IN THE SHADOW OF HEGEL: INFINITE DIALOGUE IN

GADAMER'S HERMENEUTIGS
by
JAMES RISSER
Seattle University
ABSTRACT
This paper ex|}lo]TS ific plaee of Hegel in Cadamer's hernieneutics through an analy-
sis ofthe idea of'infinite dialogue." It is argned that inliiiite dialogue raiinot be under-
stood as a limited Hegeiianisni, i.e., as the life of spirit in language that does not reach
its end. Rather, infinite diaiogue can be understood only by taking the Heideggerian
idea of radical finitudc seriously. Thus, while infinite dialogtie has a speculative cle-
ment, it remains a dialogtie conditioned by the occlusion in temporal becoming. This
idea is developed furtiier by contra.sting Gadamer's position with that of Blanchot, who
also stands tmder the shadow of Hegel.
One can readily see from a reading of Twill and Method tliat (iadamer's
philosophieal hermeueutics owes mueh to Hegtfl.' Gadamcr cxplieitly
tells us that with respect to the development of !iis hcrmencuUes of
history, he wants to hold to a model of integration rather than re-
construction and, aecordingly, sees il as his task to follow Hegel more
than Schleiermacher.- Tiiis broad alignment with Hegel, though, is
obviously not without qualification. Gadamer himself characterizes his
proximit}' to Hegel as "a strained closeness" {eine spannungsvdle .Ncihe)
because the critique of a "philosophy of reflection," in terms of which
Gadamer aligns himself with Hegel, is generated by the dialectical
nictliod. Gadamer sees in Hegcr.s use of the dialeetieal method "a
ditbious compromise with the scientilie tliinking of modernity"' and
therefore always wants, at the same time, to distance himself from
Hegel. This distance is aecomplished in Gadamer's eyes by insisting
that philosophical hermeneutics takes ftnitude seriously and that dia-
logue is not to be equated with dialectic."'^
Despite Gadamer's desire to maintain a certain distance from Hegei,
the shadow of Hegel looms large and remains problcmadc. Ciadamer's
insistenec on the finite and dialogical chat"acu:r o\' ihinking in opj^osi-
tion to a Hegelian dialectic of infinity can in fact i)e inleipreted a.s a
Research in Plin/n/meiiolag)/, 32
IN THE SHADOW OF HEGEL 87
mark of distance lliaL docs noi constitute a real difference at all. U
can be argued that Gadamer's whole of tradition is bnt a vat^iation
on tlie Hegelian "truth is the whole," that dialogi-te remains wedded
to determination not utilikc Hegelian concrete univcrsalit)-, and that
the movement of tradition iy not unlike the tnovcment of spirit tiiat
wants to make itself at home in the world,
The problem with respect to the tiattire of this distance has much
to do with the fact that, unlike Heidegger, Gadamer continues to ref-
erence finitude in relation to infinity and to iink understattditig to a
process of mediatioti. C'onsider the way in which Gadamer annoutices
his project in the Preface to Truth and Method. As a philosophical con-
cern, the project of pliilosophical hermeneutics wants to "discover what
is common to all tnodcs of understanding" {TM, xxxi). VVliat is to be
diseovered is the fact that understanding is eattght up in an "effective
history'" that is prior to all conseioiis itiietiding of meaning. This con-
dition of always thinking from histoty is die mark of our finittidc:
'Historically effected eonsciousness," Gadamer writes, "iy so radically
finite that our whole being, effected in the totality of otir destiny,
inevitably transcends its knowledge of it,self" {TM, xxxiv). From this
condition of htiitude, ofthe infinite separation of being from its undcr-
.standing, Gadamer further claims that "the province of hermeneutics
is universal and adds "thai: language is the form in whieh under-
standing is aeliieved" (TAf, xxxiv). On the basis of Gadamer's snbse-
quetit analysis in Triilh and Method., we know that this achievement ol
understanditig by language enaets a peculiar tnediation: Uuough lati-
guage the strueture of experienee is formed and constandy changed
whereby the order of being comes itito existence as if for the lirst
time. This dynamie of langitage, whieh in efiect is the self-retation of
language to its own differenee, occurs as dialogue. Thus Gadamei'
writes in the Preface that nnderstatiding is achieved in "the infinity of
the dialogne" {TM, xxxivj.
This piirase is most intriguing and can be taken as the focal point
for working out the precise character oi Hegel's shadow in Gadamer's
hermeneutics. In taking hold of this phrase, though, we are immedi-
ately confronted with difficulty, since it is not entirely eviden! whal
Gadamer means by the phrase "ihe infitiity of the dialogue." It is not
clear, iit other words, how dialogite expresses through its infinity the
experienee of finitude. Even if we ititrocktce at this point Gadamer's
repeated statement that with respect to his proximity to Hegel, he
wants to '\save the ho]ior of the bad infinity," we still do not have
88 JAMES RISSER
the needed clarity, for this statement too needs interpretation and
clarification. To be sure, if we are able to reaeh clarity on the mean-
ing of the phrase "the infinity of the diaiogue,'" we will have put our-
selves in a position to grasp Gadamer's proximity (or !ack thereof) to
Hegel. In what fbJlows I want to achieve die sought after clarity under
three consideradons. First, as a preliminary matter, 1 want to estab-
lish more precisely the issue of finitude in infinite dialogue. Second, 1
want to answer the question of the meaning of infinite dialogue. Third,
as a way of furthering the understanding of Gadamer's relation to
Hegel, I want to consider how Gadamer's p(5sition in this regard ean
be interpreted against another kind of infinite dialogue, one that also
has its roots in a Hegelian problematiethe infinite conversadon that
one finds in Blanchot.
