German

First
Army
World War:
Operational Ideas of
von Schlieffen and
Moltke the Younger
Preparing the
for the
The
Alfred
Helmuth von
Robert T. Foley
In the years after the First World War, German soldiers set about analysing the
conflict in great depth. In the wake of the initial shock of the defeat, they looked
understandably for reasons why the Kaiserheer lost the war for which it had spent
the previous 45years preparing. Decisions taken in the war's first weeks, in particu-
lar during the battle of the Marne where most believed the conflict was lost, were
examined with afine-tooth comb.) Key actors, such as Alexander von Kluck, Gerhard
Tappen and Hermann von Kuhl, published memoirs and essays defending their pro-
fessional reputations and their interpretations of the events in late August and early
September 1914 that led to the German retreat from the Marne.
2
More 'disinterested'
My thanks to Mr Bruce I. Gudmtmdsson, Dr Helen McCartney and Professor Derulis Showalter for their
assistance in the preparation of this article. Theanalysis, opinions and conclusions presented here are those
of the author alone, and do not represent tileviews of the J oint Services Command and Staff College, the
UK Ministry of Defence, or any other government agency.
Unless indicated otherwise, all translations are theauthor's.
1. For example, seeHermarul von Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, 2vols (Berlin: VerlagTradition Wilhelm
Kolk, 1929), 1: 45; and Otto von Moser, Kurzer strategischer iiberblick iiber den Weltkrieg 1914-1918
(Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1923), 26f.
2. Alexander von Kluck, Der Marsch m i f Paris ll11d die Marneschlacht 1914 (Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1920);
Gerhard Tappen, His zur Marne (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1920);and Hermann von Kuhl, Der Marnejeldzug
1914(Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1921).
WAR &SOCIETY, Volume 22, Number 2(October 2004)
The University of Ne\v South Wales 2004
1
2 WAR &SOCIETY
observers weighed into the arguments on one side or the other.
3
Soon, however,
research turned from the events of the fateful battle to the planning and the
direction of Germany's overall war, in short, to an examination of the generalship of
Helmuth von Moltke (the Younger) who, as Prussia's Chief of the Great General
Staff from 1906 to 1914, was responsible for such matters.
Indeed, having died during the war, Moltke offered an easy target and a
tempting scapegoat for German failures, and he was vilified by his former sub-
ordinates. First, Moltke's prewar self-doubts were recalled,4 and he was portrayed as
a weak leader who did not have the force of will to make the difficult decisions
necessary in wartime.
5
Later, he was blamed for changes made to the war plan drawn
up by his predecessor as Chief of the General Staff, Alfred Graf von Schlieffen,
changes which supposedly weakened the decisive right wing of the German army
and led to the defeat in the battle of the Marne.
6
Also from his weakness of character
came purportedly his hands-off leadership style that in September 1914 allowed
the two armies of the German right wing to advance without positive orders from the
German high command.? These works depicted Moltke as unsuited for high command
and laid the German defeat at the battle of the Marne squarely at his feet.
Recent research by Annika Mombauer has gone a long way to refute this
interpretation of Moltke as a weak leader, not least by showing the key role he
played in the decision for war in 1914.
8
However, there was another reason, usually
overlooked by historians, for German soldiers to analyse Moltke's generalship that
3. For example, see Artur Baumgarten-Crusius, Deutsche Heeifiihnmg im Marnefeldzug 1914 (Berlin: August
Scheri, 1921); and Wilhelm Miiller-Loebnitz, Die Fiihrung im Marne-Feldzlig 1914 (Berlin: ES. Mittler,
1939).
4. This view was given impetus by the publication of Moltke's memoirs by his wife, which included a
letter from Moltke in which he outlines his hesitancy to take up the position as Chief of the General
Staff in 1905. Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente 1877-1916 (ed. Eliza von Moltke)
(Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 1922), 304ff.
5. See especially, Wilhelm Groener, Der Feldherr 'wider Willel1: Operative 5tudien iiber den Weltkrieg (Berlin:
ES. Mittler, 1931); and Wolfgang Foerster, GrafSchliefjen lind der Weltkrieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1921),21
ff. Even the German official history treats Moltke harshly: see Reichsarchiv, Del' Weltkrieg 1914-1918,
Bd IV: Del' Marne-Feldzug-Die Schlacht (Berlin: ES. Mittler, 1926),533 ff.
6. Hermaml von Kuhl, Del' deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitzmg lmd Durchfiihrzmg des Weltkrieges (Berlin:
ES. Mittler, 1920), 166 ff.
7. Hans Ritter, Kritik des Weltkrieges: Das Erbe Moltkes ll11d Schlieffens im grossen Kriege (Leipzig: K.F.
Koehler, 1920), 111 f.
8. Amuka MOlnbauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 3
was unrelated to the political act of apportioning blame for Germany's defeat. Prior
to the war, Germany had developed asophisticated system of professional education
within its army, and the desire of Germany's soldiers to learn from events and to
improve professionally did not end with the dissolution of the Imperial army.9 In
the interwar period, Germany's professional soldiers, many of whom were now un-
employed as a result of the restrictive Treaty of Versailles, felt compelled to
analyse the war and look for areason for the rise of position warfare and with it the
attritional warfare Germany could not hope to win. Their motivation in doing this
was primarily to find ways to prevent asimilar situation fromarising in afuture war
that most felt would have to take place to redress the wrongs of the previous war.
IO
Thus, not only was Moltke's character and fitness for high command questioned, but
his ideas about how armies should fight and his abilities as a soldier were thrown
into disrepute.
l1
Central to this interpretation of Moltke as apoor general was the/comparison
with his predecessor Schlieffen,who was almost invariably depicted as the 'master
teacher of the modern war' .12Interwar authors held up Schlieffen's ideas about how
the army should fight as being the epitome of how to conduct Bewegungskrieg (war of
movement).13 While interwar authors sometimes praised Moltke's operational
preparation of the German army for war, they did so with hesitation. They
portrayed him as merely carrying on the ideas of Schlieffen, and not always very
well.
14
Further, when they illustrated particular operational concepts, they
invariably used examples from Schlieffen's teachings, rather than Moltke's.
Implicit within the writings of these authors was the belief that Schlieffen would
9. On this process see Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schliejfen and Prussian War Planning (Oxford: Berg, 1991).
10. Wilhelm Groener, Lebenerinnerungen (ed. Friedrich Freillerr von Gaertringen) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
&Ruprecht, 1957), 16. This was also one of the prime goals of the Reichsarchiv. See Helmuth Otto,
'Der Bestand Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres im Btmdesarchiv-, MiliUirisches
Zwischenarchiv Potsdam', Militiirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 51 (1992): 430.
11. This viewpoint has remained largely lmchallenged: see Bucholz, Pntssian War Planning, 217 ff.
12. Kuhl, Del' deutsche Generalstab, 126; Friedrich von Boetticher, 'Der Lehrmeister des neuzeitlichen
Krieges', in Friedrich von Cochenhausen, Von Scharnhorst zu Schlieffen, 1806-1906: Hundert Jahre
preuj5iscJz-delltscher Generalstab (Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1933), 249-316.
13. The prime expositions of this point of view are: Foerster, Graf Schliejfen; Wolfgang Foerster, Aus det
Gendankenwerkstatt des delltschen Generalstabes (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1931); Wilhelm Groener, Oas
Testament des Grafen Sc/zliejfen: Operative Studien iibel' den Weltkl'ieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1927); and Eugen
Ritter von Zoellner, 'Schlieffens Vermachtnis', Sonderheft to the Militiirwissenschaftliche RundscJwu 3.J g
(1938).
14. Kuhl, Vorbereitung, 140; Foerster, GrafSclzliejfen, 24f.
4 WAR &SOCIETY
have prepared the German army better for the coming war. Frorp. this premise came
the belief that if only Schlieffen's operational ideas had been followed, trench war-
fare, and with it along war of attrition that Germany could not possibly win, would
never have occurred.
