase
affiliation,
but
they
also indicate that in the
long run, many
of these
campaigns
end in fac-
tory relocation,
lack of enforcement of
bargaining agreements,
and
worker
layoffs
(Anner 2003;
Armbruster-Sandoval
2003;
Frundt
2002;
Jessup
and Gordon
2000;
Williams
2003).
A third set of studies has examined union efforts to restructure
union
organization.
Three forms of internal
organizational restructuring
seem to have a
positive
effect on union
membership: mergers
(Behrens
et al.
2004, 131),
the introduction of
participatory
forms of decision-
making
(Saint-Pierre
1993, 280;
Wells
1993, 306),
and shifts in the union
agenda
to include the needs of new constituencies
(Carmichael 2004;
Hbert
1993, 103;
Milkman
1993;
Strachan and
Burgess
2004).
These
studies
indicate, however,
that few unions
adopt
these
strategies
because
they
entail dramatic
changes
in union
power
structures.
Students of union
strategy
have also
paid
attention to the effects of
union
bargaining strategies
on union
membership.
Debate has focused
on the benefits or
pitfalls
of
engaging
in
cooperative partnership
rela-
tionships
with
management
at the firm level.5 Some scholars view
part-
nership strategies
as
positive
for unions. Ackers and
Payne
(1998)
argue,
for
example,
that
partnership
is a form of accommodation in which
unions are active
participants
in the
crafting
of firm and national
poli-
cies
affecting
them. Fichter and Greer
(2004)
and
Terry
(2004)
argue
that
in a context of decentralized
bargaining, partnership may
boost union
membership
when
accompanied by
autonomous sources of
legitimacy
in the
workplace.
Other scholars
argue,
in
contrast,
that
union-manage-
ment
partnership
amounts to union
co-optation (Kelly
1996).
Although
labor
restructuring
could
potentially explain
variation in
union
membership,
this
study
finds that
strategic
choices made
by
union
leaders at crucial moments of firm
restructuring
were the
major
deter-
minants of intrafirm variation in union
in the
cases examined. This
finding
underscores the
utility
of
union-manage-
ment
partnership approaches
for individual unions. Unions that
enjoyed
the most success in
recruiting
members in the
sample
were those
that,
at certain
key moments, pursued
an assertive
partnership strategy
toward
management.
At the same
time, however,
this
study highlights
the limitations of
partnership strategies
in contexts characterized
by high
union
fragmen-
tation and weak labor
bargaining power.
In such
settings, partnership,
even if successful for some individual
unions, expresses
the overall
weakness of unions
compared
to
employers
and tends to
perpetuate
or
even
deepen
that weakness
by diminishing
the
efficacy
of
militancy,
set-
ting
one union
against another,
and
hampering
the
development
of
more
comprehensive
and innovative
strategic approaches
to union
recruitment. In this
context,
workers
may migrate
from one union to
another,
but
organized
labor as a whole does not
grow stronger.
Research Design
This
study adopts
a "most similar cases"
comparative
research
strategy.
This
strategy
consists of
selecting
cases that
present significant
variation
on the
dependent
variable but similar values on all but one or two
explanatory
variables
(George
and Bennett
2005, 50).
Its value is that it
allows the researcher to establish more controls in situations in which
multiple
variables are at work and to isolate variables of
special
theo-
retical interest. The research
design
of this
study
controls for
national,
sectoral,
and some
potentially competing
firm-level variables
(including
skill of the
workforce,
labor
flexibility,
level and
type
of collective bar-
gaining,
union
ability
to
provide
members with substantive
benefits,
size
of the
firm, and,
to a certain
extent,
labor
restructuring),
while
allowing
variation on one
key
variable: union
strategy.
The
findings
are based on a total of
30
open-ended
and
in-depth
inter-
views with union leaders and firm
officers,
as well as
ethnographic
field-
work,
all conducted
during
2004. The research covers 13 unions in a
Chilean bank and an
equal
number in a telecommunications firm. Because
the interviews were secured with a
promise
of
anonymity,
this
study
does
not
identify
the names of the
firms,
the
unions,
or the interviewees.
In some
ways,
the unions in this
study
are
atypical
in Chile.
They
operate
in firms in which union affiliation is
relatively high.
In both
firms,
average
net union
density
between
1990
and 2004 almost
tripled
the
national
average
for the
period
(14.4
percent). They
also
operate
in con-
texts in which a
large
number of unions
compete.6
In the
bank,
where
unions cross
occupational lines,
all unions
compete
for the same mem-
bers. In the telecommunications
firm,
where unions
organize
workers
exclusively along occupational lines,
union
competition
tends to be lower
among
white-collar unions but
very high among
blue-collar unions.
The cases are nonetheless
fairly typical
of the
stronger
unionism in
Chile,
which is concentrated in
large
firms.
Large
firms
represent only
4.7
percent
of Chilean
businesses,
but
they
account for 46.5
percent
of
total
employment
(Direccin
del
Trabajo 2007, 17-20).
These firms tend
to be much more unionized than the
average
firm. In
fact,
almost half
of
large
firms have at least one
union, compared
to
3-9
percent
of small
firms;
the
larger
the
firm,
the
larger
the number of unions in it
(Direc-
cin del
Trabajo 2007, 79).
As is often the case
among
unions in
large firms,
the ones under
study
here have a tradition of labor
organization,
a skilled
constituency,
membership benefits,
and
professional
union leaders with
political
con-
nections to center-left
parties.7
Similar to other
relatively strong unions,
those in the firms covered in this article
negotiated
convenios
(voluntary
but
legally binding agreements
between workers and
employers),
instead
of the traditional formal collective
contracts,
which are more
widely
used
by
unions in Chile.8
Furthermore,
the unions in this
study
face
challenges
that are familiar to
many
workers in both
large
and medium-sized
firms,
such as
increasing job instability;
the
mushrooming
of
parallel,
more
pre-
carious forms of
employment;
labor
rationalization;
and shifts to
systems
of
job compensation
that are variable and tied to
performance.
The sectors
analyzed
here are
important
and
growing
areas of the
Chilean
economy. Combined,
the financial and telecommunications and
transportation
sectors make
up
almost 18
percent
of the workforce
(Banco
Central
n.d.).
Between
1990
and
2008, employment
in the
telecommunications subsector saw an increase of about 78
percent,
while
employment
in the financial subsector
tripled
(Banco
Central
n.d.).
There-
fore,
unions in these subsectors have future
opportunities
for
growth.
