December 29, 2010

The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
1

North Waziristan: The Death Trap
Stirring the hornets nest may lead to more instability and insecurity in Pakistan

INTRODUCTION
On December 16
th
, 2010, President Obamas White House released an abridged summary of its
Review of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Expected to report sufficient progress to
allow the US to begin a modest pullout of troops in July 2011, the review - based on a series of
Pentagon benchmarks and assessments - is at odds with a separate report by US intelligence
services and clandestine sources that paints a gloomier picture about the war's progress.
Michael Hughes called it a self-fulfilling Afghanistan war assessment devoid of any substantial
feedback from native Afghans and one wholly disconnected from the objective reality of
retrogressing conditions on the ground
1
.
In retrospect, US President Barack Obama confirmed that the review represented a
fundamental rethink of US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat an increasingly
perilous situation. As such, both Pakistan and Afghanistan said they welcomed the new
strategy
2
. To achieve its goals, Mr. Obama said, the US needed a stronger, smarter and more
comprehensive strategy, and to recognize the connection between the future prospects of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially because of the fact that both are shared homes of the
Pukhtun population. Part of this reviewed Af-Pak strategy also entails a drawdown not only of
US military personnel engaged in combat activities in Afghanistan, but also of clandestine
operatives, and bolstering unconventional technologies like drone surveillance and drone
attacks against militants and their safe havens. This is in line with an escalation in drone attacks
in 2010 there have been more drone attacks this year than from 2004 to 2009 all inclusive
that have gone beyond the regular Waziristan areas and now target even Khyber agency. By
December 17
th
, 2010, nearly 60 people had died in a series of rare attacks by US drones in
Pakistan's Khyber region
3
. Due to sensitive security environment in the area, it could not be
confirmed how many militants and how many innocent civilians were killed.

1
White House Afghan review divorced from wars brutal reality
2
US rethinks Afghanistan strategy
3
Scores die as drones renew attack on Pakistan's Khyber

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
2

FATA IN THE AF-PAK CONTEXT
Pakistans autonomous tribal areas have long been regarded as marginally governed swathes of
territory with an intensely religious constituency shackled by a tribal mindset. The truth of the
matter is that Pakistan never sent its military forces or its traditional civilian infrastructure in
these areas out of respect for the local customs and traditions of the fiercely conservative
Pakhtun tribes. These tribals have ethnic and familial linkages that transcend colonial
constructions like the Durand Line, and
their military prowess is known to the
British, the Soviets, and also the Indians,
who were repulsed by FATA tribesmen
from Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the 1948
war a time when the Pakistan Army chief,
Gen. Douglas Gracey, refused to send
British-trained Pakistani troops to fight
British-trained Indian troops occupying
Jammu & Kashmir state. This respect and
autonomy has long been confused as
ridicule and isolation, but this
misunderstanding and confusion is
inevitably borne out of a Westernized
mindset which cannot even understand the
Pakhtun mans affinity to his weapon, and
cannot correlate it to a womans affinity to
her jewelry.
It is not often understood that even in a turbulent agency like Waziristan, where the tribal
confederations are often irate and radicalized, there are several tribes, subtribes, and tribal
leaders of extended families who oppose al-Qaeda and the Taliban insurgency and are willing
to cooperate with the Pakistani government if it can provide them with effective security and
protection
4
.
Afghanistan has had Pakhtun kings for 200 years, and Afghanistan is as much the Pakhtun
homeland as Pakistan is there is no other reason why Pakistan would accommodate upwards

4
Pakistan and the War on Terror by Ashley J. Tellis (2008). Page 43-44.
Figure 1 - Taliban Spillover in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
Courtesy: BBC News Online May 12, 2009

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
3

of 3 million Afghan refugees during the Soviet invasion and there is reason to believe that
additional refugee populations have been created by the effects of the 2001 US intervention in
Afghanistan as well as Pakistans operations in the tribal areas and refugee-inhabited cities,
towns and villages. As a result of the 2001 invasion, and subsequent ethnic reconfiguration in
Afghanistans corridors of power, the Americans know that despite any withdrawal(s) in 2011
and/or 2014, the US will inevitably be involved in any future Afghan civil war, ostensibly to
preserve, protect and defend the minority Uzbek/Tajik Northern Alliance dispensation that is
currently in power.
It is high time that the US stops being construed as a foreign invader meddling in Afghanistans
internal problems and continuing civil war, and acknowledges that it is time to talk peace and
negotiate with the Taliban who control most of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan now
referred to as the Pashtun heartland
5
and are now slowly advancing into the previously
peaceful North and North-West. Just as it is fallacious to lump together all militant factions and
Afghan freedom fighters into a monolithic Taliban, it is also preposterous to believe that
these fighters can be defeated on their home ground, or that their allegiance or linkages to Al
Qaedas ideologically motivated commanders cannot be replaced by the overarching ethos of
national identity and pride in a free and sovereign homeland.
If the US/NATO/ISAF combine and President Karzai do not talk to the Taliban, or to Hekmatyar,
or to the Haqqanis, they will keep on talking to Al
Qaeda and creating nuisances directly for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and indirectly for the United States. Such
a distinction is necessary because as in the aftermath
of the Soviet withdrawal the United States can easily
pack up and leave, while the Afghans and Pakistanis
cant. This is the very reason why Pakistan presented
overtures of peace through equal negotiating terms to
the militants operating in areas like Swat, North
Waziristan and South Waziristan. Those peace deals
were not ceding Pakistans authority as much as they
were validating the opinion that these elements are not
trustworthy and if the need arises will pose a direct
and existential challenge to the Pakistani state itself.

