Constitution:

Historical Underpinnings
Evolution
Features
Amendments
Significant Provisions
Basic Structure
Comparison With Other Countries
Presidential System vs Parliamentary System
1. We opted for parliamentary system because of a very important reason.
1. The leaders of the INM were in a hurry to ensure quic social transformation and rapid economic
development of the whole country and society which had suffered for lon! at the hand of the "ritish.
#. $nd they thou!ht that the cabinet system of !overnment which is responsible to the elected le!islature and
holds a ma%ority there. So when we want quic le!islations passed lie say land reforms& the e'ecutive can !et
the bills quicly passed as they possess a ma%ority in the le!islature.
(. $merica didn)t want a stron! e'ecutive& they wanted checs and balance. They had seen the tyranny of a
parliamentary form of !overnment and so wanted to secure individual liberty. So they wanted a wea !overnment.
#. The demand for the chan!e is based on the wron! reason. The problem is some of the parliamentary practices& not
the parliamentary system itself. It is not the parliamentary system which is wea& our parliamentary system has become
wea.
1. *ules are not followed. We have borrowed certain rules only in letter& not in spirit. Inconvenient conventions
and rules have simply not been borrowed.
#. Titular head+ This is a necessary requirement of the parliamentary system. ,oo at !overnors in India.
-ue Process of ,aw .$rt #1/
1. -ue process includes equality& %ustice& !ood conscience.
#. We nearly adopted it but then ditched it. In 0S& in their enthusiasm for preservin! individual liberty from ma%ority
tyranny& this has virtually !iven %udiciary supremacy. The %udiciary has over the time interpreted it to accord themselves
primacy in determinin! the fate of any and every law. So %udiciary has become very powerful there. 1The 0S constitution
is what the supreme court says what it is.1 Thus it has surrendered the system to a minority tyranny of %ud!es.
2. -istortion to "ritish Parliamentary practices has led to the poor state of Indian politics today3
2. Is a multi party system incompatible with the parliamentary form of !overnment3
1. India follows first past the post system. So a person !ettin! even a minority votes can win and then he will represent
the entire constituency. This problem is definitely a!!ravated in a multi party system 4 the more the number of parties&
the less the number of votes the winner is liely to need to win. Thus even the most crucial decisions in India have been
taen by a minority. No !overnment in India has been elected by a ma%ority of popular vote. "ut this can be overcome by
a # sta!e votin!.
2. 0tility of *a%ya Sabha in comparison to "ritain
1. "ritain has hi!her number of nominated members from speciali5ed fields.
Parliament and State egislatures
Structure
6unctionin!
7onduct of "usiness
Powers and Privile!es
Constitutional Bodies
7$8
Independence
1. Thou!h he is appointed by president& he can be removed only by parliament .lie %ud!es/ on !rounds of 4 .a/ proven
misbehavior& and .b/ incapacity.
#. 9is salary is char!ed on 76I and is statutory .can)t be voted by parliament adversely durin! his tenure/.
(. 9e can)t hold any public office post his retirement .but can %oin a political party/. 9e submits resi!nation to president.
Duties
1. $part from auditin! !overnment accounts of states and center& he also audits accounts for any institution substantially
funded by public funds. Thus it includes PS0s.
#. 9is %ob is to chec if all e'penditures are as per laid down by the law. This means its his duty to chec for corruption in
e'penditure of public funds. Similarly all ta'es have been collected as per law.
CAG's Jurisdiction
1. $rt 1:; of < states that 7$8 1shall perform such duties and e'ercise such powers in relation to the accounts ... as
may be prescribed under law.1
#. Parliament made a law 7$8 .-uties& Powers = 7ontrol/ $ct wherein it stated that 7$8)s duty is to )audit) all
e'penditure from the 76I and states.
(. "ut the word )audit) has not been defined anywhere. When audit is viewed as a partner in !ood !overnance&
alle!ations of trespass into the e'ecutive territory lose their relevance. $nother way is to loo at international e'perience
and conventions.
:. 7$8 has a responsibility to evaluate whether the collection and allocation of revenue was optimi5ed or if the )rules
and procedures) fail to secure an effective chec on the collection and allocation of the revenue. To this e'tent it can
sub%ect the policy to scrutiny but can)t mae recommendations on its efficacy or implementation. So it can merely
hi!hli!ht the collection and allocation inefficiencies in its report to the parliament .which is e'actly what 7$8 has done i.e.
the delays in implementin! a competitive biddin! has led to a potential loss/.
>. 7$8 can)t question policy matters. "ut if in the main! of the policy its financial implications were not considered at all
or faulty assumptions were used& there is no record of a considered policy decision& or if the policy benefits some !roups
or individuals to the e'clusion of public& or the implementation of the policy defeats the policy itself then 7$8 has a
mandate to report it under the performance audit.
