REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

Second Division

LEONILA C. NAJERA,
Petitioner,


- versus - CA-G.R. SP NO. 136155

RUDY DE ASIS,
Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

COMMENT TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Respondent, RUDY DE ASIS, through counsel, in compliance
with the Honorable Courts Resolution dated 23 July 2014, a copy of
which was received on 26 August 2014, respectfully submits his
Comment to the Petition for Review dated 08 July 2014 and
respectfully states that:

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

1. Petitioner Najeras petition for review should be denied
due course because the Regional Trial Court properly reversed the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court finding that petitioner can
validly eject the respondent from the leased premises based on the
following reasons:

1.1. Petitioner was not able to prove her
case for unlawful detainer against respondent
by a preponderance of evidence.

1.2. The Metropolitan Trial Court did not
have jurisdiction over petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer and so any decision it made
in the case at bar can only be void.

1.3. There being no case for unlawful
detainer, respondent De Asis is not liable for
unpaid rentals, attorneys fees and costs.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner was not able to prove
her case for unlawful detainer
against respondent by a
preponderance of evidence.


2. It is settled that that a party who has the burden of
proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action by a
preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in
equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of
evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and the
petition/complaint must thus be denied.
1


3. As correctly held by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner Najera
failed to establish her cause of action against the respondent
by a preponderance of evidence.

4. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of
possession of real property. This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
2
In another case,
the Supreme Court held that the possession of the defendant
may also be lawful if allowed by the mere tolerance of the
owner. The subject matter in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer is merely the material possession or possession de
facto over the real property. Two questions then arise and is
determinative in such a case: a.) Who had actual possession
over the piece of real property?
3
; and b.) Was there a lease
contract between the petitioner and the respondent?
4


5. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Corpuz v. Sps.
Agustin: Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and
sufficiently proven.
5


6. The evidence presented by petitioner, as correctly found by
the Regional Trial court, was insufficient to prove the
existence of a contract of lease between petitioners mother
Natividad and respondent De Asis whether written or verbal.

1
Rivera v. CA, G.R. No. 115625, January 23, 1998.
2
Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012.
3
Dizon v. Concina, 30 SCRA 897, G.R. No. L-23756, December 27, 1969
4
Alvir v. Vera, 130 SCRA 357
5
Corpuz v. Sps. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012
The certifications presented by petitioner Najeras witnesses
that they themselves were lessees of Natividad hardly proves
the existence of a contract of lease between petitioner Najera
and respondent. Further, the notebook entries relied upon by
the Metropolitan Trial Court to prove a lessor-lessee
relationship have little or no evidentiary value insofar as the
Metropolitan Trial Court did not even examine the authenticity
of such entries, that is, whether it was indeed Natividad
Cachola who wrote them and that the contents of the entries
themselves, Bahay/Rody and Tubig/Rody is inadequate to
establish a contract of lease between the parties.

7. Before petitioner can prove that respondent has illegally
possessed or occupied the subject lot, she must first prove
her actual prior possession to it law in order to establish her
case for unlawful detainer. This she failed to do. Meanwhile,
respondent De Asis has been able to submit the relevant
evidence of the joint affidavit of Imelda Manggat and a Benie
Gutierrez who were present when Natividad spoke with the
respondent and who attest in their affidavit that during that
particular conversation, nothing was ever said about the
respondent paying rentals to Natividad. Evidence that
contradicts petitioners allegation that a contract of lease had
existed between petitioners mother Natividad and respondent
De Asis.

8. Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court had also correctly found
that respondent De Asis was in prior, actual physical
possession of the subject lot. Actual possession of which
entitles him to be maintained and respected in such a position
even against the owner himself as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Garcia v. Anas
6
.

9. Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court relied heavily if
not solely on the Memorandum of Appeal filed by the
Respondent and thereby lost sight of the documentary
evidence of petitioner.

10. The Regional Trial Court did not disregard the evidence
presented by petitioner. In fact, in its Decision, the Regional
Trial Court referred to the documentary evidence of petitioner
particularly: a.) the Certification from the World War II

6
Garcia v. Anas, GR No. L-20617, May 31, 1965.
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,Inc; and b.) the joint
affidavit of Maricar Polon and Benjamin Nadalo.

11. However as stated in its Decision, the Regional Trial Court
found that despite the presence of such documentary
evidence, the evidence adduced by petitioner taken together
as a whole was still insufficient to discharge the burden of
evidence required of her by law in order to establish her claim
against respondent for ejectment (unlawful detainer), unpaid
rental fees and cost of the suit. As found by the Regional Trial
Court in weighing the probative value of the Certification of the
WWII VLP that petitioner Najera has inherited the possession
of the subject lot in this case:

The right of World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines [WWLP for short[ to award the subject
property appears to be wanting of authority or colourable
title in the first place. Thus they cannot award right of
possession over the property of the Government for which
they have no right at all.

