The Turn to Experience in Contemporary Theology

David S. Koonce, L.C., S.T.D.

Required course in dogmatic theology, Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum
Academic Year 2013-2014, second semester

LECTURE 11. CONCLUSION: A SEARCH FOR PATTERNS
May 28, 2014
The previous two chapters have sought to listen to the voices of theologians down
through the centuries as they comment, either explicitly or implicitly, on the relationship
between theology and experience. The sequence has been diachronic, but the purpose has not
been so much to serve the demands of historical researchfor indeed, the preceding chapters
have contributed little in the way of new historical data or innovative historical insightsas
to draw upon the historical research of others in the service of what Bernard Lonergan has
called the dialectical function within theology.
1

Various techniques have been advanced for carrying out the dialectical function. For
instance, the typological or model method employed by Ian Ramsey (1915-1972), Ewert
Cousins (1927-2009), and Avery Dulles, among others, seeks to abstract from the particular
circumstances of time and place to focus on the structural features of different systems.
2
The
method of types is moreover extremely valuable for singling out the decisive issues and
implications of pure positions.
3
Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this chapter to identify
types or models of the relationship between theology and experience, for as the data show,
the number of permutations of positions would produce far too many models to be of any
service. Any systematic attempt to provide a complete and exhaustive taxonomy of all actual
and possible positions would create more confusion than clarity. The present chapter will not
offer such a taxonomy, but will limit itself to pointing out certain structural questions that
permit a unified grasp of the whole field of data. Although the array of answers to the
questions is manifold, the basic questions are few, and by grasping these basic questions, one
can hold the whole complex field of data in a relatively simple view.
What are the basic questions that give shape and form to the data? The fundamental
questions can reasonably be reduced to three. First, how does the subject experience? Second,
what is the extension of theologically relevant experience? Third, what is the relationship
between theology and experience? This chapter, therefore, will seek to lay out the variety of
answers to these three questions, recalling the salient points from the diachronic analysis.
Since the first two chapters have already examined all of the authors, with the relevant
references to primary and secondary sources, this chapter will limit itself to internal
references to preceding sections, provided in parentheses.

1
cf. B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 235. Lonergan identifies three basic causes of dialectical
opposition, namely, differences in cognitional theories, ethical stances, or religious outlooks. In
addition to these three, one may find other causes of opposition. Indeed, the differences that this
chapter will seek to identify are not necessarily reducible to the three categories that Lonergan offers.
2
cf. R.P. HALE, Religious Symbols as Evocative of Insight: the Model Method of Ewert
Cousins, Studia Anselmiana 64 (1974), 72-75, 80, 86-87.
3
cf. A. DULLES, Models of Revelation, Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1983, 25.
1. The modes of experience
The term modes of experience seeks to group under one heading various ways of
answering the first question: how does the subject experience? In terms of the classical
psychology of the philosophia perennis, it would be possible to couch the answers to this
question in terms of the faculties of the soul, but since many of the authors examined in this
survey either do not adhere to the faculty psychology of the scholastics or explicitly reject it,
the use of the generic if somewhat non-descript term modes seem preferable to designate
the realities under consideration.
There is a wide consensus that experience always implies an immediate contact with
reality, but how does the subject enter into such contact? The answer to this question
historically entails some reference to any or all of the following components of the human
way of being and acting: intellect, will, affections, and sensation. In the context of this thesis,
these human operations are what are meant by the modes of experience.
4

By applying this framework to the data assembled in the first two chapters, a certain
measure emerges for gauging the different positions with respect to each other. Prior to the
20
th
Century, most authors follow a recognizable pattern of privileging one mode of
experience over the others. For instance, Augustine privileges the intellectual component of
experience, while the monastic tradition starting with Cassian and Benedict of Nursia
emphasizes the volitive-affective dimension of experience. In the modern period two
differing trends appear: one line runs from Luther to Schleiermacher, in which feeling and
sentiment begin to take greater precedence over other modes of experiencing; the other line
finds its origin in English empiricism, in which sensory perception becomes identified with
experience as such.
Obviously, painting a picture in such broad brushstrokes leaves out many details and
nuances. In some of the authors, such as Augustine and most of the monastic and scholastic
theologians, while one mode of experience will often seem to be privileged with respect to
other possible modes, few of these authors would deny the existence or the importance of the
other modes of experience. The difference is one of emphasis, accentuation, and relative
importance. Moving into modern times, the tendency is toward reductionisms and
exclusivity: still, it is a tendency, and not all modern authors share it. Finally, in the second
half of the 20
th
century, a broad movement to restore an integral notion of experience can be
discerned, in which all of the modes of experience are present and operative. Such is the case,
to a greater or lesser degree, with Mouroux, Bouillard, Lonergan, and OCollins, to name the
most conspicuous examples.
5


