Kim - 1979 PDF

The Fukuda Government and the Politics of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty
Author(s): Hong N. Kim

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Mar., 1979), pp. 297-313
Published by: University of California Press
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THE FUKUDA GOVERNMENT AND THE
POLITICS OF THE SINO-JAPANESE
PEACE TREATY
Hong N. Kim
THE CONCLUSION OF a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace
and Friendship became a "pending issue" for Tokyo and Peking as a
result of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique of September 29, 1972,
which stipulated that the two nations should conclude a treaty of peace
and friendship to improve relations with each other. However, the
proposed treaty was not regarded as an urgent matter at that time, for
most of the outstanding issues which had long marred relations between
Peking and Tokyo, including the normalization of diplomatic relations,
had been settled. The more pressing problems, requiring the immediate
attention of both governments, were to work out bilateral administra-
tive agreements on such important matters as trade, civil aviation,
shipping, and fisheries. When most of these agreements had been con-
cluded by the fall of 1974, both sides agreed to negotiate the proposed
peace treaty.
Beginning in the fall of 1974, Japan's conservative LDP govern-
ment attempted to conclude the proposed treaty under the stewardship
of three different Prime Ministers (i.e., Kakuei Tanaka, Takeo Miki,
and .Takeo Fukuda), but it was not until August 12, 1978, that the
Sino-Japanese treaty was signed. The purpose of this paper is to ex-
amine the factors which have shaped recent Sino-Japanese relations
with special emphasis on the Fukuda government's handling of the
treaty negotiations with Peking from the time of its inauguration in
December 1976 to the actual signing of the treaty in August 1978.
Although the two nations held preliminary conversations on the
proposed peace treaty as early as January 1974, when Foreign Minister
Masayoshi Ohira visited Peking, it was not until the fall of 1974 that
297
? 1979 by the Regents of the University of California
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298 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979
Peking became serious about the treaty negotiations with Tokyo. As
the "money-power" political scandal involving Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka began to cloud the future of the Tanaka government, which
had been friendly toward China, Peking decided to initiate peace
treaty negotiations. In November 1974, Chinese Foreign Vice-Minister
Han Nien-lung visited Japan to sign a Sino-Japanese agreement on
shipping. In his talks with the Japanese Foreign Ministry's officials,
Han agreed that the proposed peace treaty should be drafted on the
basis of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique of 1972, and that con-
troversial territorial issues, such as sovereignty over the Senkaku Is-
lands, should be shelved to facilitate the treaty-making process. As a
result, both Tokyo and Peking were quite optimistic about the pros-
pects for the prompt conclusion of the proposed peace pact.
With the abrupt change in the cabinet in Japan in December 1974,
Chinese leaders became apprehensive about the future of Sino-Japanese
relations. Despite the known liberal foreign policy posture of the new
Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki, his cabinet included a number
of powerful conservative leaders of the pro-Taiwan group-e.g., Takeo
Fukuda, Hirokichi Nadao, and Etsusaburo Shiina. To dissipate Pe-
king's misgivings about the new government's China policy, Miki sent
a personal message to Premier Chou En-lai through Shigeru Hori when
the latter visited Peking on January 15-21, 1975. Hori returned from
Peking with a message to Miki from Chou who indicated that the pro-
posed treaty could be signed within three months.'
From January 16, 1975 to early May 1975 Sino-Japanese treaty
talks took place in Tokyo between Japanese Foreign Vice Minister
Fumihiko Togo and Chinese Ambassador to Japan Chen Chu. In spite
of initial optimism expressed by both sides, the treaty negotiations
were deadlocked by March 1975, largely because of China's insistence
on an "anti-hegemony" clause.2 The Chinese officially proposed the
incorporation of Article 7 of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communi-
que in the proposed peace treaty which stipulated, in part: "Neither
country should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is
opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to estab-
lish such hegemony." The Chinese argued that the inclusion of such
a provision was logical as well as necessary, since both sides had agreed
to draft the treaty on the basis of the 1972 joint communique. Appar-
ently under pressure from pro-Taiwan
LDP leaders who had opposed
the proposed peace treaty by effectively utilizing the "anti-hegemony"
issue, the Miki Government began to resist inclusion of the "anti-
1
On January 17, 1975, Premier Chou En-lai told Yoshihiro Inayama, a powerful
Japanese business leader, that the proposed treaty with Japan could be signed
within three months. See Asahi Shimbun, January 17, 1975.
2
For a detailed analysis of the "anti-hegemony" issue, see Tadashi Shibauchi,
"Haken Mondai to Tsuna hiki sareru Nihon," Chuo Koron, July 1975, pp. 154-157.
See also Joachim Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy,"
Asian Survey, 16:3 (March 1976), pp. 205-215.
SINO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY 299
hegemony" clause. On March 4, Foreign Vice Minister Togo officially
informed Chinese Ambassador Chen Chu that Japan could not accept
the "anti-hegemony" clause, since it could be construed by Moscow
as directed at the Soviet Union.3 Togo also stressed the Japanese view-
point that the inclusion of a provision pertaining to a third country (or
countries) ran counter to the very principle and practice of bilateral
treaty-making. The Japanese position as outlined by Togo clearly re-
flected Tokyo's growing apprehension about Moscow's hostility toward
the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and also Japan's unwillingness to be
entangled in Sino-Soviet rivalry and conflict.
