S.M.

Amadae
Cold War, Security Dilemma, and Prisoners Dilemma:
Does Insecurity Rationalize Hegemony?
S.M. madae
p. 1 Introduction
p. 6 Thomas Schelling, Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack, and A!
p. 1" #uclear $se Theor% &#$Ts'
p. 1( )lenn S%nder*s 1+,1 *-risoner*s !ilemma* and ./hicken* odels in 0orld
International -olitics
p. 11 Ro2ert 3er4is* 1+,1 /ooperation under the Securit% !ilemma
p. 56 )lenn S%nder*s The Securit% !ilemma in Alliance -olitics
p. 51 3er4is* 5""1 0as the /old 0ar a Securit% !ilemma7
p. (5 3ohn earsheimer*s 5""1 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
p. (1 /onclusion
p. 8, T9: :#! ; <ooking Ahead
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
Cold War, Security Dilemma, and Prisoners Dilemma:
Does Insecurity Rationalize Hegemony?
One goal of my book (Rationalizing Hegemony) is to argue tat te !risoner"s
dilemma (!#) is a better model to $a%ture &ould'be %redators tan it is to study te
%roblem of $oo%eration. My goal in tis %a%er is to follo& a line of argumentation tat
suggests tat te no& multi'dis$i%linary norm of using te !# to model $oo%eration,
$olle$ti(e a$tion, and te so$ial $ontra$t as be$ome normali)ed troug te &ides%read
use of te !# to $a%ture te *old +ar se$urity dilemma. ,n international relations teory
&e see a &ell'arti$ulated argument tat a$tors &o %refer mutual $oo%eration o(er
unilateral su$$ess may get tra%%ed in a !risoner"s dilemma %urely by te ne$essity of
self'defense. , argue tat tere are t&o main a(enues by &i$ it is asserted tat o%eful
$oo%erators be$ome mired in a !risoner"s dilemma- distrust, or te un$ertainty of te
oter, and an antagonisti$ a$$ount of se$urity tat stresses eiter mutually e.$lusi(e
&orld (isions, or $om%etion o(er %o&er and resour$es.
/(en toug it is $lear tat some *old +ar strategists eld a definite %referen$e
for unilateral (i$tory o(er te So(iet 0nion instead of a$$e%ting stalemate grounding te
strategy of 1Mutually2 Assured #estru$tion, , do not mean to %ro%ose tat any use of te
!risoner"s dilemma to model nu$lear brinkmansi% im%lies tat tose de%loying te
model &ere %ro%onents of egemony. 3ater , maintain tat te manner in &i$ it
be$ame routinely a$$e%ted tat te !risoner"s dilemma model best $a%tures te se$urity
dilemma of o%eful yet fearful $oo%erators as led us do&n a %at of a$$e%ting tat te
!# %referen$e %rofile e%itomi)es te %roblem of $oo%eration. 4is as $ontributed to
&at , refer to as 5!risoner"s dilemma %edagogy6- tea$ing tat te %risoners must
defe$t out of self'defense, &itout $learly em%asi)ing tat ea$ %risoner fa$es no
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
dilemma as ea$ o%es to su$ker te oter. 8en$e, te !risoner"s dilemma better
$a%tures a %roblem fa$ed by &ould'be %redators, or a den of tie(es, in &i$ ea$ agent
$onsistently as te goal of gaining unilateral ad(antage. ,t seems odd tat tis dilemma
of $ons%irators as $ome to re%resent te essen$e of routine $oo%eration in uman
so$iety.
1
4is $on$lusion may be &arranted. My %oint is only in $alling for te
arti$ulation tat te !risoner"s dilemma model assumes a %o%ulation of %redators, and not
a %o%ulation &ose %rimary goal is tat of mutual se$urity and $ommodious $o'e.isten$e.
,n $o(ering tis territory, and %osing a $allenge to te &ides%read use of te
!risoner"s dilemma to study $oo%eration, &e en$ounter t&o $onfusions tat are diffi$ult
to first e.%lain, and ten to set straigt. One %roblem is stri$tly logi$al- gi(en tat te
definition of a o%eful $oo%erator is se &o %refers $oo%eration to unilateral defe$tion
(**9#*), o& $an it be %ossible to assume tat te !risoner"s dilemma re%resents te
%roblem of $oo%eration as its agents stri$tly %refer unilateral defe$tion to mutual
$oo%eration (#*9**):
2
,ndeed, it is in %osing tis ;uestion tat &e be$ome immediately
$lear tat te a$$e%tan$e tat te !risoner"s dilemma $a%tures te %roblem of $oo%eration
%lays on a $ontradi$tion- allegedly o%eful $oo%erators a$tually %refer to gain at te
oter"s $ost. *oo%eration &ill be diffi$ult to a$ie(e if ea$ a$tor a$tually arbors te
o%e for sole gain. *ontem%orary teorists &o u%old tis line of argument su%%ose
tat it is $onsistent &it &estern liberal tougt insofar as te role of te state is to make
agreements binding (ia te $oer$i(e %o&er of enfor$ement.
7

1
Made e(ident in 8argrea(es 8ea% and <aroufakis" te.t book on game teory.
2
=rom te %oint of (ie& of te ro& %layer, te !risoner"s dilemma %referen$es are-
unilateral defe$tion> mutual $oo%eration> mutual defe$tion> unilateral $oo%eration>
#*9**9##9*#.
7
James ?u$anan, 3ussell 8ardin.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
A se$ond $onfusion is tat te !risoner"s dilemma re%resents te $lassi$ %roblem
of liberalism- o& to a$ie(e binding agreements. 4e state or Ae(iatan is introdu$ed
as te solution to te !risoner"s dilemma. 4us it is asserted tat traditional &estern
liberal tougt introdu$ed te $oer$i(e state to sol(e te !risoner"s dilemma tat
$ara$teri)es 4omas 8obbes" state of nature. 4erefore, in terms of te !risoner"s
dilemma, te a$$urate statement of te %roblem of $oo%eration is tat &ereas all agents
%refer sole use of a resour$e (Art Stein, 19B@), still tey seek $oo%eration as a se$ond
$oi$e in order to a(oid !areto inferior mutual defe$tion. 4e role of go(ernment is to
alter te %ayoffs su$ tat mutual $oo%eration be$omes e(ery agent"s first $oi$e. 4e
se$ond $onfusion is tat $lassi$ liberalism sol(es te %roblem of $oo%eration in te form
of a !#> altoug tis $onfusion is no& ram%ant, it is not absolute.
@
/lse&ere in tis
book , argue tat $lassi$ liberalism (ie&s $oo%eration as an assuran$e %roblem or Stag
8unt.
C
Of $ourse, in ,3 teory, te state $annot be introdu$ed to sol(e tis %roblem of
$oo%eration. Anar$y and self'el% $ara$teri)e te international system- ea$ state
must ultimately go'it'alone in te ig'stakes sur(i(al game of international se$urity.
4us it a%%ears tat tere is one $onsistent ta%estry of argumentation. 4e %roblem of
$oo%eration is te same in ,3 and domesti$ %oliti$al e$onomy. 4e solution of te state
to enfor$e agreements is not a(ailable in ,3, terefore, if $oo%eration is (ie&ed as a
!risoner"s dilemma, ten a$ie(ing $oo%eration %resents $onsiderable $allenges.
@
3ussell 8ardin $onsistently argues tat 8obbes" state of nature is a multi'%erson
!risoner"s dilemma> /d&ard M$*lennen %ro(ides an alternati(e reading of 8obbes.
C
4e Stag 8unt or assuran$e game as te follo&ing %referen$e ordering (for te ro&
%layer)- **9#*9##9*#.
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S.M. Amadae
,n my book , mobili)e t&o lines of atta$k on tis re%resentation of $oo%eration as
a !risoner"s dilemma s$enario tat better des$ribes as &ould'be %redation. One, &i$ ,
&ill not e.%lore in tis %a%er, is tat te Ae(iatan solution to te !risoner"s dilemma as
te means to reali)e te so$ial $ontra$t (8ardin D ?u$anan), rater tan refle$t
traditional +estern liberalism from 4omas 8obbes on&ards, instead re%resents a ne&
%iloso%y of go(ernment re;uiring a ma.imal se$urity state to monitor and treaten
san$tions on all transa$tions. , argue tat te use of te !risoner"s dilemma model to
moti(ate an argument for go(ernment makes a $lear de%arture from $lassi$ liberalism to
neoliberalism.
4e se$ond line of argument, &i$ is te %oint of tis $urrent %a%er, is o& te
%roblem of $oo%eration, or te se$urity dilemma, is misre%resented as a !risoner"s
dilemma. ,f tere is a $ogent argument tat mutual se$urity is a !risoner"s dilemma, it
&ill e.ist in international relations &i$ bot fa$es te $allenge of anar$y, and is
ty%i$ally regarded as a ig'stakes situation Eustifying a )ero'risk %oli$y for error. , &ill
%ro(ide a istori$ally delineated narrati(e of o& te reasoning tat te se$urity dilemma
is e;ui(alent to a !risoner"s dilemma de(elo%ed. 4is takes us troug 4omas
S$elling"s germinal 19F0 essay 54e 3e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k6 &i$
%resented te intelle$tual blue%rint for Mutually Assured #estru$tion (MA#). , ten
tou$ on te alternati(e %osition of Gu$lear 0se 4eory (G04s) tat ta$itly a$$e%ted te
im%ossibility of mutual se$urity and te ne$essary goal of unilateral (i$tory. , dis$uss
Hlenn Synder"s 19I1 5!# D *i$ken games in ,3,6 and is 19B@ 5Allian$es and te
Se$urity #ilemma.6 =ollo&ing tis is 3obert Jer(is"s 19IB, I9, and 2001 $ontributions
addressing te se$urity and !risoner"s dilemmas. ,n $on$lusion , &ill tou$ on
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
$ontem%orary analysis %resented by Jon Mearseimer 2001 Tragedy of Great Power
Politics.
4omas S$elling and MA#
#efense Se$retary 3obert M$Gamara"s re$onstitution of 0S nu$lear strategy
along te lines of assured destru$tion made is %ossible to re$ogni)e 4omas S$elling"s
$ontributions to &at &ould be$ome te %re(ailing $on$e%tual frame&ork for organi)ing
military $a%ability and %osture (Aa&ren$e =reedman, 271). S$elling"s essay,
5#i%loma$y of <iolen$e, in &i$ e dire$tly res%onds to M$Gamara"s 19F2 Ann Arbor
address, as &ell as 54e 3e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 and 5Sur%rise Atta$k and
#isarmament6 set fort is (ie& of te nu$lear stand'off as resembling a !risoner"s
dilemma situation, and is resolution of tis oter&ise mutually disastrous s$enario &it
te deterrent %oli$y of assured destru$tion.
F
S$elling initiates te $on(ention of analy)ing nu$lear brinkmansi% in terms of
te !risoner"s dilemma. 8e begins &it a Stag 8unt, or assuran$e game, for &i$
o(erlooks te ma.imin solution be$ause e su%%oses it &ould be readily soluable. 8e
a%%lies te model to a standoff bet&een a ome o&ner and a burglar, ea$ of &i$ &ant
a %ea$eable resolution &itout es$alation into a sooting in$ident. 8e introdu$es te idea
tat one is un$ertain about te %referen$es of te oter, &eter e similarly seeks a
%ea$eable solution or %refers to lea(e a(ing sot te ome o&ner, and similarly &orries
tat oter may guess one"s o&n intent in$orre$tly. S$elling introdu$es an B0J
likeliood tat one belie(es a %redator e.ists, and multi%les te $ardinal utility matri. of
is Stag 8unt by te anti$i%ated likeliood of ea$ a$t, and demonstrates tat te Stag
F
4e first essay is in Arms and Influence, te se$ond t&o in The Strategy of Conflict
(19F0).
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
8unt transforms into a !risoner"s dilemma in &i$ it is in ea$ a$tor"s ad(antage to
defe$t.
S$elling is $onsidered to be te $ief ar$ite$t of mutually assured destru$tion.
8e a%%lied te reasoning of te ome burglar standoff to te nu$lear standoff, and
reasoned tat te &ay to a$ie(e mutual $oo%eration instead of mutual defe$tion in te
!risoner"s dilemma is troug introdu$ing mutually assured destru$tion- ea$ a$tor as
te $a%ability to destroy te oter e(en after e as been atta$ked. 8is assessment fits
&it 3obert M$Gamara"s idea of $a%%ing te 0nited States nu$lear arsenal at @00
megaton of e.%losi(e %otential, regarding tis as suffi$ient to a$ie(e a de(astating
$ounterstrike in $ase te So(iets laun$ed a %reem%ti(e atta$k.