Union Membership
Trajectories:
The Bank
Between
1990
and
2004,
overall union
density
declined
by
a little more
than a
quarter
in this firm. Six
unions, designated
in table 1 as Unions
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and
8,
exhibited a
positive trajectory
of
growth.
Some of
these
(Unions 1, 3, 4,
and
5)
shared the same
steady growth
in mem-
bership
since
1990;
others
(Unions
2 and
8)
experienced
dramatic
growth
between 2000 and 2002. The
remaining
unions had an overall
trajectory
of decline.
Some,
like Unions 6 and
7, experienced
most of
their losses in the
early
and
mid-1990s.
Others,
like Unions
9, 10, 11, 12,
and
13, experienced major membership
losses after 2003.
All unions
were
cross-occupational organizations
that
competed
for the same
members.
In
1990
the bank had six unions
(1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
and
13).
All of them
belonged
to one
federation,
which hereafter will be
designated
Federa-
tion 1. At the
time,
this federation
negotiated wages
and benefits on
behalf of all unionized workers.
The
1990
bargaining agenda
was driven
by management's
move to
make
part
of workers'
earnings contingent
on individual
performance.
Federation l's initial
response
was to
reject management's proposal
and
demand
higher wage readjustments. Negotiations stalled,
and the
unions
staged
a massive strike
(interviews 1.5, 1.14).
Although initially
the unions seemed to be
gaining concessions,
after the sixth
day
the
firm hardened its
position.
Federation 1
rapidly
decided to accommo-
date
management
demands and called off the strike. Workers extracted
a
generous
cash bonus and a
higher wage
and benefit
readjustment
than
the one
originally proposed by
the
firm,
but the
changes
in the struc-
ture of
compensation proposed by management
held. The
agreement
was
signed
for four
years
instead of the traditional two. This settlement
established the foundation of a
in which Fed-
eration 1
participated
in most firm decisions
involving
labor
and,
in
Table 1. Labor Union
in the
Bank,
c.
1990-2004
Workers Unionized Share of the Workforce (%)
Union 1990 2004 Difference 1990a 2004 Difference
1 200 738 538
2 10 7.5
2 70 707 637
1
9.60 8.7
3 175 300 125 2 4.10 1.9
4 100 115 15 1 1.60 0.4
5 66 68 2 1
0.90 0.3
6 800 180 -620 10 2.40 -7.6
7 300 150 -150 4 2 -1.7
8 650 810 160 8 11
2.9
9 150 130 -20 2 1.80 -0.1
10 150 110 -40 2 1.50 -0.4
11
1,400
267
-1,133
17 3.70 -13.7
12
1,500 130 -1,370 19 1.80 -16.9
13 250 211
-39 3 2.90 -.02
Total
5,811 3,916 -1,895
72 53.5 -18.5
aThis column is calculated over the combined workforce of all the banks in which
the unions
operated
at the time.
Sources:
Membership
data
provided by
union leaders. The number of workers
per
firm is based on
unpublished
data from the
Superintendencia
de Bancos e Institu-
ciones. The
figures
include full-time workers
directly employed by
the firm and some
subcontracted workers.
exchange,
delivered union restraint and collaboration in firm restructur-
ing
(interviews 1.1, 1.5, 1.14).
Union
6, previously
the
largest
and most dominant union in Fed-
eration 1 and the one that had been the visible leader of worker mobi-
lization
during
the
strike, rejected
the
agreement
and left the federation.
Isolated,
Union 6 found it difficult to extract concessions from
manage-
ment
and, during
the next three
years,
lost close to half its members to
the more
accommodating
unions
(interview 1.5).
Unions 1 and
3
cap-
tured most of these losses
(interviews 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.15).
In
1994
the bank underwent a
merger.
As a
result,
it inherited two
more unions
(Unions 7 and
12).
Both were solid
organizations,
and one
(Union 12)
was
very
militant
(interview 1.1).
In
1994,
Union 12
joined
Federation
1,
while Union
7,
whose leaders had somewhat distant rela-
tions with the leaders of Union
12,
chose not to do so. Union 7's deci-
sion not to
join
Federation 1 involved
vigorous
internal debate. Out-
numbered,
workers who
supported
the union's inclusion in Federation
1 left for unions that were
part
of that federation
(interview 1.7).
The
merger
coincided with a new
bargaining
round.
Management's
goals
for that
year
were to control
upward pressures
on the collective
bargaining settlement,
extend it for another four
years,
trim some labor
redundancies
resulting
from the
merger,
and
expand subcontracting
and
other forms of labor
flexibility,
such as
temporary
contracts and contin-
gent compensation
(interview 1.1).
By then,
Federation 1 had established a close and
highly
institu-
tionalized
with
management.
Since the
previous
year,
it had
actively
collaborated with
management
in
drafting
the new
convenio
(interviews 1.1, 1.15). Moreover,
its leaders
enjoyed easy
access to the
top management,
which allowed unions in the federation
to offer
quick
resolution to their constituents'
everyday problems.
The
agreement finally signed by
the federation in
1994 covered four
years
and included a
generous,
one-time cash
bonus,
as well as some modest
wage
increases in both the fixed and variable
parts
of the
wages.
In
addition,
Federation 1
informally negotiated
the criteria for
allocating
job losses, generous compensation
for workers laid off and workers
who
accepted
offers of
early retirement,
and some kind of
job
continu-
ation for workers in areas
being
subcontracted
(interviews
1.14, 1.15).
Management
then
opened negotiations
with Unions 6 and 7. Both
had been excluded from the
early drafting
of collective
bargaining
agreements
and had had little to no
input
on the allocation of
job
losses.
Leaders of these two unions
thought, however, that, given
the firm's
strong
economic
performance
in recent
years
and the
improvement
of
relations between leaders of Union 6 and
management, they
could
negotiate
a
higher wage readjustment
than the one achieved
by
Feder-
ation 1
The two unions
negotiated together
but
were too small to offer
any
real
challenge
to
management. They
ended
up signing
the same
agreement negotiated by
Federation 1. The firm
subsequently
extended the same conditions to all
workers,
but Federa-
tion 1
amply publicized
the
point
that it had been a
key player
behind
the
agreement.
Similar
dynamics
occurred in
1998
and 2000.
Unable to
shape
the
bargaining dynamics,
Unions 6 and 7 focused
their efforts on
recruiting
members
This
yielded
some
positive
results: both unions were able to recover some
prior
mem-
bers.
Organizing
drives were modest and
short, however,
and did not
systematically target unorganized
workers.
