Defect Assessment in Pipelines Course

IRGANIZED BY
. .

June 7-8,2007
Lecturer
Professor Phil Hopkins
SUPPORTED BY
,
..
Defect Assessment in Pipelines
June 7-N, 2007, Houston
Organized by
Cl arion Technical Conferences
3401 Louisiana Street, Houston, Te xas 77002 , USA
Tel. 7 13.521.5929.
Web: www.clarion.org
and
Global Pipeline Mo nthly
PO Rox 21, Beaco nsfield, Bucks HP9 INS, UK
Tel. 44 1494675139
Web: www.pipcmag.com
Co pyright 2007 Pcnspcn Gr oup. All rights reserved. This publicat ion may not be
reproduced in any form wi thout permi ssion of the copyright owners. For information
contact Clarion Technical Conferences.
Defect As ses sment in Pipelines
Course Program
1. Course Int roduct ion
2. Introduction t o Oil , Ga s, a nd Pipeli nes
3. Int roduct ion to Pipeline Desi gn, Construction, a nd Op eration
4. How Safe Ar e Pipeli nes a nd Why Do Th ey Fail ?
5. Int r oduction to Fract ure Mechanics (notes only)
6. How to Assess Fatigue (notes only)
7. How to Assess Defects
8. Assessment of Corrosion
9. Assessment of Gouges
10. Assessment of Dents
11. Assessment of Cracks
12. Assessment of Weld Defect s
13. Fract ure Propa gat ion and Arrest (not es only)
1,1. Intelligent Pig Inspection
15. Pipeli ne Repair a nd Rehabi lita t ion
16. Risk Management
17. Responsibilities, Moral s and Ethics
18. Tutorials
Defect Assessment Course Schedule
Day 1
8.00 Introduction, lectures
9.15 Coffee
s.ao Lect ures
10.45 Coffee
12.00 Lunch
LOO Lect ur es
2.15 Coffee
2.30 Lectur es
3.4 5 Coffee
5.00 End of Day 1
Day 2
8.00 Lectures
9.15 Coffee
9.30 Lect ur es
10.45 Coffee
12.00 Lunch
LOO Lecture s
2.15 Coffee
2.30 Lect ur es
3,.15 Coffee
4.45 End of course
Lect urer
Professor Phil Hopkins has more than 26 years' experience in pipeline and marine
engineering, and is Technical Director with Penspen In tegrity and Visiting Professor of
Engineering at the University of Newcastle-upon.Tyne. Phil has worked with most of the
major oil and gas companies and pipeline companies around the world, providing consultancy
on management, business, design, maintenance, inspection, risk analysis and safety, and
failure investigations. He is the current chairman of the Executive Committee of the AS),IE
Pipeline Systems Division and has served on many other professional committees, including
the Bri tish Standards Institution, European Pipeline Research Group, the American Gas
Association's Pipeline Research Committee, and the DNV Pipeli ne Committee. Phil has
extensive experience in both lecturing and training, and he regularly presents on many
aspects of pipeline engineering at international industry meetings and seminars. More than
1500 engineers and technica l personnel around the world have attended his Pipel ine Defect
Assessment and Pipeli ne Integrity-related courses.
PIPELINE DEFECT ASSESSMENT
COURSE
PDAC
A Course by:
PENSPEN,UK
World Leaders in Pipeline Integrity Training
COPYRIGHT AND DISCLAIMER
Copyr ight 2007 by Penspen
All righ t s reserved . No pa'-t 01 t t ess c ourse note s may be rep roduced ,
d i st r i but ed o r stored or. a.ny for", o r by a ny mea ns wit hout the pri or writ tsr.
au t hor isat ion o f the Penspen Group .
Some of t he i mag es i n t l:e s e course not e s l ave been s upp l i ed con rt esy o f ot ter
or i nd i viduals , t he s e acknowl edge d Some o f the
t a k en from t he l iteratur e / int e rne t and i s full y
The litera ture! 'Nebsite s ho u l d be c onsul ted t or t he t e r ms.
copyri gh t of ehese mat:e , -ials re"a i:l s t he origina l copyright ho l der .
course hotes ha ve b een prepared by penspen I nt eg r i t y Ipart at t he
based On <r om s Ources t ha t are to be r e li ab l e
Howeve r ,
(1 ) mak e s no o r expres sed or i mp l i ed , res pe c t to
t h" com;Jl d ."n,,, ,,, or ll" " f ul n"" " D< th" i n fDr O". a t i on c OLta ined i n thi s
r epor t , o r t ha t us e o t any i nt orma tion , apparat us, method or proc e s s
d isc losed i n t l: i s r e port C'.ay nOt i r. f ringe p r iva t ely right s,
(2) no l i ab i l i t i e s r espect to t r.e us e of. o r for daccag es r e sulting
from t he us e o f , inf ormat ioh, apparat1l3 , or p r oc e s s in
t hese cou r se no tes .
The u s e o f a ny i n these cou r se not es i s sol e:y the respons ibi l ity o f
the use r .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The c au , s e a nd hAve been by UK. 7he a ut ho r s
aCkn owl edge the i r a r:d .,r",, ' ous cou r s e f o r tLeir' many
cornment s and Buggestior.s f or irr.proving course non",. ':"he authors also t har.k
those i nctividuala a nd compan i e s h,;v" sUl'pl ie1 some 0 1 t he i mag" " in th.. "e
CO"ree no t e s .
Defect Assessment in Pipelines
Houston, USA. June 2007
Phil Hopkins
PENSPEN INTEGRITY
World Leaders in Pipeline
Integrity Training
Hav.' bom Sun"
LOlL' ?&: k. Terrac:e w 'e!
Sf Peter. Wharf
St. Pc""" '$ Ba""
.... ca'tle upon Tyno: 1rz
OK
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f,n 44 ((Ii 19/ .' Jj 97x6
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2001
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Cell phooes OfF, please'
Welcome
::J Welcome ... to the Pipel ine Defect
Assessment Course
::J Penspen is a UK based pipeline engineering
consultancy company.
::J Part of our business is training pipeline
engineers allover the world, and we welcome
any comments, or feed back, on this course
programme.
:J Please contact us wi th your comments
u Contact details are on the front cover of this
presentation.
ClP..,.".., It'. 2001
Penspen Group
P @
I
Unipen
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",!"! !'I!!!!!!!.,,"
I R ~ ~ I
D ~ AL - HA N DAS A H
rr Penspen is owned by Dar AI-
Handasa h - 'House of Engi neers'
o 4, 500 employee company
[J Penspen has >1200 employees.
u HQ is in Richmond, UK, but has
offices around the world.
o Works in oil, gas, water
pipelines, and facilities
engineering.
r
..,. ; . , "'"'::":,.. ...
j;; - c . . .-..----

Austria, UK, Netherlands,
Romania
C P...- UO 2007
Introduction
o Introduce lecturers ... [ 4l
u and attendees
o Domestics la
u Help and Assistance j
o Interaction
o Course Timetable
o Objective of Course
o Reasons for Course
o General Guidance Notes
O_l kl 2001
Domestics and Interaction
Domestics
o Tea/Coffee
o Lunch Breaks
o Assistance
;:J Fire exits/procedures
Interaction
o It is YOUR course - interact!
o Ask questions. pass comments, share your experiences
o Vis it our website for more papers and articles on defect
assessment :
www.penspenintegrity Qcom
Course Timetable
Day 1: 08.00 17.00
Day 2: 08.00 16.45
Worked Examples
(during course)
Bring a calculator!
C_UO 2001 ..
Course Timetable
or Introduction and Wel come
or Introduction t o Basi cs Pipel ine Engineering
or Why Pipelines Fail
... Introduction t o Fracture Mech ani cs & Fat i gu e (notes only)
or Fundamental Pipel ine Def ect Fail ur e Rel at ionsh ips
or How to Assess Corrosion Defect s
or How to Assess Gouges & Dent s
or How t o Assess Weld Defects
or How to Assess Cracks
or Fract ure Propagati on and Arrest (time permitting)
.... Setting Inte lligent Pi g Inspectio n Level s
or Pipel ine Repa ir
.... Pi peli ne Risk and Integrity Management & Tutori al
"
Objectives of the Course
OBJECTIVE
to underst and the:
reason for;
behaviour or.'
assessment of;
consequences of;
defect s i n t ransmission
pipelines
----_......
AIM
to give course attendees a sound . hol istic
I'comptete') understanding of defects in
transmission pipelines, and the knowledge to
allow assessment
"
Reason for the Course
Pipelines can cause fatalities:
Ghis lengien, Belgium, July 2004
failure in a gas pipe line due to mechanical
damage, caus ing 23 fata lities
Car lsbad, New
Mexico, August 2000
fail ure in a gas pipe l ine
due to microbial int erna l
co rros io n, caus i ng 12
fata lit ies
"
Pipelines can cause. ..
Environmental damage
Reason for Training: Safety

rt A study conducted at the Swiss Federal lnslit ute of Techn ology in Zuri ch
analyzed 800 cases of structural fail ure in which 504 people wer e killed,
592 peopl e injured, and millions of dollars of damage incurred
o When engineers were at fault . the causes of failure were classifi ed as:
Insufficient knowledge 36%
Underestimation of influence 16%
Ignorance, carelessness, negligence 14%
Forgetful ness, error 13%
Rel yi ng upo n others wi th ou t sufficient control 9%
Obj ect i vel y unknown sit uation
""
Impreci se definition of responsi bili ti es 1%
Cho ice of bad quality 1/.
Oth er 3%
ODES YOUR COMPANY HAVE A STRUCTURED AND DOCUMENTED ' INTEGRITY' TRAINING PROGRAM?
"
Reason for Training: Business
'INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL'
:J The market value of a person(s) is a combi nation of the knowledge the
person creates and owns II
G A company's worth is an accumulation of its employee's knowledge.
D The market val ue of a company is determined. in a large part, by the
intellectual capital , as perceived by the investing publi c >-?
1:1 Exxon's intellectual capital estimat ed to be 72% of its market value.
c Coca Cola's is estimated to be 96% ~ ..... 1
LOSS OF CAPITAL ,_ __ j
n Intellectual capital of the oil and gas business continues to "leak into other
industries at an alarming rate"
D In the UK, across all industries. 25,000 engineers retire annually and only
12,000 graduates replace them
COMPANY RESTRUCTURINGfREORGANISATION
:::J The industry is continuing to make mistakes. As we 'downsize' ,
we are forcing staff , wit h critical knowledge and corporate memory, to
leave, and companies leam too late that such knowledge is irreplaceable.
0 _ .... _ '
"
Reason for Training: Staff
n A USA survey by The Gallup Organization
concluded:
o Employer -sponsored training and education is a
major attraction for young staff looking for jobs.
Q Worker s say they are more likely to remain with
companies that invest in training programs .
.:J A survey by the American Management Association
concluded:
:J Investing in employees skill s through training is a
more effective tool for retaining staff than purely
financial incentives.
'"
Reason f or Training: We are old
..
65
45
20
CJ We are an old wor kforce!
o Average age in oil and gas industry is 49
1:1 a 'young' worker being 43 and
u an 'old' worker being 55
o Early retirement is still popular
:J Could lose half of our experienced workforce by 2007
:J 50% of She ll's E&P workforce will retire ove r the next
12 years"
n In one major contractor the average age of senior staff is
now 49 years and increasing by about one ---,
tNo.
o OUf age profile should be this, 20
l'
but.. III 15
,
:l 10
5
o
Reason for Training: We are old.
5
l'
10
U
- - - - -
o The effe ct of age

demographi cs is
'tighter' intell ectual
capital in companies
o We need to preserve 15
U
- - - - - - -I
and grow our
intell ectual
capital
:J This can be partly
achi eved by having
well-trained staff,
under continuous and I e::
accelerated 0....
development 20 25 30- 35- 40 45 50- 55- 60- 65+
programs . \'f 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64
.' ' age of st af f
..., I
O_Ll<I 2007
Reason for Training: The Future
.:1 This cent ury..
u OUf limitations will not be computers
and communication capabilities
(they will rapidl y advance), but
rather. ..
a O Uf limi tati ons will be learning,
experi ence, values and information.
:J These will be how oil and gas
companies will succeed in our
industry in the future.
rOO' ,"""", of<>m''' ''''''''' '... 0"'.l,",""
P, >'opk;os,'Tho 0.'''''''' C"ongo',Joc"" '" 1"""' ' 0"V'Y. 1i)(l 2, Apri l , 2OOO
P, _os, 'P.,..... _ t- r' H>"'fIO<J<E""_,,, . ... """, r-.y" oe<H" K"""" 51",,,..,,., ""..
"' """", .... "co.1<-16 _ ..,,""' 2001
p _ _

Reason for Training: Regulatory
"
r:
n The USA Pipeli ne Safety Regulations Federal
Register Part 49 CFR 192.763. Pipeli ne integrity
management in high consequence areas state:
:J (2) Trai ning (i) Supervisory
u An operator's integrity management program
must provide that each supervisor... has
appropriate training or experience in the area for
which the person is responsib le...
:J (2) Traini ng (ii) Persons who eval uate.
o An operator's integrity management program
must provide criteria for the qualification of
persons who review or analyze results from
integrity assessments and evaluations..
0_1.1<12001
VNIHO STATU
OEPARTM ENT
0'
TRANSPOR TAT ION
"
What is Pipeline Integrity?
Risk .. nd
Rel ia bility
o Pipeline integrity is the
process of ensuring that a
pipeline is safe and secure. It
involves all aspects of pipel ine
design, operation, inspection ,
maintenance and management.
LI This presents an operator with a
complex 'j i gs aw'to solve if they
are to maintain high integr ity.
o Pipeline integrity
management is the
management of all the elements
of this complex jigsaw.
o The management brings all
these pieces of the ji gsaw
together.
What is Pipeline Integrity?
o The USA' s DOT considers.. ..
::J The term "integrity" means that a pipeline system maintains its
structural integrity and does not leak or rupture.
IJ "Integr ity management" encompasses the many activities pipeline
operators mus t undertake 10 ensure that releases do not occ ur,
::t lntegrity' will have different
meanings in different sectors of the
petroleum business; for example:
arca customer, it may mean
'billable quality' of product;
nrc a control room it may mean
'operational stabi lity' .
- _ - . . . ~ .......--_... -
Pipelines Fail - Why?
Therefore, engineers maintain the safety of
a pipeline by prevention, or elimination, of
defects that can cause failure.
o Pipelines carry hazardous products.
[l The products are hazardous, not the pipelines.
[1 A pipeline will have high rel iability if it is correctly designed, maintained
and operated.
n Pipelines can fai l due to:
i. natural diasters.
ii. gross human error,
iii. sabotage/wars
iv. existing defects in a new pipeline, or
v, defects introduced during operation
n Engineers can do little to prevent (i) to (iii).
() ~ s p n l td . 200 '
Important Notes
r:
Course Notes and Guidance, 1
Ll The defect assessment course and the notes
have been de....eloped over many years
Ll They are updated and improved after every
cou rse, based on:
1. course feedback, and
2, changes in the met hods reported in the
literature,
o The notes and recommended practi ces are
considered best industry practice, based on:
:J the authors' experiences
Q industry practi ce around the world
"Q literature reviews and the Pipeline Defect
Assessment Manual, a joint industry
project supported by 16 companies.
POAM
THE PIPELI NE DEFECT
ASSESSMENT MANUAL
o Your company and your work will be limited by
both company codes and practic es, and your
national and state legislation and regulations .
o For example. we will recommend a dent is
'acceptable' under static loading, if it is less than
7 percent of the pipe diameter.
o This is a technical limit, basedon fitness for
purpose.
!'J You must always checkother engineering
aspect s and the consequencesof your
conclusion(e.q. a 7%dent may restrict product
flowand pigs).
n Your cooesneqrstauorvetc. may not allowsuch a
deep dent.
You MUST always check local and national limits and legislation, before
applying fitness for purpose:
1. can I apply it, and
2. can I use the results?
o_uo2001
o Fitness-for- Purpose in this course means that: a particular structure is
con sider ed to be adequate for it s purpose, provided the conditions
to reach f ailure are not reached (see 8$ 7910 or API 579) .
o Note that 'fitness- for-purpose' may have a legal and contractual meaning
in your country:
1. CONSULTANT'S OBLIGATION
n For example, in the UK, a consultant engineer is
expected to exercise 'reasonable skill and care' in
their work.
2. CONSTRUCTOR'S OBLIGATION
o However, a contracto r carrying out a construction has
a fundamentally different obligat ion, they are obliged
by law to warrant that the completed works will be fit
for their intended purpose. '
o This wi ll be implied in the contract ; it does not have to
be stal ed explicitly
Course Notes and Guidance, 3 (contd.)
::J Therefore, if a consultan t gives a warranty for fitness-for-purpose (on the
completed works) and they are not, they will be liable even if they have
used all reasonable skill and care
o The damages that can flow from a breach of warranty are different from
those of negligence:
1. Warra nty - you pay the costs of making the works fit for purpose
2. Negli gence - you pay for anything that could have reasonably been
foreseeable.
o Therefore, check with your professional indemnity
insurance
o What are you cover ed for as a company or
professional?
C1 Usually, professionals and consultants are NOT
covered for warranties
<lO P"m.p. o Cto 2'007
:J We have to be careful with 'definitions' ...
:J New standards (e.g. API 1163) now consider...
':J a 'defect' as an anomaly" for which an analysis
indicates that the pipe is approaching failure as
the nominal hoop stress approaches the specified
minimum yield strength of the pipe material. This
means an anomaly with dimensions or
characteristics that exceed acceptable limits
o an 'imperfect ion' as an anomaly in the pipe that
will not result in pipe failure at pressures below
those that produce nominal hoop stress equal to
specified minimum yield strength of the pipe
material . That means an anomaly with
characteristics that do not exceed acceptable
limils.
c These definitions are consistent with API 5L
definitions,
c _ .... :IOO.
"
o SAFETY is ALWAYS our prime considerat ion in
any calculation
rt It is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to ensure that any
fitness for purpose assessment is correct.
Always understand the cause of any defect you're assess ing,
o Try and use the bes t possible practices available,
e Check calcul ations, inputs and assumpions.
!,;! Use all relevant data, e.q. pig data, operations record s, maps, etc.
.:J Always appreciate the CONSEQUENCES of your assessment.
!';J If there is an error, e q. if the defect measu rements are wrong, and the
pipeline fails, what are the consequences?
Consequences will dictate your safety margin on your calculations
:::J ' Rules of Thumb' are fine, but limited to past experience, and remember
the origin of a 'Rule of Thumb' is...

ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE START?
?
C_110 2001
Introduction to Pipel ine Design
Penspen
Integrity
PIPELI NES DESIGN: Legislat ion
.Pipe line l eg al/St at utory Positi on
_The operation of transmission pipelines is usually
con trolled by national regulations or laws.
_ The selection of a design standard, or design
calculations, are often limited by these regulalionsllaws.
a t.aws ('statu tes') are created by Governments (e.g. the
USA Congress).
_ Regulations are ' rules ' based on an interpretation of
these laws, usually writt en by Federal Departments.
_They are standards to implement. interpret, or make
specific the law enforced or adminis tered.
_ Regulations have the same effect as Laws: both are
enforceable.
_ Failure to comply with either the laws or regul ations
could result in legal proceedings.
,
PIPELINES DESIGN: Legislation in USA & UK
,
_e_e-..
_In the USA. the Department of
Transportation issues a range of Pipeline
Safety Regulations.
e 'r hese Regulations rely heavily on the
A$ME 831 standards.
_Any pipeline design in the USA would be
to ASME 83 1, and additionally satisfy
these Regulations.
_ In the UK, the Pipelines Safety Regulations
cover all transmission (of 'hazard ous fluids' )
pipelines in the UK.
e'Tbese Regulations are not prescr iptive,
but goal setting but Regulators would
expect existing standards to be the
starting point of any pipeline design.
PIPELINE DESIGN: We use 'Standards'
........ ..- """
. ...... ...
' .
IXU UlllBIBI/lIUI
*

..- .. .. ....
,.....
_A pipeline owner will expect a designer to produce a
pipeline to a recognised pipeline standard.
_Usually, there will be a recogni sed (by both the pipeline
owner & the regulator y authorit y) standard already in use
in the country where the pipeli ne is 10 operate .
PIPELI NE DESIGN: Fundamental Issues
. Any pipeline standard used must address four key issues:
Safety - the syst em must pose an acceptably low risk to the
surroundi ng population/environment
Security of Supply - the system must del iver its product in a constant
manner to satisfy the owners of the product (the 'shippers') and the
shippers' customers (the 'end users' ), and have low risk of supply failure
Regulatory & Legal comonmce- Some pipeline systems are
regulated, and all pipeli nes must satisfy all legal requirements
Cost Effectiveness - the system must deliver the product at an
attractive market pri ce, and mini mise risk of losing business
PIPELINE DESIGN: Fundamental Elements
Pipeline desi gn includes:
conduct engineering economic

ana lysis and a market analysis
Satisfy
to determine the optimum

system based on
designs. "
I

Route
select route,
Standard/Code
determi ne throughput & I

veloc ity, and pi pe diameter
Permits
' conceptual'
calculate pressure
design or 'FEED'
gradient,
select of pumps/
. DeiStgi1
compressors/other
& Route
equipment,
Construct and
dete rmine pipe thickness and

test
grade,
_NB - Apipeline codeis not a completeguide to a good design. A
I:>P..,.".., 2006 Ro,&' 1
design might meet a code requirements, but it may be a
6
unnecessarily costly, dangerous to construct, or ugly
PIPELINE DESIGN: The First Standards
_Steel Pipel ine Design Standards were
originally developed in the USA
_The first oil and gas piperine standards were:
_ ASMEl ANSI 8 31.4 Liquid Petroleum
Transportation
_ ASME/ANSt 831.8 Gas Transmi ssion &
Distribution Pipeline System
'-' " .. ,-'-"- , , .
GAS TRANSMISSION
AND DISTRIBUTION
PIPING SYSTEMS
UlIDIJ-1IIl
_ .
..._.
r
PIPELINE DESIGN: History of Standards and
Regulations
_ Gas: ASME 831 .8 was first developed in 1955.
_ In 1955, industry/cod e concerns were
0
) b31.8
main taini ng the safety of the pipeli ne system while
1955
economi cally trans port ing natural gas.
Liquid : ASME 831. 4 was first published in 1955.
_ The primary purpose of the standard was to
0
) B31.4 establ ish requirements for safe design.
1955
const ruction, inspection, testing, operation and
maintenance of liquid pipeline systems
_ ASME 831 was quoted in the USA Pipeline
0
1969
} Law,
Safety Regul ations, first issued in late 1960s
a
PIPELINE DESIGN: ASME standards were
popular
_ As oil & gas was di scovered around the world ,
countries developed their own standards, but
used ASME as a ' good pract ice' basis:
_ego the fi rst edition of CSA Stan dard 2183, 'Oi l
Pipe Line Transport ation' , was pub lished in
Canada in 1967, and in 1968, CSA Z184, ' Gas
Transmission & Distribution Piping Systems', was
published.
_Most developed nations have their own
standards/gu idelines, e.g. the UK uses BSI PO
80 10, Netherl ands uses NEN 3650 .
_ New international (ISO) and European (' EN' )
standards are available :
_ ISO 13623 - standard cove ring oi l and gas lines
_ EN 1594 and EN 14161 (equivalentlo ISO
13623) for gas and liqui d lines.
Cud . Qr p ,"ct;'" rQ'
pi""li,,'. _
851
PIPELINE DESIGN: Key ASME standards
_ ASME has 500+ codes and stand ards.
_ Here are some pipeline sta ndards :
_ ASME 831.3:
_ ASME 831.4:
_ ASME 831.8:
_ASME 831.8S:
_ ASME 831 .11:
_ ASME 831.12:
_ASME 831Q:
Process Piping
Liquid Petroleum Transportation
Gas Transmission & Distribution Pi peline
System
Managing System Integ rity of Gas Lines
Slurry Trans portation Piping Systems
Hydrogen Pipelines and Piping
(in deve lopment, due 2007)
Remaining Strength of
Cor roded Pipelines
Qua lification of Pi peline
Operators (under
deve lopment)
10
PIPELINE DESIGN: Standards for Offshore Lines
_ Most standards cover both onshore and offshore lines
_ ONV as Fl 01 is specifically for offshore lines, and is becomi ng the
most popular offshore design standard
'I."''''''
...."'
SYSTt MS
I.' " .
"
PIPELINE DESIGN: The 'Hydrotest'
Water
Product
Hydrotest 0= 90-100% SMYS

<0
_ Our Design Standards give a variety of
guidance.
_ For exampl e, before we put a pipeline into
service. desi gn standards require that we
first ' hydrat est ' it
_This mea ns we fill it with water and
pressurise this water, to give a hoop
stress/pressure in the pipeline of about:
90-1000/0SMYS, or
. 1.1-1.5 x design pressure .
_When the pipeline passes this test , it
' proves' the strength of the pipeline
before it enters service
_ We then fill it with product and it
enters service.
PIPELINE DESIGN: Oil & Gas Standards Differ
. Pipeline standards treat oil and gas pipelines
di fferently:
_For oil pipelines:
a no account is taken of population density in their
location (but note new movement in USA)
_ there is no specified limit on density of (occupi ed)
buildi ngs around the pipeline
. you can generally build an oi l pipeline with a high
stress ('design factor' (0.72) in most locations)
_For gas pipelines:
a account is taken of population (building) density
_ minimum distance from buildings may be speci fied
_Stress ('design faclor' is lowered in popul ated
areas (design factor is 0.3 in UK, 0.4 in USA)
_gas pipeline standards limit population by
'location classifications'
PIPELINE DESIGN: 'Right of Way"
_Our pipeline is laid in a 'right of way' (ROW)
_The pipeline owner usually leases this land
_The ROW is usually about 8 to 50m wide containing the pipeline.
_The ROW is kept clear to allow the pipeline to be safely operated, aerially
surveyed and maintained.
_Pipeline companies are responsible for maintaining their rights-of-way
to protect the public and environment
CI ............ 2IlOII ......'
PIPELINE DESIGN: ' Ri ght of Way'
"
..
-
ROW
...:
..
,
_ The pi peline operator retains
access rights for the ROW for the
life of the pipel ine. Thi s:
e enabtes workers to gain
access for inspection,
maintenance, testing or
emergencies
_ maintains an unobstructed
view for frequent aerial
surveillance
_ identifies an area that
restricts certain activities to
protect the landowner, the
community, and the pipeline
itself.
PIPELINE DESIGN: 'Working Width'
_We will temporarily need a larger width that the right of way, 10allow us
to construct our pipeline
_This is our 'working width'
I
In the USA. the Offi ce

of Pi pel ine Safety has
no aut hority over land
use practices outside
of the pipeline rights-
of-way.
PIPELINE DESIGN: 'Boundaries' for a gas line
'Locat ion classi fication' for as lines
Working width

ill
ill
CLASS 1
ill
220
yards
coPeospeo 2006 Rev6! 1
ill
1 mil e
ill
220
yards
PIPELINE DESIGN: Location Classification
No restriction In this zone
Limil building
in this zone
Prevent, or severely limit,
ROW - no building allowed here
ROW
Prevent, or severely limit,
" ..",..""..",.""...""..".. ..
Limit building
in this zone
No restriction In this zonca
PI PELINE DESIGN: ' Loc ation Classification' i n
ASME
CLASS 1: 10 or less living uni ts. CLASS 2: >10 & <46. CLASS 3: >46
220
yards
220
yards
ClASS 1
1 mile
Pipelines in Class 1 location can operate at highdesign factors.
Classes 24 operate at lower design factors than Class 1.
I
'Living units'
PIPELINE DESIGN: ' Loc at i on Classification' i n
ASME
CLASSIFICATION AREA
Class 1 (Oiv 1)
Class 1 (Oiv 2) 0-10 build ings (r ural)
Class 2 11-45 build ing s (areas around towns )
Class 3 46+ dwellings (e.g. suburban), etc ".
Cl ass 4 MUlt i-storey-type buildings
e r nese locations Originate In work In 1955. Aenal photographs of exrstmq pipelines
and their surrounding buildings were analysed and 4 location ctasses were
establ ished that closely resembled current practices in the design of pipelines.
Originally, a 'cornoor wioth' of 0.5 mi le wide , with the pipeline at the centre (this
figure was the same as the width of aerial photographs at that time.. .), was used to
determi ne the population density at risk.
_0.25 mile was later introduced by OPS as more appropriate (as it did not affect
safety to people' or risk to pipeline): therefore, t he location class is defined by an
area that extends 220 yards on either side of the center line of any continuous t -mne
length of pipeline.
.. ..__._...-.....-... ......... . .-__,_ ....._ .. .. 0...,
ts
PIPELINE DESIGN: Location Classification in
USA during operat ion
ClASSIFICAnON No. of buildings No. of bultdings Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
-N_ -Operation
Construction
Class 1 (Oiv 1) 11-25
Pf<lY>OWlolAOP bill nol gr..-tt>an IlO'lIo SUYS
Class 1 (Div 2)
0-' 0
11-25
buI 72'1lo SMYS
26-45
(l 8_pr-... but not ""'" 7Z"fos""'s
' 6-05
(I 61.-1'fftOU'e but not 60"4 SMYS
66'
II 67_P'ft*" buI no! gnNI* lI>an60'4 SUYS
IolIA-SlOIy
1I.SS__bu1 _V-lI>an SMY5
Class 2 11-45 ,6-<>5
"'-WAOP1M noI grNIoW hn6O"Jlo SINS
66'
067___ bul ... .....
""'
"""
UoIIi.slOry oS6-..c p<ftSUfe Ilul not gtN* lI>an 5O'Il. SMYS
Class 3 & 4 46.

,..-
__ bill noll ....... ".,
""
"""
. _ .... _ ... _ _ ... __...-_,.,..... "\1 __
_ _ .,.. _"'...,,_.....-.<I ....
_ . ..... _ __ _ '"lI .. _ ...- --r__....._ _ _ .. _
. n__ _ __ _ _ ........ _ "' ... _ .. __.. --.
21
PIPELINE DESIGN: Liquid Lines Location
(USA Regs)
No pipeline may be located within 15 metres of any buil dings or places of
publi c assembly unless it is provided with alleast 305 mm of cover, in
addition 10'
L. ocat ion
COVF.R*
Normal excavat ion For rock
in(mm) excavation
Industrial , commercial, arc 36 (914) 30(762)
residential areas
Walet Crossings 48 (1219) 18 (457)
Drainage ditches 36 (91 4) 36 (91 4)
Deepwater port safety zone 48 (1219) 24 (610)
Gulf of MeKico, and offshore 36 (914) 18 (457)
(less than (3.7 m) deep)
Any other area 30 (762) 18 (457)
. Pi pel ine must be at
least 12" from other
underground
structures
_ Pi peline
components can be
above ground, if
(e.g.):
_ Areas under the
di rect control of
the operator
_ Area is
inaccessibl e to
the public.

