G.R. No.

175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the
Court of Appeals Decision
1
dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution
2
dated November 14, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003
Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-
26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Michelle Ybaez (Ybaez).
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu
Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of
Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a
blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.
4
Respondent
allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt
5
issued by the store.
6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinsons and Mercury Drug Store
(Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she
failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the
receipt issued in her favor.
7
She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office
located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as
agreed upon.
8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the
black jeans.
9
They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had,
followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.
10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the
same took place while respondent was off duty.
11
Another letter was allegedly prepared and was
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused to
receive it.
12
Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of
Robinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes
of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not
given a copy of said damaging letter.
13
With the above experience, respondent claimed to have
suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.
14
She thus filed the Complaint for
Damages
15
before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing),
Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez. She demanded
the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
16

In their Answer,
17
petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official
receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was
miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the
receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the
former believed to mean that the item has already been paid.
18
Realizing the mistake,
Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to
go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made.
Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu
Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they
talked to respondent.
19
They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent
could not recall whom she gave the payment.
20
They emphasized that they were gentle and polite
in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.
21
As
counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
22

On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim
of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the
other defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that
no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when
they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief
that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the
confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who
put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu
Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees, because they merely
asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC
found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
damages.
23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybaez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to
pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
24

While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they
confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA,
however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the
demand letter to respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the official
receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.
25
Contrary to the findings of the
RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics director was sent to respondents
employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to
subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.
26

Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad
faith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not privy to the transaction.
This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a narrative of the
incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.
27
The
appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to
collect moral damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable
for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees;
while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondents
employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalos good faith, however, they were exonerated
from liability.
28

Ybaez moved for the reconsideration
29
of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the
assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER
SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN
RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS FEES.
30

The petition is without merit.
Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights
provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when
petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans
she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt
issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify
from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not.
However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such
right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the
Civil Code. The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte
31
is noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether
done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity
but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First
of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith."x x x
32
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price
of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right
was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another.
34
Good faith refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
35
Malice or bad faith, on the
other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity.
36

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not.
The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The
confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties.
As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with
conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment
issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a
mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper
forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance,
petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondents employer not only informing it of the
incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1wphi1 Petitioners claimed
that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to
hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely being
honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the
store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told
me, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2
pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no
such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and
if she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After asking
these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In
fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused
saying that shes in a hurry and very busy.
37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only
did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without
paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made
despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to
petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced
by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized
the supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondents employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability.
38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh.
39
In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the
Civil Code which read:
40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s
fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
41
Moral
damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.
42
They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.
43
We
find that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the
circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest,
attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
















G.R. No. 184318 February 12, 2014
ANTONIO E. UNICA, Petitioner,
vs.
ANSCOR SWIRE SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01417, which annulled and set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. OFW V-000031-2005 (RAB Case No. Vl-
OFW-(M) 02-12-0083).
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Anscor Swire Ship Management Corporation is a manning agency. Since the late
1980s, petitioner was employed by respondent under various contracts. In his last contract,
petitioner was deployed for a period of nine (9) months from January 29, 2000 to October 25,
2000. However, since the vessel was still at sea, petitioner was only repatriated on November 14,
2000, or twenty (20) days after the expiration of his contract of employment. Petitioner averred
that since he was allowed to stay in the vessel for another twenty (20) days, there was an implied
renewal of his contract of employment. Hence, when he was repatriated on November 14, 2000
without a valid cause, he was illegally dismissed.
Due to the foregoing, petitioner filed a case against the respondent for illegal dismissal, payment
of retirement, disability and medical benefits, separation and holiday pay. In its defense,
respondent argued that petitioner was hired for a fixed period, the duration of which depends
upon the mutual agreement of the parties. Petitioners employment was, therefore, co-terminus
with the term of his contract. Hence, the claim of petitioner that he was illegally dismissed must
fail, because he was repatriated due to the completion of the term of his contract.
On May 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioner.3 The LA ruled that since
petitioner was not repatriated at the expiration of his contract on October 25, 2000, and was
allowed by respondent to continue working on board its vessel up to November 14, 2000, his
contract with respondent was impliedly renewed for another nine months. The LA directed
respondent to pay petitioner his salary for the unexpired portion of his impliedly renewed
contract, his medical benefits and attorney's fees.
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to the NLRC. On August 24, 2005, the NLRC
affirmed with modification the LA's decision.4 Like the LA, the NLRC ruled that the contract
did not expire on October 25, 2000, but was impliedly extended for another nine months. This is
because it was only on November 14, 2000 when petitioner was told by respondent to disembark
because he would be repatriated. Since there was an implied extension of the contract for another
nine months, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to payment of the unexpired term of his implied
contract. The NLRC, however, deleted the award of medical benefits and reduced the amount of
attorney's fees.
Undaunted, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA, in its Decision5 dated
August 15, 2006, annulled and set aside the decision of the NLRC. The CA ruled that there was
no implied renewal of contract and the 20 days extension was due to the fact that the ship was
still at sea. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution6 dated August 11, 2008. Hence, the present petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not there was an implied renewal of petitioner's contract
of employment with respondent.
The petition is not meritorious.
In the case at bar, although petitioner's employment contract with respondent ended on October
25, 2000 and he disembarked only on November 14, 2000 or barely 20 days after the expiration
of his employment contract, such late disembarkation was not without valid reason. Respondent
could not have disembarked petitioner on the date of the termination of his employment contract,
because the vessel was still in the middle of the sea. Clearly, it was impossible for petitioner to
safely disembark immediately upon the expiration of his contract, since he must disembark at a
convenient port. Thus, petitioner's stay in the vessel for another 20 days should not be interpreted
as an implied extension of his contract. A seaman need not physically disembark from a vessel at
the expiration of his employment contract to have such contract considered terminated.7
It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered contractual employees.1wphi1 Their
employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their
employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for
a certain period of time.8 Thus, when petitioner's contract ended on October 25, 2000, his
employment is deemed automatically terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal or
extension of the expired contract.
However, petitioner is entitled to be paid his wages after the expiration of his contract until the
vessel's arrival at a convenient port. Section 19 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing
the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels is clear on this point:
REPATRIATION. A. If the vessel is outside the Philippines upon the expiration of the contract,
the seafarer shall continue his service on board until the vessel's arrival at a convenient port
and/or after arrival of the replacement crew, provided that, in any case, the continuance of such
service shall not exceed three months. The seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages and benefits
as provided in his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01417, dated August 15, 2006 and August 11, 2008, respectively, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that respondent is DIRECTED to PAY petitioner his salary
from October 26, 2000 until November 14, 2000. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter
for the purpose of computing the aforementioned monetary award to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.























G.R. No. 188539 March 12, 2014
MARIANO LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION,* Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying
that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), promulgated on July 30, 2008, and the
Resolution2 dated June 1, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be
reversed and set aside.
Petitioner executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of respondent to secure "any and all types
of credit accommodation that may be granted by the bank hereinto and hereinafter" in favor of
Raul Arroyo for the amount of P2,000,000.00 which is covered by a Credit
Agreement/Promissory Note.3 Said promissory note stated that the interest on the loan shall be
19% per annum, compounded monthly, for the first 30 days from the date thereof, and if the note
is not fully paid when due, an additional penalty of 2% per month of the total outstanding
principal and interest due and unpaid, shall be imposed.
In turn, the Continuing Suretyship4 executed by petitioner stipulated that:
3. Liability of the Surety. - The liability of the Surety is solidary and not contingent upon the
pursuit of the Bank of whatever remedies it may have against the Debtor or the collaterals/liens it
may possess. If any of the Guaranteed Obligations is not paid or performed on due date (at stated
maturity or by acceleration), the Surety shall, without need for any notice, demand or any other
act or deed, immediately become liable therefor and the Surety shall pay and perform the same.5
Guaranteed Obligations are defined in the same document as follows:
a) "Guaranteed Obligations" - the obligations of the Debtor arising from all credit
accommodations extended by the Bank to the Debtor, including increases, renewals, roll-overs,
extensions, restructurings, amendments or novations thereof, as well as (i) all obligations of the
Debtor presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records of
the Bank, whether direct or indirect, and (ii) any and all expenses which the Bank may incur in
enforcing any of its rights, powers and remedies under the Credit Instruments as defined
hereinbelow.6
The debtor, Raul Arroyo, defaulted on his loan obligation. Thereafter, petitioner received a
Notice of Final Demand dated August 2, 2001, informing him that he was liable to pay the loan
obtained by Raul and Edwina Arroyo, including the interests and penalty fees amounting to
P7,703,185.54, and demanding payment thereof. For failure of petitioner to comply with said
demand, respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against him and the Arroyo
spouses. Since the Arroyo spouses can no longer be located, summons was not served on them,
hence, only petitioner actively participated in the case.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Davao (RTC) rendered judgment against petitioner.7 The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Lim to pay the following sums.
1. The principal sum of two million pesos plus nineteen percent interest of the
outstanding principal interest due and unpaid to be computed from January 28, 1997 until
fully paid, plus two percent interest per month as penalty to be computed from February
28, 1997 until fully paid.
2. Four hundred thousand pesos as attorney's fees.
3. Thirty thousand pesos as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated July 30, 2008,
affirmed the RTC judgment with the modification that interest be computed from August 1,
1997; the penalty should start only from August 28, 1997; the award of attorney's fees is set at
10% of the total amount due; and the award for litigation expenses increased to P92,321.10.9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated June 1,
2009.
Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, where the
main issue is whether petitioner may validly be held liable for the principal debtor's loan
obtained six months after the execution of the Continuing Suretyship.
The other issues, such as the proper computation of the total indebtedness and the amount of
litigation expenses are factual matters that had been satisfactorily addressed by the CA, to wit:
(1) the CA ruled that respondent should recompute the total amount due, since the proceeds from
the foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages were deducted only on June 20, 2001,
when the public auctions were conducted on August 26, 1998 and September 7, 1999,
respectively, thus, the amount of the proceeds from the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties
should have been deducted from the amount of indebtedness on the date the public auction was
held; and (2) the CA likewise pointed out that as can be seen from the Legal Fees Form,10 the
litigation expense incurred by respondent was P92,321.10, the amount it paid as filing fee. It is
hornbook principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, hence, such issues will not be revisited
by this Court in the present petition. With regard to the propriety of making petitioner a hostile
witness, respondent is correct that the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus,
the Court will no longer address these issues which had been improperly raised in this petition
for review on certiorari.
The main issue deserves scant consideration, but the matter of the award of attorney's fees
deserves reexamination.
The nature of a suretyship is elucidated in Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Petroleum
Distributors & Service Corporation11 in this wise:
A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the
performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in
favor of another party, called the obligee. Although the contract of a surety is secondary only to a
valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although it
possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit
therefrom. This was explained in the case of Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-
Asahi Glass Corporation, where it was written:
The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but
merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless,
although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his
liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in
other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal.
x x x x
Thus, suretyship arises upon the solidary binding of a person deemed the surety with the
principal debtor for the purpose of fulfilling an obligation. A surety is considered in law as being
the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the
latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. x x x.12
In this case, what petitioner executed was a Continuing Suretyship, which the Court described in
Saludo, Jr. v. Security Bank Corporation13 as follows:
The essence of a continuing surety has been highlighted in the case of Totanes v. China Banking
Corporation in this wise:
Comprehensive or continuing surety agreements are, in fact, quite commonplace in present day
financial and commercial practice. A bank or financing company which anticipates entering into
a series of credit transactions with a particular company, normally requires the projected
principal debtor to execute a continuing surety agreement along with its sureties. By executing
such an agreement, the principal places itself in a position to enter into the projected series of
transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship agreement, there would be no need to execute
a separate surety contract or bond for each financing or credit accommodation extended to the
principal debtor.14
The terms of the Continuing Suretyship executed by petitioner, quoted earlier, are very
clear.1wphi1 It states that petitioner, as surety, shall, without need for any notice, demand or
any other act or deed, immediately become liable and shall pay "all credit accommodations
extended by the Bank to the Debtor, including increases, renewals, roll-overs, extensions,
restructurings, amendments or novations thereof, as well as (i) all obligations of the Debtor
presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the
Bank, whether direct or indirect, and
(ii) any and all expenses which the Bank may incur in enforcing any of its rights, powers and
remedies under the Credit Instruments as defined hereinbelow."15 Such stipulations are valid
and legal and constitute the law between the parties, as Article 2053 of the Civil Code provides
that "[a] guaranty may also be given as security for future debts, the amount of which is not yet
known; x x x." Thus, petitioner is unequivocally bound by the terms of the Continuing
Suretyship. There can be no cavil then that petitioner is liable for the principal of the loan,
together with the interest and penalties due thereon, even if said loan was obtained by the
principal debtor even after the date of execution of the Continuing Suretyship.
With regard to the award of attorney's fees, it should be noted that Article 2208 of the Civil Code
does not prohibit recovery of attorney's fees if there is a stipulation in the contract for payment of
the same. Thus, in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Cathay Pacific Steel
Corporation (CAPASCO),16 the Court, citing Titan Construction Corporation v. Uni-Field
Enterprises, Inc.,17 expounded as follows:
The law allows a party to recover attorney's fees under a written agreement. In Barons Marketing
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:
[T]he attorney's fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is
aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene
law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorney's fees so provided
are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.
On the other hand, the law also allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to
be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the
obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to pay
the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damages
caused by the breach.18
However, even if such attorney's fees are allowed by law, the courts still have the power to
reduce the same if it is unreasonable. In Trade & Investment Corporation of the Philippines v.
Roblett Industrial Construction Corp.,19 the Court equitably reduced the amount of attorney's
fees to be paid since interests and penalties had ballooned to thrice as much as the principal debt.
That is also the case here. The award of attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the
principal debt, plus interest and penalty charges, would definitely exceed the principal amount;
thus, making the attorney's fees manifestly exorbitant. Hence, we reduce the amount of attorney's
fees to ten percent (10%) of the principal debt only.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated July 30, 2008, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00462, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
the award of attorney's fees is reduced to ten percent (10%) of the principal debt only.
SO ORDERED.
























A.M. No. P-12-3043 January 15, 2014
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2953-P]
ATTY. MARCOS R. SUNDIANG, Complainant,
vs.
ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
The instant administrative case arose from the complaint filed by Atty. Marcos P. Sundiang,1
charging respondent Erlito DS. Bacho, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 124 RTC), with extortion, neglect of duty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
The antecedents are as follows:
Plaintiffs spouses Rene Castaneda and Nenita P. Castaeda filed a complaint for accion
publiciana against defendants Pedro and Rosie Galacan, Vicente Quesada, Pablo Quesada,
Antonio and Norma Bagares for allegedly depriving them of the use and possession of a parcel
of residential lot registered in their name, located in Camarin, Caloocan City.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision2 on October 8, 2001 in favor of the plaintiffs. The RTC
ruled, among other things, that as owners of the subject property, plaintiffs have a better right
over the property as against the defendants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants and all persons claiming right under them, directing the latter to:
1. Vacate and surrender peaceful possession to the plaintiffs of the subject property,
described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4844, located at Lot 7, Block 26,
Maligaya Park, Barangay 177, Zone 15, Purok 4, Camarin, Caloocan City;
2. Pay the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
3. Pay attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and
4. Costs of suit. Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Defendants appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision of the RTC
in its Decision dated August 5, 2003. Defendants then sought recourse before the Supreme
Court, but the Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated January 28, 2004. In a Resolution
dated March 29, 2004, the Court denied defendants motion for reconsideration with finality.
On October 20, 2004, a Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, since the defendants refused to vacate the premises and remove the structures therein,
the writ was not implemented. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion praying for the issuance of writ of
demolition. On November 12, 2004, the RTC issued the Writ of Demolition4 prayed for.
Complainant avers that prior to the issuance of the writ of demolition, respondent sheriff
demanded One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for the implementation of the writ.
Consequently, respondent sheriff received the following amounts: Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) on November 23, 2004; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on December 10, 2004;
and Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) on or about August 15, 2005. Despite receipt of the
amounts, however, respondent sheriff failed to place the plaintiffs in possession of the subject
property because he failed to remove the structures inside and in front of the subject property;
hence, ingress and egress to the property was hindered.
On the other hand, respondent sheriff averred that he received the amount of Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00) from the complainant. However, he denied that he demanded such payment
for his personal benefit. He explained that the amount was used to pay for the food and fees of
the laborers, who were hired to undertake the demolition of the concrete structures on the subject
property and those contracted to provide security for the workers during the demolition. He
found it difficult to evict the defendants because the latter employed various means to prevent
the implementation of the writ of demolition issued by the RTC. Nevertheless, respondent sheriff
claimed that he was able to fully implement the writ and that the subject property was delivered
to the possession of the plaintiffs on December 10, 2004, as evidenced by his Sheriff's Return.
After the demolition and turn-over, however, some of the defendants and unidentified persons re-
entered the subject property and reconstructed their houses thereon. Hence, the RTC found them
guilty of indirect contempt and were meted the penalty of fine. Respondent sheriff further
contended that the task of removing the shanties erected by the defendants outside the subject
property is the function of the local government concerned and no longer the duty of respondent
sheriff.
In a Resolution5 dated November 23, 2009, the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of
the RTC, Caloocan City, for investigation, report and recommendation. In her Report and
Recommendation6 dated September 22, 2010, Investigating Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe
Aguirre recommended that the complaint against respondent sheriff be dismissed for want of
evidence. Judge Trinidad-Pe Aguirre's Report was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a Memorandum7 dated November 10, 2011, the OCA recommended that respondent sheriff
be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and that he be suspended
for a period of one (1) year. The OCA found that respondent disregarded the procedural steps
laid down by Section 9 (now Section 10), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court regarding the sheriff's
expenses in executing the writ. The OCA's recommendation provides:
x x x In view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended for Your Honor's
consideration that:
1. The instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case
against respondent Sheriff ERLITO DS. BACHO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 124, Caloocan City; and
2. Respondent Sheriff Erlito DS. Bacho be found GUILTY of CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, and that the penalty of
SUSPENSION from work for a period of ONE (1) YEAR be imposed upon him.
Respectfully submitted.8
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the conclusion of the OCA that respondent sheriff violated Section 10, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, but do not agree with the recommended penalty.
In the implementation of writs or processes of the court for which expenses are to be incurred,
sheriffs are mandated to comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, the pertinent portion of which reads: Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers
and other persons serving processes.
x x x x
With regard to sheriff's expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions
or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each
kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay
said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon
approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk
of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to
effect the process, subject to liquidation with the same period for rendering a return on the
process. The liquidation shall be approved by the court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to
the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with
his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.9
It is clear from the Rule that before an interested party pays the expenses of a sheriff, the latter
should first estimate the amount which will then be submitted to the court for its approval. Upon
approval, the interested party deposits the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff.
The latter then disburses the amount to the sheriff assigned to execute the writ. Thereafter, the
amount received shall then be liquidated and any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party
making the deposit. From there on, the sheriff shall render a full report.10
The failure of the sheriff to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be
incurred in executing the writ; (2) ask for the court's approval of his estimates; (3) render an
accounting; and (4) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment
debtor,11 makes him administratively liable.
In the instant case, none of these procedures were complied with by respondent sheriff. He never
submitted an estimate to the court for approval, but, on his own, demanded and received sums of
money from the complainant. Neither did he advise the complainant that the sheriff's expenses
approved by the court should be deposited with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff.
Furthermore, no liquidation was ever submitted to the court.
It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in
the course of the performance of their duties. Nor can a sheriff request or ask sums of money
from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming that such
payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the
suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Neither will complainant's
acquiescence or consent to such expenses absolve the sheriff for his failure to secure the prior
approval of the court concerning such expense.12
Any amount received by sheriffs in excess of the lawful fees allowed in Section 10 is an
unlawful exaction.1wphi1 It constitutes unauthorized fees. This renders them liable for grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.13
Section 52 (A) (20), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service classifies conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as a grave offense, which
is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense
and by dismissal for the second offense. The Court, however, deems it appropriate to impose the
penalty of suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day, which is within the range of the penalty,
instead of the maximum penalty of one (1) year, as recommended by the OCA in light of the
circumstances surrounding the case and prevailing jurisprudence on first-time offenders of this
nature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Erlito DS. Bacho, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, is found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from service, without pay, for a period
of six 6) months and one (1) day. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.