Therefore,
neither of these
unions was able to recover
previous membership
levels. The two unions
also undertook talks about
merging
to boost union
membership,
but at
least as of 2004 this idea had not become a
reality
In 2000 the bank
began
a new
merger,
which culminated in 2002.
The
newly incorporated
bank had been one of the three
largest
in the
country.
It had a
strong
tradition of unionism and an
amalgamated
union
(Union 11)
that in
1997 had led an
aggressive,
militant
campaign
and had achieved one of the best collective contracts in the
industry
during
the
1990s.
Although
less
militant,
the other four unions
(Unions
2, 8, 9,
and
10)
were also
strong.
Until their arrival in the bank under
study,
these five unions shared a
general trajectory
of
membership
sta-
bility
(interviews 1.2, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10).
Most of the
incoming
union leaders were critical of Federation 1 . In
initial
conversations,
leaders of Federation 1 came across as
defending
personal positions
of
privilege
and
offering
inclusion in the federation
under conditions of subordination rather than
cooperation
(interviews
1.2, 1.8, 1.9).
As a
result,
all the unions
except
Union 2
(at
the time one
of the smallest unions in the
firm)
refused to
join.9
Union 2
sought
out
Federation 1 as an
opportunity
to
grow
(interview 1.16).
Between 2000 and
2002,
Federation 1 was a
conspicuous presence
in the firm. Its leaders
frequently appeared
in the
company
of
manage-
ment, promoting
the firm's
policies
and
motivating
workers to
join
with
management
in
making
the firm successful.
By
then the
logo, website,
and overall
image
of Federation 1
closely
resembled the firm's
corpo-
rate
image.
During
this
period,
the
big
debate between unions and
manage-
ment concerned the
trimming
of
merger-induced
redundancies. In 2000
Federation 1 secured an informal
agreement
that
spared
its members
from
layoffs
if
they
showed
good performance
and
negotiated
a new
convenio
(interview 1.14).
These
agreements,
similar to the
1994
agree-
ment,
were extended to the rest of the
workers,
whether unionized or
not. Newcomers were more
likely
to have lower evaluations immedi-
ately
after the
merger
and therefore to be more vulnerable to
job
loss.
However,
because the first evaluation was
supposed
to take
place
after
two
years, many
new workers found accommodation in the firm. Once
again,
Federation 1
amply publicized
how its
negotiations
had benefited
even unaffiliated workers.
In
2003,
Federation 1 succeeded in
negotiating wage
and benefit read-
justments slightly
above the
industry average
(interview 1.15).
The collec-
tive
bargaining process
followed the
pattern
of the
previous
ones since
1990.
Federation 1 was the first to
sign
a collective
bargaining settlement,
which,
for the
previous
six
months,
it had been
jointly crafting
with man-
agement.
Nonfederated unions tried to
negotiate higher wage readjust-
ments,
but were
largely
unsuccessful. As a union leader
recounted,
We [Unions
8, 9,
and 10] did not want to
sign
an
agreement
we had
not
negotiated,
but the firm
just ignored
us.
They
told us to
present
our
proposal,
which we
actually
did. But when we went to discuss
it
they
had the document of Federation 1 there for us to
sign. They
added a few clauses we
wanted,
but we did not like how the firm
proceeded,
(interview 1.10)
All the nonfederated union leaders
initially
resisted
management's
pressures
to
sign
the document
already signed by
Federation
1,
but
they
faced
significant pressures
from their own rank and file to
accept
the
conditions offered
by management
(interviews 1.9, 1.10).10
According
to
union
leaders,
this was the result of two factors. One was that members
of the
incoming
unions had a hard time
adapting
to the firm because
new work demands and
pressures
were
perceived
as
significantly greater
than in the
original
banks
(interviews 1.2, 1.8, 1.9).
The other
reason,
one
that affected new and old
unions,
was that the
agreement negotiated by
Federation 1 was attractive
by contemporary
Chilean standards.
Most unions
gave
in to rank-and-file
pressures
as soon as
they
started to
experience membership
losses or even threats of massive
membership
defection
(interviews 1.8,
1.9).
Union
11,
at the time the
largest
of the nonfederated
unions,
offered the
longest opposition,
three
months.
According
to its
leaders, during
that
period
the union lost five
hundred members and
experienced painful
internal divisions
(inter-
views
1.2,
1.8).
Roughly
half of these
membership
losses were
captured
by
unions in Federation 1.
According
to one of the federation's
leaders,
their unions did not need to
actively
recruit those
potential
members:
"We [leaders of Federation 1] are
managers
of
success,
not conflict. We
don't need to seek
people
out. Our
president
has a lot of influence with
the administration" (interview 1.14).
The other half of the losses were
captured by
Union
8,
a nonfeder-
ated union
Union 8's
success,
in
turn,
was the
result of two factors. It was
among
the first of the nonfederated unions
to
sign
the 2003
convenio. In
doing so,
it was able to add some modest
specific
benefits to its version of the collective
contract,
which were later
expanded
to Unions
9
and 10. In
addition,
as a result of internal divi-
sions a
couple
of months before the collective
bargaining process,
a
senior union leader had
organized
a
recruiting campaign
to boost his
power
within the union
(interview 1.8).
This
yielded only
modest mem-
bership gains
but made the union better known within the firm. Union
8, moreover,
had a
unique opportunity
to seek
prior
members of Union
11 because it offered
similarly generous
benefits.11
Following
the
2003
collective
bargaining process
and a series of
internal
leadership disputes
in Federation
1,
Unions 12 and 13 left Fed-
eration 1 and
joined
the
incoming
Union 1 1 . These three unions created
a new and more militant federation.
During 2004,
the new federation
sued the firm for unfair labor
practices,
asked for funds
allegedly
owed
to
workers, picketed
the
corporate building,
and tried to
nullify
the con-
venio
they
had
agreed
on
previously
as
part
of Federation 1 .
This behavior was not well received
by management
(interviews
1.3, 1.4, 1.6).
As unions in the new federation hardened their
positions,
they
met increased resistance from the firm.
Management
circulated
internal memos
denouncing
leaders in this federation as
treasonous,
and
Federation 1 did the same.
Although unhappy
with
management,
non-
federated unions also
rejected
the behavior of the new federation.
Many
argued
that
given
the success of Federation
1, militancy
was suicidal
(interviews 1.5,
1.8).
Some also felt that the lawsuits
presented by
the
new federation did not have a solid basis
Joining
the new federation cost Union 12 close to a third of its
membership
(interview 1.3).
The hardest hit
union, however,
was still Union
11,
the
most vocal of the unions in Federation 2
(interviews 1.3, 1.5, 1.17).