_ ......-IIJ,. .... l PG __.... .... -...... _"'_ e-... ....._ .....
22
PIPELINE DESIGN: Liquid Lines and
'Safe ty Zone'? *
_ Research conducted in the USA during the
19805 on liquids pipelines showed that:
_Two thirds of deaths and damage, and
three-fourths of inj uries occurred within
150 feet of the point of discharge;
_8 percent of deaths, none of the injuries .
and 6 percent of property damage
extended as far as 1.2 mile from the
pipel ine
rRB '!lea lWt>o9oP<o_., .... u..
__.. '-ono-...c.:....o, ..._"""""oc
PIPELINE DESIGN: Location Classification for
offshore lines?
23
_ Offshore pipeline codes do not have
'location classifi cations' as these pipelines
ar e not usually near bui ldings , other than
oil and gas facilities
_ Sui when a pipeline approaches the
shore line, and there are occupied ----..
buildi ngs at the shoreline, then the
location classifications are applied
_ Also, the contents of an offshore pipeline
wi ll affect the safety/risk evaluat ion of the
pipeline at the design stage (e, g as PD
80 10-2)
. Fi nally, offshore design codes red uce
de sign factors at pipeline risers
0 __
Shorel ine .. ...
PIPELINE DESIGN: Design Stresses
We want to ensure that our pipeline does
not fail due 10:
Burst
Structural collapse (buckling)
Fatigue
Fracture
And we don't want our pipeline to
become ' unserviceable' due to:
Ovalisation
Displacements
Therefore, we control our stresses below
a specified stress level or ...
a 'design level' or 'design factor' .
These factors vary in codes.
A 30" pipeline with an
internal pressure of 15 MPa
is loaded by a total force of
1.1 MN (1,100 lannes)
-This force tries to separate
each metre length of line, so
that each metre of wall has
to carry a hoop force of 5.5
MN.
r
PIPELINE DESIGN: Key Parameters in Standards
Pressure, Stress, Design Factor
.Pressure (p) in a pipeline causes
Pressure
a 'hoop' stress in the pipe wall. The
F'o"'"
\
higher the pressure the higher the
hoop stress.
.Pipeline design codes limit the
Hoop stress
level of hoop stress in a pipeline
using 'design factors'. This will
\
effect D and t.
. 'Design factor' is:
hoop stress/SMYS
Design Factor =Hoop stress
SMYS
_Hence, the higher the design factor,
the higher the stress in a pipeline.
II:I p"""",", ]006 R..6/ 1
26
PIPELINE DESIGN: Pressure to Stress
'.
;
,""
-:/ ..../
....,.
_When we put pressure into a
pipeline. the pipe wall
experiences a load or a 'force'
thai attempts to expand the pipe
_The 'force' is from the pressure
in the pipe.
Stress =Force/Area
. 'Area' is a function of
Diameter and Wall
Thickness
_ The internal pressure causes
a 'hoop' stress.
_ The higher the pressure the
higher the hoop stress.
c __""""_.
,
. / ~ ~
~ ".
...,........././
. . / \ ~
(
&&
Interna :"
pressure
.....
PIPELINE DESIGN: Hoop Stress
. The hoop stress tries to expand
the circumference of the pipe in the
'hoop' direction
hoop
stress
.'
"-' -.
/ ' -",
.,- "'.
..'
.
hOOp
st ress
za
PIPELINE DESIGN: Calculating 'Design' Hoop Stress
- '-r - - - - - - - - , - ,
It
,
o
The hoop stress is calculated by:
pD
2t
~
hoop
(Yo hoop stress
p internal pressure
o diameter
(use outside diam. /0 be conservative)
wall thickness
29
PIPELINE DESIGN: Hoop Stress to Design Factor
_Usually the most important stress we
need to calculate is the hoop stress .
Hoop Stress, C T ~ : : : PD! 2.t
.Pipeline design codes limit the level of
hoop st ress in a pi peli ne - hence the
codes limit the pressure and size of
pi peline.
Pipel ine design codes refer to 'design
factors' .
_This design factor is hoop stress/SMYS
_ Hence, the higher the design factor, the
higher the stress and pressure in a pipeline.
hoop
Design Factor (9)= Hoop stress
SMYS
30
PIPELINE DESIGN: Stress & Design Factor
Hoop Stress
= ao = pD
code
.:
< SAfYS <dxr
'I' y
(}" = st ress. ; = design factor,
8 = hoop, t = wa ll thickness.
D = diameter, p = internal pressure,
OJ.= yield strength,
code = as specified in the code
Design Factor =Hoop stress
SMYS
Design Factor = 1/Safety Factor
_ Usually, codes use outside diameter,
a c ooee can use ei ther nominal or minimum wallthickness
_ Minimum wall is typically -8% nomi nal wall in welded li ne pipe.
_ The highest design factors (0.8) are in the USA and Canada. Most other codes
have 0.72 as highest design factor
DESIGN FACTOR: Is a Safety Factor
a r here are uncertainties in the design, construction, operation
a c cnsequenuy desi gners use 'safely factors' in their calculations
_ The Design Factor is the inverse of 'safety factor' , It allows Ior":
. Variability in materials.
_Variability in construction practices
auncertaintres in loading conditions
e uncertamnes in in-service conditions
_ When we cannot 'prove' the condition of a new structure we have a low
design factor (high safety factor ):
_bridges, ships have a design factor -0.6.
_if the structure may buckle, we'll reduce this to -0.5.
_ If we can ' prove' the st ructure prior to service, or if we have high
' redundancy' in the structure, we can tolerate higher des ign factor s
_We can proof test pipelines, therefore we have higher design factors.
"
)
..... ,_ Tn..- '-__~ _ _ r .... _..".
__~ T . ~ _ .....'."""'._,__"'C.,_...... """
Water
az
DESIGN FACTOR: Is a Safety Factor
_ When decid ing on a safety factor we need to consider many details, for
example"
Safety Factor Appl icati on?
1.25 to 2 0 We are confident about materials and loads... we are
going to perform regular maintenance and inspection...
we have condu cted a proof load... .
2.0 to 2.5 As above, but no proof load
2.510 3 Less-tried materi als, perhaps brittle , under 'average'
loadings...
>3 Untried materi als, uncertain environment s. uncertai n
loads, etc.
_ We need to increase our safety factor further If the consequence of
failure is high. e.g. casualties
II the teeter of safety is too big. performance/cost are an tssues!
If the factor of safety is too small , safely is an issue!
PIPELINE DESIGN: 'Design Factor' and ' Loc at i on
Class' i n ASME B31.8
ASME AREA Maximum Desig n Faetor
CLASSIFICATION (hoop stress/SMYS)
Class 1 {Div 1) 0.80
Cla ss 1 (Div 2) 010 bu ildi ngs (rur al) 0.72
Class 2 11-45 bui ldings (areas arou nd towns) 0.60
Cl ass 3 46+ dwelli ngs (e.g. suburban), etc'; 0.50
Class 4 Multi -storeytype buildings 0.40
_There wi ll be high numbers of activities in the higher class areas (Classes 2-4) ,
because there are more buildings (people) in these classes
. Most design standards require reduced design factors in these high location
classes
e o peretors usually cannot reduce pressure; therefore, operators maintain the
pressure and diameter, and increase wall thickness
. Increasing wall thickness ensures more resistance to external interference
o-..-au_,
33
DESIGN FACTOR: Wall thickness
Size (inches) Type of Tolerance (% Specifi ed Wall Thickness
pipe
Grade B or lower Grade X42 or higher
<2.875 All +20, -12.5 +15, - 12.5
>2.875 and <20 All +15, -12.5 +15, -12.5
>20 Welded +17.5, - 12.5 +19.5, -8
>20 Seamless +15, - 12.5 +17.5, - 10
I -
ASME Stalldards use ' specifi ed' wall thickness when calculating design factor : some other
standards use mimmum
35
"
MAXIMUM DESIGN FACTORS (HOOP):
International Comparison
STANDARD Hoop stress Hoop Stress Hoop Stress
(0"1/) equauoncu Design Factor Design Factor
(using
(using t
nom
)
ASME 831.4
uo=P
D
/
2t
nom
0.72 0.72
AsME 831.8
O"e=P
D12t
oom
0.80 0.80
858010-1
utrP
D12t
Jtlltl
O.72
l1
)
0.65
CsAZ662 uq==PDl2t
nom
0.80 0.80
AS 2885.1
utT'P
D12tnom
0.72(2)
0.72
ISO CD 13623 0.77 to 0.83 0.76
EN 1594
aq=pDI2t"""
0.72 0.65
""" -""
BS_ UI( .
CSA_ CClI'acIa
150 __
loS _ Austra ha
EN-E_an.
.... -..-.,._--...-.... _-'-' ... __.-
,. _"' .. _._--.. ..,
" _._"' .... _,_..._-_.,,-,,--' ,_.....
_. __ __. ..-. "' ,, .. . _ _ '"v ..... _ _
J6
DESIGN HOOP STRESS: Offshore Examples
pD
6
0
= - -
2t
_Offshore pipeline codes have various equations and conditions
for calculating hoop stress .
_For example, DNV as F101 uses:
_Hoop stress = (pi - Po)(D - tnom)/2tnom
.where t
nom
is t he nominal wal l thickness less fabrication
tolerance, less any corrosi on allowa nce, p is internal pr essu re
and Po is external press ure
Po
_The international pipeline standard , ISO 13623 uses a simi lar
formula:
.Hoop stress = {pi - Po)(D - tmin )f2tmin
ewhere t", n is minimum wallthickness which will incl ude
fabricat ion tolerances and any cor rosion allowa nce
DESIGN HOOP STRESS: Offshore Codes
('Usage') Design
Factor*
~ , -..
~ ?\....
Design Factor - Hoop stress
SMYS
STANDARD
Risers Line pipe
DNV 0.5 0.72
ASME 631.4 05 0.72
ASME 631.8 0.6 0.72
6S PD 8010-2 0.6 0.72
(
C' p.""",":1006Rw4&"
The 'usage' (design) factors are the same, but the codes have different definit ions of I
me
and l oom
38
DESIGN FACTOR: Why ' 0.72' in most standards?
0.72
0.72 = Design Factor
= Hoop stress
SMYS
DESIGN FACTOR: Why ' 0.72'1
39
_ Most pipelines around the world have a
maximum design factor of 0.72, although there
are some pipelines operating at higher factors.
_ This 0.72 design rector originates in North
America, from lheAmerican Pipeline Standard
ASME 831 .
_ The 72% SMYS limit originates from the
19305 in the USA. It was based on the mill
testing of tine pipe
_ The mill (water ) test was typically 90% SMY$.
e o oerators agreed that a 1.25 safety factor on
this was reasonable, therefore the 72% SMYS
limit was created, and appeared in the American
Code ASME 8 31.8 in the 196Os.
_ It has no structural significance
_ It is an historical limit.
0.72 = Design Factor
= Hoop stress
SMYS
90%
SMYS
0
= : i ~
90% SMY$/l.25 =
72% SMYS
DESIGN FACTOR: 1935 ' 0.72'
_The first ' 0. 72' design factor pipeline was the Natural Gas Pipeline
Company of America in the 1930s: thought to be the world's first all
electric girth welded pipeline. This was needed as no other all welded
pipeline had been put in use, so the 80% of the manufact urer's mill lest
(typically 90% SMYS) was introduced.
_ A 72% stress level first appeared in the 1935 American Tentative
Standar d Code for Pressure Pipi ng.
_This is the fir st record of using a pressure test to set maximum operating
pressur e/stress, and the pressure test is st ill used today to set maximum
pressure, although the field test is used today.
_ But note ... the line pipe standar d in use in 1935 (API 5L) did not require
hne pipe to be tested to thi s 90% SMYS; for example. Grade B line pipe
(SMYS of 35,000 Ibfl in
2
) was required to be tested between 16.000 and
18.0001bflin
2
(about 50% SMYS)
"
DESIGN FACTOR: Why '0.72'1
90% SMYS
,
t '
I
' 0%, II
I '--..-
_ Another explanat ion of '0.72' is:
_ The 90% SMYS mill test. .
a was reduced by 12.5% to allow
for tolerances (under-thickness')
in the line pipe wall thickness .. .
_ And then divided by 1.1 to
allow for 110% overpressure
allowance (as was common
practice in the water industry)
_ 90% SMYS x 0.875/1.1 =
0.72 SMYS
0.72 SMYS
DESIGN FACTOR: Why 0.8 i n some standards?
_The 0.72 design factor was based on a safety margin of 1.25 on a
water test in the pipe mi ll to 90% SMYS.
Using the same logic (i.e. a safety factor of 1.25) , pipelines hydrotesled
in the field pre-service to 100% SMYS would be able to operate at 80%
SMYS.
_I n the 19805, the ASME 831.8 committee considered >72% SMYS
pipeli nes, and a 1990 addenda to the 1989 ASME 831.8 Editi on
included provi sions for the operation of pipelines up 10 80% SMYS.
_ 0.72 _ 0.8
)
\

) \

0.72 =Design Factor
0.80 - Design Factor
=90% SMYS (mill test )
= 100% SMYS (field lest)
1.25
1.25
C_2OCIi"-"6;'
"
DESIGN FACTOR: Why are USA lines still limited
to 0.72?
s u s Regulations restrict the maxi mum design factor in oil and gas lines to
72% SMYS.
_ This restriction was a problem for some lines: some wer e operating>
72%, and in some cases 80% SMYS, when they came into force,
. ' Grandfather' lines (old lines operating above code) were given
concessions to operate - in some cases - up to 85% SMYS
ASME allows 0.8
C _1OOIl Ra.ll. ,
USA Regs =0.72
' Grandfather' >0.72
Introduction to Oil and Gas, &
Pipel ines
We must under stand
basic pipeline concepts
before we understa nd
defect behaviour
_Outline of this lecture:
eon, Gas, Energy
.Pipelines - History, Economics
~ P ~ n e ft Ud. 200T
n \tI D
1
ENERGY: Where does it come from?
The Sun provides 99.8 percent of the energy input to the earth's
surface, but:
there are ove r 1 mi llion tonnes of oi l cons umed every hour arou nd the
wor ld' , and
250 mi llion cu metres of gas are consumed every hour around the world
USA cons umes 20 mi llion barrels (360,000,000 gal lons) of oi l per day!
World energy consumption wi ll increas e by 2%/annum from 2003 to 2030 '
World Use of Primary Fuels is*:
Oil = 34%
Coal = 24%
Gas = 21%
Nuclear = 7%
Hydro = 2%
'Other' = 12%
World Supply of Primary Fuels is:
Gas - 60 years
Coal - 200 years
Oi l - 40 years
(all proven and
recoverab le)
2
.[ t>. 0.,. _ 2003
AJ _ wco'""",,", 0, o.r>d u_. o.>:du(""'il.' &ct"C'1y"" ",,>oo,' g "' n.'flI "'""" "' '"' ...'OCO"e" I ,;.,. "'9""""" OCOnQ Iy
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, Modern History
. 1859: 2 oil wells in the USA, with
value of 540,000 produced 2.000
barrel s of crude oil.
. Now, in the USA alone. billions of
barrels of oi l are produced, with a
value of $bill ions.
_The first commercially
successful wells were in
Pennsylvania.
_The first well was drilled to
59.5 feel.

--.- -
,
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, Modern History
_Within 50 years of the oil
industry' s birth, petroleum had
revolutionised travel by powering
the world's first airplane (1903) and
helping the age of the automobile .
aou consumption increased, with
pri ces more than doubling from
1910 to 1920, as the number of cars
and trucks on American roads grew
from <500,000 10>9 mi llion.
PETROLEUM: What is it?
. 'Petroleum' is a complex mixtur e of ' hydrocarbons'
_ Hydrocarbons are made up of hydrogen & carbon
e penoiocm occurs in the earth in liquid (crude oil),
gaseous (natural gas), or soli d (bitumen) forms.
_The term is usually restricted 10the liquid form
_ But as a technical term it also includes gas, and
the viscous or soli d form known as 'bitumen'
. Petroleum' is also call ed ' oil' .
_Oil in the ground is call ed 'crude' oil
_ It was formed millions of years ago, from the effects of heat and
temperature on dead, anci ent sea life and plants (fossils')
Downstr eam'. Refers to refining, market ing. supply and transportation operations.
Upstr eam Refers to exploration, production, natural gas and gas products.
..... . ...... "".. .. _-"'.". ........ _.""""""'-
5
'OIL': What is it?
_The liqui d (crude oil) and gaseous (natural gas)
phases of pet roleum const itute the most important of
the primary fossil fuels
_ Oi l is a mineral oil of natural origin
_ It is in underground reservoir s.
_ It is a combi nation of:
. Iiquids (' hydrocarbons' ):
. other liquids(e.g. water ); and
. gases (e.g. 'natural gas')
_Oil sometimes naturally seeps to the Eart h's
surface along fault lines and cracks in rocks, where it
can contami nate wate r as bitumen (tar, asphalt )
deposits.
Bitumen
Typic al USA crud e 011 has a carbon content of 83 10
87%, a hyd rogen cont ent of 11 to 14%, and minor
amount s of oxygen, nitrogen, and sul phur
e
'CRUDE' OIL: What i s it?
_ Oil in the ground is called ' crude oil'
_ It is oil that has not been processed into
' products' such as qasotene.
a c rude oil ranges in colour from almost
clear 10green, amber, brown or black. II may
flow like water, or creep like molasses.
a c ruoe quality is defined by its density and
sulphur content.
_ Density is gi ven in deg rees API (Ame rican
Petroleum Institute): the higher numbe rs
recresentuqhter oil s, and are called 'l ight'
cr udes l ow numbers are ' heavy' oils.
_ It is described as "sour" or "sweet' ?"
depending on the presence (sour) or
absence (sweet) of sulphur and other sul phur
compounds.
Brent oil is light and sweet.
Dubai oi l is heavy and sour.
Light, sweet oi l is easier to refine.
and produces greater QuantitIes of
high value (e.g. gasoline) product s
C _ UO :lOC'
CRUDE OIL: Refining
8
Refine...
Products .. CHJt
_' Refining' is the process of
converting a raw material (cr ude
oil ) into 'finished' products
suitable for use by consumers.
_These products are
gasoline (petrol), kerosene,
gasoil (heating oil) , etc..
_A typical large refinery costs
Smillions to build and Smuhons
more 10maintain and upgrade
_ It runs every hour of the
day, all year
.. Per..- l.I<I 2001
--
OIL: What You Obtain From a Barrel of Crude Oil
What Does A Barrel (42 gallons) Of Crude Oil Make?
Product
gasoline
disti llate f uel oil
(Includes both home heating 011 and diesel fuel)
ke rosene-type jet fue l
residu al f uel cu
(Heavy oils used as fuels In Industry, marine
transportation and for electric power generation)
l iquefi ed refinery gasses
st ill gas
coke
asphalt and road oil
petrochemica l feedst oc ks
lubricants
kerosene
other
Gallons per barrel
19. 5
9.2
4.1
2.3
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.3
1.2
0.5
0.2
0.3
aWe measure oil by
the 'barrel' as oil was
or iginally transported
in wooden barrels,
aFigures are based
on 1995 average
yield5 for U.S.
refineries.
aOne barrel contains
42 US gallons of
crude oil. (=35
imperial gallons '"
159 Iitres)
aThe tota l volume of
products made is 2.2
gallons greater than
the original 42
gallons of crude oil.
Thi s represents
"processing gain ."
Ethane:
GAS: What is in ' Nat ural Gas'?
Natural gas comprises gases, occurring underground,
consisting mainly of methane(CH
4
) .
Typical natural gas is:
Hydrocarbons:
Methane: 70 to 98%
Ethane: 1 tolO%
Propane: trace to 5%, Butane: trace to 2%,
Pentane: trace t01%, Hexane: trace to 0.5%,
Heptane-: none to trace
Non- Hydrocarbons:
Nitrogen: trace t015%,
Carbon dioxide: trace t01%,
Hydrogen sulphide: trace to occasionally
e PenSW' ltd. 2007
About 1/3 of
Alberta (Canada)
Natural Gas is
sour
Definitions of
'sour' vary.
-e.q. in Canada,
'sour' natural gas
is gas containing
more than 10
moles of hydrogen
sul phide (H
2
5) per
kilomole or natural
gas; is sometimes
expressed as 1
per cent H
2
S
Typi cal 'midcontinent' USA natural gas has 88%
methane, 5% et hane, 2% pr opane and 1% but ane
GAS: What is in 'So ur' and 'Sweet'
Natural Gas?
Natural gas can contain hydrogen
sulphide
Sour gas contai ns hydrogen sulphide,
or sulphides and/or carbon
Sour is often defined as >1% H
2S
Sour gas will usually need purifying
Sweet gas is low (e.g.<1%) in
hydrogen sulphide, sulphides
The process of removing H
2
5 from a gas is
called 'sweetening'
tt
-.. .. <a..,_."' .......... _ ... __ __...... __
..... \10< ..... _ ... .,.-.'0-_-..... ""_
OIL AND GAS: Effect of CO
2
and H
2S
('Sweet' and
'Sour') on pipelines...
We can have 'sweet' corrosion if we have carbon
dioxide and water in our oil, product or gas.
We can have 'sour' corrosion if we have hydrogen
sulphide and water in our oil, product or gas.
"
ENERGY: Supply and Demand
-
..
_...-
Supply and demand locations differ. Therefore :
i. We"11 need pipelines for transportation,
ii . Economics & Pol itics will play big roles .. ..
OI L
>60% of proven oil reserves are in Middle
East
-20% of these reserves are in Saudi Arabi a
Main oil producers and exporters are Saud i
Arabi a, then Russia
GAS
80% of proven gas reserves lie in 10
countries
40% of wor1d reserves are in CIS
30%of world reserves are in Middl e East
Largest consumers of gas (34% of total) is
CIS'
USA and West Europe collectively
consume the most. but they col lectively r.::-.,--:-:--,.,.--,.,...--,"'"--:::----;- ---,
only possess 11% of proven reserves
O_llO 2001
-e-_ .. - - - . _ ~ T - d d .... _ _ ... ....... _
OIL: The Political Dimension
Oil & Wars have been linked many
t imes:
_ The Trojans used catapults to hurl
flaming pitch , gathered from oil
see ps, at Greek ships
ewmston Churchill in 1911
controversially decided that the
British Navy shoul d change from
(British coal) steam power to
(Persian) oil power to assure the
cou ntry's mastery of the seas
. 1990-91 Gulf War
. Etc....
'Control energy and you control the nations '
Henry Kissinger
ENERGY - Oil Reserves are Increasing
1000 million barrels
120 0
100 0
800
600
400
200
o
R",. tWorld
I!l USA
S&C Amer i ca
D F.Sov.Union

