Anthro Paradox

1C
Chapter 1 is Framework

Sunk into a sea of grief
Its a bother to open my eyes
And thus Ill be falling
Until I find my truth

I am Bennett Gilliam, and I am a twin. Ive always wondered why we looked alike, and
why others were looked down upon for being different. To me being different is
amazing, which is why I think debate should be a place to develop ideas about
oneself.

One form of difference I always thought seemed arbitrary was the difference
between our siblings and

Humynity: Why do we put ourselves in the position of God, only to trample upon our
fellow inhabitants? Why do we think we are superior as a species? Why are we lying
to ourselves? And so I explore the ocean of lies and paradoxes.
The paradox of the oceans and mountains; change from the unchanging, represents
Truth
HALL vice-chancellor @ University of Salford 2k10
Martin-historical archaeologist; He was for a time President of the World Archaeological Congress and General Secretary of the South African
Archaeological Society. He moved to UCT (University of Capetown) in 1983, where he led the Centre for African Studies and later became the
Head of the Department of Archaeology. He was the inaugural Dean of Higher Education Development between 1999 and 2002; was deputy
Vice-Chancellor at UCT for six years. Professor Hall is married with three children. His wife, Professor Brenda Cooper, is an academic
specialising in post-colonial and African literature; There Was An Ocean; Professional Inaugural Lecture at University of Salford, September 29;
http://www.salford.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/73628/There-Was-an-Ocean-final.pdf
Paul Simons lyrics capture a paradox. And because
paradoxes must, by definition, embody profound truth,
this signals something interesting, worth exploring
further. Change emerges from the unchanging. The
predictability and solidity of mountains and oceans
foreclose on our ability to alter our environment. But,
at the same time, they also enable us to navigate the
world around us, including our intellectual and
emotional conceptualization of experience. The ability
of universities to bring about change and to produce
new knowledge rests on this paradox. Like the ocean,
they are robust and survive as organizational forms.
Like mountains, they are solidly built and steeped in
traditions and processes that may appear, and
sometimes are, arcane. They remain reassuringly
familiar, founded in disciplines and systems of
accreditation that persist stubbornly. But they are also
sites of new ideas and opportunities, unstoppable in
their motion, which are entwined with their traditions.

After hearing of this new truth I began to think. Are there unrecognized paradoxes,
which need recognition in order for humanity to move forward? I found the paradox
in question

Humankind views itself as solely from the land, instead of from both the earth and the
ocean: a paradox
Schmitt 54 (Carl Schmitt was a German philosopher, jurist, and political theorist. Schmitt is a major
figure in 20th century legal and political theory, writing extensively on the effective wielding of political
power. His work has been a major influence on subsequent political theory, legal theory, continental
philosophy, and political theology in the 20th century and beyond, Carl Schmitts Land & Sea, Part 1,
1954, http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/03/carl-schmitts-land-sea-part-1/, Bennett Gilliam)

Man is a terrestrial, an earthling. He lives, moves and walks on the firmly-grounded Earth. It is his
standpoint and his base. He derives his points of view from it, which is also to say that his impressions
are determined by it and his world outlook is conditioned by it. Earth-born, developing on it, man
derives not only his horizon from it, but also his poise, his movements, his figure and his height. That is
why he calls Earth the star on which he lives, although, as it is well known, the surface of the planet is
three fourths water and only one fourth firm land; even the largest continents are but huge floating
islands. And since we found out that our earth is spherically shaped, we have been speaking quite
naturally of the terrestrial sphere or of the terrestrial globe. To imagine a maritime globe would
seem strange, indeed. All our existence down here, our happiness, our mis-fortunes, our joys and our
pains are the earthly life for us, that is to say, a paradise or a valley of tears, depending which aspect
is taken into consideration. Thus, it is easy to understand why earth is represented as the primal
mother of mankind in a great many myths and legends that give expression to the oldest memories
and the innermost trials and tribulations in the lives of nations. She is considered the oldest of all the
deities. Sacred writings tell us that man, emerging from earth, would return to earth. The earth is his
maternal support, because he himself is the son of the earth. He sees in his siblings his ground-
brothers, the inhabitants of the same earth. Among the four elements (earth, water, air and fire), it is
the first which is vowed to man and which leaves its mark on him to the fullest. The idea that he could
be marked as strongly by any of the other elements appears quite chimerical at first sight: man is
neither fish nor bird, and even less a being of firewere one to exist. Are we to surmise from all this
that human existence and the human being are essentially and exclusively earthly and earth-oriented,
while the other elements are but accessories of a secondary rank? The problem is not so simple. The
question whether a human existence other than strictly terrestrial is possible has more sense than it
appears at first sight. It is enough for you to go to the seaside and glance into the distance from the
shore: the immense surface of the sea will occupy all your horizon. Is it not remarkable that a human
being standing on the shore would direct its eyes quite naturally from the land towards the sea and
not the other way round, that is, from the sea to the land? In peoples deepest and often unconscious
memories, water and the sea are the mysterious and primordial source of all life. In their legends and
in their myths, most peoples conjure up deities and human beings emerging not only from the ground
but also from the sea. All speak of the sons and daughters of oceans and seas: Aphrodite, for instance,
the goddess of feminine beauty, had been born out of the foam of the billows. But the sea has also
delivered some other children, and later on, we shall meet the children of the sea, as well as some
wild sea-roamers who have little in common with the engrossing image of feminine beauty born out
of sea surf! This world which suddenly opens before you is quite different from that of the soil and of
the firm land. You may now understand the reason why poets, natural philosophers, and the men of
science seek the origins of all life in water and why Goethe wrote these solemn verses: Everything is
born of water,/ Everything is preserved by water/Ocean, bring us your eternal rule!


Our concept of our origins is a paradox, in that we mistakenly think we come from the
earth, as opposed to both the ocean and the earth. We advocate the exploration of
the metaphorical oceans of our past, through an examination of anthropocentrism in
regards to the ocean.


Chapter 2 is Humans and Nature

Our current belief of earth-based origin isolates us from the rest of the oceans
children.
We isolate ourselves from nature in the status quo, valuing ourselves as separate
and above our siblings and half siblings
KINGSNORTH ed dir of DARK MOUNTAIN & HINE co-founder and managing editor of DARK MOUNTAIN 2k9
Paul- & Dougald; Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto; Summer; http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/
The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for
greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the other. Both
tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval swamps, as a humble part of
something called nature, which we have now triumphantly subdued. The very fact that we have a word for
nature is [5] evidence that we do not regard ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our
separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our civilisation. We are, we
tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won. In this, our
unique glory is contained.
We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from
this imaginative error is all around us: a quarter of the worlds mammals are threatened with imminent extinction;
an acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second; 75% of the worlds fish stocks are on the verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more
of the worlds natural products than the Earth can replace a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the deadening
lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us.
These are the facts, or some of them. Yet facts never tell the whole story. (Facts, Conrad wrote, in Lord Jim, as if facts could prove anything.)
The facts of environmental crisis we hear so much about often conceal as much as
they expose. We hear daily about the impacts of our activities on the
environment (like nature, this is an expression which distances us from the reality of
our situation). Daily we hear, too, of the many solutions to these problems:
solutions which usually involve the necessity of urgent political agreement and a
judicious application of human technological genius. Things may be changing, runs
the narrative, but there is nothing we cannot deal with here, folks. We perhaps need
to move faster, more urgently. Certainly we need to accelerate the pace of
research and development. We accept that we must become more sustainable.
But everything will be fine. There will still be growth, there will still be progress:
these things will continue, because they have to continue, so they cannot do
anything but continue. There is nothing to see here. Everything will be fine.
We do not believe that everything will be fine. We are not even sure, based on current definitions of progress and improvement, that we want
it to be. Of all humanitys delusions of difference, of its separation from and
superiority to the living world which surrounds it, one distinction holds up better
than most: we may well be the first species capable of effectively eliminating life
on Earth. This is a hypothesis we seem intent on putting to the test. We are already responsible for denuding the world of much of its
richness, magnificence, beauty, colour and magic, and we show no sign of slowing down. For a very
long time, we imagined that nature was something that happened elsewhere. The
damage we did to it might be regrettable, but needed to be weighed against the
benefits here and now. And in the worst case scenario, there would always be
some kind of Plan B. Perhaps we would make for the moon, where we could survive in lunar colonies under giant bubbles as we
planned our expansion across the galaxy.
But there is no Plan B and the bubble, it turns out, is where we have been living all the while. The bubble is that delusion
of isolation under which we have laboured for so long. The bubble has cut us off from life on the only
planet we have, or are ever likely to have. The bubble is civilisation.
We are the first generations born into a new and unprecedented age the age of
ecocide. To name it thus is not to presume the outcome, but simply to describe a
process which is underway. The ground, the sea, the air, the elemental backdrops
to our existence all these our economics has taken for granted, to be used as a
bottomless tip, endlessly able to dilute and disperse the tailings of our extraction,
production, consumption. The sheer scale of the sky or the weight of a swollen
river makes it hard to imagine that creatures as flimsy as you and I could do that
much damage. Philip Larkin gave voice to this attitude, and the creeping, worrying end of it in his poem Going, Going:
Nearly forty years on from Larkins words, doubt is what all of us seem to feel, all of the time. Too much filth has been chucked in the sea and
into the soil and into the atmosphere to make any other feeling sensible. The doubt, and the facts, have paved the
way for a worldwide movement of environmental politics, which aimed, at least in
its early, raw form, to challenge the myths of development and progress head-on.
But time has not been kind to the greens. Todays environmentalists are more
likely to be found at corporate conferences hymning the virtues of sustainability
and ethical consumption than doing anything as naive as questioning the intrinsic
values of civilisation. Capitalism has absorbed the greens, as it absorbs so many
challenges to its ascendancy. A radical challenge to the human machine has been
transformed into yet another opportunity for shopping.
Today, humanity is up to its neck in denial about what it has built, what it has
become and what it is in for. Ecological and economic collapse unfold before us
and, if we acknowledge them at all, we act as if this were a temporary problem, a
technical glitch. Centuries of hubris block our ears like wax plugs; we cannot hear
the message which reality is screaming at us. For all our doubts and discontents,
we are still wired to an idea of history in which the future will be an upgraded
version of the present. The assumption remains that things must continue in their
current direction: the sense of crisis only smudges the meaning of that must. No longer a natural inevitability, it becomes an
urgent necessity: we must find a way to go on having supermarkets and superhighways. We cannot contemplate the
alternative.
And so we find ourselves, all of us together, poised trembling on the edge of a
change so massive that we have no way of gauging it. None of us knows where to
look, but all of us know not to look down. Secretly, we all think we are doomed:
even the politicians think this; even the environmentalists. Some of us deal with it by going
shopping. Some deal with it by hoping it is true. Some give up in despair. Some work frantically to try and fend off
the coming storm.
Our question is: what would happen if we looked down? Would it be as bad as we imagine? What might we see? Could it even be good for us?
We believe it is time to look down.

