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The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 19701978
Martijn Rasser
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Lorton, Virginia, USA
Version of record first published: 23 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Martijn Rasser (2005): The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 19701978, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 28:6, 481-492
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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:481492, 2005
Copyright Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100591008953
The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism,
19701978
MARTIJN RASSER
Lorton, Virginia, USA
The Netherlands experienced a spate of terrorist attacks by Moluccan nationalists in
the 1970s. Lessons learned during this time should be re-examined as elements of
the Dutch response are very relevant to current counterterrorism efforts. The so-
called Dutch Approach is notable for its pragmatic and flexible nature and pro-
vided policymakers sufficient room for maneuver in responding to individual terrorist
acts within the context of the greater conflict. Further deserving of renewed appre-
ciation are the Dutch governments efforts to address and bridge the chasms within
Dutch society by working hand-in-hand with Moluccan community leaders.
Dutch society suffered its first instances of international terrorism during the 1970s.
1
Moluccan nationalist radicals launched a series of terrorist hostage-taking attacks to draw
attention to their quest to establish an independent Moluccan state. The Dutch govern-
ment did not have a counterterrorist strategy prior to then and a 1970 hostage-taking
caught the government by surprise. Dutch government officials began work on a counterterrorist
strategy only after the 1972 Munich Olympics hostage-taking crisis but were still caught
unprepared by major terrorist acts in 1975. By 1976 senior Ministry of Justice and
police officials laid out a policy known as The Dutch Approach. The policy empha-
sized not giving in to substantial terrorist demands and focused on prolonged negotia-
tions conducted under the supervision of psychologists, both to buy time and wear out
the hostage-takers. The use of force to end a crisis was authorized once the danger to
the hostages was deemed too great.
Lessons learned in the 1970s should be re-examined. Despite the very different
threat posed by contemporary Islamic terrorism, elements of the Dutch Approach are
very relevant to current counterterrorism efforts. The importance and urgency for doing
so is evident. The November 2004 murder of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh
by the Islamist extremist Hofstad Group may, like the 1975 hostage-taking, prove to be
another turning point in Dutch counterterrorism policy.
This article consists of five parts. It will first provide a brief background of Dutch
colonial history in the territory of modern-day Indonesia and the origins of the Moluccan
Received 30 November 2004; accepted 6 December 2004.
Address correspondence to Martijn Rasser, 7847 Seafarer Way, Lorton, VA 22079, USA. E-
mail: mr268@georgetown.edu
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community in the Netherlands. It then reviews the factors leading to the radicalization
elements of the Netherlands Moluccan population. Third, it reviews the four major
terrorist attacks in the Netherlands by Moluccan terrorists in 1970, 1975, 1977, and
1978 and analyze the Dutch governments response to each crisis. Fourth, it analyzes
the overall evolution of Dutch counterterrorism policy during the 1970s. The article
concludes with an examination of the Dutch Approachs strengths and weaknesses and
its implications for counterterrorist policy today.
Background
2
The Moluccas, also known as the Spice Islands, comprise an island group in the eastern
Indonesian archipelago. Traders with the Dutch East India Company first settled there in
the early seventeenth century to establish a foothold in this valuable spice-growing re-
gion. Many Moluccans converted to Calvinism during Dutch rule and were generally
considered the most loyal colonial subjects in the Dutch East Indies. Christian Moluccans,
especially those from the island of Ambon, constituted the vast majority of native sol-
diers in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), established in 1830 to solidify
Dutch rule. Javanese nationalists resented Moluccans preferential treatment and consid-
ered them collaborators and the dogs of the Dutch.
3
The Dutch colonized the entire Indonesian archipelago over the course of the next
300 years. The Netherlands lost control of its vast colony when allied forces surrendered
to Imperial Japan on 8 March 1942. Whereas Indonesian nationalists largely cooperated
with the Japanese occupiers, Moluccans remained loyal to the Dutch crown and were
persecuted by the Japanese and Indonesian nationalists alike. Upon Japans surrender in
1945, Indonesian nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared an inde-
pendent Indonesian republic.
The Dutch government launched a war against Indonesian nationalists in late 1945
to regain control of the territory. The KNIL led the fight against the predominantly
Muslim opponents. Although the KNIL achieved significant military victories there was
little support for re-colonization in the war-ravaged Netherlands or abroad. Dutch political
and military leaders ultimately caved in to domestic and international pressure, espe-
cially from the United States, and formally recognized Indonesian independence on 27
December 1949.