19 73 -8 6 1986-98
15 Countries have oil supplies
> 10 billion barrels":
"USA (22 billion)
-ueaco (12)
"Venezuela (78)
"Norway (10)
-Russie (60) [I
-Cenede (180"") t
"Libya (30)
"Nigen'a (24)
' Iraq (113)
'Iran (89)
'Kuwait (97)
'UAE (98)
'Saudi Arabia (261)
"China (18)
"Qatar (15)
' FIA, XIO' I ,", lA
.eo.... d.. """""" ""'".-"'"""" ' '''''' , t<II>oo ,2002110 ' ''' ",", 00 '.'003 ' "''' <t,. _""" '""'''''''''',"" """"
THE PRICE OF OIL - Can be a Roller Coaster!
1999.
_ In the UK North
Sea. it costs $11-
13/barrel to develop
exi sting fields.
_ New f iel ds now
cost $10/barrel
(compared to -
$20 in 1980),
_The global aim is
now to reduce to $8.
Petrobras
(Brazil) are
planning
deepwater oil
development at
$6/barrel.
4th Q 2nd Q 3rd Q
Quarter in 1999
I "u,.... -,-' (.SWdi,.o< 0'f""'""' ''' '''''''''' ,.,I J'
"","""'",- '""-."".",,,, , "",m",,,.' ''''',""m,,,,,,,," "","" . ' ''',''' ''' . ",,, ,'0 ft - I
",,,,,,I '''''f_I hid,
1st Q
OPEC annoonce ,
red uce<1oulput
Brent Crude
(USA prices sligntly higher)
20
25
15
10
THE PRICE OF EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Middle East
Easy E&P, good size fields
Deepwater('mean' depths are 100m)
Vast reservoirs in deep water (>300m)
UK North Sea
$4/barrel
GI
$8/barrel 8
$10-12/barrel
Shallow water fields are being depleted. Large E&P costs
There are various definitioosof' d" " pwate, ' The US Mineral Management Services
considers 'deep" 10 be >400m (13121t), .s this dept h requires deepwater and
traditional fi xed plall"""" begin to ooc<:>ma uneCOnOfTOC The largest platform
in 1353ft of water in the Guff 01M". ico 'Ullradeep' lSnow (2001) generally
considered >5000ft ofw3ter
Deep water :
1950 5m depth
1970 100m
1990 686m
1994 1QOOm
2004 2300m
H
Introduction to Pipelines
Ltd. 2001
II !I t. \
18
PIPELINES: The Start (1859 to 1879)
The early oil rush
Trans port by wat er
19
Wooden stor age tanks
Transport by rail
1
',... ..,..""" O' S"""."'O" e-",,"f . ' ''' T."",'
...... "IW'/ '''':heSl", "",'
PIPELINES: The Start...
20
1915: California. Shell Oil line
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: Going Offshore
_The early years of the petroleum
business was ons hore-ba sed
_the oil was plentiful onshore. and the
technology was not available to go
'offshore'
. in the late 18005, engineer s in
California erecled wharfs to tap oil &
gas reserves close to shor e, but. ..
_the first oi l well str uctures to be built
in open water s were in the Gulf of
Mexico
O _UI:I 2OO'1'
los Ange les od 18900.
!';on all coa5I '" c._<_ 00"'""mmo_)
"
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: Going Offshore
_Kerr-McGee Corporation drilled the f irst
well from a f ixed platform offshore out-of-
sight of land in 1947
_ Srown and Root built the offshore pipeline
_ 90% of the world's offshore structures are in
relatively shallow wat ers - less than 75 metres
deep
But oi l and gas is now being developed at
2000 metres
C"--,-,,, lOOT
_._-_.-...
"
PIPELINES & LINE PIPE
PIPELINES: What Are They Made From?
2J
- - ~
_ Our pipeli nes are usuall y made from steel.
_T he steel we use in pipelines is called
' line pipe' steel, as it is specifically made
for pipel ine purposes.
_ It is bought from a steel manufacturer. to
a specification.
C> P__l .. 2001
PIPELINES: What Are They Made From?
- 99% of all gas pipelines in the USA
are made from steel line pipe"
.The most-used specification in the
world is the American Petroleum
Institute's 'API 5L'
e we can also buy line pipe to European
('EN') or International (' ISO') standards
=::=
API5L
2S
.l' .... ........_"" ,,_.. l&\!AGoOoG'lDooo. '9''
LINE PIPE: Types
_The three types of modern line pipe are:
_ double submerged arc welded (DSAW).
_This type of line pipe contains either:
_a longitudinal weld; and
_a spiral weld.
_ high frequency welded (HFW).
_ This line pipe has a longitudinal weld.
_ There are two methods used:
. high frequency induction (HFJ): and
_electric resistance welded (ERW) .
seamless.
_ This line pipe has no weld long its length . -
CP<o<-..-110 2001
([ w"" ' )
OZ Z)
() )
LINE PIPE: Welded Line Pipe
_ Our larger diameter pipelines are made by
bending a steel plate or strip into a tubular and
welded the ends together
_ The plate is shaped CU' and '0' ) befor e welding
'0' 'U'

vO
PLATE
27
LINE PIPE: 'Expansion' and 'Mill Testing'
_ Most large diameter line pipe is cold' expanded (' E') diametrically in the
pipe mi ll.
_The line pipe is strained to at least 0.3%, and usually 0.5-1.5%, to
give an increased yield strength, and the correct diameter and
roundness.
If the line pipe is expanded ('E') and has been made from shapi ng plate (' U' and
'E') it is called 'UOE'
28
LINE PIPE: 'Expansion' and 'Mill Testing'
_ Each length of line pipe is then
subjected to a ' hydrostatic test': plugs
are inserted into the end of each
length, and the section of line pipe
filled with water and pressurised up 10
a hoop stress of 90% SMYS for a
short time (seconce').
_This internal pressure and end
pl ugging will cause a compressive ~ c J ~ \ ")-
axial stress and hence a biaxial axial hoop
stress state exists in the line pipe. .
_ If the line pipe section was
made into a pressure vessel, with
the ends free to move, the tensi le
axial stress = 50% the hoop
stress .
API 5L spec ifies 5 to 10 seconds, depending on pipe
LINE PIPE: Mechanical properties
30
Specimen
STRAIN 'Plastic'
'Elastic'
Proport ional
limit
_The tensile testi ng of material gives us basic mechanical properties
_We generate a 'stress strain' curve
_This is a graphical representation of the materials basic mechanical
properti es
Ultimate stress
--- - - - - o_ - ~ ~
LINE PIPE: Yield strength, UTS Specimen
_We cut our specimens from our line pipe for mechanical testing,
a s eamress pipe uses transverse speci mens, as seamless pipe is
'isotropic'.
_ Small diameter 80/.0 inch) welded pipe use transverse and large
diameter (<: 83,1.. inch) use longitudinal specimens (See API 5L) .
The manufacturer will
not test every section
ot une pipe.
For examples. 1 in 20
pipes may be tes ted,
using one tensile test.
Longitudinal
LINE PIPE: Measuring yield strength and UTS
T_I
"""
I
T _ S ~ .
V>eld Sl'fftQIh
The tensile properties of line pipe ar e measured from specimens.
We load these specimens and pl ot the force (load) versus the
spec imens elongation (strain). We measure:
the yield strength; and
the ultimate tensile strength (UTS)
h
Load ~
...... Yield
EKampl e
stress-strain curve
,-
-- .-
32
~ _ _
Elongallon
".
~ ~ ---l
" _ ..... 2001
LINE PIPE: 'SMYS' and 'SMUTS'
The Pipe Manufacturer ensures the strength of our pipe is above
certain 'specified' minimum levels:
specified mini mum yield strengths (SMYS) , and
specified minimum ultimate tensi le strengths (SMUTS*)
Histori cally,
SMY$ has been
measured in 'old'
units of Ibf/in
2
tim8'te tensile s reoot
,
!. 200
SMYS .. - ..... Yield
Load
;
,

SMUTS ...
Example
stress-strain curve
0.10

Elongat ion
of 'SMT$'
LINE PIPE: 'SMYS' and 'SMUTS'
Our actual yield strength and tensile strengt h are usually above $MY$
and SMUTS
ftimate tensile s reng Ii1
Example
stress-strain curve
' 00
SMUTS
... " .. .......

SMYS
soc
...... Yield
,
Load
"
zoo
a
!
"
' 00
0
000
SI "' in
0.10
Elongation
o P"" "",o lt a . 2007
LINE PIPE: 'SMYS' and ' SMUTS' & Design Stresses
Our design stresses (often quoted as a percent of the SMYS) are
always well below the SMYS, to give us a safety margin.
SMUTS
Ultimate tensi le strength
Safety margin
- YIeld
c-
..300..
200
j
SMYS
Load
0:_""200'
We 'desi gn' our structures in this region, but they "fail' in this
region. at much higher stresses & strains This gives us a
safely factor on both stress and strain
35
LINE PI PE: 'SMYS' and ' SMUTS' & Design Stresses
The SMYS will be below the actual yield strength in most pipeline spool s
60.000
Ibf/in
2
I '"""
,--
!
.....
-
"'
"
c::
.e>
:::l

'"
::!;;

::!;;
Ql
H,
Q CI)
0,"
CI)

J6
LINE PIPE: 'Grade'
API 5L specifies the required yield strength of a pipel ine.

' Grade'
It is trad itionally measured in units of Ibfli n<

=
We normally know line pipe by its 'grade'

SMYS (/1000 Ibfli n
2
)
Line pipe with an SMYS of 52,000 is known as gr ade X52.
60,000 Iblt in' is known as X60, etc.
Some lower 'grade' steels are known by letters (Grade B or A)

These have SMYSs of :$35,000 Ibll in'

This mat erial has yielded
70
I
al->52,OOOIbllin' . 60
Therefore it has an SMYS
0
Ultimate tensile strength
of 52,000 Ibllin' . 40
--
We wi ll ca ll this line pipe
30 Yield strength
maler ial'X52"
20
Failure
10
2 4 6 e 10 12
cp",,_ , UO. 200 7
St ress Units: 1 h i 11lO0psi 1000 1Win' 6 69 689 MNim' - 6 89Ninm'
LINE PIPE: API 5L Grades, Strengths
' SMTS' is specifred minimum tensil e stronglh.
==_==__==---, 38
.'-
APl5L EN10208-2 and ISO 31832
We ooy om li ne
Grade SMYS SMTS Grade SMYS SMTS
pipe from
suppli ef",oOO
Nfmm
2
N/mm
2
N/mm
2
N/mm
2
,pecity ils
diameler, woll
B 241 413 L245 245 415
and
'grade' The grade
dic1ales how
X42 289 413 L290 290 415
sl rooglhe line
pipe will be
X46 317 434
. . .
X52 358 455 L360 360 460
Til<) 'grade'
nurro!:>er, re1ers 10
Ihe yield WOflg1h
X56 386 489
. . . of Ihe line pipe in
Ibfl in' . For
X60 413 517 L415 415 520
' X42' is
lino pipn wi1h o
X65 448 530 L450 450 535
specifiC'drninirr<Jffi
y,old 'lrengl h of
X70 482 565 L485 485 570
42,000 Ibflm'.
X80 551 620 L555 555 625
' X' means

r
LINE PIPE: Diameter and Wall Thickness
_We buy our line pipe from suppliers , and specify its
diameter. wall thickness. and 'grade'.
_ The diameter and wa ll thickness we need for our
pipeline are determined duri ng its design,
_ If we have large oil and gas rese rves , at very high
pressures, or if we want to transport large amounts of
pr oduct. we will need large di ameter l ine pipe .
_ If weare transport ing prod ucts al high pressures, we will
need thick wa ll li ne pipe. to resis t the st resses caused by
the high pr essures.
"_l.. 200'
w
thickness
39
PIPELINES: Are Coated on the Outside to Prevent
Corrosion
polyethylene tape and extruded
polyethylene jacket material
has been used for 50 years
fusion bond epoxy "FBE) was
and is being used
asphalts were used
coa l tar, wax , and vi nyl tape
19505 -
present day
1940's and
50's
1960's
1970's -
present day
_Buried pipe is coaled to protect it from the
surrounding envi ronment.
_We've been coating most of our pipes since
the 19405
_A breakdown in the coating will result in
pipeline metal being exposed.
_Ttle material used for coa l ing pi pes varied over
the years as tech nology evolved:
l ~ d 2001
- "' . .......,.. .'-~ "'""' "'" ..... ...."*'-
c..-.-.. "-., ,.......... _,... "" =, ", ' Ho '
PIPELINES: Coating Examples: ' FBE' &'3 layer'
_ 3 LAYER: The first layer of the coating
(e.q . 150 microns), applied above the steel
surface of the pipe, is made from FBE
Primer.
_ The second layer (e.q. 250 micr ons)
i s a copolymer or spray ap plied
i mmediately aft er the FBE application .
This layer allows the FBE 10 bond
wi th..
_ The top layer (e.q. 2.5mm) consists
of either polyethyl ene (low, medium or
high density) or polypropylene
_ FUSION BONDED EPOXY (FBE) : - - - - - :::;;....
Powder is sprayed onto the hot (220 to
24()OC) pipe
_ Coaling is typically 400 to 600
microns (0.4 to O.6mm) thick
C _ UO 2001
PIPELINES: ' Fi el d' Coatings on Wel ds
_We will weld our sections of
line pipe 'in the field'
e c onsecuenuv the ends of
each section of line pipe does
not contain coal ing (3" to 6").
_After welding we coat the
weld area.
_ The 'field' coating we will use
depends on the main coating
on the line, design
temperature, etc..
'MO ' 0 19611 11 7D
n"
I _OhM ....
I c__. ylpoty.._
1910 1_ 200f
'Cut-back' area to be field coaled
()
-Shook s.leeves
. rea type of
Wfllp.ll.ape . but we
heat the seeve up
and add adhesnre

... .......... _0:.0-...... .. .., _ ,"__.,...... _G.. _ .. .... .20
PIPELINES: Internal Coatings
_Some pipelines have internal
coatings
a s omenmes we need internal coatings
on some lines due to aggressive product
_Sut on most pipelines we have
int ernal coatings to improve flow
and intern al coatings are often called 'flow coats 0__
_ Coat ings can increas e flow by several percent '
_ Internal coatings can:
_ give incr eased pipeli ne effici ency, due to increased flow rat es and reduced
compressor/pump costs.
protect against corrosion during trans port and storage.
areouce incidence of 'black dust' in gas lines
a u so of internal coatings is usually based on a cost benefit using flow
analyses. etc., but some companies apply internal coatings as 'good
practice'
0_1... 2001
PIPELINES: Concrete Coating
_ Some larger diameter subsea pipelines are
coated in concrete (concrete weight coat ing')
to prevent them floating back to the surface
_ This coating (incidentally) also gives
protection
Concrete coating
Example of a line pipe
ccanrq below the
concrete .
PIPELINES: Are made from welding line pipe
PIPELINES: What Types?
FLOWLINES & GATHERING LINES - Pipelines
serving wells and facilities in the upst ream are
referred to as flowlines and gathering systems.
These lines travel short distances withi n an area.
They gather products and move them to
processing facilities,
Flow1i nes are usually sma ll, e.g. 2-410 diameter, and
gathering lines bigger (say 4-12 " )
They carry many products. often mixed together.
FEEDER LINES - These pipelines move
product from processing faci lities , storage,
etc., to the main transmission lines.
Typically 6-20io diameter
Carry variety of products, somet imes 'belched '.
PIPELINES: WHAT TYPES ARE THEY?
TRANSMISSI ON LINES - Pipelines linking the
upstream and downstream sectors are called
transmission systems , These are Ihe main
conduits of oil and gas transportat ion.
These lines can be very large diameter
(Russia has 56" diameter lines)
Natural gas transmission lines del iver to
industry or 'distribut ion' system. ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ i R "'1iiOl!.
erode Oil transmission lines carry r
different types of product . sometime
betched. to refirenes Of storage
PRODUCT LINES Pipelines carrying
refined pet roleum products from
refineri es to drstnbcncn centres
DISTRIBUTION LINES - These allow local
dist ribut ion from the 9<15 t ransmission
system to busi ness , residences. etc..
They can be large diame ter, but most
are < 6"
PIPELINES: Why do we prefer them?
Pipelines have been the preferred mode of
transportation over competing modes such
as sea, road and rail for several reasons:
they are less damaging to the environment,
. Iess susceptible to theft, and
more economical, safe, convenient, and
reliable than other modes.
"
PIPELINES: World Summary
"00
10 00
50.
i' .