The Telecommunications Firm
Between 1990
and
2004,
overall union
density
declined
by
almost a fifth
in this firm. Two
unions,
Unions 1 and
5, experienced growth.
Until
2002,
these unions shared with the other unions the same
membership
trajectory: stability
until
1999,
followed
by
decline. After
2002, however,
these unions broke with the
typical trajectory
and
grew dramatically.
The rest of the unions had an overall
trajectory
of loss
(see
table
2).
Two
of these
(Unions
2 and
10)
appear
to have
expanded
their share of
unionized
workers,
but this reflects the
sharp shrinkage
in the firm's
workforce rather than real
growth.
Unions were
organized along
occu-
pational
lines. Unions 4 and
5,
which
organized professionals,
com-
peted
for the same members.
Likewise,
Unions
1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and
13,
which
organized
skilled blue-collar workers and
technicians,
competed among
themselves.
Between 1990
and
1998,
the telecom firm
pursued
a
gradual adjust-
ment of the workforce to
technological changes
and market liberaliza-
tion. After the
1980s,
a decade marked
by
adversarial
relations,
man-
agement
and workers
sought
these
changes through
accommodation
(interviews 2.8, 2.11, 2.12).
Unions
exchanged wage
restraint for
involvement in
managerial decisions, layoff compensations,
allocation
of
job
losses,
and
negotiation
of areas to be subcontracted. All unions
were
present
at the
bargaining table,
but the
largest
(Union 8)
wielded
more influence
(interviews 2.3, 2.10, 2.11).
In
general,
union leaders
perceived
this situation as a
system
of
cogovernance
(interviews 2.9,
2.11, 2.12).
Although
individual unions continued the tradition of
negotiating
in
small blocs of two or three
unions,
the
participation
of all unions
together
in
drafting
the
bargaining
document created one
blueprint
of the conve-
nio
(interview 2.4).
Although they cooperated,
individual unions
staged
routine small
stoppages
to
negotiate particular
issues or to accelerate
spe-
cific
negotiations regarding
the
blueprint's appendixes.
These strikes
tended to be
very
short and
small,
but
relatively
successful
(interviews 2.3,
2.8).
As a result of this
dynamic,
between 1990
and
1999,
unions suc-
ceeded in
negotiating
better collective conditions for workers and man-
aged
to establish short-term instrumental interunion coordination.
Table 2. Labor Union
in the
Telecommunications
Firm, 1990-2004
Workers Unionized Share of the Workforce
(%)
Union
1990 2004 Difference 1990 2004 Difference
1 700
1,473 773 7.0 39.3 31.8
2
190 186 -21 2.0 5 2.8
3 600 219 -381 6.5 5.8 -0.7
4
1,100 190 -910 11.9 5.1 -6.9
5 40 111 71 0.4 3 2.5
6 130 2 -128 7.6 0.1 -1.4
7 85 7 -78 0.9 0.2 -0.7
8
1,700
24
-1,676
18.4 0.6 -17.8
9 300 3 -297 33 0.1 -3.2
10 25 16 -9 0.3 0.4 0.2
11 585 23 -562 6.3 .6 -5.7
12 500 31 -469 5.4 .8 -4.6
13 600 50 -550 6.5 1.3 -5.2
Total
6,555 2,335 -4,220
76.5 62.3 -14.2
Source:
Membership
data
provided by
union leaders. The workforce for each
year
is
based on the firm's annual
reports,
which include
only
full-time
employees directly
hired
by
the firm.
The
union-management partnership
established in the
1990s,
how-
ever,
was not without tensions. In
particular, significant
intraunion
debate took
place
about how far accommodation should
go.
Several
union leaders became
increasingly wary. They argued
that labor unions
were
giving up job security
without a
fight
because the
system
allowed
for mere consultation rather than
cogovernance
and the
preference
given
to some leaders was a
managerial strategy
to
co-opt
unions
(inter-
view
2.3).
As a
result,
some
prominent
leaders left their unions to form
new ones
(Unions 3, 5, 10,
and
12).
This
fragmented
the union struc-
ture and reduced the unions'
average
size.
Despite
their
rhetoric,
in
practice
these unions did not
adopt
a more militant stance.
These
problems notwithstanding, during
the collective
bargaining
process
of
1998,
workers made
important gains.
The
agreement signed
that
year
raised
many
benefits and leveled
wages,
so that all workers in
the same
occupational category
shared the same
salary.
On
top
of
this,
unions
negotiated specific
benefits to be
appended
to their individual
collective contracts. This
negotiation was, according
to union
leaders,
the best since 1986 (interviews 2.7, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12).
In
regard
to the
allocation of
job losses,
this
agreement
led
management
to continue
gradual job shedding
across the
company, usually generously compen-
sated and
voluntary.
Both the more
accommodating
and the more crit-
ical unions
participated
in the
process
and
signed
the same
blueprint
agreement.
Between
1990
and
1998,
unions shared a similar
membership
tra-
jectory,
characterized
by
some losses but overall
stability
in
regard
to
each union's share of the workforce. The
exceptions
were Unions 6 and
7,
which
organized mostly
workers whose functions had been elimi-
nated in the 1980s.
These unions had
negotiated
at that time a
gradual
shedding
of those
jobs,
to be finalized
by 1991; during
the
period
of this
study, they
saw
very
little
activity.
The
year
1999
marked the end of the
honeymoon
between unions
and
management.
It also marked the
beginning
of a trend toward
increasing
differentiation of union
strategy.
The firm was in a
precarious
economic
situation,
and the
top
man-
agement changed.
The new team had a mandate
radically
to downsize
the firm. Its
approach
was
quite aggressive
and was
perceived
as
highly
authoritarian
by
union
leaders, who,
until
then,
had been used to
giving
input
on such
important
decisions
(interviews 2.7, 2.8, 2.11, 2.12).
The
incoming management
team
ignored
the unions
altogether
and offered
no concessions. More
important,
between 1999
and
2002, management
delayed payment
of
many
of the benefits in the
1998
convenio and
undertook three massive rounds of
layoffs, offering
no
compensation
beyond
the
legal
minimum. Each
department
was
requested
to downsize
its internal
occupational groups by
the same
percentage. Thus,
no union
escaped painful membership
losses. As in the
previous period,
between
1999
and
2002, membership trajectory
did not
vary significantly.
During
the waves of
layoffs,
workers would be called
by
their
supervisor every Friday
and informed whether or not
they
would be
fired.
Many
left the
premises
in tears
(interview 2.10).