5
Partitioning Afghanistan Is a Terrible Idea
Figure 2 - The Pashtun Ethnic Group
Courtesy: Heritage Foundation

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
4

Maintaining lines of contact with these militants is only a means of gathering intelligence and
deterring such nefarious designs against the Pakistani state it is again preposterous to assume
that the same suicide bombers attacking Pakistani military checkpoints and killing Pakistani
soldiers and civilians are being sanctioned and deployed by Pakistans Army and ISI to Kabul or
to Mumbai to gain some perverted measure of strategic depth. Pakistans Foreign Minister
has affirmed that the concept of strategic depth clarified by General Kiyani as soft strategic
depth only implies a peaceful and sovereign Afghanistan where the rights and duties of all
Afghans are equal, and which is non-aligned and friendly with Pakistan
6
. Foreign Minister
Qureshi was careful to clarify and reiterate that Pakistans interpretation of strategic depth
does not and never did imply the establishment of a puppet government in Kabul. The
United States and her allies which also includes Pakistan should not make the same mistake,
especially because such mistakes have grave spillover effects in Pakistan.

THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN DEBATE A BACKGROUND
Ever since the United States and its NATO/ISAF allies conquered the settled areas of
Afghanistan and set up shop in Kabul, a shortsighted mindset declared victory over the Taliban,
and assumed that the capture or death of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri and the rest of
the Al Qaeda network would follow suit. Yet Mullah Omar claimed that he was going into
hiding, and would resurface later to fight for Afghanistans freedom. Between 2001 and 2006,
Islamic fundamentalism and radical extremism became a hot topic around the world, and
neither Muslim majority nations nor Western countries were safe from Muslim nationals who
could become marginalized, or were encouraged to join fringe elements that struggled against
any manner of oppression according to any definition of us and the other.
Inhabited mainly by the Utmanzai Wazirs and the Dawars, the Northern Waziristan area was a
part of the Mughal Empire during Emperor Aurangzebs reign, and after its demise, they
resisted the Sikh and Khalsa armies from Punjab in order to confirm their allegiance to Kabul
and the Durrani Emperor. In 1849, the British settled in Bannu district, and 45 years later, they
entered North Waziristan as well. What did they do when they came to this tribal region for the
first time? They struck deals and made agreements with the tribes. The British also introduced
a measure of modernity in the tribal areas; land recording systems, revenue administration
systems, and so on. By 1910, North Waziristan became a formal British tribal agency.

6
Pak has no objection to India, Afghanistan ties: Qureshi

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
5

The first insurgency in North Waziristan happened as a result of a Hindu-Muslim marriage
quarrel in Bannu; incensed by the marriage of a Hindu girl to a Muslim male, the tribals rallied
around one Mirza Ali Khan the Faqir of Ipi who declared war against the British, and
conducted offensive guerilla operations against them till they left in 1947. While the Faqir died
in 1960, he continued his opposition to Pakistan in his remaining years; despite the fact that the
tribes had already decided in a Jirga to join Pakistan. It was not until 1954 that peace could be
brought to North Waziristan by the personal surrender of the Faqirs Commander in Chief,
Mehar Dil, to the Deputy Comissioner of Bannu District.
The political administration in North Waziristan is headed by a Political Agent who administers
the region on behalf of the Federal Government (as opposed to the provincial Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa government). The administration is still carried out under redundant Frontier
Crimes Regulations, and Customary Law which is open to interpretation as well as misuse in the
absence of strict institutional controls. The North Waziristan Agency consists of three sub-
divisions and nine Tehsils, administered by political Tehsildars and political Naib-Tehsildars
whose main duty is to control the tribes and maintain law and order within their own areas
in effect, their duties are not to serve the tribes, but to control them. This, along with the
draconian FCR, is one of the most important reasons for tribal disdain against Pakistan
economic and social development can only follow political development, and the former
without the latter will lead to greater inequality and greater isolation of the tribal masses.
Land revenue administration in some parts of the agency continues to be carried on exactly on
the same lines as in the settled districts of Pakistan. Some cases are decided by the tribes
themselves through their elders who are known as Maliks and Motabars. The Maliki system
introduced by British government was the same in North Waziristan Agency as functioning in
other FATA. Maliks used to work as a medium between administration, and the Qaum or tribe.
A Malik is a hereditary title and devolves on the son and his son so on, for which regular
benefits and subsidies are sanctioned from time to time. One of the major reason why Al Qaeda
was able to gain a foothold in this region was that it was successfully able to eliminate all the
Maliks and their families, thereby wresting institutional control from them and vesting it into
self-appointing Amirs and Mujahids who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan.
As such, North Waziristan cannot be simply configured according to certain perceptions of
modern state institutions or Western liberal secular values. North Waziristan and its inhabitants
have their own rich cultural traditions and historical antecedents, and they must be cautiously
and gradually accommodated into a localized political, economic and security solution for the

