NEW DELH SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 27, 2014

P
rime Minister Modi has catapulted for-
eign policy or external relations, to
be more precise centre stage in a man-
ner not seen since the heady days of
Pt Nehru, when the nations diplomatic
machine acquired its reputation of a pen-
chant for punching above its weight.
Every foreign interaction of his has evoked
unprecedented public enthusiasm and
pride, the last two with China and Japan
in particular. The commentariat have
been compelled to concede the recent fore-
grounding of Indias strategic salience
internationally.
So far so good. However, moving from
the mood of the moment to the needs of
the long-term, and from the individual
plane to that of institutions, a note of cau-
tion might be in order. Because the
wherewithal for translating the gains
from strategic diplomacy into tangible ben-
efits is not in place the institutional
capacities of the strategic policy and deci-
sion-making machinery in Government
are not great; not at all, in fact, in relation
to the likely demands on it now, as the
country shifts to high gear in its engage-
ment with major powers.
B-schools posit a strategic manage-
ment function in case of the modern-day
firm to address its vital vulnerabilities and
opportunities lurking over the horizon.
Tasks of a cross-cutting or structural
nature that cannot be left to (even senior-
most managers in) line departments with
tunnel visions limited to their turf and are
therefore, defined as a domain in itself,
directly under top management. The fact
that there is no corresponding term for it
in the government even the vague terms
higher management, or systems
approach, are no longer much in vogue
speaks for itself in this regard.
This is an aspect that will be central
to the forthcoming interaction with the
remaining big players in the power
quadropole on the Asia-Pacific strategic
landscape, the weightiest of them all with
its own middle kingdom complex no less
than the original. The formidable institu-
tional strengths of the US Administration
(with forbidding complexities in its sys-
temic norms, control mechanisms and
procedures), and proclivity to have them
prevail on the other side, will be a new ele-
ment to be contended with. For it will be
engagement with USA Inc., and not
straightforward geo-politics, that will be
the primary driver here, with associated
vexatious demands for boldly opening
up the economy (and undertaking sys-
temic reform) in accordance with its
preferences (rather than Indian priorities)
in play and only individuals unbacked
by institutional capacities on the Indian
side batting against the pace bowling.
Comprehensive and fundamental
refurbishing, going far beyond the basic
toning up of bureaucracy already initiat-
ed (and aimed at shaking it out of its set
ways and making organisational/man-
agement innovation and synergy a pal-
pable reality, not mere bookish buzz-
words) nothing short of governance
reform 2.0, in other words is, of
course, what is called for. It can be
argued that that is a tall order, inappositely
conflated with foreign interactions. Be that
as it may, the point is that a beginning has
to be made somewhere unless one opts
for an all or nothing approach. The
strategic establishment, especially the
security related sections and those over-
looking the eco-system germane to eco-
nomic diplomacy (which, like others in
GOI, are known to function in silos in a
timeless world), are appropriate candidates
for the kick off. And if it has to be trig-
gered by the imperatives of external
strategic engagement, so be it.
Only a few aspects can be highlight-
ed in this first piece.
Strategising is no one-off exercise
the real work begins after media glare and
blare have faded away. When the baton
is handed over by the individual (leader)
to the institutions under his direction,
which is where systemic inertia and com-
placency tend to set in frequently. Often
under the mistaken assumption that all
that needed to be done had been done (and
reflected in the understandings arrived at
between the leaders). Without need for
reinforcement or rear guard action sub-
sequently at bureaucratic levels, to guard
against foot dragging at these levels, in fol-
low through negotiations, with a view to
price extraction or backtracking or what-
ever. And to bolster the concrete content
of the understandings (couched invariably,
of necessity, in lofty but ambiguous terms).
The importance of follow up action
(on high-level understandings and com-
mitments), the bane of the Indian system,
cannot be overstated. Every Indian
Ambassador has a fund of sob stories to
tell, each more glaring than the other. Not
to mention those of outsiders, with their
higher standards and expectations.
Then the question of quality. Inter-
Ministerial institutional capacity for draw-
ing all strands of the issue at hand togeth-
er and weaving them into a coherent whole
will have to be developed, and demon-
strated, to shed the current image of poros-
ity of the decision-making structures,
which invites pressures and lobbying.
The capacity to ensure that overall con-
siderations, and not sectional interests,
drive and determine decisions. And aim
for optimal outcomes, instead of satis-
ficing with sub-optimal ones.
For example, in the case of China, the
foremost challenge will be to prevent the
industrial parks idea from becoming a
panacea for alleviating the trade deficit.
And to ensure that it results in augmen-
tation, and not weakening (or wiping
away), of existing manufacturing capaci-
ty in the SME sector, above all. (Besides
maintaining a permanent watchful eye on
the security front, mindful of the (sys-
temic) asymmetry in-built in India open-
ing up to Chinese investment because of
its being state controlled on their side.)