Relations between
workers and
supervisors
deteriorated as
many supervisors adopted
a
"take it or leave it" attitude that created an
atmosphere
of fear and dis-
engagement
in the firm
(interview 2.10).
In the words of a firm
officer,
The firm has shifted
away
from a culture where what the firm
gave
to the worker mattered the most to one in which workers'
attitudes,
collaboration with the
firm,
and trust make the difference. This
means
transforming
the mindset of workers. We are thus
informing
workers and new recruits about the shift from tenured
job
to
"employ ability."
We stress that
wages
will be based on internal
equity
and firm
competitiveness.
(Interview 2.4)
Not
surprisingly,
the conflict escalated in
2002,
the
year
the 1998
convenio
expired. Management approached
the
negotiation proposing
further
wage
and benefit cuts. All unions united to
reject
this
proposal
and founded the
largest
union coordination committee in the
history
of the
company, calling
a massive strike that lasted 28
days
and
cap-
tured the media's attention
Of the unions cov-
ered
here, only
Unions
3, 5,
and
6,
which had
negotiated earlier,
did
not
participate.
Although
almost all unionized workers
joined it,
the strike was a
failure. Workers were unable to
stop
the firm from
functioning normally
(interview 2.2).
By
2002 the firm had
completely
outsourced and sub-
contracted functions related to the maintenance of infrastructure and
provision
of customer services and had also automated its
plants. Thus,
most of the
daily provision
of services was
already performed remotely.
The firm also hired substitute
workers,
and offered customers
experi-
encing
difficulties with their
phone
service new cell
phones
and other
forms of
compensation. During
the
strike, moreover,
leaders of Union 8
were
questioned by
the
police
under
allegations
of
sabotaging
the
firm,
which is a crime that falls under Chile's antiterrorist law
(interview 2.14).
As the
days
of the strike
passed,
the firm remained inflexible and
seemed
willing
to absorb
any
loss to avoid
giving
in to workers' demands.
According
to union
leaders,
this intimidated workers
(interviews 2.7, 2.10,
2.12).
Halfway through
the
strike, many
returned to their
jobs.
Union
2,
which
organized
white-collar
professionals,
was the first to
defect,
and
was followed
by
Union
1,
a blue-collar union
(interview 2.10).
Defections
continued,
so that
by
the 28th
day
of the
strike,
union leaders decided to
call it off.
By then,
Union
2, representing top professionals
and
supervi-
sors,
had
opened negotiations
with the firm. It ended
up accepting
the
cuts
(interview 2.10).
This made it clear to the other unions that the firm
was determined not to
give
in to
any
of their
demands, making accept-
ance of the cuts a
precondition
for further
negotiation.
The
remaining
unions
rejected management's
demands and used Article
369
of the Labor
Law to extend their
previous
collective
agreement
for another 18 months.
Article
369
protects
workers when labor
negotiations
stall and
manage-
ment is
seeking
cuts to the collective
agreement.
In
2003,
five more unions
(1, 4, 5, 6,
and
7)
also
accepted
the cuts.
Although negotiations
were
individual,
in
practice
these unions ended
up
with one common collective contract structure
(interview 2.6).
According
to the main leader of Union
1, they
decided to abandon Article 369
because
"People
were disillusioned after the
strike,
and we were afraid
that our
people
were
going
to
join paraunion bargaining groups.
The firm
also seemed more
open
to talk"
(interview 2.9).
In
contrast,
Unions
8, 9,
10, 11, 12,
and
13
decided to bide their time
by extending again
their 1998
collective contract under Article
369 (interviews 2.3, 2.5, 2.8).
Although
all the unions that
negotiated
after 2002
stopped
massive
defection and
recaptured
some
members, only
Unions 1 and 5
grew.
These two unions did not undertake
organizing campaigns; instead, they
benefited from a
unique
status:
they
were the
only
unions in this
group
that
competed
with other unions. Union 1
competed
with all the blue-
collar unions and Union 5
competed
with Union
4,
a more combative
professional
union.
Although they,
like all the other unions that
negoti-
ated,
lost
many
benefits and were unable to
stop job losses, they
were
granted
a few
privileges:
their leaders had more access to
management
for
resolving everyday problems, participated
with
management
in
developing training
seminars and career
development programs,
and had
modest success
reaching
informal
agreements
to
delay
or slow
job
losses
The
remaining accommodating unions,
which
mostly organized professionals,
never
sought
this kind of
relationship,
instead
focusing exclusively
on
finding
formulas to
compensate wage
and benefit losses for their members
Firm officers were
very outspoken
in their
support
for Unions 1 and
5.
They appeared publicly supportive especially
of Union
1,
the
larger
of the two and the
only accommodating
blue-collar union. Between
2003
and
2004, management
showcased Union 1 in the firm as a
good
example
of
partnership
with workers.
According
to the firm's human
resources
manager,
Unions that do better in this firm are those that have leaders that
understand the business. For
example,
we hear the leader of Union
1
speaking
about the
"probability
of
employment"
instead of tenure.
That makes a lot of sense because the contracts will
get
streamlined
and more flexible . . .we will eliminate all fixed costs. The others
just
don't
get
it. (Interview 2.4)
In
contrast, management
circulated a series of internal memos
against
unions under Article
369 (Unions 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and
13).
Alien-
ated and
facing
increased
management hostility,
these unions had to
settle each of their demands
through
the courts
(interviews 2.3, 2.8,
2.10, 2.11).
Despite
some
legal victories, management hostility
led
many
workers to leave these unions. Since
by
2003
most of these workers
were blue-collar and Union 1 was the
only
blue-collar union on
good
terms with
management,
the latter
capitalized
on most of these losses
(interviews 2.1, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9).
Explaining Variation in Union Membership
Trajectories
This
study
has
sought
to understand
why,
between
1990
and 2004 in
two
large private
sector
firms,
some unions
experienced membership
growth
while others did
not,
and whether individual success translated
into overall increases in firm-level union
density.
With
regard
to the first of these
questions,
the literature identifies
two
possible explanations:
labor
restructuring
and union
strategy.
In
principle,
variation in labor
restructuring
could have influenced the rei-
ative success of different unions in
maintaining
or
increasing
their mem-
berships.
The evidence marshaled
here, however,
indicates that in the
two
cases,
no
significant
interunion variation occurred in the
exposure
of unions to labor
restructuring.
In the
bank,
the
cross-occupational
and
cross-departmental
charac-
ter of
unions,
the merit-based character of
job
losses,
and the relative
evenness of labor
flexibility
across the firm meant that unions were sim-
ilarly
affected
by
labor
restructuring.