This belief that human kind has bested nature is part of the paradox. We think we
can defeat our past and enter a new plane of existence occupied by only human
kind, when in reality we cannot transcend as we are worth just as much as our siblings

Status quo policies are rooted in anthropocentrism, preventing an ethical policy. Only a shift
to a biocentric standpoint will be sufficient to protect the interests of the environment. If
policies take place with a anthropocentric environment, then only can the actions fully
evaluate the consequences for nature
King 97 [1997, Roger King is has a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of
Reading in England, where he was on the faculty until resigning He has received multiple
fellowships from Yaddo, The MacDowell Colony, and the Virginia Center for the Creative Arts.
Critical Reflections on Biocentric Environmental Ethics: Is It an Alternative to
Anthropocentrism? Space, place, and environmental ethic, pg. 215-216]

Without denying that anthropocentrism can become much more environmentally informed
and sophisticated, there are still several reasons for suspicion that motivate biocentric ethics.
First, it might be argued that without a radical shift in attitudes and beliefs about the value of
nonhuman nature, narrowly conceived and short-term human interests will continue to
prevail at the expense of the environment. Our sense of difference from and superiority to
nonhuman nature is so fundamental to our cultural outlook, it might be argued, that nothing
short of a shift to a biocentric standpoint will be sufficient to protect even human needs and
interests. From this standpoint, it is essential to develop and adopt a biocentric environmental
ethic even in order to promote human rights or preference satisfaction. A second argument is
that anthropocentrism simply fails to articulate the experience of many human beings. Just as
many men and women care about their fellow human beings, respect human rights, and hope
to minimize human suffering, so too they care about what happens to domesticated and wild
animals, natural ecosystems, and the planet as a whole. And while some may see their moral
concern as entirely derivative from their concern for human beings, in the Kantian fashion,
many others value nonhuman nature for its own sake and not for the sake of other human
beings. The phenomenological reality of this experience and the potential for expanding it
justifies efforts to articulate an environmental ethic that does not ultimately reduce value to
some derivative of human rights and preferences. A third argument in favor of abandoning
anthropocentric ethics is a practical one. If the goal of public policy is simply the satisfaction of
human interests, then the resolution of policy conflicts reduces to a balancing of human
rights and utilities. In such circumstances, environmental policy may tend to provide less
protection both to nature and to human beings than might have been achieved by a biocentric
ethic. Eric Katz and Lauren Oechsli have suggested that if the intrinsic value of nonhumans is
granted by the parties in policy conflicts, then resolution of the conflicts will also take into
account the consequences for nature." Christopher Stone has defended the idea of granting
natural entities legal standing on the grounds that unless the natural entity is represented in
court proceedings, it is unlikely to benefit directly from damages awarded or reparations
imposed by the courts." In sum, the skepticism about anthropocentrism lies in the concern that
the definition of costs and benefits will inevitably skew moral deliberations in a self-serving,
anthropocentric direction unless we can develop a satisfactory biocentric environmental
ethics.

The anthropocentric view that dominates thought makes it impossible to see the
world inter-connectedly
Goodman 11 Benny Goodman Professor of Sociology, Plymouth University --
Transformation for health and sustainability: consumption is killing us -- 2011
It is arguably the case that the anthropocentric view dominates in Western thought , making us
incapable of making the interconnections between the stars, the external cosmos of the myriad galaxies, the internal
human physiological cosmos, the ecosphere, the biosphere, and ourselves. We then delude ourselves
when we think that we are separate entities, that we are able to control for our own benefit that which we
are actually a part of. Thus we have triumphed over nature controlling it for our own ends resulting in the magnificence of cities such
as New York, which have become our own natural habitat. This comes at a cost. We are unable to see systemically, inter-
connectedly or interdependently . The separation between humanity and ecosphere is complete
within consumer capitalism in its delivery of the dreams of avarice.

The subjugation of animal life justifies genocide
Sanbonmatsu 11. John SanbonmatsuProfessor of Philosophy, Worcester
Polytechnic InstitueCritical Theory and Animal Liberation 2011
The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example,
is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a fatally
wounded animal falls on a human being. What is crucial to bear in mind, however, as Victoria Johnson points out
in her chapter here the very power of such animal metaphors depends on a prior cultural understanding
of other animals themselves, as beings who are by nature abject, degraded, and hence worthy of
extermination. The animal, thus, rests at the intersection of race and caste systems. And nowhere is the link between
the human and nonhuman clearer than in facist ideology for no other discourse so completely authorizes absolute violence in the weak. In
our own contemporary society too, Johnson emphasizes, we find daily life and meaning based on elaborate
rituals intentded to keep us from acknowledging the violence we do to subordinate classes of beings,
above all the animals. So numerous in fact are the parallelssemiotic, ideological, psychological,
historical, cultural, technical and so forth between the Nazis extermination of the Jews and Roma
and the routinized mass murder of nonhuman beings , that Charles pattersons recent book on the subject despite its
strengths, only manages to scratch the surface of a topic whose true dimensions have yet to be fathomed.
Passive Bystanders are those are aware of genocide, but do nothing about it.
Vetelson 2k(ARNE JOHAN VETLESEN, b. 1960, PhD in philosophy (University of Oslo, 1993); Associate
Professor, University of Oslo (1994 ). Most recent book in English: Close-ness: An Ethics (ed. with
Harald Jodalen; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997); author of eight books on ethics, political
philosophy, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis. Within this card, Vetelson quotes the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an international conference. Article
published July 2000)

Most often, in cases of genocide, for every person directly victimized and killed there will be hundreds,
thousands, perhaps even millions, who are neither directly targeted as victims nor directly
participating as perpetrators. The moral issues raised by genocide , taken as the illegal act par
excellence, are not confined to the nexus of agent and victim. Those directly involved in a given
instance of genocide will always form a minority, so to speak. The majority to the event will be formed
by the contemporary bystanders. Such bystanders are individuals; in their private and professional
lives, they will belong to a vast score of groups and collectives, some informal and closely knit, others
formal and detached as far as personal and emotional involvement are concerned. In the loose sense
intended here, every contemporary citizen cognizant of a specific ongoing instance of genocide,
regardless of where in the world, counts as a bystander.
Bystanders in this loose sense are cognizant, through TV, radio, newspapers, and other publicly
available sources of information, of ongoing genocide somewhere in the world, but they are not
by profession or formal appointment involved in it. Theirs is a passive role, that of onlookers,
although what starts out as a passive stance may, upon decision , convert into active engagement in
the events at hand. I shall label this category passive bystanders.


