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With few exceptions, the causal relationship between the philosopher and events
that follow him, remains mired in the historical discourse through which ideas inspire
actions that determine the contours of history. While the philosopher retains no control
over the use to which his work is put, he is credited and blamed for its consequences.
Centuries) fired the European imagination with its promise of great wealth, and relief
from regional tension and domestic social-pressures. The international setting in which
John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) lived and wrote was
capable of sustaining trans-oceanic European empires, and reflective of the grand scales
of space and human potential perceived following discovery of new lands, peoples, and
technologies. Locke, the historical figure, contributed to the development of empire, and
the philosophers Locke and Rousseau, engaged concepts relevant to empire. Locke’s
treatment of property, labor, and man’s relationship to the state are seen in the intellectual
foundations of British imperialism, and Rousseau extends the logic of state control for
public ends. Without directly confronting the concept of an empire, their works
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contribute to it its component ideas, and perhaps most startlingly through their shared
Discovery and understanding pursued each other between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries as philosophers developed new questions from discoveries and the
foundations of imperialism, in much the same way that modern ethicists inform and
human life and politics. English colonization of North America presents examples of
political innovation with lasting consequences that interact very closely with the works of
John Locke and his contemporaries in London. Both settlers in search of greater liberty
and investors in pursuit of profit found use for contemporary emphases on reason, the
individual’s capacities and rights, and the significance of property. The religious settlers
constitutional liberty with revolutionary actors such as John Hampden and Oliver
official patronage was without precedent in the time’s imperialist expansion. The
historian Carl Friedrich writes, “Sober, well-to-do men of middle age, to whom the spirit
families, their goods to new homes across the seas, there to found not a colony, but a
*
Historical Note: In a speech on the Mayflower, John Winthrop told the new settlers,
“We are a company professing ourselves fellow members of Christ … The care of the
publique must oversway all private respects … The end is to improve our lives to do
more service to the Lord … that ourselves and posterity may be better preserved from the
common corruptions of the world” (Friedrich 287).
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John Locke is among the few philosophers who have participated in the projects
provided laws and institutions to guide and govern English settlers. Hsueh argues, “The
Three classes of land-holders are distinguished in the text, each with specific powers and
functions within the colony and within the empire. For example, possession of fifty acres
qualified a settler to vote and five hundred provided eligibility to sit in a colonial
legislature; two classes of North American nobility are established according to land-
possession; and all were subject to the Lords Proprietor who remained in England. Locke
assigns each class a name and status not found elsewhere in the English systems of
property and nobility to prohibit full incorporation of the colonies in the broader system
assigns roles for serfs and slaves, and directs settlers to navigate complex relationships
between Native Americans and Europeans for maximum benefit to the Crown.
and his contemporaries’ works. However, property is selected over the individual or
other measures as the unit of politics and enfranchisement; both the colony and the settler
are conceived of as tools for wealth-generation; and the Indian is regarded as an unsteady
ally at best. It is argued that, “The Two Treatises … ‘were written as a defense of
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England’s colonial policy in the new world against the sceptics in England and other
Locke’s political ideas unfold from a particular image of the State of Nature, and the
concept contains elements that must color understanding of all that follows from it. In
the state of nature, men are free and equal (ST §4), and bound to a community by the
Law of Nature described as reason (ST §6). Following Richard Hooker, Locke begins
the explication of the Law of Nature with the principle of reciprocity (ST §5). He posits
that among equals, reason engenders “mutual Love amongst Men, on which [Hooker]
Builds the Duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great Maxims of
And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature,
there cannot be supposed any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to
destroy one another … Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit
his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not into
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest on Mankind, and may
not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what
tends to the Preservation of the Life, Health, Limb or Goods of another (ST §6).