=o$using on te ;uestion of &eter S$elling"s re%la$ement of a Stag 8unt
model &it a !risoner"s dilemma rationali)es egemony by suggesting tat %otentially
$oo%erati(e a$tors assume te %referen$es of a %redator in self'defense, it is $lear tat tis
is an im%li$ation of is &ork, altoug it is not $lear tat e $learly $onsidered tis
im%li$ation. ,t is %ossible to $on$lude tat S$elling rationali)es egemony by %ermitting
is status ;uo a$tors to assume te %referen$es of a re(isionist a$tor, &o $learly %refer to
su$ker te oter, and to a$ie(e unilateral su$$ess (#*9**). 8o&e(er, in (ie&ing te
use e %ut is analysis to, (indi$ating an argument for nu$lear deterren$e o(er an arms
ra$e, it is $lear tat e did not belie(e tat i tougt e.er$ise rationali)ed egemony.
8is %er$e%tion tat nu$lear &arfare altered &ar fore(er due to teir inerent destru$ti(e
$a%ability led im to see te *old +ar nu$lear standoff as a %osition of stalemate tat did
not offer eiter side te o%e for unilateral (i$tory.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
S$elling"s deterren$e solution to te !risoner"s dilemma game mimi$s te role of
te Ae(iatan in a nation'state- no a$tor &ill a(e te in$enti(e to tres%ass on or atta$k
anoter as te %uniti(e $onse;uen$es &ill be $ostly. 8is solution to te %roblem of
$oo%eration tat is modeled as a !risoner"s dilemma under te assum%tion tere is a
reasonable likeliood of %redators ser(es as te basis of neoliberal %oliti$al order. ,ts key
$ara$teristi$ is tat suffi$ient likeliood of te %resen$e of a %redator transforms all
agents into %redatory a$tors seeking dominan$e o(er oters. 4is ado%tion of te
%redile$tion for aggression is defended as ne$essary for self'defense.
8o&e(er, S$elling does not ade;uately defend is reasoning tat status ;uo
a$tors transformation into aggressors. ,n final analysis is argument remains un$lear. 8e
im%lies tat gi(en a status ;uo a$tor a ome o&ner in te burglary in$ident e des$ribes,
and tat te oter agent a$ted first by $oo%erating, tat te ome o&ner &o %re(iously
%referred resolution &itout (iolen$e, &ould soot te burglar as e left. ,f tis is not
&at S$elling im%lies in is analysis, ten te ado%tion of !risoner"s dilemma
%referen$es by status ;uo a$tors is misleading. ,f tis is &at S$elling meant, ten it
must be %ossible to argue tat a status ;uo a$tor %refers to $oo%erate &it oter status ;uo
a$tors, but tat if tat agent"s $ara$ter is suffi$iently in ;uestion, te status ;uo a$tor
%refers to subEugate a &ould'be %redator. ,t is un$lear &i$ S$elling ad in mind. 4e
first rendering $onfuses a Stag 8unt game &it a !risoner"s dilemma, and, as far as , $an
tell, remains %art of te state of te art reasoning tat in a situation of %otential
$oo%eration, e(en toug one is a $oo%erator, one must $eat in self'defense. 8ere
S$elling ignores tat %layers in a ig'stakes Stag 8unt a(e am%le reason to $oose te
ma.imin strategy. More(er, one $ould en(ision a situation in &i$ , fully a(e Stag
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
8unt %referen$es, but may dis$ern tat , am %laying against an agent &it %redatory !#
%referen$es, and terefore &ill reali)e , must defe$t in self'defense &itout ado%ting te
allmark !risoner"s dilemma ranking %ri(ileging unilateral su$$ess.
4us S$elling"s 53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 in arguing tat do(es
assume te %referen$es of a&ks, introdu$es an ongoing $onfusion into te literature on
te se$urity dilemma and $oo%eration. ?ot of tese literatures use retori$ tat
%resumes agents are status ;uo oriented, but must ado%t te %redator"s $ara$teristi$
%referen$e for unilateral su$$ess (#*9**). 4is im%li$ation of S$elling"s &ork,
enan$ed by is outrigt statement tat 3ousseau"s Stag 8unt is e;ui(alent to a
!risoner"s dilemma, and is insisten$e tat su$ !risoner"s dilemmas abound trougout
so$iety, as mired te literature on te so$ial $ontra$t, $olle$ti(e a$tion, and $oo%eration
in $onfusion lea(ing te o(erall im%ression tat 5agents %refer to be te sole user of a
$ommon resour$e6 (Art Stein, 19B@).
I
=ollo&ing S$elling it as been ty%i$al to %resume
tat te %roblem of a$ie(ing so$ial order is tat of resol(ing a multi'%arty !risoner"s
dilemma.
B
8o&e(er, S$elling"s fo$us &as more dire$ted at sol(ing te *old +ar
brinkmansi%. 8ere te $allenge seemed to be sol(ing te !risoner"s dilemma as te
tougest $ase for a$ie(ing $oo%eration. 8is solution of mutual deterren$e relies on
nu$lear &ea%ons being fore(er distin$t from $on(entional arms in offering uni;ue
retaliatory %o&er. Altoug S$elling definitely suggests tat status ;uo agents assume
te %referen$es of an aggressor, noneteless e stands by te idea tat in nu$lear &ar,
$old or ot, tere $an be no (i$tor. 4erefore agents" best out$ome is to a$$e%t a balan$e
of terror.
I
S$elling makes tese $laims in a 19F@ %a%er-
B
?u$anan, 19I@> 8ardin, 19B2> Hautier, 19BF.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
Gu$lear 0se 4eory (G04s)
S$elling"s o%%onents, 8erman Kan, Albert +olstetter, and !aul Git)e, &o
ad(o$ated Gu$lear 0se 4eory (G04s) similarly %er$ei(ed of te need to err on te side
of se$urity, but tey ado%ted a different solution to te nu$lear stand'off. 4ey belie(ed
tat S$elling"s neoliberal solution troug MA# signified te a$$e%tan$e of a stalemate.
4ey &ere un$omfortable &it a balan$e of terror as it ad too many limitations- te
irrationality of te deterren$e as an a$t of sui$idal des%eration, te la$k of any $oerent
%lan for te failure of deterren$e, and te $on$ern tat deterren$e &as %o&erless in lesser'
s$ale $onfli$t su$ as te <ietnam &ar. 4ey frontally $allenged te rationality of
S$elling"s strategy, tat guided 0S nu$lear %oli$y until te mid'19I0s breakdo&n of te
$onsensus on MA#, on numerous %oints. 4ey agreed &it S$elling tat un$ertainty is
$ru$ial to te %oli$y maker. 8o&e(er, instead of ado%ting is argument based on a
reasonable estimation of likelioods tat re;uired an B0J %robability tat tere be a
%redator, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es tolerated )ero'risk. 4us tey argued tat if an
atta$k &ere $on$ei(able, ten it re%resented a %ossibility of being a$tuated, and tat
terefore 0S %oli$y must be $onstru$ted to $ounter e(en te least likely &orst'$ase
s$enario. ,n tis $ase, tey argued tat te So(iet 0nion $ould dismantle te 0S"s
assured destru$ti(e $a%ability &it teir ability to dete$t submarines, and teir ea(y
missile to&'&eigt.
9

,n addition to te ado%tion of a )ero'risk %oli$y and te %ro%osal for arms build u%
be$ause assured destru$tion may fail in a &orst'$ase s$enario, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es
also reEe$ted te neoliberal stalemate %osition on *old +ar as a%%ro%riate. 4us, tey
$ountered S$elling"s mutually assured destru$tion &it a %lan for unilaterally assured
9
+ostetter> Git)e> 4eam ? re%ort.
June 1, 2009
11
S.M. Amadae
destru$tion. 4eir logi$ &as %robably as sound as &as tat of te MA# %ro%onents.
4eir %remise &as at if mutually assured destru$tion &ere %ossible, ten surely
unilaterally assured destru$tion, ensuring tat te So(iet 0nion alone &ould be %ressured
to $oo%erate, is also be %ossible. ,f an arms ra$e &ere ine(itable, ten it &as $ru$ial tat
te 0S &in it. Soring u% te &eakness of S$elling"s first translation of a se$urity
dilemma into a !risoner"s dilemma, and subse;uent transformation of te !# into a
$i$ken game (ia mutually assured destru$tion, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es &orried tat
tis $i$ken game style brinkmansi% signified tat te 0S &ould %refer in some
$ir$umstan$es to surrender to te So(iet 0nion rater tan $arry troug on te sui$idal
a$t of mutually assured destru$tion.
10
4erefore tey eld out te o%e for unilaterally
a%%lying %ressure on te So(iets to $oo%erate so tat te 0S $ould be (i$torious in te
*old +ar. *onsistent &it teir idea of a$ie(ing unilateral defe$tion or mutual
$oo%eration o(er unilateral $oo%eration, tey ado%ted a %ro'nu$lear use %oli$y to treaten
destru$tion for lesser a$ts of aggression on te @@ run ladder of es$alation, ultimately
oning in on a %oli$y of 5full s%e$trum dominan$e.6
11
4is &as offi$ially initiated as te
5S$lesinger do$trine,6 in 19I7 %ubli$ly announ$ing tat te 0S &ould use nu$lear
&ea%ons to $onfront a (ariety of a$ts of aggression temsel(es sort of nu$lear &ar.
12
4ere $an be no doubt tat te %roto'neo$onser(ati(e %osition &as one tat eld
out te o%e for (i$tory, reEe$ting S$elling"s stalemate. ,n se$ret do$uments
10
4is transferen$e of a !# into a $i$ken game of deterren$e is dis$ussed in an earlier
se$tion of my book. /ssentially te idea is tat mutually assured destru$tion $reates a
situation in &i$ ea$ $ountry &ould rater surrender or submit tan be anniilated, or
*#9##.
11
4is &as originally arti$ulated in 8erman Kan"s 19F0 On Thermonuclear War.
12
4ere &as an earlier %re$edent in te 19F7 S,O! %lan under M$Gamara, but te
intention to use nu$lear &ea%ons to retaliate for a nonnu$lear atta$k &as made %ubli$ in
19I7.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
$onser(ati(es argued trougout te *old +ar tat tere &as a fundamental
in$om%atability bet&een So(iet *ommunism and Ameri$an free enter%rise.
17
/a$ state
sougt for its (ision of te &orld and its instantiation to be dominant. 4erefore tere
&as %er%etual $onfli$t at all le(els on te es$alation ladder to se$ure unilateral su$$ess.
4e stalemate %essimism of assured destru$tion, and its relian$e on irrational treats, &as
re%la$ed by a bid for egemony tat &as billed as $onsistent &it liberal (alues of mutual
%ros%erity. 4e $ore idea is tat te 0nited States stands for fundamentally good (alues,
or at least (alues it trusts. ,t is better to stand as a sole su%er %o&er defending (alues one
regards as good tan to rest $ontent &it a balan$e of terror. Ge(er mind tat te %ursuit
of egemony &ould trigger te (ery s$enario tat S$elling feared- te re$i%ro$al fear of
sur%rise atta$k as te o%%osition &ould likely also u%old a %iloso%y for %re%aring for
te &orst'$ase, and &ould not feel se$ure e(en gi(en te assuran$es of one"s 5good guy6
intentions.
1@
Mutually assured destru$tion is an attem%t to re%li$ate $lassi$ liberalism"s
Ae(iatan by a$$e%ting tat distrustful %arties ea$ a(e te %o&er of deterren$e, tereby
in$enti(i)ing a$tors to $oo%erate. One diffi$ulty, tat te neo$onser(ati(es %i$k u% on, is
tat it may be diffi$ult to a$ie(e mutually off'setting deterren$e> if one agent %ulls
aead, it seems tat e &ill gain te unilateral ad(antage. /(en toug numerous
teorists tougt Mutually Assured #estru$tion su%erior to Gu$lear 0se 4eory be$ause
it eld out te best o%e for %ulling ba$k from te destru$ti(e $asm brinkmansi%
o%ened for a$tors to fall into, still its &eaknesses &ere roundly a$kno&ledged
(=reedman). Anoter &ay of stating te &eakness of neoliberalism"s mutual deterren$e is
17
4ere are numerous 0S statements to tis affe$t, notably Git)e"s 19C@ ($e$k) GS*'FB.