In an attempt to mollify the Soviet Union and the pro-Taiwan ele-
ments within the LDP who were opposed to the proposed treaty, the
Miki government tried to exclude the "anti-hegemony" clause from
the main text of the treaty. The Chinese countered the argument by
saying that the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" principle should not
create a problem, since it had been stipulated not only in the Sino-
Japanese Joint Communique of 1972, but also in the Sino-American
Joint Communique issued at Shanghai on February 28, 1972. Since
Japan and China had agreed to draft the proposed treaty on the basis
of the 1972 Joint Communique, the Chinese wondered why the inclu-
sion of the "anti-hegemony" clause constituted a problem for Japan.
The Japanese replied that there was a fundamental difference between
a treaty and a joint communique, for the former prescribed legal rights
and obligations, whereas the latter merely expressed policy intentions.4
By the beginning of May 1975, it became evident that the Chinese
would not compromise on the "anti-hegemony" issue along the lines
suggested by Tokyo. Consequently, the Miki government decided not
to adhere to the original timetable which had called for the ratification
of the peace treaty before the closing of the Diet session on May 25,
1975. The decision, made at a top level meeting at Miki's residence on
May 15, 1975, led to the indefinite suspension of Sino-Japanese treaty
negotiations.
Although the Miki government made further efforts to work out
a compromise with Peking on the thorny "anti-hegemony" issue, any
hope for the resumption of Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations under the
M\Mki government was dashed with the revelation of the "Lockheed
payoff scandal" in early February 1976. The scandal touched off a
serious political crisis in Japan, paralyzing the legislative process in the
Diet. The Miki government's preoccupation with a domestic political
crisis made it difficult for the Japanese government to pursue the treaty
issue further. Moreover, the deaths of Premier Chou En-lai and Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung in 1976 touched off an intense power struggle in
China, culminating in the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in October 1976.
This made it equally difficult for the Chinese to tackle the treaty issue
3 Asahi Shimbun, March 5, 1975.
4 Shibauchi, "Haken Mondai," p. 159.
with Japan, and it was only in the fall of 1977 that serious discussions
on the suspended treaty negotiations between Tokyo and Peking re-
sumed.
By the summer of 1977, the political situation in both China and
Japan had stabilized. In Japan, a new LDP government headed by
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, which had replaced the Miki govern-
ment in December 1976, succeeded in weathering the political crisis
created by the Lockheed scandal and thwarted the opposition parties'
attempts to win a majority in the Upper House elections of July 7,
1977. Meanwhile, in China the new "pragmatic" leadership headed by
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng was consolidating its power. At the 11th Party
Congress held in Peking in August 1977, the "Gang of Four" and their
followers were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, and the
new leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping (who
had made his third political comeback in July) was firmly established.
Against this background, renewed interest in the reopening of the
treaty talks began to surface both in Japan and China. As early as May
30, 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda had indicated that his government's
next major diplomatic task would be the conclusion of a peace treaty
with Peking because his government had successfully handled the con-
clusion of a Japanese-Soviet interim fisheries agreement and had as-
sured itself of the Diet's ratification of the Japanese-South Korean
continental shelf agreement. Fukuda also stated that he would not be
bound by the four principles expounded by ex-Foreign Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa as the basis for the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause
in the proposed peace treaty.5 Furthermore, Fukuda indicated his will-
ingness to send a personal letter expressing his interest in resuming
treaty negotiations through Shigeru Hori, the Lower House Speaker,
who was planning to visit China in June. A few days later, however,
Fukuda modified his position, apparently under the pressure from
pro-Taiwan LDP leaders who counseled against rushing into treaty
talks with Peking. Fukuda's apparent "turnabout" in turn necessitated
the postponement of Hori's China trip.
By the fall of 1977, pro-Peking LDP Dietmen began to express re-
newed interest in the resumption of the Sino-Japanese treaty negotia-
tions. Following their visit to Peking in September, the LDP Dietmen
belonging to the Dietmen's League for Sino-Japanese Friendship (e.g.,
Seigo Hamano, Hideji Kawasaki, Zentaro Kosaka) urged Prime Minis-
5
In his testimony before a Diet committee on November 7, 1975, Foreign
Minister Miyazawa indicated Japan's willingness to accept the Chinese demand for
the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the proposed peace treaty, if China
would accept the Japanese viewpoint on the meaning of "anti-hegemonism." Spe-
cifically, Miyazawa listed the following four points: (1) "the anti-hegemony prin-
ciple is not directed against any specific third country"; (2) "Japan and China do
not envisage any joint action against a hegemony-seeking third country"; (3) "this
policy represents a principle applicable to all parts of the world"; and (4) "anti-
hegemonism does not run counter to the United Nations Charter." See Asahi
Shimbun, November 7, 1975.
ter Fukuda to adopt whatever measures were necessary to reopen the sus-
pended treaty negotiations with Peking.6 A similar view was expressed
by Yohei Kono and members of the New Liberal Club, who conferred
with Vice Premier Teng in Peking in September 1977. Teng and other
Chinese leaders told the Japanese delegates that the Sino-Japanese
peace treaty could be signed in "one second" if only Prime Minister
Fukuda made up his mind on the treaty. Despite Peking's urging,
Fukuda remained cautious on the treaty issue. Among other things,
Fukuda did not want to aggravate Japanese-Soviet relations in the face
of the approaching Japanese-Soviet long-term fisheries treaty negotia-
tions. Fukuda was also keenly aware of the attitude of the pro-Taiwan
elements within the LDP who were opposed to an early conclusion of
the treaty with Peking. Finally, Fukuda refrained from making any
bold moves toward Peking while there was no substantial progress be-
ing made in Sino-American relations, a fact which had become appar-
ent following Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's trip to China in August
1977.