G.R. No. 195243 August 29, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRY BERIBER
@ BONG @ RAUL FUENTES, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision
1
dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01623, which affirmed with modification the Judgment
2
dated July 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City, finding appellant Raul Beriber y
Fuentes @Jerry Fuentes y Ignacio@ Gerry Beriber@ Bong@ Raul Fuentes, guilty of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide.
On March 22, 2001, a Second Amended Information
3
was filed before the RTC of San Pablo
City charging appellant of Robbery with Homicide.
4

The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about October 3, 2000, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the premises of SPOUSES HENRY
and MA. LOURDES VERGARA, located at Brgy. San Cristobal, this city, and once inside and
finding an opportune time, did then and there take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to P 2,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Spouses Henry and Ma. Lourdes Vergara,
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons and by reason of or on the occasion of
said robbery, said accused attacked and stabbed to death his immediate employer Ma. Lourdes
Vergara with a bladed weapon with which the accused was then conveniently provided, thereby
inflicting wounds upon the person of said Ma. Lourdes Vergara which caused her immediate
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

When arraigned on April 17, 2001, appellant, with the assistance of a counsel de oficio, entered a
plea of not guilty.
6

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution is aptly summarized by the Solicitor General in the Appellees
Brief as follows:
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, as well as documentary evidence to prove its case.
The first witness for the prosecution was Dr. Lucy Andal Celino (Celino), the physician who
examined the remains of the victim, Lourdes Vergara. Celino is the Health Officer of San Pablo
City. She testified that she conducted a necropsy of the victim on October 3, 2000 at 4:15 p.m.,
and that she prepared a Necropsy Report which states that the victim died of shock and
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds all over her body, some of which damaged her
heart, lungs, and liver. Celino also stated that the location of stab wounds, abrasions and
lacerations on the victims body indicated that the latter struggled against her killer. The
physician added that the perpetrator used two kinds of instruments in inflicting wounds on the
victim: a sharp-pointed instrument and a pointed rounded instrument.
On cross-examination, Celino confirmed that the wounds sustained by the victim were inflicted
using two different pointed instruments.
The prosecution also presented police officer Armando Demejes (Demejes), who testified that
while he was on duty on October 3, 2000, he went to the house of Henry Vergara (Henry) in
Barangay San Cristobal, San Pablo City to investigate a stabbing incident which occurred
thereat.
When Demejes arrived at the scene of the crime, Vergara informed him that his wife, Lourdes,
was stabbed to death. Demejes entered the house and saw a cadaver lying on a bamboo bed. He
also looked around the house and saw that the place was in disarray. In the sala, about five to six
meters away from the corpse, was an open drawer containing coins, and on the floor near the
said drawer were more coins. Another drawer was pulled out from its original location and left
on a couch. Demejes likewise found a blue tote bag on top of the center of the table and a
passbook on top of the bed. He also saw that the door leading to the stairs was open. Demejes
prepared a sketch of the crime scene to document what he saw during his investigation.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Neville Bomiel (Bomiel), a resident of Barangay San
Cristobal, San Pablo City. Bomiel testified that he had known the appellant for less than a month
prior to October 3, 2000. He knew that the appellant was working for the Vergaras and resided at
the latters rice mill. Bomiel recalled that while he was standing in front of his house in the
morning of October 3, 2000, at around 10:00 a.m., he saw the appellant leave the house of the
Vergaras and walk towards the direction of the school. When appellant passed by Bomiels
house, he asked appellant where the latter was going. Appellant replied that he was on his way to
Batangas for medical treatment. Bomiel noticed that appellant was wearing a yellow collared t-
shirt, blue denims, and shoes. Later, he saw appellant return to the house of the Vergaras and
enter the place. Afterwards, appellant left the house and passed by Bomiels residence a second
time. Bomiel again greeted the appellant and asked him why he (appellant) had not yet left for
Batangas. Appellant replied that he was still waiting for Henry. Appellant again proceeded to the
direction of the school. Subsequently, Bomiel saw the appellant return to the house of the
Vergaras a third time. That was the last time Bomiel saw him. Bomiel observed that on that day,
appellant looked restless. ("balisa at hindi mapakali.")
The fourth witness for the prosecution, Rolando Aquino (Aquino), likewise a resident of
Barangay San Cristobal, San Pablo City, testified that he had known appellant for less than a
month on October 3, 2000. He knew the appellant was hired by the Vergaras as a helper in their
rice mill.
In the morning of October 3, 2000, Aquino was able to talk to the appellant at the house of a
certain Lola Rosy, the victims mother. Appellant told Aquino that he was going to Batangas that
day for medical treatment. Thereafter, appellant, then wearing short pants and a t-shirt with cut-
off sleeves, left the house of Lola Rosy to go [to] the rice mill. At around 8:30 a.m., Aquino
again saw appellant at Lola Rosys house, but appellant was already wearing a mint green-
colored shirt and khaki pants. Aquino asked appellant why he had not yet left, but the latter did
not answer and appeared restless. Later that morning, at around 11:30 a.m., Aquino learned that
Lourdes had been killed. He rushed to the house of the Vergaras and saw the victim lying on a
bamboo bed, drenched in blood. Aquino then noticed that the appellants personal belongings
which were kept by the appellant underneath the bamboo bed were no longer there. He further
testified that he did not see appellant return to San Cristobal after October 3, 2000.
Henry Vergara also testified before the trial court. He said that he and the victim hired appellant
as a helper in their rice mill in September 2000. Appellant slept in the house of Henrys mother-
in-law, Rosy, but kept his personal belongings in their house (the Vergaras house), specifically
under the bamboo bed where Lourdes corpse was discovered on October 3, 2000 at past 11:00
a.m.
At around 5:30 in the morning of October 3, 2000, appellant asked Henry for permission to go to
Batangas. Henry asked appellant to fetch a certain Junjun to be his replacement as Henrys
helper in their store in Dolores, Quezon that day. Henry left their house in San Cristobal at 6:00
a.m. to tend their store in Quezon and stayed in the store until 11:00 a.m. before heading back
home.
When he arrived at their house in San Cristobal, he noticed that the door was slightly open. He
called for Lourdes, but nobody answered. He immediately entered their house and saw that the
door of their rice mill was closed. This caused him to suspect that something was wrong. He then
noticed that coins were scattered on the floor. He proceeded to the kitchen and saw Lourdes
lying on the bamboo bed, lifeless and bloodied in the chest and stomach areas.
Henry thereafter ran to the house of his brother-in-law, Wanito Avanzado (Avanzado), who also
resided in San Cristobal. Henry told Avanzado that Lourdes was already dead. Avanzado then
ran to the house of the Vergaras.
Henry recalled that before he left for their store in Quezon that day, he left appellant, his wife
and their children in their house. He also remembered that cash amounting to Two Thousand
Pesos (P 2,000.00) was left inside the drawer in their rice mill. However, when he looked for the
money after he discovered that his wife was killed, he could no longer find it.
Henry also testified that he did not see the appellant in their house when he went home from
Quezon and that appellants personal effects were no longer under the bamboo bed where
appellant used to keep them. He did not see appellant anymore after he left their house on
October 3, 2000.
Lastly, the prosecution presented as witness Avanzado, the brother of the victim. Avanzado
testified that at around 11:00 a.m. on October 3, 2000, he saw his brother-in-law, Henry, running
towards his (Avanzados) house and shouting "Si Aloy", the victims nickname. He ran to the
house of the Vergaras and saw his sisters bloodied body on the bamboo bed.
Avanzado tried to lift her body, but her neck was already stiff. After he was sure that Lourdes
was indeed dead, he called up the police and requested them to investigate the incident. When
the police arrived, they took pictures of the crime scene and conducted an investigation.
Avanzado further stated that he knew that the appellant was a helper of the Vergaras. He said
that he was told by several residents of San Cristobal that they saw appellant leaving the scene of
the crime with a bag.
He also narrated that as Barangay Chairman of San Cristobal, he coordinated with the police for
the apprehension of the appellant. Avanzado went with some police officers to Talisay, Batangas
to search for appellant in the house of his uncle, but appellant was not there. Later, Avanzado
received information that appellant was apprehended in Capiz, but was released by police
authorities because the latter were worried that they would be charged with illegal detention.
Avanzado then sought the assistance of the staff of Kabalikat, a program aired by the ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Company. Appellant was subsequently apprehended and brought back to San Pablo
City to face the charge against him.
7

Except for Dr. Celino, the defense waived its right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.
Appellant's counsel further waived the presentation of evidence.
8
Both parties failed to file their
respective memoranda despite being ordered to do so; thus, the RTC resolved the case on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
On October 22, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision,
9
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
accused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRY
BERIBER @ "Bong", @ "Raul Fuentes" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and
he is hereby sentenced the supreme and capital penalty of DEATH, with costs.
He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased:
a) the sum of P 50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the sum of P 2,000.00 representing the stolen cash;
c) the sum of P 200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
d) the sum of P 100,000.00 representing burial and other incidental expenses of the
victim.
SO ORDERED.
10

The case was then elevated to us on automatic review. However, in a Decision
11
dated June 8,
2004, we had set aside the Judgment of the RTC and remanded the case to the same court for
further proceedings. The fallo of our Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in
Criminal Case No. 12621-SP (00), is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the case
REMANDED to said court for its proper disposition, including the conduct of further appropriate
proceedings and the reception of evidence. For this purpose, the proper law enforcement officers
are directed to TRANSFER appellant RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES from the New Bilibid
Prison where he is presently committed to the BJMP Jail in San Pablo City, with adequate
security escort, where he shall be DETAINED for the duration of the proceedings in the trial
court.
The Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32 is directed to dispose of the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
12

In compliance, the RTC scheduled the case for hearing. On July 27, 2004, appellant's same
counsel submitted a Manifestation that the defense is again waiving its right not to adduce
evidence and with appellant's conformity. On August 10, 2004, appellant's counsel reiterated her
manifestation. The RTC then ordered to place appellant on the stand, wherein appellant stood
firm not to present any evidence for his defense.
13

The RTC then forwarded to us the transcripts and the records of the proceedings held on August
10, 2004. In a Resolution
14
dated January 18,2005, we ordered the RTC to render its decision on
the case based on the evidence that had been presented.
On July 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting appellant of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide based on circumstantial evidence, the dispositive portion which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
accused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @ GERRY
BERIBER @ "Bong," @ "Raul Fuentes" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and
considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance which merits the imposition of the
maximum penalty of death, and conformably with Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall
be applied, accused RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y IGNACIO @
GERRY BERIBER @ "Bong," @ "Raul Fuentes" is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA with costs.
He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased:
a) the sum of P 50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b) the sum of P 2,000.00 representing the stolen cash;
c) the sum of P 200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
d) the sum of P 100,000.00 representing burial and other incidental expenses of the
victim.
SO ORDERED.
15

In so ruling, the RTC enumerated the pieces of circumstantial evidence which established
appellant's culpability for the crime charged, to wit:
x x x 1. accused was at the locus criminis at around the time of the stabbing incident; 2.
witnesses testified seeing him at the scene of the crime going in and going out of the house of the
victim at the time of the perpetration of the crime; 3. accused, in his own admission mentioned
that he was going to Batangas for medical treatment, however, when the policemen, together
with the Barangay Chairman went to Talisay, Batangas where he lives, he was nowhere to be
found; 4. immediately after the incident, the witnesses and the offended party noticed that all his
clothes kept underneath the bamboo bed where the victim was found sprouted with blood were
all gone because he took everything with him although his intention was merely for medical
treatment in Batangas; 5. he mentioned that he was then still waiting for Kuya Henry, husband of
Lourdes, when he had already a talk with Henry Vergara that he will go to Batangas for medical
treatment that did not materialize; 6. after the killing incident, accused simply disappeared and
did not return anymore; 7. when he was confronted by Henry Vergara concerning the killing, he
could not talk to extricate himself from the accusation; and 8. that he has been using several
aliases to hide his true identity.
16

Appellant filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA). The Solicitor General filed his
Appellee's Brief praying that except for the modification of the damages awarded, the RTC
decision be affirmed.
On July 9, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which affirmed with modification the RTC
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Judgment dated July 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 12621-SP (00) finding
Raul Beriber y Fuentes, @ Jerry Fuentes y Ignacio, @ Gerry Beriber, @ "Bong,"@ "Raul
Fuentes" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, for which he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that
the damages to be awarded the heirs of Ma. Lourdes Vergara shall be: a) P 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; b) P 2,000.00 as actual damages; c) P 25,000.00 as temperate damages; and d) P
50,000.00 as moral damages.
17

Appellant filed his Appeal with us. In a Resolution
18
dated March 9, 2011, we required the
parties to file their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. Both parties filed their
Manifestations stating that they were dispensing with the filing of Supplemental Briefs as their
Briefs earlier filed were sufficient.
19

Appellant's lone assignment of error alleges that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
20

Appellant contends that to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is
necessary that robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the
crime which was not established in this case. He argues that the eight (8) circumstantial evidence
found by the RTC can be summarized into two circumstances, i.e., (1) the appellant was at the
scene of the crime at approximately the same time that the crime was committed; and (2) that he
fled the locus criminis thereafter. He claims that the first circumstance cannot be taken against
him, since it is natural for him to be at the victim's house as he resides therein. As to the second
circumstance, appellant claims that witnesses even testified that he told them that he was going
to Batangas for a medical check-up, thus, the finding that he fled the crime scene is a conclusion
without sufficient basis; and that assuming he indeed escaped and flight be an indication of guilt,
such circumstance is not enough to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We find no merit in the appeal.
The crime for which appellant was charged and convicted was robbery with homicide. It is a
special complex crime against property.
21

Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of
the robbery. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: (a) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property
belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with intent to gain;
and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, which is used in the
generic sense, was committed.
22

Admittedly, there was no direct evidence to establish appellant's commission of the crime
charged. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt.
23
At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since
to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to the community.
24
Thus, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on
circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused. We have ruled that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an
accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
25

We agree with the RTC as affirmed by the CA that the circumstantial evidence proven by the
prosecution sufficiently establishes that appellant committed the offense charged.
The prosecution had established that around 6:00 a.m. of October 3, 2000, Henry went to his
store in Dolores, Quezon, leaving his wife (the victim) and appellant in their house at Barangay
San Cristobal, San Pablo City. He remembered leaving a cash amounting to P 2,000.00 inside the
drawer in their rice mill.
26
Around 10:00 a.m., Bomiel, the victim's neighbor who lived around
15 to 20 meters from the victim's house, saw appellant leave the house. When appellant passed
by his house, Bomiel asked the former where he was going to, which appellant answered that he
was going to Batangas for a medical treatment. Later, Bomiel saw appellant return to the victim's
house and left after a while. When appellant passed by his house again, Bomiel asked appellant
why he had not yet left for Batangas, to which appellant answered that he was waiting for Kuya
Henry and went ahead. After a while, Bomiel saw appellant again going back to the victim's
house.
27
Around 11:00 a.m., Henry, who came back from his store in Dolores, entered their
house and found his lifeless wife with several stab wounds lying on a bamboo bed. Henry saw
drawers and coins scattered on the floor, and the drawer, where he put the P 2,000.00 cash which
was nowhere to be found, was pulled out.
28