4
An alternative meaning of modes of experience, as advanced by Michael Oakeshott, was
explained in the introductory lecture.
5
The tendency in the late 20th Century to seek an integral notion of experience is not unique to
theology. Martin Jay documents the ways in which philosophers of the period also sought to
rediscover a unified notion of experience, overcoming the disaggregation of experience into separate
discursive sub-contexts, whether epistemological, religious, aesthetic, political, or historical. cf. M.
JAY, Songs of Experience, 260-400.
2. The extension of theologically relevant experience
The second fundamental question concerns the extension of theological relevant
experience. If the modes of experience concern the subject, and the way or ways in which the
subject enters into direct contact with reality, this second question concerns the reality or
realities that form the objective pole of experience, and specifically, which objects of
experience are theologically relevant?
Answers to this question vary in terms of their extension. For some contemporary
theologians, like Henri Bouillard and David Tracy and to a certain degree Gerald OCollins,
all human experience, insofar as it has a religious dimension, is theologically relevant. In
other words, theologically relevant experience is coextensive with all human experience. In
contrast to the position that sees a religious dimension in all human experience, there are
others who argue or at least postulate that even without reference to a religious dimension,
all human experience, simply insofar is it provides insight into reality, is theologically
relevant, and thus, there could be room for an empirical critical method, as Heinrich
Stirnimann suggests but does not develop.
Other authors restrict theologically relevant experience to a subset of human experience.
William James and Bernard Lonergan, among others, argue that within the whole realm of
human experience, there are certain experiences which are specifically religious, and it is
these that are relevant for theology. Thus, theologically relevant experience is not coextensive
with the whole of human experience, but only with that subset which is specifically religious.
Even this restricted subset seems far too broad for some authors, who prefer to restrict
theologically relevant experience to a further subset of religious experience, namely, that
experience which is properly Christian. Authors that give special attention to Christian
experience as a particular instance of human, religious experience include Jean Mouroux,
John Paul II, Joseph Ratzinger and Aidan Nichols. Within Christian experience, there are
those who give special consideration to mystical experience as a subset of Christian
experience; such is the case with Bernard of Clairvoux and the mystics of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries. Even on this score, however, there is disagreement, since a swath of
modern authors inspired by William James and the study of comparative religions argue that
the phenomenon of mystical experiences is not confined to Christianity, and thus even non-
Christian mystical experiences ought to be considered as relevant to theology.
Lastly, the notion of subsets of experience can be restricted even further to the kinds of
experiences which are considered particularly apt to mediate an experience of God. For
James and many of his followers, the religious experience is primarily a positive one, of
wonder and awe, while for Lonergan, religious experience is equivalent to being in love
with God. On the other end of the spectrum, for Luther the most powerful religious
experiences are those of sin, weakness, and fear; the emphasis on negative experiences finds
an echo in the approach of Hume, for whom fear is the basic religious experience, and also in
that of Schleiermacher, insofar as the feeling of dependence is an experience of weakness.
The monastic tradition, as represented by both Cassian and later by Bernard of Clairvaux, is
much more balanced, recognizing that both positive and negative experiences can be caught
up into the Christian experience of God.
Which of these kinds of experience is theologically relevant? Are they all relevant? Do
they admit different degrees of relevancy? There is no consensus regarding the answers to
these questions, nor do all authors exhibit equal awareness of the full range of questions to be
addressed. In a certain sense, it is futile to compare authors positions when they are not
addressing the same questions in the same way, yet by identifying the most basic underlying
question and the range of answers that have been given, a dialectic approach to theology can
at least help to pinpoint any given authors position with respect to others.
3. The relationship between experience and theology
The final question to be considered concerns the relationship between theology and
experience. Here, too, the answers vary, and the survey of relevant literature reveals that there
is no clear consensus concerning this relationship, nor even of the terms of the relationship.
Just as there is no consensus about what experience in either its subjective modes of
appropriation or its theologically relevant extension, neither is there a full consensus about
what theology is, what its nature is, and what its tasks are. The question concerning theology
itself is one of the major threads of the historical narrative, appearing in different forms at
different times, whether in the various conflicts between dialectic and monastic theology in
the Middle Ages, or in Martin Luthers rejection of scholasticism, or more recently, in
Bernard Lonergans repudiation of a discourse on the nature of theology in favor of a
discourse on its method. Where the notion of theology itself changes, one should expect to
find that the notion of theologys relationship to experience will also change. If one factors in
the different notions of experience, too, the number of possible relationships is further
multiplied. To muddy the waters even more, in some of the 20
th
century authors there is a
tendency to conflate fundamental theology and its method with the whole field of theology,
or to take approaches that are proper to the apologetic and dialogical dimension of
fundamental theology and apply them uncritically to the methods of dogmatic or systematic
theology.
Independent of the mutable terms of the relation, there is the relationship itself. How
many ways are there of relating theology and experience? Five basic patterns suggest
themselves as ways in which the authors studied relate theology to experience. Experience
can be considered to be one of the following: (1) a presupposition of or condition for
theology; (2) a source for theology; (3) the object of theology; (4) the goal of theology; or (5)
the criterion for theology.
The first basic pattern sees experience as a presupposition or condition for theology. The
type of experience that is generally presupposed is a specifically Christian experience, in
which the participation in the various aspects of the Churchs liturgical, spiritual and
apostolic life nourishes both the Christians faith and the quest to understand ones faith that
is proper to theology. Most authors who subscribe to this pattern would describe theology in
some form of Anselms classic definitionfides quaerens intellectum. Since there is no quest
for understanding without a previous life of faith, that living experience must be the
presupposition and condition for theology. Although there is a broad consensus on this point,
some noted authors, such as David L. Tracy (2.4), explicitly deny that the theologian must be
a believing or practicing Christian.
6
Others, including Bernard Lonergan (2.3), are less
explicit in making such a denial, but Lonergans Method seems to require little in the way of
actual Christian practice. One could just as well be a Buddhist or a Muslim or an animist and