Initially the Republic of Indonesia comprised a loose federation of the main islands
of Java, Sumatra, Celebes, and Borneo, and numerous smaller island groups. Within a few
months, however, most regional governments voluntarily dissolved and ceded authority to
Sukarnos central government in Java. Moluccan politicians resisted this trend, fearing
Javanese retribution for Moluccanss close ties with Dutch colonial authorities and a
suppression of their political voice by the Indonesian Muslim majority. Under pressure
from local constituents, Moluccass political leadership declared an independent Republik
Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Moluccas or RMS) on 15 August 1950.
Indonesian forces ultimately overwhelmed RMS fighters and exerted the central
governments control over the islands, although RMS holdouts waged a guerilla war for
13 more years. The fledgling republic never received the international support for which
it hoped. The United Nations became embroiled in the Korean War and the international
community absorbed itself in other Cold War matters. A lack of Dutch support for the
Moluccan cause was a significant source of resentment. Many Moluccans felt the Nether-
lands owed them support for a Republic of South Moluccas after centuries of colonial
allegiance.
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Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 19701978 483
To complicate matters, the Dutch government was obliged to demobilize 13,000
KNIL troops still remaining on Indonesias main island of Java in mid-1950. Nine thou-
sand Dutch troops were repatriated. Four thousand Moluccan soldiers remained. Indonesias
government refused to allow their demobilization on Indonesian soil or in neighboring
Dutch New Guinea for fear they would join RMS forces. The Dutch government had no
choice but to bring the Moluccan soldiers and their families (12,500 people in total) to
the Netherlands. All soldiers were demobilized upon arrival and interned with their families
in Nazi-era camps.
Radicalization within the Moluccan Population
The Moluccan population initially lived in encampments and later in specially constructed
suburbs and remained largely isolated from Dutch society well into the 1950s. Their
stay in the Netherlands was only supposed to be temporary and neither the government
nor the Moluccans initially made much effort toward integration. The political situation
in Indonesia, however, prevented their return. Indonesian troops defeated remnant RMS
forces in 1963 by capturing Soumokil, their leader. The government in Jakarta, now
headed by Suharto, ordered Soumokils execution in 1966 to the outrage of Moluccan
expatriates in the Netherlands. J. Mansuma, a well-regarded figure in the Dutch Moluccan
community, assumed the title of RMS president-in-exile and vowed to continue the fight.
Adding fuel to the fire, the Dutch government declined to condemn the Indonesian
government for the execution or their subsequent brutal repression of the Moluccan
islanders.
4
Second and third generation Moluccans in particular called for more direct
and radical activity.
5
According to Frieda Tomasoa, leader of the Free South Moluccan Youth, We Moluccans
felt completely let down [by the government] . . . we felt humiliated. With any injustice,
no matter where in the world, the Netherlands was always one of the first to voice its
objections. But with our people, that stood alongside the Dutch for over 300 years, the
government acted like an ostrich. . . . In the beginning we held proper demonstrations.
We offered petitions, one after the other. But there was absolutely no reaction.
6
A growing number of second-generation Moluccan youths became convinced that
only a show of force would bring attention to their cause. They were inspired by the
perceived successes of Che Guevara, the Black Panthers, and Yasser Arafat.
7
They soon
followed their words with deeds.
Occupation of the Indonesian Ambassadorial Residence1970
On 31 August 1970, 33 armed Moluccan extremists forcibly entered and occupied the
residence of the Indonesian ambassador to the Netherlands in The Hague suburb of
Wassenaar to protest the planned visit of Indonesian president Suharto. A Dutch police
officer was killed during the raid and the group took 35 hostages. The Indonesian ambas-
sador managed to escape. RMS president-in-exile J. Manusama, under strong pressure
from Dutch authorities, negotiated with the terrorists and convinced them to surrender.
8
The Dutch Moluccan community, notwithstanding, sympathized with and generally
supported the actions.
9
Manusama declared:
I, as the president, totally support the actions. What has happened in Wassenaar
is a political statement, an act of patriotism. The occupiers are heroes,
not murderers. For twenty years the Netherlands ignored us and supported
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Indonesia. Officer Molenaar [the officer killed] is the victim of that. In the
whole world our case has attracted attention. The youngsters achieved that.
10
Official Reaction
Dutch officials were caught off-guard by this action despite growing anti-Indonesian
sentiments and an arson attempt at the Indonesian embassy in The Hague in 1966 shortly
after the Soumokil execution. No planning for crisis management and specific protocols
existed. It was not clear what agencies bore responsibility to resolve the crisis and what
the chain of command was. Ultimately the mayor of The Hague assumed operational
control while the Prime Minister coordinated negotiations with the hostages.
