Villegas v.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]

En Banc, Fernandez (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen
of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business
or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of
Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City
of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular
missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and
any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders
or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and
the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai
Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil
Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop
the implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May
1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17
September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the preliminary
injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure working permits
from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.

Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be employed, to get a permit from
the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right
of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not
lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon
the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens required to pay
it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.

Ople v. Torres [ GR 127685, 23 July 1998 ]
En Banc, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It was published in 4 newspapers of general
circulation on 22 and 23 January 1997. On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and
member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee are charged with the implementation of Administrative Order 308.

Issue: Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a legislative act.

Held: Administrative Order 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their
right to privacy. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies: the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no
protection, and creates no office. Under it, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to
get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Administrative Order 308 does
not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, but establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. The authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws. AO 308 was beyond the power of the President to issue.











Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [GR 148560, 19 November 2001]
En Banc, Bellosillo (J) : 2 concur, 2 filed separate concurring opinions, 6 joined the concurring opinion of
Mendoza, 3 dissented in a separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by
RA 7659; (b) Criminal Cases 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3,
paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
respectively; (c) Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7, paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury
(Article. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias
(Commonwealth Act 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus
Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for reconsideration /
reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. The grounds raised were
only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove
lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which
they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001, Estrada moved to quash the Information
in Criminal Case 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion
to Quash.

Issue: Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear to inform Estrada of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Held: As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged
with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public
officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder Law. Herein, the amended
Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or
ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the
crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
Upon such unequivocal assertions, Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable
him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

There is no basis for Estrada's claim that the Supreme Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on
the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." The doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases. "On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.










Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]
Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and
the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of
mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon.
Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in
his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. They suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General
avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took
place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette only.

Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know
of its existence. Publication is required, even if their enactment is otherwise provided or effective
immediately. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication requirements applies to
(1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations
for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a
city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on
case studies. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people
as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.





























Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. (Extelcom) [GR 147096, 15 January 2002];
also Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) Inc., vs. Express Telecommunications Co. [GR
147210]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular
4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications
before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed
after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the
NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an
amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing
were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But
before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December
1993 stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and
GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by
Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was
ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.
On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency
bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's
application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the
application was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency
shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an
Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application; arguing that
Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the
documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all outdated and should no
longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an
Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15,
Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the application of
Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a
nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public
telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September
2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting
aside the NTC orders dated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended
Application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter
being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC
Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the
NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In
the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised
Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon
filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the
effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general
circulation,the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of
Bayantels application.

Held: The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that
the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken
effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules
were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of
codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the
National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price
sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take
effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service
Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly
mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that
said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of
such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.


Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632, 11 February 1986]; also Nuclear
Free Philippines Coalition v. Napocor [ GR L-68474]
Resolution En Banc, Plana (J) : 5 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: The Official Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled "The Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant-1" was published in 1985 when Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and
Alejandro Ver Albano had already been appointed to their present positions. Other pamphlets entitled
"Nuclear Power Safe, Clean, Economical, and Available," and Nuclear Power Plant and Environmental
Safety were issued earlier, but the majority of the Commissioners even then were already occupying
positions of responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department
on Nuclear Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC
Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano was PAEC
Deputy Commissioner from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These pamphlets continued to be distributed by
PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official distribution continued after the filing of National Power
Corporation (Napocor)'s motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its order
dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion. In GR 70632, the competence of
the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1)
was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor's motion/application for the conversion of its construction permit
into an operating license for PNPP-1 was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were charged with bias and
prejudgment.

Issue: Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in determining the safety of PNPP-1.

Held: The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must
characterize such an important inquiry because they already have prejudged the safety of PNPP-1. The PAEC
Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from the official pamphlets, which clearly indicate the
prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued when the
Commissioners had already been appointed to their present positions and and even after PAEC had issued its
order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting Napocors motion for conversion.



Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982]
Second Division, Aquino (J); 4 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical Research Department) became
vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-in-rank to the vacant
position, both holding positions of Scientist Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950,
College of Pharmacy, UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside from
her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor
(unassembled). She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other hand, Dr.
Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has served for 21 years.
Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the
position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against such recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee
found such protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST Commissioner, however, did not
resolve the issue. The position was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the
NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January 1978, after thorough study and screening
of the qualifications of both doctors and upon recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes).
The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon appealed to the Office of the President
of the Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the
Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afables
decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose A. Melo
recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in
conflict with the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The
Resolution was made in pursuance to Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6
October 1975), which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President
shall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5 January 1980, after denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980 revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment
and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's
appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr.
Venzon's protest. In a resolution dated 14 August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr.
Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special
civil action of certiorari.

Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the recommendation of the Presidential
Executive Assistant, who is himself, in the appointment of Dr. Venzon.







Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave implemented the 23 August
1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending
the appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the
Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's
recommendation: he was concurring with himself . It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process
of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave
of the Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals). Common
sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted
by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who
would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.


Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan [GR 103501-03, 17 February 1997]; also Peralta v. Sandiganbayan
[GR 103507]
En Banc, Francisco (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur pro hac vice, 1 took no part

Facts: Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office
and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and
Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,
then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and
white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA
funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25
Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at
the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB
Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the
money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of
another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986
for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager's check for this amount.
Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of
the
P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's car. Peralta did not go with
Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs.
Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,
1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the
justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12
October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions
for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20
December 1991.

Issue: Whether Tabuena and Peralta were denied due process by the active participation of a Sandiganbayan
justice in the questioning witnesses in the trial.

Held: Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement,
we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process. Our courts should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or
more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For
obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith in our courts.
Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of
the accused. The Court was struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves, as shown in the records. The volume of questions hurled by
the Sandiganbayan was more the combined questions of the counsels. More importantly, the questions of the
court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. We
have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to
observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. The
impartiality of the judge; his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either one side or the
other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in criminal cases.












Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de Leon [GR 121245], and
Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297]
Second Division, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son of a Philippine
Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6
other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of
those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Paraaque. During the preliminary
investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the
Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes
maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the
autopsy report involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab
wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The NBI
submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of
Evidence and Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that
he did not commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines
on 27 October 1992. The others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong
submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of
the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with
subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding
probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide
be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al.
with the RTC Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by Judge
Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the
warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from
the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his
appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued
against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-
404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano
likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of their right to fair trial.

Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due
process right to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of
the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors;
and their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of
probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of
his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense
impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to
assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.





















People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]
Resolution of First Division, Melo (J) : 3 concur

Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van,
which was parked in front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo
Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan,
who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were
then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by
Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next
day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth
covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the
Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to
Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head
was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot
from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok,
Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon,
Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later,
all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains
behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza).
Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and forensic
findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory.
On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found
Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of
P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as
additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito
Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed
its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity,
besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13-
year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded
have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently
impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue,
besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of events. On
2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was
assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September 2001.

Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the case.

Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.




















Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000]
Third division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the
front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of
Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has
overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford
followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the
confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to
continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP
Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994,
12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer,
Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for
conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of
domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance
of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in
performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended
for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional
Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack
of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted
the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found
Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision,
by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent
could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board
filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the
original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse
of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges against
him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more
serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light,
for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges
or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of
official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was
also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that
Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should
have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife.





















People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000]
En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur, 1 on official leave
Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishops chair while the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the security
guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers. Mararac went near Estrada and told him to
vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped Estradas hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about
to strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his
left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01
Conrado Francisco received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral,
approached Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed.
However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the confirmation rites,
went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue
Estrada. Estrada was brought to the police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after
arrival at the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of
Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was
alleged that Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental
defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio
General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu
proprio, propounded several questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions were understood and answered
by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of
not guilty was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City,
Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found
Estrada guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay P50,000 for
indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages. Estradas counsel appealed.

Issue: Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the accused may be subjected to
trial.

Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of
the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just
defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a
violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's
capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By depriving
appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's
negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings
before the said court must be nullified.




































Lim vs. Court of Appeals [GR 111397, 12 August 2002]
Third Division, Carpio (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: On 7 December 1992, Bistro Pigalle Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Alfredo Lim
in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. The Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims
instructions inspected and investigated the Bistros license as well as the work permits and health certificates
of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in the Bistros night club and restaurant operations (i.e. the New
Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant). Lim also refused to accept the Bistros application for a
business license, as well as the work permit applications of the Bistros staff, for the year 1993. Acting on the
Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order on 29 December
1992, ordering Lim and/or his agents to refrain from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the
establishments of the Bistro. At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective
positions. On 20 January 1993, the trial court granted the Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on the Bistros
operations effective 23 January 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order. Lim insisted that
the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the
statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory
power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991. On 25 January 1993, the Bistro filed
an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped the Bistros operations on
January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for contempt on 29 January 1993, the Bistro withdrew its
motion on condition that Lim would respect the courts injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and
27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted the Bistros
business operations. Meanwhile, on 17 February 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and
to dismiss the case. The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in
an order dated 2 March 1993. On 10 March 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. The Court of Appeals sustained the
RTC orders in a decision on 25 March 1993, and denied Lim's motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated 13 July 1993. On 1 July 1993, Manila City Ordinance 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim
ordered the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of the Bistro, which
order the police implemented at once. Lim filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.