It is the responsibility of bystanders to become active, as they are the last resort for
the oppressed. Vetelson 2k(ARNE JOHAN VETLESEN, b. 1960, PhD in philosophy (University of Oslo,
1993); Associate Professor, University of Oslo (1994 ). Most recent book in English: Close-ness: An
Ethics (ed. with Harald Jodalen; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997); author of eight books on
ethics, political philosophy, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis. Within this card, Vetelson quotes the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an international
conference. Article published July 2000)
To put it as simply as possible: From the viewpoint of an agent of genocide, bystanders are persons possessing
a potential (one needing to be estimated in every concrete case) to halt his ongoing actions. The perpetrator will fear
the bystander to the extent that he has reason to believe that the bystander will intervene to halt the
action already under way, and thereby frustrate the perpetrator's goal of eliminating the targeted group. That said, we immediately
need to differentiate among the different categories of bystanders introduced above. It is obvious that the more
knowledgeable and otherwise resourceful the bystander, the more the perpetrator will have reason
to fear that the potential for such resistance will translate into action, meaning a more or less direct
intervention by military or other means deemed efficient to reach the objective of halting the incipient genocide. Of course, one
should distinguish between bystanders who remain inactive and those who become actively
engaged . Nonetheless, the point to be stressed is that, in principle , even the most initially passive and remote bystander
possesses a potential to cease being a mere onlooker to the events unfolding . Outrage at what comes to pass
may prompt the judgment that 'this simply must be stopped' and translate into action promoting that aim.
But is not halting genocide first and foremost a task, indeed a duty, for the victims themselves? The answer is simple: The sheer fact that
genocide is happening shows that the targeted group has not proved itself able to prevent it. This being so, responsibility for halting
what is now unfolding cannot rest with the victims alone; it must also be seen to rest with the party not itself affected but
which is knowledgeable about which is more or less literally witnessing the genocide that is taking
place. So whereas for the agent, bystanders represent the potential of resistance, for the victims they may
represent the only source of hope left. In ethical terms, this is borne out in the notion of responsibility
of Emmanuel Levinas (1991), according to which responsibility grows bigger the weaker its addressee.


Debate is an institution whose hallmark is passive bystanding. Debaters, all too often,
research plans and actions that they think will win them ballots, seeing casualties as
cards, deaths as empiric evidence, then turn off their computer, shut off their light,
and go to sleep. They do nothing about the genocide and problems they see. And now
that you the judge - are cognizant of this genocide, it is your responsibility and the
role of this ballot to vote for us, such an action will be a step, no matter what size,
toward ending this genocide.
Further, voting for a team embracing anthropocentrism is accepting, approving, and
complying with genocide.
Vetelson 2k(ARNE JOHAN VETLESEN, b. 1960, PhD in philosophy (University of Oslo, 1993); Associate
Professor, University of Oslo (1994 ). Most recent book in English: Close-ness: An Ethics (ed. with
Harald Jodalen; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997); author of eight books on ethics, political
philosophy, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis. Within this card, Vetelson quotes the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an international conference. Article
published July 2000)

Ricoeur's proposed extension certainly sounds plausible. Regrettably, his proposal stops halfway. The
vital insight articulated, albeit not developed, in the passages quoted is that not acting is still acting.
Brought to bear on the case of genocide as a reported, ongoing affair, the inaction making a difference
is the inaction of the bystander to unfolding genocide. The failure to act when confronted with such
action, as is involved in accomplishing genocide , is a failure which carries a message to both the
agent and the sufferer: the action may proceed. Knowing, yet still not acting, means granting accept-
ance to the action. Such inaction entails 'letting things be done by someone else' clearly, in the case
of acknowledged genocide, 'to the point of criminality', to invoke one of the quotes from Ricoeur. In
short, inaction here means complicity; accordingly, it raises the question of responsibility, guilt, and
shame on the part of the inactive bystander, by which I mean the bystander who decides to remain
inactive.

ALT Reject anthropocentric thinking and replace it with an ecocentric ethic that
values all life.
Deckha 10 Maneesha Deckha University of VictoriaIts time to abandon the
idea of human rightsDecember 10, 2010
That the human/subhuman binary continues to inhabit so much of western experience raises the
question of the continuing relevance of anthropocentric concepts (such as human rights and human dignity) for
effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a
better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. The human specialness claim is
a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other the subhuman and nonhuman to be intelligible. The latter groups are beings, by
definition, who do not qualify as human and thus are denied the benefits that being human is meant to compel. More to the point,
however, a dignity claim staked on species difference, and reliant on dehumanizing Others to establish the moral worth of human beings, will
always be vulnerable to the subhuman figure it creates. This figure is easily deployed in inter-human violent conflict
implicating race, gender and cultural identities as we have seen in the context of military and police camps, contemporary slavery and slavery-
like practices, and the laws of war used in these situations to promote violence against marginalized human groups. A new discourse
of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner
that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of
inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative
discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for subhuman humans. This move, in
addressing violence and vulnerabilities, should be productive not only for humans made vulnerable by
their dehumanization, but nonhumans as well.


And so we explore our past with the oceans, and find our brothers and sisters.
2C Stuff On Case
Sam Social Location

In the novel Kingdom Come, Mark Waid, speaking through the fictional Rev. Norman
McKay says; The Sandman had gone to his grave without one grain of faith in the
future. And the saddest part was... he was far from alone. With each passing day,
hope for tomorrow has become more precious a commodity among every day folk.
Still, I tried to keep the faith... and hew to the scriptures. According to the word of
God, the meek would someday inherit the earth. Someday. But God never accounted
for the mighty. While the quote refers to a fictional world, it is equally applicable to
us and the world today. Debaters, and the world as a whole, are weak, listless, and
obedient to the mighty, to authority. The meek are subsumed under authoritys
wishes. My location, my pedagogy, is simple. In debate, we act as rebels. You see, and
this is another quote from the book; "Rebels are the system testing itself. If the
system cannot withstand the challenge to the status quo, the system is overturned
and so reinvented. If debaters can offer a challenge strong enough to the system, the
system falls, and a new one, without some of the flaws of the last, is born. As Violet B.
Ketels posited in her 1996 paper Havel to the Castle! The Power of the Word;
Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade the full
weight of the consequences attendant on our choices. It is always the intellectuals,
however we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word ... who must bear the full
weight of moral responsibility. As debaters, as intellectuals, it is our duty, our ethical
obligation, to act as the wave crashing on the shore, eroding the mountains of
injustice. In this instance, to act as rebels, challenging the anthropocentric norms that
permeate the current system. Humanity views animals as a separate other. We put
ourselves in the position of God, only to trample upon our fellow inhabitants. Why do
we think we are superior as a species? Why are we lying to ourselves? And so I explore
the ocean of lies and paradoxes.

Ocean Anthro Links
The suffering of species is considered instrumental instead of intrinsic; justifies further
violence. Anthropogenic environmental destruction is one such example
Brennan and Lo 08 (Professor Brennan has research interests in Environmental Philosophy,
Comparative history of science & medicine entailment & contitionals identity & personal identity,
Environmental ethics, Philosophy & Environmental policy worldviews, attitudes & social policy, Dr.
Norva Lo works in areas of moral philosophy, environmental philosophy, the philosophy of David Hume,
logic and critical thinking. She received her Ph.D. (with distinction) from the University of Western
Australia in 2002. She was a post-doctoral fellow from 2003 to 2005, and became a lecturer in 2006, in
the Philosophy Department of La Trobe University, having previously held posts at Hong Kong University
and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 1/3/2008, Environmental Ethics,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#IntChaEnvEth)

In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic
value (meaning non-instrumental value) has been of considerable importance. The former is the value of things
as means to further some other ends, whereas the latter is the value of things as ends in
themselves regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have
instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed
that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who
want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person,
has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving the ends of others.
For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for
some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself
independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant
also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically valuable is that which is good as an end in itself, it is commonly agreed that something's
possession of intrinsic value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to protect it or at least refrain from damaging
it Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they
assign intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a strong sense) or they assign
a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such that
the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e.,
what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that nature has made all things
specifically for the sake of man and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions
find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment of nonhuman animals, except to the extent that such treatment may
lead to bad consequences for human beings. Immanuel Kant (Duties to Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics), for instance, suggests that
cruelty towards a dog might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty towards humans. From this
standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically,
wrong . Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic
(i.e. human-caused) environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human
beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable
environment (see Passmore 1974, Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and Maple (eds.) 1995).
Embrace stewardship, and the fact that we are all fellow life forms, to reject
Anthropocentric mindset
Sanbonmatsu 11. John SanbonmatsuProfessor of Philosophy, Worcester
Polytechnic InstitueCritical Theory and Animal Liberation 2011
Of course, humans seize every opportunity to claim special moral qualities, placing themselves above
brutal nature and the beasts that populate it. Yet while it is no great intellectual triumph for humans to establish their
primacy over naturethey have done so for millenniathe real question turns on the exact character that primacy
assumes as it is historically played out. In the present context, dominion (as spelled out in Genesis and other texts) has meant
exploitation and abuse, that is, domination largely bereft if positive ethical content although some recent works (for example Matthew
Scullys Dominion) have sought to ground a defense of animal rights in religion. A different kind of human obligation would
point in the direction of stewardship, calling attention to equity, balance, ecological sustainability, and
coexistence between humans and the natural world. So far, however, human beings have done little to distance themselves
from a brutal or Hobbesian state of nature having repeatedly proven themselves the most destructive and murderous of all creatures. The
view of natural relations adopted here derives from Regans philosophical work namely that all sentient being has inalienable
rights to be free of pain and suffering at the hands of humans. For Regan, this line of thinking holds to several interrelated premises:
(1) no moral justification exists for overriding animal interests in order to serve higher interests; (2)
what matters is not specific intellectual or communication skills but rather the capacity to experience
pain, suffering and loss; (3) while much of nature is inescapably used by humans as resources to satisfy
material and other needs, this logic should not extend to other sentient beings; (4) humans ought to be
stewards of nature and other species within it to the extent possible; and (5) human and animal interests are closely bound
together within the same social and historical processes.
Humyns are putting massive amounts of toxic minerals and chemicals into the ocean,
and the effects are being felt all around the world. No life is safe. Bender 3 (Frederic L. Bender is the
author of The Culture of Extinction: Towards the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, published in 2003, the book from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also holds the following degrees:
Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic University of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Need I say more?)