While reciprocity produces a balance of each man’s power against his neighbor, and
remains a principle of human behavior under law as well as nature, reciprocity alone also
permits cycles of reparation for mutual offences that prohibit the ease and convenience
portrayal of the Law of Nature, and together they provide the conditions for the
Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a standing Rule to live by, common
to everyone of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected in it; A
Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to
be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man (ST
§22).
well as their natural liberty and equality in exchange for “the mutual Preservation of their
Lives, Liberties and Estates” (ST §123) under a form Locke calls the commonwealth (ST
§133). The powers of government are limited to those Locke determines are required to
execute its limited ends according to the Legislative Power, but may extend absolute
authority in government provided its rule is neither arbitrary nor destructive (ST §135).
“The Legislative Power … in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the publick good of
the Society,” defined by its ability to retain the society’s consent and its capacity to
Property is seen as the basis of each man’s participation in the life of the
commonwealth. Locke explains that both reason and Revelation make natural resources
available to man for his sustenance, support, enjoyment and comfort (ST §26), and that
That labour put a distinction between them and the common. That added something
to them more than Nature [had done] … The labour that was mine, removing them
out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my Property in them (ST §28).
Locke maintains that the earth contains enough raw materials for every person to
cultivate property and sustain himself without impinging upon the right of his neighbor to
his property.
The political and proprietary franchises are linked by the community’s shared
by the transfer of estates (ST §72), and the human-developmental component of property
ownership. Each of these intersects critically with the individual’s relationships with
family and state, in which the former prepares citizens for the latter. Parents’ control of
children is seen as a private affair in which the state should not intervene, permitting the
they are not yet competent to consent and engage. Locke conceives of the family, in
which the father protects children until they have grown able to administer their affairs
and property, as analogous to the government’s protection of citizens’ lives, liberty, and
possessions for their development and enjoyment, one following the other in a cycle that
it is used primarily as the basis for hypotheses concerning man’s course without society
and government rather than as the basis for his political theory (DI 39). He criticizes
earlier state of nature theorists for ascribing to the natural state unnatural vices produced
by societies (DI 38). In the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau’s distinction
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between natural and moral inequality indicates that the portrayal and normative
assessment of politics are more properly the tasks of philosophers’ political inquiry, but
the consideration of nature is significant to the extent that pre-political conditions might
Rousseau’s state of nature posits individual men who are free, strong, virtuous
due to their independence and ignorance, subject to natural inequalities of strength and
intelligence, and free of moral (political) inequalities of wealth and power. In contrast to
Locke’s natural man, who cultivates resources and associates with others, Rousseau
language, and families, in which natural man relied for his life on physical prowess and
native intelligence.
… What man would be so foolish as to tire himself out cultivating a field that will be
plundered by the first comer, be it man or beast, who takes a fancy to the crop? …
How could this situation lead man to resolve to cultivate the soil as long as it is not
divided among them, that is to say, as long as the state of nature is not wiped out? (DI
47)
Without the comforts and temptations of settlement and society, natural man retains a
native dignity and virtue. As the increased capacities for comfort and contrived manners
distinguish man’s life in society, their cultivation takes precedence over the maintenance
of virtue and vigor. As in Locke’s image, society and government remedy the danger and
inconvenience of the state of nature, but security (of property and lives) is only the
impetus for change in Rousseau’s image (SC 147). Without effort to curb their effects,
security and property come at the cost of corruption and social decline.
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finds the force and stability to generate and protect property as basic qualities of a state,
and that the strongest, most just state engages the body politic for their mutual
Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will; and as one receive each member as an indivisible part
of the whole … This act of association produces a moral and collective body
composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives
from this same act its unity … its life and its will (SC 148).
The relationship between man and state is characterized as an interaction (as opposed to
the Lockean exchange) in which the action of one done with regard to the other adds
value to the shared enterprise. Each exerts a formative and empowering influence on the
other, but the state remains subordinate through the power of the general will to place the
decision-making function in the hands of a political body of equals (SC xvi). The
resulting sovereign power derives its legitimacy and solvency from the tacit, constant
Similarly, departure from the state of nature exerts a change in the individual.