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
6

agency. It is not uncommon to hear that most tribesmen are armed; such a scenario makes a
standing police force redundant. At the same time, having an irregular tribal militia or Lashkar
perform security duties and police the area is also akin to surrendering the writ of the state if
such bodies are not appropriately formed and administered.

NORTH WAZIRISTAN AND THE EPICENTER OF TERRORISM
THE US WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
When the US and its NATO/ISAF allies realized that the Taliban were not a conventional military
phenomena, they suddenly understood the importance of referring to history (however late)
and figuring out the modus operandi of the Mujahideen during the Soviet war. Utilizing the
complex inter-linkages and connexion among Pakhtuns across the Durand Line, a rear base
was located in the FATA region for these terrorists. To fight the Jihad, the Taliban recruits
simply crossed the Durand Line (i.e. Af-Pak border) into Afghanistan, created havoc in Southern
and South-Eastern Afghanistan (i.e. the Pakhtun heartland), and when US technological
supremacy and modern weaponry got the best of them, they melted away and retreated to
their safe havens in Pakistans tribal area after brief pit-stops and detours through
Afghanistans sprawling
countryside and villages
areas which the US does
not deem necessary to
control, just like the
Soviets. It is the villages
and the tribal areas of
Afghanistan that fall under
NATO/ISAF jurisdiction, yet
are still used by the Taliban
(or their allies in the Afghan
national resistance) as a
staging area for attacks on
foreign troops perceived as
occupation forces.
Figure 3 - The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1989
Courtesy: Wikimedia

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
7

Thankfully, President Obamas strategy for this war greatly unpopular back home in the US
has been multifaceted. A military approach must be balanced by a political, economic and
diplomatic approach as well. Yet, the US Administration continues to support President Karzais
corrupt and inefficient dispensation which is restricted to Kabuls Green Zone precisely because
the Pakhtuns have not been thoroughly taken on board. The US is yet to funnel in some major
economic breakthroughs into Afghanistan or into the RoZs (Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones) in FATA, for that matter because without offering an alternate vocation (or an
alternate allegiance) to the ordinary Taliban footsoldier, the Petraeus COIN model successful
in Iraq but considered a scorched earth policy for Afghanistan can never succeed. The late
US Special Representative Richard Holbrooke was in charge of President Obamas tenuous and
tricky diplomatic mission to the region an attempt at killing two birds with one stone that
never worked. Holbrooke's death has made an already-precarious "Af-Pak" situation more
deadly and uncertain; the Ambassador was efficiently but ineffectively managing Obama's
Af-Pak objectives, which continued to be a difficult job but Ambassador Holbrooke "learnt the
ropes" and understood regional political sensitivities. He also built great rapport with Pakistan
and Afghanistan something that will be difficult to build up again for his replacement, Mr.
Ruggerio, especially after the Wikileaks fiasco.

THE AFGHAN WAR SPILLING OVER INTO PAKISTAN
While the US clamors for Pakistan to do more more
action on the ground against militants based in FATA,
more pressure against Al Qaeda whether they are of
Pakistani origin or not the situation is restricted to
US drone attacks on the tribal areas, as well as
limited clear-hold-build operations by the Pakistan
Army. The drone attacks issue transformed into a
debacle when a tribesman, Karim Khan, initiated a
case against one Jonathan Banks, allegedly the CIA
Station Chief in Islamabad, for conducting drone
attacks and killing innocent civilians. Rather
haphazardly, the CIA chief was exfiltrated from
Pakistan. Figure 4 - FATA and the Afghan Border

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
8

President Obama ostensibly
having determined that a surge
strategy akin to the one employed
in Iraq will be suitable for
Afghanistan since these both wars
are just the War on Terror has
escalated drone strikes in Pakistans
tribal areas along with enhancing
the scope of diplomatic
engagement with Pakistan via the
Strategic Dialogue, and the Af-Pak
Review does include further
political, military and financial
sustenance. But following a gradual
course in unusual circumstances is a
grave mistake that cannot be
accepted. General McChrystals
policies of restricting raids and military powers of NATO/ISAF that offended the Afghans were
welcome strategies that definitely seemed to weaken the moral and social hold the native
Taliban had over the average Afghan. The strategy of calculated and timely Special Forces
action was also a maneuver developed after careful study of the ground realities and the most
feasible solution available.
However, General McChrystals departure has brought the battle-tested General Petraeus to
the Afghan front, and the ground strategy has shifted in two of three measurements;
NATO/ISAF forces are now re-empowered to defend themselves over and above the safety and
security of the Afghans, and conduct night time raids so as to eliminate terrorist threats but
also unwittingly defiling the honor of an Afghan home in the process. The calculated and
surgical Special Forces action methodology is now going to be employed on a surge quantum
this means that between 2011 and 2014, regular troops and infantry forces can draw down
while the remaining contingent consists mostly of NATO trainers and US Special Forces
operatives. And despite the lessons of Operation Khanjar and Operation Anaconda, the
continuing counterinsurgency doctrine is one of establishing battlefield superiority in enemy
territory while they have the operational and logistical momentum.
Figure 5 - Attacks by US drones & Islamic militants between 2009 and 2010
Courtesy: BBC NEWS Online 22 July, 2010

