e n e r g i ze - March 2012 - Page 32

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Eskom Di st r i but i on has exper i enced
s ubs t at i on s hut - downs caus ed by
spurious AC signals superimposed on the
substation's main DC supply. In one case,
commissioning staff mistakenly connected
a 230 V AC mains supply to the positive leg
of the DC supply. In another, an AC signal
was coupled to the DC circuitr y during
earth fault conditions on the HV network as
a result of irregularities with the substation
earthing. Both cases led to the complete
shutdown of the MV (secondar y-si de)
busbars at the affected substations, with
all HV/MV transformer MV circuit-breakers
tripping spuriously. Both incidents were
subsequently found to have been caused
by the same circuit of the specific type of
transformer protection scheme used.
The two incidents of maltripping due to
AC coupling onto DC circuits were found
to involve the same circuit in the same
type of transformer protection scheme
(see Fig. 1).
The circuit in Fig. 1 operates as follows:
I n t he event of a wi ndi ng over -
temperature condition on the power
t r ans f or mer, cont act A i n t he
t r ansf or mer i nt er f ace box cl oses,
ener gi zi ng t he coi l of t he al ar m
annunci ator (for purposes of l ocal
and remote indication) and the coil
of the winding temperature trip relay.
Not shown in Fig. 1, the pick-up of the
tripping relay causes the transformer's
MV (secondar y side) circuit-breaker to
be tripped.
T he wi ndi ng t emper at ur e t r i p i s
physi cal l y Anded wi th the cl osed
status of the MV circuit breaker and the
combined signal is wired to a binar y
input (BI1) of the numerical transformer
IED. Not shown in Fig. 1, BI1 starts a
sustained fault timer which if not de-
energised within 500 ms causes the
HV circuit-breaker to be tripped via the
master relay. The timer thus causes the
HV circuit-breaker to trip should the MV
circuit-breaker fail to trip.
The scheme makes provision to accept
a potential-free tripping contact from
an MV busbar protecti on scheme,
also operating BI1. BI1 is thus set to
immediately issue a trip command
to the transformer's MV circuit breaker
upon pick-up in addition to the time
delayed function indicated above.
The transformer IED in Fig. 1 is typical of
earl y numeri cal IEDs , featuri ng bi nar y
inputs with no intentional pick-up delay
(often termed debounce time) or power
frequency AC filtering. The circuitr y to BI1
features three wires into the substation yard:
K135 between the relay panel (RP) in the
control room and the transformer interface
box, and K137 and K157 between the
relay panel and the MV circuit-breaker.
Each of these cabled wires is seldom less
than 30 m long. In some large distribution
subst at i ons each wi r e may exceed
200 m in length.
C a se 1 : D ire c t c o u p lin g o f AC m a in s
su p p ly
A mul ti pl e ci rcui t-breaker tri p i nci dent
occur r ed due t o t he i nadv er t ent
connection of a 230 V AC mains supply
to the posi ti ve l eg (+55 V DC) of the
substati on DC suppl y vi a undetected
terminal block bridges in the tap change
drive of a new transformer. The MV circuit-
breakers of the three existing transformers,
protected by the scheme indicated in
Fig. 1, tripped immediately upon closure of
the AC supply miniature circuit-breaker. The
only flagging on the protection schemes
was a TRIP LED on the transformer IEDs.
A waveform recording from one of the
transformer IEDs is included as Fig. 2. Note
in particular the per formance of binar y
input BI1. The transformer's HV current (in
secondar y Amps) are included in Fig. 2
to view the pickup of BI1 in relation to the
power system frequency. The pick-up of
BI1 is not directly related to the transformer
currents, however.
C a se 2 : C a p a c itive ly c o u p le d AC sig n a l
d u rin g n e two rk fa u lt c o n d itio n s
A second incident occurred at a large
distribution substation that was equipped
with three 132/33 kV 40 MVA transformers.