Appellant, who was supposed to have gone to Batangas for a medical treatment on the same day,
never came back. In fact, appellant's belongings, which were kept under the bamboo bed where
the victim's body was found lying, were no longer there when the incident was discovered.
29

Moreover, when the victim's brother, Avanzado, went to the house of appellant's uncle in
Batangas, appellant was nowhere to be found. Appellant was later apprehended in October 2000
in Capiz, so Avanzado went to Capiz to verify this but appellant was already released as the
police feared that they might be charged with illegal detention. Notably, appellant knew that he
was being arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide, yet he did not present himself to the
authorities or to the victim's family to establish that he had nothing to do with the crime. In fact,
he was not seen by the victim's family since the incident and it was only on March 25, 2001,
after he was again apprehended in Capiz and brought to San Pablo City that Henry saw him at
the police station.
30
These circumstances denote flight. The flight of an accused, in the absence
of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be
established, for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to
defend himself and assert his innocence.
31

Appellant offered no explanation on why he never returned to his employer after his alleged
medical treatment in Batangas and why he was in Capiz when arrested. In fact, worth quoting
was the narration of the RTC in its decision on what transpired during the hearing of August 10,
2004, thus:
x x x The Court found the accused to be firm in his stand not to present any evidence as both
manifested by his counsel and by himself. The Court therefore ordered the accused Raul Beriber
y Fuentes to be placed on the witness stand and questions were propounded on him by the Court.
x x x he reiterated his stand on waiver to present evidence as his defense; when asked by the
Court why, he answered "none"; he does not know of any reason why he should defend himself
despite the fact that the charge against him is very serious and punishable by death; he could not
tell of any reason why he would not like to bring out his defense in this case; he is aware that by
not presenting and waiving his right to present evidence for his defense, he knew that he could be
sentenced to death as the Court did.
32

Although appellants silence and refusal to testify, let alone refusal to present evidence, cannot
be construed as evidence of guilt, we have consistently held that the fact that an accused never
testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against him goes against the principle that
"the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at
the first opportune time."
33

Appellant's contention that there is no evidence of robbery is devoid of merit.1wphi1 The
element of taking and the existence of the money stolen by appellant were adequately established
by the prosecution. Henry positively testified that he left P 2,000.00 in the drawer in the ricemill
in the morning of October 3, 2000 which was no longer found upon discovery of his wife's
lifeless body.
34
Moreover, Investigator Demejes testified that when he came to the crime scene,
he saw the place in disarray, i.e., drawers and coins were scattered on the floor, another drawer
was pulled out from its original location and left on a couch; and that a blue tote bag was also
seen on top of a table and a passbook on top of the bed.
35
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may
be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. The prosecution was able
to establish that the motive for killing the victim was robbery.
Appellant's argument that it was natural for him to be at the house of the victim at around the
time of the incident as he lives there does not persuade. True, the mere presence of appellant at
the scene is inadequate to support the conclusion that he committed the crime.
36
However, his
presence there becomes an indicium of his commission of the offense when coupled with his
unexplained act of fleeing from the situs instead of reporting the incident to the police
authorities, as well as with his act of hiding until he was arrested.
37
Taken together, the foregoing
circumstances are highly indicative of guilt.
38

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 9, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01623, which affirmed with modification the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, finding appellant Raul Beriber y Fuentes@ Jerry Fuentes y Ignacio@
Gerry Beriber @ Bong @ Raul Fuentes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 164435 June 29, 2010
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
1
dated November 11, 2009 and
respondent's Comment
2
thereto dated March 5, 2010.
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for bigamy.
Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages
were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29
of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage.
Petitioner's argument lacks merit.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,
3
the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of
the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason
is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
4

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
5
the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of
Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite usually the marriage license and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy. x x x
6
lawphil
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall
never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code
should not be applied to her case, cannot be upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009
is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 180069 March 5, 2014
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now BDO UNIBANK, INC.),
Petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO P. FRANCO, substituted by his heirs, namely: MAURICIA P. FRANCO,
FLORIBEL P. FRANCO, AND ALEXANDER P. FRANC0,1 Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the July
31, 2007 Decision2 and October 4, 2007 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 82340, which affirmed the October 21, 2003 Decision4 of the Makati City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61.
The pertinent facts, as narrated by the trial court and as adopted both by the CA, as well as
petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (Bank),5 are as follows:
This is an action for damages filed [on September 5, 2000] by plaintiff Arturo P. Franco against
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), now known as Equitable-PCIBank, and
Equitable Banking Corp.
The complaint essentially alleges, among others, that plaintiff secured from defendant PCIB the
following Trust Indenture Certificates:
Number Issued Maturity Amount Interest
094846 (Exh. "B") Dec. 8, 1986 Jan. 7, 1987 P100,000.00 8.75% p.a.
135928 (Exh. "C") Jan. 19, 1987 Feb. 18, 1987 P850,594.54 7.75% p.a.
205007 (Exh. "D") May 13, 1987 June 15, 1987 P500,000.00 8.50% p.a.
205146 (Exh. "E") July 15, 1987 Aug 14, 1987 P502,958.90 9.25% p.a.
that despite demands, defendants refused and still refuses to return to plaintiff the trust amounts,
plus the stipulated interest[;] that in all of the trust transactions that defendant PCIB had entered
into with the plaintiff, defendant PCIB represented to plaintiff that[,] in making the trust
investment, plaintiff was actually providing for his future since the money invested was going to
be managed and administered by their PCIB-Trust Services Group and will be commingled,
pooled and automatically rolled- over for better investment return; that believing the
representation of the bank, the plaintiff invested his lifetime savings in the hope that the
defendant bank will actually provide for their future by reinvesting and rolling-over their
investment automatically, without any need for the plaintiff to take any further action; that on the
few occasions that plaintiff had visited the defendant bank to request for a status on his
investments, bank officers would normally pull out his (sic) ledger card and show plaintiff the
updated amount due him; that sometime in 1995, plaintiff discovered that one of his children had
leukemia and[,] in the ensuing hospitalization and treatment, plaintiff spent a lot of money; that
because his funds were already exhausted, plaintiff then turned to his Trust Indenture Certificates
and started inquiring as to how he could liquidate the trust; that in the beginning, defendant bank
constantly asked for time to look for his records, at one time [on June 18, 1998], promising to
have an answer before July 15, 1998, then writing plaintiff on May 18, 2000 saying that the bank
[had] coordinated with their Branch and Trust Department but that it might take [some time] to
retrieve their records; [and] that to plaintiffs surprise, on June 22, 2000, he received a letter
signed by defendants counsel, Curato Divina & Partners, in effect denying plaintiffs request for
payment by stating that due to the conversion of all outstanding PCIBank trust indenture
accounts into common trust certificates, all such PCIBank trust indenture certificates have been
rendered "null and void." Plaintiff prays for the payment of the amounts under the Trust
Indenture Certificates, plus interest, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In their Answer, defendants admit the issuance by defendant PCIB of the Trust Indenture
Certificates subject matter of the complaint, but deny the allegation that the investments subject
of the Trust Indenture Certificates are automatically rolled-over as such certificates have their
own fixed term and maturity date, and that the present action had already prescribed.
As stated in the Pre-Trial Order issued by this court on 15 February 2002, the following issues
were defined and agreed upon by the parties, to wit:
1. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the relief he seeks; and
2. Whether or not the cause of action as exerted (sic) by the defendant has already
prescribed.
Plaintiff presented as its witness plaintiff Arturo P. Franco himself [who] testified, among
others[:] that he is the proprietor of Fair Marketing Freight Services[,] which is the investor
named in Trust Indenture Certificate 094846; that[,] in 1986, he decided to save up for his
retirement and to invest his hard earned money; that he was then 51 years old and his choice was
to deposit his funds with defendant PCIB which later on merged with defendant Equitable
Banking Corp. and is now known as Equitable PCIBank; that he chose defendant PCIB for the
latters representation that by making such investment, he was actually providing for his future
since his investment would be commingled, pooled and automatically rolled-over for better
investment return and which will provide for his needs upon retirement, without need for him to
take any further action; that he was a loyal client of the defendants from 1986 up to 1997; that he
entered into a trust agreement with defendant PCIB for which the latter issued subject Trust
Indenture Certificates ([TICs], for brevity); that sometime in 1997, when he was then 62 years
old, he [tried] to encash the trust indenture certificates only to be given a run-around by the
defendants; that sometime in 1995, his son, Arthur, was diagnosed to be afflicted with leukemia
and eventually died on October 24, 1997; that because of his sons illness, he was forced to go to
defendants and try to encash his trust indenture certificates but was denied by defendant bank;
that in a letter dated June 22, 2000, defendants, through their counsel, informed plaintiff that the
subject [TICs] are "null and void"; that when he received the letter of June 22, 2000, he was at
first speechless and totally defeated and at a loss; that he and his wife begun to experience
sleepless nights, became anxious because their hope to secure their life in their old age had fallen
apart[;] that instead of just enjoying a secured life with his wife and enjoying his grandchildren
and spending more time with the Lord, he was now in debt and burdened with the fact that his
lifetime savings just disappeared before his very eyes without a trace; [and] that plaintiff was
constrained to file this case and [spend] P22,117.80 in filing fees, to engage the services of
counsel for the amount of P50,000.00 with appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing, and that he
suffered moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00.
The foregoing facts were not rebutted by defendants. The court finds the witness and his
testimony credible as the witness testified in a simple and straightforward manner. Upon
admission of plaintiffs exhibits, plaintiff rested his case.
The defendants presented Cecilia P. Soriano and Antonio M. Fortuno as their witnesses.
Cecilia P. Soriano, Operations Officer of defendant Equitable-PCIBank, testified that she came
to know plaintiff in 1987 when she was assigned at PCIB Gil Puyat Branch; that plaintiff was
one of the banks valued clients[;] and that plaintiff secured the [TICs] subject matter of the
complaint. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that she has seen only the photocopies of
plaintiffs [TICs]; that she had no direct dealing with plaintiff regarding the [TICs] and she had
no idea what happened to plaintiffs [TICs] after their respective maturity dates; [and] that
valued clients of the bank were given special privileges, such as allowing these clients to
withdraw or encash [TICs] or investments over the phone[,] but she did not receive any call from
plaintiff withdrawing or encashing the plaintiffs [TICs].
The testimony of their next witness, Antonio Martin S. Fortuno, was offered to prove, among
others, that [TICs] expired upon maturity and after which, they were automatically rolled-over.
Antonio Martin S. Fortuno, Operations Officer of defendant Equitable-PCIBank, testified that he
is familiar with the Trust Indenture Certificates issued by defendant bank; that when a client
would like to secure a Trust Indenture Certificate from the bank, they would ask the client,
among others, to sign [roll-over] agreement/rules and regulations; that when a client would like
to withdraw his proceeds from the certificate upon maturity, they follow the following steps: (1)
they retrieve the old certificates from client, (2) they have [the] client sign on the back portion of
the certificate, (3) they prepare mode of payment MC or credit to other accounts, and (4) they
file the paid certificate to paid/roll-over file; that if the holder of a certificate does not withdraw
the placement upon maturity, they replace the old certificate with a new one; that if the client is
at the branch, the old certificate is replaced with a new certificate, have the client sign at the
register copy, then stamp the old certificate as Old Certificate-Stamp rolled-over/replaced; that if
the client is not at the branch, they replace the old certificate with a new certificate and stamped
with rolled-over; that certificates have fixed maturity dates; that interest rates stated in the
certificates vary as they go either up or down depending on the prevailing bank rates as provided
by the Trust Department; that[,] in 1992[,] all existing Trust Indenture Certificates were
converted into Common Trust Funds; [and] that he is not aware of any Trust Indenture
Certificate belonging to plaintiff which were converted into Common Trust Funds in 1992.
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he is familiar with Trust Indenture Certificates;
that Trust Indenture Certificates have been converted into Common Trust Funds; that the change
is only in name because they have the same features and that the only difference is that Common
Trust Funds are classified into several product types depending on the limit of the amount of
investment; that there is nothing in the certificate that says it has a roll-over feature; that,
however, if the certificate expires and the client does not claim or withdraw his funds or
surrender the certificate, they roll-over the funds of the client; that if a guest comes with the
original Trust Indenture Certificate without any stamp as being taken or cancelled, the bank
should verify with the outstanding copy because the bank should have an outstanding copy of
that Trust Indenture Certificate; that he is not aware that the Trust Indenture Certificates of the
plaintiff were verified with their records; and that he does not know whether plaintiffs Trust
Indenture Certificates were actually paid out by the bank to plaintiff.
Defendants did not conduct any re-direct.6
On October 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and ordering defendant Philippine Commercial International Bank, now known as
Equitable-PCIBank, to pay plaintiff the following:
1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum of P100,000.00, plus the stipulated interest of
8.75% per annum for the period December 8, 1986 to January 7, 1987, plus interest of
6% per annum from January 8, 1987 until fully paid;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P840,594.54, plus the stipulated interest of
7.75% per annum for the period January 19, 1987 to February 18, 1987, plus interest of
6% per annum from February 19, 1987 until fully paid;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, the sum of P500,000.00, plus the stipulated interest of
8.50% per annum for the period May 13, 1987 to June 15, 1987, plus interest of 6% per
annum from June 16, 1987 until fully paid;
4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, the sum of P502,958.90, plus the stipulated interest of
9.25% per annum for the period July 15, 1987 to August 14, 1987, plus interest of 6% per
annum from August 15, 1987 until fully paid;
5. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
6. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
7. Attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P3,000.00 for every hearing
attended; and
8. P22,117.80 as reimbursement for filing fees.
The case against Equitable Banking Corporation is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.7
Considering that the four TICs have not been replaced or cancelled, the RTC held that the
relationship of express trust between petitioner Bank and respondent still subsists at the time the
latter demanded the withdrawal of his funds under them. While the TICs contain a maturity date,
the court opined that the same refers only to the gross income expectation or the applicable
interest rate because the funds are automatically rolled-over with varying interest rates depending
on the prevailing interest rates as determined by petitioners Trust Department. With respect,
however, to the interest rate applicable after the stipulated maturity dates, the court deemed it fair
and reasonable to impose the legal rate of interest for want of evidence on the prevailing rate at
the time of roll-over. Finally, the court found that petitioner Bank is in bad faith in its dealings
with respondent when it unilaterally declared despite claiming that respondent was one of its
valued clients the TICs as null and void by reason of their conversion to Common Trust Funds
in 1991. The absence of good faith was made more manifest when Fortuno testified that the trust
indenture certificate and common trust fund have the same features and the only difference is in
the name and classification of the amount of investment.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. According to the appellate court, Soriano could not
have possibly known if respondent indeed withdrew any or all of his participation in the subject
TICS, because by her very own admission during the cross-examination, she did not have any
direct dealing with him with respect to the TICs at the time they matured or even thereafter.
Likewise, petitioner Bank failed to adduce any documentary evidence to establish the alleged
fact that the four TICs were already paid or cancelled, or that respondents participation therein
was already withdrawn. Further, respondents testimony that he gave verbal instructions to
petitioner Bank to roll-over his investment upon their maturity was bolstered by Fortunos
admission in open court that it has been petitioner Banks practice to roll-over investments which
remain unclaimed after their maturity even without instruction from their owners. With all these
findings, the CA concluded that the claim of respondent is not yet barred by prescription, since
the maturity dates of the four TICs did not terminate the express trust created between the
parties.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but the CA acted unfavorably; hence, this
petition.
We deny.
Upon perusal of the entire case records, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA
in sustaining the RTC Decision. Considering the evidence at hand, both courts have applied the
law in accordance with the facts of the case.
A quick point, however, on the issue of alleged payment by petitioner Bank on the subject trust
certificate indentures.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it.8 Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.9 When the
creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove non-payment for it is
presumed.10 The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been
discharged by payment.11
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject TICs strongly supports
his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the money
placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of
indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid. Petitioner Bank could have
easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim, but it did not. In its omission, it may
be reasonably deduced that no evidence to that effect really exist. Worse, the testimonies of
petitioner Bank's own witnesses, reinforce, rather than belie, respondent's allegations of non-
payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The July 31, 2007
Decision and October 4, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82340,
which affirmed the October 21, 2003 Decision of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner Corazon
Macapagal of the crime of Estafa;2 the Order denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June 29, 2010 denying her Notice of Appeal,5 in Criminal
Case No. 98-166722.
For a proper perspective, a brief statement of the factual and procedural antecedents of the case
follows:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the
value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.6 Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order
dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly
filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for
having been filed out of time.8
Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-
APPELLANT.
II.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA.
III.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED
BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9
We deny the petition.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities
which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It appears that petitioner assails
not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her
conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail,
because of petitioners complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the
rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
x x x x
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
x x x x
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal
itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower
courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order
denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be
taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order
disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a
special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition
under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright
dismissal.12
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow the
requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance
may well be fatal to the clients cause.13
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties
the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be
directed.15 Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and
compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in
this case.16
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this
Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of
estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of
procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her
notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must
contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition.19
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the
petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings,
transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to the issues
presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the Rules and
the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15, 2010, the Court
required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x x
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on the
RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid certification of non-
forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing
that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as required under
Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc
Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsels contact
details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within
five (5) days from notice. x x x22
Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her counsel
to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance. Records
likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondents Comment to the petition.
On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and asked
for more time within which to comply with the Courts resolution, because of heavy workload
and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution23
dated
August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished
petitioners counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the
required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsels explanation why he should not
be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners counsel claimed that he could not prepare the required
reply because the documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise,
pointed out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that
point.24 After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for not complying with the Courts resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate
with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and
responsibilities as counsel on record.25 In a Resolution26 dated December 10, 2012, we required
petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.1wphi1
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice.27 It is the duty of the counsel to make
sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate
jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal.28 Any error in compliance may be fatal to
the client's cause.29 It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.30 The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with
numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to
facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.