There
was, however, significant
variation in union
strategy.
This variation
arguably explains
interunion
variation in
membership trajectory.
Between
1990
and
2004,
labor
restructuring
in the telecommunica-
tions firm also had a
comparable impact
across unions. From 1990
to
2002,
union
strategies
and union
membership
outcomes were also rela-
tively homogeneous.
In
contrast,
between 2002 and
2004,
there was
sig-
nificant interunion variation in union
strategy
and
membership
out-
comes,
while labor
restructuring
became more intense but continued to
be
relatively
even across unions. Thus the evidence
suggests
that the
main factor
explaining
variation in
membership trajectory
between
1990
and 2004 was variation in union
strategies
in
regard
to
management.
As the literature
indicates,
unions resort to a
variety
of
strategies
to
boost
membership,
the most common of which involve
recruiting
drives,
coalition
building, mergers,
and
partnership bargaining
strate-
gies. Although
the case studies
suggest
little
activity
in the area of union
organizing campaigns
and no
activity
in the areas of coalition
building
or internal
restructuring, they
indicate that unions that
grew
were those
that,
at critical
junctures
of firm
restructuring,
accommodated
manage-
ment's demands earliest or most
aggressively,
later
establishing
a
part-
nership relationship
with
management.
In a situation of
great
imbalance
in the
power
of unions relative to
management,
this
partnership
involved union restraint and
cooperation
in
exchange
for modest
par-
ticularistic benefits that
gave
these unions a
competitive edge
over
others. The
logic
of such
strategic
choice resembled a
"prisoner's
dilemma,"
in which those unions that defected first
got
the best results.
In the
bank,
unions that
experienced growth
in
membership
were
those
belonging
to Federation
1, along
with Union 8. Federation 1
accommodated and
supported management's plans
to restructure the
compensation system
and increase labor
flexibility
in
1990
after the
strike,
and in
1994
and 2002 after
important mergers.
It also delivered
wage
restraint
during
all the collective
bargaining processes, beginning
in
1990.
In
exchange, management
offered Federation l's leaders exclu-
sive informal
benefits,
such as a voice in
layoffs
and
subcontracting
decisions, monopoly
over the collective
bargaining process,
and
easy
access to
top corporate
officers. In
general,
unions in this federation had
a
steady upward membership trajectory.
Union
8,
which was not
part
of Federation
1, experienced
most of
its
growth
after
2003.
Although
not
cooperative
to the
degree
that Fed-
eration 1
was,
in
2003 Union 8 was the first of the new unions to accom-
modate
management, signaling
other similar unions to follow suit.
Although
this did not
bring
the union all the informal benefits
enjoyed
by
Federation
1,
Union 8 was able to
negotiate
some modest benefits
for its
members,
and its leaders
gained easy
access to
higher executives,
something
that similar unions had more
difficulty doing.
This made the
union attractive to
potential
members
recently
arrived in the
firm,
and
at the same time
represented
a middle-of-the-road alternative to the
accommodating
Federation 1 and the militant Federation 2.
In the case of the telecommunications
firm,
two unions
experienced
growth
after
2002,
Unions 1 and 5.
They
were
among
the first unions
that accommodated
management
demands in 2002 and were the
only
accommodating
unions that
competed
with others for members. These
unions
experienced management hostility
at a
very
difficult
juncture
of
worker-management
relations and
subsequently
became
management's
partner
in
training policies.
Unlike the
bank,
which had seen variation
in union
strategies
and individual union
since
1990,
this variation became
significant
in the firm
only
after 2002. How-
ever, despite
the shorter
period involved,
the
relationship
between
union
strategic
choice and
membership
outcome is even clearer: the
two most
accommodating
unions
enjoyed important membership gains
at the direct
expense
of their
competitors.
In a context of
significant job losses, rising
work
demands,
and
weak institutional and
political support
for
unions, privileged manage-
ment
recognition yielded practical
resources that enhanced the
capacity
of these unions to deliver benefits to their constituents and
gave
more
accommodating
unions a
competitive edge
over other unions.
Although
some of these
gains
were
subsequently
extended to other
workers, they
demonstrated that the unions were on
good
terms with
management,
which could
potentially
mean individual
protection
from
job
losses or
faster solutions to
workplace problems.
Field interviews
suggest
that in
most
cases,
workers themselves
sought
out unions that would offer
them more
practical guarantees
and
identify
them as
good
"team
play-
ers," increasing
their
opportunities
for
long-term employment
and
career advancement.12 In
contrast,
workers abandoned unions that had
adversarial relations with
management.
The fact that
only
a handful of
unions
(Unions
6 and 7 in the
bank)
devoted resources to
organizing
campaigns,
with modest
results,
indicates the
strong impact
that man-
agement support
had on worker
disposition
to
join particular
unions
over others.
More militant unions
(e.g.,
Unions 11 and 12 in the bank and Union
8 in the telecommunications
firm)
or unions that accommodated man-
agement
demands later on
(e.g.,
Unions 6 and 7 in the bank and Union
4 in the telecommunications
firm)
experienced marginalization and,
in
some
cases, management persecution.
This fostered resentment toward
management
and the more
accommodating
unions and decreased the
possibilities
of union
coordination, leaving
more militant unions isolated
and ineffective and therefore more vulnerable to union
raiding.
The
iconic
examples
of this were Unions 6 and 11 in the
bank,
which lost a
significant
number of members in the
early
1990s
and
dramatically
after
2003, respectively,
and Union 8 in the telecommunications
firm,
which
lost massive numbers of members after 2002.
Why
did some unions refuse to accommodate
despite
the harsh
consequences?
The field interviews
suggest
three reasons. One was that
the
dynamics
of adversarial relations nurtured
high
levels of mutual ani-
mosity
and distrust between unions and
management
that were difficult
to overcome once established. As adversarial relations
evolved,
the
divide became
increasingly personal
and had
important
emotional over-
tones for union leaders
The second reason had to
do with the
objective
conditions of certain unions. For small unions
organizing
older
constituencies,
the costs of accommodation out-
weighed
the costs of
militancy,
because the concessions demanded
by
management
involved smaller retirement funds
(interview 2.10).
A third reason was that some union leaders calculated that the firm's
long-term
success
ultimately depended
on the collaboration of labor
and that
they
had
enough
resources to resist
management
intimidation
for a few
years
(interview 2.12).
