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1. Florentino v. PNB
Doctrine: Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur
sententia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless
the context otherwise requires.
Petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel it to
accept the backpay certificate of Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by
the Republic of the Philippines
o Payment for an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum
of P6,800 secured by a real estate mortgage on certain properties.
Law in question: Section 2 of RA 897
o xxx for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or
to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or
controlled by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to
any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

ISSUE: W/N qualifying clause who may be willing to accept the same for
settlement refers to all antecedents the Government, any of its branches
or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government, etc.," (PNBs contention) or only the last antecedent any
citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines. (Florentinos contention)?

RATIO: LAST ANTECEDENT ONLY. Florentino is correct.
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent;
that is, any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines. It should be noted that there
is a comma before the words or to any citizen, etc.," which separates
said phrase from the preceding ones.
Also, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory
upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government
entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2
of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional.
Note: PNB does not fall under the last antecedent. Therefore, it does not
have the option to deny the acceptance of the backpay certificate.

2. Mapa v. Arroyo
Doctine: Same
Mapa seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President
which dismissed his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper,
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and affirming the decision of
Office of Adjudication and Legal Affairs of HSRC. Petitioner avers that
public respondent gravely transcended the sphere of his discretion in
finding that PD 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in this
case and in consequently dismissing the same.
SEC. 20. Time of Completion.Every owner or developer shall
construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and
other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities,
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in
any form of advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance
of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other
period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

ISSUE: WON the demonstrative phrase which are offered and indicated
in the approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of
development and not to facilities, improvements and infrastructures.?
NO.

RATIO:
And is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to
denote a joinder or union.
We reject petitioners strained and tenuous application of the so called
doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and,
correlatively, of Section 21.
He would thereby have the enumeration of facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development interpreted to mean that
the demonstrative phrase which are offered and indicated in the
approved subdivision plans, etc. refer only to other forms of
development and not to facilities, improvements and infrastructures.
While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation, whereby the supposed
adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and
erroneous.
The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio
nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent,
unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the
employment of the word and between facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, far from supporting
petitioners theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal
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hermeneutics that and is not meant to separate words but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or union.

3. People v. Tamani
Doctrine: REDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS (refering each to each;
distributive)
This is an appeal of Teodoro Tamani from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, sentencing him to life imprisonment for the
murder of Jose Siyang and attempted murder of Domingo and ordering
him to indemnify the victims heirs.
The lower courts decision convicting defendant Tamani was
promulgated on February 14, 1963. A copy thereof was served on his
counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served
by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendants counsel through his
wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if
the reglementary fifteenday period for appeal should be computed from
the date of notification and not from the date of promulgation of the
decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or
fortyeight days from July 24th.
Law in question: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must
be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period, for perfecting an appeal
shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the
defendant or his attorney.

ISSUE: WON the appeal must be counted from the date of the notification
and not from the date of promulgation, if the counting would refer to the
issuance of the decision? NO.

RULING:
Appeal lies 15 days from promulgation of judgment in criminal cases.
o The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from
February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served en
appellants counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken.
o The word promulgation in section 6 should be construed as referring
to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as referring to
order. That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula
singulis: referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
words should be taken distributively.

4. Amadora v. CA
Doctrine: REDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
Law in question: Article 2180 of the Civil Code:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody.

ISSUE: WON the heads of establishment should be liable for the acts of
the pupils and students? NO.

RULING:
o Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and
students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word
apprentices.

5. Atienza v. Villarosa
Doctrine: Doctrine of necessary implication
Basically, the question is whether it is the Governor or the Vice-
Governor who is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in
connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment,
including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Law in question: Vice Governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

ISSUE: WON the authority granted to the Vice Governor to sign all
warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the SP as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority
to approve purchase orders covering the same? YES.

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RULING: The doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied
in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressedevery
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms.

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an allembracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the
future. So called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of
the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication.