A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 March 5, 2014
[Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ]
MA. LIZA M. JORDA, City Prosecutor's Office, Tacloban City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377
[Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ]
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before this Court are Consolidated Complaints dated March 29, 20111 and March 25, 20112
filed by Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao, Office of the City Prosecutor, Tacloban City and Ma. Liza M.
Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor, Tacloban City, respectively, against respondent Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7,
Tacloban City, for Grave Abuse of Authority, Irregularity in the Performance of Official Duties,
Bias and Partiality, relative to Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537,3 2009-11-538, 2009-11-539
entitled People v. Danilo Miralles, et al.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ
City Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao,
Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S.
Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City
The complaint stemmed from Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537; 2009-11-538 and 2009-11-5394
for Qualified Trafficking and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610, which were filed against Danilo Miralles (Miralles), et al. before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Complainant alleged that on January 15, 2010, accused Miralles, through counsel, filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an order taking cognizance of the
same and directed Prosecutor Anthea G. Macalalag to file her comment on the motion. The
prosecution then filed its comment/opposition and moved for the issuance of the required
warrant for the arrest of Miralles. No warrant of arrest was issued against Miralles.
On February 2, 2011, respondent judge issued an Order which states:
After the prosecution presented their witnesses, the Court finds that there is probable cause to
hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208 and, therefore, the court orders
Lynna Brito y Obligar to file a bail bond of Forty Thousand Pesos (PhpP40,000.00) for her
temporary liberty. Danilo Miralles is, likewise, ordered to put up a bail bond of Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00) for each of the three (3) cases.
Subsequently, on February 4, 2011, Sheriff Jose Cabcabin of the Office of the RTC Clerk of
Court issued a certification that Miralles surrendered to him to avail of his right to bail. The cash
bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00 was approved by respondent judge on the same day.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated mandatory
provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused
Miralles, who was charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal offenses. As early as November
19, 2009, criminal complaints against Miralles for Qualified Trafficking were already filed, yet
respondent judge never issued a warrant of arrest for Miralles despite accused's presence during
the court hearings.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles even
without any petition for the fixing of bail. In fact, complainant reiterated that even after
respondent judge found probable cause to hold accused Miralles for trial, he did not order the
arrest of the accused. Instead, respondent judge summarily granted a reduced bail in the absence
of a motion to fix bail and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to interpose its
objections. Complainant claimed that such acts of respondent judge were evident of his bias
towards accused Miralles.
In his Answer, respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court
was still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused
for trial. He explained that Miralles had always made himself available during the hearings for
the determination of probable cause; thus, the court already acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.
After the hearing for the determination of probable cause, the court ruled that there is no strong
evidence presented by the prosecution. On February 4, 2011, accused Danilo Miralles
surrendered to Sheriff Jose Cabcabin and posted P40,000.00 bail for each of the three (3) cases,
or a total of P120,000.00.
Respondent judge claimed that there was no more need for a petition for bail, because in the
judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the evidence against accused was
weak.5
Respondent judge further averred that complainant did not know the facts of the case and
whether the evidence for the prosecution is strong, yet he was faulted for granting bail and for
not issuing a warrant of arrest. He stressed that when the court has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, there is no more need to issue a warrant of arrest. Respondent judge
pointed out that Miralles always made himself available, hence, he believed that the ends of
justice had not been frustrated. He insisted that there is no anomaly in the procedure because a
warrant of arrest will be issued only upon the finding of probable cause. In this case, however, he
was able to post his bail bond before a warrant of arrest can be issued against him. Thus, the
warrant of arrest had become fait accompli.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3625-RTJ
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Associate City
Prosecutor, Tacloban City v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City
This complaint, borne from the same criminal cases, has substantially the same facts involving
accused Danilo Miralles referred to in A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ.
Complainant, Prosecutor Liza M. Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor, alleged that during the
hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Commitment of the minor victim Margie Baldoza, to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), respondent judge propounded a series
of questions which appeared to mitigate Miralles' role in the crime charged. The pertinent portion
of which is quoted as follows:
Q. Did you see Danny shouting at you and get angry as what you have stated in the record of the
court?
A. No.
x x x x
Q. In other words, you are only for a presumption that it is Danny who is getting angry where in
fact you have seen him at anytime?
A. It was Lynna whom he was [scolding] because the women under her are stubborn.
Q. You have seen him scolding to (sic) your nanay Lynna?
A. She would be called to the room in the Office and there she would be scolded.
Q. You have not seen nanay Lynna and Danny Miralles in the office, you have not seen them?
A. No.
Q. Never have you (sic) seen them?
A. No.
Q. So did you come to the conclusion that she [was] being scolded by Danny Miralles?
A. Yes.6
Complainant pointed out that respondent judge's line of questions went beyond judicial authority
and discretion. Upon investigation, complainant claimed to have discovered that the family
members of respondent judge are close associates of Miralles.
Prompted by said events, complainant filed a motion for inhibition on December 14, 2009
against respondent judge. Respondent judge denied the motion. During the hearing on December
15, 2009, complainant alleged that respondent judge publicly humiliated her and exhibited his
anger and animosity towards her for filing the motion for inhibition.7 Respondent judge was
quoted saying, among others things, that:
"I dont want to see your face! Why did you file the motion for inhibition when it should have
been Attorney Sionne Gaspay who should have filed the same[?]"
"You better transfer to another court! You are being influenced by politicians. I am not a close
family friend of the Miralles(es), it is my sister who is now in the United States who was close to
the Miralles(es)."
"So you are questioning the integrity of this court, you better transfer to another court."
"I dont want to see your face."8
Complainant added that when she was supposed to conduct the cross-examination, respondent
judge stated off-the-record: "I dont want you to participate anymore," and refused to allow her
to do the cross-examination.
In support of her allegation, complainant presented the Joint Affidavit9 of Carmela D. Bastes and
Marilou S. Nacilla, social workers who were present during the December 15, 2009 hearing of
the subject case, and corroborated that indeed respondent judge uttered the abovementioned
statements to complainant in open court in the presence of court personnel and the lawyers of the
parties.
Due to the continued hostility of respondent judge towards complainant during the subsequent
hearings of the case, complainant opted to transfer to another court, pursuant to an office order
issued by City Prosecutor Ruperto Golong.
In a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit10 dated April 8, 2011, complainant raised the possibility
of "misrepresentation." She alleged that it was made to appear that a hearing on the subject case
was conducted on February 2, 2011, when in fact there was none. She claimed that the Order
dated February 2, 2011 appeared to have been inserted in the records of the case, when in fact no
hearing transpired that day.
On April 7, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent judge to
comment on the complaint against him.11
In his Answer and Comment12 dated May 10, 2011, respondent judge denied the allegations in
the complaint and contended that complainant was piqued when he blamed her for making
baseless assumptions. He claimed that complainant was incompetent as showed by the lack of
evidence against Miralles.
Respondent judge further averred that, contrary to complainant's allegation that it was her option
to transfer to another court, it was he who caused her transfer. He accused complainant of
lacking in knowledge of the law and that she appeared for politicians and not for the Republic of
the Philippines.
Regarding complainant's accusation that he was close to the Miralleses, respondent judge
explained that it was his sister who was a classmate of one Nora Miralles. He claimed that he is
unaware of any personal relation between Nora Miralles and the accused Danilo Miralles. He
insisted that complainant merely assumed things even if she has no evidence that he knew Danilo
Miralles.
Respondent judge also admitted that he indeed stopped complainant from conducting a cross-
examination on the witness during the hearing for involuntary commitment, because the lawyer
for petitioner DSWD should be the one actively participating in the case, and not the prosecutors.
He, however, added that the court had already ordered that minor Margie Baldoza be committed
to the DSWD Home for Girls pending resolution of the criminal cases.
As to the other allegations in the Complaint, respondent judge commented that these were mere
rehash of the complaint filed in A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ and reiterated that the
evidence found against accused Miralles during the judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause in the trafficking case was weak. Therefore, he ordered the posting of P40,000.00
bail by the accused. Respondent judge claimed that he merely acted upon the evidence presented
and made a resolution on what was right for the case.
In her Reply13 dated May 21, 2011, complainant refuted respondent judge's allegation of
incompetence against her and insisted on respondent's apparent bias in favor of Miralles. She
argued that respondent judge granted bail to the accused even when there was no motion to fix
bail and no hearing was conducted thereon. Despite the finding of probable cause, respondent
judge did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused. Complainant also reiterated the
controversy surrounding the appearance of an Order dated February 2, 2011, when in fact no
hearing transpired that day.
In his 2nd Indorsement14 dated June 14, 2011, respondent judge denied that he falsified any
document. He explained that his stenographer made a mistake in placing the date as February 2,
2011 instead of February 3, 2011, the date when the hearing was conducted. He attached the
affidavits15 of his court stenographer and court interpreter in support of his explanation.
On May 11, 2001, the OCA directed Judge Bitas to file his Comment on the instant complaint.
In a Resolution16 dated September 12, 2011, upon the recommendation of the OCA, the Court
referred A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On October 12, 2011, the Court, in a Resolution,17 resolved to consolidate A.M. OCA I.P.I. No.
11-3645-RTJ (Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban
City) with A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ (Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City).
In its Report and Recommendation18 dated February 14, 2013, Associate Justice Carmelita
Salandanan-Manahan, Court of Appeals, Cebu City, found respondent judge guilty of grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and recommended that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ and fined anew in the
amount of P20,000.00 for A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ.
RULING
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice, except as to the recommended penalty.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment, absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean,
however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance
of his official functions.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C)
of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of
the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised
only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the
application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly
determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong.19
As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, with life imprisonment as one of the penalties
prescribed for the offense charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.20
Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate from the requirement of a
hearing where there is an application for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without
neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Respondent judge's
justification that he granted bail, because he found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot
be sustained because the records show that no such hearing for that purpose transpired. What the
records show is a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a
petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the determination of the existence of
probable cause. The latter takes place prior to all proceedings, so that if the court is not satisfied
with the existence of a probable cause, it may either dismiss the case or deny the issuance of the
warrant of arrest or conduct a hearing to satisfy itself of the existence of probable cause. If the
court finds the existence of probable cause, the court is mandated to issue a warrant of arrest or
commitment order if the accused is already under custody, as when he was validly arrested
without a warrant. It is only after this proceeding that the court can entertain a petition for bail
where a subsequent hearing is conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is weak or not.
Hence, in granting bail and fixing it at P20,000.00 motu proprio, without allowing the
prosecution to present its evidence, respondent judge denied the prosecution of due process. This
Court had said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications
for bail in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
is strong.21
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the
same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law.22
Likewise, we are convinced that respondent judges actuations in the court premises during the
hearing of the petition for commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest
partiality to the accused. Indeed, respondent judges utterance of: "I dont want to see your
face!";
"You better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by politicians" was improper
and does not speak well his stature as an officer of the Court. We note the improper language of
respondent judge directed towards complainants in his Answers and Comments where he
criticized them for their incompetence in handling the subject case. Respondent Bitas' use of
abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainants ignorance of the laws and
procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously
and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Complainants, likewise, cannot be blamed
for being suspicious of respondents bias to the accused considering that the former can be
associated with the accused following his admission that his sister was a classmate of one Nora
Miralles. Considering the apprehension and reservation of the complainants, prudence dictates
that respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing the case. Such abuse of power and
authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public.23
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also
act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges
competence, integrity and independence.24 Even on the face of boorish behavior from those he
deals with, he ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of
the court.25
The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all the activities of a judge." It bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice,
respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting
language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
We come to the imposable penalty.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule, as amended, if respondent judge is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of the offense charged. In the
case of Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo Bitas,26 the Court had previously imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 on respondent judge for disregarding the basic procedural requirements in instituting
an indirect contempt charge, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bail are so clear and unmistakable that there can be
no room for doubt or even interpretation. There can, therefore, be no excuse for respondent
judge's error of law. It hardly speaks well of the legal background of respondent judge,
considering his length of service when he failed to observe procedural requirements before
granting bail. To top it all, the actuations of respondent judge towards the complainants, as
shown by his use of abusive and insulting words against complainants in open court, and his
correspondence with the Court, are evident of his partiality to the accused. All these taken into
consideration, respondent judge deserves a penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one (1)
day for the two (2) cases, instead of P20,000.00 fine for each of the cases, as recommended by
the Investigating Justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, is hereby SUSPENDED from the service for a period of THREE
(3) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.






















G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's
petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace
of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to
the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage
contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries
in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son
Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent,
the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that:
(1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage
contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of
the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being
the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used
by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the
following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected,
because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who
appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal
circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate
of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the
petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the
guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and
final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There
is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here,
the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery
of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and
the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR
from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of,
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional
Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 173773 November 28, 2012
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES YVES and MARIA TERESA REMONDEULAZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision
1
dated April 12, 2005 and Resolution
2
dated July 20,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61490.
The undisputed facts follow.
On May 26, 1994, respondents insured with petitioner their 1994
Toyota Corolla sedan under a comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy for one year.
During the effectivity of said insurance, respondents car was unlawfully taken. Hence, they
immediately reported the theft to the Traffic Management Command of the PNP who made them
accomplish a complaint sheet. In said complaint sheet, respondents alleged that a certain Ricardo
Sales (Sales) took possession of the subject vehicle to add accessories and improvements
thereon, however, Sales failed to return the subject vehicle within the agreed three-day period.
As a result, respondents notified petitioner to claim for the reimbursement of their lost vehicle.
However, petitioner refused to pay.
Accordingly, respondents lodged a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (trial court) praying for the payment of the insured value of
their car plus damages on April 21, 1995.
After presentation of respondents evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence.
Acting thereon, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The full text of said
Order
3
reads:
Before the Court is an action filed by the plaintiffs, spouses Yves and Maria Teresa
Remondeulaz against the defendant, Paramount Insurance Corporation, to recover from the
defendant the insured value of the motor vehicle.
It appears that on 26 May 1994, plaintiffs insured their vehicle, a 1994 Toyota Corolla XL with
chassis number EE-100-9524505, with defendant under Private Car Policy No. PC-37396 for
Own Damage, Theft, Third-Party Property Damage and Third-Party Personal Injury, for the
period commencing 26 May 1994 to 26 May 1995. Then on 1 December 1994, defendants
received from plaintiff a demand letter asking for the payment of the proceeds in the amount of
PhP409,000.00 under their policy. They alleged the loss of the vehicle and claimed the same to
be covered by the policys provision on "Theft." Defendant disagreed and refused to pay.
It appears, however, that plaintiff had successfully prosecuted and had been awarded the amount
claimed in this action, in another action (Civil Case No. 95-1524 entitled Sps. Yves and Maria
Teresa Remondeulaz versus Standard Insurance Company, Inc.), which involved the loss of the
same vehicle under the same circumstances although under a different policy and insurance
company. This, considered with the principle that an insured may not recover more than its
interest in any property subject of an insurance, leads the court to dismiss this action.
SO ORDERED.
4

Not in conformity with the trial courts Order, respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (appellate court).
In its Decision dated April 12, 2005, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Order issued
by the trial court, to wit:
Indeed, the trial court erred when it dismissed the action on the ground of double recovery since
it is clear that the subject car is different from the one insured with another insurance company,
the Standard Insurance Company. In this case, defendant-appellee herein petitioner denied the
reimbursement for the lost vehicle on the ground that the said loss could not fall within the
concept of the "theft clause" under the insurance policy x x x
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the October 7, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
63, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
x x x.
SO ORDERED.
5

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration against said Decision, but the same was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated July 20, 2006.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court praying that
the appellate courts Decision and Resolution be reversed and set aside.
In its petition, petitioner raises this issue for our resolution:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals decided the case a quo in a way not in accord with law
and/or applicable jurisprudence when it promulgated in favor of the respondents Remondeulaz,
making Paramount liable for the alleged "theft" of respondents vehicle.
6

Essentially, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable under the insurance policy for the loss
of respondents vehicle.
Petitioner argues that the loss of respondents vehicle is not a peril covered by the policy. It
maintains that it is not liable for the loss, since the car cannot be classified as stolen as
respondents entrusted the possession thereof to another person.
We do not agree.
Adverse to petitioners claim, respondents policy clearly undertook to indemnify the insured
against loss of or damage to the scheduled vehicle when caused by theft, to wit:
SECTION III LOSS OR DAMAGE
1. The Company will, subject to the Limits of Liability, indemnify the insured against loss of or
damage to the Scheduled Vehicle and its accessories and spare parts whilst thereon:
(a) by accidental collision or overturning, or collision or overturning consequent upon
mechanical breakdown or consequent upon wear and tear;
(b) by fire, external explosion, self-ignition or lightning or burglary, housebreaking or
theft;
(c) by malicious act;
(d) whilst in transit (including the process of loading and unloading) incidental to such
transit by road, rail, inland waterway, lift or elevator.
7

Apropos, we now resolve the issue of whether the loss of respondents vehicle falls within the
concept of the "theft clause" under the insurance policy.
In People v. Bustinera,
8
this Court had the occasion to interpret the "theft clause" of an insurance
policy. In this case, the Court explained that when one takes the motor vehicle of another without
the latters consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft there being intent to
gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain.
Also, in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
9
this Court held that the taking of a
vehicle by another person without the permission or authority from the owner thereof is
sufficient to place it within the ambit of the word theft as contemplated in the policy, and is
therefore, compensable.
Moreover, the case of Santos v. People
10
is worthy of note. Similarly in Santos, the owner of a
car entrusted his vehicle to therein petitioner Lauro Santos who owns a repair shop for carburetor
repair and repainting. However, when the owner tried to retrieve her car, she was not able to do
so since Santos had abandoned his shop. In the said case, the crime that was actually committed
was Qualified Theft. However, the Court held that because of the fact that it was not alleged in
the information that the object of the crime was a car, which is a qualifying circumstance, the
Court found that Santos was only guilty of the crime of Theft and merely considered the
qualifying circumstance as an aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the appropriate
penalty. The Court therein clarified the distinction between the crime of Estafa and Theft, to wit:
x x x The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in
estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there
may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the
material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.
11