It became increasingly clear, however, that Prime Minister Fukuda
would not be able to stall too long on the treaty issue, for there was a
growing consensus among the leaders of big business (e.g., Keidanren)
that Fukuda should tackle the treaty issue as soon as possible.7 They
were convinced that China would import more from abroad to push
ahead its ambitious "modernization" program under the leadership of
Chairman Hua and Vice Premier Teng. For the Japanese big business
community, which was facing increasing difficulty in its trade relations
with Western Europe and the United States, the China market seemed
a logical alternative. Japanese business leaders assumed that the Chi-
nese would play coy on economic agreements until the Japanese had
moved ahead on the treaty issue. Adopting a similar position, the tra-
ditionally cautious Japanese Foreign Ministry officials had recom-
mended that Fukuda resume the treaty talks by November 1977. Their
reasoning was based on three factors: (1) the political foundation of
the Hua Kuo-feng regime was firm and stable; (2) the Sino-Japanese
peace pact was "a prerequisite" to the signing of a long-term trade
agreement between Japan and China; and (3) if Japan accepted the
Chinese proposal for the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the
main text of the treaty, China would accommodate the Japanese desire
to dilute the political implications of the "anti-hegemony" clause.8
On November 28, 1977, the Fukuda government decided to in-
struct Ambassador
Shoji
Sato to investigate the possibility of
resuming
6
Asahi Shimbun sha, Asahi Nenkan 1978 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1978),
p. 236.
7 In the spring of 1977, the Keidanren leaders signed a petition urging the early
conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. See "Sekai no naka no Shin Nitchu
(8)," Yomiuri Shzimbun, August 20, 1978. See also, Tracy Dahlby, "Planning the
Peace Pact," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 25, 1977, pp. 8-9.
8
Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 1977.
the treaty negotiations with Chinese authorities and report the results
to the Prime Minister. At about the same time, Prime Minister Fukuda
indicated his positive posture toward the treaty issue by appointing
Sunao Sonoda, an ardent advocate of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty,
as the new Japanese Foreign Minister. Returning from Peking on De-
cember 1, Ambassador Sato conveyed his impression that China would
accept unconditionally Japan's proposal to resume treaty negotiations,
if it were made officially by Prime Minister Fukuda.9 At a press con-
ference, Sato added that the Chinese were in agreement with him that
Japan and China should not set any preconditions to the reopening
of the treaty talks, but he admitted that China had not changed its
basic position on the "anti-hegemony" issue.
In spite of Ambassador Sato's optimistic report, Prime Minister
Fukuda did not make any immediate positive move to resume the
treaty talks. In Fukuda's policy speech to the Diet on January 21, 1978,
he merely repeated his previous remarks that his government would
make "further efforts" to reopen the treaty talks, adding that "the time
for pursuing the negotiations is growing ripe."10 Initially, Fukuda had
intended to say that "the time for the conclusion of the treaty is ripe."
But at the last moment he decided to replace that sentence with a
more cautious phrase. Fukuda's statement on the treaty issue fell short
of the expectations of many political observers who had anticipated a
more positive move on the part of the Japanese Prime Minister.
Although Fukuda and his aides denied it, it was suspected that the
Prime Minister had retreated from his positive stand on the treaty
issue to a more passive posture out of fear that, despite apparent en-
thusiasm on the Chinese side, negotiations could bog down over the
"anti-hegemony" issue. In such a case, Fukuda could be blamed for
bungling a major foreign policy issue, and he wanted more spadework
done on the controversial "anti-hegemony" clause before he would
officially initiate treaty talks with China. Another major factor that
influenced Fukuda's overly cautious attitude toward the treaty issue
was the pro-Taiwan leaders' advice not to conclude the treaty until
after the inauguration of Chiang Ching-kuo as the new President of
the Republic of China in May 1978. There were reports that former
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, an influential pro-Taiwan leader and
Fukuda's political mentor, urged Fukuda not to resume the treaty talks
until May. Finally, Fukuda may have wanted to delay the treaty until
late spring or summer of 1978, so as to utilize the political windfall of
the treaty in his bid for reelection to the LDP presidency (hence the
premiership) in December 1978. Thus, Fukuda instructed Ambassador
Sato to probe further on the treaty issue with China, but did not in-
struct him to resume official treaty negotiations.
9 Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 1977.
10
Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 1978 (evening edition). See also, Japan Times,
January 22, 1978.
