T the heart of Islam was the concept of +ustice and e&uity. The rabs were suddenly and 'aguely empowered by the strength, 'igour and resilience that comes from a new faith.
T the heart of Islam was the concept of +ustice and e&uity. The rabs were suddenly and 'aguely empowered by the strength, 'igour and resilience that comes from a new faith.
T the heart of Islam was the concept of +ustice and e&uity. The rabs were suddenly and 'aguely empowered by the strength, 'igour and resilience that comes from a new faith.
The Dynamics of Early Islamic Empire hen Islam made its frst appearance in the 7th century, the time was ripe for it to fourish. To the students of history, who may not all be Muslims; it was the right moment for a new religion. For Muslims, though, it was a divine moment. Islam, in fact, came as a secret! before it became a factor of power or strength of armies. More importantly, it was also the right time for this new idea, which actually was an ideology or, in other words, theology! of liberation" # $ Islam celebrated some completely new concepts li%e the total e&uality of men irrespecti'e of caste, colour, creed, boundaries of geography et cetera. It also brought with it an unprecedented %ind of egalitarianism. The polity and political structures that it 'isualised broo%ed no distinction between man and man, e(cept in terms of 'irtue. )nly the &uality of one!s character and moral fbre set one higher than the other. *t the heart of Islam was the concept of +ustice , personal as well as social +ustice. This is summed up in the phrase *dal-o-Ehsan. It is this basic concept of +ustice and e&uity that made it a radical and re'olutionary religion at its beginning. This ga'e it a uni&ue initial thrust that enabled it to successfully see% a large number of con'erts in a 'ery short period of time. The other factor, which must not be o'erloo%ed, was that it o-ered an unprecedented empowerment to the *rab people. The *rabs, as such, were a dis+ointed nation of fragmented tribes without a sense of purpose or direction. They were suddenly and 'aguely empowered by the strength, 'igour and resilience that comes THE MUSLIM WORLD from a new faith. This led to the *rabs becoming the torchbearers!, the e'angelists or crusaders! of the new faith. In a non#religious historical analysis, it was, again, the right moment for Islam to come because certain other impressi'e empires had gone into decline around that time. *mongst these was the .y/antine 0mpire, which was faced with internal contro'ersies. The fault#lines that had emerged in the world of 1hristianity and in other reigning ideologies in the region left a decline or 'acuum which the new power was to fll. )n the other hand, the pre#Islamic 2ersian 0mpire also had a similar confguration and, later in history, the battle of 3uadsia decided the supremacy of Islam on the Iranian dispensation or that of the *rab on the Iranian. Then, the con&uest of 0gypt also brought to Islam another e(traordinary e(pansion in terms of %nowledge, s%ills and arts and crafts of military or ci'ilian nature. 0gypt was an ancient ci'ilisation stretching far bac% into time. It was a ri'al to the ci'ilisations before it that lay between Tigris and 0uphrates ri'ers in the area of Mesopotamia. This, as such, was another boost to the power of Islam and the *rab world. *mongst other factors was the uni&ue way in which the scripture, the 3uran, shifted the attention of its followers from an e(clusi'e focus on another! world, a supernatural world, to the world of nature. The 3uran repeatedly urges its readers to consider their own environment; for instance, the earth and what is below it and the s%y and what is abo'e it. It urges its followers to in'estigate and en&uire. The importance of this new message 4which we Muslims need to redisco'er5 must not be underestimated because, in the historical conte(t, it came at a time when other faiths and ideologies had settled into rigid orthodo(ies. The Muslim con&uest of 6pain, for instance, occurred at a time when the 1hristian theologians of 6pain were hotly debating, often to e(tent of using force, such abstruse &uestions as, 7ow many angels could stand on the head of a pin8! To such a world, Islam brought a challenging new reality # a reality of empiricism, of e(amining things and of collection of data and its interpretation in an earthy sort of way. In Islam, there is a large and o'erarching framewor% of ideas, but the rest is the realm of obser'ation