NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Co-
ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]


FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in
their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the
previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the
deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.





















SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
[1]
of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision
[2]
of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,
[3]
while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
[4]

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;
[5]
and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence,
we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the
records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.
[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of
the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[7]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
[8]

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
[9]
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
[10]
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
[11]

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage,
[12]
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
[13]
renders the marriage
void ab initio.
[14]

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
[15]
the Court held that such
a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
[16]
Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community
or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man,
[17]
-
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
[18]

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common
by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no
right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
x x x x x x x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto.
[19]
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in
the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-
half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
[20]
where the Court awarded one-half
of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second
wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
[21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring
the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum
of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
[23]
the Court
explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion,
the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family.

















FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quohas
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil
Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the trial court,
[1]
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is
hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
for proper recording in the registry of marriages."
[2]
(Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
[3]
(Italics
supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property."
[4]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay."
[5]

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is
a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;
[6]
it
provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"
[7]
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household."
[8]
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarifi ed Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share
in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all
of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon
the termination of the cohabitation
[9]
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
[10]

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both
of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
[11]

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,
[12]
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The
rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43,
[13]
relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40
[14]
of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on
the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation
to Articles 41
[15]
and 42,
[16]
of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro
hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.