It substitutes justice for instinct in his behaviour and gives his actions a moral quality
they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty replaces physical impulse
and right replaces appetite, does man, who had hitherto taken only himself into
account, find himself forced to act upon other principles and to consult his reason
before listening to his inclinations. His faculties are exercised and developed, his
ideas are broadened, his feelings are ennobled, his entire soul is elevated (SC 151).
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Entrance into society is not merely functional, but transformative; it is the process by
important ends of the political endeavor, Rousseau places property and luxury in tension
with virtue in the life of the republic. In the Social Contract and the Letter to Count
Wielhorski, the principal diversion from virtuous pursuits and public welfare is luxury.
Luxury is subject to only moderate prohibitions against waste in Locke’s treatises, but
response that begins in his choice of regime. The republican form requires a cohesive
community of identity in which citizens’ attentions are centered upon public service and
the public good. Rousseau refers the political observer to Moses, Numa, and Lycurgus,
who built strong nations by cultivating their peoples’ peculiar virtues (GP II§2) to
encourage attachments to each other and their native lands instead of uniting them
through laws and the common pursuit of property (GP II§6). Institutions and laws should
act on the culture to make luxury contemptible and the nobler pursuits of learning and
public or military service esteemed (GP III§13). Rousseau maintains that the state in
which citizens are committed to one another and remain focused on pursuing the public
good is best positioned to rebuff foreign incursion and enjoy stable, prosperous
conditions.
individual, with the interests and weaknesses suggested by the term, but as the
association between the public and private individuals (SC I §7). The sovereign is guided
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by the general will, defined as the general interest understood in isolation from “the sum
The general will, like the laws its produces, takes as its object issues of general public
concern, and it exerts a coercive force on each individual to identify his interests with
its enactment. The social compact … tacitly entails the commitment … that whoever
refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This
The sovereignty is not composed of relationships between inferior and superior parties
(SC II §4). Therefore, it does not regard classes of people, but perceives the individual as
an agent of the public good composed of identifiable and changeable qualities. In the
context of the republic, the objective of the general will is often to conduct public affairs
with prudence and integrity according to laws which unite natural rights with
conventional duties (SC II §6). However, the image of the human developed to make the
general will effective is adaptable to the power relationships and objectives of empires.
to govern states extending beyond the Old World’s coasts to encompass unmapped lands
and unstudied peoples, Locke and Rousseau each acknowledge that unknown lands and
peoples are necessary components of the social and political realities Europe had to
confront to manage empires and account for the world as it was known. The lessons of
the state of nature and the centrality of property in Locke’s treatises feature in his
discovered places often emphasized the novel and horrific. For example, European arts
and letters had long since developed archetypes of foreigners (i.e. the despotic Oriental,
the lascivious Moor, the clever Jew, the servile African) and deployed them as common
sets of symbols to evoke dread, disdain, and laughter. Locke recounts a graphic story of
cannibalism in Peru from a popular book by the Spanish writer Garcilaso de la Vega, in
which children are reared and overfed for consumption by fathers (FT §57). Locke’s use
of reason, property, and the commonwealth form must be brought to bear upon the exotic
to understand how foreign elements are regarded in his politics, and to uncover his
opposed by Rousseau for its influence on the republic, but Rousseau extends its implicit
image of the human as a subject of state action who is manipulable for state ends to re-
appropriate foreign lands. Just as Locke posits moral equality and equal capacities for
reason, humans share an equal but conditional right to property. The right is contingent
upon the completion of labor, and limited to prohibit waste and comfortably sustain one’s
Every man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we must say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided,
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned something to it that is his
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own, and thereby makes it his Property … It hath by his Labour something annexed
to it, that excludes the common right of other Men (ST §27).