The ocean, covering 70 percent of the planet's surface, absorbs atmospheric gases, including CO2, buffering what would otherwise be
drastic global warming. It also sustains half the planet's biomass. Yet today the ocean must absorb vastly more
silt from the land than before the rise of agriculture. It also must handle the rapid increase in
chemically contaminated sewage sludge, industrial effluent, chemical runoff from agriculture, and
other human wastes. Every year, hundreds of tons of new synthetic chemicals, for which there is no
evolutionary history or built-in adaptation, flow down to the seas. Oceanic mercury contaminations, for
example, are now two-and-a-half times their preindustrial levels; manganese four times; zinc, copper,
and lead about twelve times; antimony thirty times; and phosphorus eighty times.90 We know next to
nothing about these wastes' potential impact upon marine ecosystems, either singly or synergistically. We do
know, however, that they concentrate as they rise upward through marine food chains, with devastating impact on top
predators. Since ocean currents circulate globally, no part of the ocean is exempt from pollution ;
scientists have found DDT in the fat of Antarctic penguins, thousands of miles from its nearest point
source, and have detected manufactured toxins even in the deep ocean trenches.91
And the destruction doesnt end with atrocities against inanimate nature. Humyns are
wreaking havoc on marine animals as well. Bender 3. (Frederic L. Bender is the author of The Culture of Extinction: Towards
the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, published in 2003, the book from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also holds the following degrees: Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic
University of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Need I say more?)

Apart from devastating the coastal zones, nations exploit the open ocean as they see fit. As
competition for diminishing marine resources grows more intense, exploiters drive those resources to
extinction. Whale species, for example, have crashed, one after another, under human pressure. Because of
low calving rates and slow maturation, most whale species need many decades' complete moratorium on
hunting to recover. if they can at all. The International Whaling Commission had set 1986 as the date for
the cessation of all commercial whaling. Nonetheless Japan, Iceland, Norway, and some former Soviet republics still refuse to
comply. Advancing technology and high interest rates encourage whaling entrepreneurs to make their
profits as quickly as possible.94

Humyn activities are destroying important and productive parts of aquatic
environments. Bender 3 (Frederic L. Bender is the author of The Culture of Extinction: Towards the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, published in 2003, the book
from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also holds the following degrees: Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic University of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He
further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Need I say more?)

Since almost two-thirds of the human population lives near seacoasts, about 85 percent of ocean pollution comes from
human activity on land. Ninety percent of it remains in coastal waters, the oceans' most biologically
productive sector. As a result, marine habitat destruction is most serious in coastal zones, especially in
salt marshes, estuaries, mangroves, and coral reefs. As coastal cities expand, they all but obliterate nearby
wetlandshighly productive biological areas that formerly filtered pollution between land and sea.
Terrestrial erosion, sewage, industrial waste dumping, thermal pollution, oil production and spills,
removal of coral for construction, tourism, souvenir collection, mining and blasting, nuclear testing
all pressure or destroy reefs and mangroves.

Coral Reef destruction is particularly high. Bender 3 (Frederic L. Bender is the author of The Culture of Extinction: Towards the
Philosophy of Deep Ecology, published in 2003, the book from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also holds the following degrees: Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic University
of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. Need I say more?)

Over one-fourth of the world's coral reefs have been lost to global warming, pollution, fishing, and
other stresses, according to the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network, a joint effort of the United Nations
Environment Program, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Conservation Union, and the World Meteorological
Organization.92 In 1998 alone, bleaching destroyed about 16 percent of the world's reefs. In some parts of
the western Pacific, 90 percent of shallow-water corals have died.
"It is shocking that two-thirds of the world's reefs may be dying, and that 30 percent of the world's reefs are already
gone," Former U.S. Commerce Secretary Norman Mineta observes.93
Humyns are thrashing the environment at incredible levels, the Aleutian Island
Ecosystem is an empiric example. The chain destruction reaction is massive. Bender 3
(Frederic L. Bender is the author of The Culture of Extinction: Towards the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, published in 2003, the book from whence this card came, on pages 55-58. He also
holds the following degrees: Professor of Philosophy. BS, Polytechnic University of New York; MA, PhD, Northwestern University. He further teaches at the University of Colorado at Colorado
Springs. Need I say more?)

Indicative of ocean ecosystems' vulnerability is the recent collapse of the Aleutian Island ecosystem,
one of the world's most remote areas." Until recently, this subarctic ecosystem based on vast undersea kelp
forests supported immense numbers of smelt, shrimp, king crabs, sea otters, and sea lions. Suddenly, in the mid-1990s,
the marine mammals vanished (ibid.). Now sharks, pollock, and sea urchins dominate waters once
brimming with seals, otters, and king crab. Marine ecologist Jim Estes, who has studied the Aleutian ecosystem for thirty
years, says no one "has ever seen a decline of this magnitude in such a short period of time over such a
large geographic area" (ibid.).
In the 1980s as many as one hundred thousand sea otters inhabited the Aleutians. Yet by the year 2000,
only about six thousand remained, according to aerial surveysa rate of decline that researchers say is
unprecedented for any mammal population in the world. Scientists could find neither signs of disease, famine, nor
reproductive failure. It turned out that the otters had become prey for orcas, with whom they had previ-
ously lived in harmony. All of a sudden, though, the orcaswho normally feed on sea lions and sealsbegan
preying heavily on otters. The reason was that the population of harbor seals and Steller sea lionsthe world's
biggest sea lionsdropped sharply in the late 1980s. By 1992 otters were the only plentiful marine
mammals left in Aleutian waters for orcas to eat. With far fewer otters to prey upon them, sea urchin
populations exploded, eating almost all the kelp. Sea urchins now cover the ocean floor. As late as 1993, the Aleutian
kelp forests were twenty feet deep; today they are found only right by the shoreline, in water too
shallow for urchins. When the thick, leafy undersea forests vanished, so did most of the rockfish, snails, starfish, and
other creatures that used the kelp for food, shelter, and breeding grounds. Local seabirds, notably
puffins and kittiwakes, also are hurting from lack of fish (ibid.).
For years, scientists puzzled over the cause of the Aleutian collapse . Now they believe that the key event
occurred in 1977, when the average temperature of the Gulf of Alaska suddenly rose by two degrees
Celsius due to global warming. The warmer water would have caused the plankton at the base of the
food chain to disappear, with tiny copepods and krill probably following soon afterward. Deprived of their
food, the shrimp, crab, and smelt fishes, such as capelin and herring, vanished next. Soon they were replaced
by an explosion of the cod and pollock populations. By the mid-1980s, the seal and sea lion populations
collapsed, since to survive the winters, their young needed the smelt, which have high fat content. Without
seals and sea lions, the orca had to shift their diet to sea otters and, since sea otters are much smaller
than seals or sea lions, the orca had to eat them in large numbers to survive. To top it off, as the water
warmed, the salmon population boomed, drawing in sharks, who feed not only on salmon, but on
seals. Competition for seals also forced the orca to shift predation to sea otters. Thus, in less than
twenty years, the Aleutian ecosystem, formerly teeming with life, has collapsed, its marine mammals
on the verge of extinction. Opportunistic species such as pollock, sharks, orcas, and Homo colossus
thrive on the chaos, at least temporarily. Though once-thriving crab fisheries collapsed in the late 1970s, the new species
attracted large fishing trawlers, which harvest millions of tons of pollock and cod a year (ibid.).


The Role of an Intellectual/Debate has Failed

It is the role of an intellectual to speak out passionately about the right thing.
Empirically, stances of passivism lead to Nazi attitudes. The choice to not speak out
against anthropocentrism will have consequences and influence others. Ketels 96(Violet
Ketels is a well-known intellectual, who currently teaches at Temple University and has an award at the Intelligence Heritage Program named after her. The article from whence this card came,
Havel to the Castle! The Power of Word was published in November 1996).