I
Taken by itselfthat is, withont regard for the position of philosoph-
ical hermeneudcsan infinite dialogue, a dialogue made infinite by
virtue of finitude, would have to be, in its infinity, a dialogue that in
some sense suspends understanding. More precisely, an infinite dia-
logue would have to suspend the end of understanding. Aecordingly,
an infinite dialogue would be one that suspends perfected understanding,
and the experience of finitude would consist of this laek of perfection,
the part that is not yet whole. To state the reladon between infinite
dialogue and finitude in this way is to suggest that the infinity of the
dialogue is simply a matter of the unending. That is to say, dialogi-
eal understanding enacts a kind of finite infinity whereby understand-
ing lacks completeness and constantly defers its end without deferring
understajiding. A finite infinit)', tliough, is just what eharacterizes Hegel's
notion of the bad infinity. In this context, dialogicai understanding
piays otit like a restrained Hegelian infinite spirit, constantly lacking,
keeping its end out of sight, yet accomplishing meaning all along the
way. Gadamer implies that he is taking over this of idea of infinite
dialogue in his Preface at that point where the phrase "the infinity of
the dialogue" is (irst introduced. In iiis attempt to clarify the sense of
a hermeiieutic universality that joins understanding and linguisticality,
Gadamer asks whether such universality can justify the philosophical
universality implied in the statement "being that can be understood is
language." Gadamer answers, without elaboration here, that wiiat
appears to be unsayable does not afTecl hermencutic universality becatisc
IN THE SH;\DOW Ol' HEGEL 89
the inlinily of the dialogue "makes any reference lo llie unsayable itself
relative" {TM, xxxiv-xxxv). Tl would appear thai for philosopliical
hermenciuics what cannol be said is only what cannot iv^ be said, for
language is oriented to infinitya dialogue lo infinity. In such a dia-
logue the experience of finitude would not be jusi a matter of a lack;
it would also be, by virtue of its relation to iniiniiy, an optimism rel-
ative to the sticcess of understanding.
But I think we miss the real eharacter of Gadamer's infinite dia-
logue wben we regard it simply in this way. Most certainly, by regard-
ing il iu tbis way we overlook the signilieance of Gadamer's claim that
"language is the mark of finitude" [TM, 457);'' tbat is lo say, we fail
to follow the implications of the idea of radical finitude, announced
tlirough the idea of efiective fiistoi-y, ihal Gadamer insists determities
the very character of tfie infinity of tfie dialogue, Wlien we take lliis
idea of radical finitude into consideration, it beeomes appareni iliat tfie
experience of finiuide pertains not simply to a notion of lack, bnt to
a distinct notion of limit. If eveiy dialogue is an unending process, a
dialogue tfiat lacks completeness, tfiis lack is itself brought about by
tfie limitations of our temporality, of being subject to time. Sucfi lim-
itation effects tfie beginning and end of dialogue as well as tfie dia-
logue itself in a fundamental way.'' Being in timeifiis condilion of
being liijitorical, wbicli is also tlic condition of language and concep-
tualization insofar as fanguage does not reside in fbrmalizable state-
mentsmeans precisely tfiat we do nol begin at tbe beginning.' History
lias already begun when we attempt to tell bistory, and language has
already begun wfien we first speak." Equally important is tfie fact tfiat
eveiy dialogue that seeks tfie appropriale word must take plaee in rela-
lion to "tfie inability to satisfy tbis desire and tfie fact tfiat our own
liumaii existence dissipates in time and befcjre cleatfi."" All speaking is
engaged by tbe mo.st proper limit of all temporal presencing, viz.,
death, and wfien we speak we do so from out of events ifiat liave
already entered tfieir cleatfibeing's own perishing and self-differing.
Can we not say tfien that an infinite dialogue, by virtue of this finitude,
is one tfiat has ah'eady begun, in effect blind to its beginning, and
continues in relation to its own perisliinga phoenix-like movement,
now rising from tbe aslies of what it cannot sec?'" Tlie bad infinity
tfiat Gadamer will bonor needs to be interpreted in ligbt of tfiis idea
of radical finitude.
90 JAMES RISSER
II
Let us begin here by recalling Hegel's idea of the spurious or "bad"
infinite. It is an infinity that is not yet a true infinite. It functions by
being unable Lo sever its relation to the finite, wliicfi entails both lim-
itation and nonbeing. Finitude is at once determination as limitation,
i.e.. a determination determined by not being its otlier, and that which
is negatively related to itself, i.e., a determination that alters sucii that
it ceases to be. Finite beings, Hegel tells us, "have the germ of pass-
ing away [Vergehens] as their being-vvithin-itself the hour of their birth
is the hour of their death."" Considered dialectieally, the infinite as
such emerges when the understanding attempts to grasp the limil of
the finite, but in holding on to a notion of limit, vanishes into this
other: the infinite is held fast to the finite. Such an infinity is spuri-
ous, an infinite diat is itself finite. Unable to escape limit, the spuri-
ous infiniLe progresses to infinity; it is an infinity of infinite progress,
an infinite related to transcending limitation. The tnie infinite for Hcgcl
overcomes limitation sueh that it is the relation of itself to itself
When Gadamer then acknowledges that he wishes to save the honor
of the bad infinity, we have to locate first the context for this remark
and decide on its intended meaning before we let it elecidc the ques-
tion of an infinite dialogue. There are two places in Gadamer's writ-
ings where we find more than a passing reference to this idea.'- In
both places Gadamer introduces the idea in tlie context of recogniz-
ing the infiuence of Hegel on his philosophicai project, while also rec-
ognizing the infiuenee of Heidegger. From this context, I would not
argue, however, as a critic of Gadamer has recently done,' ' that Gada-
mer is primarily drawn to the spirit of Hegel's philosophy, a philoso-
phy of spirit unfoldiug to its end, but under the infiuence of Heidegger
and the hermeneutics of" facticity. knows full well that the unfolding
can never complete itself. In other words, the very fact that Gadamer
is drawn to Hegel in the first plaee indicates that the function of fini-
tude in Gadamer's hermeneuties is not as radical as he himself pro-
claim,s, that the radieality of Heideggerian faeticity "has been subverted
from within by a creeping Hegclianism." This argument, which in
effeet claims that Gadamerian finitude contains a latent metaphy,sies
of infinity, is committed to the position that the infinite dialogue is
nothing other than the experienee of the unending as an unfolding.