While much of Schlieffen's writings about the conduct of war were published
in the interwar period
I5
(thus providing evidence for Schlieffen's supporters), the
publication of Moltke's service writings was delayed by the outbreak of the Second
World War.l
6
With the destruction of Moltke's papers along with most of the rest of
the German army archives by Allied bombers in 1945, historians have been left
without the source material needed to re-examine this interwar interpretation of the
supposed inferiority of the teachings of the seventh Chief of the Prussian General
Staff. However, the recent discovery of copies of most of Moltke's 'tactical-strategic
problems' in the us National Archives allows us for the first time to question this
earlier interpretation.
I7
Instituted by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the 'tactical-strategic
problems' were originally designed to be given to prospective General Staff officers
as a final test of their abilities; as such, they were more commonly known as
Schluflaufgaben (final problems). By the time that Schlieffen took over as Chief of
the General Staff, they were given to a much wider range of officers on the General
Staff and had come to playa crucial role in their training.
I8
As General Staff officers
would 'fight' the Kaiserheer in wartime, the discovery of these problems allows for
aunique insight into Moltke's ideas about how the German army should conduct its
coming war and into what he was teaching his subordinates in the General Staff on
the eve of the First World War.
The copy of the problems now held in the us National Archives was
originally sent by Colonel A.L. Conger, the American military attache in Berlin, to
15. Alfred von Schlieffen, Dienstscllriften, Bd I: Die taktisch-strategiscllen Aufgaben aus den jahren 1891-1905
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1937); and idem, Dienstscllriften, Bd II: Die Groflen Genera/stabsreisen - Ost - aus den
Jahren 1891-1905 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1938).
16. On the planned publication of Moltke's service writings, see Friedrich von Rabenau (chief of the army
archive) to all army archives, 22 May 1937, Alfred von Schlieffen papers, RG 242, M-961/Roll 1,
National Archives and Records Administration [NARA].
17. 'German General Staff Problems, 1892-1913', RG 165, box 620, NARA. These problems were translated
in 1928 by Lawrence Ecker, an employee of the US Embassy in Berlin. My special thanks to Bruce
Gudmtmdsson for bringing these problems to my attention.
18. Preface, Schlieffen, Dienstscllriften I, vii; Max van den Bergh, Das Deutsche Heer var dem Weltkriege
(Berlin: Sanssouci Verlag, 1934), 175 f; KuW, Der deutsclze Genera/stab, 126; and Groener, Leben-
erinnenl11gen, 67 f.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 5
the Intelligence Section of the War Department in Washington in J une 1928. Conger
had been loaned a set of Schluj3aufgaben by a friend in the Reichswehr for his own
'personal study and benefit'. This manuscript contained copies of 18 Schluj3aujgaben
issued by Schlieffen and six issued by Moltke. Conger had seen fit to have these
translated by a clerk in the American Embassy,19 not only because the problems were
valuable pieces of history, but because they were still being used for training German
officers and as such were an important piece of intelligence about the Reichswehr.
20
Thus, this manuscript, when combined with the few surviving examples of Moltke's
comments to other staff problems, gives us problems for seven of his eight years as
Chief of the General Staff before the beginning of the war.
21
With this evidence,
this article aims to add to our growing picture of the operational capabilities of the
German army before the outbreak of the First World War by subjecting Moltke's role
in preparing General Staff officers, and hence the Kaiserheer, for war to a much
needed reassessment.
22
IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
Drawing its inspiration from the traditions of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Carl von
Clausewitz, the Kaiserheer was an institution that took training and education
19. A comparison with Schlieffen's published SchlLtfiaufgaben and the copies of several of Moltke's
problems fotmd inthepapers of WilhelmGroener has shown that the 1928translation isaccurate, if
somewhat rough. Original copies of Moltke's problems for 1907, 1911(not included in theConger
manuscript), and 1913canbefotmd inthepapers of WilhelmGroener, RG242,M137,rolls 19and 20,
NARA.
20. A.L. Conger to Lieutenant Colonel R.H. Williams, 26J tme 1928, RG 165, box 620, NARA. Conger
wrote: 'Pleaseimpress on everyone they go to thehighly confidential nature of theseproblems. No
one on this side knows I have themexcept theman who loaned themto meand for that reason the
fact that wehave themshould particularly not bementioned toany visiting German officer'.
21. Copies of two of Moltke's critiques to his staff rides have also survived in PH3/663, 'Grosse
Generalstabsreise 1906',and PH3/664, 'GrosseGeneralstabsreise 1908',BtmdesarchivIMiliUirarchiv,
Freiburg [hereafter BA/MA]; and copies of Moltke's general comments on the army corps general
staff rides from 1906to 1914still exist in GSt. 1231, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv-Kriegsarchiv,
Munich [hereafter BayHSTA-KA].
22. Although thisarticleisclearly related, it does not attempt todeal directly with thecontroversy about
the Schlieffenplan that has been running since 1999and shows little sign of abating. For themost
recent salvos in this debate, including this author's own contribution, see Terence Zuber, 'The
Schlieffen Plan Was an Orphan', War in History 11: 2 (2004), 220-5; Terence Holmes, 'Asking
Schlieffen: A Further Rely toTerenceZuber', War in History 10:4(2003),464-79; and Robert T. Foley,
'TheOrigins of theSchlieffenPlan', War in History 10:2(2003),222-32.
6 WAR &SOCIETY
seriously.23Each commander had the responsibility to train his men to the utmost of
their ability, and every officer was expected to continue his education throughout his
career.
24
To this end, senior officers throughout the various armies that made up the
Kaiserheer set up training programmes for their subordinates.
25
Officers were
expected not only tobecompetent on thedrill deck, but also to display theprogress of
their learning in wargames such as staff problems carried out indoors and staff rides
carried out in the field. Their performance in such exercises served as important
indicators for promotions and assignment to other positions.
26
Training and edu-
cational exercises were taken very seriously, therefore, by most officers.
The Chief of the General Staff had training and education duties similar to
any other commander within the German army, and it has always been clear that
Schlieffen took his duty as teacher to his younger officers very seriously. Indeed, he
took this task so seriously that he left his subordinates little free time, even
assigning problems to his officers over holidays.27In addition to being used to train
officers in skills needed to perform their staff duties, Schlieffen viewed his staff
problems, staff rides and wargames as important preparation for high command.
28
Thus, in acritique of the Schluj3aujgaben in 1903, Schlieffe!l wrote:
I do not seeany reason why thefuture should not seeafew of you gentlemen at the
head of an army. Nonetheless, I hope that you are at least called to lead an army
corps or a division or to stand by the side of a commander [Truppenjiihrer] as a
chief of staff or as ageneral staff officer. Then you will have to understand how to
judge themanCEuvresof an army.29
The seriousness with which Moltke took his educational duties is also clear.
Indeed, he took these duties so seriously that he challenged the erratic Kaiser
23. Themilitary education culture of the Kaiserheer has not been well examined. For an introduction, see
Heiger Ostertag, Bi/dung, Ausbildung und Erziellllng des Offizierkorps im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918
(New York: Peter Lang, 1990).
24. SeeKriegsministerium, Felddienst-Ord11l111g (Berlin: E.S.Mittler, 1908),10.
25. A good example of an 'education plan' has survived in the US National Archives. It was written by
thecommander of the Bavarian 6th Division. Pflauen, 'Ausbildtmg der Offiziere', 15December 1905,
RG242,T-78, roli21, NARA.
26. On the importance of such training to tlle careers of German officers, see Holger Afflerbach,
FalkenhaYI1: Politisches Denken ll11dHal1deln im Kaiserreich (Mtmich: Oldenbourg, 1996),83f.
27. Kuhl, Der deutsche Generalstab, 126.
28. Ritter, Kritik des Weltkrieges, 7.
29. Alfred von Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems 1903', in Robert T. Foley, Alfred von Schlieffen's
Military Writings (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 107.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 7
Wilhelm IIin a way that Schlieffen never dared. As a requirement for his taking the
post as Chief of the General Staff, Moltke insisted that the Kaiser absent himself
from taking his usual disruptive role in the large-scale manreuvres held every year.
