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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) field sitevisit
Typeof event: Interview with CINC NORAD (Commander in ChiefNORAD), General
Ralph Edward Eberhart DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PA EL,
Date: March 1,2004 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Special Access Issues: Clearance check ISCAP APPEAL 0.2012-042, document no. 29
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014
TeamNumber: 8
Location: Peterson Air Force Base, Building 2
Participants - Non-Commission: Colonel David Hayden (U.S. Army), Colonel Punch
Moulton (U.S. Air Force)
Participants - Commission: Team8: J ohn Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown. J ohn Farmer,
Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer
Note: Please refer totherecorded interview for further details.
Background:
Eberhart hadbeen part of themilitary for 33years on September 11, 2001 (9/11),
andhad been afour star general for fiveyears.
Please refer totheattached biography for acomprehensive record of Eberhart's
career.
Debate over the relevance of NORAD:
,
Thetwo major factors that contributed to thedeclined importance of NORAD's
air defense mission were: 1) theSoviet Union development of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) - thus changing thelikelihood of atraditional bomber/fighter air
attack; and2) afterwards, therelative endof the Cold War threat after thebreak up of the
Soviet Union. A common thought that stemmed fromtheabovefactors was that the air
defense mission ofNORAD could bedistributed amongst sites that could perform
multiple missions. Thepriority was to"recapitalize andre-modernize" the forces for the
future. Eberhart noted: "I'veargued both sides of that." [Note: Eberhart was theVice
Chief of USAF between 1997and 1999, andthus engaged inthedebate over NORAD
funding. He seemed infavor of using regular Air Force assets, vice theNational Guard,
for alert duty. Hecommented that it could be"cheaper andbetter" to do so, andwould
assist with themodernization of theforce.]
Asymmetric threats:
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According toEberhart, prior to9/11 asymmetric threats were seen aspart of
national security's "away game" instead of its "home game". These threats included
cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or computer systems threats.
Though theclassic attrition warfare ascribed totheCold War was unlikely, asymmetric
threats were not scene as adomestic priority for NORAD. Most thoughts ondomestic
terrorismwere tied to thecircumstance ofthe Oklahoma City bombing, and thus alaw
enforcement issue.
NORAD considered itself least prepared torespond tocruise missiles during the
Soviet era. Afterwards, with thedisbanding of theSoviet Union, as stockpiles of weapons
were less stringently monitored, andas thetechnology to create a"poor man's" cruise
missile became disseminated, NORAD considered it possible for terrorist organizations
to employ cruisemissiles. This was NORAD's primary terrorist-related concern.
Air Sovereignty in name only:
Eberhart held thesameconcerns as General Myers upon his ascendancy to the
position of CINC NORAD, which included thenotion that NORAD could only provide
"token sovereignty" for CONUS airspace. They both believed theability tohave air
traffic control and aerospace control was undergoing aprocess of atrophy. He
commented that it was very difficult to express theimportance of thethreat before 9/11,
but had developed aNAASC (North American Air Surveillance Council) to address this
concern.
TheNAASC was ableto stopanFAA proposal to disable the ability to track
primary targets onradar, andNORADIF AA attempted to create afunding-sharing
arrangement. Themoney was allotted with theassumption that GPS (global positioning
satellite) technology would replace theradar technology. Eberhart stated that NORAD
went onrecord, viatheNAASC, for theneed to sharetheair surveillance financial
burden across theDoD (Department of Defense) andtheDoT (Department of
Transportation). He commented: "Without 9/11wewould have likely lost that fight.
Everyone agreed, but didn't want topay for it or thought that new technology would
come online" toreplace thetechnical difficulties. Succinctly, Eberhart opinedthat if 9/11
had not occurred therewould havebeen no fmancial will topay for new radar capability.
J oint FAAINORAD training:
Eberhart explained that prior to 9/11 therewas not much interest between the
FAA andNORAD to shareinexercises. The FAA priority was to servethe economic
needs of theair traffic, whereas NORAD at times would be seenby theFAA as
infringing onthis priority by theuseof air spacein exercises.