' 00
-
'"
o

"
400
'00
0
C_ue7lfJtl,
USA( l 999 - CPS Dala ):
Onshore Gas TransmISSIon - 295.000 mile s
Offshore Gas TraO$lllISS'on - 6.000 mile s
Onshore Gas Gathering . 21.000 miles
Offshore Gas Gathering . 6.000 miles
Onshore D,sln'bulion 1.007,000 miles
Liquid Transmission lines 157,000 miles
II you laid Canad ian pipeline system,
end to end, it would eJctend 17 times
arccro the wodd.
There are >3.5milli on km of pipelines
UK Western Europe USA Rest of the Worl d in the world tod ay .
"
--_. '---------'- -"
__,:-_"""" ",,,,- ,,-, -"--....
-,-
., "-"-LIO. 2007
PIPELINES ARE GETTING OLD
_96000 km of pipelines in the USA in 1942.
_After World War II, big and long pipelines were
constructed, due to increasi ng energy demand
_ In 2005, >50% of the 700,000 km USA gas pipeline system
is >50 years old. The liquid system is older.
_ 50 years of proven oil & gas supplies in the world.
_ In many cases oil & gas field infrast ructure is at the end of its design life
but they still have 25 or even 50 years of production left.
_ E.g. -20% of Russia 's oil and gas pipeline infrastructure is nearing the end of
its design life. In 15 years time , 50% will be at the end of its design life.
_ Many 1,DaDs of km of lines are being replaced, repaired or rehabilitated in the
USA every year.
_ The US Department of Transportation estimates that 80.000 km of
pipel ines will require rehabilitation in the next 10 years.
_ Some operators are already replacing their pipelines for the 3rd time .
50
A Marna n would dcscnbe lilt: 'normal'
earth person as non-white, non-Cbnsnan.
poor, malnourished, and illiterate
PIPELINES ARE GLOBAL AND THE WORLD is not
what you think
IF WE COULD SHRINK THE WORLD INTO 100 PEOPLE. WITH ALL
POPULATION RATIOS REMAINING THE SAME.. ..
l'EOPlE P1cOPlE
""""""a
"
"""'O<<<'S''''''
"
50 perren! ollhe Wonlh wealth would be on the hands of 6 people - all US otaens
80 people woold IiYe m SUbstandard holJs,ng .... ...,
70 people WOOJId be unatlle to read
60 people would neverhaveused a phone
50 people would be malnouli$hed
1 pef$Oll would Ila..e a college edueahon
51
Additional Information
These slides are for information only.
They are based on questions asked by previous attendees,
and they are not presented in class.
O _ Lt oLmo.
52
General Information
CI _ l.OI 21X)1
53
' OPEC' . Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countrie
_c........ . .....
._. ---
__ l 'Oou
.... _.-
. .... ..-.....,-
1 '- _
plaItS
- -
2
HYDROCARBONS
. Hydrocarbons - natural chemical compounds based on hydrogen and carbon -
are a remarkable source of energy.
_ When the bonds hol ding the hydrogen and carbon molecules together are
broken, usually under heal , the energy that went into the bond is released.
_ Machines such as generators . boi lers and engines harness this released
energy to create useful power.
_Although small amounts of oil and natural gas seep through the Earth's crust on
their own , most deposits are located deep under the surface
_ Oil as it comes from the Earth is called " crud e oil " because it contains valuable
hydrocarbons - natural chemical compounds based on hydrogen and carbon thai
contain stored energy - as well as oxygen and other impurities.
_ A ref inery takes the crude oil and processes it into a variety of hydrocarbon
categories, either fuels such as gasoline or petrochemicals (i.e. chemica ls der ived
from petroleum) used 10produce an impressive array of useful products that we
rely on every day.
55
Visit""""'.APl.otg fot roore facts
WELLS
_ The first well in an area is known as an 'exploration' well.
_ If oil is di scovered, further wells, known as 'appraisal' well s, are drilled to establish
the limits of the field.
_If the fiel d is developed, some of thes e appraisal wells may be used as 'prod uction
wells'
_The depth of an oil or gas well can range from a few hundred to more than 20,000
feet.
_A well is made by drilli ng a hole, called a "well bore" , into the earth .
_A rock drill carves a hole into the ground. As the hole gets deeper, it is enclosed by metal
piping ('casing') to keep its sides from collapsing and to keep water and other impurities
from ent ering,
e Cement is pumped through the hole, When the cement reaches the bottom of the casi ng,
it is forced out around the end, and pushed to the surface between the outs ide of the
casing and the well bore,
_ This critical layer of cement bonds the casing to the well bore . It protect s oil,
gas and underground water resources, keeping them from moving freely into
and out of the well to mi x with -- and contaminate -- each other
_The diameter of the hole decreases with depth, ranging from about 2 feet at
the top to about 8 inches at the bottom . The casing is extended to the bottom of
the gas pool The drill is withdrawn, and the casi ng is pierced by an explosive
lowered into the shaft .
o p..,,,,,,,, Ud 2001
OIL AND GAS Where does it come from?
_ How does the oil and gas move up thro'
a well bore?
_Fluids move from high to low
pressure areas. The crushing layers of
rock around the hydrocarbon put high
pressure on it, and 'push' it out thro' the
well bore,
_The water below the oil and gas may
push the hydrocarbon upwards ('water
drive'). The gas can act in a similar way -
if the well bore is into the oil, the gas
will expand to fill in the space left by
the extracted oil , so maintaining
pressure (' gas drive')
57
EXAMPLE NATURAL GAS SPECIFICATION
_We control the content of our natural gas. Example specification":
Hydrogen sulfi de
",025 grai ns per 100 fI' 01gas
Mercaptans
,; 0.25 grains of mercaptans per 100 ft' of gas
Tot al su lfur
(i nc. mercaptans and HIS ) S 2 grains per 100 It' of gas
Oxygen
s; 0. 1"4 by volume
Carbon dioxide
s 2 % by volume
Nitrogen
s 3 'f. by volume
Hydrogen
no carbon monoxide. halogens. or unsafuraled h)'drocatboos allowed. and no
more than 400 ppm of hydfogef'I
Isopentane+
s 0 .20 galons of i$0gefl\aOe or heaVIerhydrocarbonsllQOO n' .
Liquid
free of water and otr'Ief Objectoooilble liquids
gas must no! contain any h)":lrocarbons which might condense 10liquids
Water
in no event, can con tain water vapor > 7 pounds per 1 million It' .
Ou st/g ums/s o lids
must be corntnefCialty free of these
Heating val ue
>975 aro::l<1175 Btu per rt3 on a dry basis
Tempe rature
gas to be deliv ered at >40 OF aro::l <120 OF
,
O_U0 200
Energy Demand 2050
, __E""7\' Aqorq< - -00;1
2 ... _ E_CcvooI. -
59
ENERGY Gas Reserves are Increasing*
-- - - --- - - - B
Trill ion m
3
600
500
Proven
O Ult i mat e?
6,000 Trillion ft3
Other
CIS America
Asia
Africa
NAmerica
400
Middle East
300
200
100 U---:C:-::1
o
rsu
1970 2 001
Reserves
60
Future Energy Demand 2050
- us Geological Survey estimates that - at current rate of
consumption - the world's entire oil supply will last for 60-70
yea rs
_Total world consumption of primary energy in 2000':
- 10,000 Mtoe
_ Estimated future world demand in 2050':
a t.ow 14,000 Mtoe
_Med 20,000 Mtoe
_High 25,000 Mtoe
_Energy demand is likely to double
O_Ud 2001
I __E__~ _ l I
2 W.... E...... Ca<r<>I. _...__""9
"
RENEWABLE ENERGY - Market Share'
% 45
o Hyd r o
,-
Renewables
40
o Sohlr
(ignoring large
3 5
. Wa ve
scale hydro)
30
_ T ida l
account for only
O Wi n d
r-
25
O Bioma
2% of the world's -
primary energy
2 0 Geotherm
.,
15
~
needs
10
<--
5
=:L-
0
Energy
""""-... ....... -.l , _
-----.........
62
)
THE ENERGY FUTURE Summary
TIME
DOMINANT ENERGY
..... 0
O_UlllO)'
.....2000. .
G
.... 2050
63
OIL AND GAS PROJECTS
O_Ull;'
..
OIL AND GAS PROJECTS - Influence on Project
Expenditures and Concepts
U
z
3
z
,
"on' en<! eoO"Oe'ng de, lgn (FEED)
,
Final Authorisation
&
,
Oneconce t
PLANNING SRECT DEFINE EXECUTE OPERATE ABANDON
Major Influence , , Rapidly Decreasing Influence , Low Influence
,
65
' Soo Oft_'.v.,. ''(1('2
PIPELI NES 'Position in Food Chain'
Exploration and Production
Facilities
Engineering
Ho't
Enginec"t"ing
Pipelines
Controls
Petroleum Engmeer mg Geoscience Pipel ines,
etc.
Upst ream operations comprise activities related to the exploration and production 01crude oil and natural gas
Downstream operations refer to the reflnong, market.nq and distribution activities for petroleum products.
I r>.

Reservoir,
I
Well Sy<lem
1
-
G! Simulation Dctinition
-
-fi
'-
I R"""" o;r
Re", rvoiTntl
Geophp ics
f"
IDescr ipt ion Management
1
EX'kiiliUiiti rroouction
g
I
I'mce<s
1-
Engineering Definition
<:>
66
PIPELINES - Types of 'Line Pipe' and Coatings
Pipe Manufacture
67
seamtese pipe
H$<lIing
BlUtl
@;l
M. nneSl'l"ann lon\lllKlI

ERW pipe
Forming ER welding BeadcUlling
UO PlJlt
w-
otfC" " "$- ..f?
Splrlllpipe
- 67-
Sut ..."'gM an; wt lding

68
PIPELINES - Longitudinally welded
line pipe*- 'SAW'
Q
If t
WELDING,
FOLLOWED BY
INSPECTION AND
TESTING
CRIMP
'0 '
+
'U
STEEL
PLATE
_ A popular welding process we

use is called 'submerg ed arc
welding', so we often refe r to this
type of line pipe as SAW line pipe.
_ If I pass a high current through
and between two metals, I crea te a
continuous spark (arc) and heat in
the gap,
_ If I put meta l into this arc, it wi ll
melt and j oin (wel d) the metals
together. A welder has a metal rod
(electrode) and a workpiece (line "
pipe).
_ I can sur round my arc with a
granular material or a gas
('submerge' the arc). This gives
me a better weld
69
S()JT)() ollho graphics me Illlen from M"fl"esma M . Gerrno,' y, liter ature
PIPELINES - Longitudinally welded
Line pipe 'ERW'*
Another weldi ng
process we use for
longitudinally welded
line pipe is 'ERW' -
electric resistance
welding'
ROLLIl\G PROCESS
-
WEI.DING & IJ\SPITTIOJ\
HEAT TREATM ENT WATER TEST FC\AL
e PO' SI>6'1 Ltd. 2007
VISUAL

WATER i"'f4...
EST '-.1

WELD

PIPELINES - Spirally welded line pipe'
PLATE
X RAY INSPECT
PIPELINES - Seamless line pipe'
CAST ROU:'\f) Bl LI.ETS
ROLLERS GRIP
REHEATED
BILLET, AS IT IS
PIERCEDALOl\G
FULL LEM jTII
REHE,\TED & CLEASED
PIPE IS SENT TIIRO'
ASTRETCH REDt:CI\:G
\lILI. TO REDlX E TO
FThl SHED SIZE
I :-.l SPECT A\" O WATER TEST
.......' ,.... ..... ,' '''tL..,...." ...... ,,,,' .. lAO' ,,..
GAS PIPELINES IN USA What Are They Made
From?
Prior to 1949, II PI covered GradesA, B,C, but C (yield = stoppco in
1930" therefore Gf ade B ;'\oQul<J be grade prior !o 1949. Nole that actual
yield could have been lt1anGrade B. as yields of 5(1 ,000 COIJld
t>e produced
Materials of Construction"
Steel ('Line pipe' - API 5L)
Plastic
Other
%
98.7
1.2 b
<0. 1
,,,,,,,,,,",,,, "" w,,,,,,
PIPELINES - Are Coated on the Outside to Prevent
Corrosion
.The line pipe is usually coated at the
pipe mill.
.Older Coatings:
. Asphaltic Enamels
. PVC/PE Butyl Rubber Tapes
_ Coal Tar Enamels
.Newer Coatings:
_ Fusion Bonded Epoxy (FBE)
_ Extruded Polyethylene (PE)
_ Extruded Polypropylene (PP)
. Epoxies/Polyurethanes (EP/PU)
i:l P",, "P"" U,. 2007
In the mid 1900s , the maximum lemperature of OUf pi pelines WaS SOC (122F)
Recent ly, it was up to BOC ( 17EYF).
Now. some designs are from 100C to 150C (212-302Fl
Corrosion
_TEMPERATURE The temperature of the soil, as well as the temperature of the
pipe may create favourable conditions for attack on pipeline materia ls
_l iquid and gas lines have slightly diff erent opet<Il lIlg temperature characteristics but
both are still susceptibl e.
_ E.g. in gas lines. the pipe and surroundi ng ground can vary from a high of 400c as
it leaves a compressor station. down to 5"C at distances from the steuco.
_SOIL Soil structure and conditions can affecllhe effectiveness of the cathodic
protectio n, and may also cont ribute 10 the creation of a corrosive envi ronment.
_ Factors such as soil type, drainage , temperature. and electrical
conductivity all contribute to the environment surrou nding the pipe
OLDER
FIELDCOATING
_ ..-. ". _r-"" __.. _"*"'-'
... __........ ' ... '
Corrosion (cant.)
Thickness, mm
Enh anced
IiiI Normal
Hot Temperature
L" C Imitations. 0
e r l imit
f-
-
f- -
,
-
' I I
,
a
n,
CTE FBE PEi PP EPIPU
'"
CTE F8E PU PE Pf'
76
PIPELINES - Concrete Coating on site
e p""..,., Uo. 2001
PIPELINES A QUICK HISTORY
e Pon""", ltd . 200 7
PIPELINES - The Old Days
4QObc BAMBOO PIPE - The Chinese used bamboo pipe to transmi t natural gas to
light their capital, Peking, as early as 400 Be.
18DOs Wood, iron lead and tin pipes were common in the 1800s to transport water, &
in 1821 wood pipe transported nat ural gas in New York state.
1859 RIVERS/RAIL TRANSPORTATION - From 1859, in Pennsylvania,
0;
oil was transported In barrel s on rive" by horse drawn barnes.
This was dangerous - weather & labour disputes often di srupted flow.
The railway relieved this, but the oil was now controlled by rail _c-
bosses and their lOoos of 'teamsters' . .
1861- Short cast iron oil l ines lai d with pumps in USA. Teamster s reported t o
63 have sabotaged or du g up and de stroyed some of these l ines. 1863 was
start of 'war' between pipelines and teamsters.
1864 Proposed long oil line in Penns ylvania opposed beca use it would 'affect local
prosperity' (probably teamsters opposition).
1865 6" gr avity (no pumps) oil line, 7000 barrelsfday, built in Pennsyl vani a.
PIPELINES - The first one?
.....
1865:
Partial view of the
Benninghcff Run
(farm) oilfiel d. The
field consisted of 87
wells. most with
derricks. The righ t.
of-way 01Harley's
1865-66
Benninghoff Run -
Sha ffer Farm oi l
pipeli ne is seen as a
straight white streak
on the hill (see
arrow). A pump-
station for the line is
indi cated.
80
PIPELINES Recent History
1879: PIPELINE -In 1879 a 108 mile, 6in line was built in Pennsylvania
to transport crude, to tank cars for the New York market.
12 years later the first high pressure, long distance pipeline was built.
They reduced the transport cost of oil from $3 to $1 per barrel.
Initially, all steel pipes had to be threaded together. This was difficult
to do for large pipes. and they were apt to leak under high pressure.
1920s: WELDING - In the 19205 steel pipe and welding became popular
in USA
This made it possible to construct leakproof, high-pressure, large-
diameter pipelines.
19405: LONG DISTANCE PIPELINES - Long distance pipelines wer e
pioneered in the USA in the 19405 due to the demands of the Secon d
World War.
PIPELINES Th e Hi story (1800.) Summarised
MI LESTONES INOfVHOPMENl Of PIPElI NE INOUSTRY
" ,...
"_" UM Uj
Ilio. OO.! '/2 .. H......,
\
"" us_., eo..0.0, .... , ...
' ''I, lotI", ... ,.1... fl .. , 10oo."",,,,
G"'__I" \ .n.,I, .. ,;p.t_
IOOi. ,......" 1. ..~ ..,I. G..: l........ T.....
fin' US!
~ . . . . . . . . .
" " ... .... f " .
M ..." .. ';......~
/
PIPELINES The History (1800) Summarised
MILESTONES IN DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINE INDUSTRY F. ,
...,
Fil'$' US long-
distance pipeline
1110miles. 6 in.
Tidewater Pipeline)
18'; (
, ... 2000
\
First use of high-pressure
(2.200 psi) X-70 pipe
First natural gas
transportation inthe US
(2in. 00. sln miles long)
\
'925
Introduction of first x-an pipe
tor natural gas uensmisslen
in North America Composile pipe
(NOVA GasTransmission) development for
I
gas

,,,.
1938
US CleanAirAct
her.lding clnn fuel
sources IOf pow"
''"\'
,...
1811
US Nat ural Gas Ac t 1843 185.')
regulating gas prices First long-distance
Garpromfirst gas \ all steel gas pipeline
main}n Russia (Magnolia Icuistene-Iexes!
19100
"'16
USSupreme Court
regulating of well
head gas prices
/
19'58
First majorcross border pipeline
/
(Canada-US-Alberta to
California gas pipeline)
1961 tntroducticn of high-
gUide sleellAPI X701
./to North Ame rica for
./ natural gas transmission
First gas main laid in london. . _
manufactured in lead Iron pipe Introduced (or
\
First gas work i nst all ed i n natural gas service
First commercial New World, i\"Baltimore. Md. '\
useof natural gas
'"
filSl cross
pressure. larger diameter. )-- __ Nort h Sea development
high-grade steel marking the offshore
(IGAT 1-lran to pipeline industry
Azerbaijan pipeline)
First Russian gos delivery
to Europe (via Poland)
-, ' 8112
TransCanade Pipelines
completed 2.000mile
gas transmission line \
(Alberta.Ontario)IF"';\===f.========f=====";j======9========'R:=;r{
First high-pressure
long distance gas line
lIndiana fields 10 Chicago)
Penspen Ltd. 2007
Figure from - M. Mohil pour, Alan Glover, Bill Trefanenko: Pipeline Repor1: Technol ogy advances
worldwide gas pipeline developments ', Oil and Gas Journal . Nov 26, 200 1. tl2
PIPELINES - What are they?
:
1 1 - -
i
P>p. lmu
I . "-,-
It. 'I '"',00