3 D
The prospective General Staff Chief told his sovereign: 'The worth of the great
manceuvres as preparation for war lies in the testing of the higher commanders
against an enemy who makes his own decisions ... If the decisions of the Commanding
Generals are always influenced by the interference of Your Majesty, the desire for
initiative will be taken from them' .31 The Kaiser agreed to Moltke's terms, and the
results were almost immediate. One foreign observer wrote of the first manreuvres
under Moltke's control: 'On the whole there seems little doubt that the new chief of
the general staff has infused fresh life into these manceuvres, and that a marked
advance has been made on previous years'.32 Moltke's reputation consequently rose
within the army.33
However, training subordinates in the mechanics of staff duties and for
higher command was only one function of such exercises. Despite the attention paid
by postwar observers to the tactical and operational ideas of the Chiefs of the
General Staff, these men had little formal means of influencing 'doctrine' within the
Imperial German army. The Ministry of War wrote drill regulations, and the
commanding generals of Germany's corps districts had substantial latitude to teach
whatever tactical and operational methods they saw fit.
34
Although recent research
has gone a long way towards showing that the General Staff was not the only source
of tactical and operational concepts in the Kaiserheer,35 General Staff officers
nonetheless played a crucial role in 'fighting' the German army in the First World
War.
36
(Indeed, much of the tactical innovation during the war came from young
30. Moltke, Erinnenmgen, 308ff.; Mombauer, Moltke, 58 ff.
31. Moltke, Erinnenmgen, 310.
32. War Office, General Staff, 'Report on Foreign ManCEuvres 1906', W0106/6170, National Archives,
Public Record Office, Kew [hereafter PRO].
33. See Franz Endres, 'Kaisermanover 1906', MKr. 3165, BayHSTA-KA; Mombauer, Moltke, 88; Groener,
Das Testament des Grafen Scl1lieffen, 79.
34. Bergh, Das deutsche Heel', 38 ff.
35. Antulio J . Echevarria, II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2000), and Eric Dorn Brose, The Kaiser's Army: The Politics of Military
Technology in Germany during the Machine Age, 1870-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
both downplay the role of the Chief of the General Staff in developing tactical and opera tiona I ideas
in the Kaiserheer.
36. Upon being given command of the Fifth Army in 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II told his son, Crown Prince
Wilhelm, that he was to do whatever his Chief of Staff, Constantin Sclunidt von Knobelsdorf, told
8 WAR &SOCIETY
General Staff officers, such as Hermann Geyer, Fritz von LoBberg, and Max Bauer,
who entered the General Staff during Moltke the Younger's tenure as Chief.)37 In
order to influence how the German army would fight, Schlieffen and Moltke relied on
the key roles that their subordinates would play once they had left the confines of
the Great General Staff in Berlin. Thus, the two men also used these training
exercises as a means of imparting their views on the conduct of warfare, and from the
available material we can gain a good view of how each man wanted their sub-
ordinates to fight future wars and battles.
LESSONS IMPARTED
Both Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger faced broadly similar strategic situations.
Since the negotiation of the Franco-Russian Military Convention in 1892, Germany
was compelled to plan to fight on two fronts in the event of a general European war.
38
While Germany could count on the support of her firm ally, Austria-Hungary,
against Russia, she had to face alone in the west France, and possibly Great
Britain.
39
Although the German army was stronger than the French, it would be
weakened by the need to send at least some forces to the east to deal with an
expected Russian invasion. Thus both Schlieffen and Moltke recognised that the
German army would have to fight outnumbered on both fronts.
4o
While recent
research by Stig Forster has cast doubt on the traditional interpretation that
him to do. Kronprinz Wilhelm, Meine Erinnerzmgen aus Deufschlands Heldenkampf (Berlin E.S. Mittler,
1923),4.
37. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (New York:
Praeger, 1989); and Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British
and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995).
38. Indeed, Germany had begun to plan for this contingency much earlier. Already in 1877 Moltke the
Elder began to develop plans for a war against France and Russia simultaneously. See Helmuth Graf
von Moltke, Die Aufmarschpliine 1871-1890 (ed. Ferdinand von Schmerfeld) (Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1929),
65 ff.
39. Although Italy was supposed to send a force to the Franco-German border in the event of war,
neither Schlieffen nor Moltke truly believed that Italian aid would be forthcoming. See Schlieffen to
his sister Marie, 13November 1892, reprinted in Alfred von Schlieffen, Briefe (ed. Eberhard Kessel)
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1958), 296.
40. Both pushed very hard for increases in the German army to even the odds somewhat. See Ludwig
Riidt von Collenberg, 'Graf Schlieffen und die Kriegsformation der deutschen Armee', Wissen und
Wehr ]g. 1927: 605-34; Mombauer, Moltke, 145ff; and Stig Forster, Der doppelte Milifarismus: Die deutsche
Heeresriistungpolitik zwischen Statlls-quo-Sicherung lmd Aggression, 1890-1913 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner,
1985).
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 9
Schlieffen and Moltke trusted completely in a short war,41it is clear from their staff
problems that neither man stopped training for a 'decisive' battlefield victory.42
This situation increased the importance of creating a corps of officers capable of
fighting more intelligently than their larger enemies, an officer corps capable of
identifying and exploiting fleeting opportunities on the battlefield. In Moltke's
words: 'Wemust not believe ... that we will faceeasy problems in afuture European
war which the near or distant future may bring. But in every [situation]' however
difficult it may be, there will be favourable moments which can be exploited. If they
are recognized, rapid and energetic action must be taken' .43 To prepare their sub-
ordinates for such a war, the wargames of both men abound in examples of smaller
German forces combating larger enemies.
Given its expected numerical inferiority, both Chiefs of the General Staff
stressed to their subordinates that the German army had to strive for decisive action
in every case. Generally, this meant the 'annihilation' of the enemy army, or at least
a substantial enough portion to force the enemy to end the war on German terms.
44
Both men stressed the necessity of taking advantage of a divided enemy whenever
possible in order to defeat him piecemeal. For example, during the General Staff
Ride (East) in 1894, the commanders of a notional weak German army faced the
advance of two separated Russian armies. When faced with such a scenario,
Schlieffen advised his subordinates 'to exploit this situation'. He told them to
'attempt to strike one Russian army decisively and then turn against the other'.45
Moltke offered similar advice. In his problems of 1909, Moltke assumed a multi-
pronged French advance against Germany with one army advancing in Alsace, one in
Lorraine between Metz and Strassburg, and a third via Luxemburg. He stressed: 'The
victory of the Germans over the French secondary army will not cause the main army
to halt or turn around; it will still only be a partial success. It is otherwise if the
41. Stig Forster, 'Der deutsche Generalstab lUlddieIllusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik
einesMythos', Militiirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 54(1995):61-95.
42. Seealso Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and Attrition
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004),ch. 3.
43. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909',in'GermanGeneral Staff Problems', 370.
44. BothSchlieffenand Moltke used the term Vernichtung extensively. However, this did not mean the
physical destruction of the enemy, but rather the destruction of the enemy's ability to continue
fighting. Thus, Schlieffenwrote: 'Capitulations [Kapitulationen] have taken theplaceof slaughters [in
modern battles of annihilation]': Schlieffen, 'Camlae', in Schlieffen's MilitanJ Writings, 210.Cf. J ehuda
L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their
Impact on the German Conduct afTwo World Wars (Westport, CT:Greenwood, 1986).
45. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride(East), 1894',inSchlieffen's Military Writings, 14.
10 WAR &SOCIETY
main army in Lorraine can be beaten. With its defeat the operations of the secondary
army will immediately collapse' .46
However, for both Chiefs of Staff, it was not as simple as defeating
decisively the largest enemy army. Both men pointed out repeatedly the inter-
dependence of the disparate enemy armies; if one were destroyed, the others might
not be able to carry out their missions. Under the direction of Schlieffen and Moltke,
wargames taught General Staff officers to examine the situation from the enemy's
perspective and to try to come up with the enemy's most likely course of action, not
least by having one set of officers direct the 'enemy' forces.
47
From there, officers were
encouraged to look for the key elements of an opponent's probable plan and attempt to
disrupt it.