1@
=or dis$ussion, see 3obert Jer(is" Percetions and !isercetions.
June 1, 2009
17
S.M. Amadae
tat a$kno&ledge tat bargaining %o&er &ill be dire$tly linked to deterrent $a%ability, and
tat terefore ea$ side &ill a(e te $ontinual in$enti(e to sore u% its armed for$es to
retain te edge o(er te oter. 4e neo$onser(ati(e %osition merely a$kno&ledges tis
ine(itable fa$et of neoliberalism, and o%enly builds %oli$y a$$ordingly.
Synder"s 5"!risoner"s #ilemma" and L*i$ken" Models in +orld ,nternational !oliti$s6
4e %oint of re(ie&ing te %rominent arti$les on te se$urity dilemma is to re(eal
bot te e.tent to &i$ it be$ame a$$e%table to regard te !risoner"s dilemma model as
$a%turing te %roblem of o%eful $oo%erators &o are frustrated by teir inability to trust
ea$ oter, and its de%loyment to $a%ture te $ase in &i$ mutual se$urity is not
%ossible as one agent"s se$urity ne$essarily undermines anoter"s. ,n te !#"s
a%%li$ation to bot s$enarios a $ru$ial distin$tion bet&een %ea$e seeking and te %otential
for mutual se$urity (ersus aggression an antagonisti$ a$$ount of se$urity is lost.
+e $an be $onfident tat te !risoner"s dilemma &as &idely %er$ei(ed to refle$t
nu$lear brinkmansi% and te %roblem of un$ertainty in Synder"s 19I1 %a%er,
5"!risoner"s #ilemma" and L*i$ken" Models in ,nternational !oliti$s.6 Ainking
S$elling"s landmark 53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k6 to 3obert M$Gamara"s 19FI
assessment of 0nited States" nu$lear strategy, Snyder for$efully argues my tat te
!risoner"s dilemma model e.em%lified te ig'stakes *old +ar brinkmansi%.
1C
4ere
$an be no doubt tat te !risoner"s dilemma, tat no& is $ommon %arlan$e trougout te
so$ial s$ien$es, s%e$ifi$ally for studying $oo%eration, first %ro(ed its &ort for modeling
te nu$lear standoff and for %ro(iding te strategi$ logi$ underlying MA#. Muoting
1C
3obert Jer(is, 2001, agrees &it tis estimation of te im%ortan$e of S$elling"s
53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 autor $orre$ted footnote in email $orres%onden$e
dated NNN.
June 1, 2009
1@
S.M. Amadae
M$Gamara at lengt, Snyder $on(eys tat un$ertainty o(er te oter"s intentions is
suffi$ient to s%ark an arms ra$e-
,n 19F1, &en , be$ame Se$retary of #efense, te So(iet 0nion %ossessed a (ery
small o%erational arsenal of inter$ontinental missilesO1and (ery little
te$nologi$al and industrial $a%a$ity to augment teir military $a%ability.2
Go&, &e ad no e(iden$e tat te So(iets did in fa$t %lan to fully use tat
$a%ability. ?ut as , a(e %ointed out, a strategi$ %lanner must be 5$onser(ati(e6
in is $al$ulations> tat is, e must %re%are for te &orst %lausible $aseO
Sin$e &e $ould not be $ertain of So(iet intentionsPsin$e &e $ould not be sure
tat tey &ould not undertake a massi(e buildu%P&e ad to insure against su$
an e(entuality by undertaking oursel(es a maEor buildu% of te Minuteman and
!olaris for$esO
*learly, te So(iet buildu% is in %art a rea$tion to our o&n buildu% sin$e te
beginning of tis de$ade. So(iet strategi$ %lanners undoubtedly reasoned tat if
our buildu% &ere to $ontinue at its a$$elerated %a$e, &e migt $on$ei(ably rea$,
in time, a $redible first'strike $a%ability against te So(iet 0nion.
4is &as not in fa$t our intention. Our intention &as to assure tat teyP&it
teir teoreti$al $a%a$ity to rea$ su$ a first'strike $a%abilityP&ould not in fa$t
outdistan$e us.
?ut tey $ould not read our intentions &it any greater a$$ura$y tan &e $ould
read teirs. And tus te result as been tat &e a(e bot fuilt u% our for$es to a
%oint tat far e.$eeds a $redible se$ond'strike $a%ability against te for$es &e
ea$ started &itO
,t is futile for ea$ of us to s%end Q@ billion, Q@0 billion, or Q@00 billionPand at
te end of all te s%ending, at te end of all te de%loyment, and at te end of all
te effort, to be relati(ely at te same %oint of balan$e on te se$urity s$ale tat
&e are no&. (Synder, 19I1, I7).
Synder $on$ludes tat tis regrettable situation is best $a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma
model- 54us, te Se$retary of #efense, &it remarkable $larity, and in a tone &i$ $an
only be des$ribed as &istful frustration, e.%ounded te essen$e of te %risoner"s dilemma
in te nu$lear age6 (Synder, 19I1, I7). Synder a$kno&ledges tat tis state of frustration
June 1, 2009
1C
S.M. Amadae
is a$$om%anied by 5te belief tat one"s o&n $ountry is %ea$efulO1and tat2 one"s o&n
arms are only defensi(e rea$tions to te oter"s treat6 (IB).
4e 0S"s inter%retation of te *old +ar as ena$ted by M$Gamara and is staff
&as inse%arable from S$elling"s early game teoreti$ a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s
dilemma to nu$lear &ar and is solution of tis oter&ise mutually subo%timal situation
&it deterren$e in te form of se$ond'strike $ounter'$ity military $a%ability. S$elling"s
analysis a$$e%ted tat nu$lear &ea%ons fore(er altered &arfare as te destroyed nation
$ould guarantee itself te &ere&ital to laun$ a de(astating $ounter'atta$k on te
&ould'be (i$tor. An im%ortant $onse;uen$e of S$elling"s assertion tat te Stag 8unt of
mutual $oo%eration may degenerate into a !risoner"s dilemma gi(en a suffi$ient
likeliood tat te oter ad %redatory intent, and furter outrigt stating tat 3ousseau"s
Stag 8unt is a !risoner"s dilemma, is tat te t&o'fold no(elty of nu$lear &ar and its
solution in mutual deterren$e are lost. ,n fa$t, S$elling"s reasoning ;ui$kly be$ame
absorbed into te ne&ly de(elo%ing *old +ar $anon tat su%%osed tat liberalism ad
al&ays re;uired a solution to te !risoner"s dilemma in te form of a Ae(iatan &o
altered %ayoffs tus ensuring tat $oo%eration &ould be all %arties" first $oi$e.
Synder, follo&ing S$elling"s lead, asserted tat te se$urity dilemma &i$ is
%o%ulated by status ;uo agents seeking self'%reser(ation, but &o are aunted by te
s%e$tre tat te oter is seeking to get te u%%er and, is best $a%tured by a !risoner"s
dilemma- 5,t %ro(ides a more $om%lete %ortrayal of te $onse;uen$es of anar$i$ system
stru$ture be$ause it allo&s for te %ossibility of illusory $onfli$t engendered by mutual
sus%i$ion and fear and for te %ossibility of a$tual in$om%atibilities of interest and
aggressi(e intent not moti(ated by se$urity $onsiderations6 (B2). 4e $ore idea is tat
June 1, 2009
1F
S.M. Amadae
un$ertainty, &itout any a$tual %redatory intent, is suffi$ient to mimi$ a real
in$om%atability of interests. 0n$ertainty is e.%loited to $arry tis assessment be$ause &e
must a$kno&ledge tat ultimately it is im%ossible 5e(er to be sure of te oter %arty"s
intentions6 (I@). Aike S$elling, te se$urity dilemma is dri(en by te belief tat tere
may be a %redator> real $onfli$t may e.ist, and tis $onfli$t is beyond $on$erns of
se$urity. Synder, in o%ening u% te %roblem of oter minds and te im%ossibility of e(er
%eeking inside tem, %a(es te road for te %roto'neo$onser(ati(e %osition tat tis
unresol(able unkno&ability $an only be $ountered by %lanning for te &orst.
4us Synder, follo&ing in S$elling"s footste%s, (oi$es te essen$e of &at , refer
to as te !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy tat defends te %referen$e for unilateral su$$ess
in te name of self'defense- 5,n te !risoner"s dilemma, te reali)ation of te $ommon
interest may &ell be a %rimary desire of bot %arties, but neiter $an trust te oter to
$ollaborate in reali)ing it> against te &ill of te %arties, te situation degenerates into
$onfli$t6 (B@). Synder builds in, as did S$elling, tat un$ertainty rests on te diffi$ulty
of dis$erning &eter &ea%ons are designed for offense or defense. ,t &as &ell a$$e%ted
from M$Gamara on&ards tat it is less $ostly to build nu$lear &ea%ons tan it is to
defend against tem. 4erefore a nation de%loying a nu$lear arsenal for deterren$e may
be indistinguisable from a nation %lanning a sur%rise atta$k- 5defensi(e %o&er
a$$umulation by one &ill be %er$ei(ed as a treat by te oter6 (II). ,t &as tis
reasoning tat lead S$elling to em%asi)e te im%ortan$e of $ounter'$ity instead of
$ounterfor$e &ea%ons as te latter &ould a%%ear offensi(e. Still, gi(en te $ea%ness of
offensi(e $a%ability and un$ertainty about intention, Synder &orries tat se$urity'seekers
June 1, 2009
1I
S.M. Amadae
are tra%%ed in a 5grand su%ergame of te !risoner"s dilemma from &i$ tere is no real
es$a%e6 (II).
Synder suggests te %ossibility tat se$urity may a(e a )ero'sum $om%onent as
one state"s in$rease in se$urity may dire$tly detra$t from anoter"s. 8o&e(er, tis is not
&ere e rests te burden of is argument tat %ea$e seekers &ill be tra%%ed in a
!risoner"s dilemma &it little o%e for es$a%e. 8e assumes %ea$eful intent, te diffi$ulty
of differentiating offensi(e and defensi(e &ea%ons, and te im%ossibility of dis$erning
intent. 8e e.%lains tat te dri(ing for$e of te se$urity dilemma, modeled as a
!risoner"s dilemma, is te un$ertainty status ;uo a$tors a(e in determining te nature of
te oter %o&er-
4e se$urity dilemma idea $larifies te determining effe$ts of system stru$ture,
igligts te $entral im%ortan$e of te se$urity dri(e in international bea(ior,
and so&s o& te sear$ for se$urity $an be tragi$ally self'defeating. "ut it
does not em#race o#$ecti%es of ower and e&ansion which are not fueled #y the
security moti%e. (B2, em%asis added).
4us, Synder argues tat un$ertainty alone, &itout te a$tual %resen$e of a state &it
e.%ansionist goals, is suffi$ient to dri(e te se$urity dilemma tat e e.%lains is best
$a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma model. ,n fo$using on un$ertainty, Synder seems to
miss tat, as S$elling s%e$ifies, te %oint is in $ombating some likeliood tat a
aggressi(e state e.ists. Synder is not able to e.%lain o& a %ea$e seeker $ara$teri)ed by
a %referen$e order of ** 9 #* $omes to a(e te #* 9 ** %referen$e %rofile of a
re(isionist state. 4e no& routine e.%lanation of te !risoner"s dilemma follo&s Synder
in su%%osing tat a %ea$e seeker &ill ado%t a %referen$e for unilateral su$$ess as a
$onse;uen$e of un$ertainty and distrust. 4ere are t&o stages in tis mo(ement from a
se$urity dilemma %o%ulated by do(es to one of a&ks. =irst, a a&k must be introdu$ed.
June 1, 2009
1B
S.M. Amadae
Se$ond, te do(e determines tat be$oming a a&k is te best means of self'defense.
Again, &it teir )ero'risk %oli$y, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es %ermitted tat any
likeliood, no matter o& slim, is suffi$ient to ne$essitate te a%%ro%riation of te
a&kis $ountenan$e. 4roug tis logi$, it be$omes %ossible to regard te !risoner"s
dilemma &it its me'first a$tors as de%i$ting a tragi$ $ir$umstan$e of t&o a$tors &o
really &ant to get along.