Development of capacity for effective
monitoring of the impact of the proposed
industrial parks on the economy in that
wider sense i.e. on manufacturing com-
petitiveness (and market penetration at the
Indian end and market access at the
Chinese end), as well as tracking the net
flows of foreign exchange they generate
(with the secondary and tertiary loops fac-
tored in) would be a daunting but emi-
nently doable task. As also evolution of a
phased approach, limiting investment in
these parks initially to sectors in which
Chinese industry is in the process of vacat-
ing due to high labour intensity and costs
(or has an acknowledged lead or superi-
ority technologically or marketing wise)
and prohibiting it in those in which
Indian industry is still fledgling (or in a
consolidation phase and not yet in a posi-
tion to withstand competition) or restrict-
ing it to technological upgradation/mod-
ernisation of existing units. Evolving an
appropriate policy design, as above, could
perhaps form part of the remit of the
revamped Planning Commission to be,
which could also be mandated to make
strategic assessments of (the actual unfold-
ing of) such initiatives (offering opportu-
nity but also risks) periodically to enable
mid-course corrections to well inten-
tioned starts gone astray.
Another, a more basic one, is the need
to overcome the most fundamental non-
tariff barrier of all lack of felicity in the
Chinese language that comes in the way
of purposive interaction between the two
nations in all fields, including political. The
handicaps of having to depend on the
interlocutors interpreters unfamiliar with
thinking and the larger setting at ones own
end should need no elaboration. It is, at
minimum, a recipe for making certain that
only an overall flavour of ones articulation
goes through to the other side, with
nuances falling by the wayside. Thus, we
have no way of knowing what exactly was
put to the Chinese President, with regard
to the message the PM sought to convey
on the sensitive boundary and border
issues, in the absence of a practice of (for-
mally recording) reverse translations (of
the Chinese interpreters remarks). It is not
clear if the MEA has any such standard
operating procedures in place for high-
level diplomatic interactions. It would
seem not, going by the visibility of Chinese
interpreters (and absence of Indian ones)
from the visuals of the Chinese Presidents
visit and judging by some stray indications
(from actual translations heard in video
footage casually). And, most tellingly, from
Hindi versions of English documents and
vice versa (including in this visit), which
betray no finesse.
A related aspect is the question of thor-
oughness in follow up media monitoring
of coverage of the interaction (with all for-
eign leaders) to facilitate understanding of
matters in proper perspective. How the
visit is projected by the Chinese leadership
back home, for instance, to their own peo-
ple in their domestic media (as distinct
from the projections in their English lan-
guage media, which have little validity for
they are made for the benefit of the out-
side world), can obviously tell a lot about
their (real, as opposed to stated) approach
to India-China relations. Aspects of
speeches and statements highlighted to
their own citizenry, and aspects under-
played or omitted altogether, can be
extremely revealing of intent and think-
ing. In a State controlled media environ-
ment, the considerations and calculations
of the powers that be are embedded, nec-
essarily, in their projections to their
publics (both civil and military), and that
design can therefore easily be discerned at
our end if examined with a keen eye.
Yet there is no agency in the country
that undertakes such an exercise of
monitoring coverage of India in the
Chinese media comprehensively, with a
flair for nuance even temporarily dur-
ing high-level visits, let alone on an on-
going basis. This is a serious gap reflective
of the lackadaisical and intellectually lazy
way we do things in our country.
Monitoring of the domestic media of
the country of accreditation is standard
in diplomatic reporting but that, and
other similar work undertaken else-
where within Government, has, for obvi-
ous reasons, to remain confidential.
There is none in the public domain, and
that is a national shame. For all it
requires is a little money for hiring lan-
guage experts. Proposals for (funding of)
such an exercise (and others for intensi-
fying the non-official gaze on China) sub-
mitted by this writer languish, unac-
knowledged, in various quarters, both
official and academic. The Ministries of
External Affairs and Defence should
take it upon themselves to sponsor such
programmes in the interest of promoting
better informed public opinion which, in
turn, will be conducive for greater stability
in India-China relations (without offi-
cialdom itself having to go on the defen-
sive from time to time, as at present). Else
the relationship will continue to be vul-
nerable to shrill calumny in an age of the
digital media prone to marking meaning
in debates in decibels dished out on the
basis of dubious information.