The neutral points of the star-connected
132 kV windings were solidly earthed and
each contributed up to 1500 A of zero
sequence current to earth faults on the
HV supply network. The substation is of
a terraced desi gn wi th the HV busbar,
transformers and MV busbar all on different
terraces. A similar incident to that in case 1
occurred upon the incidence of a nearby
earth faul t on one of the 132 kV l i nes
feeding the substation. The transformer
IED exhibited transient pick-up of BI1 as
in Fig. 2, cycles 10 14, for the duration
of the HV line fault. It was subsequently
established that the earth mats of each of
the substation terraces were not bonded
to one another and that the armouring
Protection scheme maloperations due
to AC on the substation DC supply
by Stuart van Zyl, Eskom
Th is p a p e r d e sc rib e s two in c id e n ts in wh ic h sp u rio u s a lte rn a tin g c u rre n t (AC ) sig n a ls su p e rim p o se d o n a su b sta tio ns m a in d ire c t c u rre n t (D C )
su p p ly c a u se d p ro te c tio n sc h e m e s to m a lo p e ra te , trip p in g c irc u it-b re a ke rs. Two typ e te stin g sta n d a rd s, a re g io n a l sta n d a rd fro m th e U n ite d
K in g d o m a n d IEC 6 0 2 5 5 -2 2 -7 , a re d e sc rib e d wh ic h m a y b e u se d to ve rify th e im m u n ity o f p ro te c tio n c o m p o n e n ts a n d sc h e m e s to p o we r
fre q u e n c y AC in te rfe re n c e o n D C in p u ts.
Fig . 1: DC c irc uit susc e p tib le to o p e ra ting d ue to AC sup p ly c o up ling .
Fig . 2: Tra nsfo rm e r IED wa ve fo rm
re c o rd ing sho wing tra nsie nt p ic k-up o f
BI1 in the p re se nc e o f AC o n the DC sup p ly.
e n e r g i ze - March 2012 - Page 34
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
of cont r ol cabl es bet ween t he r el ay
house (on the transformer terrace) and
the HV and MV equipment formed the
only connections between the different
electrodes. Potential differences occurred
between the three sections of earth mat
during earth fault conditions on the HV
networ k ( wi th si gni fi cant faul t cur r ent
contribution from the transformer terrace).
This potential difference was capacitively
coupled to the substation DC supply via
the extensive network of control cables
from the relay house.
I nvesti gati on i nto the above i nci dents
found that the circuit ( Fig 1) presents the
following mechanism for spurious operation
in the presence of AC signals on the DC
supply: an AC source coupled to either
the positive or negative legs of the DC
system anywhere in the substation creates
a capaci ti ve l eakage current through
BI1; discharging via the capacitance-to-
earth of the control cables K135, K137
and K157. In these cases, the capacitive
current was sufficient to cause transient
pick-up of BI1 and gave rise to the tripping
of the transformer's MV circuit-breakers.
Each core of typi cal 4-, 12- and 19-
core control cables with 0,5 mm
2
wire,
have capacitances to earth of between
375 nF and 440 nF per kilometre [3,4].
For the transformers in case 1 and 2, wire
K135 from the transformer interface box
to the rel ay panel was approxi matel y
100 m long, whilst K137 and K157 from
the MV circuit-breaker mechanism box
to the relay panel were 125 m long. Wire
K135 thus presented an approxi mate
capaci tance to earth of 40 nF, whi l st
K137 and K157 together presented a
capacitance of approximately 100 nF.
Laborator y tests were undertaken on the
circuit in Fig. 1 with the three cabled wires
represented by non-polarised capacitors.
The transformer I ED' s Contact BI 1 was
seen t o exhi bi t t he behavi our shown
in Fig. 2, cycles 10 to 14, with a 59 V
AC vol t age sour ce appl i ed bet ween
K102 and the capacitor earth. The coil-
operated winding temperature trip relay
and alarm annunciator did not operate
in this condition, or when up to 350 V AC
was applied. The winding temperature
trip relay remained stable for an applied
voltage of 250 V AC with K135 modelled
as a 70 nF capacitor (approx 185 m of
wire) and K137/K157 a 130 nF capacitor
(350 m of wire), but operated intermittently
with K135 and K137/K157 modelled as 100
nF and 200 nF capacitors respectively.