Shortcoming in CAG Appointment Process
1. The present selection process for the 7$8 is entirely internal to the 8overnment machinery? no one outside has any
nowled!e of what criteria are applied& how names are shortlisted and how a final selection is made.
#. In most of the other countries there is no scope for the head of the Supreme $udit Institution to be chosen at the
discretion of the 8overnment.
(. $nother related issue is that of the appointment of I$S officers as the 7$8. This has had a demoralisin! effect on the
I$$S cadre.
:. I7$I 7ode of @thics states that an auditorAs independence has two aspects4 independence in fact and independence
in appearance. The appointment of former secretaries as 7$8 may compromise the independence of this institution
because of apparentBperceived conflict of interest.
Issues With CAG
1. Issues with the audit process
1. 7$8As reports are not timely because there is substantial time !ap between occurrence of an irre!ularity
and its audit. It reviews pro!rammes after these have run for a few years.
#. $udit findin!s are based e'clusively on documents and files. The situation on the !round is quite different
from what is reflected in the papers. There is practically no verification to validate the audit findin!s.
(. 7$8 reports tend to be unduly ne!ative and their focus is on irre!ularities and faultfindin!. They do not
reco!ni5e the practical constraints under which the departments function.
:. They do not !ive due credit for !ood performance.
>. They do not discriminate between errors arisin! out of bonafideBmalafide intentions. $udit as such could act
as a dampener a!ainst new initiatives and ris tain!.
C. They do not delve into the root causes of the problems and how to address them.
D. *eportin! each year a lar!e number of problems which are already nown does not add value. $udit must
therefore identify systemic problems.
E. The relationship between the auditor and auditee is not always harmonious. 8enerally interaction is
confined mainly to the lower levels. $udit is viewed as a policin!. There is poor response to e'ternal audit which
seriously reduces the effectiveness of audit.
;. There is inadequate coordination between e'ternal audit and internal audit.
#. Issues with post audit process
1. There is hardly any accountability for not taking timely action on audit observations. Thousands of reports
containing a huge number of observations are lyin! unattended in the departments. $udit 7ommittees comprisin!
representatives of audit and !overnment a!encies have been set up to review the departmental action taen on
inspection reports but their functionin! is not satisfactory.
#. -etailed e'amination of paras included in the $udit *eports by P$7 is barely about 1>4#F a!ainst the total
number of 1FFF 4 1>FF paras in the 7$8 reports.
(. The Ministries tae only those audit paras seriously which come up for discussions in the P$7.
:. P$7 and 7oP0 must form sub4committees and consider more paras this way. Gther paras should be
assi!ned to the respective -epartmental Standin! 7ommittees.
>. Ministries are supposed to submit $ction Taen Notes on the paras not discussed. "ut such $ction taen
Notes are lar!ely formal rather than substantive.
C. In the State ,e!islatures& there is a hu!e pendency of $udit Paras to be e'amined by State P$7s. Some of
the pendin! paras are 1F to #F years old.
National "acward 7lasses 7ommission
1. It has been !iven the mandate of e'aminin! requests for inclusion of any class of citi5ens as a bacward class and
hear complaints of over4inclusion or under4inclusion in such lists and tender advice to the 8overnment.
National 7ommission for Scheduled 7astes
Mandate
1. To monitor the safe!uards provided for the S7s and to evaluate the worin! of such safe!uards.
#. To inquire into specific complaints.
(. To advise on the plannin! process for S7 development and to evaluate the pro!ress of their development.
Powers
1. While investi!atin! into matters& it has the powers of a civil court tryin! a suit. Such powers include+
1. Summonin! and enforcin! the attendance and e'amine him under oath.
#. *equirin! the discovery and production of any documents.
(. *eceivin! evidence on affidavits.
#. The 7ommission has offices in 1# StatesB0Ts& which enables it to have a wide perspective.
(. The 7ommission is or!ani5ed around four win!s which loo after administration& safe!uards& atrocities and ri!hts
violations& and economic and social development respectively.
National 7ommission for Scheduled Tribes
1. The N7ST functions throu!h units which loo after administration& coordination& socio4economic development&
safe!uards and atrocities. It has si' re!ional offices which provide it with a re!ional perspective.
@lection 7ommission
Powers
1. Its powers are plenary i.e. uncontrolled by the e'ecutive. "ut @7)s powers apply only where < and laws are silent. @7
can)t override any law already made.
#. Its actions are sub%ect to %udicial review.
Composition
1. The number of @7s may be varied by president from time to time as per the law made by parliament. 7urrently the
limit is 7@7 H I : @7s.