12. Petitioner Najera protests against the citation by the Regional
Trial Court of the case of Pinlac v. Court of Appeals in its
Decision claiming that such case is totally unrelated to the
case at bar. However, it is the respondents position that it is
not altogether correct to state that the case of Pinlac v. Court
of Appeals has totally no relation to the case at bar. If nothing
else, the aforementioned case serves to present a comparison
between the applicability of the right of the World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines (WWII VLP) as
recognized by the Supreme Court over certain parcels of land
as well as the differentiation the court made between WWII
VLP itself and the individual veterans who are members of the
said organization. It would not be wrong then to say that the
case of Pinlac is relevant insofar as it raises questions on the
title, right and interest of WWII VLP on certain parcels of land
since petitioner bases her right of possession over the subject
lot on the certification made by the latter organization.

13. In the case of Pinlac, the Supreme Court Resolution which
recognized the World War II veterans as absolute owners of a
Lot 1 was limited only to a Lot 1 located at Old Balara,
Diliman and did not cover Veterans Village, Pasong Tamo
where the property of the subject matter of the instant case
lies. This is relevant because such would raise the question of
whether or not the WWII VLP has any right or interest at all in
the land on which the subject lot is located. Furthermore, in
the said resolution, it was the individual members who were
declared absolute owners of the subject lots in that case and
not the organization.
That in the first place the
Metropolitan Trial Court did not
have jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint for
unlawful detainer and so any
decision it made in the case at
bar can only be void.

14. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Delos Reyes v.
Spouses Odones that:

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
7


15. It is respondents position that petitioner failed to properly
allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer in her complaint
thus depriving the Metropolitan Trial Court jurisdiction over it.

16. First, petitioners complaint failed to allege that possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the petitioner Najera. Petitioners complaint
merely stated that the defendant was in possession of the
subject lot by virtue of a contract with petitioners mother,
Natividad. Nor did the complaint allege the fact that
respondent De Asis possessed the property by tolerance of
the petitioner. In a case decided by the Supreme Court
wherein it found that the complaint was that of a forcible entry

7
Delos Reyes v. Sps. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011.
and not an unlawful detainer, the Supreme Court came to
such a conclusion because no averment there is in the
complaint which recites as a fact any overt act on
plaintiffs' part indicative of permission to occupy the land.
8


17. Second, petitioners complaint failed to allege that respondent
De Asis ever deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the
subject lot. As stated in petitioner Najeras complaint, she had
the same address as that of respondent. Furthermore, as later
on claimed by petitioner in her petition for review, she had
actual possession of the land.

That there being no case for
unlawful detainer, respondent
De Asis is not liable for unpaid
rentals, attorneys fees and
costs.

17. As discussed above, petitioner Najera failed to completely
substantiate her claim of unlawful detainer against respondent De
Asis. She was not the actual possessor of the subject property prior
to the possession of respondent De Asis, her mother Natividad
Cachola having surrendered possession of the subject property to
respondent De Asis in 2000. Neither was there a lessor-lessee
relationship between respondent and petitioner from which petitioner
can derive her claim. Lastly, petitioner Najera cannot be considered
the rightful possessor because World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines right to the subject lot, which supposedly
recognized her and Natividad as the beneficiaries to the subject lot, is
even doubtful and have not been established by petitioner Najera.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays that the
Honorable Court deny the Petition for Review and affirm the decision
of the Regional Trial Court which reversed the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Quezon City for Manila, 5 September 2014.

U.P. OFFICE OF LEGAL AID
Counsel for Respondent
Ground Floor, Malcolm Hall
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

8
Sarona et al. v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968.
Tel. No.: 9276260/Telefax: 9205514 loc.
106




By:



ROWENA E.V. DAROY-MORALES
Director
Roll of Attorneys No. 39129
MCLE Exemption No. IV-000545/15 Feb
13/ Pasig City
IBP No. LPN-04130 / Lifetime Member /
Quezon City
PTR No. 7621780 / 10-Jan-13 / Quezon
City



JOSE M. JOSE
Supervising Lawyer
Roll No. 35861
IBP No. 913771/Jan. 2,2013/Pasig City
PTR No. 0518515/Jan. 2, 2013/San
Juan City
MCLE Compliance No. III-0014917/
May 12,2010/ Pasig City



VANESSA ARRHA A. DE LEON
Law Intern

Copy furnished:
ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL
Counsel for Petitioner
Tower C AntelSeaview Towers
2626 Roxas Blvd., Pasay City







EXPLANATION ON THE MODE OF SERVICE
Copy of the foregoing comment was served to The Honorable
Court of Appeals and adverse counsel in view of the lack of available
personnel and resources at the UP Office of Legal Aid to effect
personal service.


VANESSA ARRHA A. DE LEON
Law Intern