Intellectuals are not customarily thought of as men and women of action. Our circumstances are ambiguous, our
credibility precarious. While our sense of past and future is "radically linguistic,' we scarcely have a common
human language anymore, and our fashionable linguistic skepticism elevates the denying of verities to
an article of faith, out of which we build academic careers of nay-saying.
We use the written word as the primary political medium for gaining attention. We are "writing
people," who traffic in words and thus carry an unavoidable accountability for what we say with
them.5 Havel defines intellectuals as people who devote their lives "to thinking in general terms about
the affairs of this world and the broader context of things . . . professionally,' for their occupation.
If we aspire to be distinguished from mere scribblers, history demands that we choose between being
"the apologist for rulers [and] an advisor to the people; the tragedy of the twentieth century is that
these two functions have ceased to exist independently of one another, and intellectuals like Sartre
who thought they were fulfilling one role were inevitably drawn to play both."
Alternatively, we can choose with Richard Rorty, echoing Max Weber, to stay out of politics, "where passionate
commitment and sterile excitation are out of place," keeping "politics in the hands of charismatic leaders
and trained officials." We can choose to pursue "[our] own private perfection.'
That particular stance, however expedient, did not work well in Germany. In Czechoslovakia, it produced
wartime Nazi collaborator Gustave Husak, the "President of Forgetting," who sought to perfect
totalitarianism by systematically purging "the Party and state, the arts, the universities, and the media
of everyone who dare [d] to speak critically, independently, or even intelligently about what the regime define[d]
as politics.' It produced Tudjman and Milogevie in Yugoslavia.
Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade the full weight of the
consequences attendant on our choices. "It is always the intellectuals, however
we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word . . . who must bear the full weight of moral responsibility."'

Debate has become an empty shell of competition, seen as a means of arguing and
trolling ones way to trophies. The idea that debate is an institution to apply
argumentation into the real world is gone, and now, debate is seen as purely
simulational. No more are the days when one would advocate true change. Mitchell
98 (Gordon R. Mitchell is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he has worked since
1995 (from 1985-1994 he debated and coached at Northwestern, Wake Forest and Louisville). His research program focuses on public argument, rhetoric of science, and social movements,
while his feet gravitate toward salsa dancing, stone skipping, and sweep rowing on Pittsburgh's resplendent three rivers.)
As two prominent teachers of argumentation point out, "Many scholars and educators term academic debate a
laboratory for testing and developing approaches to argumentation" (Hill and Leeman 1997, p. 6). This explanation
of academic debate squares with descriptions of the study of argumentation that highlight debate training as preparation for citizenship. As a
safe space that permits the controlled "testing" of approaches to argumentation, the academic
laboratory, on this account, constitutes a training ground for "future" citizens and leaders to hone
their critical thinking and advocacy skills.
While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected
environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic
debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is
extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a
laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the
school grow taller and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions,
argumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing
critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces . Although they may research
and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach,
students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators , with little or no
apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events (see Mitchell 1995; 1998).
The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of
alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the
visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with
the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold
for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the
"uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of
debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically
debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the
kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to
deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending
spectators in the drama of political life" (1991, p. 8).
Complete reliance on the laboratory metaphor to guide pedagogical practice can result in the unfortunate
foreclosure of crucial learning opportunities. These opportunities, which will be discussed in more detail in the later
sections of this piece, center around the process of argumentative engagement with wider public spheres of deliberation. In
the strictly preparatory model of argument pedagogy, such direct engagement is an activity that is appropriately pursued following the
completion of academic debate training (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8). Preparatory study of argumentation, undertaken
in the confines of the academic laboratory, is conducted on the plane of simulation and is designed to
pave the way for eventual application of critical thinking and oral advocacy skills in "realworld"
contexts.
Such a preparatory pedagogy has a tendency to defer reflection and theorization on the political dynamics
of academic debate itself. For example, many textbooks introduce students to the importance of argumentation
as the basis for citizenship in the opening chapter, move on to discussion of specific skills in the
intervening chapters, and never return to the obvious broader question of how specific skills can be
utilized to support efforts of participatory citizenship and democratic empowerment. Insofar as the
argumentation curriculum does not forthrightly thematize the connection between skill-based learning
and democratic empowerment, the prospect that students will fully develop strong senses of
transformative political agency grows increasingly remote.

In this day and age, no one sees debate as a means to institute real change. It has
become a hollow shell of what it was meant to be. But if you vote against
anthropocentrism, as is your duty as an intellectual, you can help restore meaning to
academic debate.

This also interacts with their Antunes and Gadotti evidence. Theyre talking about education, which is
just sitting back in a rocking chair and thinking about the world. But theyre perpetuating the SQ that we
are kritiking, through Kingsnorth and Hines. They are talking about connecting with nature, we are
kritiking the fact that they believe we are separate from the world. We need to accept our existing
connection and oneness with the world, and only then can we solve for our anthropocentric mindset
and fins our past.
Definition of Genocide
Genocide includes the destruction of a nation. Vetelson 2k (ARNE JOHAN VETLESEN, b. 1960, PhD in philosophy
(University of Oslo, 1993); Associate Professor, University of Oslo (1994 ). Most recent book in English: Close-ness: An Ethics (ed. with Harald Jodalen; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press,
1997); author of eight books on ethics, political philosophy, hermeneutics, and psychoanalysis. Within this card, Vetelson quotes the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, an international conference. Article published July 2000)

After affirming that genocide is a crime under international law whether committed in time of peace or war, the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Gutman & Rieff, 1999: 154)

Mix and match analytics:
They are implying genocide doesnt apply to animals, which is an example of
anthropocentrism.
What is the difference between the organized, planned destruction on people and
that of animals?
In the status quo, we live in a bubble that separates people from animals, extend
Kingsworth and Hine, so in the SQ anthropocentric mindset, we are one nation, and
nature is another.

Life Comes from the Ocean

The most recent scientific evidence states that life emerged in the oceans. Royal
Society of Chemistry, 6 (The Royal Society of Chemistry is the world's leading chemistry community, advancing excellence in the chemical
sciences. With 49,000 members and a knowledge business that spans the globe, they are the UK's professional body for chemical scientists; a not-for-profit
organisation with 170 years of history and an international vision for the future. They promote, support and celebrate chemistry. We work to shape the future of the
chemical sciences - for the benefit of science and humanity. This article was published on October 11, 2006.
http://www.rsc.org/AboutUs/News/PressReleases/2006/Lifebottomocean.asp)

Life on earth probably began in the depths of the ocean and not on the planet's surface, claim scientists. The
research is reported in the latest edition of the Royal Society of Chemistry journal Chemical Society
Reviews. The claim comes from Dr Isabelle Daniel at the University of Lyon and colleagues in
Germany and France who have surveyed the current knowledge on the origins of life of Earth. They
conclude that when life on Earth began, about four billion years ago, conditions on the surface would
have been unfavourable for life to emerge. Dr Daniel said: "Only a few modern species can live in the kind
of extreme environment that was present on the primitive Earth's surface." Volcanic eruptions and meteorite
impacts created an erratic climate above ground, but volcanic activity regulated the temperature at the bottom of
the ocean at a more favourable 20-50 degrees Celsius. Dr Daniel said: "Harmful radiation would have
been filtered out by the ocean and the high pressure conditions of the ocean could have stabilised
essential biological molecules such as DNA and RNA." The scientists refer to evidence that most surface
organisms can withstand pressures higher than they are used to without consequence to their life
cycle or metabolism. Dr Daniel said: "This may represent one of the most ancestral physical conditions under which life had to
emerge. "In fact, we believe that the last universal common ancestor to all living organisms was a
piezophile, an organism that prefers to live at high pressures." If life did emerge at the bottom of the ocean, it is
possible it could have begun under similar conditions on other celestial bodies, such as in the deep oceans of Jupiter's moon Europa. But Dr
Daniel is sceptical about whether the team's hypothesis can ever be confirmed. She said: "Life has erased most traces of its origins, and
reinventing life itself would simply take too much time and good fortune."

Piracy
1) Pirates are anthropocentric. They literally viewed Mother Earth as a treasure
chest, something that didnt need giving just taking.
2) Pirates participated in the excessive hunting of whales and other aquatic life, all
for a profit.
3) Bureaucracy as a whole began as a way to organize agriculture, in which animal
and plants were subjugated to provide human sustenance. The fascist regime
they try to solve for root cause is anthropocentrism.
Race
1) It isnt necessarily that we claim racial violence isnt a thing, or that it doesnt
need solving. Its more that the genocide an anthropocentric mindset justifies
perpetuates the racial violence, so we need to solve for anthro first.
2) They claim the blackening of society is rooted in the masterslave relation.
We agree with this, but the relation of master and slave can be traced back to
humans oppressing animals looooong before the whiteness oppressed the
blackness
3) So they cant possibly solve, as we must address the issues of anthro before we
can take care of the other forms of oppression.