Attempting to examine the situation from the enemy's point of view also had
another important role for Schlieffen and Moltke. Both men recognised the
limitation of intelligence and consequently laid great emphasis on teaching their
subordinates to operate within the 'fog of war'. Schlieffen in particular stressed that
putting oneself in the shoes of the enemy helped deal with the uncertainty that
accompanied any battle and helped reduce reliance on intelligence, which could
often be misleading. In 1892he wrote: 'There is absolutely no sure intelligence about
the strength of the enemy ... Moreover, exact information about this force is neither
to be awaited nor is it required. In reality, an abundance of exaggerated and contra-
dictory reports will arrive, more likely to obscure the facts of the case than to clear
them Up'.48
Moltke too acknowledged the importance of being able to operate with
incomplete information. In 1907 he told his subordinates: 'In war there is no such
thing as complete certainty. The adversary has his own will and may perhaps do
something entirely different from what we hope. One can therefore only reckon with
probabilities and cannot wait for clarification of his intentions. One would otherwise
always come too late'.49 However, while it may be true as Brose has argued recently,
46. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909', in 'German General Staff Problems', 372.
47. See Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1910', in ibid., 417.
48. Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1892', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 75. See also his 'General
Staff Ride (East), 1899', ibid., 48 f.
49. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 341. See also Chef des
Generalstabes der Armee, Nr 5090, 'Bemerklmgen zu den Korps-Generalstabsreisen 1906', 29 April
1907, BayHSTA-KA, GSt. 1231, and Moltke's discussion of the final staff ride he led before the war in
Foerster, Schlieffel1, 25ff.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 11
that the German army had an ambivalent attitude towards technology before 1914,50
it is clear that Moltke put great stock in the emerging technology of aircraft to help
fill in the intelligence picture in future war. In his Schluj3aufgaben of 1910 he wrote:
'Thanks to good balloon reports, the news at hand regarding the enemy gives avery
accurate picture of the situation' .51 The next year he again discussed the key role air-
craft would play in future conflict: 'Air reconnaissance will have the result of
determining the deployment and the maneuvers of the enemy earlier than has
previously been the case'.52
Regardless of the intelligence available, both men taught the ruthless sub-
ordination of all available means to achieving a rapid and decisive victory. In their
view, forces held back from the battlefield as a strategic or operational reserve, as
was the French and British practice at the time,53had no place in modern war,
particularly in anumerically inferior German army.54In aGeneral Staff Ride in 1894
Schlieffen wrote: 'the bringing about of a decision by means of a reserve held back
from the battle is ... barely possible. The battle lines are too long to bring reserves to
the decisive point in good time, and the battlefield is too large to know where this
decisive point will be when it is not predetermined by the general operation plan' .55
In Moltke's words: '[When] the commander-in-chief is seeking a decision, he must
unite everything that is available'.56To this end, both men stressed repeatedly that
even fortress garrisons should be used to provide more troops and artillery for the
decisive attack. As Schlieffen put it: 'fortress troops will not merely observe the
fight from the ramparts, as if from the walls of Troy, and simply fill the spectators'
stands. They must climb down and participate' .57 Moltke wrote similarly: 'The send-
50. Brose, Kaiser's Army, 159-65.
51. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1910', in 'German General Staff Problems', 407.
52. Moltke, 'SchluBaufgaben, 1911', in M-137/19, Groener papers, NARA.
53. On the Entente practice, see British General Staff, War Office, Field Service Regulations, Part I:
Operations (London: HMSO, 1909), 112-20; Wilhelm Balck, Die franzosische lnfanterie-Taktik in ihrer
Entwickelung seit dem Kriege 1870/71 (Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1902),53 ff.
54. Cf. Zoellner, Vermiichtnis, 24 f.; and Wallach, Dogma, 50 f.
55. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1894', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 24. See also Schlieffen, 'Die
taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben, 1898', Dienstschriften I, 51 f.
56. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 337.
57. Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1905', in Schlieffen's MilitanJ Writings, 114. See also, Schlieffen,
'Die taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben, 1894', in Dienstschriften I, 24 f; Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic
Problems 1907', and 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1913', in 'German General Staff Problems', 337 and
427.
12 WAR &SOCIETY
ing of the main reserve of a large fortress to take part in a tactical decision outside
the fortress is often necessary, since one can never bestrong enough inbattle and one
must not leave available forces unused' .58
Another means of balancing the uneven forces somewhat was to make use of
terrain. Perhaps unsurprisingly in an organisation that placed map-making at the
core of its peacetime business,59 the two General Staff Chiefs paid close attention to
teaching their subordinates about the important role played by geography in war. In
their wargames, Schlieffen and Moltke repeatedly used terrain features, such as
lakes, rivers, forests, and fortresses, to their own advantage. In the first instance,
such features were useful for keeping enemy armies divided, and hence liable to
defeat in detail. In the east, both Schlieffen and Moltke acknowledged the
importance of the Masurian Lakes in keeping advancing Russian armies separated.
Also in the east, the fortress of Konigsberg offered a protected point from which
attacks against the flanks or rear of invading Russian armies could be launched.
Finally, the Vistula River with its fortresses at Thorn and Posen provided a
formidable obstacle to delay a Russian advance.
6o
In the west, the terrain was
dominated by the great fortress complex of Metz and Diedenhofen (today
Thionville) in the north and the fortress of Strassburg and the Vosges Mountains in
the south.
61
Metz/Diedenhofen either offered protection for the German right flank
or divided invading French armies, while Strassburg and the mountains set limits on
a possible French invasion from this direction. In fact, geography and fortresses
created a sack along the western border into which invading French forces could
march and be caught.
62
Moreover, large rivers in the west, such as the Rhine and the
Moselle, were also useful inseparating or delaying enemy forces.
63
58. Chef des Generalstabes der Armee, Nr 5258, 'Bemerkungen zu den Korps-Generalstabsreisen', 18May
1906, GSt. 1231, BayHSTA-KA.
59. Bucholz, Prllssian War Planning, 68ff.
60. For examples, see Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1894', 'General Staff Ride (East), 1901', and
'Kriegsspiel, 1905', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 14,52 f. and 121f.; and Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic
Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 336 f.
61. Schlieffen and Moltke encouraged the construction of new outworks for these fortresses. See Oberst
a.D. Heye, 'Die Festung Metz', Vierte!jahresheftefiir Pioniere (1936), 215-22.
62. Indeed, this scenario was used frequently in wargames before the war and was written into the
German war plan of 1914 as a possible German reaction to a French invasion. See Conrad Krafft von
Dellmensingen, 'Kriegstagebuch', entry for 22 August 1914, BA/MA, W10/50642.
63. For example, see Schlieffen, 'Die taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben, 1897', in- Dienstschriften 1,46 f.;
Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909', in 'German General Staff Problems', 370, and his
'Generalstabsreise 1908', BA/MA, PH3/664. See also Zoellner, Vermiichtnis, 28 f.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 13
Terrain features also could be used to assist an attack. For instance, rivers
were useful features upon which to pin enemy forces in order to facilitate their
destruction. In his final problems of 1907 Moltke told his officers: 'Wewill ... decide
for the attack upon the enemy's left wing. If this can be enveloped and beaten, the
adversary can be crowded against the lakes ... He will have an exceptionally
difficult retreat and it is to behoped that alarge part of his combatant forces will be
annihilated' .64 Fortresses were also to play an active role with the field army. In his
Kriegsspiel of 1905 Schlieffen instructed his subordinates on the role of the fortress of
Konigsberg in a future war: 'In this fortified area, an army can be assembled to fall
upon the flank of the [Russian] army'.65 Moltke felt similarly about the role of
fortresses. In his General Staff Ride of 1906 he told his subordinates: 'We have built
Metz into a fortress of great size in order to use it operationally. Its widely dispersed
forts give an army of many corps the opportunity to assemble unseen by the enemy in
complete protection and tostrike out by surprise' .66
With no reserve held back from combat under the commander's hand and
possibly a numerically inferior force, Schlieffen and Moltke advised their sub-
ordinates to concentrate their forces at the point of decision in order to achieve a
local superiority. In Schlieffen's words: 'proper manceuvring must assemble all
available forces at the decisive point' .67Moltke expressed himself similarly. In his
Schluflaufgaben he stressed repeatedly that it was important 'to assure oneself of
local superiority on that part of the prospective battlefield on which one desires to
conduct the decisive attack'.68For both Schlieffen and Moltke the area where such a
decisive attack should take place was on the enemy's flanks.