To make thi.s argument, though, one must erroneously attribute lo
Gadamer's position a classical iheoiy of essencea classical Aristotelian
IN THE SHADOW OF HEGEL
91
theon' of essence and aeUiality'"'and ignore the distinctive way tliat
possibility and self-difference function in Gadamer's hcrmcneutics. That
is to say, it is true that for Gadamer eveiy conversation is endless
thus the inhnite dialogue does indeed have a sense of being a bad
inhnitybut it is not neeessarily an unfolding (of t!ie same), for as
Gadamer insists, when we understand we understand differently.'-'
Given the full implications of this alternative idea, 1 would argue
that saving die honor of the bad inhnity is intended to recognize pre-
cisely the Heideggerian radical hnitude that determines l!ie very char-
acter of an inhnite dialogue. But if this is indeed the case, then why
does Gadamer turn to Hege! in the hrst place? The answer to this
question becomes clear when we follow Gadamer's own explanation
of what it means to save the honor ofthe bad infinity. In "Reflections
on My Philosophical Journey," Gadamer leads up to this announce-
ment by contrasting Heidegger with Hegel on the issue of tiie philo-
sophical thinking of being. Gadamer sees Heidegger, in teaching us to
think trudi as unconcealing and concealing at the same time, as pre-
senting a fundamental alternadve to Hegel's philosophical thinking of
being. For Gadamer himself, thinking in the tradition stands within
this tension, and thus he writes: "The concepts in which thinking is
formulated stand silhouetted like dark shadows on a wall. They work
in a one-sided way . . . in a process of which [they are] not aware.""'
On the basis of tliis remark alone we can say that if conversation is
endless, it is not, to state the matter precisely, because the end delays
its arrival, but because there is an occlusion in the heart oi all
conceptual tliinkinga blindness that cannot be confused with the
one-sidedncss that occurs in dialectical thinking. It is a blindness that
pertains to the veiy historical character of concepts in language. As
productions of language, concepts arc, for Gadamer, what they are
for Heidegger, not artifices of dehnitions, but determinations of the
historical life of being that undergo a self-alienation, the recovery from
which entails a step back from dialectic. In this step back, Gadamer
is drawing his important distinction between dialectie and dialogue.
Dialogue or conversation is the form of recovery, not from the one-
sidedness of dialectical thinking, but in Socratic fashion, from the soul
fallen into the hnitude of bodily existence. As such, it is a recovery
froin the condition that "all things escape us,""' from an essential for-
getting that, following Heidegger, is tantamount to concealment.
But while recognizing this difference from Hegel, Gadamer will at
the same time sec Hegel's project as having a certain affinity with
92 JAMES RISSKR
Heidegger's in that he loo wants to "shatter the predominance of sub-
jectivism" and "the transcendental principle of the self" It is on this
point, which, positively stated, pertains to ihe self-presentation ol'being
through the speculative element in dialectical thinldng, tliat Gadamer
wishes to align himscH' with Hegel.'" On the basis of this alTinity,
Gadamer then tells us that as a first determination of the site of his
own effort at thinking, he wants to save the lionor of HcgePs bad
infinity, but with a decisive modification. Tiie key passage reads: 'Tor
in my view the inliniie dialogue of the soul with itseii' which tliinldng
is, is not properly characterized as an endlessly refined cletcrmiiiation
of the objects that we are seeking to know, either in the Neo-Kantian
sense ofthe infinite task or in the Hegelian dialeetieal sense that think-
ing is always moving beyond every particular limit. Rather, here I
think Heidegger showed me a new path when , . . he turned to a cri-
tique ofthe metaphysieal traditionand in doing so found himself "on
the way to language'."'"' For Gadamer, ihe infinite dialogise of think-
ing is sometiiing thai is tmdcrgone from within the peeuliar spectila-
tive self-movement of language, a movement that Hegel does not fol-
low because he considers language, in Gadamer's eyes at least, in terms
of the statement. For Hegel the speculative movement of language is
nothing other than the dialectical mediation of the ,speculative state-
ment. In contra,st to this, Gadamer insists that the speculative move-
ment of language doe.s not escape "the imilluminablc obscurity of our
factieiiy" from which we engage in an ""{ingoing reacquisition ihat pro-
ceeds into infinity."^"
Having said tliis, Gadamer still leaves us with the question witii
which we started: How are we to understand the infinite dialogtie as
unending that is not simply an unfolding as endlessly moving beyond
every partieular limit? To state the question positively: How does rad-
ical fmitude detennine the character of infinite dialogue? We are now
in a position to answer this question, which 1 would like to do by
summarizing the central analysis in part three of Tmth and Method.,
where Gadamer leads up to die claim "being that can be understood
is language." First, Gadamer asserts the general relation between lan-
guage and being that has been maintained by philosophy since its
beginnings. Plato's fiight into the Xoyoi in eUcct maintains that the
human experience of the world is linguistic: the structure of being is
read from the articulation of the logos, which is language bound. The
metaphysical tradition considers the articulation of the logos to be ori-
ented towards the identity of logos and being such that the fulfilled
IN I'HE SHADOW OF UKGEL 93
identity constitutes the divinity-, i.e., the infinity, of thought. In con-
trast to this metaphysics of infinity, wiiich for its success must leave
language behind, Gadamer propoi^es to understand this experience
under die assumption of ''the finitude of our historieal experience."
Sinee language characterizes our experience of the world, language
will embody finite experience with its peeuliar repetition: the return
of experience to experience that, as a temporal return, finds itself at
once both needy and given over to its own death (mortal becoming).