and e(amination. Islam e(horts a Muslim to see for yourself! and e(plore. Thus, Islam became a new human energy for the re'i'al of learning. This was the reason that in the two hundred years THE MUSLIM WORLD that followed the ad'ent of Islam, the Muslims were to lay the foundations of modern science and technology. *s it always happens in human ci'ilisations, this new thin%ing tra'elled in all directions and became a new milestone in the e'olution of man%ind. For 0urope, it was a gift because it had cut itself o- from the 'ery sources of its own learning under the orthodo(y of the 1hurch. The common man was not e'en allowed to study 9ree% philosophy and sciences or the Great Masters because their ideas were not always compatible with the ideas of the 1hurch. The e(tent of Islamic e(pansion was e(traordinary. From Mauritania, Morocco and 6pain to Indonesia and Malaysia, the new religion had established its sway in a matter of few decades. :aturally, when power is e(tended o'er such a large area, the &uestions of polity enter. Islam began with a idea of unifed caliphate as a centre but, without the modern means of communication and transportation, this was something which could not be perpetuated in its pristine form once the faith spread out to 'ast regions and di'erse people. These large new societies had di-erences not only in language but also in culture, which ranged from tribal or pre#tribal e(istence to highly sophisticated ci'ilisations li%e 1onstantinople, Iran and 0gypt. 1onse&uently, there was a %ind of e'olution of power and, while the heartland remained frmly wedded to the caliphate or the central source of authority, there de'eloped other independent sources of power. $ithin these, some areas continued to owe a certain nominal obedience to the centre, while the others completely bro%e away. The reasons for this brea%ing away 'ary and are specifc to situation but, ne'ertheless, there was a %aleidoscopic change. 0'en within the caliphate, the centre had shifted, by and large, according to a certain formula. There was an ethnic change in the 2raetorian 9uard of the caliphate; for instance, from *rab to Tur%. The locus had, therefore, started shifting. There were, of course, a host of other factors as well. The power earlier centred in .aghdad shifted to ;amascus. *nother 'ery independent and distincti'e phenomenon occurred. The western Muslim empire which was, in some ways, unli%e anything that had happened in the heartland, de'eloped and sustained itself for nearly eight hundred years in Maghrib 4Tunisia, Morocco and *lgeria of today5 and *ndalusia 46pain5. In each case, the interaction with the immediate en'ironment and neighbouring ci'ilisations produced a 'ery rich THE MUSLIM WORLD tapestry of Islamic ci'ilisation. The )ttoman 0mpire, one of the great empires of the world, which rose to its /enith and then, li%e all other empires, went into a long period decline that continued well into the frst &uarter of the <=th century. It fnally ended somewhere in >?<<#<@, though by the year >?>< it had lost most of its legitimacy and strength. In 6outh *sia, the Muslim rule was at frst limited. It gradually e(panded to e'entually pa'e way for another great empire, the Mughal 0mpire. Its own armies and secure its own defence in its specifc security en'ironment, which was then hostile, +ust as it is today. In doing so, the ideology that 2a%istan, ne'ertheless, pitched itself against was 1ommunism, which had nothing to do with Islam. In the world of reality, though, the progressi'e *rab group which had ta%en up the banner of socialism and nationalism did not see 2a%istan as their friend, but as a friend of their enemy. Then, in a dramatic turn of e'ents, the world of *rab#Islamic people simply collapsed. 0'ents of the greatest setbac% happened. In >?A7, the *rabs faced what was probably the greatest debacle of their history when they completely lost a war to Israel. They lost territories that they ha'e not been able to reclaim to this day. In 6outh *sia in >?7>, .angladesh bro%e away from 2a%istan. *gain, in >?7?, the time#honoured rules of the game were 'iolated when .re/hne' in'aded *fghanistan. In >?B=, another set of rules collapsed when a secular .aathist Ira& in'aded Iran, which had newly undergone an Islamic re'olution. In >?B<, as if it was not enough, Israel in'aded Cebanon and went right up to .eirut. *ll these e'ents, in such a defning period of history, must engage a student of history and politics. *s