11
Although
largely unprepared to deal with terrorist hostage-taking, Dutch leaders nevertheless stood
their ground and did not give in to terrorist demands to arrange a meeting between
Suharto and Manusama to discuss the Moluccan question.
12
The satisfactory outcome of
the terrorist attack was largely due to the inexperience of the terrorists and the improvi-
sational abilities of the mayor and police forces.
13
The government also handled the aftermath poorly. The hostage-takers only received
yearlong jail terms. This hardly sent a message of resolve on the part of Dutch authori-
ties. Furthermore, government officials considered the occupation a one-off incident and
did not formulate rules to combat future terrorist acts.
14
Instead, reprisal actions were
undertaken.
Devastatingly, the Minister of Justice ordered a major raid on Moluccan Camp Ijsseloord
near the village of Capelle in October 1970 as a show of force and to arrest suspected
extremists. One thousand soldiers and special police forces backed with helicopters and
tanks entered the camp, hermetically sealed it and patrolled in armored vehicles. Two
men suspected of helping to organize and plan the occupation of the ambassadors resi-
dence were arrested.
15
Although the government achieved its stated goals justifying the
raid, the extreme military action was ill conceived. The move only served to further
alienate the Moluccan population.
The governments failure to mount an effective response to the 1970 action emboldened
extremist elements in the Moluccan community to execute more audacious attacks. In
April 1974, arsonists targeted an Indonesian Airways office and the Indonesian Consul-
General was nearly kidnapped in Amsterdam. Moluccan protesters inflicted substantial
damage to the Peace Palace in The Hague in December 1974 following an RMS rally.
16
Only four months later Dutch police narrowly foiled a plot hatched by Moluccan
youths to kidnap Queen Juliana after discovering a weapons cache in the trunk of their
car during a routine traffic stop.
17
Fifteen Moluccans were subsequently arrested in con-
nection with the plot. Importantly, Moluccan terrorists signaled a shift in attention from
Indonesian targets to directing political violence toward the Dutch state.
18
Trainjacking Near Wijster and Occupation
of Indonesian Consulate-General1975
On 2 December 1975, 7 armed Moluccan terrorists hijacked a train near the village of
Wijster, taking 75 hostages. The terrorists shot and killed the trains engineer when he
resisted and two hostages were executed in plain sight. Their primary demands included
a United Nations debate on creating an independent RMS and arranging a meeting be-
tween the Indonesian government and the Moluccan government-in-exile.
19
Subsequent
intensive negotiations were undertaken by the Dutch government, where they gave no
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ground, via Moluccan intermediaries (including President Manusama and Soumokils
widow); the terrorists surrendered after 12 days.
20
Another 7 armed Moluccans occupied the Indonesian Consulate-General in Amsterdam
on 4 December 1975 taking 41 hostages. One hostage died after jumping out a window.
The crisis came to a negotiated end without further incident 16 days later.
21
Official Response
Dutch authorities were again woefully under-prepared to deal with the crisis. Despite the
previous actions by Moluccan extremists and growing tensions in the Moluccan commu-
nity the Dutch government failed to protect Indonesian facilities in the Netherlands and
only managed to loosely outline counterterrorist policy and actions. The trainjacking and
infiltration of the Indonesian consulate took the government by complete surprise.
Low-level police officers, with no negotiating experience, initially maintained con-
tact with the terrorists. When a terrorist ultimatum passed without response, terrorists
executed a hostage. Soon thereafter, authorities finally succeeded in establishing a local
policy center and a crisis management center in The Hague and scrambled to formulate
a strategy to deal with the crisis. Two days later the terrorists executed a second hostage
out of frustration with the stalling and delaying tactics of government officials.
22
Not
only did vacillation by government officials likely cost two people their lives, the inept
response likely convinced the other group of Moluccan extremists of the need for the
occupation and hostage-taking in the consulate to ensure their comrades demands would
be met.
Terrorism was classed as a crime and fell into the portfolio of the Minister of Jus-
tice. The minister assumed overall command of any counterterrorist and crisis manage-
ment efforts, although the Prime Minister had final authority. Decision making was thus
centralized at the highest levels of government.
23
This was important for two reasons.
First, the lack of strategy, planning, and preparation was glaringly obvious to key deci-
sion makers at the outset. Second, the close involvement of these leaders ensured that
important judgments could be relayed to the crisis management center without delay.
Prime Minister den Uyl overruled Justice Minister van Agt, who advocated swift
use of force after the execution of two hostages.