During
that
period, they thought,
the
management
team would have to
change, giving way
to one better dis-
posed
toward unions. In the absence of
management hostility,
their
unions would have an
advantage
in
luring
members back
precisely
because
they
had
kept
the
older,
more
generous
collective contracts.
Thus,
similar to the leaders of more
accommodating unions, many
mil-
itant leaders' main concern was institutional survival.13
Differences in
strategic
calculation between
accommodating
and
militant union leaders do not
appear
to have been rooted in
age, parti-
san
affiliation,
or
any
other
objective
condition. The interviews
suggest
instead that
they
reflected the most influential union leaders' career
experiences
and the
varying
lessons
they
derived from those
experi-
ences. As a union leader
stated,
"We've learned that we cannot
fight
windmills because workers are not interested.
Yes,
I am
promanage-
ment,
because if the firm does
well,
we do well. We've decided to be
management's
shield. If
somebody
attacks their
policies
it's as if
they
are
attacking us,
because we've
helped shape
them"
(interview 1.14).
As this article's
findings suggest, employers actively sought
to
shape
their relations with individual unions in
ways
that contributed to their
own
objective
of
maximizing profits,
and forced union leaders to make
strategic
decisions.
Employers
did
not, however,
select a
priori
which
unions would receive more favorable treatment and become
privileged
negotiating partners.
Their choices
regarding
relations with individual
unions were
shaped by
the
strategies adopted by
union leaders at criti-
cal moments of firm
restructuring.
Some union leaders chose to accom-
modate
management's
demands for
change,
while others vowed to
resist. These
choices,
in
turn, shaped management's
own
bargaining
strategies
toward individual unions.
With
regard
to the second
question,
whether individual success
translated into overall increases in firm-level union
density,
the
findings
of this
study
indicate that
despite bringing
some relative success for
individual
unions,
the
strategy
of
partnership
accommodation did not
translate into union
density gains
at the firm level. More militant unions
found themselves alienated from the normal framework of labor rela-
tions,
which increased inter- and intraunion factionalism.
Meanwhile,
the more successful unions
expanded
their
membership by raiding
other
unions,
and therefore had little incentive to
organize
the unor-
ganized. Thus, although
some unions
experienced
absolute
growth
overall,
union
density
declined.
Scholars differ in their evaluations of the effects of
partnership
strategies
on union
strength.
The conventional wisdom
among
Chilean
government officials,
center-left
parties,
and some
employers
in this
regard
has been that
union-management partnership
ensures a combi-
nation of stable firm
performance
and
organized
labor voice on
key
issues.
Although
this
perspective may
be
roughly
accurate where unions
are
legally strong
and
organizationally unified,
this
study suggests
a
very
different
reality
in the Chilean context. Where unions are
institutionally
weak,
lack a
strong political voice,
and face
increasing employment
instability, partnership strategies may
well
represent
efforts
by
unions to
advance their own narrow interests
through
vertical
patron-client
ties
that
operate
at the
expense
of other unions and undermine labor soli-
darity.14
In the
long run,
such ties could also
potentially
weaken more
accommodating
unions
by making
them
increasingly dependent
on
management's
favor as a source of
legitimacy.
This
dependency,
as
some of the more
accommodating
union leaders
openly recognized,
made them vulnerable to
changes
in
management disposition
toward
unions down the road
(interview 1.14).
Beyond Union Decline
This
study
has
emphasized
how the structural weakness of labor in con-
temporary
Chile
shapes
the kinds of
strategies
that
bring membership
recruitment success to individual unions and how those
strategies
affect
union
density.
Two broader issues are tied to the
question
of union
weakness. One is the
relationship
between union decline and the
per-
sistence of
high inequality
in
Chile;
the other is the conditions that could
potentially bring
a revitalization of Chilean
organized
labor in the fore-
seeable future.
Since its redemocratization in
1990,
Chile has been
applauded
for
making significant
advances in
poverty
reduction
(Haggard
and Kaufman
2008; Mesa-Lago 2008b; Weyland
1997).
At the same
time,
the nation has
exhibited one of the most skewed income distributions in Latin
America,
with a Gini coefficient
averaging
around 0.55 (ECLAC 2001, 71, 2006,
90).
15
This situation stems from
wage inequality
(Ffrench-Davis 2002,
198; Larraaga 2009, 22)
and the fact that real
wages
have
grown
much
more
slowly
than has national income
(Banco
Central
n.d.).
These trends
in
wages,
in
turn,
are
probably
at least
partly
a function of the structural
weakness of
unions,
since research elsewhere has demonstrated that
unions have an
important
role in
pushing up
and
compressing wages
(Freeman
and Medoff
1984;
Rueda and Pontusson
2000).
High
levels of income
inequality may
have
significant
macroeco-
nomic and
political implications.
With
regard
to the
economy,
some
scholars
argue
that
high
levels of
inequality
are associated with
poor
long-term growth performance (Easterly 2002, 266).
With
regard
to
pol-
itics,
the literature
suggests
that
high
levels of
inequality
are associated
with
lower-quality
and more unstable
democracy
(Kauffman 2007; Wey-
land
1996,
5).
Although
Chile does not face these
problems right now,
failure to deal with this situation in the
present may
make the
country
vulnerable to them in the future.
Given the current situation of union weakness and its
negative
implications,
it is worth
asking
what conditions would make it
possible
to foresee a
strengthening
of the labor movement in Chile. Besides
engaging management
in
training
and worker
protection initiatives,
all
of which
may
make unions more
appealing
to
potential members,
unions must make inroads into new constituencies.
Although
formal
employment
has become more
precarious
than in the
past
(Sehnbruch
2OO6),
Chile still has the
largest
formal sector in the
region (Mesa-Lago
2008a, 3).
This
presents
an
opportunity
for
recruiting
but
requires
more
will, innovation,
and
energy
in
mobilizing
workers who
may
have dif-
ferent needs from those of traditional constituencies.
The
findings
of this
study suggest, however,
that such
strategies
will
have limited effects in the absence of a labor reform that tackles the
multiple
incentives for union
fragmentation. Therefore,
a
stronger
union
movement
probably
will
require
a broad
change
in the
legal
framework
in which workers
negotiate
with
management.
This cannot be achieved
while unions continue to hold little
political leverage.
The
sharp
increase in union
militancy
under President Michelle
Bachelet
(2006-10)
shows that even under
existing conditions,
unions
can find common
political ground
and relative success in
seizing polit-
ical
opportunities. However,
these efforts have been limited to workers
in the
public sector,
and have not
yet
translated into
significant
reforms
to the collective
aspects
of the Labor Code. This indicates that more
pressure
is
needed,
not
only
from unions but also from incumbent
par-
ties that had historical ties to
unions, especially
the Socialist
Party
and
the Christian Democrats.
