Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ARTICLE XI
SALUMBIDES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANG. R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010
Carpio Morales, J.:
Doctrine:
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
ofoffice. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. Whenthe people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with knowledge of hislife and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had beenguilty of any.
Facts:
Salumbides and Glenda who were both appointed in July 2001 as Municipal
LegalOfficer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively of Tagkawayan,
Quezon, andMayor Vicente Salumbides III were administratively charged with with
Dishonesty, GraveMisconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, andviolation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the
Local Government Code.This is with regards to the construction of a two-classroom
building with fence for theTagkawayan Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public
school in the poblacion area wouldno longer admit high school freshmen starting school
year 2002-2003. This was done withoutany approved appropriation and ahead of the
public bidding. The Office of the Ombudsmandropped the mayor and Coleta, both
elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case,the 2004 elections having
mooted the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Condonation shall expand to cover coterminous
appointiveofficials who were administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authoritywith infractions allegedly committed during their preceding
term.
Ruling:
No. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the
extent of cuttingoff the right to remove him therefor. Election expresses the sovereign
will of the people. Underthe principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a
public official may, indeed,supersede a pending administrative case.The same cannot be
said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. Substantial distinctionsclearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
byvirtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and maybe removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officialshold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Someappointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenurewhile others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
ARTICLE XII
Section 11. Public Utilities:Francisco vs. TRB, G.R. No. 166910, Oct. 19, 2010
Facts: In 1977, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1112, authorizing the establishment of toll
facilities on public improvements. Itacknowledged the huge financial requirements and
the need to tap into the resources of the private sector to implement the program.In order
to attract the private sector, P.D. 1112 created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and
allowed the collection of toll fees for theuse of certain public improvements, allowing a
reasonable rate of ROI. P.D.1113 was also issued, granting to PNCC a franchise
toconstruct toll facilities with a right to collect fees as the TRB may fix. TRB and PNCC
signed an agreement for the operation of theexpressway. In 1983, PNCC was granted a
franchise over MMEX. As stated in the previous P.D.s. PNCC may sell its franchise
uponthe Presidents approval, then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise
provision. Petitioners assail the constitutionality ofSections 3 (a) and (d) of P.D. 1112 in
relation to Section 8 (b) of P.D. 1894 insofar as they vested the TRB, on one hand,toll
operationawarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also the power to issue,
modify and promulgate toll rate charges. The TRB, sopetitioners bemoan, cannot be an
awarding party of a TOA and, at the same time, be the regulator of the toll way industry
and anadjudicator of rate exactions disputes.
Issue: Is the authority to grant public utility franchise an exclusive legislative power? Can
it be delegated? Is a congressionalfranchise necessary before a public utility may operate?
Ruling: A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person,
which includes not only authorizations issuingdirectly from Congress in the form of
statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant
franchisehas been delegated by Congress. The power to authorize and control a public
utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from theLegislature. Any suggestion,
however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less
than accurate. Asstressed in Albano v. Reyes, there is nothing in the Constitution
remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise beforeeach and every
public utility may operate. That the Constitution provides that the issuance of a franchise,
certificate or other form ofauthorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does notnecessarily imply that
only Congress has the power to grant such authorization. In such a case, therefore, a
special franchise directlyemanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already
specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or toaward a contract.
Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility
franchise. However, it mayvalidly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities tosome
administrative agencies.