Following the Prime Minister's instruction, Ambassador Sato held
the first round of preliminary talks with Chinese Foreign Vice Minister
Han Nien-lung in Peking on February 14. Encouraged by the flexible
position shown by the Chinese on the "anti-hegemony" issue, another
round of preliminary talks between Ambassador Sato and Foreign Vice
Minister Han took place on March 4. Although details of the talks were
not revealed, both Prime Minister Fukuda and Chief Cabinet Secre-
tary Shintaro Abe indicated their satisfaction with the progress of the
Han-Sato talks. However, there was no indication as to when Prime
Minister Fukuda would give his blessing to the initiation of full-fledged
treaty negotiations with Peking.
By March 1978, it had become quite clear that the new Chinese
leadership was more flexible in its approach to the pending treaty issue
with Japan. In his talks with Komeito's Secretary-General Junya Yano
on March 14, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping indicated that
the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the proposed peace
treaty would not mean joint Sino-Japanese action against a third power,
nor would the application of such a clause necessitate joint consulta-
tions between Peking and Tokyo, for each country had its own foreign
policy and should make its decisions accordingly." Teng Hsiao-ping's
statement alleviated the Fukuda government's apprehension that the
incorporation of the controversial clause would jeopardize Japan's
relations with the Soviet Union. Peking's softer approach to the "anti-
hegemony" clause could be attributed to its anxiety to improve rela-
tions with Japan, which was capable of providing the needed tech-
nological know-how for China's "modernization" programs. Earlier,
on February 16, 1978, Chinese and Japanese business groups had signed
a long-term trade agreement, which called for the two-way trade of $20
billion for the next eight years. Under the trade agreement, Japan
would increase its oil imports from China from about seven million
tons in 1978 to 15 million tons by 1982, while exporting about $10 bil-
lion worth of industrial plants and equipment and construction ma-
terials to China. The signing of the long-term trade agreement clearly
indicated that Peking was eager to expand its trade with Japan in the
hope of securing the technical know-how needed for its underdeveloped
economy. These developments in turn convinced many Japanese eco-
nomic and business leaders that a peace treaty with Peking would pro-
vide a more stable foundation for the expanding Sino-Japanese trade
relations. Also, many politicians began to think that in view of China's
flexible position on the "anti-hegemony" issue, the peace treaty could
be signed without too much difficulty between Tokyo and Peking.
On March 23, Prime Minister Fukuda, apparently encouraged by
Teng's statement on the
anti-hegemony
issue, announced his decision
to seek resumption of the treaty talks with Peking. The incorporation
of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the treaty would not endanger Ja-
11 Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 1978.
pan's foreign relations with Moscow, according to a position paper
prepared by the Foreign Ministry officials, if Japan and China added
another clause to the treaty which would clarify that the clause would
not entail joint action by Tokyo and Peking.'2
To resume treaty negotiations, however, Fukuda had to persuade the
pro-Taiwan hardliners within his own party, many of whom belonged
to his own faction. Immediately after Fukuda announced the decision
to seek the resumption of the treaty talks with Peking, the pro-Taiwan
Asian Problems Study Group (APSG), headed by Hirokichi Nadao,
notified the Fukuda government of its opposition to the early signing
of the peace pact with Peking. In a position paper entitled "Our Con-
tention on the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty," the pro-Taiwan group
listed a number of reasons for their opposition to the proposed treaty-
the adverse impact of the treaty on Japanese-Soviet relations, the
weakening of Taiwan's international position, and the shelving of the
territorial issue on the Senkaku Islands-contending that the failure
to clarify the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands might weaken
Japan's claim over these islands in the long run. The APSG's anti-treaty
activities were supported by the hawkish Seirankai, another pro-Tai-
wan and anti-Peking group within the LDP. At the LDP's Foreign
Policy Research Council's meetings held on March 30, and April 7
and 11, these pro-Taiwan elements vehemently opposed the signing of
the proposed peace treaty with Peking. When it became apparent that
Japan and China could work out a compromise on the "anti-hegemony"
issue, these anti-treaty groups demanded the Fukuda Government to
seek the immediate cancellation of the "anti-Japan" clause in the Sino-
Soviet alliance pact of 1950 which would remain in force, nominally at
least, until 1980. They also demanded Chinese acceptance of the Jap-
anese claim over the Senkaku Islands as a condition for signing the
treaty with Peking,13 even though both Japan and China had earlier
agreed to shelve the Senkaku Islands and other territorial issues.
Against the backdrop of intensifying opposition to the resumption
of the treaty talks with Peking by the pro-Taiwan groups, Prime Min-
ister Fukuda apparently decided to postpone sending Foreign Minister
Sonoda to Peking to resume treaty talks. However, such a move in-
evitably disappointed Peking which was anticipating immediate re-
sumption of the treaty talks at this time.
Whatever hope there was for the
resumption of the treaty negotia-
tions was dashed on April 12 with the intrusion of armed Chinese fish-
ing boats in the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands (in Chinese,
"tiao-yu-tai"), which were claimed by Tokyo, Peking, and Taipei. The
sudden and unexpected appearance of armed Chinese fishing boats in-
furiated the LDP's pro-Taiwan members, who demanded that the
12 Asahi Shimbun, March 21 and 23, 1978.
13
Takeshi Uehara, "Fukuda Shusho sono tayorinasa no Kenkyu," Chuo Koron,
June 1978, pp. 53-55. See also, Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 1978 (evening edition).