4) The whole concept of race in the first place is uniquely anthropocentric. We
dont say that foxs with white fur are a different race then foxs with red fur;
only humanity decides that we have races. When you talk about the
subjugation of the black body, you are being anthropocentric.
5) Extend Sanbonmatsu 11. The violence commited against the black body has its
root in the masterslave dichotomy. Anthro is the root cause of this
dichotomy.
6) The affs foregrounding of human suffering ignores the tools that have been
produced to suppress groups and ignores the humanized context of the event.
HEYDT 2K10
[samantha, american abattoirs, December 20th, http://samheydt.wordpress.com/2010/12/20/224/, BA
Communications New School and Universitat van Amsterdam ]
The American abattoir paved the road to Auschwitz. The industrialization of death developed at the turn of the
century in the US stockyards was adopted by the Nazi Concentration camps, where sectors of humanity
relegated into the realm of subhuman were slaughtered. History repeats itself with the algorithms of domination
shifting not in construct but in context. The assembly-line technology and eugenic ideology that buttresses the
mechanized mass murder of animals share the rationalized cruelty that has historically been used in the
Western context against humans in the state of exception. Branded inferior, crammed into railcars,
forced into labor and killed when no longer of use, the victims of the Holocaust experienced the same
fate as the chattel of slaughterhouses do today. The justification for this brutality is hinged on the
biological inferiority of the victims who are dehumanized and denigrated as animals. The anthropological machine
distinguishing humans from animals collapses when man is stripped down to bare life (Agamben).
Thus, as long as the exploitation and violent slaughter of animals occurs unrefuted, the potential for
genocide remains. As history has shown us time and time again: the realm of nonhuman is not solely occupied by animals. Historical
Context: Patriarchy, slavery and the social matrix of speciesism emerged in tandem to one another from
the same region that fathered agriculture in the Middle East during the Chalcolithic Age. Sumer, now
modern Iraq, was the first civilization to engage in core agricultural practices such as organized irrigation
and specialized labor with slaves and animals. They raised cattle, sheep and pigs, used ox for draught their beast of burden
and equids for transport (Sayce 99). The knowledge to store food as standing reserve meant migration was no
longer necessary to survive. The population density bred social hierarchies supported at its base by slaves (Kramer 47). In Sumer,
there were only two social stratas to belong to: lu the free man and arad the slave (Kramer
47). Technologies such as branding irons, chains and cages that were developed to dominate animals
paved way for the domination over humans too. The human rule over the lower creatures provided the mental analogue in
which many political and social arrangements are based (Patterson 280). Caged and castrated, slaves were treated no
different from chattel. Thousands of years later, the tools developed in the Middle East for
domestication were used by the Europeans during colonization to shackle slaves. When the European settlers
arrived in Tasmania in 1772, the indigenous people seem not to have noticed themBy 1830 their numbers had been reduced from around five
hundred to seventy-two. In their intervening years they had been used for slave labour and sexual pleasure, tortured and mutilated. They
had been hunted like vermin and their skins had been sold for a government bounty. When the males were
killed, female survivors were turned loose with the heads of their husbands tied around their necks. Males who were not killed were usually
castrated. Children were clubbed to death. (Gray 91). This horrific account illustrates how the indigenous people of
Tasmania were enslaved,skinned and slaughtered by the Europeans. Meanwhile across the globe, the trans-Atlantic
slave trade was at its peak in the 18th century. Africans were taken from their native land, branded, bred, and sold as
property. Linguistically these acts of violence and exploitation are tied to animals- branded, skinned,
slaughtered, sold. Be that as it may, as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other
(Pythagoras in Patterson 210). Racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism and sexism all stem from the same systems of domination that initially
subjugated animals. Until we cease to exploit living beings as resources, the threat of man being stripped of his humanity looms. Although we
cringe at the inhumane actions of our ancestors, the scale and efficiency of murder and oppression has only advanced, while the notion of
human remains increasingly obscured.

Eco Pedagogy
1) The concept of sustainable means you want to keep using the Earth as a
resource. Granted you might protect that resource, but the idea of a resource
that we can use is anthropocentric.
2) Anthropocentrism is already in the squo, and it IS a form of eco ped that is in
the squo. As such the ballot isnt key for them, vote for us to actually solve
something.
3) Without rejecting anthro it is impossible to promote eco ped that doesnt
advocate and contribute to genocide in the structure.

Queer
1) They claim humankind has to reconnect with nature, as opposed to recognize
our existent connection.
2) The closet they want to destroy is still based on the idea that it is okay to
persecute those deemed animals. Until animals are treated the same as
humans there will always be oppression and an oppressed group.
3) They dont claim to solve or help animals, only a small group of humans. Billions
of animals are oppressed daily.
AT: People take precedence
Either an organism is sentient or is not we cannot be sentient if the animal is not
Kirkwood 97(James K. Kirkwood, june 1997, Universities Federation for Animal Welfare and Humane
Slaughter Association, UK, The Distribution of the Capacity for Sentience in the Animal Kingdom)
My view about animal welfare is in line with the sentiment behind the agreement reached by the
European Heads of State at their Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 (see above), though it is not, as I will
discuss later, in line with what it actually says. For me, concern for an animals welfare is concern for its
feelings concern for the quality of its life as it experiences it. (Here and throughout I use feelings as
shorthand for conscious/subjectively experienced feelings, likewise by feel I mean
consciously/subjectively feel.) Thus, it seems to me that welfare is: The balance, now or through life,
of the quality of the complex mix of subjective feelings associated with brain states induced by
various sensory inputs and by cognitive and emotion processes (Kirkwood, 2004a). I think it is helpful,
in this way, to reserve the use of the word welfare to address feelings rather than using it to include
health also. How an animal feels can be influenced by its state of health and by its environment, so
these are of course often central to the subject of animal welfare, but it seems to me that there is much
to be gained and nothing to be lost by keeping the meanings of the terms health and welfare distinct in
this way. To be sentient is to have the capacity to feel (in the sense defined above) something. Except in
deep sleep or some pathological states, the lives of most of us humans are characterized by many
kinds of feelings. Some of these, including sights, sounds, tastes, warmth and cold, and the various
sensations arising from touch, are associated with our external sensors. Others are assoc- iated with
internal sensors that provide our brains with information about the states of our bodies. The latter
include general, non-localized or only vaguely localized feelings such as exhaustion, malaise or
ecstasy, and localized feelings such as aches and pains. In addition, we experience a spectrum of
feelings associated with the thoughts and emotions that may be prompted either by the inputs from
these internal and external sensing devices, or (it seems) by the constant internal conversations some
conscious, some subconscious of our brains. For example, fear (or, in others, delight) may be induced
by a glimpse of a snake beside ones unshod foot, and feelings of sorrow or joy may be evoked by music
or by remembering sad or happy events. It is conceivable (though I struggle with the notion) that the
kind of multi- faceted sentience that we experience symphonic is a good word to describe it may
have sprung suddenly into existence from non-sentient ancestors. For example, some genetic change
may have resulted in a crucial alteration in the organization, the patterns of communication, among
brain modules, which resulted in the emergence of sentience. If this conferred a significant evolutionary
advantage, then it might have spread rapidly through the descendent population of our ancestors. Such
a scenario would be consistent with the views of those who believe that the current scientific evidence
is that sentience is limited to humans only, or to humans and perhaps a very few other species (see,
for example, Kennedy, 1993; Bermond, 1997; Macphail, 1998). The other, and perhaps more likely
pattern of events than this non-sentient to symphonic sentience in one step hypothesis, is that our kind
of symphonic sentience evolved in stages from an earlier, simpler, solo version. The first sentient
organism may have been consciously aware of only one sense one aspect of sight, for example (our
conscious vision is formed from the coordin- ated activity of many distinct and separate brain modules
that each handle specific tasks to do with, for example: colour, recognition of particular objects,
position, distance and movement). This faculty for conscious awareness might then have been
commandeered by evolution to enhance (if that is what it does) other aspects of vision, and then have
been further applied to other senses such as hearing and taste, and then to cognitive and emotional
processes also. I am not suggesting that this may actually have been the sequence in which various
senses and neuronal processes came under the spotlight of consciousness it might have happened in
the reverse order but only that there may have been a stepwise development in the range of
phenomena that could be accessed within consciousness. As stated above, to be sentient is to have a
feeling of something. This implies that the phenomenon of sentience either exists or it doesnt: that an
organism either is sentient or it isnt. How could this discrete presence or absence be consistent with
the gradual process of evolution? There is no problem THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAPACITY FOR
SENTIENCE 13 envisaging gradation in the intensity of a feeling pain can vary from a barely discernible
to a very severe sensation but it is much harder to see how the very capacity to be aware of pain
could be other than either present or absent. You either feel something, no matter how slightly, or you
dont it is hard to conceive a halfway stage here. This may well be an important issue the explanation
of which might prove revealing but it is not one that can be pursued further in this paper. Brains work
by passage of information among hierarchical assemblages of neurons. Perhaps sentience evolved with
a slight change, by chance, in organization that resulted in a small assemblage of cells recognizing
patterns of activity of the previously insentient brain design. Envisaged in this way, sentience may
indeed depend upon a specific form of neuronal organization that either is present or not, but it may
have started with changes that involved very few cells in the first instance. This leads on to the subject
of this paper, which is the distribution of the capacity for sentience in the animal kingdom. It is
appropriate to begin this with a brief review of the animal kingdom and of who or what is and is not
currently included within it.
AT: Humans Wont change
Alternative of showing oppression is not a fully transformative experience
King 97 [1997, Roger King is has a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of
Reading in England, where he was on the faculty until resigning He has received multiple
fellowships from Yaddo, The MacDowell Colony, and the Virginia Center for the Creative Arts.
Critical Reflections on Biocentric Environmental Ethics: Is It an Alternative to
Anthropocentrism? Space, place, and environmental ethic, pg. 220-224]//AA