3obert Jer(is 19IB 5*oo%eration under te Se$urity #ilemma6
,n is 5*oo%eration under te Se$urity #ilemma,6 3obert Jer(is e$oes S$elling
in using 3ousseau"s Stag 8unt to refle$t te true moti(es of se$urity'seekers-
4e la$k of an international so(ereign not only %ermits &ars to o$$ur, but also
makes it diffi$ult for states tat are satisfied &it te status ;uo to arri(e at goals
tat tey re$ogni)e as being in teir $ommon interest. ?e$ause tere are no
institutions or autorities tat $an make and enfor$e international la&s, te
%oli$ies of $oo%eration tat &ill bring mutual re&ards if oters $oo%erate may
bring disaster if tey do not. (19IB, 1FI).
Jer(is"s analogy is e.%li$it. 8e refers to te Stag 8unt, &it te follo&ing %referen$e
ordering-
(1) $oo%erate and tra% te stag (te international analogue being $oo%eration and
disarmament> (2) $ase a rabbit &ile oters remain at teir %osts (maintain a ig
le(el of arms &ile oters are disarmed)> (7) all $ase rabbits (arms $om%etition
and ig risk of &ar)> and (@) stay at original %osition &ile anoter $ases a
rabbit (being disarmed &ile oters are armed). (1FI).
+itin a fe& %ages, Jer(is introdu$es te !risoner"s dilemma %ayoff matri. as %era%s
more a%t to international relations as 5tere are offensi(e as &ell as defensi(e in$enti(es
to defe$t from te $oalition &it te oters6 (1I1). Altoug Jer(is does not s%e$ify &at
te $ardinal utility (alues in te %ayoff matri. stand for in is !risoner"s dilemma
rendering of te se$urity dilemma (again %o%ulated &it se$urity seekers), e adds
$onsiderations beyond tose of Synder and S$elling"s un$ertainty. 4oday"s do(e may
June 1, 2009
19
S.M. Amadae
be$ome tomorro&"s a&k, but ere te a$ti(e %oint of e(aluation is not made $lear. ,s it
tat unting stag and Eointly %ros%ering may lead te oter to find a &ay to unt stag
alone at te same time tat one forgets o& to unt are: Or may states" interde%enden$e
lead one state to 5$ontrol resour$es or land outside teir o&n territory6 (1FB). 8o&e(er,
in tis latter reasoning it is un$lear if te main idea is tat tere are no %ure se$urity
seekers gi(en a need to $ommand s$ar$e resour$es in $om%etition &it oters, tereby
rendering te Stag 8unt meta%or and %ayoff matri. meaningless. 8en$e, %era%s in
5international %oliti$sOone"s state"s gain in se$urity often inad(ertently treatens oters6
(1I0). 8ere it remains un$lear &eter Jer(is means to im%ly tat international se$urity
ne$essarily or %ossibly as a )ero'sum $om%onent.
Jer(is" %u))le is o& to a$ie(e mutual $oo%eration under te assum%tion tat
des%ite te abo(e $onsiderations, te nations fundamentally seek to get along. 8o&e(er
is introdu$tion of te !risoner"s dilemma &itout a $lear dis$ussion of &at its re&ard
stru$ture signifies, makes it un$lear o& te #*9** %referen$e $onfiguration signifies a
fundamental o%e for %ea$eful $oe.isten$e. Again falling into te !risoner"s dilemma
%edagogy of fo$using on fear and self'%rote$tion as te %rime mo(er, Jer(is obser(es,
54e fear of being e.%loited (tat is, te $ost of *#) most strongly dri(es te se$urity
dilemma6 (1I2). 0sing an e.am%le tat %ro(ides more e(iden$e tat te ea(y relian$e
on te !risoner"s dilemma to $a%ture te se$urity dilemma defined by o%eful
$oo%erators frustrated by distrust is ina%%ro%riate, Jer(is dis$usses te dilemma fa$ed by
&ite'skinned 3odesians &o ad to de$ide &eter to emigrate &it te introdu$tion
of a ne& go(ernment. A$$ording to Jer(is" analysis, 5&ites are in a multi'%erson
!risoner"s dilemma &it ea$ oter.6 8e e.%lains
June 1, 2009
20
S.M. Amadae
Assume tat all &ites are &illing to stay if most of te oters stay> but, in te
absen$e of guarantees, if tere is going to be a mass e.odus, all &ant to be among
te first to lea(e (be$ause late'lea(ers &ill get less for teir %ro%erty and &ill a(e
more trouble finding a $ountry to take tem in). (1I@)
4e diffi$ulty in a%%lying te !risoner"s dilemma to tis $ase, all te &ile a$tually
seeking to $a%ture a se$urity dilemma, is tat te ra$e to defe$t is defended by te
$onsideration of a(oiding a bad out$ome if one is te sole $oo%erator, or stag unter,
among are unters. 8o&e(er, and ere is te sleigt of and tat underlies !risoner"s
dilemma %edagogy, Jer(is im%lies tat ea$ agent &ould %refer tat all stayed in
3odesia, yet te !risoner"s dilemma %ayoff stru$ture olds tat ea$ agent"s first $oi$e
is to su$ker te oters by being te first to sell is %ro%erty and resettle. 8ere, as is often
te $ase &it te a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s dilemma to $a%ture %roblems of te so$ial
$ontra$t, $olle$ti(e a$tion, and $oo%eration, an assuran$e %roblem is $onflated &it a
!risoner"s dilemma. Often in large multi'%arty intera$tions ea$ %refers mutual
$oo%eration but la$ks any genuine assuran$e tat oters &ill not estimate tat defe$tion is
su%erior due to ma.imin reasoning guaranteeing te igest minimum %ayoff. 4is
$onsideration is suffi$ient to a%%raise Jer(is" 3odesian dilemma. 8o&e(er, in
transmuting te situation into a !risoner"s dilemma, e(en toug ea$ agent is su%%osed
to defe$t %urely out of self'defense, in fa$t a ne& moti(ation of unilateral su$$ess is
introdu$ed.
, do not mean to single out Jer(is as an international relations teorist &o %lainly
gets ;uestions of domesti$ $oo%eration &rong by a%%lying te !risoner"s dilemma in a
$onfused &ay. ,nstead , mean to demonstrate te ready transition from an analysis of
mutual se$urity seeking to te a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s dilemma model tat is
$ara$teri)ed by te o%e for indi(idual dominan$e. 4e *old +ar analysis of te
June 1, 2009
21
S.M. Amadae
se$urity dilemma ad as its allmark te a%%li$ation of te !# model to study
brinkmansi% as a dilemma of mutual distrust. 8o&e(er te model suggests ea$ is
dri(en by te o%e for dominan$e in addition to te fear of being su$kered. Of $ourse
one reason beind te default use of te !risoner"s dilemma game &as tat of sol(ing te
&orst'$ase s$enario, but tis &orst'$ase $ase &as tat of a$ie(ing $oo%eration among
aggressors. Stret$ing its narrati(e to suggest tat te a$ie(ement of $oo%eration is
%ossible in $ertain $ases &erein te introdu$tion of san$tions insures tat **9#* as
made it normal to bot a$$e%t tat $oo%eration troug te treat of san$tions re%resents
$lassi$ liberalism, and tat te default $ase tat must be sol(ed is tat of mutual
antagonism.
Jer(is" arti$le is no mere %edanti$ dis$ussion of te Stag 8unt (ersus !risoner"s
dilemma models of te international se$urity dilemma. Jer(is" %a%er %resents a staun$
defense of assured destru$tion in o%%osition to nu$lear use teory, $ounterfor$e strategy,
and arms ra$e. Jer(is" assum%tion of status ;uo states $augt in a se$urity dilemma best
re%resented by te !# game is a strategy of argument tat %ermits a&ks to entertain te
same line of reasoning- te !# is better e;ui%%ed to model a situation of mutual
antagonism, tus it may el% $onsider te best strategy for defeating a %redator assuming
one"s %rimary goal is to defeat tem. 8en$e, %resenting te se$urity dilemma in terms of
mutual $oo%eration among distrustful and $ary do(es $augt in a !risoner"s dilemma
seems to $o(er all e.igen$ies. Most im%ortantly it $o(ers te situation in &i$ a status
;uo seeking 0S is $onfronted by a %otentially belligerent So(iet 0nion. A side effe$t of
tis de%i$tion of te *old +ar &as to normali)e tat a defensi(e agent &ill ado%t te
&ays of an aggressor urely out of self'rotection. 5Me'first6 seems to flo& from te
June 1, 2009
22
S.M. Amadae
need to %rote$t oneself, gi(en tat one $annot trust oters, e(en as underneat tis
%referen$e tra%%ing, as S$elling originally suggests, one %er$ei(es of oneself as
%rimarily mo(ed by $oo%eration.
Jer(is" goal is to argue bot tat no one $an be te unilateral (i$tor of a nu$lear
&ar, tus tat offense is transformed into deterren$e (19B), and tat &ea%ons %rograms
$an be tailored to&ard identifying oneself as a $oo%erator instead of an aggressor. Jer(is
%oses a series of ;uestions about te $urrent state of brinkmansi%-
Are &ea%ons %ro$urements used as an inde. of resol(e: Must tey be so used: ,f
one side fails to res%ond to te oter"s buildu%, &ill it a%%ear &eak and tereby
in(ite %redation: *an bot sides simultaneously a(e images of ig resol(e or is
tere a )ero'sum element in(ol(ed: (199)
4e su%%osition of a )ero'sum element is ty%i$al of a !risoner"s dilemma game in &i$
one side definitely %ros%ers at te oter"s e.%ense. ,n fa$t, &ere it te $ase tat se$urity
did a(e a )ero'sum $om%onent, ten $lassi$ liberal teory &ould fail. Jer(is seems to
indi$ate is belief tat se$urity need not a(e a )ero'sum $om%onent, again suggesting
tat a Stag 8unt game is more a%%ro%riate to te se$urity dilemma tan te !# game
(199).
Jer(is fo$uses on t&o (ariables tat are $ru$ial for resol(ing te se$urity dilemma-
te ability to differentiate bet&een offensi(e and defensi(e &ea%ons, and &eter
offensi(e or defensi(e armaments a(e te ad(antage. 4is ty%ology is dire$tly
a%%li$able to te *old +ar be$ause it %ermits Jer(is to $on$lude tat &ea%ons %rograms
tat $an be differentiated any su%%orting offensi(e aims &ill aid in demonstrating one"s
$oo%erati(e intent, tereby disru%ting te distrust tat seems to %ro(ide a reason for te
sift in orientation from a Stag 8unt to a !#. 4us, &it S$elling, Jer(is is adamant in
%ro%osing tat te 0S ado%t !olaris'ty%e submarine based missiles (SA?M"s)- 54e
June 1, 2009
27
S.M. Amadae
%oint is not tat sea'based systems are less (ulnerable tan land'based ones (tis bears on
te offense'defense ratio) but tat SA?M"s are defensi(e, retaliatory &ea%ons6 (20I). 8e
dra&s te $lear %oli$y im%li$ation tat to %reser(e te a%%earan$e of a $oo%erati(e state,
te oter"s submarine'based nu$lear for$e must not be treatened- 5A status';uo state
tat &anted to forego offensi(e $a%ability $ould sim%ly foregoO1anti'submarine &arfare
(AS+)2 resear$ and %ro$urement6 (20I). 4is &as of $ourse a maEor %oint of
$ontention in 4eam ?"s 19IF re%ort asserting tat te So(iets must surely a(e AS+
$a%ability as tere is no %roof tat tey do not, follo&ing te logi$ of ultimately
un$ertainty and )ero'risk. 4eam ?, namely !aul Git)e and !aul +olfo&it), dra&s te
%oli$y im%li$ation tat at a minimum te 0S must de(elo% AS+ $a%ability.
Still, Jer(is a$kno&ledges tere is te additional %roblem tat offensi(e &ea%ons
may yet $arry te ad(antage by standing as an inde. of ea$ nation"s &ill (20B).
Moreo(er, nu$lear $a%ability $ould be used, as te S$lesinger do$trine re$ommends, to
treaten lesser aggression troug 5limited, gradual, and $ontrolled strikes6 (20B). Jer(is
a$kno&ledges tat te use of nu$lear &ea%ons in lesser $onfli$ts o%ens te %ossibility tat
tey may su%%ort dominan$e, and not Eust deterrent $a%ability in te $ase of an all'out
atta$k by te oter. 4is signifies a )ero'sum $om%onent to se$urity. Jer(is e.%lains,
?ut be$ause te 5S$lesinger #o$trine6 $ould be used not only to $o%e &it a
%arallel 3ussian %oli$y, but also to su%%ort an Ameri$an attem%t to $ange te
status ;uo, te ne& Ameri$an stan$e &ould de$rease 3ussian se$urity. (209)
Jer(is finds te S$lesinger #o$trine %ermitting nu$lear use in lesser &ars to be a
destabili)ing strategy insofar as it relies on offensi(e $a%ability tat is indistinguisable
from status ;uo goals. Hi(en tat many teorists doubted te %ossibility of guaranteeing
a limited nu$lear &ar, and e.%e$ted tat it &ould be rational for te So(iet"s to res%ond
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
&it a S$lesigner do$trine of teir o&n, Jer(is feared tat tis nu$lear %oli$y &ould be
self'defeating as refle$ted in te !risoner"s ine(itable out$ome of mutual defe$tion.