In the instant case, Sales did not have juridical possession over the vehicle. Hence, it is apparent
that the taking of repondents vehicle by Sales is without any consent or authority from the
former.
Records would show that respondents entrusted possession of their vehicle only to the extent that
Sales will introduce repairs and improvements thereon, and not to permanently deprive them of
possession thereof. Since, Theft can also be committed through misappropriation, the fact that
Sales failed to return the subject vehicle to respondents constitutes Qualified Theft. Hence, since
repondents car is undeniably covered by a Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy that
allows for recovery in cases of theft, petitioner is liable under the policy for the loss of
respondents vehicle under the "theft clause."
All told, Sales act of depriving respondents of their motor vehicle at, or soon after the transfer of
physical possession of the movable property, constitutes theft under the insurance policy, which
is compensable.
12

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 12, 2005 and
Resolution dated July 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 190928 January 13, 2014
TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (formerly MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP.), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated August 14, 2009 and Resolution2 dated January 5
2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals CTA) En Banc in CTA EB No. 422 which modified the
Decision3 dated May 16 2008 and Resolution4 dated September 8, 2008 of the CT A First
Division insofar as it reduced the amount of refund granted from P69 618 971.19 to P51 134
951.40.
The facts follow.
On the following dates, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its first to
fourth quarterly value-added tax (VAT) returns for the calendar year 2002:
Quarter Date Filed
First April 25, 2002
Second July 23, 2002
Third October 25, 2002
Fourth January 27, 2003
Subsequently, on December 22, 2003, petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund of
unutilized input VAT with Revenue District Office No. 60, Lucena City, in the total amount of
P79,918,002.95 for calendar year 2002.
However, due to respondents inaction, petitioner elevated its claim before the CTA First
Division on April 22, 2004. In his Answer, respondent interposed the following special and
affirmative defenses:
5. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative
investigation/examination by the respondent;
6. To support its claim, it is imperative for petitioner to prove the following, viz.:
a. The registration requirements of a value-added taxpayer in compliance with
Section 6 (a) and (b) of Revenue Regulations No. 6-97 in relation to Section
4.107-1 (a) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, and Section 236 of the Tax Code,
as amended;
b. The invoicing and accounting requirements for VAT-registered persons, as well
as the filing and payment of VAT in compliance with the provisions of Sections
113 and 114 of the Tax Code, as amended;
c. Proof of compliance with the prescribed checklist of requirements to be
submitted involving claim for VAT refund in pursuance to Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 53-98, otherwise there would be no sufficient
compliance with the filing of administrative claim for refund which is a condition
sine qua non prior to the filing of judicial claim in accordance with the provision
of Section 229 of the Tax Code, as amended. It is worthy of emphasis that Section
112 (D) of the Tax Code, as amended, requires the submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
before the 120-day audit period shall apply, and before the taxpayer could avail of
judicial remedies as provided for in the law. Hence, petitioners failure to submit
proof of compliance with the above-stated requirements warrants immediate
dismissal of the petition for review.
d. That the input taxes of P79,918,002.95 allegedly paid by the petitioner on its
purchases of goods and services for the four (4) quarters of the year 2002 were
attributable to its zero-rated sales and such have not been applied against any
output tax and were not carried over in the succeeding taxable quarter or quarters;
e. That petitioners administrative and judicial claims for tax credit or refund of
unutilized input tax (VAT) was filed within two (2) years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made in accordance with Sections 112 (A)
and (D) and 229 of the TAX Code, as amended;
f. That petitioners domestic purchases of goods and services were made in the
course of its trade and business, properly supported by VAT invoices and/or
official receipts and other documents, such as subsidiary purchase Journal,
showing that it actually paid VAT in accordance with Sections 110 (A) (2) and
113 of the Tax Code as amended, and in pursuance to Section 4.104-5 (a) & (b) of
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 (Re: Substantiation of Claims for Input Tax
Credit);
g. The requirements as enumerated under Section 4.104-2 of Revenue Regulations
7-95. (Re: Persons who can avail of the Input Tax Credits);
7. Furthermore, in an action for refund the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish
its right to refund and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund/credit.
This is so because exemptions from taxation are highly disfavored in law and he who
claims exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or
statutory law. An exemption from common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon
vague implications;
8. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the
nature of exemption from taxation and, as such, they are looked upon with disfavor.5
After trial on the merits, the CTA First Division rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Thus, Respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR
ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE to petitioner in the reduced amount of SIXTY NINE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE
AND 19/100 PESOS (P69,618,971.19), representing unutilized input value-added taxes paid by
petitioner on its domestic purchases of goods and services and importation of goods attributable
to its effectively zero-rated sales of power generation services to the National Power Corporation
for the taxable year 2002.
SO ORDERED.6
Not satisfied, respondent filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration against said decision,
which the CTA First Division denied in a Resolution dated September 8, 2008.
On October 10, 2007, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc.
In a Decision dated August 14, 2009, the CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA First Divisions
decision with the modification that the refundable amount be reduced to P51,134,951.40. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 16, 2008 and Resolution dated September 8, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED,
with modification that only P51,134,951.40 is the refundable amount to respondent for taxable
year 2002. Accordingly, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ORDERED to
REFUND or ISSUE a TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of Team Energy Corporation the
reduced amount of FIFTY-ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY- FOUR THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE AND 40/100 (P51,134,951.40), representing the latters excess
and unutilized input VAT for the period covering calendar year 2002.
SO ORDERED.7
Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration against said Decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated January 5, 2010.
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
THE CTA EN BANC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISALLOWED PETITIONERS INPUT
VAT FOR THE FIRST QUARTER AMOUNTING TO P18,484,019.79 BASED ON
PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE:
A. PETITIONER FILED ITS JUDICIAL CLAIM FOR REFUND WELL WITHIN THE
TWO-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD RECKONED FROM THE DATE OF FILING
OF THE QUARTERLY VAT RETURN PURSUANT TO LONG STANDING
JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT EXPRESSLY
RECOGNIZED IN ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. NOS.
141104 & [148763], JUNE 8, 2007 ("ATLAS CASE").
B. THE CTA EN BANC SHOULD NOT HAVE HASTILY RELIED ON THE
CONTRARY RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE V. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172129,
SEPTEMBER 12, 2008 ("MIRANT PAGBILAO CASE") AS THE HONORABLE
COURT COULD NOT HAVE INTENDED TO REVERSE THE DOCTRINE IN THE
ATLAS CASE IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 4 (3) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
C. ASSUMING, BUT WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE MIRANT PAGBILAO
CASE REVERSED THE DOCTRINE IN THE ATLAS CASE, THE SAME SHOULD
BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY AND NOT RETROACTIVELY TO THE
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER WHO RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE AT THE TIME OF FILING OF ITS JUDICIAL CLAIM FOR
REFUND.8
Simply, the sole issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioner timely filed its judicial claim
for refund of input VAT for the first quarter of 2002.
To appropriately address this issue, it is relevant to quote Sections 112 (A) and (C) of the Tax
Code, viz.:
SEC. 112. Refund or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax; Provided, however, That in the
case of zero-rated sales under Section 106 (A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and
(2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided,
further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also
in taxable or exempt sale of good of properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax
due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.
x x x x
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases,
the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part
of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim
with the Court of Tax Appeals.
In its assailed decision, the CTA En Banc reduced petitioners claim for refund of its excess or
unutilized input VAT to P51,134,951.40 on the ground that petitioners judicial claim for the
first quarter of 2002 was filed beyond the two-year period prescribed under Section 112 (A) of
the Tax Code, to wit:
As regards the fifth requisite, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides that a
VAT-registered taxpayer whose sale is zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2)
years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for refund or
issuance of a TCC of its creditable input tax or paid attributable to such sales.
In the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao (Formerly Southern
Energy Quezon, Inc.), 565 SCRA 154 (hereafter referred to as the "Mirant Case"), the Supreme
Court definitely settled the issue on the reckoning of the prescriptive period on claims for refund
of input VAT attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales, as follows:
x x x x
Pursuant to the above ruling of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the two-year prescriptive
period provided in Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, should be counted not
from the payment of the tax, but from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.
Pursuant to the above ruling of the Supreme Court, the following are the pertinent dates relevant
to petitioners claim for refund:
Period (2002) Close of Taxable
Quarter
Last Day for Filing of
The Claim
1st Quarter March 31, 2002 March 31, 2004
2nd Quarter June 30, 2002 June 30, 2004
3rd Quarter September 30, 2002 September 30, 2004
4th Quarter December 31, 2002 December 31, 2004
Record shows that respondent filed its administrative claim for refund or issuance of a TCC on
December 22, 2003, while the judicial claim for refund was filed on April 22, 2004. Since
respondent filed its judicial claim for refund for the four quarters of 2002, only on April 22,
2004, twenty-two (22) days from March 31, 2004, the last day prescribed by the Mirant Case,
respondent is barred from claiming refund of its unutilized input taxes for the first quarter of
2002. Therefore, the claim for refund granted by the First Division of this Court in the amount of
P69,618,971.19 should be reduced by deducting the portion of the claim corresponding to the
first quarter that had already prescribed, x x x.
x x x x
In sum, the Court En Banc finds that the total substantiated input tax filed within the two-year
prescriptive period of respondent TeaM Energy amounts to P51,134,951.40 only.9
Recently, however, in the consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation10 (San Roque ponencia), this Court emphasized that Section 112 (A) and (C)
of the Tax Code must be interpreted according to its clear, plain and unequivocal language.
In said case, we held that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or issuance of
tax credit certificate anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the
last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner
will then have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the
claim on the 120th day or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his
judicial claim with the CTA. Thus, the Court expounded:
Section 112 (C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-day period to appeal to the CTA the
decision or inaction of the Commissioner, thus:
x x x the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision denying the
claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the
unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
This law is clear, plain and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verba legis doctrine, this law
should be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain and unequivocal. As this law states,
the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal the decision of the Commissioner to the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the Commissioners decision, or if the Commissioner does not act on the
taxpayers claim within the 120-day period, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days
from the expiration of the 120-day period.
x x x x
There are three compelling reasons why the 30-day period need not necessarily fall within the
two-year prescriptive period, as long as the administrative claim is filed within the two-year
prescriptive period.
First, Section 112 (A) clearly, plainly and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer "may, within
two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of the creditable input tax due or paid to such sales."
In short, the law states that the taxpayer may apply with the Commissioner for a refund or credit
"within two (2) years," which means at anytime within two years. Thus, the application for
refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the Commissioner on the last day of the two-
year prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law. The two-year prescriptive
period is a grace period in favor of the taxpayer and he can avail of the full period before his
right to apply for a tax refund or credit is barred by prescription.
Second, Section 112 (C) provides that the Commissioner shall decide the application for refund
or credit "within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A)." The reference
in Section 112 (C) of the submission of documents "in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsection (A)" means that the application in Section 112 (A) is the
administrative claim that the Commissioner must decide within the 120-day period. In short, the
two-year prescriptive period in Section 112 (A) refers to the period within which the taxpayer
can file an administrative claim for tax refund or credit. Stated otherwise, the two-year
prescriptive period does not refer to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing
of the administrative claim with the Commissioner. As held in Aichi, the "phrase within two
years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA."
Third, if the 30-day period, or any part of it, is required to fall within the two-year prescriptive
period (equivalent to 730 days), then the taxpayer must file his administrative claim for refund or
credit within the first 610 days of the two-year prescriptive period. Otherwise, the filing of the
administrative claim beyond the first 610 days will result in the appeal to the CTA being filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period. Thus, if the taxpayer files his administrative claim on
the 611th day, the Commissioner, with his 120-day period, will have until the 731st day to
decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides only on the 731st day, or does not decide at all,
the taxpayer can no longer file his judicial claim with the CTA because the two-year prescriptive
period (equivalent to 730 days) has lapsed. The 30-day period granted by law to the taxpayer to
file an appeal before the CTA becomes utterly useless, even if the taxpayer complied with the
law by filing his administrative claim within the two-year prescriptive period.
The theory that the 30-day period must fall within the two-year prescriptive period adds a
condition that is not found in the law. It results in truncating 120 days from the 730 days that the
law grants the taxpayer for filing his administrative claim with the Commissioner. This Court
cannot interpret a law to defeat, wholly or even partly, a remedy that the law expressly grants in
clear, plain and unequivocal language.
Section 112 (A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain and unequivocal
language.1wphi1 The taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or credit at any time
within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year
prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have 120 days from
such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120th day, or does
not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA.
This is not only the plain meaning but also the only logical interpretation of Section 112 (A) and
(C).11 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the aforequoted discussions, we therefore disagree with the CTA En Bancs finding
that petitioners judicial claim for the first quarter of 2002 was not timely filed.
The San Roque ponencia firmly enunciates that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for
refund or credit at any time within the two-year prescriptive period. What is only required of him
is to file his judicial claim within thirty (30) days after denial of his claim by respondent or after
the expiration of the 120-day period within which respondent can decide on its claim.
Here, there is no question that petitioner timely filed its administrative claim with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue within the required period. However, since its administrative claim was filed
within the two-year prescriptive period and its judicial claim was filed on the first day after the
expiration of the 120-day period granted to respondent, to decide on its claim, we rule that
petitioners claim for refund for the first quarter of 2002 should be granted.
All told, we revert to the CTA First Division s finding that petitioner s total refundable amount
should be P69,618,971.19, representing petitioner s unutilized input VAT paid on its domestic
purchases of goods and services and importation of goods attributable to its effectively zero-
rated sales of power generation services to the National Power Corporation for the taxable year
2002. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated August 14, 2009 and
Resolution dated January 5, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc, in CTA EB No. 422 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner s total refundable amount shall be
P69,618,971.19.
SO ORDERED.





G.R. No. 170488 December 10, 2012
CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolutions dated August 19, 2005
1
and November 15, 2005
2
of the Former Special
Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84742.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and
Claim for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court).
3

On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision
4
dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioner. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright
Infringement and Claim for Damages is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
5

After receiving a copy of the trial courts Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of
Appeal before the Court of Appeals (appellate court) on March 4, 2005.
6

Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the Appellants Brief on May 20, 2005,
which was received by the law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as
follows:
Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure you are hereby required to file
with this Court within forty-five (45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed copies of the Appellants Brief with legible copies of the
assailed decision of the Trial Court and proof of service of two copies upon the appellee/s.
7

However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellants brief timely. Hence, on
August 19, 2005, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by
petitioner. The full text of said Resolution reads:
Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated 17 August 2005 stating that no
appellants brief has been filed as per docket book entry, the Court RESOLVES to consider the
appeal as having been ABANDONED and consequently DISMISS the same pursuant to Sec.
1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
8

Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Admit Appellants Brief,
9
which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of its
expiration on July 15, 2005.
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Admit Appellants Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the
part of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief within the time
prescribed by the Rules of Court, viz.:
For this Court to admit the appellants brief after such wanton disregard of the Rules would put a
strain on the orderly administration of justice.
As held in the case of St. Louis University vs. Cordero, 434 SCRA 575, 587, citing Don Lino
Gutierres & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87:
"It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of strict compliance with
the periods for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof, as a
rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and
manufactured excuses and would ultimately become inutile.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Admit Appellants Brief is perforce DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
10

Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the
August 19, 2005 and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court. Thus, petitioner
presents the following grounds to support its petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT SACRIFICED SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF PROCEDURAL
TECHNICALITIES WITH ITS DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO
FILE THE APPELLANTS BRIEF ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING AT ALL
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS APPEAL DESERVED FULL CONSIDERATION ON
THE MERITS.
B.
IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE, PETITIONERS APPEAL SHOULD BE
REINSTATED CONSIDERING THAT THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
RENDERING ITS APPEALED DECISION ARE EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF THE SAID
DECISION AND MORE SO AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
1. The trial courts ruling that petitioner should have established actual confusion in the
minds of buyers is contrary to jurisprudence.
2. The trial court did not state the facts upon which it based its conclusion that
petitioners trademark is strikingly different and distinct from that of defendants.
3. Respondent labeled its products in a manner confusingly similar to that of petitioners.
4. The trial court erred in finding that respondent did not pass off its products as that of
petitioners.
11

Simply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of petitioners appeal for its
failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissing its appeal, since dismissal of appeals
on purely technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure substantial justice.
For its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners
appeal for its failure to file the required appellants brief within the reglementary period. It
stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate therefrom, rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business.
We find merit in the instant petition.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the
most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve
the ends of justice.
12

In Obut v. Court of Appeals,
13
this Court reiterated that it "cannot look with favor on a course of
action which would place the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the result
would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders are issued
to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant if to be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of defense rather than for
him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."
The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Philippine Milling Company, Incorporated, et al.[14 where the Court ruled that
even if an appellant failed to file a motion for extension of time to file his brief on or before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals does not necessarily lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss appellants appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case.
Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict
application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
15

Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather
than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case
under consideration.
In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellants brief on
petitioners part.
When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellants brief, there was a clear
intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for
its counsels act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file, petitioner
could have seasonably filed its appellants brief as its counsel had already prepared the same
even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel binds
the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. In
rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants.
Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
procedure.
16
]
Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its
appeal.1wphi1 Hence, the ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the
gross negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own
rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client
of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client
who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
17