The transformer IED's BI1 could be made
i mmune to transi ent operati on for AC
signals (tested up to 350 V AC, 200 nF
capacitance) by applying a 10 ms delay
on pick-up via programmable logic. This
would not have been sufficient for the
case presented i n Fi g. 2, however, as
the transformer IED experienced a 15 ms
pick-up of BI1 between cycles 9 and 10.
A technical instruction was subsequently
issued to the Eskom business to apply a
20 ms delay on pick-up on BI1 of all such
schemes/IEDs in service.
AC im m u n ity te stin g sta n d a rd s
The investigation into the above incidents
found there to be at least two type testing
standards for the verification of power
frequency AC immunity of protective relay
DC inputs:
A CEGB standard from England and
Wales, later incorporated in National
Grid Company Technical Specification
NGTS 3.24.15 I ssue 1 (2000) [4]. A
si mi l ar st andar d was adopt ed i n
Eskom standards NWS 1819 (1989)
andm ESKASAAO4 Rev 1 (1995) Section
5.6.5.2 [1, pp.58]; and
IEC 60255-22-7 published in 2003 [2].
The above standards test the immunity of
DC inputs to power frequency voltages
coupled via capacitors both in common
mode ( bet ween one t er mi nal of t he
equipment and earth) and in differential
mode (di rectl y across the i nput under
test). The incidents described in this paper
relate to inter ference in the differential
mode, and the common mode tests are
thus not discussed further. The differential
mode test set-up is indicated in Fig. 3. Test
parameters for the differential mode test
of IEC 60255-22-7 Class A, the highest test
specification as applicable to substations
with high fault levels (as opposed to the
low fault levels of Petersen Coil earthed
or isolated systems), and ESKASAAO4 are
indicated in Table 1.
Both testi ng standards requi re the AC
voltage to be applied and removed at a
zero crossing, in order to avoid unwanted
transients at turn on and turn off [2, pp.15].
The IEC test further requires that where the
DC input under test has a settable time
delay, the test shall be undertaken with the
delay set to its minimum value. If the test
is failed, then the delay is increased until
the test is passed. The final setting must be
recorded in the test report.
The equi pment under test passes the
power fr equency AC i mmuni ty test i f
no maloperation occurs during the test
duration: 10 s for IEC, 2 s for ESKASAAO4. To
date, few IEDs or coil-operated relays have
been declared compliant to IEC 60255-
22-7 by their suppliers. Note from Table 1
that the AC immunity test of ESKASAAO4
ver y cl osel y mi mi cs the AC/DC suppl y
mixing scenario encountered in Case 1.
The 100 nF coupling capacitor represents
approximately 250 m of cabled wire being
coupled to the DC input. The origin of
the IEC testing parameters: voltage and
coupling impedances, is not clear from
the testing standard.
R e la y c o m p lia n c e to AC im m u n ity te sts
A number of numeri cal IEDs and coi l -
oper at ed t r i ppi ng and cont r ol r el ays
wer e t est ed f or power f r equency AC
i mmuni t y as per Fi g. 3 and Tabl e 1.
The r esul ts ar e pr esented i n Tabl e 2.
Numer i cal I EDs wer e t est ed wi t h t he
settable debounce time and/or AC filters
in different states, indicated in brackets
after the Plant Description. The wattage of
the operating coil is indicated in the case
of coil operated relays. The fifth column in
Table 2 describes the maximum coupling
capaci tance at whi ch the equi pment
passes the ESKASAAO4 test: 250 V AC test
voltage. Column 6 indicates the cabled
wi r e l engt hs cor r espondi ng t o t hese
capacitances (assuming approximately
400 nF/km of wire). Numerical IED 1 in
Table 2 was the transformer IED in the two
case studies presented above. Relay 4
was the winding temperature trip relay.