24
Den Uyl viewed a military solution as
a last resort because the group in the consulate had access to radio and television. Any
attempt to end the hostage-takings would require simultaneous operations, greatly rais-
ing the stakes and level of risk involved, because a raid on the train could not be kept
secret.
Dutch officials ultimately pursued a strategy of long-term, intensive negotiations
with the terrorists, later termed the Dutch Approach. The goal was to exhaust them
and bring the crises to a peaceful resolution. D. Mulder, a psychiatrist, conducted the
negotiations with the terrorists occupying the consulate. He treated the terrorists as ratio-
nal human beings, accorded them respect and conceded they were in charge of the
situation.
25
At the same time, he refused to accede to their demand that they meet with
the Indonesian ambassador.
Both hostage-takings ultimately concluded without further bloodshed. The Dutch
Approach received a lot of attention and much of the credit for the positive outcome.
Government officials, in a self-congratulatory mood, unfortunately paid little attention to
the bungling and missteps in the initial days of the hostage crisis and exaggerated the
overall effectiveness of their efforts. A major drawback of the Dutch Approach gov-
ernment leaders did identify was the significant amount of time and resources necessary
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to execute it properly. Subsequent government reviews emphasized this be factored into
consideration when dealing with potential future terrorist hostage-taking acts. Dutch of-
ficials also acknowledged that the threatened use of force significantly contributed to the
decision of the train hijackers to ultimately surrender.
26
Trainjacking Near De Punt and Hostage-Taking
at Bovensmilde School1977
On 23 May 1977 9 Moluccan terrorists hijacked another train near De Punt, taking 54
hostages. Four terrorists simultaneously overtook a primary school in a coordinated move,
taking 110 hostages, all but 5 of them children. Government officials negotiated tersely
for three weeks and finally ordered two spectacular raids on 11 June. Marines over-
powered the terrorists in the train as 6 Royal Dutch Air Force F-104s thundered over-
head as a distraction, followed by a hail of bullets from Marines surrounding the train.
Six terrorists and two hostages died in the raid and one terrorist, six hostages, and two
Marines were wounded. A concurrent attack on the school by armored vehicles ended
without injuries. The hijackers received prison terms of 68 years, whereas the occupi-
ers of the school received 79 year sentences.
27
Government officials reacted swiftly and deliberately, applying lessons learned 16
months earlier. Mulder and a team of psychiatrists again held negotiations, attempting to
repeat their earlier successes. Some scholars argue that the psychologists remained too
committed to the strategy pursued in 1975 even as conditions in the current crisis sharply
diverged.
28
The government, however, also took a harder line on this occasion. The govern-
ment categorically refused to meet terrorist demands to release 21 South Moluccan pris-
oners (most of them imprisoned for the 1975 attacks) and provide free passage from
Schiphol airport.
29
Dutch public opinion expressed outrage at the mass hostage-taking of
children and Justice Minister van Agt again advocated force early on.
The psychologists attempted to exhaust the terrorists with aggressive psychological
manipulation but were unable to secure a negotiated surrender. The hijackers on the
train apparently studied the lessons from the last trainjacking as intently as the govern-
ment had. They proved acutely aware of the psychologists tactics and resisted them
handily. The fact they agreed among themselves not to kill any hostages initially gave
them a strong bargaining position as well.
30
Frustrated by their inability to repeat the outcome of 1975 decision makers in the
crisis management and policy centers unanimously authorized the military to end the
standoffs, taking advantage of the high levels of support in Dutch society for hard-line
action.
31
Information gathered by Dutch intelligence services concluding that several Moluccans
received training in Palestinian camps undoubtedly influenced the decision to end the
crises by force.
32
Occupation of Provincial Government Office in Assen1978
The final major terrorist act on Dutch soil by Moluccan terrorists, a self-described sui-
cide commando, was an attack against the Provincial Government Building in Assen,
capital of Drenthe province. The 3 terrorists killed 1 of their 69 hostages during the
standoff. Government officials ordered a Marine unit to storm the building after only 28
hours, wounding 5 hostages. The terrorists received 15-year prison sentences.
33
Justice Minister van Agt ordered the Marine action as soon as it became clear the
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three South Moluccans had no qualms about executing additional hostages. Officials
determined the Dutch Approach of negotiations would not succeed in satisfactorily
ending the standoff.
34
The terrorists had already crossed the red line the government set
to authorize the use of force by shooting a hostage.