. .Jtt'liit
.........
I

'i
j
" \
, ,
Pro dUCl ion Trans pon arion
5.".,1'",,_, __

loIot_. E.. u '
c..."....;.n S .
5"...,. E,,_ '
- PI.....
Oi Slr l bu(l on l
."5"'-0 _ ...... SUo,....
On _ notr...
L "'... Moil_. h"""_
$"" E..,p"'_ c . ... , s"ofI.no
Sor_E _
O_llO 2007
..----_._-......------_..._--- ---..__.__._.__ ......-
-_._.__.-...
------..._..
- -_. __.. _- 83
PIPELINES - are part of a 'system'
(Receiving fecllities]
Operational support Q gJl\

Wyes
Tees
Hot taps
land pipelines:
transmasoa
Shore approaches
Crossings
Flowlines
Cables
] -tubes
Risers
[Process equipment]
Manifolds
Protection structures
Tr k lines
Distribution Lines
..
PIPELINES IN CANADA AND THE USA
OIL GAS
85
PIPELINES - are relatively cheap
5 MILES
19 MILES
45 MILES
200 MILES
238 MILES
_ AIR
_ ROAD
_ RAIL
_ SHIP
_ PIPELINE
A few years ago, $1 would move one ton of
petrochemi cal:
In the USA, the cost to transport a barrel of pet roleum
products from Houston tothe New York harbour is about
S1, or about 2.5 per gallon at your local gasoline station
(2002 figure s).
O_U02Oll '
B6
ENERGY Oil and Gas pipelines are growing
_Pipelines underway/planned/proposed (km) :
-Europe (FSU) 23000
_Middle East (Iran) 13000
_Africa (Libya) 8000
-S Pacific (Aus!.) 9000
_Far East (India) 17000
_S America (Brazil) 15000
Largest developments are in the countries in brackets
87
PIPELINES - Facts on Cost
88
(> Poe,,,,," Ltd. 2007
PIPELINES ARE COST EFFI CI ENT
In the USA petroleum pipelines depend on a relatively small
national workforce of about 16,000 skilled men and women
This workforce transports over 600 billion ton-miles of
product each year.
These workers accomplish this job so efficiently that
America's oil pipelines transport 17% of all U.S. freight
But cost only 2% of the nation's freight bill.
89
PIPELINES - are relatively safe
Road Truck accidents result in deaths at least 87 times more often than
pipeline accidents. Additionally, truck accidents result in fires and/or
explosions about 35 times more frequently per barrel of oil transported per
mile.
These figures include only acciden ts involving petroleum shipments,
not all accidents for a given transportation mode
2.3
0.1
0.1
3. 1
DEATH FIREI INJURY
EXPLOSION
34. 7
8.6
4.0
1.2
87.3
2.7
02
4 0
TRUCK
RAIL
BARGE
TANK SHIP
Values I",sslmore than 1.0 indicate nsk of accident is pipeline transponalion,
Compansons based on calculated rates per ton-mile. (Source: Allegro Energy Group)
90
." Pon,.,.n Ltd 2007
PIPELINE ECONOMICS
.Pipelines - can cost typically $1 million/km to build, and compressor stations
can cost $30 million .
_Therefore, usually one operator supplies a region/industry
e'Ihere must be a detailed economic study prior to any pipeline build
_Relative Transportation costs (1997, Canada):
_Oil - Typically, the cost of moving oil amounts 10 aboul10 per cent of the
actual cost of a barrel of oil which in 1997 averaged $27 Canadian dollars.
_ Gas Shipping natural gas costs two to three times the actual cost of the
gas itself which in 1997 averaged $1.90 Canadian per thousand cubic feet.
_Specific costs - Canadian (1999 - Canadian S) costs for moving oil/gas:
.$10.38 to move a cubic metre of light crude oil across Canada
_A cubic metre would fill 1000 one-li tre milk cartons
_$1.1110 move a gigajoule of natural gas
_A gigajoule is enough gas 10 heat a house on a cold winters day
91
PIPELI NES ARE COST EFFECT IVE
_ Replacing even a modest-sized pipeline, which might
transport 150,000 barrels per day, would require 750 tanker
truck loads per day
That's a load delivered every two minutes around the
clock.
_ Replacing the same pipeline with a railroad train of tank
cars carrying 2,000 barrels each would require a 75-car
train to arrive and be unloaded every day.
e h."""", uo. 2001
j o< m".. 'act,
92
ENERGY MEASURES
ENERGY MEASURES
_C al ori es are defi ned as t he amount of heat needed to rai se one gram of water 1C.
_Food Calo ries act uall y refer to kil ocalori es, or 1,000 calori es
_A co mmon ene rgy heat unit is the Briti sh Thermal Unit (Bt u) .
e one Btu i s t he amo unt of energy required t o raise th e heat in one po und of
water by 1 F. 100,000 Btu i s called a Therm
a one Bt u is equal to 252 ca lories or 1055 j oul es.
_One ki lowatthour is equal t o 3,412 a t us. 859,824 calories , or 3,599,660 joules
_The average American adu lt uses 3,500 kiloca lories of energy per day, active and
resting. Thi s i s roughl y t he t hermal energy needed tor one t ub f ull of hot bath water
A MATCH
RUNNING A TV FOR 100 hours
GALLON OF GASOLIN E
HIROSHI MA ATOMIC BOMB
Bt u
,
28.000
125.000
60,000.000.000
Calorie
252
7,056,000
31,500,000
20,160,000,000,000
DESIGN STANDARDS: 'Overpressures'
I
08
i
.
;
."
i
1
...
,
\ S FETY
SMYS oH'"",,,,,, SAFETY ' M RGIN
.....,. I MARGIN..... I ON AlLuRE
tv
Hy<I"' __I
00...-0"" I ON SMYS I ,--l-
A /\ I
- _.
"
:
OVERPRESSURES: I
. , 10. 15% of MAO. I
PIPELINE ' OVERPRESSURE' : Illustration
Pump P2
(inlet -1 0 bou)
Valve
liquid Flow.
' Head' l oss due to elevati on -zebar
' Head' loss due to friction, et c. - 20 bar
r - - - - Pump 2
Pump P1
(Max 50 bar outlet )
200m
essure (bar)
401<m
PRESSURE AT OUTLET OF P1
PRESSUREAT INLET OF P2

Time (seconds)
'------------ -rr--------"
Valve Closes: Surge of - tooar
.-
-,..............."""""" .. """'....
..........

.. "'....... .. .. ...........
DESIGN HOOP STRESS: ' Ov er press ure'
Comparison
CODE Hoop Stress Fact or Maximum Inc idental
Always check
(using te-l Pressure
how the code
ASME 831.4 0.72 10%
allows for Ihese
overpressures.
ASME 831.8 0.80 10% (::>0.72) ASME allows
4% (>0.72)
these
asPO 8010-1 0.72'" 10%
pressuresto be
oyer the design
pressure. This
GSA 2662 0.80 10%
means that
max imum
AS 2885.1 0.72 10%
' surge' or
' incidental'
{SO CD 13623 0.77 to 0.83 10%
pressurecan
gille1 .1xdesign
in liQuid lines.
EN 1594 0.72 15%
This is high!
,,, ' ,, _ _ .oc
....... ....,_, .n_.. __
-_._.....__.------ _--
.. ... .. --- -_._-
DESIGN PRESSURE
_ The design pressure, p, is the maximum pressure permitted by a code
_It is obtained using the hoop stress equation:
_ hoop stress = pD/2t, or P= 2t(hoop stress)/D, and ensuri ng thi s stress
does not go above yield. by using design factors (<1:
_$SMYS =pD/2t. or p =(2 .SMYS.VD).O
_Other parameters affect our design pressure.
_For example. ASME 831 .8 gives the design pressure. p. as:
. p =( 2.SMYS.VD)OE.T
t =nominal wall thickness. 0 " outside diameter.
o " design factor =hoop slre sslSMYS
E = weld pnt or jomt efficiency factor. T " temperature derating factor
_ The design tecto- depend s on jocatco class'. In ASME 631.8 q varies from 0.4 to 0.8.
_ E is to allow for the Quality of the longitudinal or SPiral seam weld in the pipe. It is based
on the historical view on the weld Quality (strength). In ASME it varies from 0.6 to 1.
_T account s fOf the fact that line pipe's strength ero modulus of elasticity decreases WI th
increasing temperature. In ASME it varies from 0.867 to 1.

"
PIPELINE DESIGN STANDARDS: I nt er na l pressure
ca use s ' Ax ia l' Stress
i nt ern al
pressure
: ..
I ..
l ~ ~ ~ ~
"
PIPELINE DESIGN STANDARDS: Calculating ' Ax ial'
Stress caused by Internal Pressure
hoop
...:;: ) 2:\ )-
_ The pressure also causes an 'axial' stress ,
that tries to elongate the pipeline.
e vtscanse a long thin balloon being blown
up - its diameter and length expands.
_ The magnitude of this axial stress is:
_O.3xhoop stress if expansion of the pipe is restricted, e.q it is buried and
restrained by the surrounding soil.
. O.511.hOOp stress jf the pipe is capped and free to expand . e.q at bends.
axial stress , V eTo
~ . . ......~
, ~
axial stress, -0.50"0
f ~ ..-..-....-..-+ --,
:+ ..:
v is Poisson's rate and is
approximately equal to 0.3
50
PIPELINE DESIGN STANDARDS: ' Radi a l' Stress

Axial stress
Codes give gu idance on eombl nl ng
these three stresses to give
'equivalent', or ' comb ined' stresses
_ We are assuming that our pipeline
has only two stresses: axial and
hoop.
..' .
Actually. we have three pri ncipal .
.... ....
stresses in the pipewau. For internal ./ -,
pressure (p) only loading' / .../'.../ R,di,' stress ....\
../// /,/./ .
_ We usuall y Ignore radial stress, as .
it is small (=p) compared to the axial
and hoop principal stres ses.
_ This is reasonable, as pipelines
have high Ol t ratios, and hence the
' radial' stress is small
C_ 2006 _'
OTHER STRESSES AND FAILURE LOCATIONS
ax ial
load
bend ing
momon!
to"lo"

P"'UUrtl
Potennar I
farlure -'---I'
location
What if we have a
combination of these
other stresses?
OTHER STRESSES: 'Equivalent' Stresses
Radial stress
Ax ial 51 55
......
......i .
.........
t-"-- ,.. /\
...
_We can have a complex three dimensional
(tri-axial) stress field acting on our pipeline
_ But our material properties (e.g. yield
strength) and our failure criteria (e.g.
ultimate tensile strength) are all ' uni-axial'
parameters
_ To assess these complex stresses, we
group them all into an 'equival ent' stress
_T his equivalent stress can then be related
back to ' uni-axial' stresses and uni-axial
failure
-ln many engineering situations stresses exist in mor e than one direction.
The direction and magn itude of these stresses influence the onset of yielding.
For example, in tri-axial compression, a material cannot yield because it has
"nowhere to go' until there is a breakdown in the atomic structure of the crystals at
severat orders of magnitude of stress greater than t he uniaxial yield stress.
53
/
COMBINI NG STRESSES: 'Equivalent' Stresses
_We have to combine all the stresses in our pipeline, to
obtain an 'equivalent' stress to compare it with our yield.
_We have two theories that help us:
e'Fresca" and 'von Mises'
........
,
.'
...... ""..
.......
.....
Radial
~
Hoop
0equivalent < 0 yield
' T,es ca gives ~ i g h r stress es than von MISCS
54
COMBINING STRESSES: ' Equi v al ent' Stresses
--
....
) .
,../ .
.........]---. -,

< 2
- a yiek:l
_ 1
2
- 0"10"2 + crl:s cr/
. crhoop
2
- O"hoopO"axiar + O"axia?
_We can calculate the equivalent stress:
. Forthree principal stresses (von Mises):
. 0.5[(0"1- CT2)2 + (0"2 - 0' 3)2 + (0"3 - 0" ,)2) :s 0/
_ If the third principal stress is negligible (we call this
'plane stress' ), as is the case in a pipeline for radial
st ress, we have:
Pipeline design standards require these calculations on equivalent
st resses to be calculated.
The stand ards then list limits on these equivalent stresses

LIMITS ON EQUIVALENT STRESSES: Example for
Offshore Lines
. Pipeline standards limit the level of all stresses in a pipeline, usually by
'des ign factor' .
_We have already covered limits on hoop stress (usually a limit of 72% of
SMYS is specified, or a design factor of 0.72)).
_Axial (longitudinal) stresses and 'combined' or 'equivalent' stresses are also
limited by using design factors.
_ For example, ASME 831.8 and 831.4 have limits for hoop, longitudinal, and
combined stresses in offshore pipelines and risers:
location Design Design Factor, F
2
Design Factor,
Factor, F, F,
Hoop stress longitudinal stress Combined
stress
Pipeli ne 0.72 0.80 0.90
Platform pip ing 0.60 (831.4) 0.80 0.90
and risers
0.50 (831.8)
LIMITS ON EQUIVALENT STRESSES: Example for
Onshore Lines
. Pipeline standards limit the level of all stresses
_A$ME 83 1 gives the following limit s for onshore lines:
Stress Limit
Maxi mum hoop stress 72 or 80% SMYS
Maximum stress due to pipeline expansion, a" 72% SMYS
Maximum bending stress O"b plus axial stress due 75% SMYS
to pressure loads, e,
Maximum (Je plus 0 b plus O"a 100 % SMYS
OTHER LI MITS IN PIPELINE CODES
57
. Pipeline codes will specify other limits.
For exampl e, AS 2885.1:
. Product: Appl icabl e to gas, crude oil, LPG.. .
Pressure/Stress: MAOP>1050kPa or >20%
SMYS
. Temperature: Temperature range is +200C 10 -
30e
_ Depth of cover' :
. T1. T2 = 900mm (normal), 600mm (rock
excavation)
_ R1, R2 = 750mm (normal), 450mm (rock
excavation)
MAOP
TEMP.
COVER
ETC.
' MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE'
_Always check 'des ign' and ' maximum' pressure
[CODE]
definitions in the relevant standard and/or regulat ion.
( Y DESIGN )
. Design pressure (DP) is that obtained from a
national or international desi gn code.
_Maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP)*
IREGULATIONl
_ MAOP' is in gas pipeline standards and regulations in
the USA.
( r
MAOP
)
_ It is a rating indicating the maximum pressure at
which a pipeline or segment of a pipel ine may be
operate d under the national or state regulations in
IOPERATOR ]
normal conditions.
_ InASME 831 .8, MAOP is also based on the
(
Y
M(
P

level of the pre-service lest
_The 'actual' operating pressure or 'maximum'
operating pressure of a pipeline must not exceed
MAOP.
,", Por """" 2006 R,,,,6I'
' w,OP " ""'"'ed ;n R'V,'.,,,,,,, ., to" USA by to. Of' >eoof p,,,,,,'. s.'<ly (OPS) " .., . , ' ''0 cor_"";on
ss
,he ' ""0' "". "', ",.,,0.., p' . "", ' . '. ' IS,_"""9 ,,,, O'}' '" !e(.h","' . ,, " Y""
PIPELINE 'DESIGN LIFE'
.'Design life'
. ASME 831.4 says '... a properly maintained and protected pipeline
system can provide liquid transportation service indefinitely'
'Our analysis indi cates a pipeline using line pipe of proper design
and construction, withstanding a successful hydrostatic pressure
test, maintaining adequate cathodic protection, and protected from
outside force damage is capable of performing safely for well over
100 years and possibly indefinitely'
USA Office of Pipeline Safely, RSPA, 'Frequently asked questions , www.ops.dct.qov
2001.
60
Introduction to Pipeline
Construction
Penspen
Integrity
61
PIPELINES: Constructed in a 'Right of Way'
)
PIPELINES: Are made up of sections
of steel pipe, welded together
_We buy sections of pipe ('line pipe'), usually 12
metres in length, and weld them toget her to produce
a pipeline
() 4 -,,- ) . L ~
r . . . . ~
D_2006...... 60- '
63
0::
)
Jm"ll".' ""'''''''1, 00 OOf'Y"(I'"
oI P..." .,."G""",
.Pipelines can be onshore or offshore:
eonehcre (land)
. usually onsho re pipelines
are laid in a trench and wJI1
10 abo,' 1 melee (
_b urial allows protection, &
landscape 10be preserved I
Some pipelines are laid above
ground; e.g. if the groun d is frozen,
or burial is difficult or not requ ired (e.g. a j ungl e).
.Pipelines can be onshore or offshore:
_Subsea (offshore or under a lake or a
ri ver)
_Subsea pipeli nes are laid in a trench
on the sea bed, or di rectly onlo the
seabed.
_ Larger diameter subsea pipelines
are often coated in concrete
{concrete wei ght coaling') to prevent
them float ing back to the surfa ce. This
coating incidentally also gives
protection .
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION: Defects & Damage?
_ Line pipe is tranSJXlrted to. and
ohen stored at, site.
_ Line pipe is welded together
_ Then put into treoctVseabed
and backfilled/ covered .
_ We can have:
_ Line pipe defects: e,g laminations or seam weld defects
_Transportation damage: e.q. goug es
_Welding defects: e.q. cracks.
a c onstrucnon and backfi lling damage : e.g. dents
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION: Failures Happen
UK _ 1911 _ www.ukopa. co.uk
O_2QOOl R""""
68
PIPELINE BENDS
PIPELINE BENDS
Line pipe is flexible and can accommodate
gentle turns and changes in elevation
But for more severe turns it needs to be
bent
69
70
PIPELINE BENDS: 'Radius' and ' Ang l e'
A pipel ine - particularly onshor e

- will need to avoid obstacles.
Theref ore it wi ll need ' bends'
A bend has radius and angle
(arc) .
The bend radi us (R) is
measured to the centrel ine of
the bend, in multiples of the
Nominal Pipe Size (NPS*) - the
pipe diameter (0).

....-.,..