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
9

DRONE WARFARE
The use of unmanned drones (UAVs) for offensive operations is a double-edged sword for the
Allied forces; on one end, they allow the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and establish
identity without compromising ones friendly forces, and they also take out the enemy without
any successful chance of retaliation, but on the other end, these technologies have not been
able to demonstrate a quantum leap from the collateral damage issues and technical or
systemic malfunction issues that many modern warfare technologies suffer from. That does not
mean that Pakistan itself does not want to acquire this capability; US defense officials have said
that Pakistan will be provided 12 RQ-7 Shadow UAVs, which seems to be the fulfillment of a
longstanding demand by Pakistan.

However, the RQ-7 A/B Shadow is an unarmed UAV, and as such it will only boost the Pakistan
militarys reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations in the FATA areas. It will not
grant the Pakistani military an enhanced capacity or greater resources to carry out an effective
campaign in any militant infested area, whether it is a frontier region or a tribal agency.
Figure 6 - Drone Strikes in Pakistan - 2004-2010
Courtesy: Long War Journal

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
10

In light of such operations, it is necessary that when the terrorists are forced to retreat from
their strongholds in Afghanistan, they are not able to utilize the routes or rat lines that lead to
various safe havens in Pakistani territory. This is where the drone attacks strategy and the
escalating use of armed UAVs plays a major role. While the federal political office-holders
have declared their protestations over the drone attacks, as representatives of the general
public, the following two outcomes are clear not only to the so-called ruling elite, but to all
Pakistani; that Pakistan is not helpless in the face of cross-border aggression since some
attempted helicopter raids have been repulsed in the past, and more importantly, that the
armed drones eventually do end up killing those people who are planning attacks not in the
United States, but in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even so, the last cross border raid led to closure
of NATO logistics for ten days and destruction of cargo in stranded trucks because the Taliban
went on a rampage and targeted the NATO supply routes throughout the road network that
exists in Pakistan.

Figure 7 - NATO Tankers on fire in Balochistan, Pakistan
Courtesy: Express Tribune
Nevertheless, the Pakistani Prime Minister has rightly stated that the drone attacks are
counter-productive
7
because they demonstrate the weakening writ of the Pakistani state
something the terrorists are also doing and such unilateral actions by a foreign power inside
sovereign Pakistani territory encourage people to join the ranks of the Taliban; as a result of
collateral damage caused by drone strikes, people who previously have no grudge against the
United States are attacked, their houses are destroyed, and their family members are killed,

7
US drone attacks counter-productive: Gilani

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
11

whether by chance or by accident. The aftermath of such tragedies is the recruiting boon for
terrorist handlers and planners that must be dis-incentivized and ultimately restore civil
defense and social infrastructure to such a level that remedial actions and safety measures can
be taken immediately. Of the 212 strikes since 2004, 70% have hit targets in North Waziristan,
and 24% have hit targets in South Waziristan
8
. On December 17, 2010, three drone strikes killed
approximately 60 people in the Khyber agency
9
, and on December 27, two drone strikes in
North Waziristan killed 18 alleged militants
10
. A study has shown that only 30 Al-Qaeda
operatives have perished in the last six years but more significantly 1266 civilians were killed
and over 445 civilians were left injured to run a tally of 2.5% as the strike rate against the Al-
Qaeda operatives
11
.
However, precisely because the US can achieve
some of its objectives via unmanned drone
operations, it is highly unlikely that the US
would ever opt for boots on the ground in
North Waziristan, even as a unilateral decision,
because it would destabilize Pakistan thereby
creating a very serious problem for the US. It
will be considered an infringement of Pakistani
sovereignty and would effectively end the
strategic alliance even if the faade is maintained. Even though the Pakistan Armed Forces are
unlikely to retaliate against the US, it remains evident that the unilateral US/NATO action would
trigger asymmetric reaction against them in Afghanistan and FATA in turn. The only remaining
scenario that can be considered is that the US and Pakistan operate together in North
Waziristan something that public opinion would never accept because Pakistan would end up
completely alienating the Pakhtuns. This is mainly why The White House has denied that
Afghanistan-based US forces are planning to conduct anti-militant ground raids across Pakistani
territory
12
, and The Pentagon has denied media reports that the United States might launch
ground operations inside FATA
13
.

