Journal of Fish Biology (2009) 75, 28722874

doi:10.1111/j.1095-8649.2009.02463.x, available online at www.interscience.wiley.com

The ethics of sh welfare
J. C. Evans
Department of Philosophy and Program in Environmental Studies,
Washington University, St Louis, MO 63130, U.S.A.
(Received 10 August 2009, Accepted 9 September 2009)
The topic of sh welfare in the context of commercial sheries is a difcult one. From traditionally
anthropocentric or human-centred perspectives, shes are simply objects for humans to use as they
see t. When it is argued that anthropocentrism is arbitrary, it may appear that a strong animal
rights position is the only recourse, with the result that humans ought not to use animals in the
rst place, if it is at all possible. It can be argued that both positions fail to view human beings
as part of the natural world. If human beings are viewed as part of the world from which they
live, then it has to be asked what it means to be respectful of the animals which humans use
and from which they live. From this perspective, concern for the welfare of the shes humans
eat is simply what should be expected from humans as good citizens in the community of living
creatures. 2009 The Author
Journal compilation 2009 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles
Key words: anthropocentrism; ethics; respect; welfare.
When the topic of sh welfare is raised in the context of commercial sheries, there
is often some hesitancy and even anxiety. This stems from the fear that once it is
agreed that sh welfare is a legitimate and perhaps even compelling issue to raise in
this context, proponents will be vulnerable to attacks from animal rights or animal
welfare activists. They will claim that if there is a real issue about sh welfare,
the only conclusion to draw is that commercial sheries should be abolished and
an exclusively vegetarian diet adopted (Regan, 1983; Taylor, 1986; Singer, 1999).
Their rhetorical strategy is to insist that there is a slippery slope such that once it is
admitted that sh have a welfare to be concerned about, there is no non-arbitrary way
to avoid the abolitionist conclusion. It has been argued that this is a false conclusion,
and that it is the abolitionists who have a false image of what it is to be a concerned
part of the world we live in and from.
In order to see this, it is helpful to take a quick look at the Western religious
and philosophical tradition, according to which there are no real moral issues con-
cerning animal welfare. The anthropocentric or human-centred tradition, which can
have religious, philosophical and even scientic roots, holds that the very mean-
ing of the existence of animals is that they exist for the sake of human beings
Tel.: +1 314 452 4669; fax: +1 314 452 4669; email: jcevans@artsci.wustl.edu
2872
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Journal compilation 2009 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles
THE ETHI CS OF FI SH WELFARE 2873
[Genesis, 1:2628; Xenophon (translation by Watereld & Tredennick, 1990); Aris-
totle (translation by Jowett, 1941); St Thomas Aquinas (translation by Bourke, 1956);
Murdy, 1985]. Human beings may be part of the natural world, but the fact that only
human beings are rational means that human beings can properly view the non-
human world as a resource for us to use in any way we see t. As the philosopher
Immanuel Kant put it in the late 18th century, as rational beings or persons, humans
have inherent value and must be treated with respect. All other living and non-living
entities are mere things. Persons have dignity and are to be treated with respect.
Things have merely instrumental value, and are there to be used in any way we see
t (translation by Beck, 1977). We have no direct duties toward animals, not even
the duty not to be cruel (translation by Ineld, 1980).
Over the course of the last c. 60 years, this traditional anthropocentrism has come
under attack from several directions. This attack has in part been motivated by the
environmental devastation that has been the legacy of unbridled anthropocentrism.
The attack has often focused on the claim that there is something special about human
beings, which makes them, and only them, worthy of moral consideration. Most
critiques of traditional anthropocentrism agree in claiming that any criterion used
to exclude non-human animals from moral consideration is arbitrary (Goodpaster,
1978; Regan, 1983; Singer, 1999). Many environmental philosophers have taken part
in this attempt to reorient human beings, to bring them to see that the living world
around them has a value in and of itself and needs to be treated with respect even
as humans, like every species, make use of it in order to live their lives.
But some thinkers and activists have taken this reorientation a step further. They
argue that if animals have more than merely instrumental value, if they are to be
respected as being more than mere means to any ends humans see t, the proper
conclusion to draw is that ideally they should not use them as resources at all, and
any use is justied only if it is absolutely necessary for human survival and health.
For this reason they argue that humans should be vegetarians, since in the modern
world they are not dependent on animal protein for a healthy diet (Regan, 1983;
Taylor, 1986; Singer, 1999).
But it can be argued that something has gone badly wrong here. This can be seen
when the moral ideal that is being put forward is reected upon: a world in which
human beings are literally not a part of the realm of organic life in which inevitably
life lives from life. There is a real irony here. Traditional anthropocentrism makes
the human being lord and master of the natural world because the human being has
a dignity that sets them, above all other living things. Animals rights theory takes
human beings out of the world again, as an ideal, but now the moral obligation is
that humans take themselves out of participation in natural processes to the greatest
extent possible (Evans, 2005).
This points to a third possibility: rather than holding that humans may use animals
in any way they see t, and rather than holding that the moral ideal would be that
they do not make use of animals at all, it has to be asked how can humans make a
respectful use of animal life. Recognizing humans as members of a community of
living creatures, it can be asked what it could mean to be good citizens. Such good
citizenship can include certain forms of hunting, even if it is not strictly speaking
subsistence hunting. Environmental good citizenship includes a conscious participa-
tion in the reciprocal relations among members of an ecosystem, and hunting and
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2874 J . C. EVANS
shing are among the most basic forms of such participation (Evans, 2005). Environ-
mental philosopher Plumwood (2000) emphasized this in responding to the question
as to what the animal who dies receives from the exchange. The answer is that
it has already received it in life itself, existence as part of the cycle of embodiment
exchange. The idea of the food chain as a cycle of sharing and exchange of life in
which all ultimately participate as food for others is what we should understand by
reciprocity here (Plumwood, 2000). From this perspective, a concern for the welfare
of shes in the commercial sheries that help feed human beings around the world
is what humans should expect of themselves. The fact that shes have a welfare
about which humans should be concerned does not mean that they would be morally
better persons if sheries were to be abolished completely.
References
Aquinas, St Thomas (1956). On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book Three, Part III. Garden City, NY: Image Books (translation by Bourke, V. J.).
Aristotle (1941). Politica. The Basic Works of Aristotle (McKeon, R., ed.). New York, NY:
Random House (translation by Jowett, B.).
Evans, J. C. (2005). With Respect for Nature. Living as Part of the Natural World. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Goodpaster, K. (1978). On being morally considerable. The Journal of Philosophy 75,
308325.
Kant, I. (1977). Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. (translation by Beck, L. W.).
Kant, I. (1980). Lectures on Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company (translation
by Ineld, L.).
Murdy, W. H. (1985). Anthropocentrism: a modern version. Science 187, 11681172.
Plumwood, V. (2000). Integrating ethical frameworks for animals, humans and nature: a
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Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of
California Press.
Singer, P. (1999). Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, P. (1986). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Xenophon (1990). Conversations of Socrates. London: Penguin Classics (translation by Water-
eld, R. H. & Tredinnick, H.).
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Journal compilation 2009 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles, Journal of Fish Biology 2009, 75, 28722874