However, no means are provided to arbitrate between cases in which claims for property
compete. The prerequisite for possession is labor completed; the standard for possession
in cases of equal labor is value imparted, measured by productivity resulting from labor
(ST §40); and in the case of land, early arrival and productive use secure possession
against competing claims. While Locke grants that natural resources cultivated and used
by native peoples (i.e. North American Indians) are naturally theirs (ST §30), he submits
that unused resources are common between men. The formula positions Indians, whom
he says lack the physical comforts and attire of the poorest Englishmen for failure to
labor upon and develop North America, as competition for Europeans inclined to
cultivate land and extract resources more for profit than for sustenance (ST §41).
Locke’s system for classifying people and meting out justice favors colonists who
claim rights to land. The law of nature states, “Every Man hath a Right to punish the
I see not how the Magistrates of any Community, can punish an Alien of another
Country, since in reference to him, they can have no more Power [(i.e. through the
engine of the Legislative Authority)], than what every Man naturally have over
It is not through the mechanism of the commonwealth that remittances and reparations
are obtained by citizens for crimes committed by aliens, but through the natural law, by
which individuals have limited power to exact justice in the mode of reciprocity against
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those who have acted without reason, and therefore committed an act of war against
By the Fundamental Law of Nature … one may destroy a Man who makes War upon
him, or has discovered an Enmity to his being, for the same Reason, that he may kill a
Wolf or a Lyon; because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of
Reason, have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, so may be treated as
By Locke’s estimation, only the determination that a person is without reason is needed
to place him in a class below humans, and therefore outside the protection of the civic
bond. Foreigners and those who are deemed sub-human inhabit the same unprotected
class of actors. Should they be accused of some offence against the commonwealth or
one of its members, they are legitimately subject to its judgment and violence. In the
case of the Carolina territories, the Earl of Shaftesbury obtained royal warrants to confer
the status of English counties on the settlements and associated lands. In the Lockean
model, the laws of the commonwealth were thereby extended across the Atlantic, and the
articulated culture of Rousseau’s small political community finds its opposite in the
imperial relationships between mother countries and distant colonies, and it is made
vulnerable by dialectic processes through which empires and colonies mutually influence
each other. The pursuit of wealth threatens the material equality and simple habits of the
stoic-minded republican; exotic materials and ideas imported from distant outposts
present unacceptable competition for republican nativism; and the commercial advantage
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of colonial imports threatens domestic labor and craft, which assume cultural significance
Rousseau’s appreciation for simple living and closeness to man’s natural virtues
produces romantic images of newly discovered foreigners that engender a desire for their
protection from colonial incursion. His theory of politics conceives of foreign rule as
Will setting one’s foot on a piece of common land be sufficient to claim it as one’s
own? … How can a man or a people seize a vast amount of territory and deprive the
entire human race of it except by a punishable usurpation, since this seizure deprives
all other men of the shelter and sustenance that nature gives them in common? When
Nunez Balboa stood on the shoreline and took possession of the South Sea and all of
South America in the name of the crown of Castile, was this enough to dispossess all
the inhabitants and to exclude all the princes of the world? (SC 152)
Rousseau gives great credit to historical figures who claimed leadership of peoples (i.e.
Persians, Macedonians), and ascribes to the contemporary habit of claiming lands (i.e.
England, France) a practical consideration: “In holding the land thus, they are quite sure
of holding the inhabitants” (SC 152). Even Locke is not immune to the romantic image.
He allows that,
He that will impartially survey the Nations of the World, will find so much of their
these means, that he will have but little Reverence for the Practices which are in use
and credit amongst Men, and will have Reason to think, that the Woods and Forests,
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where the irrational untaught Inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to
However, neither foreigners’ hypothetical wisdom nor their natural capacities for self-
John Locke is among the first contributors to a framework of ideas that facilitate
empire. In contrast to ancient empires of identity (i.e. Persian, Greek, Roman, Islamic),
in which a dominant nation extended its cultural footprint, the European model of empire
leads diverse European states abroad to extract much-needed resources (Scammel 53).