The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This
is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in
eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

6. Calawag v. UP
Doctrine: Doctrine of necessary implication
The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in
Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from DOST. They
were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of their second year.
They enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles,
and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea to be their thesis adviser, as
well as the other faculty members consent to constitute their respective
thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the
petitioners sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of
their thesis committees.
Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos questioning the propriety of the
thesis topics and disapproved the composition of the petitioners thesis
committees and their tentative thesis topics. Dean Baylon informed them
that he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the role of
the adviser and of the thesis committees.

ISSUE: WON the deans power to approve includes the power to
disapprove the composition of a thesis committee? YES.

RULING:
Under the University of the Philippines (UP) Systems faculty manual,
the dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the
composition of a thesis committee.
By necessary implication, the deans power to approve includes the
power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under
the UP Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in
approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee.
Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP
Visayas, and the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries
Program, we agree with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees
composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have
complied with the requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate
Program Manual and Section IX of the Guidelines for the Master of
Science in Fisheries Program.

7. Lopez v. CTA
Doctrine: Correcting clerical errors
RULING:
As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. This is not judicial
legislation.
Section 7 Commissioner of customs grants the CTA jurisdiction to
review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
Section 11 Collector of customs refers to the decision of the
Collector of Customs that may be appealed to the tax court
Commissioner prevails Commissioner of Customs has supervision and
control over Collectors of Customs and the decisions of the latter are
reviewable by the Commissioner of Customs.

Summary: Collector Commissioner CTA
Section 11 of RA 1125 may well be regarded as a mere complement or
implementation of Section 7. Since Section 7 provides that the Tax Court
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has jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of
provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so Section 11 naturally
provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may appeal to
the Tax Court.

However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies rendering
said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed the Collector,
instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.

The Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal entitled Acting
Collector of Customs vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs said, The
phrase Collector of Customs appearing in the abovementioned provision
(section 11) of Republic Act No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of
Congress. It should read Commissioner of Customs to make the
provision conform with Section 7 of the said Republic Act and Section
1380 of the Revised Administrative Code.

8. Santillon v. Miranda
Doctrine: Number, gender and tense
Claro Santillon filed a petition for letres of administration for the estate of
his father, Pedro Santillon. This was opposed by Perfecta Miranda, the
widow. Claro invoked Article 892, which provides that if only the legitimate
child survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to of the estate.
Miranda, on the other hand, invoked Art. 996 of the which provides that
the widow and the legitimate CHILDREN are entitled to equal shares.

ISSUE: WON the plural word children includes the singular word child?
YES.

RULING: Words in plural includes singular, just as a singular word may
embrace two or more things. Also, the masculine gender, not the
feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in which the word is
used indicates otherwise. A word in the present tense includes the future
tense.

9. Amon Trading v. CA
Doctrine: Conjunctive and disjunctive words
The term and/or was held to mean that effect shall be given to both the
conjunctive and and disjunctive or; or that one word or the other may
be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the intended
purpose. It was accordingly ordinarily held that in using the term and/or
the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.

10. Ombudsman v. CA
Doctrine: Use of shall and may
The use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive or
directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word
may, when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion.
The use of the word may in Section 20(5) of RA 6770 indicates that it is
within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an
investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence
of the complained act or omission.

11. Bermudez v. Torres
Doctrine: Mandatory v. Directory

Legality of the appointment of Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac by President Ramos. Petitioners contend that an
appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily requires a prior
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

Section 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned.

ISSUE: WON the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit?
NO.

RULING:
The legislative intent is primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in
ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered
mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular
instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be
determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar
circumstances attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the
final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a case-to-case basis. The
nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at
the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or
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liabilities depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and that
the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other
than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained,
then the statute should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as
mandatory, in character.

Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of
the appointing authority.

