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Christine Joy Maapoy

BSIE 2 - 2
Hypothetical Syllogism

[1]
In classical logic, hypothetical syllogism is a valid argument form which is a syllogism having a conditional
statement for one or both of its premises.
In propositional logic, hypothetical syllogism is the name of a valid rule of inference (often
abbreviated HS and sometimes also called the chain argument, chain rule, or the principle of transitivity of
implication). Hypothetical syllogism is one of the rules in classical logic that is not always accepted in
certain systems of non-classical logic. The rule may be stated:

where the rule is that whenever instances of " ", and " " appear on lines of a proof, "
" can be placed on a subsequent line.
[1]

[2]
The hypothetical judgment contains only the necessary relation without the immediacy of the related
terms. 'If A is, then B is'; or, the being of A is equally the being of another, of B; so far, it is not
stated either that A is,or that B is. The hypothetical syllogism adds this immediacy of being:
If A is, then B is,
But A is,
Therefore B is.
The minor premise by itself enunciates the immediate being of A.
But it is not only this that is added to the judgment. The syllogism contains the relation of subject and
predicate, not as the abstract copula, but as the pregnant mediating unity. Accordingly, the being
of A is to be taken not as a mere immediacy, but essentially as the middle term of the syllogism. This is
to be examined more closely.
In the first place, the relation of the hypothetical judgment is necessity or inner substantial
identity associated with external diversity of Existence, or mutual indifference of being in the sphere
of Appearance an identical content which forms the internal basis. The two sides of the judgment
therefore do not appear as an immediate being but as a being held within the necessity and thus at the
same time as sublated being or being only in the sphere of Appearance. Further, as sides of the
judgment they stand to one another as universality and individuality; one of them, therefore, is the
above content as totality Of conditions, the other as actuality. It is, however, indifferent which side is
taken as universality and which as individuality. That is to say, in so far as the conditions are still
the inner, abstract side of an actuality, they are the universal, and it is through their being gathered
together into an individuality that they enter into actuality. Conversely, the conditions are a separated,
scattered Appearance which only in actuality obtains unity and significance and a universally valid
existence.

[1]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_syllogism
[2]
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl696.htm
[3]
http://www.rawlogic.com/wwwboard/messages/288.html
[4]
http://www.philosophy-index.com

The precise relation between the two sides that has here been assumed as the relation of condition
and conditioned, may however also be taken as that of cause and effect, of ground and consequent
here this is indifferent; but the relation of condition corresponds more closely to the relation that
obtains in the hypothetical judgment and syllogism, inasmuch as condition appears essentially as an
indifferent Existence, whereas ground and cause are spontaneously transitive [ubergehend]; also
condition is a more universal determination in that it comprehends both sides of the above relations,
since effect, consequent, etc., is just as much condition of the cause, ground, etc., as the latter are of
the former.
Now A is the mediating being in so far as first it is an immediate being, an indifferent actuality, and
secondly, in so far as it is no less an intrinsically contingent, self-sublating being. What translates the
conditions into the actuality of the new shape whose conditions they are is the fact that they are not
being in its abstract immediacy, but being in its Notion, in the first instance, becoming; but as the
Notion is no longer transition they are more specifically individuality as self-related negative unity.
The conditions are a scattered material that waits and demands to be used; this negativity is the
mediating element, the free unity of the Notion. It determines itself asactivity, since this middle term
is the contradiction of the objective universality or the totality of the identical content, and
the indifferent immediacy. This middle term is therefore no longer merely an inner necessity, but
anecessity that is; the objective universality contains self-relation as a simple immediacy, as being; in
the categorical syllogism this moment is in the first instance a determination of the extremes, but as
against the objective universality of the middle term it determines itself as contingency, consequently,
as something only posited and also sublated, that is, as something withdrawn into the Notion or into
the middle term as unity, which middle term itself in its objectivity is now also being.
The conclusion, 'therefore B is', expresses the same contradiction, that B is in the form
of immediate being, but equally has its being through an other, or is mediated. In respect of its form,
therefore, it is the same Notion that the middle term is, distinguished from necessity only as
the necessary in the wholly superficial form of individuality as against universality. The
absolute content of A and B is the same; they are only two different names for the same underlying
fact for ordinary thinking [Vorstellung] which clings to the appearance of the diversified shape of
determinate being and distinguishes between the necessary and its necessity; but in so far as this
necessity were to be separated from B, B would not be the necessary. Thus we have here the identity
of the mediating and the mediated.
The hypothetical syllogism in the first instance exhibits necessary relation as connection through the
form or negative unity, just as the categorical syllogism exhibits through the positive unity, substantial
content, objective universality. But necessity collapses into the necessary; the form-activity of
translating the conditioning into the conditioned actuality is in itself the unity in which the
determinatenesses of the opposition, that previously were liberated into an indifferent determinate
existence, are sublated, and the difference of A and B is an empty name. Thus it is a unity reflected