8
Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2010
9
60 killed in years deadliest drone hit
10
Pakistan: suspected US drone strike against Taliban kills 18
11
Drone Attacks in Pakistan have a 2.5% strike rate against Al-Qaeda
12
US officials move to refute reports of cross-border attacks
13
Pakistan military best able to root out Fata militants: US
Figure 8 - The MQ-9 Reaper
Courtesy: NewsRealBlog

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
12

CONTINUED FUTILITY
Experts argue that the NATO military campaign is suppressing, locally and temporarily, the
symptoms of the disease, but fails to offer a cure; military action may produce local and
temporary improvements in security, but those improvements are neither going to last nor be
replicable in the vast areas not garrisoned by western forces without a political
settlement
14
. Afghanistan remains insecure, and classified UN assessments for March 2010
and October 2010 paint a dismal picture of the security situation as well as the outcome of
aggressive military operations in troubled areas
15
.












THE PAKISTANI MILITARY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 2007-2009
The United States Government has long been pushing Pakistan to send troops into North
Waziristan, in what some judge as pestering, while others call it gentle nudging. President

14
Time for negotiation in Afghanistan
15
U.N. Maps Out Afghan Security
Figure 9 - Major Taliban Fighting Fronts in Afghanistan
Courtesy: Pakistan and the War on Terror by Ashley J. Tellis (2008)

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
13

Obamas campaign statements can be recalled in this case; if we have actionable intelligence
about high-value terrorist targets in Pakistan, and we tell the Pakistani government and
military about it and they cant or wont act, then we will
16
.
In 2006, the Pakistan government was desperately trying to bring peace in the volatile frontier
region of FATA, and struck peace deals in North and South Waziristan. However, infighting
between the Taliban ranks, as well as turf wars between the Taliban, their allies and other
indigenous militias, led to an untenable situation. In 2007, Pakistan had already devised a new
North Waziristan strategy which included military, political, administrative steps with
heightened coordination among different departments and stakeholders in order to curb
Talibanization and growing militancy in then-NWFP and FATA
17
. A detailed version of this
plan
18
entailed scaling up military operations and surveillance, strengthening law enforcement
agencies, targeting militant commanders in particular, and fast-tracked recruitment of
policemen in the then-NWFP.
However, these actions were not put into play
after the Lal Masjid siege in July 2008, when all
ideologically fundamentalist militant groups
with fresh throngs of religious zealots and
fanatics declared holy war against the Pakistani
state, a puppet of the infidel United States.
While the siege was under way, Pakistani
troops stationed in Waziristan came under fire
attacks on military convoys on July 14 and 15,
2007, resulted in the martyrdom of 41 soldiers
and five civilians, while 101 were injured
19
. A
police headquarters in the area was also
attacked by a suicide bomber, causing the martyrdom of 28 police officers and recruits and
wounding 35 people. The Pakistani Army came under intense pressure after the Lal Masjid
siege; its officers were targeted by hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombers even in the garrison
city of Rawalpindi, while it was being labeled a mercenary force in the pay of its imperialist
master, the US. This narrative is also evident in the debate over military intervention in North

16
Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win
17
Plan ready to curb militancy in Fata, settled areas
18
Pakistans new Waziristan strategy
19
Two Days of Homicide Attacks Kill 70 in Pakistan
Figure 10 - Taliban militants in Pakistan
Courtesy: TopNews.in

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
14

Waziristan, and specifically, how the US is encouraging Pakistan to do so. This event escalated
the War on Terror in Pakistan, in comparison to all security assessments, evaluation of quantum
and momentum of enemy forces in Afghanistan. The militants who had been using safe havens
in Pakistan to launch attacks on Afghanistan now also busied themselves with attacking
Pakistan. This war became Pakistans war; fighting these militants was in Pakistans interest.
By 2010, when it had become clear to the various elements of the Taliban insurgency as well
as to other constituents of the Afghan national resistance that the US/NATO/ISAF combine
would eventually withdraw, the Talibanization movement picked up greater pace, and
targeted coalition troops in Afghanistan and the Pakistan Army on the other side of the border
with greater vigor and tenacity. On December 24, 2010, over a hundred Taliban militants
attacked a military check post in Mohmand Agency, and the battle resulted in 24 militants killed
and 11 Pakistan Army soldiers martyred
20
.
The Pakistan Army moved in en-masse to North Waziristan after the Lal Masjid siege, and
September 2007 witnessed escalating violence and commitment of greater resources by both
sides to the battle in North Waziristan. By October 2007, the Pakistan Army was also engaged in
Swat, despite suffering heavy personnel casualties in settled urban areas courtesy of the
relentless suicide attacks carried out by the Taliban. In January 2008, the situation in South
Waziristan also demanded military action as pro-Taliban militants overran Sararogha Fort. The
Pakistan Army launched Operation Zalzala, sending in the 14
th
Infantry Division to flush out
militants affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud, the leader/emir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP). The Army came in control of the area in just over three days, and thereafter focused
operations onto the villages and outlying rural areas of the Agency. The operation, however, led
to the displacement of over 200,000 tribesmen and their families, and the announcement for
their repatriation has just been made in December 2010 with conditionalities involved
regarding the security situation.
In September 2008, Pakistani tribal elders raised a private army, or Lashkar, to fight the Taliban
militants and restore peace. The Lashkar was approximately 30,000-strong and one of its first
acts was to burn down the houses of the Taliban and their accomplices in Bajaur Agency. The
mass displacement of tribals, as well as civilian casualties in the fight between the Army and the
Taliban militants, were cited as the core reasons for raising the Lashkar and for the tribesmen
taking matters into their own hands. While this strategy calls for measures akin to the