Fukuda government stop negotiating a peace treaty with Peking unless
China accepted Japan's claim to the islands. The Fukuda government
immediately lodged a protest with the Chinese government, demanding
the withdrawal of the ships from Japan's territorial waters. Although
the Fukuda government indicated the desirability of discussing the
Senkaku incident with the Chinese to prevent the recurrence of such
incidents, it maintained that the Senkaku incident had nothing to do
with the treaty problem, and that Tokyo should handle the two issues
separately. The pro-Taiwan Dietmen insisted, however, that the Fu-
kuda government should not bypass the territorial issue in the forth-
coming treaty talks with Peking. They also refused to accept the Chi-
nese government's official explanation that the incident was "acciden-
tal" and not "intentional," contending that the intrusion by the Chi-
nese ships was an "intentional act of invasion."14
While it is difficult to ascertain why the Chinese fishing boats
staged the Senkaku incident from April 12 to 16, it is strongly sus-
pected that the Chinese adopted calculated shock tactics to pressure
Prime Minister Fukuda into making a decision on the treaty talks.
Fukuda had disappointed Peking repeatedly by his indecision on the
treaty issue, and there were strong indications that the Chinese were
irritated by his indecisive behavior. In April 1978, for instance, former
Upper House President Kenzo Kono told the press that Chinese Am-
bassador to Japan Fu Hao had criticized Prime Minister Fukuda's "loss
of interest" in resuming the treaty talks, adding that China could wait
for several months or even a year.15 Although both Kono and the Chi-
nese Ambassador later denied the story, rumors persisted that China
did not trust Fukuda. In view of Fukuda's sharp drop in popularity
in Japan (e.g., 20% approval according to the Yomiuri Shimbun's opin-
ion survey released on April 14), the Chinese wanted Fukuda to take
action on the treaty issue, whether positive or negative. Finally, it is
also plausible that Peking wanted to thwart any attempt by the LDP's
pro-Taiwan hardliners to encourage the Fukuda government to take
up the Senkaku Islands issue in the treaty negotiations. By inaction,
Peking could have emboldened these elements; however, by taking a
calculated risk, the Chinese aimed to assert their claim over the Senkaku
Islands.
On May 10, having formally settled the Senkaku Islands incident
caused by the appearance of the Chinese fishing boats in the territorial
waters claimed by Japan and China, the two nations moved a step
closer to the resumption of treaty negotiations. The settlement was
reached at a meeting between Ambassador Sato and Foreign Vice
Minister Han Nien-lung after Sato accepted
China's explanation that
the incident was "accidental." The Japanese decision to settle the
14 Japan Times, April 22, 1978.
15
Asahi Shimbun, April 20, 1978. See also, Masaru Ogawa, "Premeditated
'Accident'," Japan Times Weekly, April 29, 1978.
Senkaku incident in order to proceed with the resumption of treaty
talks came after Prime Minister Fukuda's meeting with President
Carter in Washington on May 3. Fukuda was encouraged by Washing-
ton's support of Japan's intentions to conclude the proposed peace
treaty with Peking. On his way back from Washington, Fukuda de-
clared in Honolulu that he hoped the treaty would be concluded be-
fore June.
By the end of May 1978, the Fukuda government formally pro-
posed the opening of treaty negotiations with Peking. This decision
was conveyed to the Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Han Nien-lung by
Ambassador Sato on May 31, who expressed Japan's hope for the re-
sumption of talks in late June. The Chinese agreed to study the Jap-
anese proposal. Two weeks later, on June 14, Japan and China agreed
to reopen negotiations some time in early July. Japanese Foreign Min-
istry officials said that the treaty talks would begin in Peking first on
the working level between Ambassador Sato and Chinese Foreign Vice
Minister Han. The Fukuda government would send a team of Foreign
Ministry officials led by Yosuke Nakae, Director General of the Min-
istry's
Asian Affaiirs Bureau, to Peking to help Ambassador Sato. The
scenario worked out in Tokyo was that Sato would carry the negotia-
tions as far as he could go with the Chinese officials and then wait for
Foreign Minister Sonoda to arrive in Peking to settle the remaining
issues. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the major subjects
of the forthcoming talks would include: (1) the "anti-hegemony"
clause; (2) the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty which designated Japan as a
common enemy of Peking and Moscow; and (3) the Sino-Japanese ter-
ritorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands.16
Against the backdrop of the imminent resumption of peace ne-
gotiations, the Soviet Union stepped up its campaign to dissuade the
Fukuda government from signing the proposed treaty with Peking. On
June 19, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Dmitri Polyansky lodged a for-
mal protest against Japan's concluding a peace treaty with China. The
Soviet statement indicated that the Soviet Union might have to revise
its policy toward Japan if the treaty contained an anti-Soviet clause.
It stated further that Moscow could not remain an "onlooker" during
the Sino-Japanese moves to sign the treaty which, it claimed, would
have a serious effect on Soviet national interests. Japanese attempts to
alleviate Moscow's "grave misunderstanding"
of
Japan's foreign policy
were unavailing, and Polyansky refused to accept Japanese explana-
tions. But Polyansky's formal protest was the first since the spring of
1975 when Moscow had officially asked Japan to scrap its plans for a
peace treaty with China.