The Evolution of Counterterrorist and
Moluccan Policy in the Netherlands
The 1970 occupation of the Indonesian ambassadorial residence was the first politically
motivated hostage situation to take place in the Netherlands. Government officials con-
sidered it a one-off incident and did not seriously consider formulating a counterterrorist
strategy until after the 1972 hostage crisis at the Munich Olympics.
35
Dutch lawmakers,
however, did not pursue special domestic legislation for dealing with terrorism. Dutch
legislators became very concerned about the balance between effective counterterrorism
measures and the need to preserve democratic openness.
36
A letter from the Prime Min-
ister, dated 22 February 1973, specified that the actual fight against acts of terror is a
form of combating crime and as such the task of the police.
37
Furthermore, there was
no special emergency legislation for terrorist incidents.
38
Officials faced the unenviable
task of improvizing their response as a terrorist attack unfolded, as no counterterrorist
policy existed.
The lack of preparation and clear formulation of policy became evident during the
South Moluccan terrorist attacks of 1975. During the negotiations, however, government
officials and negotiators developed the Dutch Approach. By drawing out negotiations,
psychologists aimed to exhaust and confuse the hijackers and hostage-takers. As part of
the strategy to extend negotiating time the terrorists would never deal directly with someone
with decision-making authority.
39
The approach emphasizes the need to make sure the
terrorists feel that they are being taken seriously by the government, but will not give in
to them on any matters of substance.
40
Over time, however, the government became
increasingly willing to employ a military solution to the sieges, emulating tactics devel-
oped by West German and Israeli security forces.
Dutch officials ultimately formulated a clear organizational structure by the late
1970s to prevent and control future terrorist hostage-taking incidents. In 1978 the na-
tional policy for handling terrorist incidents were formulated in the Handbook on Hos-
tage Situations.
41
The structure details the investigative and preventive roles of local and
national police forces, civilians in the judiciary at the local, regional, and national levels,
and special counterterrorist intelligence units. Furthermore, there is a clear understand-
ing of the roles local, regional, and national officials are to play in a future crisis and
identifies important tactical aspects, technical means, and psychological and public rela-
tions aspects necessary to bring the situation to a satisfactory conclusion.
42
A critical under-appreciated element of Dutch counterterrorist policy during the 1970s
is the governments efforts to address the social and economic roots of the problem. As
a first priority, Dutch officials clearly stated throughout the decade the Netherlands would
not support the establishment of an independent Moluccan state, effectively eliminating
the major justification for the Moluccan terrorists acts.
43
In 1978, the Dutch government
officially disavowed support for or recognition of the RMS. Next, the government launched
a series of outreach initiatives to help integrate the Moluccan community into Dutch
society by providing additional educational programs and job skills training. A triad of
government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and Moluccan advocacy groups
cooperated on improving relations and formulating an official national policy for Moluccan
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minority rights in the Netherlands. The government also provided funds for a Moluccan
Historical Museum to educate the Dutch about the troubled history of Moluccans in
Indonesia and the Netherlands.
44
Although tensions among the Moluccan population in the Netherlands flared occa-
sionally after the 1970s the Netherlands experienced no further Moluccan terrorist inci-
dents. By fits and starts Dutch officials developed a comprehensive, pragmatic, and
flexible counterterrorist strategy to address the Moluccan question. This article now turns
to analyzing the implications of this strategy for current counterterrorism efforts.
Dutch Counterterrorist Strategy Today
Scholarly analyses of current Dutch counterterrorist policies unfortunately downplay the
importance of lessons learned during the 1970s.
45
Likewise, the Dutch government to
date has expended little effort to incorporate and adopt lessons of the comprehensive
social and economic integration of Moluccans into Dutch society into their current counter-
terrorism strategy. Although important judicial, legislative, law enforcement, and intelli-
gence reforms have already been instituted and more are under consideration to help
prevent and better respond to terrorist acts, Dutch political leaders would benefit from
reviewing all aspects of Dutch counterterrorist policy of three decades ago. There are
critical gaps in the current approach.
Dutch government officials reacted swiftly to the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001. Within a week the Ministry of Justice established a steering committee tasked
with identifying steps the Dutch government must undertake to prevent terrorist acts.
The resultant 43-point action plan addressed an array of issues from the role of intelli-
gence agencies to biometrics to the interception of telecommunications.
46
Strikingly, the
plan did not define terrorism or address in any way its roots and causes, in sharp con-
trast to the nuanced view the government developed during the 1970s.
This contrast is primarily due to Ministry of Justice officials viewing the current
terrorist threat in very a different light from the Moluccan experience. Al Qaedas ac-
tions represent new terrorism that threatens previously unheard-of potential for vio-
lence, with the goal of inflicting mass casualties, through suicide attacks and the appli-
cation of modern technology. The known networks are international and there is evi-
dence of great ethnic heterogeneity [among them].