Other aspects of the current national
strategic scenario will be mused upon in
coming columns. This one concludes
with the hope that all spokespersons
(especially self-styled ones outside the for-
mal set-up) would bear in mind that the
big idea in India-US relations is geo-eco-
nomics (enticing entrepreneurial energies
in the two countries for realising the full
potential of the relationship, above all), not
geo-politics. Loose talk of alliances, etc,
becoming volubly defensive in front of the
camera at the slightest provocation, instead
of remaining responsibly reticent can
unwittingly undermine strategic orches-
tration of a considered narrative and do
immense disservice to the nation. The
power of understatement, and a sense of
reserve, for magnifying the kernel of a
proposition manifold, should be borne in
mind. And the national weakness for pre-
mature crowing, simplistically presuming
a lot and going overboard, overcome
sooner rather than later.
(The writer is former Ambassador of
India to the UN and other International
Organisations in Vienna, Austria, Ireland
and Vietnam. At present, he is Adjunct
Faculty, National Institute of Advanced
Studies, Bengaluru)
O
n September 21, 2014,
proving many analysts
wrong, Ashraf Ghani
and Abdullah Abdullah, the
two presidential candidates of
Afghanistan agreed to work
together. The build-up to the
final agreement was anything
but assuring. Weeks ago,
Abdullah had threatened to
walk out of the power-sharing
talks. Ghani had agreed to vir-
tually everything Abdullah had
asked for; even then, the final
disagreements over who would
chair the meetings of the cab-
inet seemed to upturn months
of efforts to bring the two
leaders together giving rise to
worrying signs regarding the
future of a country fraught with
uncertainties for decades now.
Finally, speculation has
come to a happy end.
Afghanistan is back on rails, or
so it seems, despite the char-
acterisation by foreign media
that tenuous path to joint
governance has started with
an awkward hug between
Ghani and Abdullah.
The Challenges Ahead:
Economic Woes
Having crossed the first
hurdle, there are a lot of issues
that are hanging fire for both
leaders to attend to. The eco-
nomic situation is alarming. So
much so that in the first week
of September, Afghan Finance
Minister Omar Zakhilwal
announced that he would not
be in a position to pay the secu-
rity forces their salaries by the
end of the month. For all prac-
tical purposes, the foreign
funds have started drying up
over the last two years and the
GDP growth rate has fallen
dramatically, for example from
15 per cent in 2012 to 4.2 per
cent in 2013.
In 2012, at the NATO
Chicago Summit, conserva-
tive estimates suggested that
Afghanistan would require at
least $4.1billion dollar per year
to keep its security forces
then 2,28,500 strong going.
Today, after the much-needed
surge in the face of Taliban
assertion, the Afghan force
level has reached 3,25,00 mark.
This comprises Afghan
National Army and Afghan
Police Force. Revised estimates
based on Chicago calculations
would suggest that Afghanistan
would at least require close to
$6bn alone for maintaining its
security force at the current
level, which many would argue
is utterly underpaid, under-
trained and under-equipped.
Assertive Taliban
Coming to the security
situation, the overall scenario
in the country is far from
comforting. The Taliban have
asserted itself in a big way. As
per reports based on leaks
from official sources, the
Taliban are getting their fire-
power and direction from
sources across the Durand
Line. There are fears that a
1996-like situation may soon
emerge where one might wit-
ness active role played by secu-
rity agents of the neighbouring
country dictating Taliban
offensive in Afghanistan.
The Taliban are reported-
ly dominant in 18 out of 34
provinces and are making fast
inroads into the north, tradi-
tionally dominated by non-
Pashtun ethnic groups. They
are determined to bring their
model of Islamic rule to
Afghanistan. Their gaining
control over Helmand, infa-
mous for poppy cultivation, is
no good news for the Afghan
government.
The Drip from NATO
Against this backdrop, the
promise of financial support to
the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) by NATO is
quite assuring. In the recent
meeting at Wales on September
4-5, NATO members increased
annual aid to Afghanistan by
one billion dollars from $4.1
billion to $5.1 billion till 2017.
NATO also reportedly made
new commitments regarding
equipping and providing the
Afghan forces with modern
weapons and building the
Afghans air force. The contin-
ued presence of combat con-
tingent on Afghan soil was,
however, made conditional to
signing of the Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA).
Full financial responsibility
by 2024?
The NATO summit decla-
ration also held out several
warnings to the Afghan gov-
ernment. It made it clear that
the financial aid will flow till
2017 in its present shape, but
urged the Afghan Government
to continue and strengthen
efforts to fight corruption,
and to review the force struc-
ture and capabilities of the
ANSF to achieve a sufficient
and sustainable force. Citing
the commitments at Chicago,
the statement held that
Afghanistan should assume, no
later than 2024, full financial
responsibility for its own
security forces.
A lot will depend on the
will and capacity of the new
government taking over from
Karzai to bring about stability
and start engaging the interna-
tional community for invest-
ment in Afghanistans newly
discovered mineral sector.