6
cf. D. TRACY, The Task of Fundamental Theology, 14, footnote 3.
follow Lonergans method for theology without any great difficulty. Thus, the notion that
experience is a presupposition or condition for theology is not shared by all theologians.
Those who do share this opinion are divided among those who would say that experience is
only a presupposition or condition and nothing more, and those who accept the coexistence of
some or all of the following positions.
The second basic pattern sees experience as a source for theology. In many cases, this
position and the previous one are not mutually exclusive. Those who regard experience as a
presupposition or condition for theology often accept experience among the sources of
theology along the lines of the loci theologici proposed by Melchior Cano. Yet, insofar as
Cano allowed any room for experience among the sources of theology, such experience was
primarily human experience, embodied in the healthy use of human reasonratio humana
and testified to by universal history. Two things are noteworthy about such a conception of
experience as a source for theology: first, it concerns human experience in the broad sense,
but not necessarily the specifically Christian religious experience; second, it sees such
experience as a source coming from outside theology, counted among the loci theologici
alieni vel adscriptitii. In like manner, a contemporary author such as Aidan Nichols prefers to
restrict the term sources of theology to Scripture and Tradition, while designating the
Magisterium and experience as aids to discernment. More commonly, the sources of
theology are numbered as threeScripture, Tradition, and the Magisteriumwhile
experience is omitted. A reaction to this exclusion of experience from the sources of theology
can be seen beginning with Jean Mouroux, passing through Henri Boulliard and culminating
in David L. Tracy, who explicitly affirms that experience is not just a starting point for
fundamental theology (as Bouillard had done), but an actual source for theology as such. Like
Cano, Tracy considers this experience to be first and foremost common human experience,
but unlike Cano, he considers it to be proper to theology as such. It must be noted, though,
that when Tracy uses the term source, he is not using it in the same way as the term source
or locus was traditionally used in so-called propositional theology, namely, as the
documentary fields from which a theologian draws his material. For Tracy, common human
experience is a source of a different order; it is not so much a documentary field (for much
of common human experience is undocumented!) as an immediate stimulus for reflection. In
an effort to interpret Tracys thought in classical terminology, common human experience as
a source for theology is not so much a repository of the fides quae creditur as a challenge to
the fides qua creditur calling forth the reflection proper to the intelligentia fidei.
The third basic pattern goes one step further and considers experience to be the object of
theology. Such a formulation is found in diverse thinkers ranging from Schleiermacher and
the school of Erfahrungstheologie that takes is inspiration from him to Bernard Lonergan, for
whom theology is conceived as reflection on religion, where religion is derived from
religious experience.
7
If such a position is taken to its logical outcome, then it means that God
is no longer the object of theology, and theology ceases to mean what its name signifiesthe
understanding of God. Does this mean that one is forced to choose between God as the object
of theology and experience as the object of theology? The importance of the question cannot
be understated, for the differences with regard to the object of theology are linked, of
necessity, to a variety of methodological orientations and to different concepts of the goal to