12. Chinese Flour Importers v. Price Stabilization Board
Doctrine: Provisos
The Chinese importers were assailing that the PRISCO refused to give
them the proper import commodities pattern allocation provided by RA
426:
It provides that 70 per cent, 60 per cent and 50 per cent of the total import
quota for the fiscal years 195051, 195152 and 195253 respectively shall
be allocated to old importers, and 30 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per
cent respectively of said quota for the same fiscal years shall be allocated
to new importers (section 14).
However, PRISCO assailed that wheat flour importation was not
governed by RA 426 but was under the authority by EO 305:
regulating the importation of wheat flour into the Philippines by way of
implementation of the International Wheat Agreement and authorizing
the PRATRA (PRISCO) to control its importation and distribution.
PRISCO also used Section 15 of RA 426 to strengthen their point
which stated that ..no govt agency shall allocate import quota except
Import Control Commission provided that PRISCO shall have exclusive
authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among
importers.
So inaargue ng PRISCO na dahil sinabi provided that PRISCO shall
have exclusive authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat
flour among importers. Ininterpret nila yun to mean na exception ang
wheat flour dun sa governed RA 426 so governed siya ng EO 305. Pero
mali yun kasi ang rule ng proviso magaapply siya sa clause preceding it
which is no govt agency shall allocate import quota except Import
Control Commission.. So ang ibig sabihin lang ng Section 15, binibigyan
lang yung PRISCO ng authority about allocation hindi ineexclude yung
wheat flour sa enumeration.

Issue: Whether or not PRISCO should follow EO 305 or RA 426
Ruling: The second part of section 15, which is preceded by the word
"provided" can only refer to the clause immediately preceding it in section
15 and can have no other meaning than that the function of allocating the
wheat flour instead of being assigned to the Import Control Commissioner
was assigned to the Pratra which heretofore has been charged with said
duty by Executive Order No. 305. It simply means that the authority to
determine and grant flour quota allocations was taken from the Import
Control Commissioner and given to the Pratra now Prisco, which must
have been done presumably because of the practice and experience
heretofore enjoyed by said office in so far as the allocation of wheat flour
import quota is concerned under the provisions of Executive Order No.
305, which was issued to implement and carry out the objectives of the
International Wheat Flour Agreement.

13. ALU-TUCP v. NLRC
Doctrine: Provisos
The petitioners were contending that they were regular employees of
National Steel Corporation because they have worked for 6 years working
on the 5 year expansion program of NSC. They are basing this argument
on the Labor code:
Article280. Regular and Casual EmploymentThe provisions of the
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
actually exists.
Petitioners are saying that they have rendered (1) necessary service (2)
and has worked for more than a year. Respondents on the other hand are
stating that petitioners are project employees because they are hired for
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the sole purpose of the 5-year expansion project of the NSC (eto yung
exception sa provision sa taas)

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are project or regular employees

Held: Petitioners are PROJECT EMPLOYEES. The one year service
provided in the second paragraph applies only to casual workers
described in that paragraph. The provisos does not extend to the project
employees described in the first paragraph
General Rule of proviso: The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is
to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof.

14. Meralco v. Public Utilities
Doctrine: Provisos
Meralco is assailing the decision of the CIR, which reads, "Although the
practice of the company has been to grant one day vacation with pay to
every workingman who had worked for 7 consecutive days including
Sundays, the Court considers justified the opposition presented by the
workingmen to the effect that they need Sundays and holidays for the
observance of their religion and for rest. The Court, therefore, orders the
MERALCO to pay 50% increase for overtime work done on ordinary days
and 50% increase for work done during Sundays and legal holidays
irrespective of the number of days they work during the week."

Meralco claims that the decision is against C.A. 144, which provides that,
"No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or
center of labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during
Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at
least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing
some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or
providing means of transportation or communication."

ISSUE: WON the CIR erred in construing the proviso? YES.