20
Eleven soldiers, 24 militants killed in Mohmand clashes

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
15

strengthening of Sunni Awakening groups in Iraq, US proposals for strengthening Pakistani
Lashkars have not borne any fruit so far. The Pakistan Armys stance regarding these pro-
Pakistan tribal Lashkars as well as any estimation or calibration of intelligence operations in
the areas where the Lashkars are dominant remains unclear.
In 2009, Pakistan authorized Operation Black Thunderstorm in Swat, aimed at retaking Swat,
Buner, Lower Dir and Shangla, and eliminating militants from the area. In Operation Rah-e-Rast,
the Army initiated maneuvers on May 5, 2009, to retake Swat after securing Buner and Lower
Dir. By May 30, the Army had retaken Mingora from the Taliban, while sporadic fighting
continued. According to the military, 128 soldiers were martyred and more than 1,475 alleged
militants were killed. 317 soldiers were wounded during Operation Black Thunderstorm. 95
soldiers and policemen were captured by the militants and held hostage; 18 of them were
recovered after rescue operations. 114 militants were captured, including some local
commanders, and at least 23 of the militants killed were identified as foreigners. These military
actions led to an eventual blockade of South
Waziristan, so as to strangle Baitullah Mehsuds
control in the region and to stifle his supply lines.
Operation Rah-i-Nijat (Road to Salvation) was
launched on October 17, 2009, after a three-
month blockade that resulted in numerous
battles and skirmishes, and hundreds of
casualties on both sides. The dramatic irruption
of the Pakistani state into the FATA, through a
significant military presence of the kind not seen
in more than a century, resulted in making
conditions sufficiently inhospitable for al- Qaeda
such that its senior leadership and cadres were
compelled to relocate under fire from South to
North Waziristan
21
in the first place; causing the
terrorists to move into the settled areas. The
operation to invade and retake South Waziristan was dubbed the mother of all battles, with
more than 28,000 infantry and airborne troops from the 50
th
Airborne Division, the 7
th
and 9
th


21
Pakistan and the War on Terror by Ashley J. Tellis (2008). Page 10.
Figure 11 Operation Rah i Nijat in South Waziristan
Courtesy: BBC News October 29, 2009

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
16

Infantry Divisions of the XI Corps, and the 40
th
Infantry Division of the Army Reserve Center
22

facing a rough estimate of between 7,000 to 20,000 Taliban militants aided by Uzbek militants
in the thousands as well. By December 12, 2009, the military operation was over with the entire
South Waziristan Agency under military control, but with none of the Taliban leaders captured.
594 Taliban militants were killed and 80 soldiers of the Pakistan Army were martyred during the
ground offensive. Another 243 soldiers were wounded and 83 militants were captured.

THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN OPERATION AVOIDING THE DEATH TRAP
WHAT TO DO?
In light of all this battle experience,
and the untold suffering and
devastation that has been caused
by militancy as well as reactive
military operations in their
response, the dominant view in
Pakistan is to resist the knee-jerk
reaction to invade North
Waziristan. One of the most
important determinants of any
Pakistani military action in North
Waziristan is the regional situation,
especially the security situation of
Afghanistan. A regional approach
is sine qua non to eliminate
terrorists as Pakistan claims no
monopoly over the industry of
terror because terrorism pervades
every country in the region
23
. Terrorism exists throughout South Asia not just in Afghanistan
and Pakistan but also occurs in Iran and India, yet the blame is squarely put on Pakistan,

22
Order of Battle: Pakistani Military in FATA and Northwest Frontier Province
23
Operation Rah-e-Nijat and beyond
Figure 12 North and South Waziristan
Courtesy: BBC News Via Zeitgeist Politics (Wordpress)

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
17

which incidentally also suffers the most from terrorist attacks
24
. Pakistan supports an Afghan-
led and inclusive reconciliation process in Afghanistan to pave the way for durable peace and
stability in the war-torn country, and does not want Afghanistan to become a theatre of
proxy wars
25
. A recent Washington Post article rightly suggested that the end game in South
Asia is far more important for Pakistan than any immediate tactical action whose results can be
destabilizing.