7
B. LONERGAN, Method in Theology, 355.
be attained.
8
A balanced synthesis is possible, as St. Thomas Aquinas so aptly exemplifies
when stating that Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione dei, vel quia sunt
ipse deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad deum, ut ad principium et finem. (ST I q.1 a.7).
Following St. Thomass reasoning, it would be possible to affirm that experience falls within
the object of theology, insofar as experience is ordered to God.
The fourth basic pattern considers experience as the goal of theology: theology should
lead to a richer experience of God, where experience encompasses various kinds of
knowledge not about God but of God. This, too, is a thread running through the whole
history of theology. It is present in the scholastic debate about whether theology is a practical
or a speculative science.
9
The value judgment one makes concerning this position will depend
upon the precise meaning given to the term experience. If experience means an existential
commitment, encompassing both an intellectual and affective response to the revealing God,
within the context and structures of Christian tradition, then setting such a goal can be
extremely beneficial for theology. Indeed, it was this kind of notion of experience that
informed both the monastic and scholastic traditions, though in different ways. If, on the
other hand, experience is taken to mean a purely subjective emotional state uninformed by
Christian traditionas William James and his followers understand itthen such a
conception of the relationship between theology and experience should be met with extreme
caution.
The fifth basic pattern holds that experience is a criterion for theology. This pattern
emerges as a logical consequence of the fourth, for if the goal of theology is to produce a
more profound experience, then it follows that such experience can become a criterion for
theology.
10
Any theological statement or system can be measured and judged according to its
adequacy to experience, to use the term coined by Schubert Ogden and employed by David
Tracy. Here again, the evaluation of such a formulation will depend upon the meaning given
to the term experience. If experience is interpreted in a purely empiricist fashion, or in a
merely sentimental and subjective way, then such a criterion would prove unwieldy at best
and dangerous at worst. If, on the other hand, experience is taken in an integral way,
involving all of the faculties and powers of the subject, as well as the subjects integration
into the whole intersubjective world of the ecclesial community and Christian tradition, then
it can be a criterion for theology, though hardly the only one. Experience, rightly understood
can be a criterion for theology, but it can never be the criterion for theology.

8
J. RATZINGER, Principles of Catholic Theology, 318.
9
See, for instance, THOMAS AQUINAS, ST I, q.1.a.4.
10
For a critical investigation and assessment of the appeal to experience as a criterion of
theological judgment or as a warrant in theological argument in the works of Schubert Ogden,
Langdon Gilkey (1919-2004), and David Tracy, see:. O.C. THOMAS, Theology and Experience, The
Harvard Theological Review 78/1/2 (Jan-Apr, 1985), 180-201. There, the author notes that the appeal
to experience as a warrant in theological argument or as a criterion for assessing theological proposals
is not limited to the three aforementioned scholars, but is a widespread phenomenon, cutting across
ideological and denominational lines; it is found in a range of very diverse trends, including secular
theology, liberation theology, process theology, romantic countercultural theology, Roman Catholic
fundamental theology, as well as forms of theology derived from analytic philosophy.
4. A fourth question?
At this point, it is worth entertaining whether a fourth basic question should not be
considered, namely, the one raised by Monika Hellwig: whose experience counts in
theological reflection?
Although the question is an important one, it does not seem to be one that is widely
addressed either explicitly or implicitly by the bulk of the theologians considered in this
survey. Therefore, since the basic questions were chosen for their aptitude to provide order
and structure to the dizzying variety of data, the question of whose experience does not
enjoy the same organizing power as the others. Furthermore, the range of answers generally
provided to the question whose experience counts can be reduced to various further subsets
of human experience like those considered in the answer to the second question. Indeed, the
subject of group experiences favored by various streams of so-called identity politics and
its theological equivalents is a metaphysically tenuous entity, for the subject considered is no
longer the existing person who does theology, but rather is merely a representative of a group
whose very membership is defined by sharing in certain experiences. In other words, the
normal answers to the question whose experience counts? obliterate the very subject who
in favor of sets of experiences that supposedly define a group, such as the poor, blacks,
women, Latinos, Asians, etc. Central to the answer to the question, therefore, is not the
person, but sets or ranges of experience.
11
For this reason, the answers to this question can be
subsumed under the notion of the range of theologically relevant experiences addressed in the
second basic question.
5. Conclusions
The relationship between theology and experience is as fascinating as it is difficult and
complex. From this relatively brief survey contained in the three chapters of this first part,
one can conclude with Hans Geybels that religious experience is not a ready-to-use concept
that Christians can simply adopt from the past by dipping into Augustine, Cassian, Bernard or
Luther.
12
Indeed, there simply is no unified consensus regarding the nature of experience
and how experience functions in theological argumentation, nor are there easily identifiable
schools or models that can help to reduce the complexity of the issue to a manageable size.
For this reason, the three fundamental questions seem to hold the most promise for
establishing parameters to gauge what any theologian may say regarding the issue. These
three parameters offer certain coordinates, analogous to the axes of a three-dimensional grid,
which can help to pinpoint the position of any given theologian with respect to his peers,
whether present or past.


11
For a stinging critique of the assumptions and practices of identity politics, seeM. JAY, Songs of
Experience, 407-408.
12
H. GEYBELS, Cognitio Dei Experimentalis, 452. The survey contained in part one of this thesis is
brief relative to the whole field of research against which it is set. Relative to the remainder of the
thesis, it may be objected that the survey is too long, but it seems necessary to provide sufficient detail
to establish a proper context.