Accordingly, the word of language is neither the perfection of the
species (a reflection on a pre-given order of being) nor an instrument
that constructs an objectified universe of beings, but is ihat place wliere
"the order and stnicture of t>ur experience ilself is originally formed
and constantly ehanged"' {TM, 457). And yet, since language remains
tied to the articulation of the iogos, it remains tied to tbe universal-
ity of reason.-' In its capacity to say what is, then, the word of lan-
guage is related to a whole that cannot grasp itself, a whole that
Gadamer describes elsewhere as an "'inner infinity."--
Second, Gadamer explicitly states his alternative position: it is lan-
guage alone that, lelated to the whole of that which is, mediates our
historical existenee to ourselves and tt) the w'orld. It does so not as a
ground [dpx^], but as a middle or center. That is to say, (he media-
tion is carried out by a peeuliar "dialecdc" of the worel. Gadamer
writes: ''every word breaks Tortli as if from a center and . . . causes the
whole of the language to wiiich it belongs to resonate. . . . Tbus eveiy
word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the unsaid to which
il is related by responding and summoning" (7iV/, 458). As the (finite)
event ofthe moment, the word is nol eveiything and yet "there is laid
up within it an infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out'' (TM.,
458). The peculiar dynamic of tfie word, then, rests on language func-
tioning, not as making statements, but as the general held of intelligi-
bility that can exercise itself, and thus "mediate'' existence.'-' fn this
mediation, eveiy word has an inner dimension of multiplication, wiiicb
in its production b^'comes a production of its own heterogeneity in the
event ol" the moment. To again paraphrase Gadamer: when we under-
stand, we understand differently.
Third and linally, Gadamer explains this multiplication through the
idea of the speculative and naturally draws Hegel into his analysis,
since Hegel held fast lo the sjjeculative element in dialectic. For Hegel,
the specnlative relation, as holding together being and its presentation,
passes into dialeetieal presentation, as self-dcmoni-lralion through tlie
94 JAMES RISSER
overcoming of onc-sidcdness. For Gadamer, language as specularive
holds together being and its presentation in a way analogous to irue
mirroring, where there is a reflectionan imagethat has no being
of its own, yet allows the thing to be seen. The duplication, in other
words, is one in whieh the linguistic event does not copy the original
event, but is language's seli-prcsentation in its different and new under-
standings. Accordingly, the speculative dimension of language, in which
"finite pcssibilities of the word are oriented toward the sense intended
as toward the inhnite" iTM, 469), i,s carried out in a linguistic event
that is fundamentally different from the dialectical self-unfolding of
spirit. Certainly Gadamer acknowledges that hermeneutical under-
standing has a real correspondence with Hegel here since, similar to
dialectical presentation, "every interpretation must begin somewhere
and seeks to sujjersede the one-sidedness which thai inevitably pro-
duces" {TAl, 471). But Gadamer insists that in ttiis "dialectical" pre.sent-
ation of the word there iy no real eorresponden^ce between hermeneuti-
cal and philosophical dialectic because the parallel has not taken
aeeount of tlie "radical hnitude" that is the basis of hermeneutie expe-
rience (ZM, 472). Gadamer explains this difFereneethe difference that
hnitude makesby appealing to the eondition of hermeneutie experi-
ence lacking a real beginning. Of course intcipretation must start some-
where, but it does not start just anywhere. By virtue of hnitude, the
dialectic of the word is engendered from receptivity, from the word
"that comes down to us as tradition" addressing us. Every beginning is
a response, a response such that the dialectic of the word is the dialec-
tic of question and answer. That is to say, every beginning is the
response to the question asked. In this movement, properly speaking,
not of dialectic, but of dialogue as the encounter ofthe address of" the
odier through the question, there is no unfolding, but only an event
in which ''something happens [etwas geschieluy {TM, 461), "Something
happens," tliat is to say, something comes forward, whieh is not at all
a progi'essive knowledge; and, in fact, only eomes forward in the loss
of the control of our words.
To conclude this second consideration, then, let us say diat the
infinite dialogue is die dialogue that takes place outside the fulfillment
effeetuated by beginnings. The absolute openness of the event of mean-
ing that chara.eterizes hermeneutie experience is, not the openness
towards an end that eonstantly recedes, but simply openings,'^ It fol-
lows that sueh openings are not the shapes of an imperfect under-
standing of traditionaiy material, but simpiy aspects ofthe matter itself,
IN THE SHADOW OK tlEClEL 95
which are always historically different. The infinite dialogue is a dialogue
of being's own presenting otheiwise. This presenting, this coming into lan-
guage"being that can be understood is language" -does not mean
tbal a second being is acquired: first the diing, then second the thing in
langtiage. Since langiiage has a spectilative unity, the distinction between
being and its presentation is not a distinction at all. The inhnite dia-
logue is the event of langviage's own self-differing. And if, by virtue of
finitude, language has already begun, we can afso say that the infinite
dialogue is not really a matter of a postponement (of an end) at all,
but rather, to be precise, always a reenactment of beginning.''^ Infinite
dialogtie, under the condition of finitnde of always having to go on,
is essentially a dialogue in which there is a commencing of the word.
flT
Under this third consideration f want to engage in a more far-
reaehing analysis that will in the end allow me to provide a furUier
determination of the character of inhnite dialogue in philosophical
henneneutic-s. ft cannot go unnodced that Gadamer is not alone in
being a proponent of infinite dialogue, that one finds at least in name
something similar in the work of Blanchot as well as Levinas. It would
appear natural, then, to want to attend to this similarity, despite the
fact that a vast distance often se])arates the French scene from the
German intelleetual tradition. Clcriainly all three share in common an
orientation to philosophy that stands under the shadow of Hegel. More
to the point, ail three, in relation to the distanee they wish to take
from Hegel, hold to a notion of infinite dialogue in wiiieh there is the
subverting ofthe puiported power of (Hegelian) self-mastery, tbus hold-
ing to a notion of infinite dialogue in which the speeeh of the other
appears.-*' Here, I want to limit this comparison by focusing primar-
ily on Blanchot and on one specific issue. 1 want to consider with
respect to Blancbot the character of the movement of infinite dialogue,
the movement that, as we have seen with respect to hermeneutics, per-
tains to the self-relation of language to its own difference.