47
In other words, the threat is poles
apart from the homegrown, low-casualty, and low-tech terrorism geared to attracting
attention to a specific political/ethnic cause the Dutch endured during the 1970s. Legis-
lative measures the Dutch government undertook over the past few years underscore this
differentiation.
The Dutch government enacted far-reaching new laws in response to 9/11, although
it was not until after the March 2004 Madrid train bombings that the most sweeping
legislations passed. Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner appointed a counterterrorism czar
in April 2004. In June 2004 the First Chamber of the States-General (Dutch Parliament)
approved Donners request to criminalize the act of recruiting for jihad. The Chamber
concurrently proclaimed conspiracy to commit a terrorist act to be a separate offense
punishable by law.
48
Under consideration the summer of 2003 is a proposal by Minister Donner to allow
information gathered by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) to be
admissible as evidence in a court of law.
49
This important measure is a response to the
June 2003 trial of 12 individuals arrested for alleged involvement in recruiting for and
supporting jihad. All 12 were acquitted because the evidence consisted primarily of
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AIVD-supplied information of which the legitimacy and legal validity could not be
verified.
50
Also on the table is a proposal from Interior Affairs Minister Johan Remkes
advocating granting the AIVD wide-ranging authority to conduct analysis on data from
banks, ISPs, telecommunication providers, travel agencies, and government databases,
among others.
51
Much of the ongoing debate in the Netherlands concerning counterterrorism
policies focuses on the curtailment of civil liberties through such dramatic and sweeping
legislation.
52
Discussions of the roots of radicalization and resultant terrorism are largely
sidelined as a result.
In a letter to the Second Chamber of the States-General dated 10 September 2004,
the Ministers of Justice and Domestic Affairs acknowledged that radicalization of indi-
viduals and groups in Dutch society (this includes immigrant and indigenous groups and
is not limited to Islamic extremists)
53
will need to be addressed and curtailed in order to
prevent terrorism, although this should not be placed exclusively, or even primarily in
the realm of fighting terrorism.
54
The lessons from the 1970s suggest otherwise, how-
ever. It was the disenfranchisement of second- and third-generation Moluccans and their
disenchantment with the political process that led certain youngsters to use terrorist tac-
tics to draw attention to their grievances.
Donner and Remkes place more emphasis on managing and reducing conflicts overseas
and providing support to countries that are the primary breeding ground for terror-
ism.
55
One example of such an effort is Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bots pro-
posal for an IndonesianDutch partnership. Bot recently offered Dutch assistance in eco-
nomic development and proposes the expansion of trade; raising education standards in
Indonesia and by offering scholarships for study in the Netherlands; and improving en-
vironmental protection and natural resource conservation.
56
The Dutch government also
allocated 5 million euro for antiterrorism training at Indonesian Police Headquarters.
57
Some of the same sensitivity displayed toward the political/social/economic roots of
Moluccan terrorism during the 1970s is nevertheless evident in government publications
and statements, although concrete actions are few at this point. A June 2003 Ministry of
Justice white paper, for instance, speaks eloquently of the need to address the breeding
ground of terrorism in Dutch society and abroad by promoting social cohesion, and
improving access to education and jobs.
58
No specific actions on how to accomplish this
are offered, however.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, Dutch counterterrorist policy is growing increasingly bold and ag-
gressive, particularly in the wake of the van Gogh murder. The Dutch government rec-
ognizes strong, proactive measures at home and abroad are necessary. It has made great
strides in revising its legal code and revamping its intelligence service to better tackle
the threat faced by radical Islamic terrorism. Initiatives for foreign assistance are admi-
rable and should continue. Leaders in the Netherlands must not forget, however, to heed
the lessons and successes of the comprehensive counterterrorist policies developed dur-
ing the 1970s. Addressing grievances and sources for radicalization within Dutch soci-
ety (particularly in conjunction with civic leaders and NGOs) does not undermine the
tough, determined counterterrorist policies already adopted and should play a significant
role in their efforts to greatly reduce the appeal of, and sympathy for, militancy within
the Netherlands. The disturbing events of recent months in the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and Spain, among others, underscore the need for and importance of a na-
tional dialogue.