Eberhart noted that prior to 9/11theroleof theFAA innational securi ty was to
vector NORAD assets towards atarget inbound to CONUS.
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Pre-9f11 law enforcement events:
Eberhart explained that therole ofNORAD in CONUS events is torespond in
support of thelead federal agency, just astheNational Guard, aspart of themilitary,
supports law enforcement incertain events.
NORAD's external focus canbeattributed partially tono documented indication
of athreat akinto the 9/11 attacks having reached aCINC NORAD.
Matrix of primary threats pre-9f11 :
Oneof theprimary threats Eberhart was aware ofpre-9111 was the"slimchance"
that thepolitico-military events inRussia would destabilize tothepoint at which an
attack would beinitiated. This possibility necessitated constant vigilance over theADIZ
(Air Defense Identification Zones)..
Another primary concern at NORAD was its important role astheeyes andears
of theu.s. external drug mission. Thedifference between NORAD's projected missions
and the9/11 attacks, according toEberhart, was that in fulfilling NORAD's air
sovereignty anddefense missions, whether insupport of other U.S. agencies or not, the
threats NORAD was tasked with always originated fromoutside of CONUS, andin
externally originated events there ismoretimeto coordinate asuccessful response.
To illustrate NORAD's focus, Eberhart commented that NORAD had never "set
up" aCAP (Combat Air Patrol) programprior to 9/11 because it was animpractical tactic
for useincountering thetypes of air threats NORAD was tasked with defending against,
such as longrange air-to-surface missiles. Theonly practical anddeveloped response
would havebeen that which NORAD practiced for - toneutralize theICBM's airborne
delivery systembefore launch. Further, Eberhart noted that themission to intercept an
airborne intercontinental threat at 0.8mach does not translate tothe law enforcement
mission that has now been tasked toNORAD by thePresident.
Regarding theFAA's rolein air defense, Eberhart noted that hebelieves the FAA
thought 1) airport security would have been more robust; and2) that any hijack would
havebeen a"classic" hijack. Both thesemisconceptions led totheir lack of preparedness
on9/11.
Moving towards 9/11 in history:
Eberhart explained that it quickly became obvious tohimafter thefall of the
Soviet Union, through the oldWarsaw pact posturing andthe "saber rattling" of Sadaam
Hussein, that theworld was "far more dangerous" than it had been. But because of the
separation of theocean fromthesethreats, Eberhart had always viewed themilitary as
fighting an"away game" intheMiddle East andinEastern Europe. When hecameto
. NORAD in2000, hewas concerned withballistic missile defense. Hewas also concerned
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with "finding away ahead with cruise missile defense", andstopping theatrophy of the
radar capability.
Eberhart commented to Commission staff that he still does not know "exactly
what theintelligence community had" regarding thepossibility of anattack likethat of
9/11, but ifthe intelligence community had hadinformation that postulated aterrorist
group would attack anurban setting with anaircraft, then that information would been
passed toNORAD. Further, according to Eberhart, NORAD didpostulate an air attack
fromabroad prior to 9/11, but inall theproposed scenarios: 1) theaircraft would be
squawking; 2) theairlinepilots would beincockpit control, not theterrorists; and 3)
NORAD would have asubstantial period of timetoreact, andtopass ROE through the
appropriate National Command Authority.
TheRussian threat re-emergent:
Theposturing that was present on9/11 was respondent to Russian military
operations, andEberhart commented that there was intrinsic experiential value to
posturing tomeet thepotential threat fromtheRussian operations.
9/11:
Eberhart received acall at 6:45AM MDT (Mountain Daily Time, or 8:45AM
EDT) fromCMOC's Command Director (CD) that informed himof theongoing
circumstance ofa suspected hijacking on theEast Coast. Hewas toldthat this was anon-
exercise. Hewent tohis office, and sawtheCNN broadcast ofthe World Trade Center
explosion; Heasked if theaircraft that was suspected of impacting theWorld Trade
Center was thesame aircraft that was asuspected hijack, andwas told that they were not.