WHEN IS IT POSSIBLE?
The Pakistan Armys plans to launch a full-scale offensive in North Waziristan may hit further
delays in light of resurgent Taliban attacks in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and South Waziristan
agencies. Recent error strikes in Mohmand and Bajaur have indicated that areas already cleared
by the military were still to be consolidated and secured, and unless that happens, it would be
impossible to rush into another campaign
26
.
The Pakistan military can tackle
North Waziristan only when FATA
has been stabilized. The resurgence
of violence in FATA and threatening
resurgence of militants in Swat is
the Taliban response to the threat
of operations in North Waziristan.
Recent reports indicate that the
sanctuaries and their users exist on
both sides of the Durand Line, and
that the Taliban fighting in FATA
have bases in, and support from,
across the border. There is
increased cooperation and
coordination in this cross border

24
Terrorism and our neighbours
25
Pakistan doesnt want Afghanistan to be theatre of proxy war
26
N Waziristan offensive may see further delays
Figure 13 - The Af-Pak Border
Courtesy: Spearhead Research

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
18

activity
27
; this makes the situation very complex. Pakistan is already redeploying into Swat,
Mohmand, Khyber and South Waziristan, and troop deployments there will not leave sufficient
resources and manpower to successfully enter North Waziristan, attack and eliminate Taliban
strongholds, capture or kill their leaders and commanders, and restore peace and writ of the
state in the area. So far civilian administration has not taken over any of the areas cleared by
the military and most development work in the area is under military supervision. It is a fallacy
that Pakistan is so India-centric that it cannot move forces from the east to the west; over
140,000 troops are already deployed in Pakistans west.

RETHINKING EXISTING STRATEGIES
A fundamental prerequisite to any Pakistani military incursion in North Waziristan would be
sealing off the border from both sides to the maximum extent possible failing which, a
renewed hammer-and-anvil approach must be devised so that the Pakistani military can
conduct hot pursuit operations to capture or kill Taliban commanders seeking refuge in
Afghanistan, which is complicated, sensitive and extremely tenuous. The hammer-and-anvil
cannot be executed successfully, just as the history of this Afghan war demonstrates, until and
unless there is proactive assistance from the US/NATO forces along the Afghanistan border to
guard or eliminate the escape routes on the already porous Durand line.
Reports and ground assessments indicate that only the Pakistani forces are deployed in almost
a thousand check posts along the Durand Line, and the Tripartite Military Commission has been
an abject failure so far. The brilliant framework articulated by General Karl-Heinz Lather
28
, Chief
of Staff of NATO SHAPE, still remains to be tested and implemented. The second requirement
for Pakistan to march into North Waziristan would be the stabilization of the other six agencies
in FATA and civilian administration on the ground. The standards and indicators for strong and
successful civilian control in these areas have yet to be identified and attained. Finally, enough
resources will have to be mustered to ensure a balance in military approach and the logistical
timeframe as it exists in terms of the military objectives; right now, Pakistani forces are
overstretched because of continued instability in settled urban areas as well as tribal agencies,
and the recent flood devastation continues to utilize Pakistan Army resources that are
rehabilitating the civilian population in aid of civil power. This is besides the fact that the Army

27
Insurgents Set Aside Rivalries on Afghan Border
28
NATO in Afghanistan and better Cooperation with Pakistan

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
19

is deployed along sensitive logistical routes in the urban, rural and tribal areas, apart from
ensuring safety and security of Pakistani citizens in the cities and especially in urban
cantonment areas.
Another factor which should be of critical
concern for both the US and Pakistan is
the collateral damage caused by the
drone attacks. Every civilian casualty from
a miss-hit gives legitimacy to the
narrative of oppression propagated by the
Taliban and their Al Qaeda proxies,
garnering further support for the national
resistance in Afghanistan as well as
increasing ill-will for the Pakistani state
and military. Rather than eliminating the
malaise, such strikes give the native
population a reason to pick up arms and join the Taliban in their holy war by increasing their
numbers exponentially. Both Pakistan and the US do not gain any advantage through causing
collateral damage since it fuels the momentum of the Taliban and offers them greater
recruitment opportunities.
Most importantly, Pakistan has properly managed the counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism component (which is essentially military in nature), but the counter-extremism
component (which is political and economic) has not been able to work as well. Pakistan needs
to formulate a programme with a civil government-in-a-box quality with reference to the US
strategy for Marjah which can roll into place once the military clears the areas; this can be
tested in Swat and South Waziristan to enhance consolidated control of those areas before it is
employed in North Waziristan. Terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in Pakistan is more
about poverty than about Islam. Political inclusion, economic reconstruction, employment
opportunities, social safety nets, rehabilitation from war and benefits to the ordinary people in
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA is necessary for any counter-extremism programme to
successfully augment the military and security components of Pakistans COIN strategy. The
most crucial outcome of any successful operation in North Waziristan or anywhere else in
Pakistan is the elimination of the Al Qaeda brand and its aura, which can only come about by
forceful anti-militant propaganda campaigns that question and attack the role that Al Qaeda
Figure 14 - The MQ-9 Reaper firing an AGM-114 Hellfire missile
Courtesy: PressTV.ir

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
20

firebrands occupy in the minds and lives of conservative Pakhtun Muslims in the tribal areas.
This is because the main threat is not from the brainwashed militants, but from their Al Qaeda
handlers who brainwash them and prepare them for a war without end
29
. Recent initiatives like
Yeh Hum Naheen Say No To Terrorism
30
have been appreciated not only by the mainstream
Pakistani population at home and abroad, but also by US State Department officials in their
communications with one another.