Blanchot sees clearly what Flcgel was after: the condniiity of dis-
cotirse in the movement of the whole "from the undeveloped interi-
oiity to the exteriorization that alienates it, and from this alienation
that exteriorizes up to an accomplished and reinlerioiized plenitude."^^
It is a discourse, to invoke the usual refrain, that wants to reduce the
other to the same. This discourse that goes into its systematization will
96 JAMES RISSER
overcome every ''unworking" [distnivreineni] of itself. But even Hegel
saw that the aeeomplishment of the system was suspect and the com-
pleted cUseoiirse. in which the enci is joined to its beginning, was held
only by philosophy in its abstracted existence. In his turn from Hegel,
Blanchot is interested, not in the work of philosophy, but precisely in
its iinworking. His project is directed at the production of a work of
the absence ofthe work, which he finds in the curious form of absence
that haunts the work of philosophya non-absent absence interrupt-
ing the book of knowledge. Attending to this absence, Blanchot does
not engage in "work" but in "writing," as die experience of language
unworking itself. In Blanehot's words: ' ' To write; the work of the
absence of work, production that produces nothing except (or out of)
the absence of the subject, mark that uumarLs, infinitive in which die
infinite would like to play itself out even to the neuter: to write does
not depend on the present and does not make il raise itself."-" Behind
this desciiption of writing lies Blanchot's claim that language has a
paradoxical eharaeter: the naming that takes place in language is always
undercut by language. As such, language is the producdon of dis-
placement as well as proliferation.
If "writing'" beeomes the diought of the outside that carries out the
interruption of diseourse, then entertaining a question in writing is to
interrogate an entertainment that is infinitean inlinitc conversadon
{L'Entretien infini). Infinite conversation is not, properly speaking, infinite
dialogue, since diaiogue is understood by Blanchot as the reeiprocity
of words and equality of speakers in whieh one sees in the other
another self. Rather, infinite conversation or entertainment is plural
speech, a speech that prevents any possibility of symmetiy insofar as
it reverses die direction of the advent of meaning in direct commu-
nication. Within speech there slill occurs a movement to infinity, but
not as die unfolding of meaning; rather., the movement to infinity
occurs in the dissymmetrical field of language, in language's irreducible
detour, a detour that Blanchot acttially finds in Hegel. In his tum
from Hegel, Blanchot does not stray too far fVom Hegel. According
to Blanehot, the movement of the concept for Hegel does not refuse
the negation that is proper to truth, but acttially introduces it into
thought so that thought beeome.s other than it.self.-'' Blanchoi then takes
this movement of tlie negative for what it is and refuses to see it sim-
ply as the moment of tlie lack of being. What Hegel is really telling
us is that the life of spirit begins with deadi; we afiirm ourselves by
the power not to be, we speak and comprehend as other ttian we
IN THE SHADOW OF HEGEL 97
area struggle that extends to death and is history'.'" Death is thus
not far from language: the word in its perpetual disappearance earries
death, emptiness, absence. Infinite eonversation, plural speech, takes
up this speech witli eleath in a fundamental way. Within the giving
and receiving of meaning tliere is an interruption that escapes all mea-
sure, an interruption that, relative to the issue of mastery, robs me of
my power. This interruption, this inhnite separator, is precisely what
I cannot get beyond, is not itself a beyond, and thus consliiutes the
1 elating of one to anotber, a relating as an involvement witb alterit\'."
Blanchot tbns reproduces the Levinasian dehnition of experience as
contact with alterity. Levinas deseribes this inhnite separator with respect
to language in die distinction between the Saying, as the element of
transeendence that cannot be represented in language, and the Said,
as discourse given over to idenrity. For Levnnas, too, language infinitely
defers from itself; it is excessive to the point that it eannoi coincide
with itself Communieation that involves alterity is, accordingly, no
longer under the reign of self-identical and self-sufficient being and its
truth. The dialogue with transcendence is a dialogue in which ""the
word in its very spontaneity is exposed to the response."'-
But unlike Levinas, Blanchot refuses the concept entirely and gives
the relating to alterity a very distinct character. In language io inhnity,
language ellaces every detenninate meaning, it is "always undone from
the outside"; language lo infinity is die impossibility of meaning.'''
Writing, inhnite entertainment, begins with the gaze of Orpheus, the
gaze that returns the recovciy from death baek to deatli. Euiydiee,
the object of tlie gaze, cannot be restored to the light of being.''^
Tf we turn back to consider again Gadamcr's notion of infinite dia-
logue primarily in light of Blanchot's position, we ean see tliat, in con-
trast to Blanehot, (iadamer does not want to give up on philosophy
and the work of recognition; be does not want to let being and its
death be consumed by die act of dying; be eannol let (he thought of
the outside destroy tlie movement of time with its peeuhar eoncealing
and unconcealing, not because he is too Hegelian, but because he is
too Socratic. Gadamer's infinite dialogue remains an activity oi' the
logos, but in a way that dialectic does not see, an activity that can-
not escape the weakness of the logo.s. The character of this weakness
is deeisive. In the Seventh LcUet\ Plato describes the weakness of the
logos in terms of its inability to grasp the thing itself This inability,
though, does not stem from a condition in wbich the thing itself stands
outside language, as if there is the thing and then its representation
98 JAMES RISSER
in language. If such were the case, the weakness of the logos would
be the weakness of proper adequation. Such weaktiess is the one ihat
Nietzsche saw (and in some way is rcfleeted in Blanehot's project), and
with respeet to it, he eould say that all language is dissimulationa
form of interruption. For Plato the thing itself is simply not sayable
in language like otber ^aftj^ara. Gadamer inteiprets Plato to be say-
ing that the meaning of being cannot free itself from tbe multiplieity
in the logos. "Whal is" eannot separate itself from tlie determinate
aspects ill which it is seen.''