:.e . __
Bend Radius, R=1.5D
R=1.5D
-""$" d'''''' '' """," 11 ;, ,,. USA ,,""'''''''......'ldo'" "Y....
"""""","."""""'
o..n'<O<>"I_ NPS " .. . ..o.,,'..., ...... .. . ><PS'2 ..... ...,...-
fD 10' ' 2'50". NPS S'.. 00.' H2'l" NPS2' nu O, ;><
"
PIPELINE BENDS: 'Field'
A 'field' bend is made during pipeli ne
construction, by taking a piece of
standard line pipe and forming it in a
special bendi ng machine .
Small diameter line pipe (e.q. 6
fl
) can
be field bent to a mi nimum of 50
(D=pi pe diameter), whereas large
diameter (e.g. can only be a
minimum of 300
The outer portion of a bend has a
thinner wall than the inner portion.
The cross section of a bend has an
oval shape
T..,",
-----

72
PIPELINE BENDS: Other types
o o
Generally, we use 'forged'
bends for tight radius
changes, and pulled or
field bends for long radius
changes
The forged bends are
bought to a specification
~ ~
Bend Radius, R=1.5D
PIPELINE BENDS: Other types
o o
A 'mitre (miter) bend' (also known as mitre elbows), are made by cutt ing and
welding the ends of two consecutive pipe j oints at an angle
They were used many years ago, before forged bends were avai lable.
They were made in a shop , for various angles: 5, 10, 15, etc.
Mitre Bend
Many could be combi ned to give any angle of bend
Mult iple mit res are somet imes known as 'lobst er back s' .
They are not usually used in hi gh press ure pipelines now, and many codes
prohibillheir use in high stressed lines
J..-_D
o PIPELINE BENDS: Other types
A 'wrinkle' bend is not usually
allowed on pipelines operati ng at
>30% SMYS (see standards for
li mits on wrinkle bends)
Pressure Testing of Pipelines
Penspen Integrity
co 2006 Re>6l1
76
INTRODUCTION: Testing Structures
r:
_We test structures before we put them into
service, to ensure they are strong enough
and/or will perform safely.
_We will test a hot air balloon to ensure
there are no leaks
_We will test ropes to ensure they can
carry a specified load
_It is the same with pipelines:
_We want to show they are strong
enough; and
_We want to show they do not leak;
_We can do this by filli ng them with
water and pressurising the water.
I NTRODUCTION: Testing Pressurised Structures
December 1965, UK
150 mm th ick pressure vessel
John Thompson pressure vessel
November 170, UK
28 mm thick pressure vessel
Robert Jenkins pressure vessel
'npI/'NwN '" <, kljJLi<l pmtod.dJ'.. ", 13/" 1g;!' """""""",,28 "'"'
' no;_ "" .kI;12<1"""""'..."""" 1:li" iga' c._26 " ml
78
Water
PRESSURE TESTING OF LINE PIPE: At the ' Mill"
_As early as 1869. l ine pipe manufacturers were 'hydro' testing (testi ng
with water) each sect ion of pipe.
_ By the 19005, the manufacturers were listing the test pressure, that was
typically above pipelines' operating pressures
_Up to the 1950s/60s , line pipe manufacturers woul d hydrates! their
li ne pipe to 60% to 90% of the specified minimum yield st rength. and
conduct some dest ructive testing
'Mill Test' on individu al length of line pipe (-12m)
60 to 90% SMYS
_ From the 1940$ the manufacturers started to introduce non-destructi ve
testing methods to evaluate the seam welds. but it was not unlil1963 that
API 5L had mandatory requi rements for the non-destructive inspection
u_"'#._._.... ,.""_ _... _ .. _ _ ....... 00<_" ."
_ ......". e- _,_.. "_ ....-. .,. 1<_........ __.. _._
_ .........., ' ,-
PRESSURE TESTING OF LINE PIPE: At the 'Mill' "
_ Mili lesting to high levels (i.e. 90% SMYS) was not a requirement in the
1930s: Grade B was required to be tested to between 18,0001bf/in2 to
20,OOOlbf/in2 (about 50% SMYS), according to the relevant standard (API
5L) .
_ In 1949 API 5LX ('X' for high strength) appeared as a tentative standard
and established a mill test of 90% SMYS.
_ Hence, it is not certain how much line pipe was tested to 905 SMYS
bef ore 1949, but thi s is of minor consequence to gas pipeli nes as the vast
majorit y of USA gas pipelines were install ed after 1949.
79
80
PRESSURE TESTING OF PIPELINES: In the Field
_ We need 10know that our new pipeline can contain its pressure, and not
leak
- So... we can fill our pipeline wit h liquid (e.g. water) or gas (e.g. air),
raise the pressure of the fluid (using pumps or compressors)" inside
the pipeline to a pressure greater than the normal operating pressure
of the pipeline to determine if the pipel ine is leak tight, and can
contain a specified pressure'
_ This test pressure is held for a number of hours to ensure there are
no leaks in the pipeline.
(] D.. or gas
CI'-----'-
Pipeline (many lengths of line pipe)
C_2OOli1llft6"
._-----_...... _--_... _.. _---
___1nI_"'.
"
PRESSURE TESTING OF PIPELINES: In the Fi e l d
. Hence, a pressure l est can demonstrate a pipeline's 'fitness for
service" , and it can be carried out on new pipelines, or to prove the
integrity of existing lines, or to prove the ability of existing lines for new
operating conditions such as increased pressure, or a new flui d.
8 T ---'OI+ - -"L"';9"u,;,d or gas
Pipeline (many lengths of line pipe)
-----.........-0---- -.. _.. _---
_ /'OOOl o.-. """ " o
aa
PRESSURE TESTING: Purpose
PRESSURE TESTING: Purpose
_The purpose of pressure testing is 10:
_ establish an operating pressure limit for a pipeline;
a oetect and eliminate defects in the pipeline ;
. check for leaks.
C_2006.....6i'
8J
PRESSURE TESTING: Purpose Establishing
Operating Pressure
'Design Factor' (hoop slressfSMYS)
1.4
' Actuatfauu re st ress of defect-
free pipe is UTS or >1.25.SMYS
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
o
Safety
Factor'
based 0
failure
Design Hydrotest Failure
os.. . , .. T",""". " .,. _, ...... n '-"""- ...., R_ ' ". """'F
~ "'"7'"' ~ e "".... -. """"-"_ ' OC'''. _ ,., "'"
85
PRESSURE TESTING: Purpose Failing Defects
A pipeline will operate at a 'design' or 'maximum allowable' pressure
The pre-servic e hydrates ! will be conduct ed at a higher pressur e than this
allowable pressure,
~ a s
Design pressure
Design pressur e
Hydratest pressure
Hydratest pressure
86
PRESSURE TESTING" : Purpose What the
Standards Say
LEAK TEST
_ 851PO 8010 says the test is to...
prove the strength and leak-
tightness prior to commissioning,
and establish the existe nce of a
margi n of safety against failure at
operat ional pressure cond itions.
_A$/NZ 2885.5 says the test is to...
establ ish the st rength and leak
tightn ess of a test section, and the
pressur e strength of a pipel ine for
the purposes of det ermining or
confirming the maxi mum allowable
operati ng pressure of the pipeline.
(
The hydr ates! is a:
-Leak test, and
Strength test
for the pipeli ne
J
Water
Water
e __"",," _ ,
STRENGTH TEST
-... ..-.. _---.,... _.
PRESSURE TESTING OF PIPELINES: Types
88
r:
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Types of Test '
_There a three basic types of pressure tests :
_A 'st rength tes t' is used to establish the operating pressure limit of a pipel ine segment .
_ Typically. the strength le st pressure ratio (lest pressure/operating pres sure) is 1.25
and the duration is 4 hours or longer.
_ Strengt h tests are determined 10 be successful if no pipe ruptures or leaks occu r as
per the establ ished acceptance cri teria
_ A 'leak test' is used to det ermine that a pipeline segment does not show evidence 01
leakage.
_Typically. the lest pressure ratio is less than 1.25 and the duratoo is 2 hours Of
g ~
_ Leak tests are determined to be successful if all pressure venauooscan be expl ained
as per the established acceptance catena.
_ A ' spike lest' is used to venfy the integrit y of a pipeline containing 'l ime dependent' defects
(see later).
_The test pressure rat io is typica lly greater than 1.25, and l est durat ions are typicall y
longer than 5 minutes but short er than 1 hour.
Spike tests are determined to be successful il no pipe ruptures occur according 10a
pre-determin ed acceptance criterion.
PRESSURE TESTING: Pneumatic
' Pneumatic' pressure testing of pipelines refers to the use of air or an
inert gas (such as nitrogen) as a test medium instead of water.
Pipeline operators rarely use pneumatic pressure testing for systems
that operate at pressures above 100 psig due to safety concerns
The amount of energy stored in a compressed gas greatly exceeds the
energy stored in a compressed liquid. If a failure of the pipeline were to
occur during a high-pressure pneumatic pressure test , the sudden
release of this large amount of energy could be dangerous to personnel
In the USA, its use in large piping systems is limited to lines
transporting carbon dioxide under controlled test conditions, or in lines
with low stress (less than 20% of yield strength).
Many local distribution companies operate their systems at pressures
below 100 psig, and routinely perf orm pneumatic pressure test s on new
pipeline installations, pipeline repairs, and installation of service lines to
homes and businesses.
0 _ 2OOlI -.>i ,
89
00
PRESSURE TESTING: The ' Dynami c' Test
2':2 hours
I

Stress
e.g.
St100/0
MOP
_We can test our pipeline during
servi ce using the pipeline product
_The Ameri can Petroleum Institute
(API 1110) defines 'dynamic testing ' as
tne application of pressure to a
segment of operating pipeline above
normal operating pressure under
flowing conditions, for a fixed period of
time, utilizing a liquid normally handled
through the line '.
_ Dynamic testing is usually limited to' :
. 110 percent of the maximum
operating pressure of the line, and
ea minimum duration of 2 hours, L ---.J
API 1110says that this dynamic test can only be used lor 're-qualificatiorf of a line, and cannot
be usedas a bas.sfor increasedoperating stresslevel.
_ .. ....__'_. .... .,... __.. 91
... __ . _ . _ . _ ", ... ... _ ... , .... __,.., 00-
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics
0_2006_'
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics. 'Proving' before the
test
Before a test on a new line, we want to chec k that the line has no
blockages or major deformation (e.g. dents), and has a uniform diameter
We can check for blockages using a 'gauging' pig.
This is a standard pig, with a soft met al plate (e.g. AI) moun ted on it.
The plate is machined 10be 95 to 97% of the pipeline's internal diameter
If the plate is damaged, there is a blockage
If there is damage, a call iper pig, or a deformation
pig can then be run to size and locate the damage.
As requi red, 'pig' launchers and receivers
are walded to the ends of the pipeline
sectcn unde rgoing hydrosl<ltic testi ng. The
pipel ine may be ' pigged' prior to testing to
remove natural gas liquids, lubricating oi l,
and scale.
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Filling up
a presscrc testing invol ves seal ing the
pipeline at bot h ends and providing a
water fill location (or other fluids) and
several ai r vent s, depending on the
length and size of the pipeline.
., PO,..,.., 200&f<o,,611
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Why is Water the
Preferred Fluid?
We pref er to use water at high pressures, not gas
Natural gas, or air, is not used al very high pressures
Energy content of a pneumatic test is many times greater than
that of a hydraulic test, and can support very long running
fractures in the pipeline - should it fail.
In cold climates a mixture of
methanol and water is used
Gas
"-"""'-'
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Using water"
.Typically, the fill water is obtained from a surface wat er body, such as a river, lake,
or groundwater wel l.
Water source Fill and discharge of water
95
_We can use pigs 10control the 'flooding' of a pipel ine
_ We can put the water into the pipeline within a 'train' of pigs,
_ The pigs will sweep oul air, and ensure the pipeline is filled with water, with no air
pockets
_ The pigs must have good sealing properties
_ Several pigs may be used in the train to ensure good sealin g
96
..... , ..... GTI_I.
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Pressure and Hold
_ The fluid is pressurised up to
the requir ed level , above its
operati ng pressure,
_ The pressur e is maintained
('held' ) for a required time, to
all ow for leaks. etc.. to be
detected
_ The fluid is then removed from
the pipel ine
Pressure or stress
-'Hold'-
Test pressure
or stress
\ ~ ~ ~ i ~ pressure
or stress
Time
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Pumping System
_A high volume pumping system (Le. pumps , f ilter ) is used to fill the pipe with
water'
_ After the pipe is full, the pumping system increases the pressure 10 the oestrec
level
_ The 'l est length' can be as long as practicable (e.g. 15 to 20 miles ), but pipeline
confi guration and elevation changes will affect this lengt h
_ Elevation increases (e.g. over 6Om) are limited by standards when liquid is
used.
Thefil l pump should be siZed so
that the fi ll pigs will travel at a
speed that wi ll maintain a good
seal with the pipeline. This wi ll
reduce the risk of int roducing air
or other compressible mi xtures
behind the fi ll pigs. A minimum of
2 to 3 mph is a suggested sta rting
point lor the velocity of the fill
pigs.
."
98
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Example of
Standard Pressure Requirements ASME B31.8
ClASSI FICATION Test Fl uid Test Pressu re (TP) Maxi mum
Al lowable
Oper ating
Min
M" Pressure'
Class 1 (Di v 1) Water 1.25xMOP Nooe TP/ l .25
Class 1 (Div 2) Water 1.1xMOP Nooe TP/l .1
",
1.hMOP 1. 1xMOP TP/l .1
G"
1.1xMOP 1.1xMOP TP/1.1
Class 2 Wat er 1.25xMOP None TP/l .25
",
1.25xMOP 1.25xMOP TP/l .25
Class 3 Water l.4xMOP None TPJ1.4
Class 4 Wat er 1.4xMOP None TP/l .4
MaxImum ope ratIng pressure (MOP) is the highest opet almg pressure during normal opera tion
Maxi mum allowable operating pressure is the maximum pressure allowed by ASME 631 ,8
Design pressure is the maximum pressure permitted by ASME 6 31,8 based on materia ls and location
Must be less than design pressure
PRESSURE TESTING": Basics Pressure Hold
Period
_ The pressure is then held for a preset time, e.q. 8 hours, 10 check the integrity of
the pipeline.
_API 1160 states: 'Wi thin limits, the greater the ratio of test pressure to operatir-j
pressure, the more effective the lest' .
_A$ME B314 currently requires a test pressure of not less than 1.25 l imes
maximum operating pressure (MOP), for not Jess than four hours when the pipe is
visually inspected during the lest. and not less than an additional four hours at 1.1
times MOP when the pipe is not visually inspected during the l es;<. ....
, - ~ d T - ~ 100
--,.-""-_.... "" ....... '
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Locating Leaks
w hen Using Water*'
_Locating leaks can be a diffi cult and time-con suming process,
ev arrous methods and techniq ues may be used 10improve the opera tor's abi lity 10
find leaks during a pressu re test including the following:
. Patrol line to locate wet patches.
_ Sect ioning or segmenting t he pipeline and moni toring the pressure of each
section. Closing mainline block valves will isol ate the pipeline into smaller
segments. Freeze plugs may also be used 10isolate sections of the pipeline
for evaluation.
_ Dyes may be used in the test water 10improve visual indication of the leak
area.
_ Acoustical monitoring equipment may be employed to narrow the search
area
aooorants or tracer gases introduced into the test mediumduring the filling
processwill allowthe operator to detect leakswith sensingequipment.
Testing in short sections both increases the sensitivity to detecting small leaks,
and reduces the amount of water used
S<>o I; ,.,ft AP' 1110, ' 00f
Water
In oil lines, a small amount of
water in the first productio n is
unli kely to be a problem, so a
singl e pig can be used.
In gas and process lines, water
can' cause corrosion and
hydrates, and these lines may
requi re special pigging and
drying processes, after
'dewatering' .
test using water, a pig can be used
to push the water out of the pipeline
('dewatering').
We can use a pig to drive the
water oul.
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Following
Completion
Following compl etion of a pressure
102
To' o"<r,yn www "oll ,. ,"" ..
PRESSURE TESTING: Basics Summary
Fill
___ I
----- I
L-]
e -e
To fill 30 miles of a 1l).in. pipeline, you need ~ 4 0 0 0 0 bbl ctwater.
eQuivalent to a 1()(b.1QO.n pond, 22 ft in depth.
For 30 miles of 36-in . pipe, the volume required is X5 as large
Hydrostatic Testing
'"
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1 04
HYDRDTESTING PIPELINES: History before the
1950s
The pressure vessel industry has tested its
plant by over-pressurising for many years
the pipeline industry copied this good
practice,
Prior to 1955, construction/operating
practices only required a pipeline to
withstand SOpsi pressure higher than Ihe
pipeline's maximum pressure.
Hence, this was a leak test, not a
strength test.
Testing pipelines prior to operation were not
mandatory (specified in regulations) in USA
until 1970
>05
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: Hi story.. before the
1950s
Prior to 1955, gas or air was usually used in Ihe test:
Water was used in other industries (e.q. pressure vessels) , but:
Long pipelines meant water was costly and difficult to use
Dry regions of USA meant that there was no water available
Operators did not want any water remaining in their lines
As gas was being used, operators did not want to raise the test
pressure to levels well above the maximum operating pressure, due to
the risk of long fractures.
e Poo,,,,,o 2OCJ6 R....6I1
~ ~ d
~ s
C .
CE3
Gas
106
HYDROTESTING PIPELI NES: History the birth of
hydrotesting
Testing pipelines to high stresses start ed in Texas in the 19505
Texas Eastern were converting products tines to gas, and incidents
occurred in-service from manufacturing defects in the pi pe.
Texas Eastern's insurers would not support the lines unless the
incidents slopped.
Therefore. they hydrotested the lines to a high stress level (<!:1 00% SMYS) .
They experienced 'hundreds ' of l est brea ks from t he manufacturing defects.
But after the testing there were no failures from manufacturing defects
!'",.."l'"' ""' Water
High stress
'"
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: 'Standard' Test
Pressure & Time
Historically. pipelines, pressure