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What lessons should other nations draw from Dutch experiences with terrorism and
their methods for dealing with it? The strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch Approach
offer interesting insights for the current Dutch government and other nations grappling
with the contemporary terrorist threat. A cornerstone of the Dutch Approach was the
willingness to negotiate with terrorists to exhaust the perpetrators. No government today
is likely to risk even the semblance of instilling legitimacy or equality on todays Is-
lamic terrorists by opening a dialogue with them. The Dutch themselves recognized by
the late 1970s that the utility of mediation had run its course and that brute force was
required to end the hostage crises. At the same time, however, Dutch officials worked
hand-in-hand with Moluccan community leaders to address and bridge the chasms within
Dutch society believed to lie at the root of the problem.
One of the strengths of the Dutch Approach during the 1970s still relevant today
was its pragmatic and flexible nature. This attribute provided policymakers sufficient
room for maneuver in responding to individual terrorist acts within the context of the
greater conflict. Another important realization was that combating terrorist tactics re-
quires thought and action outside the law enforcement paradigm. Over time Dutch policy-
makers developed a coherent chain-of-command to take control during terrorist crises
and emphasized preventive measures.
Although the terrorist threat posed by groups like Al Qaeda differ markedly from
the actions of disenfranchised Moluccan youngsters, the societal efforts of the Dutch
Approach are still relevant. Given the nature of the contemporary terrorist threat these
insights should be reviewed with renewed appreciation when formulating counterterrorism
policy in the Netherlands and elsewhere.
Notes
1. Terrorism, for the purposes of this article, is defined as: The considered and systematic
useor threatened useof widespread, offensive violence, murder and destruction aimed at gov-
ernmental employees and the general population, as well as public and private property, in order
to force individuals, groups, communities, economic entities and governments to modify or change
their actual or proposed behavior and policies so as to concede to the terrorists political de-
mands.
2. This historical overview is primarily based on the authors translation and summary of:
Henk Smeets, Molukkers in Nederland on the website of the Landelijk Steunpunt Educatie Molukkers
[National Support Point for Moluccan Education]. Accessed at (http://www.lsem.nl/Geschiedenis/
Index.htm). Additional sources are identified within.
3. Bertil Lintner, Ethnic and Political Crisis in Indonesia. Accessed at (http://www.irrawaddy.org/
database/2001/vol9.3/cover.html).
4. Henk Smeets, Molukkers in Nederland on the website of the Landelijk Steunpunt Educatie
Molukkers [National Support Point for Moluccan Education]. Authors translation. Accessed at
(http://www.lsem.nl/Geschiedenis/molukkersinned.htm).
5. Valentine Herman and Rob van der Laan Bouma, Nationalists without a Nation: South
Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands, in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the
State (New York: St. Martins: 1981), p. 127.
6. As quoted in: not attributed, 50 Jaar Molukkers in Nederland, Rotterdams Dagblad,
2001. Authors translation. Accessed at (www.rotterdamsdagblad.nl/molukken/5a.htm).
7. Ben Allen and Aart Loubert, History and Identity: Moluccans in the Netherlands.
Accessed at (http://www.thehaguelegalcapital.nl/lc/publications/articles).
8. Alex P. Schmid, Combating Terrorism in the Netherlands, in Alex P. Schmid and
Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 84
85.
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9. Ben Allen and Aart Loubert, History and Identity: Moluccans in the Netherlands.
Accessed at (http://www.thehaguelegalcapital.nl/lc/publications/articles).
10. As quoted in ibid.
11. Peter Klerks, Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 19701988 (Amsterdam: Ravijn, 1989),
pp. 2930.
12. Herman and van der Laan Bouma, South Moluccan Terrorism, p. 127.
13. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, p. 30.
14. Muller, Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, p. 156.
15. Not attributed, 50 Jaar Molukkers in Nederland, Rotterdams Dagblad, 2001. Transla-
tion conducted by author. Accessed at (www.rotterdamsdagblad.nl/molukken/5a.htm).
16. Herman and van der Laan Bouma, South Moluccan Terrorism, p. 127.
17. Ralph Barker, Not Here, But in Another Place (New York: St. Martins, 1980), p. 64.
18. Herman and van der Laan Bouma, South Moluccan Terrorism, pp. 127128.
19. Ibid., p. 142.
20. Erwin Muller, The Netherlands: Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, in
Marianne van Leeuwen, ed., Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions
and Policies (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 149.
21. Schmid, Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands, p. 85.
22. Uriel Rosenthal and Paul t Hart, Managing Terrorism: South Moluccan Hostage Tak-
ings, in Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul t Hart, eds., Coping with Crises: The
Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1989), p.
370.
23. Schmid, Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands, pp. 8990.
24. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, p. 36.
