In order to achieve policy objectives early military strategists, bound by traditions and

rules of war, paid attention to theories of strategy, such as annihilation, exhaustion and
subversion. The unorthodox strategists challenged the old rules and customs of war. New
technologies as pointed by Machiavelli could affect strategy.
1
Traditional build up of strategic
theory did not take advantage of new technologies and their futures. The challengers with fresh,
creative approaches delivered unrestricted possibilities.
Andr Beaufre was a French military general and veteran of World War II, strategic
thinker with vast experience in military operations and planning. Having published three books,
An Introduction to Strategy, Strategy and Deterrence, and Strategy of Action Beaufe managed to
gain the respect of other important strategists like Liddel Hart. For Beaufre strategy was a
method of thought, the object which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then
choose the most effective course of action
2
. Furthermore, the general argued that strategic
thinking needed an analysis of both psychological and material data from which the best one
could be chosen.
Beaufre defined strategy as the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of
the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute
3
. He believed that
strategy had to be specially developed for each situation, as a given strategy that might work best
in some situations would be the worst in others. The aim of strategy was to fulfill the objectives
laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available (23). According to Beaufre,
The outcome desired is to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him. In
this dialectic of wills, a decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been
produced on the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to
continue the struggle. (23) Like Clausewitz and others before him, Beaufre placed great
emphasis on psychological factors in war and felt that they were fundamental to any theory of
strategy (13). For example, he argued that Lenins oft-quoted deviation from Clausewitz that
the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the
enemy renders a mortal blow both possible and easy was perhaps appropriate for revolutions (as
a sort of psychological artillery preparation), but wrong in the instance of defeating a military

1
Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to
the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, 11-32 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
2
Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy
in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), 13.
3
Beaufre, 22.
(23). Beaufre sided with Clausewitz, stating his view in the form of a guiding strategic rule, that
the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral
disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose upon
him (24).
Beaufre was an advocate for total strategythat is, in addition to the use of the military
to achieve ends, political, economic and diplomatic means also needed to be included (13). The
means of strategy also included both material and moral capabilities, combined to produce the
psychological pressure needed to achieve the desired moral effect. Beginning with the decisive
moral effect to be achieved, ones own capabilities were set against an adversarys vulnerabilities
until the means available were isolated to those adequate to achieve the desired end state. Given
the dialectical nature of strategic planning, possible enemy reactions to the strategy were then
calculated with provisions developed to guard against them. Just as ones own side employed
diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological means, enemy counteractions had to be
assessed for their efficacy in these arenas, also. (24-25) Beaufre illustrated his conception of how
strategy was formulated through five patterns of strategy, shown in Table 8.1. These five
courses of action were not meant to be an exhaustive categorization. Rather, they showed that
many formulations of strategy were not only possible, contrary to the one-strategy-fits-all
theories proposed by other strategists, but also necessary in order to accommodate unique
situations faced (29).
His direct threat pattern was suitable when a state with limited freedom of action sought to
achieve moderate interests with threats backed up by superiority in resources. The pattern of
indirect pressure referred to limited freedom of action situations where moderate interests were
at stake but the resources were inadequate to constitute a decisive threat. In this case, more
insidious methods were required, whether political, economic or diplomatic. A series of
successive actions might be required for restricted freedom of action situations involving high
stakes and limited resources. The successive actions would combine direct threats and indirect
pressure with a limited application of force (26). Another pattern was protracted struggle at a
low level of military intensity (more popularly known as Protracted Popular War), developed by
Mao Tse-Tung, useful when freedom of action was large but resources inadequate to achieve a
military decision. This pattern required considerable moral endurance and was very effective in
wars of liberation (27). Beaufre described his final pattern as violent conflict aiming at military
victory, for situations where a state had sufficient military strength to seek a quick, decisive
military victory best conducted when the opponents interests were not completely vital. Beaufre
noted that if this Clausewitzian-Napoleonic strategy did not end quickly, it had a tendency to
devolve into a war of attrition out of proportion to the interests at stake, such as World War I
(28).