Figure 15 - Ethnic Groups: Configuration in Pakistan
Ahmed Rashid has an interesting view on the possible outcome of the Afghan war; with specific
respect to Pakistan, he argues that peace might be possible if Pakistan issues an ultimatum to
all Afghan Taliban leaders to leave for home, or to seek asylum in another country, while it
undertakes military operations in North Waziristan to eliminate remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda
elements which could sabotage a peace process. Even if such action were not fully
successful, he argues, the aim would be to limit their capacity to sponsor insurgency
31
. This
reason lacks strategic and tactical logic, while it is also not a justifiable objective for a Pakistani
incursion into North Waziristan. Pakistan must aim to destroy the militants capacity to sponsor,
create or foment insurgency, not just to limit or restrain it.

29
Al-Qaeda braced for a war without end
30
Yeh Hum Naheen Say No To Terrorism
31
The Way Out of Afghanistan

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
21

PAKISTANS PERSPECTIVE
From the Pakistani point of view, the entire war in Afghanistan has been extremely disastrous.
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 to deny al Qaeda its main sanctuary led to the
spillover of the war into Pakistan. Al Qaedas relocation east of the Durand Line forced
Islamabad to side with Washington against the Afghan Taliban and laid the foundation for the
Talibanization of Pakistan
32
. One of the biggest mistakes attributed to the US strategy is the
way the counter-insurgency efforts were initially executed. Unlike the Pakistan-India border,
the Durand line is porous and has no definite boundaries. Therefore, when the US initially
exerted pressure from the other end, it created a free flow of militants into Pakistan; to either
escape to safe havens, or to call for new enforcements from North Waziristan. Had the US
realized this while drafting and executing the initial strategic plan a decade ago, the scenario
would have had been different altogether and Pakistan would not have been involved in the
mess that it is in today. In this context, the US strategy seems like a massive failure; for the
future, the success of the new Af-Pak strategy is entirely dependent upon the elimination of
such strategic failures.

Figure 16 - The Afghanistan-Pakistan Border
Courtesy: PakistanIdeology.com

32
The Pakistani View of the U.S. Strategy on Afghanistan

December 29, 2010
The Death Trap Shemrez Nauman Afzal, Research Analyst

Spearhead Research
www.spearheadresearch.org
22

CONCLUSION
THE WAY FORWARD: AGGRESSIVE COOPERATION FOR MUTUAL INTEREST
The gravity of the situation in this region dictates both US and Pakistan to realize that North
Waziristan tribes cannot be forced into making a fair deal until and unless the aforementioned
strategy is executed to perfection and such a scenario is attained without making any further
blunders. Every mistake further diminishes the possibility of a practical workable solution which
is in the best interest of both the parties. Trying to cut out a deal with North Waziristan seems
to be the best option right now, and this is what Pakistan should ideally aim for, but this will not
be possible until and unless there is active support from the US/NATO forces within
Afghanistan.
Any Pakistani effort to effectively counter the threat of militant extremism is dependent upon
the US strategy on the other side of the border. Just as the United States is dealing with a very
difficult situation where it has no good options, Pakistan is also caught in a dilemma. There are
broad and opposing views among the Pakistani stakeholders in regard to what the United
States should do that, in turn, would also serve Pakistani interests the important commonality
between the two is that Pakistani interests should indeed be factored into any possible future
action, and into every perceived future outcome.
There will have to be clarity in US strategy on the end game in Afghanistan, especially as far as
the negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan is concerned; the Indian and Iranian influence
in Afghanistan, as well as the capacity and capability of Afghan forces, are also pressing issues
that require due time and consideration in the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. The best bet for
the US is to understand the security imperatives for Pakistan
33
and to realize the limitations its
military faces. No Af-Pak strategy can succeed if it aims to restore peace and security in
Afghanistan by causing instability, chaos and destruction in Pakistan. This is exactly why
Pakistans security perceptions and national interest must be factored into the roadmap for
regional peace; the inclusion and mainstreaming of the Pakhtun population of both Pakistan
and Afghanistan is the first step towards achieving a lasting peace and eliminating religious
terrorism and militant extremism from the region. An important consideration should be the
economic viability of Pakistan and more major communication links with Afghanistanthere is
much less violence in the areas around the northern and southern corridors because of the
economic activity generated there.

33
US contemplating raids in Pakistan