Between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, Europeans exerted varying levels of
cultural influence over the peoples they dominated, but held networks of colonies at an
arm’s length from Continental systems of government. The colonies were subject to
empires but not meaningfully integrated states within empires. Lands and peoples abroad
Despite Rousseau’s rejection of Locke’s model on the grounds that property alone
will not sustain political communities, and that possession consists of more than claims
based upon labor or productivity, Locke and Rousseau co-author a view of man’s
relationship with the state that threatens to hamper progress toward the goal of human
emancipation that defines the Enlightenment. In a culture for which reason distinguishes
the human faculties, Locke’s fluid and conditional classification of humans according to
reason defined by threats to property broadly conceived renders human identity tenuous,
brittle, and subject to vagaries of power akin to the state of nature from which the
legitimate and viable according to their authors’ terms, provided they perform the
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necessary protective functions and remain within the boundaries of sovereign authority
explains,
The Power that every individual gave the Society, when he entered into it, can never
Within inescapable structures, the definition and use of the human is subject to political
do not preclude the development of a new repressive tool. Taken in the context of the
participatory and democratic ends, and nullify private will. In isolation, the general will
assumes new life. The images of man as a willing component and subject of a body
composed of equals strip away elements of his individuality related to agency and
the needs and objectives of the state (articulated by the general will) calls attention to
Rousseau’s hallmark innovation: the human machine. It is not surprising that the author
of Confessions and Emile disaggregates the human in his diverse qualities and identities
to redevelop him for political ends. The Social Contract uses the coercive force of the
general will to bring the citizenry into accord on common purposes, and the republican
form employs its power to cultivate virtue and suppress vice. Outside the social compact,
the disaggregates human retains his utility in other systems and for other functions.
colonialism, Rousseau’s hand is more subtly seen in empires’ use of the re-conceived
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man. For example, upon the dissolution of the East India Company in 1773, the British
Raj cultivated Anglicised cadres and established systems of rewards to promote their
success and emulation. The Empire accepted some elements of Indian identity and
discarded others according to its practical needs. Just as Rousseau submits that education
is the means to refashion countrymen into citizens (GP 4§2), Western education was
promoted throughout the empires with the belief that native peoples will be served well
by modern education, but also that it will make them serve better. Indeed, Japanese
educators have read Rousseau’s Emile since English pedagogues presented it as a model
The circle of late eighteenth century industrialists and intellectuals that called
itself the Lunar Society and counted Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgwood among its
members also encouraged the idealist Thomas Day to attempt the model of child-rearing
outlined in Emile on two adopted girls with degrees of moderate success (Porter 376).
“The old fantasy – or for some, nightmare – of making a fully fledged social person
from mere raw matrials or the logical consequence of the Lockean vision of the
The potter Wedgewood explained that, “His aim in running his works … was to ‘make
such machines of Men as cannot err.’ The workforce clocked on in the morning: man
was driven by mechanical time” (Porter 375). His model is famous as a template for
republic produce similarly configured relationships between man and the state. The
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resulting concepts of property ownership and the human create an argument for the
model, the needs of the community for conditions that lead either to property or virtue
precede individual wills, and institutions are in place to exert formative influences on
Locke by disaggregating the human’s characteristics and capacities, and emphasizing his
malleability, setting the age of empire to which they each contribute on a course to utilize
people in ways that do not parallel discourse of emancipation that characterizes their era.
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Citation Key
Works Cited
Friedrich, Carl. The Age of The Baroque 1610-1660. New York: Harper and Roe
Publishers, 1952.
Hsueh, Vicki. “Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina.” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 63:3 (2002): 425-446.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Porter, Roy. Flesh in the Age of Reason. London: Allen Lane Publishers, 2003.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Ed.
Victor Gorevich. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Basic Later Political Writings. Ed. Peter Gay. Trans.
Donald Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile. Trans. Barbara Foxley. London: Dent Publishers, 1984.
Scammel, G.V. The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c. 1400-1715.
London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989.