For the last 18
years,
while
leading
the
government,
these
parties
have embraced
relatively
orthodox market
principles
in
regard
to the
labor
market, making
it difficult to rebuild the
strong
but autonomous
relations between center-left
parties
and unions that existed before the
1973
military coup.
This situation has been the result of the
negotiated
character of the democratic
transition,
the fear and distrust of labor mil-
itancy resulting
from the
1973
breakdown of Salvador Allende's social-
ist
regime,
and the
subsequent
fall of "real socialism" in Eastern
Europe.
Divisions in the labor movement and
strong pressure
from
employers
have not
helped.
In this
context,
labor reform seems elusive.
Ironically, change
could
potentially
come as a result of electoral
shifts that
promote
alternation in
power.16
The success of the
right
in the
2009-10
presidential
election will
probably
mean that in the short
term,
progress
on labor issues will be
delayed.
In the
long run, however,
this
situation could create more incentives for center-left
parties
to
develop
a labor
agenda
that would allow them to
actively compete
for
working-
class votes while
freeing
both union and center-left
party
leaders to crit-
icize the
government
and the current
development
model. While the
greater political polarization
this scenario
implies might worry
some
observers who fear a
repetition
of the
country's
traumatic
past,
it
may
be the
only way
to
substantively
alter the labor relations structure inher-
ited from the
military regime.
Interviews
All interviews were conducted in
Santiago,
Chile in 2004. Translations
of interview
quotations by
the author.
Bank
1.1
Corporate Manager,
of Labor
Relations, August
4
1.2
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
11, May
10
1.3 Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
12, May
5
1.4
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
13, May
5
1.5
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
6, April
26
1.6
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
12, May
13
1.7
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
7, May
3
1.8
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
8, May
12
96
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 52: 2
1.9 Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
9, July
19
1.10
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
10, July
14
1.11
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
3, June
1
1.12
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
4, July
27
1.13 Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
5, August
11
1.14
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
1, April
29
1.15
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
1, June
1
1.16
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
2, June
4
1.17
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
11, May
12
Telecommunications Firm
2.1
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
9, August
30
2.2
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
6, September
27
2.3
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
12, August
26
2.4
Corporate Manager
of Labor
Relations, September
30
2.5
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
10, September
27
2.6
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
7, September
7
2.7
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
13, August
31
2.8
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
11, August
23
2.9
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
1, August
12
2.10
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
2, August
19
2.11
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
4, August
25
2.12
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
8, July
22
2.13 Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
5, September
28
2.14
Member,
Board of
Directors,
Union
3, August
27
Notes
I would like to thank
Evelyne Huber, Juan
Pablo
Luna, Jana Morgan,
the
editor of
LAPS,
and four
anonymous
reviewers for their
insightful
comments
on different versions of the
paper.
I also would like to thank Gabriel Ondetti
for his
encouragement
and his
relentless,
but in the end
always constructive,
criticism.
1.
Unfortunately,
cross-national data series on union
density
in Latin Amer-
ica between 1990 and 2004 are
problematic.
The International Labour Office
(ILO) database,
for
example,
has
comparability problems
due to considerable
cross-national variation in the methods used to collect the
data,
the
coverage
of
the
figures
on trade union
membership,
the definitions
used,
and the
approach
to
calculating
trade union
density
rates.
Country-specific
studies
indicate,
how-
ever,
that unions in
Mexico, Peru,
and
Uruguay,
which share with Chile a
long-
standing tradition,
have
experienced
similar
shrinkage
(Cassoni 2000, 8;
Fairris
and Levine
2004;
Saavedra-Chanduv and Torero
2002, 11-13).
2. The other 22
percent
of unionized workers are
organized
in unions of
independent
and
temporary workers,
two
types
of unions that have a different
legal
status.
3. The connection between
union-party political
alliances and union
strength
has been well documented in both the Latin American and
European
contexts
(Burgess 2004;
Cook
2007; Levitsky
and
Way 1998;
Murillo
2001;
West-
ern
1995, 187-88).
4. Studies of union
density
in more
developed
countries find similar links
(Ebbinghaus
and Visser
1999;
Visser
1992;
Lee 2005).
5.
Partnership
here means a
strategy
of firm-level union accommodation
characterized
by permanent
and
highly cooperative
interactions between unions
and
management
intended to
produce
mutual
gains. Militancy
refers to union
strategies
characterized
by
little
accommodation, mainly
oriented toward obtain-
ing gains
for workers.
6. Most unionized firms have one or two unions
(Direccin
del
Trabajo
2007, 79).
7.
Although
in 2004
roughly
30
percent
or all the workers
laboring
ror
both firms were
subcontracted,
the unions under
study
here
organized very few,
if
any,
of these workers.
8. Under Chilean labor
law,
the
employer
cannot refuse to
negotiate
formal collective contracts. This
procedure
also
requires higher quorums
of
union
representation
than the convenio and follows a
rigid
set of
procedures.
On
average,
20
percent
of unions
employ
this
type
of instrument (Direccin
del
Trabajo n.d., 6).
9. Union 2
sought
out Federation 1 as an
opportunity
to
grow
(interview
1.16).
10.
According
to a firm
officer,
"In the last
bargaining
round I was author-
ized to increase the cost of the collective
agreement by
2
percent
to 4
percent.
I succeeded in
negotiating
an increase of
only
1.8
percent"
(interview 1.1).
11. In
addition,
most workers maintained
strong
emotional attachment to
their bank of
origin.
Unions were
informally
named in reference to those banks.
12. This attitude is consistent with that found
by earlier,
classic works on
labor relations in Chile
(e.g., Landsberger
1967).
13.
Golden
(1997)
argues
that union leaders
may
undertake strikes
they
know will fail when
they perceive
that the criteria for
allocating layoffs
threaten
union survival.
14. Kauffman
(1974, 285)
defines a
patron-client relationship
as one char-
acterized
by
a
particularistic
informal
exchange relationship
between actors of
unequal power
and status in which each
party expects
returns
by rendering
goods
and services to the other.
15. One recent
analysis
indicates that
inequality
declined between 2000 and
2006
(Larraaga
2009). However,
even with the recent fall in
inequality,
the aver-
age
Gini coefficient for the
post-
1990
period
is above 0.55
(Larraaga 2009, 7).
16. It could also come about as a result of an electoral reform that would
give
more
representation
to
political
minorities than the current binominal
system.
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