All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Nevertheless, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action to take is to
remand the case to the appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly examine the
factual and legal issues that still need to be threshed out.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as this
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the payment of
the corresponding docket fees within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision.
Let the records and the CA rollo of this case be transmitted accordingly.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 191538 December 11, 2013
WELLER JOPSON, Petitioner,
vs.
FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision1 dated July 9, 2009 and Resolution2 dated February 12, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70781.
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Spouses Laura S. Pascual (Laura) an~ Jose H. Mendoza (Jose) owned a parcel ofland situated at
Naga City, Camarines Sur. The property had an aggregate area of one hundred one thousand
forty-five (101,045) square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
687. On 26 December 1961, the said property was subdivided into sixtythree (63) lots through a
judicially approved subdivision and became part of Laura Subdivision. Thus, TCT No. 687 was
cancelled and, in its stead, TCT No. 986 (covering 31 lots), TCT No. 987 (covering 31 lots) and
TCT No. 988 (covering 1 lot) were issued.
On 4 January 1992, spouses Laura and Jose conveyed to respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (respondent DBP), by way of dacion en pago, the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
986 (subject landholding) which has an area of eight thousand nine hundred forty-six (8,946)
square meters. The transfer was evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of Real Estate Property in
Payment of Debt. As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of Naga City cancelled TCT No. 986
and issued TCT No. 1149 in favor of respondent DBP.
Sometime in the year 1990, respondent DBP published an Invitation to Bid for the conveyance of
the subject landholding covered by TCT No. 1149. On 28 December 1990, the said property was
sold for P1.2M to petitioner Fabian O. Mendez, Jr. x x x as the highest bidder. Thus, TCT No.
1149 was cancelled and, in lieu of it, TCT No. 21190 was issued to [respondent Mendez].
Sometime in 1991, a Complaint was filed by x x x Weller Jopson x x x with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur. It was directed against respondent
DBP, [respondent Mendez] and Leonardo Tominio (Leonardo) for annulment of sale,
preemption/redemption and reinstatement with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order with damages.
In essence, [petitioner] alleged that he is a bona fide tenant-farmer of the parcel of land subject of
the sale between respondent DBP and [respondent Mendez]; his father Melchor Jopson
(Melchor), was the original tenant of subject landholding appointed as such by the spouses Laura
and Jose in 1947; in 1967, he succeeded his father in cultivating the subject landholding now
covered by the present TCT No. 21190 when his father became ill; from 1967 up to December
1990, he laboriously tilled and cultivated the parcel of land and religiously shared the harvest
with respondent DBP through its representatives or employees; on 20 December 1990, a certain
Leonardo, acting upon the instructions of [respondent Mendez], unlawfully entered the subject
landholding and ejected him from the same; the sale of the subject landholding by respondent
DBP to petitioner is void because the latter is not qualified to acquire the same under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657; the sale of the parcel of land is also violative of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
360, series of 1989, in relation to Section 1 of E.O. No. 407 dated 14 June 1990; he was deprived
of his preferential right to buy the parcel of land he tenanted under reasonable terms and
conditions as provided for by Section 11, R.A. No. 3844; in the alternative, he also has the right
to redeem the parcel of land from petitioner at a reasonable price pursuant to Section 12, R.A.
No. 3844; the forcible entry by Leonardo upon the instructions of [respondent Mendez]
desecrated his right to security of tenure and deprivation of his livelihood; he is entitled to the
award of actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses; a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued to prevent petitioner or his agents
from disposing of the parcel of land.
In his Answer dated 5 November 1991, [respondent Mendez] denied [petitioner]s allegations
and asseverated that the latter has no cause of action against him; [petitioner] is guilty of laches
(or estoppel) for not having questioned the auction sale of the parcel of land; the PARAD had no
jurisdiction over the case because the parcel of land subject of the sale is no longer classified as
agricultural and it is not located in an agricultural zone; as compulsory counterclaim, he is
entitled to the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses; as cross-claim against respondent DBP, he prayed that in the event judgment is
rendered in [petitioner]s favor, respondent DBP should shoulder all the monetary awards that
will be granted to [petitioner], return to him the purchase price with interest, reimburse him all
the expenses that he incurred relative to the purchase of the parcel of land and the improvements
thereon, compensate him for lost business opportunities and pay him for the reliefs in his
counterclaim.
Leonardo, in his Answer dated 24 January 1992, denied [petitioner]s allegations and averred
that he was already in possession of the parcel of land even before 20 December 1990, long
before he knew [respondent Mendez]; it was [petitioner], claiming to be respondent DBPs
caretaker, who placed him in the subject landholding; as counterclaim, he should be awarded
moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
In its Amended Answer dated 15 June 1992, respondent DBP alleged that [respondent Mendez]
accepted the sale will full knowledge of the extent and nature of the right, title and interest of the
former, thus, he should be the one to assume the risk of any liability, or the extent thereof, when
he purchased the subject landholding.
On 8 October 1993, [respondent Mendez] filed a Motion to Maintain Status Quo Ante Litem and
to Cite Complainant in Contempt as [petitioner] forcibly entered the parcel of land in the
company of armed men. The motion was resolved by granting [respondent Mendezs] request
and ordering [petitioner] to vacate the parcel of land. [Respondent Mendez] was, however,
ordered to post a cash bond in the amount of P10,000.00 to answer for any damage [petitioner]
may incur upon the issuance of the order to vacate.3
In a Decision4 dated August 25, 1995, the PARAD declared the sale of the subject property
between respondents as a nullity and ordered respondent DBP to execute the necessary Deed of
Transfer of the parcel of land in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. It held that while the
subject landholding is situated within a district classified as secondary commercial zone and its
subdivision was judicially approved, the same was not duly converted to non-agricultural use as
prescribed by law. Resultantly, the Register of Deeds of Naga City was ordered to cancel TCT
No. 21190. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) in favor of corespondent Fabian Mendez contrary to law and therefore
a nullity;
2. Ordering DBP to execute the necessary Deed of Transfer in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the
latter possession of subject landholding for coverage under E.O. No. 947;
3. Ordering DBP to return the purchase price of P1,200,000.00 to co-respondent Fabian
Mendez;
4. Denying the claim for redemption and reinstatement by petitioner;
5. Ordering the Clerk of the Board, DARAB, Naga City to return to Fabian Mendez the
cash bond of P10,000.00;
6. Dismissing all other claims for lack of merit.
7. Ordering the Register of Deeds, Naga City to cancel TCT No. 21190.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondents moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision and argued that the parcel of
land is no longer agricultural per Zoning Ordinance No. 603 adopted on December 20, 1978.
In a Resolution6 dated February 26, 1996, the PARAD reversed its earlier ruling and declared
that the parcel of land in question is duly classified and zonified as non-agricultural land in
accordance with pertinent laws and guidelines.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB.
In a Decision7 dated January 25, 2000, the DARAB reversed the PARADs ruling and held that
there is a tenancy relationship between respondent DBP and petitioner as evidenced by the
sharing of harvest between them. Thus, petitioner is not a mere caretaker but a bona fide tenant.
It, however, did not sustain petitioners claim for redemption of the subject landholding since he
failed to consign with the PARAD a reasonable amount to cover the price of the land. It held as
follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the assailed Order is hereby REVERSED and a
new one entered:
1. Declaring petitioner-appellant entitled to reinstatement to the subject landholding; and
2. Directing Fabian Mendez and all other persons in his behalf or under his authority to
maintain petitioner-appellant in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject-
landholding as agricultural lessee thereof.
SO ORDERED.8
Respondent Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision, while petitioner
filed a Petition for Review with the CA advancing the argument that the PARAD and the
DARAB erred and gravely abused their discretion in denying his right of redemption of the
parcel of land. In a Decision dated November 29, 2001, the CA denied petitioners petition.
In a Resolution9 dated April 26, 2002, the DARAB denied respondent Mendezs motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, respondent Mendez filed an appeal with the CA.
In a Decision dated July 9, 2009, the CA nullified and set aside the decision and resolution of the
DARAB.1wphi1 The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the DARAB, dated 25 January 2000 and
26 April 2002, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent
Jopson before the PARAD is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.10
Unfazed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 12, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE BY
OVERTURNING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DARAB THAT PETITIONER
IS A BONAFIDE AGRICULTURAL TENANT OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PARAD AND THE DARAB HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.11
In essence, the issues are: (1) whether petitioner is a bona fide tenant of the subject property, and
(2) whether the PARAD and DARAB have jurisdiction over the present case.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that in order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential
to establish all its indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.12
In this case, however, the facts substantiating a de jure tenancy are missing.
First, besides petitioners bare assertion that a tenancy relationship exists between him and
respondent DBP, no other concrete proof was presented by petitioner to demonstrate the
relationship of petitioner and respondent DBP as tenant and landowner. In fact, respondent DBP
resolutely argued that petitioner is not a tenant but a mere caretaker of the subject landholding.
Second, the subject matter of the relationship is not an agricultural land but a commercial land.
Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,13 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), states that "an agricultural land refers to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined therein and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."
As per Certification by the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Naga City, the subject
landholding covered by TCT No. 21190 is classified as secondary commercial zone based on
Zoning Ordinance No. 603 adopted on December 20, 1978 by the City Council and approved by
the National Coordinating Council for Town Planning and Zoning, Human Settlements
Commission on September 24, 1980. Thus, the reclassification of the subject landholding from
agricultural to commercial removes it from the ambit of agricultural land over which petitioner
claims a tenancy relationship is founded.
As extensively discussed by the CA
Indeed, the subject landholding is no longer an agricultural land despite its being planted with
palay. It had long been reclassified as a commercial land and it even forms part of Laura
Subdivision. Whatever the landowner does to the subject landholding, like plant it with palay,
does not convert it to an agricultural land nor divest it of its actual classification. x x x
x x x x
The reclassification of the subject landholding from agricultural to non-agricultural by the City
Council of Naga City through a zoning ordinance is undoubtedly binding to remove it from the
coverage of the CARL. "In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held
that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than DAR. This rule has been reiterated in a number of subsequent cases. Despite
claims that the areas have been devoted for agricultural production, the Court has upheld the
non-agricultural classification made by the NHA over housing and resettlement projects,
zoning ordinances passed by local government units classifying residential areas, and
certifications over watershed areas issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)." In addition, the power of the City Council of Naga City to adopt zoning
ordinances is validly recognized under the law. x x x
x x x x
Furthermore, the reclassification of the subject landholding does not need a conversion clearance
from the DAR for it to be legal since such reclassification occurred prior to 15 June 1988, the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. As it is, only land classifications or reclassifications which occur
from 15 June 1988 onwards require conversion clearance from the DAR.
x x x 14
Third, the essential element of consent is absent. In the present case, no proof was presented that
respondent DBP recognized or hired petitioner as its legitimate tenant. Besides petitioners self-
serving assertions that he succeeded his father in tilling the subject landholding, no other
concrete evidence was presented to prove consent of the landowner.
Anent the second issue, we rule that the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over
petitioners claim.
Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
the CARL under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only
limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation
of agrarian laws.15 Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise:
x x x x
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A.
6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that no agrarian dispute exists in the instant case, since what is
involved is not an agricultural land and no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and
respondent DBP.
As aptly held by the CA, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties. Perforce, the ruling of the PARAD, as well as the
decision and resolution of the DARAB which were rendered without jurisdiction, are without
force and effect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July
9, 2009 and Resolution dated February 12, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
70781, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
















G.R. No. 198357 December 10, 2012
BUILDING CARE CORPORATION / LEOPARD SECURITY & INVESTIGATION
AGENCY and/or RUPERTO PROTACIO, Petitioners,
vs.
MYRNA MACARAEG, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 24, 2011, and its
Resolution
2
dated August 19, 2011, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration be reversed
and set aside.
Petitioners are in the business of providing security services to their clients. They hired
respondent as a security guard beginning August 25, 1996, assigning her at Genato Building in
Caloocan City. However, on March 9, 2008, respondent was relieved of her post. She was re-
assigned to Bayview Park Hotel from March 9-13, 2008, but after said period, she was allegedly
no longer given any assignment. Thus, on September 9, 2008, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, non-payment of separation pay
and refund of cash bond. Conciliation and mediation proceedings failed, so the parties were
ordered to submit their respective position papers.
3

Respondent claimed that petitioners failed to give her an assignment for more than nine months,
amounting to constructive dismissal, and this compelled her to file the complaint for illegal
dismissal.
4

On the other hand, petitioners alleged in their position paper that respondent was relieved from
her post as requested by the client because of her habitual tardiness, persistent borrowing of
money from employees and tenants of the client, and sleeping on the job. Petitioners allegedly
directed respondent to explain why she committed such infractions, but respondent failed to heed
such order. Respondent was nevertheless temporarily assigned to Bayview Park Hotel from
March 9-13, 2008, but she also failed to meet said client's standards and her posting thereat was
not extended.
5

Respondent then filed an administrative complaint for illegal dismissal with the PNP-Security
Agencies and Guard Supervision Division on June 18, 2008, but she did not attend the
conference hearings for said case. Petitioners brought to the conference hearings a new
assignment order detailing respondent at the Ateneo de Manila University but, due to her
absence, petitioners failed to personally serve respondent said assignment order. Petitioners then
sent respondent a letter ordering her to report to headquarters for work assignment, but
respondent did not comply with said order. Instead, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
6

On May 13, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made dismissing the charge of illegal dismissal as wanting in
merit but, as explained above, ordering the Respondents Leopard Security and Investigation
Agency and Rupert Protacio to pay complainant a financial assistance in the amount of
P5,000.00.
Other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
7

Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), but in a Decision dated October 23, 2009, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time, thereby declaring that the Labor Arbiter's Decision had become final and
executory on June 16, 2009.
8

Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, and on March 24, 2011, the
CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 23, 2009
and Resolution dated March 2, 2010 rendered by public respondent in NLRC LAC No. 07-
001892-09 (NLRC Case No. NCR-09-12628-08) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu
thereof, a new judgment is ENTERED declaring petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and
DIRECTING private respondents to reinstate petitioner without loss of seniority rights, benefits
and privileges; and to pay her backwages and other monetary benefits during the period of her
illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
Public respondent NLRC is DIRECTED to conduct further proceedings, for the sole purpose of
determining the amount of private respondent's monetary liabilities in accordance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
9

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was denied per Resolution
dated August 19, 2011. Hence, the present petition, where the main issue for resolution is
whether the CA erred in liberally applying the rules of procedure and ruling that respondent's
appeal should be allowed and resolved on the merits despite having been filed out of time.
The Court cannot sustain the CA's Decision.
It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of
procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be
complied with for the orderly administration of justice. In Marohomsalic v. Cole,
10
the Court
stated:
While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the
interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
11

The later case of Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza,
12
further explained that:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons proffered
for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its
non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice. x x x The desired leniency cannot
be accorded absent valid and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse. x x x
We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" line is not some
magic want that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural
rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
13

In this case, the justifications given by the CA for its liberality by choosing to overlook the
belated filing of the appeal are, the importance of the issue raised, i.e., whether respondent was
illegally dismissed; and the belief that respondent should be "afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities,"
14

considering that the belated filing of respondent's appeal before the NLRC was the fault of
respondent's former counsel. Note, however, that neither respondent nor her former counsel gave
any explanation or reason citing extraordinary circumstances for her lawyer's failure to abide by
the rules for filing an appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in
following up her case with said lawyer.
It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client.
A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege
their own fault or negligence to support the clients case and obtain remedies and reliefs already
lost by the operation of law.
15
The only exception would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence
would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.
16
In this case,
there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her
case before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard. Her failure to
appeal the Labor Arbiter's Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as a deprivation of her right to
due process. In Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito,
17
the Court ruled, thus:
The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory. The limitation on the period of appeal is not without
reason. They must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid
unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial
business, and to put an end to controversies. x x x
x x x x
The right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus,
one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the
rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."
18

In Ocampo v. Court of Appeals (Former Second Division),
19
the Court declared that:
x x x we cannot condone the practice of parties who, either by their own or their counsel's
inadvertence, have allowed a judgment to become final and executory and, after the same has
become immutable, seek iniquitous ways to assail it. The finality of a decision is a jurisdictional
event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the parties.
20

Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly filed, should never be taken lightly.1wphi1 The
judgment attains finality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal without such appeal or
motion for reconsideration being filed.
21
In Ocampo v. Court of Appeals (Former Second
Division),
22
the Court reiterated the basic rule that "when a party to an original action fails to
question an adverse judgment or decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law, he loses the right to do so, and the judgment or decision, as to him, becomes
final and binding."
23
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, therefore, became final and executory as
to respondent when she failed to file a timely appeal therefrom. The importance of the concept of
finality of judgment cannot be gainsaid. As elucidated in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
24
to
wit:
The Court re-emphasizes the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Alcantara v. Ponce, the Court,
citing its much earlier ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente, stressed the importance of said doctrine, to
wit:
x x x controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which
rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of
the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end
to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective
rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not infallible, the litigants submit
their respective claims for judgment, and they have a right at some time or other to have final
judgment on which they can rely as a final disposition of the issue submitted, and to know that
there is an end to the litigation.
x x x x
It should also be borne in mind that the right of the winning party to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case is also an essential part of public policy and the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, such right is just as weighty or equally important as the right of the losing party to
appeal or seek reconsideration within the prescribed period.
25

