PACU VS SEC OF EDUCATION

95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act
No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to
regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit
should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to
own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of
Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our
system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the
law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary mustexercise said discretion;
that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by
the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal
discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties
of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals.
This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

MARIANO VS COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners contend that Sec. 2, 51, and 52 of RA 7854 is unconstitutional on
the following grounds: Sec. 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, as required
by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of the LGC; Sec.
51 attempts to alter or restart the "three-consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials; Sec. 52 increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (not
what is provided for in Art. VI, Sec. 5(4), Consti), not expressed in the title of the bill,
and survey is 450,000 people only.
Issue: WON Sec. 52, RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Negative. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as a charter of a new city.
MONTESCLAROS VS COMELEC
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age
limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed
since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay
elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering
of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction imputable to respondents.


Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners
are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than
July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date
acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age
for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a
vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.


RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the
SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. Its constitutionality
not having been assailed in the first place.

The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining
this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did
not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

LACSON VS PEREZ
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed.
Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis
both in fact and in law.
On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners'
claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific
persons in connection with the "rebellion."

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improper
at this time.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared
null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the
subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the
country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to
relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking
earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their
behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for
all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

DAVID VS ARROYO
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take
Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5
(GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his
arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP.
It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the
said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5.
A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of
the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech
cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words
and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such
power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers
(as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take
care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the
Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

JOYA VS PCGG



Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper
party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to beenforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth
in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental
acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure
of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.



FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies
of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his
relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was
already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christies of New York for the sale of the artworks

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an
actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and,
that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case
is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party
plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for
the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity
of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation
and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents
Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations
as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A.
4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation
and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the
premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the
people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of
PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due
process of law inviolation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that
the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote
non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its
president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to
the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as
gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an
occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary
government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings
has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their
subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose
authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the
Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the
criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a
writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,
petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987
Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed.
Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is
at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify
to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of
what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and
antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Actual Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991
which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public
interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant
the relaxation of the rule.
CHREA VS CHR
1. RA 8522 or the General Appropriations Act of 1998 provided special provisions applicable to
all Constitutional Offices.
2. The Commission on Human Rights through then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette Recina and
Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and
Jorge R. Coquia upgraded or raised the salaries (A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified
selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047 September, 1998) and collapsed vacant
positions (A98-062 November 1998) without the approval of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM)
3. The petitioners Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) through its
then President Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals alleging
that they have locus standi because the reorganization demoralizes the rank and file
employees and will only benefit those in top positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA)
exempted the CHR from the Salary Standardization Law.

Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR emp0wers them to reclassify, adjust salaries
and collapse vacant positions without the approval of DBM?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to ascertain that the proposed compensation,
benefits and other incentives be given in adherence to the policies and guidelines in accordance with
applicable laws. The mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section
4, Chapter 1, Title XVII to wit: shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources
and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the NationalBudget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more
economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and
review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Furthermore, Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of
Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy.
AIWA VS ROMULO
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005

Facts:
The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed a petition for
Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185
unconstitutional.
The petitioners contended that EO 185 violated their rights and interests as labor unions and as
taxpayers. By the said EO, the administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor
arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment.
Claiming that the issues does not pose an actual case or controversy, respondents contend that
the petitioners have not specifically cited how EO No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to
prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Furthermore, they argued
that the petitioners lacked legal standing to challenge the validity of said EO, not even in their
capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.

Ration Decidendi:
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged." Since petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
of sustaining any personal injury due to EO No. 185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned
EO will prejudice their rights and interests. Only NLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary of
Labors disciplinary authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue.
In their capacity as taxpayers, petitioners also do not have legal standing on this issue since
there is no mention of an established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The challenging of EO 185s
constitutionality have to wait for the proper party in a proper case before the court may intervene
and entertain.
KMU LABOR CENTER VS GARCIA
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of
one (1) year to be implemented on August 6, 1990. The Memo read as is the liberalization of
regulations in the transport sector and to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make
progress towards greater reliance to market forces: Chairman Fernando informed Sec. Orbos that
the Memo is not legally feasible and recommended for further studies because (1) under Public
Service Act rates should be approved by public service operators; there should be publication and
notice especially to affected sectors; and a public hearing be held; (2) it was untimely due to an
earthquake happened on July 16; (3) it will trigger upward adjustment in bus fares especially in trips
bound for Northern Luzon; and (4) DOTC should consider reforms that will be uplifting after the
earthquake. On December 5, 1990 the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. On December 14, 1990 LTFRB released a fare
schedule based on a straight computation. On March 30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes Prado
issued Department Order No 92-587 defining the framework on the regulation of transport services.
Then on October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose B. Garcia issued a memorandum to LTFRB for the swift
action on the adoption of the rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587 that
laid down the deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector. LTFRB issued on
February 17, 1993
On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority
given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen
(15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and
above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional,
invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant
for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative
of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court and petitions before the LTFRB.
LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and
preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned
orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the
levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced
on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have
the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRBs
authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for
certificates of public convenience.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case?
Whether or not the fare adjustment is constitutional?
HELD:
(1) YES. KMU has a locus standi (or ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that partys participation in the
case) which is inherent in the Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587,
LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby
DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to
provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly
prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor
of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is
no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June
20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted
under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders
declared invalid.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS CA
Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act
of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However,
even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.)
filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6,
paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with
a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or
suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust
and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only
twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil.
filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11)
other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for
a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section
6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and
Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against
unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article
II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the
deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent
stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they
are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled
workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such
abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign
employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only
encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to
the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and
authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of
the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against
licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It
contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and
non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The
penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the
equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1),
Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees
of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment
under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10,
paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws
and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment
agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any
of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed
guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of
the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a
labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered
recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would
be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take
more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of
proving the defense of foreign employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court
where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided,
however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already
been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause
of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No.
8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the
Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the
State.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier
shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to
demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and
impropriety of the petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition
and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The
appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.


Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary
injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it.

Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate
court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24,
1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the
said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and
prohibition.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against
good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be
unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive
relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them
unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws
on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and
necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good
faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.

One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable
doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of
constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516
[1991]).


In view of petitioner's standing
The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit
organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent
filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it
failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the
said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the
respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is
service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.

The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in
representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended
petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members.
This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. 16 An association has
standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the
action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes
inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment
industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment
opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general
welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company,
entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other
acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.


In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled
workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in
failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it
claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent
filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid
multiplicity of suits.


In view of retroactivity
In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively.


In view of equal protection clause
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of
regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are
required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory
measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class
privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or
by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all
persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.


In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may
be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury: An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions
of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment,
declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be
enjoined.

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their
relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal
recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not
offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal
recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.

The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies
would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such
conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable
injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension
that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before
the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly
irreparable injury.

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people
anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to
overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and
placement of workers for overseas employment.

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court
frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue
victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and
blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the awarded contractor
Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as
signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with
other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained
copies of Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.
RULING:
NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a consortium had actually
been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT. The president of
MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence
of the consortium. It did not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by the other
members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more
important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings. The letter is purely self-serving
and uncorroborated.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
41 SCRA 702 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Doctrine of Proper Submission
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the
Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit
such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the
people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant
that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the
people were not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at
the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore
would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the
Doctrine of Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.