In common with most German officers of their day, both Schlieffen and
Moltke eschewed frontal attacks in favour of attacks against an enemy's flanks and
rear.
69
The increased range and capability of modern firearms and artillery had con-
64. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 339. See also
Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1903', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 103.
65. Schlieffen, 'KriegsspieI1905', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 122.
66. Moltke, 'Generalstabsreise 1906',8 f., PH3/663, BA/MA. See also Moltke, 'Generalstabsreise 1908',26,
PH3/664, BA/MA; and Chef des Generalstabs der Armee, Nr 4044, 'Allgemeine Bemerktmgen zu den
Korps-Generalstabsreisen', 12April 1910, 1231, BayHSTA-KA, GSt.
67. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1899', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 42.
68. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 338. See also his
'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', and 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1913', in ibid., 355, 423, 433.
69. Schlieffen's emphasis (or obsession as some have said) on flank attacks and envelopments has been
well documented. For more recent treatments, see Gunther Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen, and the
14 WAR &SOCIETY
vinced most German soldiers of this period that purely frontal attacks would be
suicidal for the attacking troops?O In his 'War Today', published in 1909, Schlieffen
expressed this belief clearly when he wrote:
It is no longer possible, as it had been in the eighteenth century, to deploy against
one another in two lines and to fire salvos into one another at not too great a dis-
tance. In the space of a few minutes, both armies would be eradicated from the
Earth by rapid fire. It is no longer possible to storm the enemy position in
Napoleonic columns, columns as wide as they are deep. They would be smashed by
a hail of shrapnel. It is also not possible to overwhelm the enemy, as it was
recommended a short time ago, through the fire of thick swarms of skirmishers
[Schi ltzenschi i rm e]. These swarms would be quickly massacred.
71
Moltke felt similarly: 'Modern combat, particularly frontal combat, will be a long,
weary and bloody struggle. The strength of the front has constantly grown with the
improvement of firearms and the experience of the recent wars bear [sic] witness to
the fact that the victory is almost always won only by envelopment'.72
Moreover, both men feared that a purely front attack would allow an enemy
merely to withdraw and live to fight another day. Schlieffen feared that a frontal
attack on its own would lead to an 'ordinary' rather than a 'decisive' victory.73 He
believed that 'the result of [a frontal attack] is, even in the best of cases, only
limi ted. Indeed, the enemy will be pushed back, bu t he will renew his resis tance in
another place in a short space of time',74 Moltke also felt that frontal attacks could
not in themselves bring about a decision on the battlefield. In 1909 he wrote: 'Even in
the most favourable case the Germans cannot accomplish anything further by this
form of attack than to crowd the enemy together. They would throw the enemy back
in the direction from which he came, that is upon his communications, but they con-
Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment', in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to
the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1986); and Wallach, Dogma, 35 ff.
70. Antulio J . Echevarria II, 'A Crisis in Warfighting: German Tactical Discussions in the Late Nineteenth
Century', Militiirgesclzichtliclze Mitteilungen 55 (1996),51-68.
71. Schlieffen, 'War Today', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 195f. When Schlieffen submitted this article to
Moltke prior to its publication, Moltke expressed his agreement with Schlieffen's ideas. See Moltke to
Schlieffen,3 December 1908, reprinted in Schlieffen, Briefe, 308f.
72. MOltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problelns', 336.
73. Wallach, Dogma, 45; Emmanuel von Kiliani, 'Die Operationslehre des Grafen Schlieffen lmd ihre
deutschen Gegner (I. Tiel)', Wehrkunde ]g. X (1961),73 f.
74. Schlieffen, 'War Today', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 200.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 15
tinue to have him opposite them: they have not gained any decision',75 Thus frontal
attacks were merely useful in assisting the decisive envelopment. In 1903 Schlieffen
wrote: 'In strategy and in tactics, the same rule applies: he who wants to envelop,
must attack the front firmly in order to prevent the enemy there from making any
movement, thus enabling the enveloping wing to be effective',76
Such flank attacks and envelopments had two goals: first, to cause the
psychological collapse of the enemy. For Schlieffen, this effect came primarily from
the threat posed to the enemy's lines of communication, which he believed were even
more vulnerable in the days of mass armies,77Moltke expressed it in more personal
terms: 'one must consider that every rifle put into action ... against the rear of the
French will have twice the impact of one put into action [on the French front]'.78 The
psychological effect of a flank attack or envelopment, however, could not always be
counted on to achieve the far-ranging results demanded by both Schlieffen and
Moltke from any attack. Therefore, the main aim of a successful flank attack or
envelopment was also to force the enemy army into a tactically unfavourable
situation. Schlieffen expressed this idea in his Schluj3aufgaben in 1905, when he
admonished his subordinates: 'Why do you not want to look after the noble examples
that have been handed down to you by the history of your Fatherland? All great
captains have done fundamentally the same thing'. To Schlieffen, the key to the
victories of men such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon was that 'the enemy was
to be forced onto another front, was to be beaten, and was to be forced back in the most
unfavourable direction',79
From an examination of his Schluj3aufgaben, it is clear that Moltke thought
in very similar terms to his predecessor. In 1909 Moltke told his subordinates: 'The
decisive thing in a flank attack on a large scale is its direction. It must be such that in
75. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in 'German General Staff Problems', 375. See also his
'Generalstabsreise 1908',34, PH3/664, BA/MA.
76. Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1903', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 98.
77. For exalnple, see his 'General Staff Ride (East), 1899', in ibid., 46. See also his 'Tactical-Strategic
Problems, 1901', in Dienstschriften I, 87. Cf. Wallach, Dogma, 43, who argues that Schlieffen re-
introduced a'geometrical principle into the art of war'.
78. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1910', in 'German General Staff Problems', 414.
79. Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1905', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 113 f. See also his
'Kriegsspiel 1905', in ibid., 138. Schlieffen's emphasis on attacking enemy flanks reached its apogee
with the publication of Grosser Generalstab, Stlldien Zllr Kriegsgesclzichte lind Taktik, vol. III: Der
Sclllachteifolg, mit we/chen Mitteln wllrde er erstrebt? (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1903).
16 WAR &SOCIETY
case of victory the enemy front comes into an untenable situation' .80 Later, in his dis-
cussion of the 1909 problems, he explained more fully how he envisioned attacks
against an enemy flank might operate:
The promise of success in [a large-scale flank attack] is ... to be sought in the effect
which its direction must exercise upon the enemy's front if it succeeds. The greater
the masses are, the more difficult the retreat movement for the defeated. The
masses, following the pressure of the attacker, will be forced to crowd together
upon a narrow area; the retreat roads of the front are blocked by the backward
surging troops of the routed wing and it becomes impossible for the masses to
deploy anew. 81
However, while both men agreed about the importance of flank attacks and
envelopments in winning a battle decisively, Moltke took the concept further than
Schlieffen, advocating double envelopments in a way that Schlieffen never did
while Chief of the General Staff. As Sigfrid Mette and, more recently, Terence
Holmes have pointed out, it was only after his retirement that Schlieffen took to
using the battle of Cannae, a double envelopment, as a model 'battle of annihilation';
during his time in the army, he used Frederick the Great's victory at Leuthen, a one-
sided envelopment, as his idea1.
82
Although a few double envelopments occurred
during Schlieffen's wargames and staff rides, he never put particular emphasis on
this form of combat.
83
Moltke, on the other hand, openly advocated the use of double
envelopments and actively instructed his officers in its employment. In his
Schluflaufgaben of 1911 he wrote: 'The concept of annihilation comes out much more
strongly from a simultaneous attack [against both flanks] than from an attack against
the front and left flank [of the enemy]'. He went on to discuss how it should be used:
'A double envelopment [der Angriff mit beiderseitiger Umfassung] is especially
effective when strong forces advance simultaneously against both flanks of the
enemy. The binding of the enemy front that is always of the greatest importance
during an attack that envelops one flank, loses its significance during a double
envelopment.'84
80. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909',in 'German General Staff Problems', 377f.