The anthropocentric argument for protecting wild species and places because of their
transformative value is attractive. And the extension of this approach to the domesticated
landscape provides one basis for a defense of open spaces in cities, preservation of historic
districts, and exposure of urban children to rural and farming experiences. Despite the
attractiveness of the concept of transformative value, I wish to suggest that its abstractness
makes the concept epistemologically problematic. First, transformative value does not reside
in objects or places independent of those who experience them. The transformation, and hence
the value of what initiates the transformation, depends as much on what subjects bring to their
experience as it does on what is experienced. Cultural or class differences, for example, might
be expected to lead people to perceive nature differently. If so, the claim that particular places
or things have transformative value would have no clear meaning until contextualized for a
particular group of people at a particular place and time. Marti Kheel exemplifies this difficulty
when she proposes that those who see nothing wrong with eating meat should visit a
slaughterhouse. She appears to think that this experience will provide the emotional jolt
necessary to unsettle those who use abstract moral reasoning to justify the consumption of
meat. But some people visit slaughterhouses and are unmoved. Some people will be
transformed by their visit to the slaughterhouse and others will not since the slaughterhouse
experience does not have transformative value for everyone. The same point can be made
about attitudes toward wilderness. Wild places do not in themselves bring about the
experiential transformations Norton hoped for. After all, some people hate the experience
(paradigmatically, early European colonists thought the wilderness was the domain of Satan). A
second objection derives from the multiplicity of things that have transformative value. Norton
used the concept to argue that wild nature has value independent of merely felt preferences,
because the experience of wild nature can transform careless and irresponsible attitudes to
nature into insightful and caring action. Transformative values can transform an irrational
worldview based on consumption and unlimited economic growth into a rational worldview of
environmental responsibility. However, it is also true that the experience of city life can
transform the outlook of a person who comes from the country. And contact with American
commercialism rarely leaves Third World or indigenous people untransformed. All these
experiences would have a transformative value, yet surely there are some transformations
we should not encourage. Thus, it remains to be explained why transformations in favor of
wilderness protection or farmland preservation are to be valued as stages on the way to a more
rational worldview, while transformations that industrialize and Westernize indigenous people
are unacceptable. Ultimately, Norton appears to have presupposed criteria of judgment other
than the transformative effect of what he values. And for the biocentrist, one plausible
conclusion is that those transformative experiences that favor wilderness protection are
valuable because wild things after all do have intrinsic value.

2AC Stuff Off Case
AT: Topicality Exploration
We are trying to find out more about the metaphor: We meet exploration
OED 14 (The Oxford English Dictionary. Provides a comprehensive definition of English words to
scholars and researchers, Exploration, Copyright 2014,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/exploration)

Exploration: Thorough analysis of a subject or theme. An exploration of the religious dimensions of our
lives MORE EXAMPLE SENTENCES Future research may include a more thorough exploration of these
observations. He then set about a thorough and painstaking exploration of what an orchestral work of
the late 20th century might be. At the same, this is a film of emotional depth, humour and intelligent
exploration of its subject.

Self-exploration is a form of exploration as well
Tartakovsky 11 (Margarita Tartakovsky has a masters in psychology, and is the assistant editor at
psychcentral.com, 5/24/2011, Self-Exploration: Getting To Know Thyself,
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/05/24/self-exploration-getting-to-know-thyself/)
Many of us go through life skimming the surface of our identities. That is, we dont truly dig deeply
into our thoughts, feelings, desires and dreams. Specifically, self-exploration involves taking a look at
your own thoughts, feelings, behaviors and motivations and asking why. Its looking for the roots of
who we are answers to all the questions we have about *ourselves+, according to Ryan Howes, Ph.D,
psychologist, writer and professor in Pasadena, California.
AT: Topicality USFG
As governments only derive their power from the people, we, as US citizens, are
integral parts of that government
Jefferson 1776 (Jefferson, Thomas. "The Declaration of Independence: A
Transcription." National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and
Records Administration, 1776 Web. 01 July 2014.)
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to
the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-
-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for
light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed
to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off
such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient
sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former
Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.
To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.
The community, the USFG, only exists as a community of individuals acting in concert,
by the consent of the governed indivduals. The governed individuals act as a key part
of the government giving it its legitimacy. Us, the citizens, make up the USFG
Locke
For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have
thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will
and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the
individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the
body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority:
or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every
individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws,
where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the
act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the
whole.
AT: Topicality Oceans
We meet: We are exploring a type of ocean.

Questioning what the oceans mean in relation to humanity is inclusive of the ocean
topic
Schmitt 54 (Carl Schmitt was a German philosopher, jurist, and political theorist. Schmitt is a major
figure in 20th century legal and political theory, writing extensively on the effective wielding of political
power. His work has been a major influence on subsequent political theory, legal theory, continental
philosophy, and political theology in the 20th century and beyond, Carl Schmitts Land & Sea, Part 1,
1954, http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/03/carl-schmitts-land-sea-part-1/, Bennett Gilliam)

Far from me the intention to darken the brightness of such splendor. But when we raise the question
whether we are dealing here with a truly maritime destiny, with a genuine choice in favor of the sea
element, it does not take us long to realize the smallness of a maritime power limited to the Adriatic
and the Mediter-ranean basin alone, at a time when the huge expanses of the oceans of the world
were cast open.
T is not a Voter
1. Prefer reasonability- Good is good enough- key to overcoming the neg's ability to
pull unpredictable definitions from literally anywhere.
2. Avoid a race to the bottom which will exclude even the most obviously topical cases
on mere technicalities.
3. Don't vote on potential abuse, only vote neg on T if you have absolutely no doubt
whatsoever.
Framework
AT: Util Good
Utilitarianism cant address the issues of equity and distributive justice
Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000
[Environmental Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])

However, its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its quantifications techniques are far from being simple,
straightforward, and objective. Indeed, they are often too complicated to be practical. They are also to flexible
and subject to manipulation. They are impersonal and lack compassion. More importantly, they fail to deal the
issue of equity and distributive justice. Seemingly, you cannot get fairer than this. In calculating benefits and
costs, each person is counted as one and only one. IN other words, people are treated equally. For Mill, justice
arises from the principle of utility. Utilitarianism in concerted only the aggregate effect, no matter
how the aggregate is distributed. For almost all policies, there is an uneven distribution of
benefits and costs. Some people win, while others lose. The Pareto optimality would is almost
nonexistent. A policys outcome is Pareto optimal if nobody loses and at least one person gains.

Utilitarianism policies result in inequality
Liu PHD University of Pennsylvania 2000 (Dr. Liu, PHD @ University of Pennsylvania, writes 2000
[Environmental Justice Analysis: theories, methods and practice, 2000 ISBN:1566704030, p.20-21])

Besides these ridiculous policy implications in the United States and in the world, the logic underlying Summers
proposal represents cultural imperialism, the capitalist mode of production and consumption, and a particular
kind of political-economic power and its discriminatory practices (Harvey 1996:368). Except for its beautiful guise
of economic logic, the proposal is nothing new to those familiar with the history. The capitalistic powerhouses in
Europe practiced material and cultural imperialism against countries in Africa, America, and Asia for years. They
did it by raising the banner of trade and welfare enhancement. They did it through guns and powder. Of course, they
had their logic for exporting opium to Canton (Guangzhou) in China through force. Now, we see a new logic. This
time, it is economic logic and globalization. This time, the end is the same, but the means is not through guns and
powder. Instead, it is political-economic power. This example illustrates clearly the danger of using the utilitarian
perspective as the only means for policy analysis. Fundamentally, the utilitarian disregards the distributive
justice issue altogether and espouses the current mode of production and consumption and the
political-economic structure, without any attention to the inequity and inequality in the current
system. Even worse and more subtly, it delivers the philosophy of it exists, therefore its good.
However, just because it sells, doesnt mean we have to worship it (Peirce 1991).
AT: Cede the Political
The refusal of immediate choice is precisely what gives the critique the power to force
us to re-consider our options and question the nature of the political. This will
invigorate progressive politics.
Brown, 05 (Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Wendy, Professor of Poli Sci, UC
Berkeley).