Eberhart commented that there was apparently "great confusion inthe system". After the
second impact, it was "obvious" toEberhart that therewas anongoing andcoordinated
terrorist attack. Heattempted to contact the Chairman of theJ oint Chiefs of Staff (CJ CS),
but was unable sincethe CJ CS was airborne at thetime. Sohe immediately contacted
higher command authority at thePentagon. Eberhart stayed at Building 1(US Space
Command, which hewas also theCommander of), sincehedidnot want to loose
communication. Hewent to theCheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) later in
themorning.
After Otis ANGB scramble:
Eberhart had trust in thecommanders ofthe sectors and theauthority at CONR,
andthus hadno involvement with vectoring the fighters. He didnotethat ifhe heard
(while monitoring thedecisions of his commanders) anorder hedidnot agree with, he
would counter theorder; but for most incidents hehas confidence inhis commanders. He
noted that incross-border operations hetakes more of anactiverole.
Eberhart stayed incommunication with General Myers. Hebelieves hemoved his
operations to Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) at approximately
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9:30EMT. Hebelieves that hewas traveling to CMOC whileboth Delta Flight 1989[On
9/11, Delta 1989was mistakenly reported hijacked.) andUnited Airlines Flight 93(VAL
93) [UAL 93crashed inPennsylvania at 10:03:11(NTSB).] wereongoing events. He
believes hereported toCheyenne Mountain asUAL 93was ongoing.
Langley at Battle Stations:
Eberhart noted that onhis communication loop it had"quieted down" before he
made thedecision to goto CMOC.
Langley scramble and the rebirth of AAL 11:
Eberhart hadnoknowledge of thecircumstance that initiated thescramble of the
Langley fighters. Hewas only made aware of the circumstance recently. [Note:
Commission staff believes that afalserumor that AAL 11was still airborne after 8:46:40
EDT (NTSB time of impact) andheaded enroute to Washington, D.C. was thecause for
theLangley scramble. This is evident through analysis of theNEADS Mission Crew
Commander recording fromposition MCC Op 2.]
Threat to Chicago:
Eberhart recalls concern over responding with capable assets to anaircraft that
was reported headed towards Chicago. Eberhart informed Commission staffthat he
believed the Sears Tower was alikely target.
American Airlines Flight 77 (AAL 77) [Impact at thePentagon at 9:37:45 (NTSB)]:
Eberhart recalls that General Arnold, Commander of Continental United States
Aerospace Defense Region (CONR), gave information that aplane "might have been" in
thevicinity of Washington, D.C.
Authority for Interceptor Operations (AFIO):
Eberhart hadnocomment ontheLangley fighters AFrO [Also known as Quad 7,
since afighter transponds "7777" when declaring AFIO] declaration, and only noted that
when afighter achieves certain levels of mach theweaponry onthe fighters may not
work upon arrival toatarget.
Delta 1989 and the circumstance with VAL 93:
Commission staff represented toEberhart partial results of its investigation.
Eberhart commented that Delta 1989andUAL 93may havebeen interchanged. He
commented that heunderstands that there is "support" for this theory.
Vice President's order:
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Eberhart noted that the VP order occurred slightly prior to his arrival at CMOC.
Henoted that heindicated by theway theorder was input through theNORAD
communications systemthat anairliner would have to display a"hostile act" before the a
shoot down order would occur. Eberhart believes that General Findley informed himof
theVP order. He reacted that to shoot-down anairplane based on its location was an
extreme act. The order had already been communicated down chain when hearrived at
CMOC, sohecommunicated to CONR that they should still look for ahostile act. He
viewed his direction as specificity, not countermanding. Eberhart noted that theburden of
making thedecision topass anorder authorizing the engagement of acommercial airliner
"pales incomparison to theburden ontheperson who would pull thetrigger" - Eberhart
used this comment to indicate that heunderstands that there is "no onewho wants to do
this less than the fighter pilot". Hecommented that if thepilot saw"the nose down, no
landing gear, high speed" - then this couldbeconstrued as ahostile act; but nomatter
what thecircumstance, thepilot would look towards his command for anindication of
what todo.