To ineoqjorate this insight into the framework of the aiinouJiced
radical finitude that Gadamer insists defines his project, we wonld want
to say that the very sayability of the thing itself is decomposed in lan-
guage by being given over to presupposition. We ean translate this
notion into the idea of infinite dialogue. Infinite dialogue is a dialogue
of tradition, but not ti"adition as a stoekpile of past events that arc
retrieved; rather, it is tradition as the work of finitude and its impos-
sible presence: the sayability of things under the aspect of presuppo-
sition. All our eflorts at communicating stand within presuppositions
operating on the opening of communicadon. Infinite dialogue, as the
dialogue that does not and ean not speak absolutely, tliat is lo say,
always from within language that has already begun, is always and
only passing along, handing over {uber-lufemng) the very sayability of
things, exposing thereby tlie limits of language widiout giving up the
work of recognidon.
But iu sa)ang this we have not yet touched upon the essential ele-
ment of tlic Gadamerian infinite dialogtie. Let us recall that ibi" Gadamer
langLiage does not reside in the production of statements from a stock-
pile of words, but exists in a condition of movement. The eharaeter
of this movement, as we have seen, cannot be understood dialectically.
Let us also recall here that Kierkegaard, in his attempt to grasp the
peculiar movement of temporal becoming, also refused to understand
tliis movement dialectically, insisting that it cannot be understood dialee-
tieally. Kierkegaard ealied this movement of life, wbich is the sphere
of real freedom, repetition. If we now consider die movement of lan-
guage that takes place in infinite dialogue, as analogous lo temporal
becoming, then we will wanl to describe that movement in similar
Kierkegaardian fashion. Accordingly, in language's self-preseniatiou
Uiere is a repetition of tradition; that is to say, a retrieving of lan-
guage from within its finitude. A retrieving in which the power of the
possible breaks open: language retrieving itself in its infinite otherness.
IN THE BI-IADOW OK HEGEL 99
But let US also note that this retrieval, wliich is actualized iu the Finite
event of tiic movement, does not separate the present moment from
its history.'"' In ihe finite event of the momeni then, there is a pre-
sentauon of time that, by virtue of finitude, is not a progression of
time. Such presentation of time can oniy be regarded as a spacing of
time; that is to say, an event of the difTerence o/timethe difference
that finitude makes. Infinite dialogue is a dialogue in whieh language
earries time. This means that in infinite dialogue, where one must
begin without beginning, there is not only the commencing of the
word, but in relation to infinity, there is always the word fbr whieh
it is nol vd time.
NOTES
1. This rchilion ni" Giidamer to Hcgcl has been taken up rlscwhpfe. See Merold
Wesiphal, "'Hegel and Giidamtr," in Henneneiilks and Modem Pkilosophy, cd. Brice
Wachtcrhimser (Aibany: SUNY Press, 1986), 65-86; FrancisJ. Ambrosio, "(Jadamer:
On Making OiieselT at Home wilh Hegel," Owl of Minerva 19, no. 1 (ftill 1987):
23-4(1; Rod CoUman. The Language of^Hermeneutics [iSlhany. SUNY Press, 1998),
95-115.
2. Haiis-Georg Ciadanier, Wahrheil und Metlwde._ \'(.>1. 1 ol' (esamnwlti- VVcrlw (TLihingcii:
Mohr/Siebeck, 1990), 177; translated under the lillc Truth and Mellind by Joci
AVfiiisbdmo- liiid Donald Mar.shall {New York: Crossroads PiihlisUing, 1989), 173.
Hereafter <:iung Englisli iranslalion, 'TM.
3. (ladamer, "Zwiscben Pbaiiomenologic und DialcklikVersucli oiiior Sfl IJS I kritik,"
vol. 2 of Gesaninielk Werke (Tubingen: Mohr/Siolicck, 1986), 8. A translation of this
essay appears as part of "RcHcction.'i on My Philo.sopbical Journey" in The Philosophy
of Han\-Gcorg Gadamer, Library of Living Pbilosopbcrs, ed. Lewis Hahn (C^bicago:
Open Court, 1997). See p. 44.
4. CSadanicr iiolcs Lbi.s difference frcquenily when be discusses his position relative to
Hegel. In the Preface to the Second Edition oT TnitJi and Method, Gadamer says ibat
one Kbould not draw any metapby.sica! conclusions from the notions of play and
language, as he employs tbcm. He then adds: "Nevertheless, tbe tradition of nieta-
pbysies and especially of its last great creation, Hegel's speculative dialectic, remains
close to us. The task, tbe 'infinite relation', remains. But my way of demonstrating
it seeks to free itself from the embrace ofthe syntbetic power of tbe Hegelian dialec-
tic, even froin the 'logic' wbieb developed frnm lhe dialectic of Plato, and to take
its stand in Lbe movement of dialogue, in wbich word anci idea first become wbat
they are" {TM. xxxvi-xxxvii). Similarly, Gadamer explains in Reason in Ihe Age of
Science that the statcmeni 'dialectic bas to be retrieved in bermeneutics" may IKH be
reversed, "at least not if with Hegel one utidersrands under dialectic the unfolded
form of philosopbical demonstration and not simply tbe speculative element, wbich
of course bestows upon all tbe ultimate basic propositions of philosophy from tbe
days of Hcraclitus onward, their tension-filled character" {Reason in lhe Age of Science,
trans. Frederick Lawrence [Cambridge: Tbe MIT Press, 1981]), 59. To say tbe least,
tben, dialogue, unlike dialectic, does not consist of an unfolding, though Gadamer
does want to give up the "speculative element." Gadamer al.so notes his difference
from Hegel along these lines in "Tbe Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth
100 JAMES RISSER
Century." Here Gadamer refers to Hegel along with Kant and the Greeks as thf
tliree great partners of "the language ofthe dialogue." With respect to Hegel, hf
first points out his reservation concerning Hegel's "speculative-dialecucal transcen-
dence ofthe Kantian concept of finiludc" and then adds: "This concept of spirit
that transcends the subjectivity of the ego has its true counterpart in the plie-
nomenon of language, which is coming increasingly to die center of contemporary
philo.sophy. The reiwon is that, in contrast to die concept of spirit thai Hegel drew
from die Chnstian tradition, the phenomenon of language has the meril of heing
appropriate to our finitude. It is infinite, as is spirit, and yet linite, as ia every
event" [Philosuphiml Hi^nmeutki. trans. Da\'id Linge |Berkcley: Univer.siiy ol'Galiforjiia
Press, 1976]), 128.