RULING: First part enactment clause; Second part exemption clause
To hold that the exception or second part of section 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 444, only exempts public utilities mentioned
therein from the prohibition to compel employees or laborers to work
during Sundays and legal holidays, but not from the obligation to pay
them an extra or additional compensation for compelling them to work
during those days, is to make the exception meaningless or a superfluity,
that is, an exception to a general rule that does not exist, because the
prohibition in the enactment clause is not an absolute prohibition to
compel a laborer or employee to work during Sundays and legal holidays.
The prohibition to compel a laborer or employee to work during those
days is qualified by the clause "unless he is paid an additional sum of at
least twenty five per centum of his regular remuneration," which is
inseparable from the prohibition which they qualify and of which they are a
part and parcel. The second portion of section 1 is in reality an exception
and not a proviso although it is introduced by the word "provided"; and it is
elemental that an exception takes out of an enactment something which
would otherwise be a part of the subject matter of it.

15. Tolentino v. Sec. Finance (evat law)
Doctrine: Exceptions

Provision in question:
Article VI, Setion 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.

ISSUE: WON the presidential certification qualifies both the printing and
reading in 3 separate days? YES.

RULING: As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have
already explained in the main decision that the phrase except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc. in Art.
VI, 26(2) qualifies not only the requirement that printed copies [of a bill]
in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its
passage but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it
must have passed three readings on separate days. There is not only
textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases
three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed
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in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered
academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity
which it is meant to address.

16. Pendon v. Diasnes
Doctrine: Exceptions

Petitioner seeks to declare Diasnes as ineligible to holding office as
elected municipal mayor of Dumangas, Ilo-ilo for being previously
convicted for a criminal offense (estafa, sentenced to one year and one
day imprisonment). He claims that he has been granted absolute pardon
by the Governor General. Nature of the pardon extended: absolute and
plenary, with the purpose of enabling him to exercise the right to suffrage.

The contention is that the court erred in not holding that pardon does not
remove the incapacity and disqualifications as voter, in matters of
convictions of crime against property. Problem arises from the apparent
ambiguity of Sec. 99 of RA 180:

"The ff shall not be qualified to vote:
1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to
a) suffer one year or more imprisonment, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon
b) any person who has been declared by final judgment guilty if any crime
against property xxxx."

ISSUE: WON Diasnes may vote? YES.

RULING: There is no conflict between paragraphs (a) and (b), and
paragraph (b) in no way encroaches upon the pardoning power of the
Chief Executive.

Paragraph (b) must be construed in conjunction withparagraph (a). Thus
construed, it modifies that part of paragraph (a) which refers to sentences
for less than a year and not that which refers to the nature of the crime
committed. Paragraph (a) is comprehensive, making no distinction
between crimes against property and other classes of crimes. By the
terms of this clause (paragraph [a]), all persons convicted of crime of
whatever nature and sentenced to one year or more are disqualified to
vote. But it makes two exceptions each of which is independent of the
other, to wit: (1) when the penalty imposed is less than one year and (2)
when pardon is granted. Paragraph (b) qualifies or further limits the first
exceptions but not the second. It creates an exception to the exception of
paragraph (a) that persons sentenced to less than one year may vote. It
is not meant to say that conviction for a crime against property bars the
convict from voting irrespective of the penalty and irrespective of whether
or not pardon has been granted. Construing paragraphs (a) and (b)
together, as stated, they should read thus: Absolute pardon for any crime
for which one year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores the
prisoner to his political rights. Where the penalty is less than one year,
disqualification does not attach, except when the crime committed is one
against property, in which case, the prisoner has to have a pardon, as in
the cases provided in paragraph (a), if he is to be allowed to vote. For
illustrations: (1) A was prosecuted for physical injuries and condemned to
suffer 10 months imprisonment. Though not pardoned, he is not, under
paragraph (a), disqualified. (2) B was prosecuted for theft and sentenced
to imprisonment for 10 months. Under paragraph (b) he may not vote
unless he is pardoned. (3) C was prosecuted and sentenced to four years
for physical injuries or estafa. C has to be pardoned if he is to exercise the
right of suffrage. This is the class of cases envisaged by paragraph (a);
the nature of the crime is immaterial.