81. Ibid., 382.
82. Sigfrid Mette, V0111 Geist Deutscher Feldherren: Genie und Technik, 1800-1918(Zi.irich:Scientia, 1938),226
ff. Cf. Wallach, Dogma, 42 ff; Terence Holmes, 'Classical Blitzkrieg: The Untimely Modernity of
Schlieffen's Calmae Programme', Journal of Military History 67: 3(J uly2003),752 ff.
83. For example, seehis 'Kriegsspiel1905', inSchlieffen's Military Writings, 132ff.
84. Moltke, 'Sthhillaufgaben, 1911',inGroener papers, M-137/19, NARA.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 17
Whatever the method of attack chosen, however, both General Staff Chiefs
faced the challenge of how to command Germany's mass army, and here is where the
greatest difference between the two men becomes apparent and where the seeds of
the postwar criticism of Moltke were sown. European armies had increased in size
dramatically during the period between the German Wars of Unification (1864-71)
and the outbreak of the First World War. While Moltke's uncle had led 462,000 men
against France in 1870, the German field army in 1914 numbered some 2.5 million and
faced a war on two fronts.
85
Moreover, the increased effectiveness of modem weapons
meant that the size of battlefields themselves had grown dramatically. (Moltke
assumed that an attacking army corps would have a front of 6 kilometres, while a
defending corps would occupy 8 kilometres.
86
) This enormous increase in size and in
scale had a profound impact on how armies were commanded in the field. As
Schlieffen noted, 'the art of commanding an army has changed fundamentally since
earlier times. The commander can no longer direct the battle solely with the
assistance of adjutants and orderlies. The expansion of armies has become too great' .87
To deal with this command problem, the German army under the influence of
Helmuth Graf von Moltke (the Elder) had developed a system of 'directive
command'.88 Under this system, the high command told subordinates what they
needed to achieve, rather than how their tasks were to be performed. Subordinate
commanders were left to determine themselves how best to accomplish the mission
assigned to them. This system had several advantages. First, it allowed the high
command to concentrate on the big picture and future planning while the subordinate
commands dealt with the details of particular actions. Second, it allowed
commanders on the spot, who would invariably have better knowledge about a
particular situation, to make rapid decisions without fear of being overruled from
above. This system had generally functioned well during the Franco-German War in
85. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961),60; Reichsarchiv, Der
Weltkrieg Bd I: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1925),38 f.
86. Chef des Generalstabes der Armee, Nr 3964, 'Gesichtspunkte fUr die Anlage und Leihmg von Korps-
Generalstabsreisen', 12March 1914, 1231, BayHSTA-KA, GSt.
87. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1894', in Schliejfen's Military Writings, 23.
88. This systerTI was first propagated in the German army in 1869 by Moltke the Elder's 'Instructions for
Large Unit Commanders'. This manual was reissued in 1885 and 1910 and even served as the basis for
the Reichswehr's famous Truppenfiihrung. See Daniel J . Hughes (ed.), Moltke 011 the Art of War: Selected
Translations (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), 171 ff.
18 WAR &SOCIETY
1870-71, and the German army maintained it as its official command 'doctrine'
throughout the First World War.
89
For directive command to function properly, however, subordinate
commanders needed to have a firm understanding of what the higher command
wanted to achieve and had to subordinate their actions to this goal. In an army hIll
of independent-minded officers, Schlieffen feared that this would be difficult to
accomplish. Indeed, he often made reference to where the system had broken down
during the Franco-German War of 1870-71.
90
Thus, Schlieffen put great stress on the
importance of the responsibility of subordinates to understand their commander's
goals. In 1899 he wrote:
subordinates have the duty to understand completely and fully the intentions of
the supreme commander. They must not have eyes merely for the roles of their
own units, but most also understand the whole situation [die gesnmte Lnge] and
conform and subordinate their decisions and orders to this. Only when sub-
ordinates know how to bring their necessary independent decisions and actions in
line with the intentions of the higher commander can they correctly carry out
their missions.
91
Indeed, Schlieffen was clearly sceptical enough of directive command to advocate its
abandonment under certain circumstances.
92
Schlieffen expected that the budding communications technology of the
early twentieth century would make the problem of command easier in future war. In
his Schluflnufgnben in 1901 he wrote: 'According to current theory, with the help of
the telegraph, modern mass armies can be as easily and as surely led as one would
have in earlier times directed a corps of 15,000 to 20,000 men'.93 While in 1901 he
merely hoped that telegraphs could play such an important role, by 1909 he was con-
vinced that 'modern Alexander', located centrally behind the front lines, would issue
his orders to his disparate armies via the field telegraph and field telephone.
94
In
89. See Samuels, Command or Control; and Bradley J . Meyer, 'Operational Art and the German Command
System in World War I' (PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1988).
90. Schlieffen, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1903', and 'Helmuth von Moltke', in Schlieffen's Military
Writings, 106 f., and 230 f.
91. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1899', in Scl1lieffen's Military Writings, 49. See also his 'General
Staff Ride (East), 1894', 'General Staff Ride (East), 1899', and 'Kriegsspiel1905', in ibid., 23 .,48 ., and
138f.
92. See his 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1903', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 98.
93. Schlieffen, 'Die taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben, 1901', in DienstscJzrijten I, 84.
94. Schlieffen, 'War Today', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 199.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 19
short, Schlieffen hoped that modern communications technology would go some way
to replacing what was, in his view, a problematic system of directive command. He
advocated a much more proactive higher command, one that did not shy away from
intervening when necessary to direct the overall battle.
Moltke, on the other hand, was a firm believer in the directive command
system introduced by his famous uncle. He went so far as to say that 'the higher the
commander, the less the interference in the duties of the subordinate commanders'.95
However, this is not to say, as did his critics after the war, that MoItke proposed
abdicating responsibility for command. In 1911 he indicated clearly the positive role
he envisioned the High Command playing in battle:
an attack made by two separate groups at first lacks unity, as at the beginning of
the advance there exists no communication between the two groups. However, this
will come if the corps are properly commanded. The responsibility for this falls to
the High Command [Heeresleitung]. The High Command also has to attend to the
simultaneity of the attack. More than this, it cannot do. Once the corps are set
into motion, the remainder must be left to the Commanding Generals.
96
While Moltke believed firmly in directive command, he also set out its
parameters clearly to his subordinates. In his comments to the army corps General
Staff rides of 1912 and 1913 he wrote: 'In certain quarters there is uncertainty about
the basic difference between commanding armies and army corps. An army command
[A.O.K.] will from time to time have to choose whether orders [Befehle] or
directives [Weisllngen] are appropriate for their subordinate army corps, etc. Army
corps commands [Generalkol111nandos] will almost always direct their divisions by
means of orders'.97
Like Schlieffen, Maltke believed that the intentions of the higher command
must always guide the actions of subordinate commands. This said, he went further
than Schlieffen in advocating that the higher command take an active role in
making its intentions known. He stressed that 'the Commanding Generals must be
informed about the intentions of the High Command, but this is best accomplished
orally through the sending of an officer from the Headquarters'.98 However, it is
95. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909', in 'German General Staff Problems', 373.
96. Moltke, 'SchluJ 5aufgaben, 1911', in Groener papers, M-137/19, NARA.
97. Chef des Generalstabes der Armee, Nr 3964, 'Gesichtsplmkte flir die Anlage und Leitlmg von Korps-
Generalstabsreisen', 12March 1914, 1231, BayHSTA-KA, GSt.
98. Ibid. During the First World War, Moltke made extensive use of his staff officers to keep in touch with
the front line headquarters. The most infamous of such visits was Richard Hentsch's trip to the First
and Second Army headquarters during the battle of the Marne, which led to the German retreat. See
20 WAR &SOCIETY
clear from his staff problems, as well as from his actions in the First World War,
that Moltke believed the higher command should refrain from meddling in the
affairs of its subordinate commands.
