Home | Columns | Media Watch | Reports | Links | About Us | Contact

MEXIDATA . INFO
Column 061608 Brewer

Monday, June 16, 2008

Intelligence Confusion Inhibits a Collaborative Process

By Jerry Brewer

The absolute necessity for sound intelligence collection and

processing is a critical component for assessing threat. The
Americas, in particular, can greatly benefit from effective and
efficient application of fundamentally sound practitioners tasked
to collect, process, and report necessary data. The inherent
problems in the art of intelligence gathering precede Biblical
times and remain to this day. The problems, among many, are
in confusion and the lack of appropriate sharing of collected
data for proactive purposes.

The "confusion" element actually conflicts with the word

"fusion," which in intelligence circles (and the concept of
"Intelligence Fusion Centers") is the meticulous process of
managing the flow of information and intelligence across all
levels and sectors of government, as well as private industry.
The primary focus of these fusion centers is the process
through which information is "collected, integrated, evaluated,
analyzed, and disseminated."

Nations attempting to work together to interdict common threats

that transcend national borders are also faced with regimes that
control the intelligence process in oppressive ways as a
powerbase to perform evil deeds. Venezuela's President Hugo
Chavez, who has adopted the communist Cuban "DGI" style of
intelligence, recently overhauled Venezuela's intelligence
process. The two main intelligence services, the DIM (military
intelligence agency) and the DISIP (secret police), will be
replaced with the General Intelligence Office and General
Counterintelligence Office. These are to be under the direct
control of President Hugo Chavez. Chavez's efforts are
described as those to "assert greater control over public
institutions in the face of political challenges." Chavez was
defeated last December in a proposed package of constitutional
changes that would have expanded his powers. Chavez
declared that this would not "dampen his ambitions to transform
Venezuela into a Socialist state."

Much confusion about intelligence, in what has been

traditionally described as cloak and dagger and shrouded in
intense secrecy, conjures up the vision and ideas of assassins,
coup d’état scenarios, and other sinister behaviors. A proactive
intelligence process of competent democratic nations engaging
in collection efforts regarding transnational terrorism and
organized criminals can thwart threats from destabilizing
democratically elected governments. Too, the process includes
the interdiction efforts to prevent illegal narcotics production,
illicit trafficking in arms and humans, and the proliferation of
WMD, their precursors, and delivery systems.

Mexico is a prime example of a critical need for sound

intelligence gathering to fight the savage drug war that has
engulfed the country, as well as the U.S. border.

The U.S. Patriot Act, although criticized due to much

misunderstanding, remains an antiterrorism tool that has
enhanced the ability to secure a homeland. The ability to
monitor communications of suspected individuals that "indicate
association" to terrorism has resulted in the capture and
dismantling of terrorists and terror plots in cities around the
globe. This vital antiterrorism tool contrasts with Venezuela's
new intelligence overhaul. Theirs’ authorizes "any special or
technically designed method" to intercept and obtain
information. This appears to be purely Cuban-style policy.

A monumental task for domestic intelligence gathering within

the homeland is to seek out, detect, disrupt, and dismantle
terrorist sleeper cells before they can commit an operational act
or attack. Much of this must be accomplished by focusing
collection efforts on suspected recruiting, terrorist training,
fundraising, and logistical support. The collection efforts require
the capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications and
details of terrorist threats and to improve the capacity to
disseminate threat-related information to local, state and federal
agencies. The next problem for those at the local levels is to
operationally understand the complexities of terrorist modus
operandi.

Challenges must be confronted before they mature into direct

threats. This necessitates broad cooperation of partner nations,
as well as continuing to strengthen existing relationships, to
provide the appropriate amount of security across a broad
spectrum facing peaceful nations within the region. Tactics,
techniques, and procedures must be continually enhanced to
meet the fluid nature of a changing strategy by terrorists to
defeat methods in place to interdict them. Their reactions to a
non-unified effort against them results in the enabling of their
movement to hide and sustain themselves with ease.
Within the U.S. homeland "Fusion Centers" were put in place as
a collaborative effort between intelligence organizations and law
enforcement, in an effort to share intelligence and
counterterrorism information. However, in what has been
described as "an absence of a widespread domestic terrorist
threat," the Centers face undue scrutiny as to their value. The
argument essentially is that there is "not enough terrorist activity
to justify multi-jurisdictional and multi-governmental level fusion
centers."

The threats of terrorism and associated violence and death to

the south of our border require our utmost attention, planning,
readiness and reaction. Being proactive, as well as strategic,
requires situational awareness of these real threats.

——————————
Jerry Brewer, the Vice President of Criminal Justice
International Associates, a global risk mitigation firm
headquartered in Miami, Florida, is a guest columnist with
MexiData.info. jbrewer@cjiausa.org