a result of these tumultuous e'ents, all the isms that the Islamic#$orld was obsessed with earlier simply became inade&uate to address their concerns. The people from one end the Muslim $orld to the other deduced that these new ideologies had aggra'ated their situation, mush less sol'e it. The *rabs, in particular, and Muslims, in general, who had in'ested hugely in their defence were distraught because when the time came, their military policy did not wor%, their security policy crumbled and, more importantly, 'ery negati'e economic conse&uences further impo'erished the &uality of life and compounded the social and economic problems in 'irtually the whole of the *rab#Islamic $orld. THE MUSLIM WORLD )ut of this disenchantment from *rab nationalism and socialism, new forces emerged. In the Middle 0ast, we saw disillusionment with 2C), which was replaced by the new message of 7ammas, i.e., the capacity to sacrifce one!s life in the name of 9od rather than socialism or nationalism. 6imilar mo'ements occurred all o'er the Islamic $orld. In *fghanistan, 2a%istan indulged in ceaseless round#the#cloc% diplomacy. This certainly had its uses but what truly determined the outcome, i.e., the withdrawal of Dussian forces from *fghanistan was not so much the diplomacy as the capacity of hundreds of thousands of people to lay down their li'es. It was they who made the occupation untenable. In Cebanon, a similar thing happened; a few suicide bombings too% place and Israel withdrew 'irtually bac% to its borders 4though it still occupies a part of southern Cebanon5. The E6 marines too left as a result of these acts of terror!. The new message was that if Islam is to liberate and deli'er itself from its enemies, it will ha'e to gi'e up the ideological baggage of the preceding thirty years , the legacy of :asser, the reformists and the nationalists. That it must rely completely on re'i'al of the old concepts li%e martyrdom, sacrifce and use of 'iolence to meet 'iolence. This belief in it self is one of the biggest sources of troubles in the *rab#Islamic $orld today. The 'ery success of these strategies has gi'en them a new lease of life. In *fghanistan, for instance, though the +ehad! against the Dussians came to an end, it left behind a new fgure and personality of the eternal jehadi, one who is constantly engaged in one &uest or the other in the belief that what he does will sa'e his people, his part of the world and Islam in general. The Challenge and the Response There were, on the contrary, di-erent %inds of attempts which brought some en'iable unity and cohesion in the Islamic $orld. These came to the forefront in >?7@" # >?7@ is an important year. *fter a long time, the *rab army of 0gypt demonstrated that it could successfully ta%e on Israel. The crossing of the .ar#Ce' line was not an ordinary achie'ement. .ut for a 'ery acti'e assistance, an air bridge through which massi'e supplies and intelligence data was transferred to Israel by E6 in real time, the 0gyptian and 6yrian armies might ha'e succeeded THE MUSLIM WORLD e'en better than they actually did. .ut, then again, there was a stalemate that did not go 'ery well for 0gypt and 6yria. 1ertain ob+ect lessons, though, were drawn. For instance, that if they had the resources, training and technology, 'ictory could be achie'ed. Importantly, with this e'ent came the )il 6hoc%!, the phenomenal increase in the oil prices which opened opportunities that were not present before. In such a situation, the Islamic#$orld tried to create a common forum or a minimal programme on things that stri%e at the 'ery heart of the Islamic $orld. This was the creation of )I1 4)rgani/ation of Islamic 1ountries5, which was a great pro+ect. The founding fathers of the pro+ect saw in it a forum that would one day create a common security policy, a common foreign policy and a common economic policy. Man proposes, 9od disposes. *s it happens, an indi'idual or community may plan one thing but the actual course of the following e'ents may not be what they wish them to be. There were, in fact, certain e'ents which contained the seeds of further problems and disruptions. Two of these had a 'ery serious impact. $hile the Islamic world had the charter of )I1 on one hand, it also had on the others the reality of Iran#Ira& war which so di'ided the Islamic $orld for eight years as nothing else has di'ided in recent history. This also led to a phenomenal competition, ri'alry and hostility between the two great Muslim powers, Iran and 6audi *rabia. This specifc strain is being resol'ed only now, i.e., beginning with the last Islamic 6ummit in Islamabad. 