Commenting on the Soviet protest, Fukuda said that his govern-
ment would go ahead with the treaty despite Moscow's objections.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe also indicated that the Fukuda
16
Japan Times, June 15, 1978.
government had no intention of changing its plans, adding that the
pact was designed only to strengthen Japan's friendship with China
and was not directed at any third country. In short, the Fukuda gov-
ernment was demonstrating its belief that the treaty was a bilateral
issue with China and that Japan should not be pushed around by a
third power in the conduct of its own foreign relations.
On July 21, 1978, the Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations were
formally resumed. Initially, Japan had wanted to hold the talks on
July 3, but the Chinese suggested a later date on the grounds that
Foreign Vice Minister Han Nien-lung was ill. But other developments,
such as China's deepening crisis with Vietnam in the wake of the mas-
sive exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China in the summer
of 1978 and China's unhappiness at the joint Japanese and South
Korean exploration of oil resources in the continental shelf, may have
been the real causes for the delay. By the time the negotiations were
resumed, it became apparent that the only major issue to be ironed
out between the two sides was the "anti-hegemony" issue.
The Fukuda government's basic approach was to allow the inclu-
sion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the main text of the treaty but
to add another provision stipulating that it was a general principle not
directed against a third country. The addition of such a qualifying
provision in the main part of the text, it argued, would eliminate any
anti-Soviet nuance in the "anti-hegemony" provision. On the basis of
such a strategy, the Fukuda government drafted a five-article treaty
and presented it to China on the second day of the treaty talks in
Peking on July 22.17 The Chinese negotiators indicated their apprecia-
tion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in the Japanese draft, but argued
that the Japanese proposal for the inclusion of both the "anti-hege-
mony" clause and the "third nation" clause was contradictory and in-
compatible. Thus, by the beginning of August, it was apparent that the
treaty talks focused on Japan's proposal to include in the treaty a
clause stipulating that the planned treaty was not aimed against any
third country.
The Japanese "third country" clause had been taken from a pas-
sage in Article 7 of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communique which
stated in part: "Normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is not di-
rected against any third country...." However, the Chinese negotiators
were opposed to the Japanese version of the "third
country" clause
which would dilute the political implications of the "anti-hegemony"
clause. According to Chang Hisiang-shan, Vice President of the China-
Japan Friendship Association, the Chinese therefore suggested the fol-
lowing wording: "The establishment and
development
of
friendly
relations between the two countries are not directed
against any third
country."'8 In response,
the
Japanese suggested:
"the
treaty is not di-
17
For the text of the Japanese draft treaty, see Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 1978.
18
Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 1978. See also, Japan Times, August 6, 1978.
rected against any particular country" instead of "any specific country"
as originally proposed. Chinese negotiators did not accept either ver-
sion but came up with yet another revised version of its original pro-
posal, which the Japanese refused to accept. Thus, after 12 rounds of
talks between Ambassador Sato and Vice Foreign Minister Han, there
still was no agreement on the treaty issue.
To break the stalemated negotiations in Peking, Fukuda decided
to dispatch Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda to Peking. The decision
was made on August 6 following a strategy meeting held at Fukuda's
summer resort residence in Karuizawa. Attending the conference were
the Foreign Minister and Yosuke Nakae, who had just returned from
Peking to make a progress report on the treaty negotiations. Fukuda
made the decision when it became apparent that both Japan and
China had a tight diplomatic schedule in the latter half of August.
Sonoda was to hold an annual consultation meeting with his Indian
counterpart in Tokyo from August 14, while Chairman Hua and
Foreign Minister Huang Hua were scheduled to visit Eastern European
countries at approximately the same time. Furthermore, it was evident
by then that a "political settlement" was necessary to find a break-
through in the "third country" clause.
Arriving in Peking on August 8, Foreign Minister Sonoda held a
series of meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on the
treaty issue. At about the same time, the Japanese negotiators pre-
sented a compromise plan which weakened the wording of the contro-
versial "third country" clause in the proposed treaty. Japan's revised
version read: "The treaty shall not impair the position of either signa-
tory in its relations with any third country."19 The revised provision
was much more general than the original version which stipulated:
"The treaty is not directed against any specific third country." In his
meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister on August 9, Sonoda ap-
parently succeeded in securing Chinese acceptance of the revised ver-
sion, and Sonoda appeared confident that the treaty would be con-
cluded during his visit in Peking. With the compromise reached on the
"third country" clause, China and Japan had removed the chief stum-
bling block to the treaty. The broad agreement was worked out on
August 10 at the 15th round of working level talks on the basis of the
Huang-Sonoda talks.
Immediately following the agreement, the Japanese delegation
sought Prime Minister Fukuda's approval of the draft treaty in the
hopes of finalizing the wording of the treaty text by the next day.