5. See also Gadamer, "Man and Language," in Philosophical Hinmeneidics, 64.
6. The distinction I am trying to make here is similar to the one Thomas Sheehan
makes in his analysis of 74 of Being and Time. The way in which an entity ''lives
from" its essence can be understood in one of tlnt-e ways: \] perfecdon already
attained (God); 2) currently imperfect, but on the way to a future pcrlection (e.g.,
a table under construction); and li) pcrfeet in its imperfectioji (hnniaii being). In
this third way, Dasein is "ever rettirnitig" to itself-qua-lacking in-beiiig, hut with
no prospect of ever overeoming that lack. It is "a movement that, in its veiy
ineompleteness, is characterized by "pcrlecdve a.spect'." The lack of perfected under-
standing in infinite dialogue wiU Jieed tu be read along the lines of this tliird way.
See Thomas Sheehan and Corinne Painter, "Choosing One's Fate: A Rc-Rcading
of &Hi und ^eil 74," Research in Phenoimnohigy 29 (1999): 71.
7. "VVhai seems to be the diedc-like begiiniiiig ofthe inicipretation is in reality already
an answer, and like eveiy answer the .sense of an iiiterprtnation has been deter-
mined through the question ihal is posed. The thalectic of quesdon and answer is
already prefigured in the dialectic: of interpretation. It is this that causes under-
standing to be an event" (7^/, 476).
H. See Gadamer, "Sprache und Versleliai." in Gesammelk Werke, 2:196.
9. Gadamer, "Grenzen der Sprathe." in vol. 8 of Gesammelk Werke iTiibingrn:
Mohr/Sieheek, !993), 361.
l(.). For Gadamer, our awareness of ihis blindness is preci.sf'Iy what lie means when
he characterizes experience in general, which is the essential structure of iiermeneu-
tic experienee, as the experience of finitude: "The truly experienced person is
one . . . who knows that he is master of neither time nor the future" (T'l-/, 357).
11. Hegel, Science of Lugk\ trans. A. V. Miller ['New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
129.
12. See Ciadamer, "ReHecUons on My Philosophical Jonrney." 37; and Rixmiii ui llie
Age of Science. 40 and 59-60. Gadamer also mcMitions this idea in his essay,
"Hermeneudcs and I^igocentrism," in Dialogue ci?i/l Decomlnjclion. ed. Diane A'lichelfelder
and Richard Palmer (Albany: SUN\' Press.. 1989"!, 123-24.
13. See Jtjhn D. Caputo, More Radical He.mie>milin- (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2000), ehapter 2.
14. I have elsewhere critiqued this idea ol' Caputo's, which he jirst fumiulated in Itis
book Radical Henneneviics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), by mak-
ing the case that for Gadamer, following Kierkegaard and Heidegger, possihilit>'
sUinds higher than actuality. See my Herineneulics and the Voice of Ihe Other (Alhany:
SUNY Pre.ss. 1997),
15. "Unlblding'" ceiiainly suggests a nodon of understanding belicr. In 'hiUii tiiid Miilii'd
Gadamer is quite explicit about ihis dilfeience in henneneutic understanding:
"L'ndcrstanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in ihe sense of supe-
rior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of funda-
mental superiority of conscious over unconscious produetion. It is enough lo say
IN THE SHADOW OF HEGEL 101
tbat we understand in a different way, if we understand ai all" (7iV/, 296-97). See also
Cjadamer, "Letter to DaUmayr," in Dialogue and Decomtruction, 96.
16. "ReHections oti My PbiJosophical Journey," :i5-36.
17. "Tn fact, our fundamental experience of behigs subject to time is tbat all things
escape us, that all tlie events of our lives fade more and more, so tbat ai best
tbey glow witb au almost unreal shimmer in the most distant recollection" {Relevance
of the Beautiful and Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 114.
18. Gadamer states tliis affinity through questions: "Was Hegel's intention not Uie same
as tbat in Heidegger's turn: away from tbe transcendental principle of tlie self?
Was il TKit Hegel's intention, iilso, to surpass die orientation to self-eonsciousness
and the subject-object schema of a philosophy of consciousness?" But then adds,
"Or are ihere still diflerenccs dial remain? Do not my orientation to the univer-
sality of language and my insistence on die lingui.stieahty of our access to tbe world,
both of wbich I .share with Heidegger, really coiistilute a step beyond Hegel, or
are they a step bat k behind Hegel?'' ("RcHcctiniis on My Philosophical Journey, '
37).
19. 'Refiections on My Pliilosopbical Journey." 'M.
20. Reason in the Age of Science. 60.
21. In liis explanafion of the fact that our ability to understand goes beyond any state-
ment we can make, and tbis fact implies a criiique of language, Cadamer wriies:
"For all critique that arises from the schematism of our statements in order to
understand finds its expression in tbe form of language. Hence language always
forestalls any objection to its jurisdiction. Its universality keeps pace witb the uni-
versality' of reason" {TM, 401).