When the Labor Arbiter's Decision became final, petitioners attained a vested right to said
judgment. They had the right to fully rely on the immutability of said Decision. In Sofio v.
Valenzuela,
26
it was amply stressed that:
The Court will not override the finality and immutability of a judgment based only on the
negligence of a partys counsel in timely taking all the proper recourses from the judgment. To
justify an override, the counsels negligence must not only be gross but must also be shown to
have deprived the party the right to due process.
In sum, the Court cannot countenance relaxation of the rules absent the showing of extraordinary
circumstances to justify the same. In this case, no compelling reasons can be found to convince
this Court that the CA acted correctly by according respondent such liberality.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 24, 2011, and its Resolution dated August 19, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No.
114822 are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC-LAC No. 07-001892-09 (NLRC Case No. NCR-09-12628-08), ruling that the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter has become final and executory, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 183015 January 15, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari and prohibition are the Decision1 dated
November 29, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated May 8 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97784. The CA affirmed the Order3 dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga, granting respondent s motion to admit
amended complaint, and denied reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
On February 10, 1992, respondent Tetro Enterprises, Inc. filed with the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga a Complaint4 for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Director of Region III of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), docketed as Civil Case No. 9179. In its complaint,
respondent alleged that: it is the registered owner of a piece of land consisting of 12,643 square
meters (the subject lot), located in Barangay San Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 283205-R with a probable value of P252,869.00; that sometime in 1974,
petitioner, without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
constructed a road on the subject lot depriving it of possession without due process of law; and,
despite its repeated demands, petitioner refused to return the subject lot and to pay the rent for
the use of the same since 1974. Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to return the subject
lot in its original state before it was taken away and to close the road constructed thereon; and to
pay actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00, rentals for the use of the land at P200.00 a
month, in the total amount of P40,800.00, and attorney's fees equivalent to 5% of any amount
recoverable.
In its Answer, petitioner contended that respondent had no cause of action and that the State has
not given its consent to be sued; that the construction of the part of the Olongapo-Gapan Road on
the subject lot was with respondent's knowledge and consent who, subsequently, entered into
negotiations regarding the price of the lot; that petitioner was willing to pay the fair market value
of the lot at the time of taking, plus interest.
As the return of the subject lot was no longer feasible, the RTC, with the parties' conformity,
converted the action for recovery of possession to eminent domain and expropriation.
Upon agreement of the parties, the RTC issued an Order dated November 25, 1994, creating a
Board of Commissioners tasked to determine the actual value of the subject lot which shall be
the basis for an amicable settlement by the parties, or the decision to be rendered by the Court as
the case may be.5 On December 8, 1995, the Board submitted its report recommending that the
price for the subject lot be fixed between P4,000.00 and P6,000.00 per square meter, which is the
just and reasonable price to be paid to respondent.6
On March 29, 1996, the RTC, taking into consideration the report submitted by the Board,
rendered a decision fixing the price of the subject lot at P6,000.00 per square meter, or the total
amount of P75,858,000.00.7 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated
October 3, 1996.8
On December 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC denied in an Order
dated January 7, 1997, since the decision had become final and executory. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed in a Decision dated June 9, 1997. A
motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was also denied in a Resolution dated August 6,
1997. Petitioner came to us in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 130118,
which we granted by reversing the CA decision and ordered the RTC to approve petitioner's
notice of appeal.9
Consequently, petitioner's appeal was taken up in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60492.
On May 24, 2001, the CA rendered its decision,10 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated March 29, 1996 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the defendant-appellant, is held liable to pay the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Nine (P252,869.00), plus six
percent (6%) interest per annum from 1974 until such time that the same shall have been fully
paid; and, for further determination of other damages that plaintiff-appellee had suffered for the
loss of the use and enjoyment of its property, let the original records of Civil Case No. 9179 be
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, for further
proceedings.11
Respondent filed a petition for review with us, docketed as G.R. No. 151959, which we denied in
a Resolution dated October 2, 2002. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The case was then remanded to the RTC for the computation of damages for the loss of the use
and enjoyment of the subject lot. The case was scheduled for mediation proceedings, which
failed, thus, the case was set for a pre-trial conference. At the pre-trial conference on March 21,
2006, Presiding Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan called the attention of the parties on the
improper conduct committed by respondent's representative for approaching her close relative
and trying to influence the outcome of the case. Thus, Presiding Judge Aquino-Simbulan
voluntarily inhibited herself from conducting the trial of the case,12 but proceeded with the
scheduled pre-trial conference of the case without objection from the parties.13 When petitioner
presented the proposed issue, to wit: "Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to damages, can it
legally claim an amount more than what is alleged and prayed in its complaint," respondent
moved for the amendment of its original complaint, which the Presiding Judge granted and
ordered respondent to file the required motion within 30 days. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of such order, which the RTC denied for being premature.14
Respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,15 attaching the amended complaint16
therewith. In its Order dated September 22, 2006, the RTC admitted the amended complaint.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order17 dated December 7, 2006. In its
amended complaint, respondent, citing the report of a professional licensed appraiser on the fair
rental value of the subject lot, sought payment in the amount of P57,631,680.00 representing
damages it suffered since 1974 for the alleged undue deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the
subject lot.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for
temporary restraining order alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in allowing
substantial amendments of the complaint at the very late stage of the proceedings, thus,
increasing the claim for damages or rentals from the original amount of P147,840.00 to a grossly
excessive amount of P57,884,549.00. After the submission of the parties' respective pleadings,
the CA issued its assailed Decision dated November 29, 2007, which affirmed in toto the RTC
Order admitting the amended complaint.
In finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in admitting the amended
complaint, the CA found that such allowance was made pursuant to the Decision dated May 24,
2001 of its Former Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 60492, which ruled that aside from the
actual value of the subject lot, respondent was likewise entitled to damages; and so remanded the
case to the RTC for the determination of the amount of damages respondent suffered since 1974
as the lawful owner of the property unduly deprived of its use and enjoyment for 27 years. The
CA also found that the amendment of the complaint was sanctioned by Sections 2 and 3 of Rule
10 of the Rules of Court; and that the amendment introduced did not alter respondent's cause of
action for damages which is yet to be determined by the RTC; that the grant or leave to file an
amended complaint is a matter peculiarly within the sound discretion of the RTC in the exercise
of its jurisdiction which normally should not be disturbed on appeal unless there is evident abuse
thereof which was not so in this case; and, that Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
explicitly allows amendment during the course of the pre-trial conference when it listed, among
other things, that the RTC may consider in the conduct thereof "the necessity or desirability of
amendment of the pleadings."
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated May 8, 2008.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner raises the following errors committed by the CA, thus:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE
PEREMPTORILY, OVER PETITIONER'S VEHEMENT OBJECTIONS, ALLOWED
THE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AFTER IT WAS FILED.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR DESPITE HER
EARLIER VOLUNTARY INHIBITION, WHEN SHE UNJUSTLY HELD ON TO THE
CASE AND EVEN ALLOWED THE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT OF THE
COMPLAINT IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FAVOR.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE WENT
BEYOND THE COURT OF APPEALS' DIRECTIVE FOR DETERMINATION OF
DAMAGES BASED ON THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT. IV RESPONDENT JUDGE
SHOWED MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.18
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint.
We find merit in the petition.
The CA found that the amendment of the original complaint filed in 1992 is sanctioned by
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, which provide:
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time
within ten (10) days after it is served.
Section 3.
Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears
to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse
party, and an opportunity to be heard.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, the original case which respondent filed in 1992 was for recovery of possession,
which the RTC, with the parties' conformity, converted into an expropriation case as recovery of
the subject lot was no longer possible. Thus, the pre-trial of the case had long taken place in
1994. The expropriation case was then decided by the RTC on March 29, 1996, fixing the value
of the subject lot in the total amount of P75,858,000.00 as just compensation. Such decision was
modified by the CA's Former Third Division in a Decision dated May 24, 2001, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 60492, reducing the amount of just compensation to P252,869.00 plus 6% interest
from 1974 until full payment thereof and ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further
determination of other damages respondent suffered for the loss of use and enjoyment of its
property. The CA decision was brought to us in a petition for review on certiorari which, in a
Resolution dated October 2, 2002, denied the same and affirmed the CA decision. In ordering the
remand of the case to the RTC, the CA then said:
x x x the Board of Commissioners did not consider the amount of damages that should be given
the plaintiff-appellee for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property. Understandably so
because the Presiding Judge limited the function of the Board of Commissioners, to wit:
x x x to determine the actual value of the property subject of this case which shall be the basis for
amicable settlement by the parties on the decision to be rendered by this Court, as the case may
be.
x x x x
x x x In addition to the actual value of the land at the time of the taking, plus legal interest
thereon, plaintiff-appellee is likewise entitled to damages. The subject property used to be a
sugar land earmarked for a subdivision, but no evidence was adduced before the trial court. Any
attempt on our part to award damages in the present appeal would then be purely speculative.
Thus, there is a need to remand this case to the court of origin to determine the amount of
damages that plaintiff-appellee suffered since 1974 as the lawful owner of the property unduly
deprived of its use and enjoyment for twenty-seven years.
Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA
was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of
the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to
the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case
where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of
the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of
the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no
evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated
March 29, 1996. Therefore, the above-quoted provisions on amendments of pleading find no
applicability in this case.
Respondent's contention that amending the complaint to include reasonable rental value for the
deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the land is the logical implication of the CA ruling is not
persuasive. It cannot be clearly inferred from the CA decision that when it remanded the case to
the RTC for determination of damages respondent suffered that the former referred to indemnity
for rentals. Assuming that the CA did refer to the rentals on the subject lot, it bears stressing that
when it modified the RTC's award of just compensation, it reckoned the value of the land on the
date of its actual taking, and quoted the rationale for the rule as cited in Republic v. Lara,19 to
wit:
x x x where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed,
due to general economic conditions. The owner of the private property should be compensated
only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just not only to the
individual whose property is taken," "but to the public, which is to pay for it."20
Consequently, as the CA computed the just compensation of the subject lot based on its value at
the time of taking, whatever indemnity for rental value of the subject lot is, if to be awarded,
must also be computed at the time of the taking. This is so because it is as of that time that the
true measure of respondent's loss may be reasonably determined. We find that the RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it admitted
respondent s amended complaint which increased the amount claimed as back rentals.
Respondent pointed out that the reasons for amending its original complaint was due to the
devaluation of the Philippine peso in the interim as well as the improvements in the conditions of
the real property market, thus, the amount solicited as relief in the original complaint is no longer
realistic; and, that consistent with the development abovementioned, the evidence now to be
submitted will establish a greater amount of damage.
We do not agree.
We find that it was not the CA s intention, when it remanded the case to the RTC for the
computation of damages, to award respondent beyond its loss or injury at the time of the
taking.1wphi1 Hence, the factors which are not existing at the time of the taking could not be
considered. To reiterate, the CA then could not award damages since no evidence yet was
introduced at the RTC at that time; otherwise, if there was already an evidence presented to
establish the damages prayed for in the original complaint, the CA could have already awarded
damages and the case is now closed and terminated. There is, therefore, no basis to consider the
devaluation of peso as a ground in allowing the amendment of the complaint.
While we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of
the complaint filed in 1992, such finding does not necessarily establish that Presiding Judge
Simbulan had exhibited bias or partiality in favor of respondent, as petitioner claims, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2007
and the Resolution dated May 8, 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97784, are
hereby REVERSED. The RTC Orders dated September 22, 2006 and December 7, 2006 are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 173166 March 13, 2013
PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO and RUPERTO ESTANISLAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES NORMA GUDITO and DAMIANO GUDITO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks
the reversal of the Decision
1
dated October 25, 2005, and Resolution
2
dated June 16, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 46323.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents are the owners of a residential lot being leased by petitioners on a month-to-month
basis. Petitioners had been renting and occupying the subject lot since 1934 and were the ones
who built the house on the subject lot in accordance with their lease agreement with one Gaspar
Vasquez. When Gaspar Vasquez died, the portion of the lot on which petitioners house was
erected was inherited by his son Victorino Vasquez, married to Ester Vasquez (Vasquez couple).
In the 1980s, the Vasquez couple wanted the Estanislao family and the other tenants to vacate
the said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibiting their ejectment
therefrom. Resultantly, the Vasquez couple refused to accept their rental payments. Thus,
petitioner Purificacion Estanislao, with due notice to Ester Vasquez, deposited the amount of her
monthly rentals at Allied Banking Corporation under a savings account in the name of Ester
Vasquez as lessor.
In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Vasquez couple in favor of respondent
Norma Vasquez Gudito. Hence, in October 1994, respondents notified petitioners to remove
their house and vacate the premises within three months or up to January 31, 1995, because of
their urgent need of the residential lot. In a letter dated March 5, 1995, respondents reiterated the
demand and gave petitioners another three months or up to June 30, 1995, within which to
remove their house, vacate the subject lot and pay the rental arrearages. However, petitioners
failed to comply.
Accordingly, on November 10, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer/Ejectment against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
On March 6, 1996, the MeTC of Manila rendered a Decision
3
in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering:
(1) The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the
subject premises known as 2351 Pasig Line, Sta. Ana, Manila, and surrender its peaceful
possession to the plaintiffs;
(2) The defendants to pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the
subject premises in the amount of P500.00 a month beginning October 1985 and every
month thereafter until they shall have finally and actually vacated the subject premises;
(3) To pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorneys fees;
(4) To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4

Thereafter, petitioners elevated the case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
On November 28, 1997, the RTC of Manila rendered a Decision
5
reversing the MeTCs decision.
The fallo states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 6, 1996 rendered by the court a
quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The instant complaint filed by the Guditos is hereby DISMISSED;
(2) The "Guditos" are hereby enjoined to respect the lease agreement as well as the
possession of the "Estanislaos" over the leased premises. Should the "Guditos" decide to
sell or otherwise dispose of the same property to third parties, the "Estanislaos" are given
the right of first refusal pursuant to PDs 1517 and 2018 or; should the "Guditos" need the
same property for residential purposes, they can avail of the remaining 205.50 square
meters of the same lot wherein they can build their house.
(3) The present monthly rental is hereby fixed at P500 per month;
(4) Attorneys fees at P20,000 plus the cost of suit; and
(5) Other claims and counter-claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
6

Dissatisfied, respondents interposed an appeal before the CA.
In a Decision
7
dated October 25, 2005, the CA annulled and set aside the RTCs decision and
reinstated the MeTCs decision. It held as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Civil Case
No. 96-77804 dated November 28, 1998 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Consequently,
the Decision of Branch 11 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 149805-
CV dated March 6, 1996 is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the
respondents are ordered to pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject
premises in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos a month beginning November 1995, and every
month thereafter until they have finally vacated the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.
8

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
1. Whether or not the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals violates Presidential
Decree No. 2016, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517, expressly prohibiting the
eviction of legitimate tenants from land proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development or
as Urban Land Reform Zones.
2. Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 877, relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its
decision, can prevail over P.D. 2016, in relation to P.D. No. 1517, a special law and a
later enactment, considering that P.D. No. 2016 expressly repeals, amends or modifies
accordingly any law inconsistent with it.
3. Whether or not a legitimate tenant covered by P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016 can be evicted
if the owner of the leased land does not intend to sell his property as affirmatively held by
the Court of Appeals.
4. Whether or not respondents as lessors can adequately use the leased lot for the alleged
personal need without ejecting petitioners who occupy only a very small portion thereof.
5. Whether or not the donation of the leased lot to respondents can defeat petitioners
protected right under P.D. Nos. 1517 and 2016.
9

The pertinent issue in this case is who has the better right of possession over the subject property.
Petitioners strongly argue that respondents cannot evict them from the subject property pursuant
to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, as the subject property is allegedly
within one of the 245 Proclaimed Area for Priority Development and/or Urban Land Reform No.
1967, as amended by Presidential Proclamation No. 2284. Petitioners further contend that they
were not aware that the subject property had been acquired by respondents via a Deed of
Donation executed by the Vasquez couple. Thus, they assail that said donation was merely
simulated in order to deprive them of their right of first refusal to buy the subject property.
Conversely, respondents maintain P.D. 1517 cannot be appropriately applied to the present case,
since the same applies only to a case where the owners intend to sell the property to a third party.
They argue that in the instant case they are seeking the eviction of petitioners solely on the
ground that they need the property for residential purposes. Lastly, they assert that they have
sufficiently established a better right of possession over the disputed property than the
petitioners.
We deny the petition.
To begin with, the only question that the courts must resolve in an unlawful detainer or ejectment
suit is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
in dispute.
10

In the case under review, respondents have overwhelmingly established their right of possession
by virtue of the Deed of Donation made in their favor. Moreover, they have complied with the
provisions of the law in order for them to legally eject the petitioners. Section 5 (c) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 states:
Sec. 5. Grounds for judicial ejectment. Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:
x x x x
(c) Legitimate need of owner/ lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the use of
any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate member not
being the owner of any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality:
Provided, however, that the lease for a definite period has expired: Provided, further, that the
lessor has given the lessee formal notice within three (3) months in advance of the lessors
intention to repossess the property: Provided, finally, that the owner/ lessor is prohibited from
leasing the residential unit or allowing its use by a third party for at least one year.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents do not own any other lot or real property except the herein
subject lot. They have urgent need of the same to build their own house to be used as their
residence. Also, petitioners had already been asked to leave the premises as early as 1982, but
sternly refused, hence, its former owners refused to accept their rental payments. When the same
property was donated to respondents, petitioners were allowed to continue occupying the subject
lot since respondents did not as yet have the money to build a house of their own.1avvphi1 But
now that respondents have sufficient money to build their own house, petitioners still rebuff
respondents demand to vacate the premises and to remove or demolish their house. Clearly,
since respondents have complied with the requirements of the law, their right to possess the
subject property for their own use as family residence cannot be denied.
It is also worthy to note that petitioners have failed to prove that the transfer of the subject
property was merely a ploy designed to defeat and circumvent their right of first refusal under
the law. As emphasized by the CA, the Deed of Donation executed in favor of respondents was
signed by the parties and their witnesses, and was even notarized by a notary public.
Veritably, it is a settled rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution. It is admissible in evidence and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.
11