Jer(is is $lear tat te S$lesinger do$trine %ursues se$urity as a(ing a )ero'sum
$om%onent be$ause it a$$e%ts tat 54e means of %reser(ing te status ;uo &ould also be
te means of $anging itO6 (217).
=or Jer(is, a$ie(ing mutual %ea$e is de%endent on eliminating te )ero'sum
$om%onent from se$urity, and e ad(ises tat tis may be a$ie(ed by reali)ing tat
nu$lear &arfare $an a(e no (i$tor, and tat se$ond'strike $a%ability $ombined &it te
differentiation of offensi(e and defensi(e $a%ability, is te re$i%e for stability (210).
Jer(is $on(eys te idea tat se$urity'seeking states $an %ursue teir aim by de%loying
&ea%ons systems tat $learly signal teir %referen$e for defense and deterren$e o(er
offense and aggression, and tat mo(e a&ay from %ursuing a form of se$urity tat
demands unilateral ad(antage. !era%s &at is im%li$it if not e.%li$it is tat te sear$
for mutual se$urity is best %ursued by a$$e%ting te im%ossibility of dis$erning intent,
terefore fo$using on $a%ability instead, and demonstrating one"s status ;uo $redentials
by sele$ting &ea%ons systems tat fa(or defense o(er offense. 8ere it is a$kno&ledged
tat &itout te benefit of $on$rete earmarks mat$ing intent &it a %redile$tion for
a$tion, te means of signaling tat one is a status ;uo, or Stag 8unt, a$tor and not an
aggressor or !risoner"s dilemma a$tor, lies in $onstru$ting strategy tat lea(es no doubt
tat one"s %referen$e for se$urity is mat$ed by obser(able material artifa$ts e(iden$ing
one"s %ea$e'seeking $redentials. 4e key is to signal not troug $ea% talk but real
a$tions tat one stri$tly %refers **9#*. 8o&e(er, again it is $lear tat te #*9**
%referen$e ordering does not indi$ate te o%e for $oo%eration.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
Hlenn Synder"s 54e Se$urity #ilemma in Allian$e !oliti$s6
4is sli%%age from starting &it se$urity'seekers &o find temsel(es needing to
defe$t out of te moti(e of self'defense in a !risoner"s dilemma situation is so
&ides%read tat it is diffi$ult to first isolate te mis%er$e%tion and ten to $orre$t it.
*onsider Hlenn Synder"s 54e Se$urity #ilemma in Allian$e !oliti$s6 (19B@). Again, &e
see te %resu%%osition tat un$ertainty and te inability to trust te oter is te %rimary
dri(er of te se$urity dilemma &rit as a !risoner"s dilemma- 54e se$urity dilemma
arises from te state"s un$ertainty &eter its ad(ersary as far'rea$ing e.%ansionist
aims, or, like itself, is interested essentially in te %reser(ation, or limited modifi$ation of
te status ;uo6 (@FB). Synder admits tat states or a$tors ten do not a$tually kno&
&i$ game is being %layed, as tey do not kno& te oters" %referen$es o(er out$omes.
Synder does not %ro(ide te $ain of reasoning tat &ould %ermit a se$urity seeker to
ado%t te %referen$es of a o%eful aggressor, altoug e essentially makes tis
assum%tion.
4e semblan$e tat one $ould be a se$urity'seeker &o is tra%%ed in a !risoner"s
dilemma &it te ultimate frustration of te im%ossibility of $oo%eration follo&s from
first obser(ing tat ea$ a$tor as one of t&o $oi$es- to $oo%erate or to defe$t> and
se$ond obser(ing tat of $ourse no one &ants to be su$kered, and terefore defe$tion is
te only (iable $oi$e as a matter of self'defense (see Synder, 19B@, @F2). ,n is
!risoner"s dilemma %ayoff matri., a$tors $oose bet&een allying (defe$ting) and
abstaining from Eoining an allian$e ($oo%erating). Synder"s analysis a%%ears seamless-
a$tors %refer tat no allian$e forms tan bi'%olar ri(al allian$es form> as &ell, no %arty"s
last $oi$e is tat of being isolated &ile an e.$lusi(e allian$e forms. 8o&e(er, Synder
June 1, 2009
2F
S.M. Amadae
fails to make sense of te main'dri(er of te !risoner"s dilemma model tat e uses- if
states are %rimarily se$urity seekers, &y do tey %refer to isolate te oter %arty &ile
tey Eoin in an allian$e if tey are not %oised to benefit from tis dominant %osition: ,f ,
fundamentally %refer a $oo%erati(e system and a(e no %redatory intent, e(en if , may
need to %rote$t against aggression, , need not ado%t te %referen$es of a %redator. Ret te
routine use of te !risoner"s dilemma model to $a%ture all manner of $oo%eration,
es%e$ially in domesti$ %oliti$al e$onomy, automati$ally assumes tat 5ea$ a$tor most
%refers to be te only user of a $ommon resour$e6 (Stein, 19B2, 717).
,t is tis routine o(ersigt of te %referen$e for unilateral gain tat stru$tures
!risoner"s dilemmas, es%e$ially in a%%lying tis model to se$urity studies in &i$
%resumably state"s %rimary goal is tat of a$ie(ing self'defense, tat $ara$teri)es its
%resentation as a situation of o%eful $oo%erators tat are frustrated. 4e idea is sim%le,
and it translates from international relations teory to %oliti$al e$onomy and so$ial
$ontra$t teory- status ;uo seekers or &ould'be $oo%erators $annot be tra%%ed in a
!risoner"s dilemma unless tey ado%t te %referen$e %rofile of a re(isionist state or of a
o%eful free'rider. ,n tis &ay, te dilemma is a%tly named, im%lying te inerent
diffi$ult of a$ie(ing armony in a den of tie(es, or domesti$ tran;uility amidst me'first
ad(antage takers. 8o&e(er, it is mysterious o& it as be$ome $ustomary to assume tat
agents seeking $on$ord and $ommodious li(ing (8obbes) ea$ %refer to su$ker e(eryone
else in te o%e of unilateral gain. 4is routine 5!risoner"s dilemma %edagogy6 as
re%eated o(er and again deri(ing te dilemma from te o%eless bind oter&ise agreeable
a$tors are $augt in solely due to te inability to trust oters> un$ertainty is used to Eustify
te ado%tion and e.%ression of myo%i$, me'first, %referen$es. ,nternational relations
June 1, 2009
2I
S.M. Amadae
teorist 3andall S$&eller $on$urs, %ointing out, 5*onfusion about tis %oint arises
be$ause neorealists a(e mistakenly $on$e%tuali)ed te se$urity dilemma as a !risoners"
#ilemma (!#) rater tan a Stag 8unt6 (199F, 10@). S$&eller %atiently e.%lains-
,n a !# game, te first $oi$e is to su$ker your o%%onent (you defe$t &ile te
oter %layer $oo%erates)> in a Stag 8unt, mutual $oo%eration is bot %layers" first
$oi$e. +en se$urity is te goal, as in te se$urity dilemma, states &ill seek to
su$$or, not su$ker, teir neigbors (te ** %ayoff). (10@)
/(en if one is unsure of oters" %referen$es, still one $an be sure of one"s o&n. *a%turing
te faulty, but %er(asi(ely used, logi$ tat se$urity seekers and o%eful $oo%erators $an
find temsel(es in a !risoner"s dilemma, S$&eller dire$tly addresses Synder- 54is !#
%referen$e ordering 1suggesting tat $oo%erators &ould most %refer to su$ker te oter2 is
all te more %u))ling in ligt of Synder"s first assum%tion tat Lno state is aggressi(e, but
none $an kno& te intentions of te oters6 (10@).
As international relations teory de(elo%ed to simultaneously analy)e te *old
+ar &orld stage and a%%ly game teoreti$ models, tere &as a %rofound intermi.ing of
abstra$t teory and material %ra$ti$e. S%e$ifi$ally, one keen interest in te se$urity
dilemma &as tat of inter%reting te *old +ar itself as su$ a dilemma in &i$ %era%s
bot te 0S and te So(iet 0nion really &anted to get along, but &ere $augt u% in an
arms ra$e tat seemed ine(itable, e(en des%ite essentially ami$able intent. !risoner"s
dilemma %edagogy tat 53ational states tus e.%and only to a$ie(e se$urity,6 (10F) $an
be dire$tly related to making sense of te 0S strategy during te *old +ar. Altoug it
as been $ommon to %resent te 0S as a &ary a$tor tra%%ed in a !risoner"s dilemma out
of te ne$essity to a(oid being dominated by te 0SS3, S$&eller fo$uses on te
$om%onent of Ameri$an a$tion tat &as dri(en by te o%e for stru$turing te &orld
system a$$ording to its &ises-
June 1, 2009
2B
S.M. Amadae
More generally, o&e(er, te aim of 0.S. %oli$y &as not merely negati(e and
defensi(e. As !aul Git)e argued at te time, te 0nited States &as $om%eting
&it te So(iet 0nion and its allies for te %ositi(e goal of de$iding &o &ould
$onstru$t a ne& international order. (10B, $iting Git)e)
4e im%ortant %oint is tat te relian$e on te !risoner"s dilemma, &ile ostensibly used
to de%i$t se$urity seekers, a$tually seems to %ro(ide te Eustifi$ation for oneself
manifesting te %referen$es of a %redatory state. !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy ta$itly
a$$e%ts tat one seeks dominan$e and a$$e%ts tis stan$e as flo&s dire$tly from a moti(e
of self'defense. !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy a$$e%ts tat one seeks dominan$e but
Eustifies tis %redile$tion by suggesting it flo&s dire$tly from te moti(e of self'defense.
Jer(is" 2001 5+as te *old +ar a Se$urity #ilemma:6
+riting in 2001 3obert Jer(is obser(es tat in understanding te *old +ar as a
se$urity dilemma, 5/a$ side &ould a(e seen its o&n bea(ior as designed to maintain
te status ;uo and &ould a(e &el$omed measures to stabili)e it..O&ould be %oliti$ally
and %sy$ologi$ally attra$ti(e6 (7B). +e like to belie(e tat our moti(es are %ure, e(en
&ile &e ;uestioned our o%%onent"s. Most often it &as assumed tat te 5ideologi$ally
dri(en So(iet 0nionO1is2 inerently e.%ansionist6 (@2). Of $ourse, altoug do&n'
%layed, it &as also a$kno&ledged tat regardless of &eter te So(iet 0nion e.isted or
not, 5te 0nited States &ould a(e sougt to t&art any %otential ri(als and o%en te
&orld to Ameri$an $a%italist %enetration6 (@7) during te %ost'+orld +ar ,, %eriod.
Jer(is a$kno&ledges tat suggesting tat bot states &ere inerently e.%ansionist, more
s%e$ifi$ally tat te 0S ad egemoni$ %retensions, is un%alatable- 5,t is un$omfortable
to find tat no a$tors on te &orld s$ene are sym%ateti$.6 (@7)
Jer(is" goal is to determine &eter te *old +ar &as a se$urity dilemma,
im%lying tat bot nations &ere oriented to&ard te status ;uo but feared te oter
June 1, 2009
29
S.M. Amadae
arbored ostile intent. A de$isi(e feature of a se$urity dilemma is tat se$urity does not
a(e a )ero sum $om%onent and is best re%resented as a Stag 8unt. Jer(is reali)es tat
tis determination, e(en using indsigt, may be diffi$ult as it is not yet agreement on
&eter ++, re%resented a se$urity dilemma. Again a$$ording to S$elling, a Stag 8unt
is translated into a !risoner"s dilemma gi(en suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator e.ists.
!era%s it is %ossible to %ro%ose tat te 0S and 0SS3 &ere a$tually status ;uo a$tors,
&o imagined te %ossibility te oter ad ostile intent- tis 5diagnosis tat te *old
+ar &as a se$urity dilemma &ould be %oliti$ally and %sy$ologi$ally attra$ti(e6 (7B).