22. See Fhihsophical Heimeneutics, 67.
23. Language, in effeet, is living language. In Tmth and Method Cadamer writes: "I
woukl say that tbe misunderstanding in the question of the linguislicahiy of our
understanding is really one about languagei.e., seeing language as a stock of
words, and phrases, of concepts, viewpoints and opinions. In fact, language is the
single word, whose vinutility opens for us the infinity of diseourse, of speaking with
one another. , . . Language is not elaborated conventionalism, nor the burden of
pre-schematization wilb which it loads us, but tbe generative and creative power
to nnceasingiy makes tbis whole once again fiuent" [TM, 549).
24. In an interview Gadamer says, in relation to the concept of experience as ii is
presented in Truth and Method: "[T]" our cxpeiicTice we bring nothing to a close . . .
and the human sciences have ibeir special significance on the basis of tbis uncon-
clndabiJity [unak^chliessbarkeit] of all experience. fFhe result of wbich i.s lliatj we
come upon [new] insights. And that always means that we reluni from ibc blind-
nesses [Verhkndungen] t hat hel d us capt i ve. " (Ha/i.^-Gefirg ('adanin im (ie.Kpritch. r d.
Carsten Dutt [Heidelberg: Uni\'ersitatsverlag C. Winter. 1993]). 32.
25. We should recall here that in Being nnd 'Time the issue of Dasein's happening in a
historical way {Geschehen) develops from the idea of beginning. The question of
Dasein's totaliiy cannot be fully answered through a consideration 'i'[ Dasein as
behig-toward-ibe-end alone. With re.spect lo Dasein's totality there is the oihcr
"end," viz., beginning, that also has to be taken into consideration. Thus tbe issue
of Dasein's connectedness of life, of ils stretching akitig between birth ajid death
is raised. Heidegger identities this movcmcni in whicb Dasein "'is stretched along
and stretches itself along" as (iiwchehen. For Gadamer. finitude cannot be tbinigbi
apart from this Ge.'<chi'-hi'ii.
26. The misreading of Gadamer tin Lbis point, \iz., that in dialogue tbe speech of the
Olher appears, is widespread. Sec for example lerr^' Eagleton, Literacy 'llieoiy
(Minncajioiis: l.^niversily of Minnesota Press, I98!i). and Mark '! aylor, Tfim (Albany:
102 JAMES RISSER
SUNY Press, 1990). This misreading is also present ui j ohn Caputo's earlier book
Radical Hemieneulics but has been corrected somewhat in his more recent More Radical
Henneneutics. But Gadamer himself eould not be elearer on this point. In Tnith and
Method, Gadamer writes: "Conversation is a proce.ss of coming to an understand-
ing. Thus il belongs to eveiy true eonversation dial eaeh person opens himself to
the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes liimseif into Ihe
other to such an extent that he understands not die pardcular individual liut wliai
he .says" {TM, 38.3). And a few pages laler in relation to the idea of iranslalion,
Gadamer writes: "Reaching an understanding in eonversation presupposes that
hodi partners arc ready for it and trying to recognize the full value of what is
alien and opposed to them" {TM. 387).
27. Maurice Blanehot, Tlie Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis:
Universily of Minne.sota Press, 1993), 15.
2%. Blanchot, llie Step .Not Beyond, trans. Lycette Nelson (/Mhany: SUNY Press, 1992),
55.
29. See Infmite Qinvermtinn, 35.
.'^0. Set- Blanchot, The Space- oJ Literalure., irans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1989). 252.
31. "The Other speaks to me and is only tiiis exigeney of speech. And when the Other
speaks to me, speech is the relation of that which remains radically separate, die
relation of the third kind aflirming a relation without UJtity, without ec|ua!ily, . . .
When Antrm speaks to me he does not speak to me as a self Wlien I caU upon
dif Other, I respond to what speaks to me from no site, and thus am separated
from him by a caesura such that he forms with me neither a duality nor a unit)'.
It is this [issurediis relation with the otherthai we ventm-ed to characterize as
an interruption of being. And now we will add: between man and man there is
an interval that would be neither of heing nor non-being, an interval borne by
the Difference of speecha difference preceding eveiytliing that is different and
everything unique" {Jr^inite Conversation, 69).
32. Emmanuel Levinas, "Dialogtie: Sell-Consciousness and the Proximity of die Neighbor,''
in Of Cod Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettino Bergo (Stanford: Stanfoi^d Univei'sity
Press, 199B), !48. Although Le\'inas uses the term "'dialogue" here, ihe term should
he put in quotation marks since dialogue as ihis is normally understood presup-
poses a "we" and reduces the problem of eominunieation to the problem ihat
truth be told. For Levinas the word "exposed to the response" stands in opposi-
tion to dialogue. See Olhemiise. 'Tlian Beini^ or heyond Es.'nce, irans. Alphon.>;o Lingis
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), 119-20.
33. Because of Blanchor's acknowledged closeness to Levijias, ihe difference between
their positions is frecjuently discussed in the secondary literature. See especially,
Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Conteniporan' (New York: Routledge, 1997), and Gerald
Bruns, Maurice Blanchot: Tlie Refusal of Philosophy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997).
34. See Blanchot, Tlie Gaze qfOrphem, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill Press,
1981).
35. See Gadamer, "Dialectic and Sopliisin in Plalo's .Seventh /.etter," in Dialogue anil
Dialeetie: Eight Henneneutica! Studie.^ on FInto. irans. P. C'hristopher Smilh (New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1980).
3G. Gadamer describes the .strueture of tliis relation in inteijiretation as the applica-
tion. Understanding i.s in the interpretadon, and the inteqiretadon, in tum, is in
applicalion. See TM. 3l.l7ff.