Eberhart assumed that theorder was passed to the level of the fighter pilot. "Rules
of engagement areonly good if those engaged know therules".
Eberhart spent time in thedays thereafter 9111on efforts to formulate proper and
formal specificity of ROE to bepassed tohis commands.
Weapons-free:
Eberhart noted that General Worley didnot have the authority to give a
"weapons-free" order. Eberhart commented that aNORADpilot is not under Worley's
command, andthus would not operateunder that order. Further, theAndrews AFB pilots
under Worley's command should haveknown that Worley didnot have that authority,
andthus would ideally have still lookedtowards ahigher command authority for
specificity and direction.
Eberhart commented that afighter pilot istrained only to become weapons-free
after ahostile target is identified.
Eberhart noted that the fighters' Command andControl eC2) through NEADS
rested onhis authority; whereas the air traffic control of the fighters rested with theFAA.
Eberhart noted that despite the communication difficulties there is almost always away
tocommunicate through relays tothefighter pilots.
DEFCON 3 declaration:
Eberhart explained that therewas adebate over the advantages anddisadvantages
of declaring DEFCON 3, andbelieves thePentagon initiated theDEFCON 3transition.
Eberhart commented that DEFCON 3was not intended for the attacks of9/11, andthus
could have complicated theresponse tothe attacks. Eberhart did not think it would have
. "done anything for us" within CONUS. [Commission staff believes General Myers was
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responsible for DEFCON 3inorder to increase thereadiness posture of U.S. global
forces inlight of thepossibility that theCONUS attacks would befollowed by attacks on
U.S. forces abroad.]
Eberhart conunented that "Transition ROE didn't changewhat wehad already
told them(pilots)". [According to theLangley pilots' Commission interview Transition
ROE certainly had asignificant effect ontheir thought process.]
SCATANA:
Eberhart was concerned onthe"unintended casualties" of declaring SCATANA -
the military was not prepared and/or postured to take over theUnited States airspace
since therewere still ongoing lawenforcement andgeneral aviation aircraft airborne. He
directed theNORAD planning officeandtheFAA representative to write amodified
SCATANA that allowed for certain necessary flights. Eberhart called SCATANA a
"Cold War relic", andnoted that SCATANA is designed to sterilize anarea for the
purpose of aircraft identification asfriend or foe; thus, intheevent of an air attack by the
Russian military, theRussians would not beabletouseU.S. navigational aids totheir
advantage. .
Post-9/11:
Eberhart noted that theevents of 9/11were discussed at thetactical, strategic and
operational levels of NORAD. Time-distance warning was recognized as afactor that
"complicated the day"; which ledtotheDEN (Defense Event Network) line, liaisons
between theFAA andthemilitary andgreater radar inter-operability. Further, thealert
base missions were evaluated inconjunction with key infrastructure andmajor population
centers. Certain "air defense levels" were developed that could beimplemented within
time intervals (twenty minutes beingthequickest possible escalation of an air defense
level). This ledto recommendations towards ''tiered air defense alert levels" - levels that
servealongtermgoal for appropriate responses provided tothePresident given
escalating air defense threats.
Eberhart noted that it isnecessary for thedata link system- which allows for
target identification tobepassed fromoneIn systemto another - to beimplemented
directly fromthe FAA toNEADS, andfromNEADS to theintercepting fighter aircraft.
Timelines of events on 9/11:
According to Eberhart, thetimelines developed for NORAD of the 9/11 attacks
indicate that there were difficulties with notification andwith communicating ROE.
Eberhart commented that though thosetimelines "were not exactly correct" they were
used to address theoperational faults of theday.