17. Bautista v. Fule
Doctrine: Saving clause

Suarez was the owner of a parcel of an unreg coconut land in Laguna.
Sold it to Atienza subject to repurchase in 10 years. Atienza sold it to
Dimaano subject to redemption in 5 years. 4 years after, land was levied
upon to satisfy a judgment rendered against Atienza. Sold to Bautista
during the public auction. Atienza has the right to redeem the land within a
year from the date of the auction sale, which he did. Then, he sold it to
Fule by the original owner Suarez (who acted as vendor a retro). Bautista
now wants to recover the land so he filed a case, contending that the it
was from him, not from Atienza, that Suarez should have made the
repurchase. Dismissed.

ISSUE: WON Fule has, by virtue of the transactions covering the
repurchase of the property by Atienza and its sale to Fule, acquired a right
superior to that acquired by Bautista as a purchaser in a prior sale that
was duly registered.
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RULING: In justifying the repurchase of the land from Atienza instead of
from Bautista, the lower court cites article 1510 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"The vendor may bring his action against any possessor who holds under
the vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have
been made of the conventional redemption, saving always the provisions
of the Mortgage Law with respect to third persons."

In authorizing the vendor a retro to enforce his right of repurchase against
any possessor who holds under the vendee, article 1510 of the Civil Code
has provided a saving clause in favor of the rights of third persons under
the provisions of the Mortgage Law whose function may, in the case of
land not registered either under that law or the Land Registration Act, be
deemed to be performed by those of Act No. 3344, and registration under
this Act produces its effects against third persons.

It follows from the foregoing that the repurchase of the
land from Atienza instead of from Bautista did not divest the latter of his
right to said land as purchaser at the auction sale, a right which. must now
be deemed to be absolute in view of the nonredemption of the property by
the judgment debtor or any other person entitled thereto within the period
prescribed by the Rules. Obviously, Fule's remedy is against Atienza for
the recovery of the sum paid to him in the repurchase.

18. Ibanez de Aldecoa v. HSBC
Doctrine: Saving Clause

Law in question, Sec. 581, which is all a whole the saving clause:
"Pending guardianship to proceed in accordance with
Spanish law, with certain exceptions.All proceedings in cases of
guardianship pending in the Philippine Islands at the time of the passage
of this Act, shall proceed in accordance with the existing Spanish
procedure under which the guardians were appointed: Provided,
nevertheless, That any guardian appointed under existing Spanish law
may be removed in accordance with the provisions of section 574 of this
Act, and his successor may be appointed as therein provided, and every
successor to a guardian so removed shall, in the administration of the
person or estate, or either, as the case may be, of his ward, be governed
by the provisions of this Act."

RULING:
The saving proviso of section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
intended to withhold the application of the new law from all those
incompetents who were at that time being taken care of under the
provisions of the Civil Code and who would otherwise have been affected
by the new law. A parent exercising the patria potestad {parental
authority) over the property of his minor children was substantially,
although not eo nomine, as nearly a guardian within the meaning of that
word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure as the Civil Code guardian.
The prerogative of parent over the property of his minor children under the
patria potestad (parental authority) and the Civil Code guardian have both
been abolished by the new law of guardianship. It is therefore held that
pending cases of the one and of the other are equally saved from the
operation of the new law by section 581.

A saving clause is enacted to save something which would otherwise be
lost. When existing procedure is altered or substituted by another, it is
usual to save those proceedings pending under the old law at the time the
new law takes effect. This was the purpose of section 581. It was
designed to save undisturbed all pending proceedings in guardianship
cases; that is, those proceedings already begun and still unfinished, which
would otherwise have been affected by the .new law, were to be allowed
to continue to determination in accordance with the old law.