Total strategy was hierarchical in nature, under the control of the government, which dictated
how it was to be conducted (30). It was subdivided into political, economic, diplomatic and
military categories, each of which had its own overall strategy, with tasks unique to each field
assigned and coordinated. Beaufre lamented that in the past, the fields of political, economic and
diplomatic strategy had not been effectively coordinated, but needed to be under the guidance of
the appropriate minister (30). The hierarchy descended downward below each field to the
operational level where concept and implementation meet, when the optimum must be adjusted
to the possible in the light of technical limitations (31). For example, in the case of military
operational strategy, tactical and logistical factors had to be taken into account, which dictated
the form of warfare (static or maneuver, annihilation or attrition) that could be pursued.
Beaufre conducted an evaluation of the principles of strategy by the best-known theorists of the
past (shown in Table 1.2 Beaufres interpretations of rules in strategy) against his own theory of
total strategy. He determined that only the rules of Foch (economy of force and freedom of
action) constituted real strategic rules. The rest were merely general guidelines for particular
situations rather than universal principles (34). This was a result of the dialectic nature of conflict
in which two opposing wills used force to resolve their dispute. According to Beaufre (34): In
this battle of wills two broadly similar systems will confront each other; each will try to reach the
others vitals by a preparatory process, the object of which will be to strike terror, to paralyze
and to surpriseall these objects are
psychological. In any strategy, therefore, there are two distinct but equally
important vital components: 1) Selection of the decisive point to be attacked (this
depends on the enemys vulnerable points), and, 2) Selection of the preparatory
maneuver, which will enable this decisive point to be reached. Victory will go to
the side that which succeeds in blocking his enemys maneuver and carrying his
own to its objective.
Beaufre concluded that this was the essence of Fochs notion of preservation of freedom
of action. Battle was simply a struggle for this freedom of action with each side
attempting to preserve its own and deny it to the enemy. Allocating ones resources to
accomplish this efficiently comprised economy of force. In the end, attainment of the
objective broke down to reaching the decisive point through freedom of action gained
by sound economy of force(35).
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Continuing down the strategy hierarchy, Beaufre went on to describe the methods
by which economy of force and freedom of action were achieved. He noted that a
strategic decision was made within the confines of not only time, space, and the size and
morale of forces available, but also through the factor of maneuver, which governed
the order of and inter-relationship of successive situations (36). He described
maneuver as the direct product of the dialectic of the conflict (36). He likened the
forms of action and reaction of combat to the postures and decisions of fencing, to
include eight offensive postures (attack, which may be preceded or followed by threat,
surprise, feint, deceive, thrust, wear down and follow-up), six defensive postures (on
guard, parry, riposte, disengage, retire, and break-off), with five possible types of
decisions (concentrate, disperse, economize, increase, and reduce). Beaufre associated all
of these actions and reactions with freedom of action, intended to either gain, regain or
deprive the enemy of it. Additionally, these actions illustrated that freedom of action was
essential to maintain the initiative, another fundamental factor in maneuver.
Beaufre contended that doctrines governed the choices of action and reaction
available for maneuver. The doctrine of the rational application of force provided
guidance for choosing a course of action that would permit forces to exert their maximum
effect against an enemys main force in decisive battle, given stronger forces available as
the entering argument (42). Alternately, the doctrine of guile guided the choice of a
course of action that would best throw the enemy off balance, disorientate, and deceive
him through psychological effect. This meant attacking an enemys weak points with
strength, as opposed to attacking an enemys strong points in the doctrine of the rational
application of force. Neither doctrine was universally valid. The doctrine of the rational
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application of force was better suited for situations in which one held a relative strength
advantage or when an enemy of superior strength was dangerously dispersed. The
doctrine of guile was best used when one was inferior in strength. The situation dictated
which doctrine was best to employ (43).