On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has
something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be
made in the political realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take
or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here
we might remind ourselves that prying apart immediate political constraints from intellectual ones is
one path to being "governed a little less" in Foucault's sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond
the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degoverning
rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to
politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to
remember that the "immediate choices" are just that and often last no longer than a political season
(exemplified by the fact that the political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not
forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory
threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in
which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes
progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their
imaginative reach and vigor.

1. The political is already ceded, our Kingsnorth and Hine 9 evidence concludes that
the political is incapable of taking on any tasks due to its entrenchment in the stories
of binarism.
2. Not an argument; when you step outside of this room, no matter who wins, nothing
will happen. Were working in different worlds.
3. The political is bad it oppresses the animal body in the squo.

Framework T
A. Our interpretation is that debate should test the methodology of social
movements.
B. Violation: They run framework this glosses over the real world suffering of
animals in order to allow them to run wild arguments about an imaginary theoretical
world.
C. Reasons to prefer
1. Education were in debate to learn, and framework is the death of education.
Sorry, but hearing you complain about how you dont feel like engaging in our aff is
not educational. 2 reasons to prefer our education: First, we lose education because
we dont hear any arguments from the neg that test the aff, especially the
methodology. Second, they lose education because they dont bother learning
anything from our aff. By deconstructing anthropocentrism, we can destroy binaries
and power structures
These power relationships are uniquely bad and cause inhumane actions towards not
only us but nature as well.
Fox and Mclean 8 (Michael Allen Fox has a phd from Toronto and researches in environmental
philosophy, animal ethics, and science of peace. taught a diverse range of undergraduate and
postgraduate courses in philosophy at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada for 39 years.
Lesley Mclean is a lecturer of humanities at the school of New England. animal subjects: an ethical
reader in a posthuman world, Pg 155-156)
Most of us are accustomed to thinking of the world as made up of people and places, that is, of
humans and the venues in which they do things. But this way of looking at things omits some
dimensions that are vital to determining what we are and how we become what we want to be. For
starters, the world contains much more than people and places; it is the biosphere in its seamless
totality, including its organic and inorganic ingredients, all the animals, all the ecosystems in their
interdependency. Next, all the places of the world are contiguous; we only separate them artificially
(geopolitically, in terms of interests, travel destinations, zones to be avoided, etc) The world is
properly one vast space containing many places, each designated as it is for pragmatic, symbolic,
intellectual or other purposes. Furthermore, some authors demonstrate, the extent to which
nonhumans transform humans and the conditions of their lives, and the reverse is also true, of course.
But this is not all, for as Lynn rightly comments, the shared contexts of all life-formsinform our moral
understanding and relationship to animals. These contexts too are spatial and meaning-giving aspects
of the world. The question of who, or what, belongs in the moral community has always been a vexed
one. Membership and non-membership are functions of inclusion and exclusion respectively, of
recognition and non-recognition, validation and denial and so on. As Michel Foucault has so carefully
demonstrated, such choices and decisions are made at the conceptual level and reinforced at the
social and political level; but in either case they are expressions of power relationships. The dominant
group determines who is in and who is out (or other). But for our purposes here, what is
interesting to note is that such determinations have operational significance in the ways they are carried
out, that is they become more loaded with meaning as they are applied in the physical space of the lived
world. Thus, Foucault wrote, ghettos, reservations, affluent suburbs and the like are created and
maintained. The same dynamics apply in general in our dealings with animals. In the mores apparent
sense, we have created zoos, laboratories, factory farms, aquariums, circuses, hunting and fishing
zones, wildlife refuges and other forms of confinement and separation; but we have also created
natural history museums in which animals are safe, but dead and statically on display.
2. Fairness and infinite regression there are infinite amount of things they could
deem unacceptable. Framework is an excuse for them to skirt arguments that they
dont want to prep for and gain ballots based solely on how good they are at
manipulating the rules of debate. This is unfair because debate is supposed to be a
game about the content, not about the rules.
3. Its a monolithic representation of debate you cant expect to walk out of this
round and have the world at your fingertips due to one idea that you deem true, the
world doesnt work like that. Their claims of a monocausal interpretation to debate
are inherently violent, turning and outweighing their framework interpretation.
Bleiker 3- Roland, Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland Discourse and
Human Agency Contemporary Political Theory. Avenel: Mar 2003.Vol. 2, Iss. 1; pg. 25

A conceptualization of human agency cannot be based on a parsimonious proposition, a one-sentence
statement that captures something like an authentic nature of human agency. There is no essence to
human agency, no core that can be brought down to a lowest common denominator, that will
crystallize one day in a long sought after magic formula. A search for such an elusive centre would
freeze a specific image of human agency to the detriment of all others. The dangers of such a totalizing
position have been well rehearsed. Foucault (1982, 209), for instance, believes that a theory of power
is unable to provide the basis for analytical work, for it assumes a prior objectification of the very
power dynamics the theory is trying to assess. Bourdieu (1998, 25) speaks of the 'imperialism of the
universal' and List (1993, 11) warns us of an approach that 'subsumes, or, rather, pretends to be able
to subsume everything into one concept, one theory, one position.' Such a master discourse, she
claims, inevitably oppresses everything that does not fit into its particular view of the world. What,
then, is the alternative to anchoring an understanding of human agency in a foundationalist master
narrative? How to ground critique, actions, norms and life itself if there are no universal values that can
enable such a process of grounding? Various authors have advanced convincing suggestions. Consider
the following three examples: de Certeau (1990, 51) attempts to avoid totalitarian thought by grounding
his position not in a systematic theory, but in 'operational schemes.' A theory is a method of delineation.
It freezes what should be understood in its fluidity. An understanding of operational schemes, by
contrast, recognizes that events should be assessed in their changing dimensions. Rather than trying to
determine what an event is, such an approach maps the contours within which events are incessantly
constituted and reconstituted. Or, expressed in de Certeau's terminology, one must comprehend forms
of action in the context of their regulatory environment. Butler (1992, 3-7) speaks of contingent
foundations. Like de Certeau, she too believes that the Foucaultean recognition that power pervades all
aspects of society, including the position of the critic, does not necessarily lead into a nihilistic abyss. It
merely shows that political closure occurs through attempts to establish foundational norms that lie
beyond power. Likewise, to reopen this political domain is not to do away with foundations as such, but
to acknowledge their contingent character, to illuminate what they authorize, exclude and foreclose.
One must come to terms with how the subject and its agency are constituted and framed by specific
regimes of power. However, this is not the end of human agency. Quite to the contrary. Butler (1992,
12-14) argues persuasively that 'the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its
agency.' To appreciate the practical relevance of this claim, one must investigate the possibilities for
agency that arise out of existing webs of power and discourse. One must scrutinize how social change
can be brought about by a reworking of the power regimes that constitute our subjectivity (Butler, 1992,
13). Deleuze and Guattari (1996, 3-25, 377) go a step further. Opting for the rhizome, they reject all
forms of foundations, structures, roots or trees. The latter three, they say, has dominated much of the
Western thought. A tree is a hierarchical system in which ones becomes two, in which everything can
be traced back to the same origin. Roots and radicles may shatter the linear unity of knowledge, but
they hold on to a contrived system of thought, to an image of the world in which the multiple always
goes back to a centred and higher unity. The brain, by contrast, is not rooted, does not strive for a
central point. It functions like a subterranean rhizome. It grows sideways, has multiple entryways and
exits. It has no beginning or end, only a middle, from where it expands and overspills. Any point of the
rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, is connected to any other. It is a multiplicity without
hierarchies, units or fix points to anchor thought. There are only lines, magnitudes, dimensions,
plateaus, and they are always in motion. To travel along these lines and dimensions is to engage in
nomad thought, to travel along axis of difference, rather than identity. Nomad thought, says one of
Deleuze's feminist interpreters, 'combines coherence with mobility,' it is 'a creative sort of becoming, a
performative metaphor that allows for otherwise unlikely encounters and unsuspected sources of
interaction of experience and of knowledge' (Braidotti, 1994, 21). The extent to which this form of
thinking constitutes a grounding process may be left open to question. Judging from Deleuze's own work
it is clear, however, that the exploration of difference and multiplicities does not prevent him from
taking positions for or against specific political issues. What he does forgo, however, is a central
authorial voice -- to the benefit of a polyphonic array of whispers and shouts.

D. Voter for reforming debate it doesnt matter if we win the framework flow or not,
if we win this, you vote not because we win framework, but because THEY RAN
framework. They kill education, spiking out of our aff because they didnt feel like
prepping for it. Thats not fair to the animal body, to themselves, or to you.