Having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, the said Deed is vested with
public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and
convincing evidence.
12
Thus, the donation made by the Vasquez couple is a valid exercise of
their right as owners of the subject property and respondents are legally entitled to the said
property as donees.
By the same token, this Court is not persuaded with petitioners insistence that they cannot be
evicted in view of Section 6 of P.D. 1517, which states
SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate
tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the
land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten
years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to
purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions
to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by
Section 8 of this Decree. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, petitioners cannot use P.D. 1517 as a shield to deny
respondents of their inherent right to possess the subject property. The CA correctly opined that
"under P.D. 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, the lessee is given the right of first refusal over the
land they have leased and occupied for more than ten yean and on which they constructed their
houses. But the right of first refusal applies only to a case where the owner of the property
intends to sell it to a third party. If the owner of the leased premises do not intend to sell the
property in question but seeks to eject the tenant on the ground that the former needs the
premises for residential purposes, the tenant cannot invoke the land reform law."
13

Clearly, the circumstances required for the application of P.D. 1517 are lacking in this case,
since respondents had no intention of selling the subject property to third parties, but seek the
eviction of petitioners on the valid ground that they need the property for residential purposes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 25, 2005, and Resolution dated
June 16, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46323 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 174297 June 20, 2012
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. LIGGAYU, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman
which assails the Decision
1
dated May 17, 2005 and the Resolution
2
dated August 3, 2006 issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65572.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The former Chairman and General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), retired Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma, authorized the release from her discretionary
funds a cash advance in the amount of P45,000.00 to cover the expenses of the PCSO Legal
Department in attending to cases pending before the Ombudsman and the various courts in Metro
Manila.
3
Respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu was a manager in the legal department to whom
the cash advance was issued under Check No. 165755 dated July 8, 1999.
4
The actual expenses
incurred by the legal department for the purchase of food and drinks while attending to the court
cases amounted to P45,717.39. To liquidate the cash advance and reimbursement, Disbursement
Voucher No. 0499110507 dated December 3, 1999 was thereafter submitted wherein respondent
attached thereto the various official receipts (ORs) as reflected in the summary of expenses for
the food and drinks purchased on different dates
5
which included among others: (1) receipt
6

dated July 8, 1999 issued by New Concepcion Cafe and Restaurant in the amount of P1,525.50;
and (2) Sales Invoice No. 31203
7
dated October 2, 1999 issued by Nature's Cafe in the amount of
P2,204.00.
On July 4, 2000, then PCSO Corporate Auditor, Atty. Milagros Romero (Romero), issued a
Notice of Suspension
8
for the amount of P23,577.14 as she found some deficiencies with the
documents submitted by respondent, to wit: (1) absence of accomplishment reports; and (2)
excessive expenses for food and beverages. Later, Romero issued a Notice of Disallowance
9
in
the total amount of P7,519.00 from the cash advance of respondent, which included among
others the amounts of P2,204.00 under Nature's Cafe Sales Invoice no. 31203 and P1,525.50
under New Concepcion Cafe and Restaurant Cash Invoice No. 36166. The disallowance was due
to the findings of the audit team that the amount of P2,204.00 covered by Invoice No. 31203 was
merely written or caused to be written by respondent as the duplicate copy of the invoice in
possession of the establishment was found to be blank per certification by the latter's cost
comptroller; and that the OR corresponding to the said sales invoice which was for the same
amount was actually issued to and paid by United Moonwalk Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. (UMVHAI). On the other hand, the New Concepcion Cafe and Restaurant Cash Invoice No.
36166 in the amount of P1,525.00 was discovered to be falsified since the duplicate copy on file
with the restaurant was only for the amount of P525.00; that the figure "1" which appeared
before the numbers 525.50 was only added after the issuance of the said invoice to make it
appear that the bill was for the amount of P1,525.50; and that the establishment's proprietor
certified as to the correctness of the amount appearing in the duplicate copy of the sales invoice.
Consequently, then PCSO General Manager Ricardo Golpeo (Golpeo) formally charged
respondent of dishonesty, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
10
On July 19, 2000, Golpeo placed respondent under preventive suspension for a period
of 90 days pursuant to the July 18, 2000 meeting of the PCSO Board of Directors.
11
He also
issued an Order
12
on even date for the creation of a Special Investigating Committee to conduct
the formal investigation on the charge filed against respondent.
Respondent filed his Answer
13
denying the charges against him. He explained that as to the
Nature Cafe's Sales Invoice No. 31203 in the amount of P2,204.00, he had no control in the
preparation of the said sales invoice, particularly the duplicate copy thereof; that if the duplicate
copy was left blank, then it should be the establishment which must be investigated before the
BIR; that the sales invoice given to him bore the cashier's signature evidencing receipt of the
amount indicated therein and presumed to be valid, since it was numbered and contained the tax
identification number of the establishment; and that he is a member of UMVHAI but it was
possible that his identity was not known to the cafe's staff, thus the official receipt was issued to
UMVHAI.
As to the New Concepcion Cafe's Cash Invoice No. 36166 in the amount of P1,525.50,
respondent argued that he merely received the cash invoice and had no participation in the
preparation thereof; that business establishments usually reduced the amounts appearing in the
duplicate of their receipts in order to enable them to pay lesser tax. Respondent also alleged in
his answer the reasons why he could not get a fair and impartial trial from the special
investigating committee, thus prayed for an independent committee to try his case.
On August 1, 2000, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
Petition for Certiorari with Damages and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
14
to enjoin
then PCSO Chairman Rosario Lopez and the Board of Directors from implementing the
preventive suspension. The case was docketed as Q-00-41464 raffled off to Branch 225.
On September 1, 2000, the RTC issued an Order
15
granting the prayer for the issuance of an
injunctive writ and ordered the aforementioned PCSO officials to: (a) reinstate respondent to his
position as Manager of its Legal Department; (b) lift the preventive suspension imposed on him;
(c) suspend the investigation on the formal charge against him and/or from doing or procuring to
be done acts which tend to render any judgment in the case ineffectual until after the case shall
have been decided on the merit or until further order from the court. A writ
16
was subsequently
issued.
Earlier however, in a meeting held on July 28, 2000, the PCSO Board of Directors had already
resolved to endorse the formal charge for dishonesty, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service against respondent to the Resident Ombudsman for
investigation and resolution. The Resident Ombudsman in turn forwarded the charge to
petitioner for administrative adjudication in order to allay respondent's fear of not getting a fair
treatment at the PCSO. He also recommended respondent's preventive suspension.
Before petitioner could issue an order requiring respondent to file his counter-affidavit on the
charge, the latter filed a Manifestation
17
informing the former of a writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC.
In an Order
18
dated October 18, 2000, petitioner resolved the manifestation regarding the RTC's
issuance of an injunction. It found that the injunction had been directed not against petitioner but
to the PCSO officials named therein; that it merely sought to enjoin the conduct of a formal
investigation by the PCSO management, thus such injunction could not be interpreted as to bar
petitioner from its administrative investigation. The same Order placed respondent under
preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and required him to file his counter-
affidavit. The following day, petitioner issued an Order
19
directing PCSO to implement the
preventive suspension order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which petitioner
denied in an Order
20
dated October 26, 2000. Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 43 assailing these orders. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 62760. During its pendency, petitioner had rendered a Decision dated March 30,
2001 on the merits, thus the petition filed with the CA was subsequently dismissed on November
3, 2004.
21

Petitioner's Decision
22
dated March 30, 2001 found respondent guilty of the charge of
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
In an Order
23
dated April 18, 2001, petitioner's Decision was modified so as to include the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification for re-
employment in the government service.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by petitioner in its Order
24
dated May 15,
2001 and the PCSO General Manager was instructed to immediately implement the Order.
Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 with application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction entitled, Atty. Romeo A.
Liggayu v. Ricardo G. Golpeo.
25

On May 17, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed Decision reversing and setting aside petitioner's
Orders.
The CA stated that petitioner's conclusion on the guilt of respondent was based on its findings
that: first, the respondent had falsified Official Receipt No. 36166 by adding the digit "1" before
the amount P525.50 to make it appear that the cost of the food and drinks he purchased was
P1,525.50; second, respondent used the falsified official receipt to support his disbursement of
public funds; third, Sales Invoice No. 31203 was actually issued to UMVHAI for food and
drinks it purchased at the cost of P2,204.00; and fourth, the sales invoice of UMVHAI was used
by respondent to support his disbursement of public funds.
The CA found, however, that the original copy of Official Receipt No. 36166 which was
submitted for liquidation was never proven to be a falsified document; that mere discrepancies
between the two copies of one document did not establish the falsity of one copy unless the
veracity of the other copy was first established, since it was equally possible for the false entry to
be found in the latter copy. As to petitioner's finding that Sales Invoice No. 31203 was actually
issued to UMVHAI and not to respondent, the CA found the evidence presented to be at odds
with each other. It found that Elenita So was not the one who issued the official receipt to
UMVHAI, since her signature therein differed from her signature in her certification and in her
affidavit; thus, she was not the proper person to testify on the transaction embodied in the official
receipt; that there was no basis for petitioner to conclude that the actual transaction involved in
Sales Invoice No. 31203 was that stated in the official receipt.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) filed in behalf of the PCSO General
Manager a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and
Reconsideration. The CA denied the motions for reconsideration in a Resolution dated August 3,
2006.
In denying reconsideration, the CA reiterated its findings contained in its May 17, 2005 decision.
In addition, the CA held that the testimony given by Elenita So in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
100794, which involved the matter of Sales Invoice No. 31203 which was claimed to be actually
issued to UMVHAI and not to respondent, established that So categorically admitted that the
signature appearing in Sales Invoice No. 31203 was her signature and that the entries therein
were entirely written by her and that she had no personal knowledge that OR No. 3132 issued to
UMVHAI corresponded to Sales Invoice No. 31203 issued to respondent as she was not the one
who issued the OR; and that she was merely made to sign the certification stating she was the
one who issued OR No. 3132 which was used as evidence against respondent.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner raises the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT LIGGAYU'S INTERCALATION OF THE DIGIT "1" BEFORE THE
AMOUNT "[525.50]," TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE PAID "P1,525.00" TO NEW
CONCEPCION CAFE AND RESTAURANT UNDER ITS OFFICIAL RECEIPT NO. 36166
THEREBY ALLOWING HIM TO CLAIM THE LATTER AMOUNT CONSTITUTES
DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
II
RESPONDENT LIGGAYU'S USAGE OF SALES INVOICE NO. 31203 FOR P2,204.00 FOR
THE LIQUIDATION OF HIS CASH ADVANCE, WHICH WAS ISSUED BY NATURE'S
CAFE TO AND PAID FOR BY THE UNITED MOONWALK VILLAGE HOMEOWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, INC. (UMVHAI) FOR FOOD AND DRINKS SERVED TO ITS MEMBERS
DURING ITS MEETING ON A SUNDAY, LIKEWISE CONSTITUTES DISHONESTY,
GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE.
26

Petitioner assails the factual findings of the CA. It contends that as between the OR in the
amount of P1,525.50 submitted by respondent to support his liquidation and the duplicate OR in
the amount of P525.50 on file with the business establishment which issued the same, the
duplicate OR is more credible, as the business establishment is a disinterested witness to
respondent's purchase; and that it is pure speculation to conclude that the business
establishment's duplicate ORs bore understated amounts to evade taxation, since respondent had
not adduced evidence to show that New Concepcion Cafe is a tax evader.
Petitioner claims that as to Sales Invoice No. 31203 issued by Nature's Cafe, the CA erred in
discarding the declarations of Elenita So that the amount of P2,204.00 under Sales Invoice No.
31203 was paid for by UMVHAI and not by respondent; and that respondent's utilization of the
said invoice in liquidating his cash advance is a clear act of misrepresentation.
In his Comment/Opposition, respondent informed us that the PCSO, through its Board of
Directors, adopted and approved Board Resolution No. 415 on August 30, 2006, which accepted
the CA decision and decided not to appeal the same which reversed petitioner's order dismissing
respondent from the service; that the OGCC, acting as PCSO's agent and counsel, did not
anymore file any petition assailing the CA decision. Respondent also states that earlier in
November 2002, PCSO had already cleared him of all his property and cash accountabilities with
the office and that he had already received all the salaries and benefits due him; thus, rendering
the instant petition moot and academic. He also contends that petitioner has no standing to file
the case as it cannot be considered as an aggrieved party who can file the appeal, because it is
neither respondent's employer nor has it any interest that was prejudiced by the CA decision.
Finally, respondent argues that the PCSO failed to substantiate the charge against him.
In its Reply, petitioner contends that it has standing to file the petition, citing Philippine National
Bank v. Garcia, Jr.;
27
that it is the party adversely affected by the ruling of the CA which
seriously prejudiced the administration of disciplinary justice in the bureaucracy; thus, it has a
duty to intervene and represent the interest of the State to preserve the principles of public
accountability.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner has legal standing to file the instant
petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA ruling which reversed petitioner's decision.
We find that petitioner has no legal standing to file this petition.
In National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) v. Mamauag
28

(Mamauag), citing Mathay, Jr, v. Court of Appeals,
29
we ruled that the disciplining authority
should not appeal the reversal of its decision and made the following ratiocination:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining
authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that
the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes
that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal
which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service. The government party appealing must be the one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result
where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial
and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. Thus, in
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought to the Court of
Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial
body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role
as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to litigate.
30

(Emphasis supplied.)
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison,
31
where the issue of whether the Ombudsman, which had
rendered the decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public officers and employees,
has the legal interest to intervene in the case where its decision was reversed on appeal, we ruled
that it is not the proper party to intervene applying the above-quoted disquisition we made in
Mamauag. We further stated that:
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the
instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of
its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their
decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is the
fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties
to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the
judges' active participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment,
they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-
CIDG), the Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion to
Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when hearing
and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher
court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is
an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence
and applicable laws, regulations and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify
further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the
quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his
detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective
now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellant's
assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.
32

(Emphasis supplied.)
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno,
33
we ruled that:
x x x Every decision rendered by the Ombudsman in an administrative case may be affirmed, but
may also be modified or reversed on appeal - this is the very essence of appeal. In case of
modification or reversal of the decision of the Ombudsman on appeal, it is the parties who bear
the consequences thereof, and the Ombudsman itself would only have to face the error/s in fact
or law that it may have committed which resulted in the modification or reversal of its decision.
34

Clearly, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
respondent. In this case, it is the PCSO, through its then General Manager Golpeo, which filed
the administrative case against respondent for the latter's alleged act of dishonesty in falsifying
the OR and sales invoice he submitted in the liquidation of his cash advance. Thus, it is the
PCSO which is deemed the prosecuting government party which can appeal the CA decision
exonerating respondent of the administrative charge. It is the PCSO which would stand to suffer,
since the CA decision also ordered respondent's reinstatement, thus, the former would be
compelled to take back to its fold a perceived dishonest employee. Notwithstanding, the PCSO
did not file any petition assailing the CA decision. In fact, the PCSO, through its Board of
Directors, adopted and approved Board Resolution No. 415 on August 30, 2006, to wit:
RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of PCSO accept, as it hereby accepts, and to no longer
appeal the Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 17 May 2005 and 03 August 2006 reversing
and setting aside the orders of the Ombudsman dismissing former PCSO Legal Department
Manager Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service, and ordering the payment of all the salaries and benefits
due Atty. Liggayu from his suspension to the time of his attainment of his retirement age and to
restore him all retirement benefits and privileges to which he is entitled, subject to the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and the availability of funds and applicable accounting and
auditing laws, rules and regulations.
35

Petitioner cites Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia)
36
to show that it has legal interest
to file this petition. In that case, the PNB charged its employee, Ricardo V. Garcia, with gross
neglect of duty in connection with the funds he had lost in the amount of P7 million. The PNBs
Administration Adjudication Office found him guilty as charged and imposed upon him the
penalty of forced resignation. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exonerated Garcia
from the administrative charge against him. The PNB filed a petition with the CA which
dismissed the same, ruling that the only party adversely affected by the decision, namely the
government employee, may appeal an administrative case. It held that a decision exonerating a
respondent in an administrative case is final and unappealable. Consequently, the PNB filed a
petition with us. In accordance with our ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,
37
we
ruled that the PNB had the legal standing to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution exonerating
Garcia. We said that after all, PNB was the aggrieved party which complained of Garcia's acts of
dishonesty.1wphi1 Should Garcia be finally exonerated, it might then be incumbent upon the
PNB to take him back into its fold. The PNB should, therefore, be allowed to appeal a decision
that, in its view, hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can
protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in the country.
PNB v. Garcia, Jr.
38
is not on all fours with the present case.1wphi1 First, herein respondent
was not exonerated of the administrative charge of dishonesty, gross misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but was found guilty thereof by petitioner and was
meted the penalty of dismissal. Thus, it was the respondent who filed the petition with the CA as
the party aggrieved by petitioner's decision. Second, the PCSO, which is supposedly the party
aggrieved in the CA decision, did not file any petition, but it was the petitioner - the
administrative agency - which rendered the decision reversed by the CA. Third, PNB v. Garcia
39

must be read together with Mathay, Jr. v. CA
40
and National Appellate Board of the National
Police Commission v. Mamauag
41
wherein we qualified our declaration in CSC v. Dacoycoy
42

which was cited in PNB v. Garcia
43
that the government party that can appeal the decision in
administrative cases must be the party prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or
tribunal which heard the administrative case.
Considering that petitioner has no legal interest or standing to appeal and seek the nullification of
the CA decision exonerating respondent from the administrative charge of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, we, therefore find no need
to delve on the merits of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 17, 2005 and the Resolution
dated August 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65572 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.