Modes of strategy referred to general postures that emerged from either of these
doctrines. The direct strategy mode utilized military force as the principal weapon to
achieve victory. The indirect strategy mode primarily used less direct methods through
the use of political, economic or diplomatic means. Military means could also be used,
but they were subservient to political negotiations. Beaufre considered these two modes
to be complementary, particularly in the Cold War era. The nuclear dialectic represented
the direct strategy mode, which sought to neutralize the great economic and industrial
potentials on each side (44). The indirect strategy mode was manifested in the political
dialectic that ran concomitant to the system of nuclear deterrence.
Beaufre recognized that strategy had to be dynamic. He encapsulated this need for
changes in strategy in his variability factor, which he described as resulting from the
variability of resources available and the circumstances surrounding their employment.
This factor necessitated the discarding of rigid and dangerous hypotheses like some
recent theories, mostly of American origin, which are based on a mathematical evaluation
of probabilities. Instead, Beaufre offered that they needed to be based on a whole
gamut of possibilities (45), meaning that periodic forecasts were required in order to
guard against surprise and keep up with changes. The variability factor was of such
import that Beaufre declared that preparation is now of more consequence than
execution (45).
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Implementation of strategy required a close linkage with tactics, with tactics
subservient to strategy (47). Beaufre noted that many writers on strategy had turned this
relationship upside-down, with tactics driving strategy, based upon technical innovations.
However, Beuafre observed that the advantage of technical and tactical superiority could
be rendered ineffective if used under the umbrella of an erroneous strategy. Indeed, the
choice of tactics is in fact strategy (48). According to Beaufre (48):
It is strategy which decides the form in which the conflict is to be waged,
whether it is to be offensive or defensive, whether it will use force or subversion,
whether force is to be used directly or indirectly or in stages, whether the main
battle is to be political or military, whether atomic weapons are to be used, etc.,
etc.
... The choice of tactics is not however the only task of strategy. It must
also direct the evolution of tactics so that they can play their proper part in
reaching a decision. Strategy must therefore lay down the aim which the
inventions of the technicians and the research of the tacticians should strive to
achieve. Only then shall we be able to direct evolution into profitable channels,
channels which lead towards the objective of any conflicta decision.
Beaufre summed up his theoretical discussion of strategy by closing the loop
between strategy, tactics, policy and ideological philosophy:
[S]trategy is no more than a means to an ends. It is for policy to lay
down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is basically governed by the
philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny of the human race depends
upon the philosophy which it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries to
ensure that the philosophy will prevail.
The previous discussion summarized Beaufres original theory of strategy,
published in Introduction to Strategy in 1962. After a decade, Beaufre returned to his
theory of total strategy, discussed in his 1972 book, Strategy for Tomorrow, with some
additional ideas on strategy.
Beaufre came to realize that two changes forced a renaissance towards limited
war. First, the haunting specter of pyrrhic nuclear annihilation pushed politicians to avoid
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escalation towards unlimited war (Beaufre 1974, 2). Second, the development of mass
media delivered a capability to sway public opinion either for or against war, depending
upon the political orientation of those who wielded it. News programs that focused on
the horrors of war were inevitably pacifist and defeatist (1974, 4). On the other hand,
news media that provoked nationalistic sentiment stirred a hawkish influence upon the
public. According to Beaufre, the media intensified the effects of public opinion on
policy (4):
This domestic involvement of the mass media is crucial because it molds
public opinion to the point where war is acceptable to the public and it also
demoralizes the public and makes compromise possible. Compromises are the
only type of result possible in limited war.
However, Beaufre also realized that the increased efficacy of the media was
subject for use as a propaganda tool. Not only was it used for garnering domestic support,
it was also used to push governments to intervene in other conflicts through moral
suasion or to restrain governments from certain actions (5). Beaufre referred to this
ability of public opinion to restrain government as moral deterrence (5). In the case of
world opinion, this effect was only crucial if it undermined an antagonists will to fight.
While Beaufre is more known for his theories on deterrence, he should be credited
for his contributions to total strategy and his attempt to tie together what others had
considered to be disparate styles of warfare (such as guerilla, nuclear and conventional
warfare) under one rubric. Additionally, with his five patterns of strategies, dependent
upon the strategic situation, laid the groundwork for a strategy theoretical framework,
discussed later.