Issue: Whether the Bistro should be given an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.


Held: From the language of Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and Section
455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses
and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same.
However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of
the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)"
on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to inspect and
investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits.
However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or
investigating these commercial establishments. Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any
business establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly
or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice
and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution
requires that Lim should have given the Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.



















Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur

Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and
Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the supply
purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and accordingly, the public bidding was held on 14 September 1990. The
lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only
1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections made by a A Technical
Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids
and Awards Committee, however, voted to award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which
offered Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the Bids and Awards Committee
reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its choice to the two brands recommended by Gen.
Tanchanco and, by majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder. Thereafter,
the Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno,
on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared.
Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the amount of P167,335,177.24,
representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the
bid price of Tahei Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the Purchase Order was
P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a total of
P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire trucks. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding,
awarding and purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a
complaint on 12 February 1993 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman,
against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP, (3) Fire Marshal Mario
Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.), (5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan
Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio
Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos, and (12) Ms.
Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where the
accused submitted their respective counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the indictment of
all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter
recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15
April 1993. Accordingly, the appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan
(Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos. Roxas,
Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included among the accused. However, upon motion of
Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On
19 October 1993, without any notice to or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that
Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the
approval of the recommendation, while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented. Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the
Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de
Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order dated 10
February 1994. Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with
respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the issuance of Office of
the Ombudsman null and void.

Held: It is not material either that no new matter or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the
case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of
the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the
prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, Roxas and Nacpil at the
reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any rate, Roxas
and Nacpil cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due
process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the
record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary
investigation, they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of the
Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956.














Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
En Banc, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were members of
the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio
dominates the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that
Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The
Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the
Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation
that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union
affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a
motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations.
Issue: Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe special
requirements of due process in administrative cases.
Held: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even
in proceedings of this character, to wit:

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration.
c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from
the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
"substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose,
to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA
103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in
any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10)
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It
may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorize
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to
solve the difficulty.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.








Montemayor v. Araneta University [GR L-44251, 31 May 1977]
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave.
Facts: Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF), serving as head
of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged against
him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a
committee to investigate such charge. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral
advancescommitted against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which took place on 24 April
1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as the complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the
postponement of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he filed a motion to
dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an affidavit to sustain his defense.
On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating committee came, and was adverse to
Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo
adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF for
appropriate action. On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime
Castaeda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another
committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but
was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. On 5 December 1974, the Committee submitted its report
finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the
President and the Board of Trustees of the AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with
Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was
ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. On 12 December 1974, the
University filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a report of his suspension and
application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1974, Montemayor in
turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for reinstatement and payment of back wages and
salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on
the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered
reinstated to his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF appealed to the Secretary of
Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's
dismissal justified. The AUF was, however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00
representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied
with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal
from AUF.

Held: In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to
proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due process, a
term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when an adverse decision
against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a
conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the
charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a
special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher
accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the first
investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The second
investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for postponement therein was denied, the
hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting
its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending his
removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor was able to present his case before the
Labor Commission. Denial of due process happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating
committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to
present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his
day in court.























Ateneo v. CA [GR L-56180, 16 October 1986]
Second Division, Gutierrez (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and Teresita
Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck at the left
temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him from striking
again, but the boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the
slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the
university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint
states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due
process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious
expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its
answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan
Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility,
that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction
and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student
found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its
existence as an institution of learning. After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the
university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees
and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's
decision was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the
Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The
motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach
unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the
University filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed students parents negates the compliance of the
requirements of administrative due process.

Held: Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the incident, due
process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence
of evidence to support the decision. Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice
Gancayco) showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate.
Therenwere nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely
no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila
University. Juan Ramon was given notice of the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The
investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative due process were met. It
cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature
enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he
asked if he could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the
Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. The fact
that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went home to
Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University.





























Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988]
Second division, Paras (J): 3 concur.

Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon
Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students
and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the
school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded
the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass
assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October
1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should
not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the
commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was
answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students
were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October
1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and
student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees,
requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand
letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees,
to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The
students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the
students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to
speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The
right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof.
Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process
are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with.
The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of
justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if
not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to
the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of
the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of
the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was
filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.

























Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]
En Banc, Cortes (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave.

Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome
Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres,
students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for
the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8
August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February
1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition,
for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid
down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the
affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken
against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.

Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired,
cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution
of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right
to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court
should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of failing grades when
the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a
denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one
or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic
deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein,
the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but
the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be
imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145,
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or
re-enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated
in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings
would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between the students
and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.