Fukuda then conferred with leaders of the LDP to seek their consent
to the terms of the proposed peace pact. The hardliners within the
LDP were reluctant to go along with the terms proposed, largely be-
cause of unsettled issues in Sino-Japanese relations. They insisted that
the treaty should recognize Japan's sovereignty over the disputed Sen-
19 Asahi Shimbun, August 8, 1978. See also, Japan Times, August 9, 1978.
kaku Islands. Reflecting this sentiment, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Chairman
of the LDP' Executive Council, urged Fukuda to seek clarification on
this issue.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sonoda met with Chinese Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on August 10 to discuss a number of issues,
including the problem of the Senkaku Islands and the Sino-Soviet
treaty of 1950 clause classifying Japan as a common enemy of the two
signatory powers. The talks were designed to secure an
understanding
with China on these issues so important to the pro-Taiwan hardliners
within the LDP. Teng told Sonoda that the Chinese government would
not allow a recurrence of the type of incident that had taken place
near the Senkaku islands in April. Teng also indicated that China was
ready to take the necessary steps to scrap the Sino-Soviet treaty of alli-
ance in 1979.20
These developments clearly satisfied Fukuda, who instructed For-
eign Minister Sonoda to sign the treaty on August 12, following an
extraordinary cabinet meeting that approved the Prime Minister's de-
cision. A similar endorsement of Fukuda's decision was made by the
Executive Council of the ruling LDP on the same day, despite the pro-
tests of a few pro-Taiwan hardliners such as Masayuki Fujio, Koichi
Hamada, and Masayuki Nakayama.
Signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries at the Great
Hall of People at 7 p.m. on the evening of August 12, the treaty came
almost six years after the two countries had established diplomatic ties
and followed nearly four years of arduous negotiations. Consisting of a
preamble and five articles, the treaty incorporated virtually all the
major principles enunciated in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Commu-
nique. In the preamble, each country pledged to respect the principles
of the U.N. Charter, and to contribute to the peace and stability of
Asia and the world. The treaty then listed five articles. The first
pledged Japan and China to develop peaceful and friendly relations
based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to settle all
disputes peacefully without resorting to force or the threat of force.
The second article dealt with anti-hegemonism: "The contracting
parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts
by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."
The third called for the promotion of economic and cultural relations
and personnel exchanges, and the fourth article stipulated: "The pre-
sent treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party re-
garding its relations with third countries." (Japan clearly hoped to
mollify Moscow with this provision.) The fifth article stipulated that
the treaty would remain in force for ten years, after which it could be
terminated with one year's advance notice
by
either
signatory.21
20 Japan Times, August 12 and 13, 1978.
21
For an English text of the treaty, see Japan Times, August 13, 1978.
The treaty was hailed by leaders of the ruling LDP as well as all
opposition parties except the Japan Communist Party as an epoch-
making event that brought "a new page in the history of Sino-Japanese
relations and that of Asia at large." Leaders of Japan's business com-
munity
also welcomed the signing of the treaty, expressing their hopes
that bilateral trade would be further expanded. Yoshihiro Inayama,
chairman of Nippon Steel Corporation and President of the Japan-
China Economic Association called the pact an "axis for promotion of
peace in the world."22 The United States welcomed the signing of the
new treaty, commenting that it would contribute to the peace and sta-
bility in Asia. Moscow, however, reacted with an angry denunciation
of the pact, saying that it was far from persuaded by Japan's insistence
that the new pact was not directed against the Soviet Union. The
Kremlin leaders denounced Japan for "capitulating before Peking's
insistence on the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty"
and warned that Japan might have "damaged its national interests and
its relations with the Soviet Union." Moscow was, however, far more
critical of China than Japan, condemning Chinese leaders as "great
Han chauvinists."23
The Soviets' denunciation of the treaty notwithstanding, it was
ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
of China on August 17, 1978, and by both houses of the Japanese Diet
by October 18, 1978. On October 23, the instruments of ratification
were duly exchanged between the Chinese and Japanese Foreign Min-
isters at a ceremony attended by Prime Minister Fukuda and Chinese
Vice Premier Teng Flsiao-ping in Tokyo. According to an opinion
survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in October 1978, 87% of the
Japanese respondents supported the Sino-Japanese peace treaty.
Although it is still too early to evaluate the full significance of the
Sino-Japanese treaty, a few basic conclusions can be drawn. First, the
treaty has clearly signaled a Chinese victory over the Russians in their
bitter rivalry to court industrially advanced Japan and came as a tre-
mendous blow to Moscow. Since 1956, the Soviets had attempted to
sign a similar treaty with Japan, but these efforts had repeatedly floun-
dered, largely because of Moscow's stubborn refusal to return four
small islands in the Kurile chain to Japan. The Kremlin's unhappiness
over the Sino-Japanese pact also stemmed from Moscow's uneasiness
about China's attempts to build a broad "united front" encircling the
Soviet Union. The timing of the treaty signing, coming only a week
before Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Romania and Yugoslavia in
Russia's backyard, intensified the bitter Soviet response. Furthermore,
the Russians were also apprehensive about the prospects of Sino-
Japanese economic and technical cooperation, which could work
against Russian interests.
22
Ibid.
23
Washington Post, August 13, 1978.