8o&e(er, Jer(is suggests, tat gi(en tat te *old +ar ended &it te demise of te
So(iet 0nion, instead of mutual a$$ord, tat &e may a(e reason to $allenge te
se$urity dilemma rendering.
As Jer(is e.%lores te *old +ar more fully, e tou$es on te du%li$itous as%e$t
of !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy- it seems &rong to suggest a rationale for %redation
based on self'defense> 5te definition of self'defense as a Eustifi$ation for murder is
$ontentious6 (79).
1F
,n de(elo%ing is tougt, Jer(is rea$es te $on$lusion tat tere
may be elements of se$urity'seeking tat are indistinguisable from e.%ansionist goals.
,f tis is te $ase ten 5states &ill be for$ed to $om%ete e(en if teir %rimary goal is
se$urity.6 Jer(is refers to tis latter situation as a 5dee% se$urity dilemma.6 ,t is
a$$urately be de%i$ted by a !risoner"s dilemma, and is $on$e%tually distin$t from te
se$urity dilemma $a%tured by a Stag 8unt transformed by un$ertainty (@1).
8o&e(er, Jer(is also a$kno&ledges tat %ossibly te *old +ar &as not any form
of se$urity dilemma. ,t $ould a(e been te $ase tat 5one of te su%er%o&ers sougt to
1F
On tis s%e$ifi$ %oint Jer(is $ites S$eller, (eadly Im#alances) Triolarity and
Hitler*s Strategy of World Con+uest (Ge& Rork- *olumbia 0ni(ersity !ress, 199B), B7'
91.
June 1, 2009
70
S.M. Amadae
e.%and in order to a$ie(e nonse$urity goals6 (@2). One su$ s$ool of tougt olds
tat 5te So(iet 0nion ad no o%%ortunity to establis good relations &it te 0nited
States oter tan by $on$eding 0.S. dominan$e,6 and tat te 0S &ould a(e taken
&ate(er ste%s &ere ne$essary to 5o%en te &orld to Ameri$an $a%italist %enetration6
(@7). ,n running troug %otential inter%retations of te *old +ar, Jer(is also tro&s in
ea$ $ountry"s domesti$ %oliti$al agenda &i$ may a(e dri(en %oli$y out$omes, but
not ne$essarily been %rimarily dire$ted to e.ternal e.%ansionist goals. A ty%i$al e.am%le
of tis is a state"s military'industrial $om%le. tat as its o&n momentum to maintain te
need for &ea%ons systems and e$onomi$ de(elo%ment troug armaments manufa$tor.
,n sele$ting &i$ analysis of te *old +ar is more fitting, Jer(is first
a$kno&ledges tat it seemed tat te 5*ommunist (ie& of $a%italist statesO1&as2
ine(itably ostile6 (@F). Still, it is not at all $lear tat te *ommunists sougt su$$ess
troug military $on;uest, instead tey &ould 5gain %o&er troug a $ombination of
ele$tions, sub(ersion, and unrest6 (@B). ,n fa$t, $ommunists asserted tat $a%italism
&ould $olla%se of its o&n a$$ord, due to internal in$onsisten$ies (@9). 3egardless of te
So(iet"s self'im%ression, o&e(er, it seemed to te +est tat te 0SS3 ad little
toleran$e for dissent, and e.%ressed tis intoleran$e using $oer$i(e for$e (C1).
Jer(is %ortrays a 0nited States tat &as similarly un$om%romising- 5Ameri$an
leaders did not belie(e tat mutual se$urity &as a realisti$ goal6 (C2). Jer(is $on$ludes
tat 0S %oli$ies, e(en if ineffe$ti(e, 5&ere $learly offensi(e in teir im%a$t6 (C2).
,ndeed, 0S stated %oli$y &as $onsistent in its aim 51t2o redu$e te %o&er and influen$e of
te 0SS3.6
1I
At a minimum, terefore, 50.S. efforts to e.%loit o%%ortunities tat arose
&ere indistinguisable in teir effe$t from e.%ansionism, &i$ means tat te situation
1I
Jer(is ;uotes GS* 20S@, in =30S, 19@B, <ol. 1, !art 2, FFI'FFB> Jer(is, %. C7.
June 1, 2009
71
S.M. Amadae
&as a dee% se$urity dilemma6 (C7). +alking te find line bet&een asserting tat te 0S
$ondoned %reem%ti(e murder in self'defense, or instead &as %re%ared to engage in man'
slaugter if atta$ked, Jer(is determines tat te *old +ar &as a dee% se$urity dilemma
meaning tat bot states $ould not a$ie(e se$urity. ,n introdu$ing te dee% se$urity
dilemma Jer(is mo(es in te dire$tion of Jon Mearseimer"s neorealism tat also argues
tat nations $annot li(e togeter %ea$eable> one"s se$urity must $ome at te e.%ense of
anoter"s. 8o&e(er, for Mearseimer tis reality is based on obEe$ti(e resour$es tat
nations must $ommand in $om%etition &it oters as a $ondition for teir sur(i(al. =or
Jer(is, te dee% se$urity dilemma is based on te ideational features of se$urity set fort
by bot antagonists. ,n is final estimation, Jer(is maintains tat te root of te *old +ar
$onfli$t 5at best &as a $las of so$ial systems.6 *ru$ially, 5Mutual se$urity in tese
$ir$umstan$es &as a goal tat $ould not be attained6 (CB). ,n a dee% se$urity dilemma in
&i$ a nation %er$ei(es tat e.%ansion is ne$essary in self'defense, ea$ nation &ill
%ursue its se$urity aims $ountering te oter. Muoting from a 19C2 !oli$y !lanning Staff
%a%er tat all subse;uent 0S !residents, sa(e Jimmy *arter in is early %residen$y, ad
agreed &it, Jer(is re%orts-
+e belie(e tatO1$ontainment2 is inade;uate and also unrealisti$. +e do not
belie(e tat te situation $an remain indefinitely stati$. One side &ill gain and te
oter &ill de$line as a fa$tor in &orld affairs. ,t must be our obEe$ti(e to be te
one &i$ gains. (Jer(is, C9)
?y Jer(is" analysis, te *old +ar &as not a sallo& se$urity dilemma, but rater a dee%
se$urity dilemma. Se$urity &as terefore not a mutually attainable goal. ,n %resenting
tis line of tougt Jer(is suggests te rationale tat self'defense may be %er$ei(ed as
re;uiring offensi(e and e.%ansi(e efforts. 8o&e(er, again, e suggests tat tis $onfli$t
June 1, 2009
72
S.M. Amadae
for se$urity deri(ed from $lasing &orld (ie&s and systems, not from a stru$turally
enfor$ed ne$essity to $ommand resour$es and %o&er a military.
Jon Mearseimer"s 2001 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
?efore introdu$ing Jon Mearseimer"s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, ,
&ill re$a% te maEor %oint of te de(elo%ment of our understanding of te se$urity
dilemma, and its entanglement &it 0S nu$lear strategy. 4e first signifi$ant use of te
!risoner"s dilemma model &as its a%%li$ation by S$elling to a se$urity dilemma defined
by te absen$e of $onfli$ting interests. ,ntrodu$ing un$ertainty, S$elling argues tat in
anti$i%ation of $onfronting a %redator, or e(en of being taken as one, te best %oli$y is to
ado%t te %referen$es of a %redator. +ereas S$elling $learly makes an argument tat
one ado%t a %oli$y of unilateral dominan$e in self'defense, te main im%ort of is
%osition is to sol(e te !risoner"s dilemma &it mutually assured destru$tion. S$elling
eld tat in a &orld &it nu$lear &ea%ons, tere $annot be a unilateral (i$tor as ea$
nation as te %o&er to destroy te oter e(en after it as suffered a massi(e atta$k.
8o&e(er, tere are t&o maEor im%li$ations of S$elling"s !risoner"s dilemma su%%ort for
MA#. 8e definitely %resents an argument for stri(ing for egemony in a $ase &erein
one is &orried tat tere is a %redator. Moreo(er e alters te footing of liberalism &i$
as iterto been $on$e%tuali)ed to sol(e te assuran$e %roblem> en$e te role of te
Ae(iatan is to alter a$tors" in$enti(es for defe$ting, not to assure a$tors tat one anoter
is fundamentally $oo%erati(e.
Gu$lear 0se 4eorists, re%resented by Albert +olstetter, 8erman Kan, !aul
Git)e, James S$lesinger, and *olin Hray, &ere dissatisfied &it te %res$ri%tion tat te
0S a$$e%t a stalemate solution to te *old +ar standoff &it te 0SS3. 4ey reEe$ted
June 1, 2009
77
S.M. Amadae
S$elling"s solution to te !risoner"s dilemma stru$ture of te *old +ar in mutually
assured destru$tion. /(en toug suggesting tat te 0S is best $ara$teri)ed as a benign
a$tor, tey a$$e%ted te !risoner"s dilemma stru$ture of te se$urity dilemma fa$ed by
te 0S by in$or%orating te idea of radi$al un$ertainty about te So(iet"s intentions, and
e(en $a%abilities, to mobili)e an argument to ado%t a %oli$y of &orst'$ase analysis and
)ero'risk toleran$e. S$elling"s argument for a suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator e.ist
in order for a se$urity dilemma or assuran$e game to transform into a !# &as reEe$ted in
fa(or of te %osition tat any degree of un$ertainty %resents te need to ado%t te
$ara$teristi$s of a %redator in order to figt %redation. 4e %roto'neo$onser(ati(e
%osition &as to use te radi$al un$ertainty of oter minds in order to mobili)e an
argument tat one must ado%t te strategy of a %redator as te best res%onse to a &orst'
$ase situation. An a$tual $al$ulation based on rational e.%e$tations &as e.$anged for a
ma.imin strategy in res%onse to any $on$ei(able likeliood of an atta$k by te So(iet
0nion.
Synder and Jer(is du%li$ate S$elling"s logi$ for MA# and Kan"s arguments for
G04s. 4ey, too, %ro%ose tat a situation %o%ulated &it se$urity seekers de(ol(es into a
!risoner"s dilemma gi(en te $an$e tat a %redator e.ists. 8o&e(er, te %roblems of
assuran$e and %redation are $onfused be$ause it is ta$itly assumed tat a se$urity seeker
really %refers to $oo%erate not&itstanding te fa$t tat te !# %referen$e ordering
mandates tat all a$tors %refer unilateral su$$ess. Solutions to te assuran$e %roblem are
o(erlooked be$ause $oo%erators are assumed to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of %redators.
A%%arently follo&ing S$elling"s lead, Synder and Jer(is assume tat agents" ado%t
%referen$es $ontrary to teir true or defining interests, as in te $ase of te 3odesian
June 1, 2009
7@
S.M. Amadae
&ites &o really %refer for e(eryone to stay, but a$t on te %rerogati(e of te agent
&ose first $oi$e is to su$ker e(eryone else, or te se$urity seeker &o really %refers
%ea$e, but a$ts on te strategy of dominating oter nations. 4is ado%tion of me'first,
!risoner"s dilemma %referen$es, su%%osedly out of self'defense, as be$ome so ty%i$al of
our dis$ourse and analysis of $oo%eration tat Art Stein obser(es of domesti$ a$tors tat
ea$ seeks to be te sole user of a $ommon resour$e (19B2). Ob(iously su$ a %osition is
selfis or antiso$ial, and destru$ti(e to $olle$ti(e a$tion. Ret it as be$ome normali)ed as
te a%%ro%riate res%onse of rational agent is seeks $oo%eration.
,n is 2001 arti$le dis$ussing &eter te *old +ar &as a se$urity dilemma,
Jer(is takes is analysis a ste% furter in %ro%osing tat tere is a routine se$urity
dilemma in &i$ agents" fundamental interests do not $onfli$t, and a more fundamental,
5dee% se$urity dilemma6 in &i$ agents" fundamental interests do $onfli$t. Of $ourse,
as bot a(e been %ortrayed by a !# game, te analyti$ distin$tion is lost. , argue tat
Jer(is" standard se$urity dilemma %o%ulated by status ;uo seekers is best $a%tured by an
assuran$e game, and te situation in &i$ one agent"s se$urity undermines anoter"s is
best $a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma. 0ltimately Jer(is $on$ludes tat te *old +ar
&as a dee% se$urity dilemma as te 0S and 0SS3"s interests &ere o%%osed> mutual
se$urity $ould not be ad.