25. Ralph Barker, Not Here, But in Another Place, p. 132.
26. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, pp. 3334 and Rosenthal and t Hart, The South Moluccan
Hostage Takings, p. 371.
27. Muller, Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, p. 149.
28 Rosenthal and t Hart The South Moluccan Hostage Takings, p. 383.
29. Note that the nationalist focus of the terrorism has radically changed over this period:
terrorism by South Moluccans metamorphosed into terrorism by South Moluccans for other South
Moluccans (Herman and van der Laan Bouma, p. 142)
30. Ibid., p. 373.
31. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, p. 37.
32. See J. A. Emerson Vermaat, Terrorist Sympathizers in The Netherlands, Terrorism
(10) (1987), p. 330.
33. Schmid, Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands, p. 85.
34. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, p. 39.
35. Muller, Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, p. 156.
36. For an in-depth discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of democracies in coping
with terrorism see Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism and Democracy, in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald
D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 1425.
37. As quoted in Schmid, Combating Terrorism, p. 90.
38. Muller, Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, p. 153, as quoted in Schmid,
Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands, p. 90.
39. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding, p. 41.
40. Rosenthal and t Hart, The South Moluccan Hostage Takings, p. 371.
41. Muller, Structuring the Management of Terrorist Incidents, p. 156.
42. Willem Fraker, Organizational Aspects of Hostage-taking Prevention and Control in
the Netherlands, in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Denis Szabo, eds., Hostage-taking (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 105118.
43. Barry Newman, Why the Moluccans No Longer Hijack Trains in Holland, Wall Street
Journal (24 May 1984), p. 1.
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44. Ben Allen and Aart Loubert, History and Identity: Moluccans in the Netherlands.
Accessed at (http://www.thehaguelegalcapital.nl/lc/publications/articles) and Henk Smeets, Molukkers
in Nederland on the website of the Landelijk Steunpunt Educatie Molukkers [National Support
Point for Moluccan Education]. Accessed at (http://www.lsem.nl/Geschiedenis/Index.htm).
45. See, for example, Erik van de Linde, Kevin OBrien, Gustav Lindstrom, Stephan de
Spiegeleire, Mikko Vayrynen, and Han de Vries, Quick Scan of Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Policymaking
and Implementation in Selected European Countries, MR-1590, May 2002 (Leiden: RAND Eu-
rope).
46. Ministry of Justice, Actieplan Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 5 October 2001.
Accessed at (http://www.justitie.nl/pers/persberichten/archief/2001/actieplan.pdf).
47. Ibid., p. 2. Authors translation.
48. Ministry of Justice press release, Senaat stemt in met wet terroristische misdrijven, 22
June 2004. Accessed at (http://www.justitie.nl/pers/persberichten/archief/archief_2004/220604Senaat_
stemt_in_met_wet_terroristische_misdrijven.asp?List=Y&Compone).
49. Janny Groen, Big Brother ligt op de loer sinds 11/9, De Volkskrant, 21 June 2003 and
Rinskje Koelewijn en Tom Kreling, Privacy word in hoog tempo afgebroken, NRC Handelsblad,
14 September 2004.
50. General Intelligence and Security Service Annual Report 2003 (The Hague: AIVD, July
2004), p. 17.
51. Johan Remkes, Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-generaal,
No. 61, 15 July 2004.
52. For example, Toby Sterling, Netherlands Terror Laws Raise Concerns, The Associated
Press, 23 September 2004, and Wil vand der Schans, Terrorisme Plannen Remkes doen Oostbloktijden
Herleven,, Ravage, No. 12 (September 23, 2004). Accessed at (http://www.burojansen.nl/artikelen/
rasterfahndungnl.htm).
53. AIVD reviews radicalization trends in the Netherlands immigrant (e.g., Moroccans, Turks,
Kurds, Chechens) and indigenous populations (e.g., neo-Nazis, Jewish Defence League) in its
2003 annual report. See pp. 2329.
54. Piet Hein Donner and Johan Remkes, Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer
der Staten-generaal, Kenmerk 5306302/504, 10 September 200, p. 5. Authors translation.
55. Ibid., pp. 56.
56. Bernard Bot, The Case for a Strong RI-Dutch Partnership, Jakarta Post, 25 August
2004.
57. Not attributed, Netherlands to Extend Aid for Anti-terrorism Training, Antara/Indone-
sian National News Agency, 28 August 2004.
58. Ministry of Justice, Terrorisme en de bescherming van de samenleving, June 2003. Accessed
at (http://www.justitie.nl/Images/terrorisme_tcm7439620.pdf).
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