Second, the treaty is expected to improve trade relations between
Tokyo and Peking. China has been trying to obtain industrial hard-
ware, technology, and capital from Japan and Western countries. From
Peking's perspective, Japan is well equipped to provide the technical
know-how for China's development. In economic terms, the Sino-
Japanese nexus is symbiotic: Japan has immense technical assets but
no raw materials; China has raw materials, including oil, but lacks the
technological know-how needed to modernize its underdeveloped econ-
omy. Thus, the Chinese government is clearly eyeing Japan as a major
market for Chinese exports and a valuable source of technology and
financing for its "modernization" programs. The signing of the long-
term trade agreement on February 16, 1978, clearly indicated the will-
ingness of both countries to facilitate bilateral economic and trade re-
lations. In the wake of the new treaty, there are strong indications that
the two-way trade could total $80 billion over the next 13 years (1978-
1990), instead of $20 billion for the eight year period (1978-1985) as
provided in the February 16 agreement. The new agreement for the
extension of the time span as well as the increase of the trade volume
was worked out during International Trade and Industry Minister
Toshio Komoto's visit to Peking in September 1978. By the fall of
1978, Japanese sources reported that Peking had signed contracts for
about $5 billion worth of industrial plants and goods, including a steel
mill to be built near Shanghai (i.e., Poashan) with a total annual ca-
pacity of six million tons, and another $5 billion worth of contracts
in the offing with various Japanese firms. Inevitably, it created a kind
of "China boom" for the hitherto depressed Japanese steel, chemical-
fertilizer, and textile industries.
Third, the signing of the bilateral peace treaty is expected to
facilitate political consultation between Tokyo and Peking. Foreign
Minister Sonoda and Chinese leaders have agreed to establish regular
ministerial meetings between the two countries in order to promote
mutual understanding and cooperation on matters of common interest.
During International Trade and Industry Minister Toshio Komoto's
visit to Peking in September 1978, Chinese and Japanese leaders agreed
to hold bilateral economic ministers' conferences on a regular basis. In
addition, increased diplomatic contacts between Tokyo and Peking
(e.g., Teng's flamboyant visit to Japan in October 1978) are expected
to improve bilateral political relations between Tokyo and Peking.
Fourth, there are also clear indications that Japan and China will
increase their cultural and personal exchanges. Already Peking has
decided to send a large number of Chinese students to Japan for train-
ing; Fukuda indicated his government's willingness to welcome these
exchange students from China,24 about 500 of whom are expected to
24
Japan Times, August 22 and 27, 1978. Reportedly, China is planning to send
as many as 10,000 students and trainees to Japan within the next few years. See
Shukan Asahi, October 2, 1978, p. 158.
arrive in Japan in 1979. In addition, necessary preparations and ar-
rangements are being worked out between Tokyo and Peking for the
training of thousands of Chinese at various industrial plants in Japan.
Also, there are growing indications that more Japanese and Chinese
will cross the Yellow Sea to visit each other.25
Fifth, the successful handling of the Sino-Japanese treaty negotia-
tions improved Prime Minister Fukuda's image and enhanced his
popularity both within and outside the ruling LDP. As Fukuda's pop-
ularity rose in the fall of 1978, many predicted that he would be un-
beatable in the LDP's presidential election in December 1978. To the
surprise of many, however, Fukuda was defeated in the primary elec-
tion by Masayoshi Ohira, the LDP's Secretary-General, who enjoyed
the support of the pro-Peking elements within the LDP. Ohira had
been instrumental in hammering out the Sino-Japanese rapproche-
ment in 1972 as well as several administrative agreements with Peking
from 1972-1974 in his capacity as Foreign Minister. Thus, Fukuda's
failure to retain the LDP's presidency, and hence the premiership,
should not be attributed to the China treaty but to other factors such
as the complicated factional politics within the LDP and the introduc-
tion of the new primary election system in the LDP's presidential
election. In spite of his unsuccessful bid for reelection, Fukuda should
be credited with putting an end to the thorny "China problem" that
had plagued the LDP for nearly three decades. Clearly Fukuda could
legitimately claim that the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace pact,
which had eluded his predecessors, was the crowning achievement of
his administration in foreign relations.
Finally, the Sino-Japanese peace treaty also promises in a sense
the dawning of a new era of cooperation among Japan, China, and the
United States. The U.S. welcomed the treaty by saying that it contri-
buted to "stability and security" in East Asia. The U.S., which has
endorsed the "anti-hegemony" principle since 1972, encouraged Japan
to do the same. Washington also had other reasons to be pleased with
the conclusion of the treaty. According to a U.S. official, the increas-
ingly closer ties between Tokyo and Peking would make it unnecessary
for the U.S. to "choose" between China and Japan, a choice the U.S.
had often been required to make in the previous half century26 Fur-
thermore, the flexibility shown by the Chinese in treaty negotiations
with Japan also encouraged the Carter Administration to believe that
some compromise could be reached with Peking in normalizing Sino-
American relations, especially on the bothersome Taiwan issue. Viewed
in this perspective, President Jimmy Carter's dramatic announcement
of December 15, 1978, for the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic
25
During 1977, more than 23,400 Japanese visited China, while 4,039 Chinese
visited Japan.
26
Richard Holbrooke, "U.S. Policy in Asia: Changing Perspective," Current
Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department), No. 24, June 1978, pp. 2-3.
ties between Washington and Peking on January 1, 1979 should facili-
tate the development of a general framework of accommodation and
cooperation between Washington, Tokyo, and Peking. The emergence
of a "triple entente," coupled with the expected abrogation of the
Sino-Soviet alliance pact in 1980, clearly signals the beginning of a new
era of international relations in East Asia.
HONG N. KIM is Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University, Morgan-
town.

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The Fukuda Government and the Politics of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty

Author(s): Hong N. Kim

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