8o&e(er, Jer(is makes $lear tat te dee% se$urity dilemma is a %ers%e$ti(e not
&idely sared by *old +ar international relations teorists &o took te %osition tat
mutual se$urity &as an attainable goal. Jer(is suggests tat many ,3 teorists a$$e%ted
te %osition arti$ulated by S$elling, M$Gamara, and Ste(en ?rams, tat assured
destru$tion, %redi$ated on te assum%tion tat nations are status ;uo seekers &o are
June 1, 2009
7C
S.M. Amadae
un$ertain of te oter"s intentions, $an resol(e nu$lear brinkmansi% and, &it
a%%ro%riate means of dete$tion, $an undertake arms $ontrol. ,n Jer(is" (ie&, 0S
strategists did not sare tis (ie& of te &orld &it liberal ,3 teorists> 5most $i(ilians
&o sougt su%eriority did so for self'%rote$tion6 (CC). Mutual se$urity &as out of rea$
for tese strategists be$ause tey (ie&ed te o%e for se$urity as ne$essarily antagonisti$.
4is (ie& of international relations %er$ei(es of te %ursuit of su%eriority as te means to
se$ure sur(i(al &as re$ently arti$ulated by Mearseimer in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, e(en toug Mearseimer differs from Jer(is in assigning te res%onsibility for
te mutual antagonism. +ereas Jer(is looks to mutually e.$lusi(e &orld (ie&s,
Mearseimer looks to te stru$ture of &orld in &i$ agents must $om%ete for %o&er.
/(en if , do not (ye for %o&er, te ne.t agent &ill> terefore all agents must $om%ete for
s$ar$e resour$es as a $ondition of teir sur(i(al.
Mearseimer elaborates is teory in $ontradistin$tion to Kennet +alt)" Theory
of International Politics. 4e latter %osition e refers to as defensi(e realism, &i$ e
$laims Jer(is" offensi(e'defensi(e balan$e is an attem%t to buttress (20). ,n essen$e,
Mearseimer $a%tures te distin$tion bet&een $on$e%tuali)ing Jer(is" mundane se$urity
dilemma as an assuran$e game in &i$ se$urity is a %ositi(e sum good, and Jer(is" dee%
se$urity dilemma in &i$ se$urity as a negati(e sum $om%onent. Mearseimer
arti$ulates is offensi(e realism in $ontradi$tion to +alt)" and Jer(is" defensi(e realism-
My teory of offensi(e realism is also a stru$tural teory of international %oliti$s.
As &it defensi(e realism, my teory sees great %o&ers as $on$erned mainly &it
figuring out o& to sur(i(e in a &orld &ere tere is no agen$y to %rote$t tem
from ea$ oter> tey ;ui$kly reali)e tat %o&er is te key to teir sur(i(al.
Offensi(e realism %arts $om%any &it defensi(e realism o(er te ;uestion of o&
mu$ %o&er states &ant. =or defensi(e realists, te international stru$ture
%ro(ides states &it little in$enti(e to seek additional in$rements of %o&er>
instead it %uses tem to maintain te e.isting balan$e of %o&er. !reser(ing
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7F
S.M. Amadae
%o&er, rater tan in$reasing it, is te main goal of states. Offensi%e realists, on
the other hand, #elie%e that status +uo owers are rarely found in world olitics,
#ecause the international system creates owerful incenti%es for states to loo- for
oortunities to gain ower at the e&ense of ri%als, and to ta-e ad%antage of
those situations when the #enefits outweigh the costs. A state*s ultimate goal is to
#e the hegemon in the system. (My em%asis, 21)
Mearseimer e$oes Jer(is" sentiment $a%tured by te dee% se$urity dilemma- 5sur(i(al
mandates aggressi(e bea(ior6 (21). Mearseimer asso$iates liberalism &it te (ie&
tat se$urity $an be mutually attained, and offensi(e realism in &i$ se$urity $annot be
sared.
Mearseimer s%e$ifi$ally dis%arages Ameri$an a$ademi$s &o 5are es%e$ially
good at %romoting liberal tinking in te market%la$e of ideas6 (2C). 4ese liberals, &o
in$lude S$elling, Jer(is, Snynder, Jose% S. Gye Jr, and 3obert Keoane es%ouse te
o%timisti$ (ie& tat states $an get along, and tat free trade lea(es %ros%erity in its &ake,
remo(ing te moti(e for aggressi(e e.%ansionism. 8o&e(er, 51b2eind $losed doorsO
te elites &o make national se$urity %oli$y s%eak mostly te language of %o&er, not tat
of %rin$i%le, and te 0nited States a$ts in te international system a$$ording to te
di$tates of realist logi$6 (2C).
/(en in a%%re$iating te teoreti$al similarity bet&een Jer(is" dee% se$urity
dilemma and Mearseimer"s offensi(e realism, es%e$ially insofar as bot a%%ear
admirably suited to using te !risoner"s dilemma model, still te t&o are distin$t as te
former fo$uses on ideas as an im%ortant $om%onent of se$urity seeking, and te latter
&olly looks to material $onsiderations- 5Hreat %o&ers need money, te$nology, and
%ersonnel to build military for$es and to figt &ars, and a state"s latent %o&er refers to te
ra& %otential it $an dra& on &en $om%eting &it ri(al states6 (CC). Mearseimer admits
tat is teory of offensi(e realism, as its label suggests, may be offensi(e to many
June 1, 2009
7I
S.M. Amadae
%eo%le &o &ould rater belie(e, or at least state for %ubli$ $onsum%tion, tat &orld
%oliti$s a%%ens in a$$ordan$e &it liberal teory. Aiberals %ro%ose tat maintaining an
e.isting balan$e of %o&er, %otentially a balan$e of terror, is te best means to a$ie(e
%ros%erity as tis fosters mutually benefi$ial trade (1F). Aiberal teory olds tat
%redatory states $an be in %rin$i%le, e(en if not %era%s in fa$t, distinguised from status'
;uo seeking states (1F). Of $ourse e(en in follo&ing Mearseimer"s des$ri%tion of
liberalism &e may a(e a eigtened sense of dis$rimination in differentiating bet&een
$lassi$ liberalism"s %redi$ation of a Stag 8unt and neoliberalism"s $on$ession of a
!risoner"s dilemma. Again, sin$e tis distin$tion &as blurred in S$elling"s &ork, e set
te %re$edent for grounding neoliberalism on te mutually antagonisti$ !risoner"s
dilemma as o%%osed to te mutually benefi$ial Stag 8unt.
=or Mearseimer, 5states do not be$ome status ;uo %o&ers until tey $om%letely
dominate te system6 (7C), terefore a$$ording it im, it is not %ossible to a state to be
se$ure &itout $ontrolling te %o&er relations stru$turing te &orld system. Sin$e
egemony &ill al&ays be $ontested and is terefore im%ossible to maintain, tis endless
%ursuit of se$urity means tat states are $onstantly in $ir$umstan$es of dire$t or indire$t
&ar &it one anoter. ,n te language of te !risoner"s dilemma, a$tors endlessly seek to
su$ker oters to a$ie(e unilateral su$$ess as a means to teir o&n %reser(ation.
*on$lusion
S$elling, Synder, and Jer(is ea$ inad(ertently make arguments tat su%%ort te
idea tat it is rational to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of an aggressor in order to figt an
aggressor. 4ey suggest tat e(en a suffi$ient likeliood tat an aggressor e.ists %resents
a suffi$ient reason for one to be$ome an aggressor. Ret, e(en in a$kno&ledging tis
June 1, 2009
7B
S.M. Amadae
!risoner"s dilemma model for se$urity, in %ro%osing deterren$e or mutually assured
destru$tion, tese teorists suggest tat an in$enti(e s$eme may be introdu$ed to mimi$
$lassi$ liberalism"s a$ie(ement of mutual se$urity. !redators &o atta$k &ill be
destroyed, and tey terefore %refer to $oo%erate.
S$elling argues tat an assuran$e situation may degenerate into a !risoner"s
dilemma gi(en a suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator e.ists. 4e nu$lear use teorists, by
$ontrast, ado%ted a )ero'risk o%tion tat assumes te final unkno&ability of oter minds
and intentions, terefore going furter do&n S$elling"s %at in suggesting tat it is only
natural tat a se$urity seeker &ill %re%are for te &orst, tereby assuming tat any a$tor
$ould be a %redators and $ombating it &it te %ursuit of dominan$e. Jer(is
a$kno&ledges tat in 0S strategi$ %lanning su$ reasoning &as assisted by te mutually
in$om%atible &orld (ie&s of $a%italism and $ommunism- 0S %oli$y offi$ials &ere $lear
tat 5One side &ill gain and te oter side &ill de$lineO,t must be our obEe$ti(e to be te
one &i$ gains6 (2001, C9).
Jer(is" admission of tis dee% se$urity dilemma, in &i$ not all agents $an be
se$ure, differs from Mearseimer"s be$ause e ultimately asso$iates it &it a 5$las of
so$ial systems6 (CB), and not a fundamental $on;uest for te resour$es $om%rising %o&er.
4us Mearseimer %uts a ne& set of $onsiderations on te table in suggesting tat te
stru$ture of te &orld system re;uires tat nations %ursue %o&er &itout limit as a
$ondition of teir self'%reser(ation.
,n ste%%ing ba$k an assessing te arguments for te %ursuit of unilateral su$$ess in
self'defense, &e obser(e four. =irst, underlying S$elling"s un$ertainty argument is te
first %osition &i$ olds tat &ereas it is rational for a %ea$e'seeker to $oo%erate &it
June 1, 2009
79
S.M. Amadae
anoter %ea$e'seeker, if one &ere fully $onfident one fa$ed an aggressor instead, ten it is
rational to seek domination. 4is admission is ne$essary to dra& te furter im%li$ation,
as does S$elling, tat an estimation of a suffi$ient likeliood tat tere is an aggression
is similarly Eustifa$tory of ado%ting te %referen$es of a %redator. 4e im%li$ation is tat
te 5&ite $o&boy6 &ill not soot oter &ite $o&boys &o re%resent te o%e for
$oo%eration. 8o&e(er, e &ill %refer to kill a bla$k $o&boy, or any indi(idually
suffi$iently likely to be a bla$k $o&boy, be$ause subduing an aggressor is %referable to
attem%ting %ea$eful $oe.isten$e.
Se$ond, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es take S$elling"s reasoning a ste% furter in
insisting tat it is im%ossible to e(er kno& anoter agent"s intentions, s%e$ifi$ally tose of
a nation. Hi(en tat te state of anar$y is ig'stakes, and no single misste% $an be
afforded, it makes sense tat e(en te smallest degree of un$ertainty $an %ro(ide
Eustifi$ation to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of an aggressor in anti$i%ation of meeting an
aggressor. 8o&e(er, tird, te %roto'neo$onser(ati(e se$urity dilemma a%%ears to be
more like Jer(is" dee% se$urity dilemma gi(en tat te %ursuit of dominan$e and (i$tory
$ould not be sared by bot su%er%o&ers.
=ourt, Mearseimer dis%enses &it te %roblem of un$ertainty and oter minds
in is %resentation of offensi(e realism. 8e a$kno&ledges te tenden$y underlying te
use of te !risoner"s dilemma to re%resent te se$urity dilemma im%lies tat a$tors like to
tink of temsel(es as moti(ated first and foremost by $oo%eration, but tat underneat
tis all must $onfront te stark reality tat self'%reser(ation $an only be a$;uired troug
te $ontinuous a$$umulation of %o&er. 4us, 5Hreat %o&ersOare al&ays sear$ing for
o%%ortunities to gain %o&er o(er teir ri(als, &it egemony as teir final goal6 (29). 8e
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
distan$es imself from te %roblem of oter minds be$ause de$lares it ob(ious tat all
a$tors must seek %o&er> no un$ertainty is in(ol(ed.
1B
,n fa$t, e derides as y%o$riti$al
te tenden$y to %retend 5&e all &ant to get along,6 all te &ile kno&ing tat it is
ne$essary to gain te ad(antage &ene(er %ossible. Altoug is analysis sares little
&it S$elling"s un$ertainty, te neo$onser(ati(es radi$al un$ertainty, or Jer(is" dee%
se$urity dilemma, still e, too, %resents a rationali)ation for self'%reser(ation in te form
of egemony.