Both Schlieffen and Moltke hoped to overcome some of the difficulties of
commanding a widely dispersed army by developing an early version of what is now
known as the 'operational art'. Schlieffen viewed the clash of two mass armies as
one huge battle spread over space and time, in which the smaller battles fought by
the independent armies and army corps, what he termed 'Teilsehlaehten', would
form the tactical encounters of traditional battles. These large numbers of battles,
which would take place far away from one another as the individual corps or groups
of corps came into contact with the enemy, would be welded together by the supreme
commander into a 'Gesamtsehlaeht', or 'complete battle'. The Teilsehlaehtel1 would
be given significance by the supreme commander's plan. J ust as a commander of old
gave units particular goals on the battlefields of days past, a modern commander
would give specific goals to his army corps. Each would playa part in the supreme
commander's overall plan. In Schlieffen's words: 'The success of battle today depends
more upon conceptual coherence than on territorial proximity. Thus, one battle might
be fought in order to secure victory on another battlefield'.99 The army corps would, in
essence, play the role once assigned to battalions or regiments in traditional battles.
Indeed, this very idea formed the basis for his famous 1905 plan.
Moltke viewed modern wars similarly. In 1907 he wrote: 'Every tactical
success is highly valued and will be appreciated and exploited by the high
command' .100Moltke stressed that the high command should have a clear idea of
what it wanted to accomplish with its disparate battles and needed to stick to its
goals. He wrote: 'however much his sentiments may sway back and forth, the
commander must steadfastly keep in view the clear and fast lines of the great
common action into which all the individual actions must be fitted'.101
However, despite the advances in communications technology, fighting this
Gesamtsehlaeht with armies spread from Belgium to the Swiss border was much
more difficult than either Schlieffen or Moltke imagined. Moltke's hands-off
leadership approach did not help matters. While such an approach may have
Wilhelm MiHler-Loebnitz, Die Sendung des Oberstleutnants Hentsch am 8.-10. September 1914 (Berlin: E.S.
Mittler, 1922); Mombauer, Moltke, 253-60.
99. Schlieffen, 'War Today', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 218.
100. Chef des Generalstabes der Armee, Nr 5090, 'Bemerktmgen zu den Korps-Generalstabsreisen 1906',29
April 1907, 1231, BayHSTA-KA, GSt.
101. Moltke, Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1909', in 'German General Staff Problems', 386.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 21
functioned effectively in 1870-71, in 1914 it helped unravel the German war plan, so
that no matter how many 'individual actions' the German army won at the
operational level, Moltke was unable to turn these victories into something
grea ter. 102
Another area of significant difference between the two Chiefs of Staff was on
the question of surrendering territory to the enemy. Schlieffen did not hesitate to
advise his subordinates that national territory should be voluntarily given up to the
enemy in order to gain a more favourable military situation at some other point.
Moltke, on the other hand, made it clear to his officers that national territory
should not be surrendered without a fight. In 1907 he wrote that 'the duty of the
Commander of the German forces assembled in Prussia is to protect the territory east
of the Vistula'.lo3 In other words, the commander of the weak German eastern army
had to stop the Russian invasion before it conquered East Prussia. This desire to keep
the enemy out of German territory as much as possible would have consequences for
Moltke's war plan. While in his wargames and in his war plans Schlieffen was quite
happy to surrender terrain to achieve a decisive victory on another part of the front,
Moltke would not do this. Thus, in 1914, Moltke deployed substantial forces to protect
south Germany from a French invasion.
lo4
Further, he did not hesitate to dismiss the
commander of the German Eighth Army when he looked likely to withdraw his
weak forces behind the Vistula and surrender East Prussia to the Russians.
los
However, far from demonstrating that Moltke was a weak character and a
poor general, his decisions in 1914 were in keeping with the operational concepts he
developed while Chief of the General Staff and show the originality of his
thinking. In 1914 he was convinced that the invading Russian armies could be
defeated piecemeal. Had the Eighth Army retreated to the Vistula, the two
separated Russian armies would have been free to join forces, and the combined army
would have been too large for the Eighth Army to defeat. The outcome of the battle
of Tannenberg showed the correctness of his reasoning. In the west, Moltke's decision
to deploy a sizeable force to protect south Germany from a French invasion allowed
him to attempt a more ambitious undertaking than envisioned in the original
'Schlieffen Plan'. After the defeat of the French invasion in 1914, Moltke ordered his
102. Recent research by Bruce GudmlU1dsson has shown how effective German tmits were at defeating
their French cOlU1terpartsin open battle. Bruce GudmlU1dsson, 'Battle of the Frontiers, 1914', paper
presented to theSociety for Military History Annual Conference, University of Calgary, May 2001.
103. Moltke, 'Tactical-Strategic Problems, 1907', in'German General Staff Problems', 332.
104. Mombauer, Maltke, 92ff.
105. Ibid., 244-50; Demus Showalter, Tannenberg: Clash a/Empires (Camden: Archon Books, 1991), 196 ff.
22 WAR &SOCIETY
Sixthand Seventh Armies to attack.
106
Thus, tocomplement thewing enveloping the
French fqrces fromthenorth, Moltkeadded asouthern wing, adecision that offered
the prospects of completing a double envelopment of the French army.l0? That
Moltke's undertaking ultimately failed had less to do with the supposed weakness
of the German right wing, as many of Moltke's detractors would have it, than an
overestimation of what was possible in the age of modern mass armies, especially
the great difficulty in coordinating the actions of such widely separated forces. In
contrast to the postwar picture painted of him, Moltke's operational decisions in
August 1914 show himtobeanambitious commander willing totakerisks toachieve
far-reaching objectives. In keeping with this prewar thinking, he aimed to maintain
the initiative and to destroy completely theFrench field army.
THE SCHLIEFFEN MYTH
In 1938, in memory of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Schlieffen's death, Eugen
Ritter von Zoellner, aformer General Staff officer, published 'Schlieffen's Legacy' as
a special edition of the official army journa1.
108
In common with most of his con-
temporaries, Zoellner argued that Schlieffen had been the master teacher of the
Kaiserheer and that the army owed its successes during theFirst World War, such as
they were, to Schlieffen. In particular, he implied that Schlieffen had been the
106. Based on the development and deployment of heavy artillerYJ Brose argues that Moltke had planned
this double envelopment from 1911 and that this was incorporated as 'Case 3' in the army's deploy-
ment plans. See BroseJ Kaiser's ArmYJ 165-82. However
J
archival evidence does not support this.
InitiallYJ Moltke repeatedly stressed the role of the Sixth and Seventh Armies as flank protection for
the decisive right wing. It was only after Moltke was convinced that the French were all but defeated
that he ordered his left wing to attackJ to the astonislunent of the Sixth Army. See Conrad Krafft von
DellmensingenJ 'Kriegstagebuch'J entries for 17-22 August 1914J BA/MA
J
W10/50642. Indeed
J
Dellmensingen's entry for 22 August describes Case 3 as a defensive measure: 'when the threat to the
flank in Lorraine had been successfully parriedJ either defensively or offensivelYJ it was not intended
to advance beyond the upper Mosel and the Meurthe line. The Sixth and Seventh Armies were to
halt there
J
organise a defensive positionJ and send away tmits. What strength could be freed was to
march northeast
J
in the direction of Metz'. After the defeat of the French invasion
J
Dellmensingen
assumed that Case 3 would be ordered by Moltke and was surprised when the Sixth Army was
ordered to attack instead.
107. See Hermann Gackenholz, Entscheidllng in Lothringen 1914: Der Operationsplan des jiingeren Moltke tl11d
seine Durclifiihrzmg auf dem linken deutschen Heeresfliigel (Berlin: J mlker tmd Dilnnhaupt
J
1933); and Hew
Strachan
J
The First World War, vol. 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press
J
2001)J 243 ff.