into itself hence an identical content; and it is so not merely implicitly but it is also posited as such
through this syllogism, in that the being of A is also not its own but B's, and vice versa, and in general
the being of one is the being of the other, and in the conclusion the immediate being or indifferent
determinateness appears specifically as mediated; the externality of the determinatenesses has
therefore sublated itself and their unity into which they have withdrawn is posited.
The mediation of the syllogism has hereby determined itself as individuality, immediacy, and as self-
related negativity, or as an identity that differentiates itself and gathers itself into itself out of that
difference as absolute form, and for that very reason as objective universality, a content that is
identical with itself. The syllogism in this determination is the disjunctive syllogism.
[2]
Valid and Invalid Structures

[3]
Hypothetical syllogisms (conditional arguments) can have two valid and two invalid structures. The two
valid structures are affirming the antecedent (modus ponens) and denying the consequent (modus tollens).
The two invalid structures, or fallacies, are denying the antecedent and affirming the consequent.
[3]


Valid Structures


[4]
Modus ponendo ponens, usually simply called modus ponens or MP is a valid argument form in logic. It
is also known as "affirming the antecedent" or "the law of detachment".
The form of modus ponens is: "If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q." It may also be written as:
P Q, P Q

If the cake is made with sugar, then the cake is sweet.
The cake is made with sugar.
Therefore, the cake is sweet.
If Sam was born in Canada, then he is Canadian.
Sam was born in Canada.
Therefore, Sam is Canadian.


Modus tollendo tollens, usually simply called modus tollens or MT is a valid argument form in logic. It is
also known as "denying the consequent".
The form of modus tollens is: "If P, then Q. Not Q. Therefore, not P." It may also be written as:
P Q, Q P
P and Q may represent any proposition, or any other formula (using Greek letters to represent formulas
rather than propositions, we may also express modus tollens as , ).


[1]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_syllogism
[2]
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl696.htm
[3]
http://www.rawlogic.com/wwwboard/messages/288.html
[4]
http://www.philosophy-index.com

If the cake is made with sugar, then the cake is sweet.
The cake is not sweet.
Therefore, the cake is not made with sugar.
If Sam was born in Canada, then he is Canadian.
Sam is not Canadian.
Therefore, Sam was not born in Canada.

Invalid Structures
Denying the antecedent is a logical fallacy, committed by an invalid argument form "If P then Q. Not P.
Therefore, not Q.".
,
The argument is invalid because for some reason other than .
If the car breaks down, we'll be late for the movie.
The car won't break down.
So, we won't be late for the movie.
This argument can be demonstrated as invalid by the case that we're late for the movie for some
reason other than the car breaking down, such as a traffic jam.

Affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy, committed by an invalid argument form If P then Q. Q.
Therefore, P.
,
The argument is invalid because for some reason other than .
If I win the lottery, I will buy a new car.
I will buy a new car.
Therefore, I will win the lottery.
This argument can be demonstrated as invalid by the case that I buy a new car with money that I
earned from a lucrative career in philosophy, having failed to win the lottery.
[4]

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