S$elling"s 53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 in arguing tat do(es assume
te %referen$es of a&ks, introdu$es an ongoing $onfusion into te literature on te
se$urity dilemma and $oo%eration. ?ot of tese literatures use retori$ tat %resumes
agents are status ;uo oriented, but must ado%t te %redator"s $ara$teristi$ %referen$e for
unilateral su$$ess (#*9**). 4is im%li$ation of S$elling"s &ork, enan$ed by is
outrigt statement tat 3ousseau"s Stag 8unt is e;ui(alent to a !risoner"s dilemma, and
is insisten$e tat su$ !risoner"s dilemmas abound trougout so$iety, as mired te
literature on te so$ial $ontra$t, $olle$ti(e a$tion, and $oo%eration in $onfusion lea(ing
te o(erall im%ression tat 5agents %refer to be te sole user of a $ommon resour$e6 (Art
Stein, 19B@).
19
=ollo&ing S$elling it as been ty%i$al to %resume tat te %roblem of
a$ie(ing so$ial order is tat of resol(ing a multi'%arty !risoner"s dilemma.
20
8o&e(er,
S$elling"s fo$us &as more dire$ted at sol(ing te *old +ar brinkmansi%. 8ere te
$allenge seemed to be sol(ing te !risoner"s dilemma as te tougest $ase for a$ie(ing
$oo%eration. 8is solution of mutual deterren$e relies on nu$lear &ea%ons being fore(er
1B
=or dis$ussion see Hlenn 8. Synder"s 5Mearseimer"s +orld,6 International Security,
2I-1, 1CC.
19
S$elling makes tese $laims in a 19F@ %a%er-
20
?u$anan, 19I@> 8ardin, 19B2> Hautier, 19BF.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
distin$t from $on(entional arms in offering uni;ue retaliatory %o&er. Altoug S$elling
definitely suggests tat status ;uo agents assume te %referen$es of an aggressor,
noneteless e stands by te idea tat in nu$lear &ar, $old or ot, tere $an be no (i$tor.
4erefore agents" best out$ome is to a$$e%t a balan$e of terror.
4e nu$lear use teorists (G04s), !aul Git)e, Albert +olstetter, and 8erman
Kan, follo&ed S$elling"s analysis, but reEe$ted its fundamental assum%tions. 4ey
a$$e%ted tat un$ertainty &ould make it ne$essary to take on te %referen$es of an
aggressor, but tey re%udiated tat it is im%ossible to &in a nu$lear &ar. ,n
$on(entionali)ing nu$lear &ar, tey determined tat mutual deterren$e is irrational.
,nstead of a$$e%ting a stalemate and balan$e of terror, tey %romoted te %ursuit of
unilateral dominan$e and (i$tory. ,n seeing nu$lear &ar as no different from
$on(entional &ar, tey bot ad(o$ated using nu$lear &ea%ons in lesser $onfli$ts, and tey
argued tat it is $ru$ial to be able to dominate an out$ome on any le(el of es$alation,
terefore %romoting full s%e$trum dominan$e.
S$elling ad already argued tat status ;uo seekers &ill ado%t te %referen$es of
an aggressor gi(en a suffi$ient likeliood a %redator e.ists, terefore %referring unilateral
(i$tory, and te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es agreed. 8o&e(er, tey altered S$elling"s
argument tat a ig %robability be ne$essary to make tis $on(ersion. ,nstead tey
argued tat nu$lear &ar is a ig'stakes situation in &i$ tere $an be no toleran$e for
error, and in &i$ a )ero'risk %oli$y must be ado%ted. 4us, tey ad(o$ated %re%aring
for te &orst $on$ei(able situation- if a situation &ere $on$ei(able e(en if im%ra$table,
ten it ne$essitated a res%onse. +itout blinking an eye, Git)e, +olstetter, and Kan all
strenuously a$$e%ted tat te 0S *old +ar goal must be to &in, and tat deterren$e &as
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S.M. Amadae
saky if not buttressed &it su%erior and not e;ual means to old te So(iet 0nion in
$e$k. 4e %roto'neo$onser(ati(e %osition, tat &ould see $ontinuity &it late t&entiet'
$entury neo$onser(atism in te figure of !aul +olfo&it), +olstetter"s 0ni(ersity of
*i$ago !.#. student, definitely rationali)ed egemony, and $ould do so by building on
S$elling"s reasoning. 4ey sim%ly reEe$ted te non$on(entional status of nu$lear
&ea%ons, and te %otential tat deterren$e &ould &ork if not guaranteed by su%erior
for$e. 4us tey sol(ed te !risoner"s dilemma game re%resenting nu$lear standoff by
urging unilateral deterren$e.
Synder and Jer(is built on S$elling"s reasoning tat a se$urity dilemma of %ea$e'
seekers &o arbor un$ertainty about ea$ oter"s intentions is best %resented by a
!risoner"s dilemma game. 4ey %ersist in %ermitting $onfusion o(er &eter te
%resumed status ;uo a$tors ado%t te as first $oi$e te %referen$e for unilateral
ad(antage. 4is seems ne$essary a$$ording to teir analysis, yet also seems
$ontradi$tory. ,n teir &ritings &e $an see te lega$y of a%%lying te !# model to te
*old +ar &it te inter%retation tat te a$tors really Eust &ant to get along, but are
%re(ented from doing so due gi(en te insurmountable distrust of oters. , demonstrate
te ongoing $onfusion of alleged se$urity'seekers %referring to su$ker one anoter in
Jer(is" dis$ussion of te 3odesian &ites" de$ision making, and in Snyder"s dis$ussion
of allian$e building. , agree &it S$&eller tat a se$urity dilemma is an assuran$e game
in &i$ no one as te in$enti(e to $on;uer te oter> tat a troublesome $onfusion is
introdu$ed in %ermitting se$urity seekers to ado%t te %referen$es of an aggressor.
4e $ru$ial %oint in differentiating bet&een te %roblem of se$urity as a Stag 8unt
or as a !risoner"s dilemma is tat te former game %ermits all agents to a$ie(e se$urity
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S.M. Amadae
in a %ositi(e sum fasion &ereas te latter game assumes tat se$urity as a negati(e
sum $om%onent. S$elling un&ittlingly a$$e%ted te inter%retation tat se$urity as a
negati(e sum $om%onent in is use of te !# to model te se$urity dilemma. 8o&e(er,
in %ermitting deterren$e to mire a$tors in a stalemate tat mimi$s a Ae(iatan, S$elling
stri(es to res$ue $lassi$ liberalism"s o%timism tat se$urity is mutually attainable. Still,
te damage &as already done, and any use of te !# to $a%ture te %roblem of se$urity,
and not tat of %redation, &ill $allenge te liberal foundation in te %romise of mutual
se$urity. 4is &atersed in tinking about te %ossibility of mutual se$urity as gone
unnoti$ed as it as be$ome normal to a$$e%t tat te %roblem of $oo%eration and te
so$ial $ontra$t are best refle$ted by te !risoner"s dilemma.
21

/(en if $lassi$ liberals %resumed te %ossibility of mutual se$urity, and S$elling
&orked to a%%ro.imate teir out$ome &it te introdu$tion of mutual deterren$e, oter
late t&entiet'$entury teorists &ere more $omfortable tinking in terms of se$urity &it
a negati(e sum $om%onent. ,n tis manner one agent"s in$rease in se$urity may &ell
$ome at te $ost of anoter"s. Jer(is finally makes te distin$tion bet&een a regular
se$urity dilemma, re%resented as a !# but $ontaining status ;uo oriented a$tors (e(en if
tis is not logi$ally %ossible), and a 5dee% se$urity dilemma6 in &i$ agents"
a$ie(ement of se$urity is antagonisti$. Altoug many ,3 teorists tougt of te *old
+ar as a mundane se$urity dilemma soluable troug mutual deterren$e, Jer(is
a$kno&ledges tat many in te 0S %oli$y elite (ie&ed te *old +ar as a situation in
&i$ only one nation $ould &in. Mutual se$urity of te 0S and 0SS3 &as im%ossible
to a$ie(e. 4is latter %ers%e$ti(e $ara$teri)es tat of te %roto'neo$onser(ati(es and
teir se$ond generation in te form of today"s neo$onser(ati(es.
21
See, for e.am%le, 8argrea(es 8ea% and <aroufakis.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
Jer(is $ara$teri)es is dee% se$urity dilemma as one of $lasing &orld (ie&s,
and e em%asi)es an ideational $om%onent dri(ing te $onfli$t bet&een $ommunism and
$a%italism. Geo$onser(ati(e tinkers $on$ur. 4e onus is on a$ie(ing full s%e$trum
dominan$e, su%%osedly to be te &orld"s good $o%, but re$ogni)ing te need to figt
oters on teir o&n terms. 4us, 3i$ard *eney ad(o$ates taking te glo(es off, and
using des%i$able means to figt odious a$tors &o &e %er$ei(e a(e e(en a small
likeliood of being terrorists. 3e$ent neo$onser(ati(es ado%t bot S$elling"s initial idea
tat un$ertainty $an moti(ate ado%ting te %referen$es of a %redator> moreo(er tat
ado%ting tese %referen$es ne$essitates figting e(il &it e(il. ,n essen$e, te *old +ar
argument tat un$ertainty and a )ero'toleran$e for risk rationali)es domination as
be$ome fully absorbed in 0S international %oli$y. 4e ;uestion, of $ourse, is &eter
tis rationali)ation %ro(ides a legitimate Eustifi$ation for te %ursuit of egemony in self'
defense, or &eter it is self'ser(ing to stri(e for unilateral su$$ess.
One re%er$ussion of te argument for dominan$e in self'defense, tat resonates
&it Mearseimer"s offensi(e realism, is te im%li$ation tat underlying te bid for
egemony is te real %oliti$k moti(ation of se$uring s$ar$e resour$es in $om%etition &it
oters. Of $ourse, as , a(e dis$ussed, Mearseimer"s offensi(e realism seeks to
rationali)e egemony as a stru$tural $ondition of te &orld, and not (ia te route of
un$ertainty %ioneered by S$elling and endorsed by te neo$onser(ati(es. Mearseimer
%ro%oses tat it is $ommon kno&ledge tat ea$ must be moti(ated to se$ure %o&er as a
$ondition of sur(i(al and %er%etuation. +ereas te neo$onser(ati(es" &orld is one of
%ursuing ideals, Mearseimer"s is one of material $onditions tat bind a$tors to a blind
logi$ of te ne$essity to a$$umulate resour$es and &ea%ons. ?ot s$ools, in a$$e%ting
June 1, 2009
@C
S.M. Amadae
tat se$urity as a )ero'sum $om%onent and tat self'defense re;uires aggression, %art
$om%any &it $lassi$ liberalism. 3andall S$&eller argues tat tis bid for dominan$e in
te name of se$urity essentially re%resents a form of fas$ism. 4e offensi(e realism state,
and, , add, te neo$onser(ati(e state is 5in %ra$ti$e, best $a%tured by a fas$ist state.6
22

4ere $an be no ;uestion tat S$elling inad(ertently and G04s %ro%onents,
neo$onser(ati(es, and offensi(e realists o(ertly, rationali)e egemony in self'defense.
Moreo(er, S$elling"s almost a$$idental argument for affe$ting te %referen$es of a
%redator, and is loose language stating te e;ui(alen$e of te Stage 8unt and te
!risoner"s dilemma, a(e normali)ed a !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy of tea$ing te !#
as toug it &ere a game form %o%ulated by o%eful $oo%erators &o must ado%t te
%referen$e for unilateral su$$ess %urely out of te moti(e of self'defense. 4ere $an be
no ;uestion tat te $ontentious debate bet&een MA# ad(o$ates and G04s %ro%onents,
and te ig'&ire tension o(er nu$lear brinkmansi%, ad te side effe$t of normali)ing
in our dis$ourse te need to ado%t te manners of an aggressor to %rote$t one"s interests.
Aittle as it been noti$ed tat tis sift of footing from mutual se$urity to se$urity as
antagonisti$, or from a Stag 8unt basis of te so$ial $ontra$t to a !risoner"s dilemma
basis, as made it se$ond nature to a$$e%t tat one agent"s se$urity $omes at te $ost of
anoter"s, and tat $lassi$ liberalism as failed.
22
S$&eller, 5Geo$lassi$al 3ealism and State Mobili)ation,6 in Ste(en /. Aobell, et. al.,
/eoclassical Realism, the State, and 0oreign Policy (*ambridge- *ambridge 0!, 2009),
22I'2C0> 270.
June 1, 2009
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S.M. Amadae
Please Come to our
Mutual Achievement
Celebration, 2008-9
7-11pm
June 1, 2009
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