China and India have already
expressed their interest. If peace
prevails, Afghanistan may be
able to do remarkably well in
the next five six years to be able
to earn enough revenue to sus-
tain itself, and throw off the
yoke of foreign dependency.
Stability, easier said
than done
However, bringing about
stability in Afghanistan is eas-
ier said than done. There are so
many issues to be resolved
before Afghanistan can attain
political stability. The most
important among them is the
issue of bringing about recon-
ciliation among disparate fight-
ing groups in Afghanistan.
They have their own agendas.
Despite the presence of a
3,25,00-strong national force,
almost each district has its
own regional or local strong-
man, an euphemism for war-
lords. Fear of an uncertain
future post-withdrawal
has made these forces even
more insecure and led them to
strengthen their private militias
in the event of possible civil war.
There are more worrying
signs of ethnic consolidation
taking place all over again in a
much more heightened form.
The show of strength by Tajik
forces in the capital during the
observation of the national
martyrs day marking the assas-
sination of legendary Tajik
leader Ahmad Shah Masood,
despite the appeals of Abdullah
and Amrullah Saleh, was a dis-
turbing reminder of the way
the security situation might
worsen. On that day, followers
of Abdullah went round the
city in open vans demonstrat-
ing their firepower and shoot-
ing in the air, and booed mem-
bers from the Ghani camp
when they came on the podi-
um to speak.
Ghani-Abdullah rap-
prochement a few days later
may be a good beginning. But
the ghosts may be stalking in
the dark still. In this context, it
is important to ask, can
Afghanistan turn over a new
leaf? True, the post-election rig-
marole sapped Afghan energies
and complicated matters. But
will Ghani-Abdullah duo be
able to work without hassles
and usher in a new dawn in
Afghanistan?
Task of tall order
Well, this is a task of very
tall order for a system trans-
planted in Afghanistan not
long ago. The process is still in
its infancy. Unlike the post-war
efforts, under the Marshall
plan, in Europe where it was
easier to sell western concepts
of rights, liberty and democ-
racy, in Afghanistan, even after
two presidential elections, the
process is still in its infancy.
Moreover, the centralising
impulses (to be distinguished
from centripetal pulls) of the
presidential system imposed in
hurry under the Bonn Process
has not been able to change the
existing power structures on
the ground. The state of
Afghanistan, right since its
inception, has been an overly
decentralised entity, with Kabul
exercising power when it must
but leaving the constituent
units tribal areas dominat-
ed by one group or other often
fighting among themselves
with lots of autonomy as it
deemed necessary to keep dis-
parate groups together.
It will befit Ghani and
Abdullah to quickly work on a
constitutional amendment to
make the system more decen-
tralised and federal in nature
and take the system to the peo-
ple outside Kabul, rather than
choosing to rule over the vast-
ly different areas with different
socio-cultural reflexes through
puppets or strongmen of
Kabuls choosing. Democratic
deficit has been at the root of
the present crisis in
Afghanistan. This can only be
addressed by making the sys-
tem at the local levels more rep-
resentative and autonomous.
The second biggest problem
worrying foreign donors and
investors is corruption, which
has to be addressed with sin-
cerity and determination. They
must also learn how to keep
their followers under check
for there is a larger fear of their
sectional interests trumping
national interest and adverse-
ly impacting Afghan future.
In their task to take the
process forward, Ghani-
Abdullah duo must also be
assisted by regional countries,
which should not look at
Afghanistan either as their
strategic backyard or as a bat-
tleground for their competing
interests. Countries having
maximum stake and influence
in Afghanistan Pakistan
and Iran have a major role
to play here. Given Pakistans
unreasoned fear of India, a
regional consensus is hard to
come by. Rather than helping
the process of a genuine rec-
onciliation, Pakistan has been
enabling forces acting against
consolidation of the process of
stabilisation in Kabul. This is a
major challenge that the new
Government in Kabul will have
to deal with, as much as its pre-
decessors did with little success.
Anyway, well begun, half
done. Perhaps the Afghan lead-
ers have taken their lessons
from the Iraqi experience.
From a functioning state with
sectarian harmony, Iraq today
is divided against itself. In
contrast, from being an anar-
chical society for long,
Afghanistan has shown some
promise of inter-ethnic har-
mony and the will to work
together as the two leaders
agreed in August this year
to preserve the achievements
of the dynamic democratic
experience of the past thirteen
years as a guiding principle in
the realisation of a national
reform programme. One only
hopes that the process will
chug on.
(The writer is Coordinator,
and Fellow, South Asia Centre,
IDSA, New Delhi)
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The power of
understatement, and a
sense of reserve, for
magnifying the kernel of a
proposition manifold,
should be borne in mind.
And the national
weakness for premature
crowing, simplistically
presuming a lot and going
overboard, overcome ~
sooner rather than later
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