It is to be noted how, with no input delay
(debounce ti me), the numeri cal IED i s
highly susceptible to maloperation due
to capacitively coupled AC signals. Relays
3 and 4 were subject to noisy contact
bounce during both AC immunity tests,
causing the entire relay to vibrate. The
Fig . 3: Se t-up fo r the d iffe re ntia l
m o d e AC im m unity te st.
St a nd a rd
VTe st
Vrms
C1
nF
C2
nF
R1

R2

IEC 60255-
22-7
150 100 100 100 100
ESKASAAO4 250 100 N/A N/A N/A
Ta b le 1: AC im m unity te st p a ra m e te rs.
Pla nt De sc rip t io n IEC ESK
Ma x C @
250V AC
Ca b le
le ng t h
1a Numerical IED (0 ms) Fail Fail 5 nF 12 m
1b Numerical IED (10 ms) Pass Pass 300 nF 800 m
2a Numerical IED (Filter off) Pass Pass 150 nF 400 m
2b Numerical IED (Filter on) Pass Pass >800 nF >2100 m
3 10-pin auxiliary relay (1,2 W coil) Fail Fail 15 nF 40 m
4 Self-reset tripping relay (3,2 W coil) Fail Pass 110 nF 270 m
5 Self-reset tripping relay (25 W coil) Pass Pass 570 nF 1500 m
6 Latching relay (6 W coil) Pass Pass 230 nF 600 m
7 Latching relay (12 W coil) Pass Pass 360 nF 900 m
Ta b le 2: Re sults o f AC im m unity te sts o n a sa m p le o f p ro te c tive re la ys.
e n e r g i ze - March 2012 - Page 35
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
results from Table 2, suggest that the IEC
and ESK tests for power frequency AC
immunity are functionally ver y similar. This
is supported by theoretical calculations
which indicate that for a DC input/coil
impedance of 20 k (typical of numerical
IED binar y inputs), the test currents from
the above tests are similar in magnitude;
similarly the test voltages. With a 4 k
impedance (typical of a coil operated
relay), the test currents and voltages across
the input are some 20% higher in the IEC
test than with ESK. This explains why Relay
4 in Table 2 passed the ESK test, but failed
the IEC test. Relay 4 was seen to fail the ESK
test when the coupling capacitance was
increased from 100 nF to 110 nF.
I t must be not ed t hat al t hough t he
numer i cal I ED i n 1b passed both AC
immunity tests, it would have maloperated
in the practical case presented in Fig. 2.
This is due to the switching transient that
occurred in practice, but which is expressly
excluded from the testing standards (via
the requirement for switch on/off at zero
crossings). The AC immunity tests are thus
unable to guarantee relay stability in the
transient period immediately following AC
and DC supply mixing. Columns 5 and 6
in Table 2 indicate the maximum amount
of cabled wire that can be connected to
each DC input such that the input remains
immune to direct coupling of symmetrical
250 V AC onto the DC supply. The relays in
the test sample, all except relays 1 and 3,
can be connected to significant lengths of
wire cabling without fear of maloperation
due to stray power frequency voltages on
the DC supply. It must be noted, however,
that even this level of immunity may not
be sufficient in all applications. A high
impedance bus zone protection scheme
using zone selection via isolator auxiliar y
contacts is one example where a large
number of relatively long cables may be
coupled to one or a limited number of
tripping relays. Relay 6 which has been
used in such applications for Eskom, may
not have sufficient AC immunity despite
passing both the IEC and ESK tests.
In flu e n c e o f c irc u it d e sig n o n a c im m u n ity
o f re la ys
The relays from Table 2 were used in an
investigation on the effect of common
control circuit design practices on the AC
immunity of relays: installation of a diode
in series with the input or a shunt positive
temperature co-effi ci ent (PTC) resi stor
(or thermistor) across the input. Refer to
Table 3.
The dramatic effect of the shunt PTC on
the power frequency AC i mmuni ty of
binar y inputs and coiloperated relays was
unexpected given that the component was
added to satisfy a different test requirement.