6o, while the pro+ect of )I1 was worthy and glorious, it had had to content itself with realities such as Iran#Ira& confict and 6audi#Irani competition. The other great disruption has been the reality in the Middle 0ast. In >?7@ *rab#Israel $ar, though it was demonstrated that an *rab# Islamic army could ta%e on the army of Israel successfully, the actual articulation of e'ents also demonstrated that if a superpower was on the opposite side, the success could only be limited. This led to a basic strategic decision by 0gypt that military option would not wor%. 0gypt bro%e ran%s and sought peace. *fter 1amp ;a'id, 0gypt was ostracised and it too% the *rab#Islamic $orld se'eral years to ha'e 0gypt brought bac% to its fold. 2a%istan played a ma+or role in this respect" it was 9eneral Fia#ul# 7a&!s initiati'e at 1asablanca that set the stage for 0gypt!s THE MUSLIM WORLD return. .ut by that time, all that had happened had certainly slowed down the scope of )I1 as en'isaged at its inception. There are still other factors and a host of regional problems that stand in the way of unifcation of the *rab#Islamic $orld. Meanwhile, and on the contrary, the potential of the *rab#Islamic $orld has not diminished. 6audi *rabia has the largest oil reser'es in the world, along with huge reser'es of gold and other minerals. Iran, Ira& and Guwait also account for a huge share of that wealth. * third source, which was not a'ailable before the dissolution of E66D, has opened limitless possibilities in the 1aspian 6ea. .ut in each case, hostile factors are in operation as well. 6audi *rabia has the wealth but it has to content with the politics of the region. It is not a neutral country but is hea'ily committed to the $est. Guwait is aHuent but e'er since it was in'aded by its *rab Muslim neighbour, which sought to obliterate its 'ery e(istence, it does not fnd its security in the Islamic Emmah but in the capacity and readiness of the $est to defend it. These e'ents ha'e created a new confguration where a country has wealth but it also has a huge foreign presence in its midst. The 2ersian 9ulf is the most hea'ily policed area in the world today. 0ruptions occur from time to time, mostly in Ira&, because what began with the in'asion of Guwait has not been sorted out to this day. 6o the Islamic Emmah has a mi(ed bag of factors" it has the resources, capabilities and the pro+ect but a large number of factors oblige indi'idual states to create and craft their own policies in their own national interest and not in the larger collecti'e interest of the Emmah. This will ha'e to be o'ercome. Finally, a new challenge of globalisation means whether a country is a part of it or it is marginalised and left out. If a country is marginalised in this open mar%et system, it has absolutely nowhere to turn to. 2art of the protection against this has come from regionalism. $e are not certain today whether the *rab# Islamic $orld will fnd it easier to unite in the Islamic 1onference and a common economic mar%et or prefer to wor% out its own regional deals. The agenda is well#%nown. If the Middle 0ast peace process succeeds, the $est would li%e to integrate that part of the $orld with countries li%e 0gypt, 6yria, Cebanon, Iordan, Tur%ey and Israel into a sub#system of a larger 0uropean system. They will reach out across the Mediterranean 6ea to create another confguration. The same will be true elsewhere. In Far 0ast and 0ast *sia, the Muslim states of Malaysia and Indonesia possibly fnd it more proftable to be acti'e members of *60*: than to THE MUSLIM WORLD pursue an Islamic economic /one or community. *ll told, it is yet diJcult to analyse and predict what the impact of globalisation would be. Conclsion *s we enter a new century, we stand at a point, which is full of promise but also full of perils. There are se'eral roads ahead and it is going to ta( the intellectual, diplomatic and economic resources of the *rab#Islamic countries to decide what their course of action should be. 9lobalisation and a multi#polar world would come and how the Muslim world ma%es its choice with regard to these two will greatly determine its future.
(Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic Stud) Meir Hatina-'Ulama', Politics, and The Public Sphere - An Egyptian Perspective - University of Utah Press (2010)