#. 7@7 and @7s are appointed by the president and while appointin! them the president %ust consults the 7oM.
(. 7@7 and @7s are appointed for I C years or C> years of a!e. @7s if promoted to 7@7 can hold office only till there
combined tenure as @7 H 7@7 is I C years. @7 can)t be reappointed as @7 and 7@7 can)t be reappointed as 7@7.
:. @7s can be removed by president only on the recommendation of 7@7 and the president is not bound by such a
recommendation. 7@7 cannot be removed e'cept in a manner lie S7 %ud!e.
Reforms suggested b !C
1. While appointin! 7@7 and @7s& the president should consult a hi!h level panel comprisin! of PM H law minister H
leader of opposition in 9oP. Such recommendation shall be bindin!.
#. @7s should be removed only in a manner lie S7 %ud!e. 0pon retirement the 7@7 and @7s shouldn)t be allowed to
hold any office of profit under the state .currently they are allowed to/ neither be allowed to %oin any political party for J
1F years from retirement.
(. While appointin! 7@7 seniority principle should be followed.
Regiona" !"ection Commissioner
1. 9e is appointed by the president on recommendation of @7 on the eve of an election to 9oP or ,e!ass or ,e!co to
assist the @7 in dischar!in! its duties. So far none have been appointed and his functions have lar!ely been taen care
of by chief electoral officer who is a permanent officer.
!epresentation of People"s Act
Salient 6eatures
Issues in Political *eforms
#unding Reforms Attempts
1. -inesh 8oswami 7ommittee in 1;;F and later Indra%it 8upta 7ommittee recommended limited support in ind while
simultaneously recommendin! a ban on company donations.
#. Subsequent developments include parties bein! forced to file ta' returns.
(. S7 decision in 1;;C clubbed e'penditure by third party.s/ as well as by the political party under the e'penditure
ceilin! limits prescribed under the *epresentation of People $ct.
:. @lection and Gther *elated ,aws .$mendment/ $ct
1. 6ull ta' e'emption to individuals and corporates on all contributions to political parties.
#. *epeal of @'planation I under Section DD of the *P$. @'penditure by third parties and political parties now
comes under ceilin! limits& and only travel e'penditure of leaders of parties is e'empt.
(. -isclosure of party finances and contributions over *s. #F&FFF.
:. @quitable sharin! of time by the reco!ni5ed political parties on the cable television networ and other
electronic media.
>. The #FF# amendment to *P$ stipulates that every elected candidate shall& within ninety days file the details of
hisBher assetsBliabilities.
$ightening of Anti%Defection "aw
1. The @lection 7ommission has recommended that the question of disqualification of members on the !round of
defection should also be decided by the PresidentB8overnor on the advice of the @lection 7ommission. Such an
amendment to the law seems to be necessary in the li!ht of the lon! delays seen in some recent cases of
obvious defection.
Dis&ua"ification
1. In cases of persons facin! !rave criminal B corruption char!es framed by a trial court after a preliminary
enquiry& disallowin! them to represent the people in le!islatures until they are cleared of char!es seems to be a fair and
prudent course. $s a precaution a!ainst motivated cases& it may be provided that only cases filed si' months before an
election would lead to such disqualification.
#a"se Dec"arations
1. The @lection 7ommission has recommended that all false declarations before the @lection 7ommission should be
made an electoral offence. 8overnment is opposin! it in courtK
Pub"ication of Accounts b Po"itica" Parties'
1. Political parties have a responsibility to maintain proper accounts of their income and e'penditure and !et them
audited annually. The @lection 7ommission has reiterated this proposal. This needs to be acted upon early. The audited
accounts should be available for information of the public.
!(pediting Disposa" of !"ection Petitions
1. @lection petitions in India are at present to be filed in the 9i!h 7ourt. 0nder the *epresentation of the People $ct&
such petitions should be disposed of within a period of C months. In actual practice however& such petitions remain
pendin! for years.
#. Special election benches should be constituted in the 9i!h 7ourts earmared e'clusively for the disposal of election
petitions.
(. Special @lection Tribunals should be constituted. @ach Tribunal should comprise a 9i!h 7ourt Lud!e and a senior
civil servant. Its mandate should be to ensure that all election petitions are decided within a period of si' months.
Grounds of Dis&ua"ification for Membership
1. $rticle 1F# provides for disqualification for membership of either 9ouse of Parliament under certain specific
circumstances& which are as follows+
1. If he holds any office of profit.
#. If he is of unsound mind declared by a competent court.
(. If he is an undischar!ed insolvent.
:. If he is not a citi5en of India.
>. If he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament. So far& no such law has been enacted.