This was found to be due to the PTC having
a rel ati vel y l ow resi stance at ambi ent
temperature (usually between 300 and
700 ) and that the coupling capacitor
thus represents the dominant impedance
in the test circuit, limiting the AC current to
the milli-Amp range. The PTC can sustain this
test current for long periods without heating
up towards i ts cut-off threshol d where
it effectively becomes open circuited.
The binar y input or operating coil that is
shunted by the PTC has an impedance
in the k or tens of k range, and most
of the AC test current is shunted by the
PTC. The manufacturer of relays 4, 6 and
7 in Table 2 has released a range of coil-
operated tri ppi ng- and l atchi ng rel ays
featuring PTCs across their operating coils.
The documentation suggests that the PTCs
were added to provide for immunity to
capacitive discharge current. In practice,
the PTCs also provide the relays with a
significantly increased level of immunity to
capacitively coupled AC signals. Results
indicated in Table 2 are quoted for models
of relays without PTCs installed.The tests in
Table 3 suggest that series diodes tend
to increase the level of AC immunity of a
specific relay, but may not be sufficient
to prevent nuisance operations. Where
used, the circuit design must be such as
to provide a discharge path for the cable
capacitance so as not to leave this in
a charged state, potentially causing an
electric shock to maintenance staff.
C o n c lu sio n
It is strongly recommended that design
engineers specify- and test their protection
schemes to one of the avai l abl e AC
immunity standards. For complex circuits
involving interfaces to a number of cabled
wi res (e.g. Fi g. 1 or bus zone tri ppi ng
circuits), each wire may be represented
by an equi val ent capaci t ance- t o-
earth rather than the fixed values of the
testi ng standards. Notwi thstandi ng thi s
previous recommendation, the existing
test standar ds do not pr ovi de a fi r m
guarantee of immunity to all AC signals
that may occur on DC systems, especially
in the case of direct AC/DC mixing. This is
because the test methods expressly seek to
avoid supply transients on the application
of the AC test signal, while transients may
occur in practical applications. To this
end, commissioning and maintenance
per sonnel must t ake t he necessar y
precautions to avoid the occurrence of
inadvertent coupling of mains AC and
substation DC supplies. Protection scheme
DC circuits can achieve a higher level
of immunity to AC signals by limiting the
number and length of cabled wiring that is
interfaced with a single input or operating
coil. Physical logic combinations achieved
by wi ri ng di stant contacts i n seri es or
parallel (e.g. the winding temperature trip
And MV circuit-breaker closed logic of
Fig. 1) are better achieved by supplying
each contact into a separate binar y input
and logically combining them within the
IED. The application of shunt PTCs across
I ED i nput s and r el ay oper at i ng coi l s,
typically to provide for immunity against
capacitor discharge, tends to provide a
high level of immunity to maloperation due
to capacitively coupled AC signals. Some
manufacturers of coi l -operated rel ays
offer transient performance variants with
shunt PTCs factor y-fitted internally to the
relays, and type tested as a single unit.
Such variants should be used in tripping
applications in preference to their more
AC-susceptible predecessors.
Ac kn o wle d g e m e n t
T hi s paper was pr es ent ed at t he
Southern African Power System Protection
Conference, Johannesburg November
2010, and is reprinted with permission
R e fe re n c e s
[1] Eskom standard, ESKASAAO4 Rev.1 (1995):
Standard for electronic protection and fault
monitoring equipment for power systems.
[2] IEC 60255-22-7 (2003), Electrical relays Part
22- 7: Electrical disturbance tests for measuring
relays and protection equipment Power
frequency immunity tests.
[3] LV control cable information downloaded from
www.aberdare.co.za/ and www.africancables.
com/.
[4] AREVA Analysis of Power Systems Protection
Course Notes: Volume 5 Section 11 Type Testing
of Protective Equipment. 7 Mar 18 Apr 2005,
Stafford, UK.
Contact Stuart van Zyl, Eskom,
Tel 012 421-4713,
stuart.vzyl@eskom.co.za
Ta b le 3: Effe c t o f c irc uit c o m p o ne nts o n AC im m unity o f DC inp uts.