108. In 1914, Zoellner was sent from Mtmich to tile Oberste Heeresleitlmg to serve as one of the Bavarian
representatives. Somewhat ironically, as a Bavarian officer, Zoellner would not have served in the
Prussian General Staff tmder Schlieffen or Moltke had it not been for the outbreak of the war.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 23
intellectual father of what most felt to be the German army's greatest victory of the
war: the battle of Tannenberg. In support of his claim, Zoellner discussed in some
detail Schlieffen's General Staff Ride (East) of 1894, which bore a similarity to the
battle in August 1914. In the ride, as in the battle, a weak German force of five army
corps faced two separate Russian armies, one advancing from the northeast, the other
from the southeast. As in 1914, the ride resulted in weak forces screening the Russian
army advancing from the northeast, while the bulk of the German forces con-
centrated against the Russian army advancing from the southeast, and annihilated
it.
109
In Zoellner's view, Schlieffen had prepared his subordinates clearly and
properly for what they would face in 1914.
Zoellner, however, did not need to look so far in the past for an example of a
prewar training exercise with similarities to the battle of Tannenberg. Rather than
discuss a 20-year-old staff ride, he need only have looked at the Schluj3aufgaben
given three years before the outbreak of the war. In 1911 Moltke issued a set of
problems that examined how a German army of six army corps would defend itself
and the eastern German borders from two separated Russian armies of seven and six
corps, respectively. As in 1894 and in 1914, Moltke advised his students to concentrate
against the Russian army advancing from the southeast and merely hold the army
advancing from the northeast with a weak force of Land'wehr and cavalry. Indeed,
Moltke advised the annihilation of the Russian army by the means of a double
envelopment, much like that used at the battle of Tannenberg three years later,1l0
Present in the Great General Staff in Berlin when Moltke issued these
problems were a number of the individuals who played key roles in the battle of
Tannenberg. In 1911 Erich Ludendorff (chief of staff to the Eighth Army during the
battle) was head of the Aufmarschabteilung. Also in the Rote Bude in Berlin at the
time were Max Hoffmann and Paul Grunert, who in 1914 were the first General Staff
officer and the quartermaster general respectively of the Eighth Army.Ill On the
other hand, no one who had participated in Schlieffen's 1894 staff ride was in any
important command position during the battle of Tannenberg.
112
Yet, despite having
been familiar with Moltke's 1911 Schluj3aufgaben, Ludendorff, like Zoellner,
attributed his victory to Schlieffen's training rather than to that of Moltke, when
109. Zoellner, 'Schlieffens Vermachtnis', 21 H.
110. Moltke, 'Schlu15aufgaben, 1911', in Groener papers, M-137/19, NARA.
111. One could also add Georg Graf von Waldersee, who had been chief of staff to the Eighth Army until
LudendorH's appointInent. See KriegsministeriuITI, Rangliste der Koniglich Preuflischen Armee und des
XIII. (Koniglich Wiirttembergischel1) Armeekorps fiir 1911 (Berlin: ES. Mittler, 1911), 15 H., and ReicllS-
archiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Bd II:Die Befreiung OstpreujJens (Berlin: ES. Mittler, 1925), 358 H.
112. Schlieffen, 'General Staff Ride (East), 1894', in Schlieffen's Military Writings, 25 f.
24 WAR &SOCIETY
writing about how he felt after the victory at Tannenberg: 'I thought of General Graf
von Schlieffen, and thanked this teacher'.113How was it then that Ludendorff, who
had only joined the General Staff several months before Schlieffen retired, could
attribute his abilities to Schlieffen's training?
As the analysis above has demonstrated, for the eight years he spent as
Chief of the General Staff before the outbreak of the First World War, Moltke
taught his subordinates roughly the same operational approach as Schlieffen. Both
men focussed on educating their subordinates to fight intelligently against a
numerically superior foe. The concept of annihilating key portions of the enemy's
forces through flank attacks and the avoidance of purely frontal attacks lay at the
heart of both their teachings. Indeed, Moltke even took the concept further than
Schlieffen by advocating and teaching the double envelopment, aform of attack that
Schlieffen only embraced after his retirement; and it was this form of attack that
the Eighth Army carried out at Tannenberg. Moreover, both men encouraged the
development of a 'wargame mentality' within the General Staff by stressing the
necessity of examining the situation from the enemy's perspective in order to under-
stand what it was he might be trying to accomplish. From this would come
knowledge of the key aspects, and hence key targets, of the enemy's plan of action.
Even on the topic of command, Schlieffen's and Moltke's ideas shared more simi-
larities than differences. On almost every issue picked out by postwar German
officers as the central elements to Schlieffen's Be'lvegungskrieg, Moltke either taught
the same lessons as, or even developed the concepts further than, Schlieffen. His
Schluj3aujgaben clearly show the extent to which Moltke prepared the German army
operationally for the First World War and demonstrate that Moltke's ideas should
be ranked along with those of Schlieffen as one of the most important sources of the
doctrine of the Kaiserheer, and later the Reichswehr and the Wehnnacht.
Indeed, while Schlieffen has traditionally been hailed as the father of the
concept of the double envelopment in the German army, Moltke's staff problems
demonstrate that it was he rather than Schlieffen who formally introduced the
concept into General Staff training. During his time as Chief of the General Staff,
Schlieffen concentrated on one-sided envelopments, using Leuthen as his model
battle. Moltke, on the other hand, instructed his subordinates actively in the use of
double envelopments and attempted tocarry out an ambitious double envelopment on
agrand scale in August 1914. In tum, those officerswho had begun their General Staff
training under Moltke before the outbreak of the First World War, such as Ludwig
Beck, Wilhelm Heye, Gerd von Rundstedt, Fedor von Bock, Gunther von Kluge and
113. Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserrinerzmgen1914-1918 (Berlin: E.5. Mittler, 1919),45.
Foley: Operational Ideas of Schlieffen and Moltke 25
Ewald von Kleist, carried his lessons to their subordinates during the war, into the
interwar period, and ultimately into the Second World War.
The fact that Moltke's role in the intellectual development of the German
army has been largely forgotten today owes much to the creation of the 'SchlieHen
myth' during the interwar period. Originally, this myth was developed to show
that Germany could have won the war if only Schlieffen's original war plan had
been followed to the letter. By casting the blame for altering the original plan, hence
losing thewar, on one man, Moltke, his subordinates appeared innocent of theguilt of
the defeaL114To maintain this fiction in the highly charged political environment of
Weimar Germany, everything connected with Schlieffen eventually grew in
significance, while everything to do with his successor became tainted with his
failure. In 1921 the Generalstabsverein Graf Schlieffen (General Staff Society Graf
Schlieffen) was even established to perpetuate the teachings of the sixth Chief of
the General Staff.lIS
The establishment of the Generalstabsverein Graf Schlieffen coincided with
the re-training of the Reichswehr. The General Staff officers who survived the
dissolution of the Kaiserheer began teaching the Reichszvehr in the art of
Bewegungskrieg as ameans of purging the bad habits of trench warfare and as away
of avoiding the reappearance of attritional trench warfare in a future war.
116
To do
this, they used examples from the teachings of asoldier who was put forward as the
one who would have led Germany to victory in 1914-Schlieffen.
117
That his hapless
successor had done just as much, if not more, to prepare the Kaiserheer to fight awar
of movement was conveniently forgotten. With the German army archives destroyed,
historians have largely accepted this negative interpretation of Moltke the Younger
until his long-hidden tactical-strategic problems resurfaced three-quarters of a
century later permitting its re-examination.
114. MOlnbauer, Moltke, 2-6; Wallach, Dogma, 87-93.
115. 'Satzungen der Vereins der Angehorigen des ehemaligen Generalstabes', 22 February 1921; and
'Bericht tiber die erste ZusammenklU1st der VereiniglU1g Graf Schlieffen', 16 March 1921, in N512/14,
Nachlass Wilhelm Dommes, BA/MA.
116. For example, see the staff problelns in N35/18, 'Militarisches AusbildlU1gsmaterial, 1922', Nachlass
Hans von Haeften, BA/MA, which clearly shows the difficulty in purging the 'bad habits' of trench
warfare from the jmuor officer corps of the Reichswehr.
117. 'Taktische UblU1gsal1fgaben und Studien vom Generalstabsverein Graf Schlieffen', W10/50164,
BA/MA.