Eberhart stated that in"noway" werethetimelines created as a"falsification of
thetruth", andthat they were compiled withbest intent. Commission staff represented to
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Eberhart thetimelinefacts that havebeen compiled by itsresearch. Eberhart, after being
presented with these facts, commented that hedoes not knowwho was tasked with
compiling thetimelines for NORAD, andthat whenever NORAD is shown that there is
something wrong with thetimeline, they adjust it. He commented that "no onehas ever
discussed that with mebefore", regarding thedifferences between theNORAD official
timeline andthe facts uncovered by Commission staff. [Note: Upon further interviews at
NORAD, Commission staff learned that Eberhart was briefed ontheNORAD timeline in
advance of Commission interviews, andthis briefing was basedon thetimelinedelivered
to Commission staff onFebruary 23, 2004. Eberhart denied inthecourse of this interview
that hehad ever been exposed to theaforementioned timeline.]
Eberhart also statedthat thenewest NORAD timeline [delivered to Commission
staff onFebruary 23,2004] was likely theresult of his "standing order" to correct the
record of events whenever possible.
Commission May 2003 Hearing:
Eberhart reviewed theprepared statement of General Arnold prior to it being sent
to theCommission. Hehas also reviewed atranscript of thehearing, but said hehadno
rolein creating thetimeline that was presented [Thetimeline presented to the
Commission in May of2003 was compiled by Colonel Scott (ret.) ofCONR]. Eberhart
stated that he spoke with General McKinley (thecurrent Commander at CONR)
following thehearing, andwas not pleased.
Recommendations:
Eberhart believes the"biggest challenge right now iswhat arethey (terrorists)
thinking about doing that we're not practicing for or equipped for". Eberhart commented
that within that challenge there is adilemma between confidence for theAmerican
people, deterrence against theaggressor, andtheground truth of capability.
Eberhart has concerns over a"complacent crew" in anaircraft who might have
terrorist intentions.
Eberhart opined that the effort to unify thelanguage between theFAA and
NORAD has been successful. Heisworried however that over time this relationship may
become less proactive,
Eberhart commented that theNational Guard ownership ofthe NORAD mission
is appropriate, andthat thereis no reason to move themission back to theactive duty
military. Eberhart noted that for the"budgeted years" there isenough resource to execute
thecurrent NORAD mission.
Eberhart commented that hehas found thequality of theintelligence information
sharing tobe"very good". Hehas found great value in interrogation of terrorists at
Guantanamo Bay and inlawenforcement intelligence sharing.
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Eberhart commented that heknows of no need fromNORAD for achange in
Posse Comitatus, but that if aneedpresented itself then it will bechanged.
Eberhart commented that thereis currently ascramble plan that has been
developed sothat fighter pilots know exactly how toreachthe likely air patrol areas
unless they arepaired with aspecific target. These efforts have been coordinated with the
FAA.
Eberhart "personally thinks" that theground to air defense measures that arein
place currently areappropriate, andthat theefforts made toimplement suchmeasures on
individual event bases areongoing, considered for each event, and also appropriate.
9/11 in American history:
Eberhart hopes thewar onterrorismwill bewon, andthat therewill beno
animosity to aspecific ethnicity. Hebelieves that theU.S. will know it has won when the
roots - poverty andunemployment - that spawn terrorismare attacked.
Follow up:
Eberhart was not aware that NORAD issued theCommission anew timeline after
its CONR interviews. Eberhart reviewed General Arnold andColonel Scott's prepared
statements for theCommission hearing inMay of2003. General McKinley briefed
Eberhart on thehearing. Eberhart didnot focus or participate inany high level
reconstruction of theattacks for review andrelease totheAmerican public immediately
thereafter 9/11. He answered Commission staff that hewas not involved in any effort to
"spin" theevents of 9/11. Eberhart answered Commission staff that there isno reason in
his knowledge that Commander Marr would not represent theground facts ofthe 9/11
attacks to theCommission.
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