Pressure
vessels and piping have been
tested from 1.1 10 1.5 times the
:S1.1

design pressure.
Design
Minimum levelshouldbe1 .1x
design pressure (this is design
pressure + surge pressure)
1.25xdesign pressure is often used
in standards
The higher the ratio of test pressure
Time
to design pressure. the higher the
<"
certemty" that any defect present at
rocrs
the time of the test will not fait at the
subsequent design pressure
Pr essure need s to be 'hel d' for a

time pe ri od 10 allow temperat ures,
etc. to settle.
c Pw.......2006 R_l
'"
"SeeASJNZS2885.5: 2002
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: 'Standard' Test
Pressure & Time
Pressure, historically, is held for

Pressure
24 hours:
to allow leak detection in long s 1.1
pipe lines; and Design
due to failures being observed
during the hol d period .
Many pipeline codes do not now

require a 24 hour hold period :
for example, ASME B31.4
Tim
requires a minimum of a 4 <2,
hour hold per iod at a minimum
hours
of 1.25 times the maximum
/
allowable operating pressure
As temperature drops, pipel ine pressure drops.
Leaks are detected by pressure crop.
We must not confuse temperat ure changes with
leaks.
Hence, long (8 to 24 hours) hold periods allow the 109
water in the pipe to stabilise with the surrounding soil.
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: 'High Level', and
'Test to Yield' Tests: Stress and Time
The concept of a 'high level' test Stress

or a 'test to yield'
Test to yield
(100% SMYS ) was introduced
<':100%
into the UK & USA for gas lines
SMYS
Hi gh level test
in1967
2: 90%
",-- _.
It was recognised that testing
SMYS
to 80 or 900f0SMYS would not
revea l (fail) defects thai may
cause failure during
operation.
These high level tests are
popular in gas pipeline codes,

TIme
e.g. IGEITD/ 1 requires seam
welded pipe to be tested to a

design factor of 1.05 (i.e.
Low stresse d (:<>20% SMY8 ) liquid lines (e.q
105%SMYS") .
ASME 831.4) are test ed to 2: design
pressure
O P"" ,.,.., 2006 Rev6l,
110
'BSI POOO1(\-1".' "" 'high '""oj ' .. be ......, 9<l.ed SMYS, ,,"toO. st ' ... calo, '",'o,.". ""sed 00 """',"', ...11 t h ,"0. "
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: Offshore Lines
Offshore pipelines are typically tested to 1.25 x maximum allowable
operating pressure. or 90% SMYS
Many offshore design codes requir e water 10be used: gas cannot be
used in many codes
The hold period is often quoted as 24 hours (e.g. DNV as F101 and
85 PO 8010-2) , but other codes require shorter hold periods (e.g. CSA
2662-99)
The British pipeline stand ard PD 8010-2 says a 24 hour hold period is: 10
ensure the detection of small leaks in large pipelines; and to cover the
possibility of creep mechanism causing fail ures after a number of hours.
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: Offshore Lines
Hydrotesting an offshore line can be time-consuming:
Fil ling wi th water ;
Cleaning and gaug ing' the line:
Temperat ure stabili sation; Oissol'l ing residual ai r;
Pressuri sation \0 the requ ired lest level : Hydrostat Ic str ength tesl (and leak test ):
Emptying the pipel ine (after a successful hyorct est), and disposal of the test wat er;
Drying the pipeline.
Here is an example for a long . offshor e pipeline in the UK
Msling
'"
s:art
I
j '
f ill ing
time -e-e-
dl uolvl ng
."
equaliz inll
t ompe. alU' o Ii.:
diN" ont ;.1 L
empty;nll d,ylnll
I I
- .
-24 hours
approxunateiy two months
0 __
--a..- _ .. _ -.. "'I_... . "' .r- ..
_ _ _- 00 .. _'-. __... .....,..,..".
HYDROTESTING: Summary of Benefits
Hydrotesting of pipelines is now accepted as a means of:
checking for leaks,
(
)
(
-e--
proving th e st rengt h of the pipeline,
removing def ect s of a certai n size
'bl unt i ng ' defects th at surv ive, and
this increases subsequent fatigue life,
'war m prest resses' def ect s that
surv ive, and this improves their
low temperature properties,
reducing residual stresses
(
o
PROBLEMS WITH THE HYDROTEST?: In-Ser vice
In-service hydrol eslin g is a problem due to the pipeline
being taken oul of service
on average, an in-service bvorotesttakes aboul18 days, This is
expensive'
acquiring permits to acquire. treat. and di spose of the l esl water
the water may be contaminated and require treatment before an
environmentally-friendly (and possibly expensive) disposal.
PROBLEMS WITH THE HYDROTEST?: Surviving
Defects
Hydrostatic testing is valuable as a tool to destructively remove 'critical'
defects
Testing a pipeline above the operating pressure wilt demonstrate the
absence of defects that could result in failure up to the test pressure.
But not all defects are removed by the lest, leading to possi ble
'damaging' aspects of hydrol esting, in particular:
. 'Pressure reversal s' - a defect can grow during the hydrotest,
both during the loading and unloading. Subsequently, the line can
fai l at a lower pressure.
_Time dependent growth - a lest could assisllime dependent
cracking (e.q. fatique].
e 'r t ese are net usually a maj or problem unless you have an already
defective pipeline.
Defects... 'Reversals'
A pressure reversal can occur when a
previ ous hydrostatic test causes a
defect to grow nearly to failure, and
when additional defect extension
occurs during pressure unloading.
If this occurs, then the line can fail
at a pressure lower than the
previous hydrostatic test pressure.
Hydratest Press ure
Hyorotest 1:
Failure
Hydratesl2:
Failure
Time
'"
Defects... 'Reversals' *
,-

d-x<l4hQ'95 ",,1
seoa
DeIO<l No.l _<t
/......, ,,,,,,,, -

Do!<ICl No.2.97':IlorJ
---
IU . O.l 71 nl
_6 part wall defects machined
i nto line pipe (36", 0.39", X6D)
_ All del ect lengths = 4.4"
_Defed depths = 0.078" 0. 195"
( Jij -i!3
euetect NO.1 (depth 0.195")
failed
. Def: cts 2-4, with
0.171 .0.142 and 0.125, y.,' >:,
extended due to cracking during _ ;;<:;"1:
the pressurising -,<'t.2
' . -..
ar heretore, defects Nos 2-4 are 10;:,;7. _ -.-,:;.r{i
it."" - ' -,-"':;
now deeper, and wou ld fail at a
lower st ress than defect No 1.
.They would exhibit a "reversal' o,,<..,No.(91'l'o:;m
---
14."0.125 ")
PROBLEMS WITH THE HYDROTEST?: Avoiding
Reversals
. Pressure reversals may be a risk in pipel ines
containing a large number of defects (e.q.
seC) and with mode rate line pipe touqhness"
. Hydratesting can help.
When we hydratest a pipelines with defects
we have two conflicting requirements:
. to avoid failures: we want to minimise the
exposure of a defect to high stress
(as it may grow),
abut we also want to maintain the
pressure for a period to det ect any
leaks.
we may also want to sat isfy a code
requirement for pressure level
. A 'spike' test can satisfy these requirement s.
Hydratesl Pressure
Hydrotest 1:
Failure
Hydrotest 2:
Failure
Time
" P. , S<>6'1 2006 Re, 6il
PROBLEMS WITH THE HYDROTEST?: Avoiding
Reversal .. . the Spike Test
.._w.__.....,. __... ~ ........ ....... , ~ _ , , , . . . .......... .... , """
'"
Time
Most hydrctest
failures occur in
under a hour
>
LEAK
DETECTION
Stress ~ SPIKETEST
e.g, 110% 1-_ ,...':;"
SMYS ,
e.q. 90% \......,,......,
SMYS
WThe ' spike test' has been used for
many years in the pipeline business"
_ It is a short duration (typical ly< 1 hour). but
high pressure (e.g. >1,25 design pressure):
WAn initial (high) pressure is held for a
short time (e.q. one hour)
a This high pressure fails defects. but
the short durati on reduces growth
a The pressure is lowered (at least 5%
below the spike-test level) and held for a
longer period (as in code. e.g. 8 hours)
_ \0 allow leak detection and code
requirements
A 'spike' le st is simi lar to a hydrotest, in tha t it wm use water under
no-now conditions, but spike tests are conducted at the high est
possiblepressure (frequently 139 percent of MOP), for a very short
OP......,2OC duration (usuallynot morethan30minutes)
PROBLEMS WITH THE HYDROTEST?: Time
Dependent Growth*
A second possibl e damaging aspect of a hydrotest is time-dependent
defects
These can occu r when pipeline defect growth takes pl ace due to
fatigue, sec, or corrosion.
Although this type of crack growth can occur regardless of hydrostatic
test history. it is possible that a hydrostatic test could initi ate crack
growth that can become susceptible to continued time-dependent
growth .
In this case, to prevent future in-service failures, continued hydrostatic
testing would be required to remove defects that have extended over
time.
Aspike test, strength test, and/or a leak test can be used to control jnternal
and external corrosion
A spike test, or a strength test can be used to control fatigue and see ,
O_1'<lOII """,,, '
120
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES: Closing comments
. Pre-service hydrotest: always test a pipe to the highest possible stress' :
_ With biaxial stress , a buried pipeline yields at - 1.09 SMYS , therefore
yieldi ng is unli kely at 100% SMYS, but do not les t over 110% SMY$.
Yielding does not harm pipe,
. Yielding does not harm coating. /" ....,

' e SA Z662 states thatthe bydrotest should not exceed the lesser of:
8. 110% SMY$ for line pipe, other than continuous welded (continuous
welded line pipe {i.e. line pipe that is welded by heating in a furnace and
then pressing the ends of the skerp together, using no filler ) has a hydrates!
limi t of 66% SMYS), and
b. 0.2% deviation on the P-V plot.
C_2D06_1
_Test needs only to be >2 hours
Pressure
(but may be longer for lines with
sec,
_ Longer than 8 hours may
be of no value (see AS/NZS
2885.5)
_ Extensive load hold and
repeated cycling dur ing the test
is not beneficial" . particularly at
high stresses (see GSA Z662)
Time
Time 2 to 8 hours???
.... '<w ...... C<rl,'-""-',_19ll1
__R'''''''' """,,,.. E"9__ So<>I.... _",", . 11
'"
_ In-service hydrotestinq is not always the
best option:
_Water is difficult to obtain. expensive
and polluting.
_Smart pigs can be better,
_ Most of the pipe in a pipeline is usually
sound .... It makes sense to use a
technique that will fi nd the critical defects
and allow thei r repair, as opposed to
testing the entire pipeline when it is
unnecessary.
"'"
Test in-service?
-"
TESTING STRUCTURES: History
Year Structure Location Method
Be
Ice covering
Worl d wi de
Send fat boy
nds across first
Middle
Bridges UK Troop of soldiers
A as
1817
Steam
UK
Pressure
Boilers steam testin
before
Pipel ines USA Gas test ing
19305
19505 Pipelines USA
Hydrostatic
testin
1967 Pipelines USA
High level
t estin
1967 Pipelines UK
High level
testin
D_2COI_'
'"
Pipeline Operation
PIPELINE OPERATION & CONTROL
1 2 5
Modern long-di stance pipelines
are operated mainly
automatically by a computer at
the headquarters of the pipeline
company.
The computer monitors the
pressure, flow rates, and other
parameters at various locations along
the pipe, performs many on-line computations, and sends commands
to the field to control the operation of the valves and pumps.
Manual intervention is frequently needed 10modify the automati c
operation, as when different batches of fuels are directed to different
temporary storage tanks, or when the system must be shut down or
restarted.
'26
'SCADA': Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
CONTROL
VALVE SENSOR LEAK
Continuous transmission of pipel ine
operational data to central
control location
Communication may be wi re, satellit
microwave, etc
Allows rapid detection of major
incidents without requiremen
for regular inspection
Intendedfor remote
control.of valves etc
.
SCADA IN A CONTROL ROOM

'"
L ORe"OI'
Pipeline Pumps and Compressors
129
PIPELINE PUMPS AND COMPRESSORS
_A pump is a a device that expends
energy in order to raise, transport . or
compress fluids.
_We use pumps to help transport
our liquids along a pipel ine
_A compressor is a device for
increasing the pressure of a gas by
mechanically decreasi ng its
volume.
_We use compressors
to help transport our
gases along a pipeline
no
PIPELINE COMPRESSORS
Typical compressor station
Turbine hall
Centrifugal compressor
........
Pipeline Maintenance
1 32
PIPELINE PROTECTION: Corrosion

<>(;(:urrinyIn walt '
pllau
Eo_I Conoo.ion
occu<Tin9 at CNlinll
holiday
. Pipeline protection starts with a good design and construction .
_ eXTERNAL CORROSION - We need 10separate our pipe steel from lhe soil or water
environment otherwise it wil l cooooe (the iron tums to Iron oxide).
_ Usuall y. there is no corrosion allowance for elCtemal COO'OSion in pipelines.
_ Hence we need to protect our outside surface"
_ The pipe coaling is the pri mary orotecnon
_ A Cathodic Protection (CP) system is the secondary
protect ion
ec emonc protection is a techn ique to prevent the
corrosion 01a metal surface by makmq the surf ace
the cat hode of an electrochemical cell .
_ INTERNAL CORROSION - We can include a
'corrosion allowance' (increase thicknes s of line pipe) to
accommodate in-service. predict able. corrosion. But we
prefer to prevent internal corrosion by:
_ Treall ng the product prior to ent ry into the line, and checking quality
_Cleaning the line
_ MIXing chermcals to Inhibi t any corrosion
EXTERNAL PIPELINE PROTECTION: Coating
Breakdown
_ Coatings wi ll not be peri ect
_On new pipelines there
wil l be several damaged
areasrkm'
Pipeline coatings can break
down. The major causes
are" (Australia):
arnccrrect application
(68%)
e fncorrect specification (i.e.
wrong coating for job)
( 19%)
_Changes in environment
since the origi nal
specification ( 11%)
_ Faulty produc t (2%)
."
. a " LICil TOR
.. .. o ..
. , a u LTY " I.. T
. , .. CO"'ICT
U lc,"ca T'O "
_ C" il" OI O
... YI.. O.... I .. T
-.-....... """ ... _---
".
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION: Where?
_ EXTERNAL CORROSION:
_ Old coatings, or poorly applied coatings wi ll allow corr osion
_For onshore lines , externa l corrosion can occu r where the coating is
damaged
_For subsea pipelines,
external corrosion is
likely around the 'splash
zone ' of the riser at the
sea surface where wave
action is severe .
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION: Where?
'Diff erential aeration cells' are probabl y the most common
corrosion cell found on pipel ines.
The upper portion of the pipe is exposed to a higher concentration
of oxygen than the lower portion.
The O
2
enr iched environment in the uppe r port ion promotes the
formation of a stable oxide film.
This is cathodic to the oxygen defici ent area on the unde rside of the
pipe, which becomes a net anode . G",uod ," vol
Hence, most external corrosion on pipelines
Oxygen ric h
occurs on the lower portion of the pipe
This area must be carefully inspected
when carrying out 'direct assessments' .
Oxygen deficient
D 6
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION: Cathodic
Protection (CP)
_ Corrosion is an electrochemical reaction that requires the flow of
electrons to chemically change the iron into iron oxide.
e c orrosion prevention techniques are designed to prevent or reduce this
harmful flow of el ectrons.
- SO... CP is an el ectrical way of stopping rust (iron oxide)
Pipeline
(Cathode)
Sacrificial
Anode

./""""..".

"." . ,po

Elewons fiowt"""" ,d in the circuit.
The cathode is negal ively charged. i.e an 01eloclm ns are preseot.
The i,on i""s ale posi:ively and cannol le ave the metal s urf""" if structure a suffIcient negative charge
ABOVE GROUND INSPECTION: External Corrosion
_Close Interval Potential Survey ----
_ This survey measures the pipe to soi l pot entials
at short intervals along the pipe line, to check the
CP system
. 'CIPS' will detect high or low potentials that may
indica te problems such as interference from other
structures, coating damage, etc..
Direct Current Vo ltage Gradient _
.'DCVG' detects coat ing defects in buried _________
pipe li nes.
_ It examines the voltage gradients in the soil from
t he CP system, and can locate and estimate a
relative size of the coating defect
. El ect romagneti c Methods
. Pearson, ACVG, Pipeline Current Mappi ng (PCM)
can locate coating defects
>3,
PIPELINE PROTECTION: External Damage
-,g
$-V'"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ C l
. Pipeline protection starts with a good design and construction.
_ EXTERNAL DAMAGE - Wecanprotect our linesfrom thirdpart ies by:
_ Thicker Pipe wall, or deeper cover (but beware of overburden). .
_ Locallng in remote regions, . .
_Regular patrols or surveys of the line, and clear markings, and good communicatiOns
with third parties including general public,
. Protective measur es such as conc rete casings,
_Damage detection equipment.
_._0......
C_2OOlI_'
",
EXTERNAL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE:
Onshore
dP
"
- "#. .
~ -
-....
"_2OOlI_.
1ma<:pe5 from C<>I umbla Gas. USAaod Tran....,. UK
'"
EXTERNAL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE:
Onshore Markers
. Pipeline markers are used to help surveillance from the air, and also
mark its location for mai ntenance and warning
. AS2855.1 gives these spaci ngs:
Location* Maximum
Spacing (m)
Rural 5000
Semi rural 2000
Suburban 500
High rise 50
INTERNAL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE:
On/Offshore using 'Pigs'
'"
'"
EXTERNAL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE -
Offshore using ' ROVs'
'"
SURVEILLANCE & INSPECTION: Frequency in UK
Depends on pipeline
ACTIVITY RECOMMENDED MAXIMUM
INTERVAL
Aeri al Survey. or 'Vantage' Point 2 weeks
Survey
Full Wal king Survey 4 years
Leakage Survey 3-9 months"
Landowner/Authority Liaison 6 month (letter), 1 year (visit)
Intemal Inspection. or 10 years
Above Ground Survey (e.g. CIPS) or 5-10 years
Hydrotest 20 years
CP Systems 1-3 mcntns ". 10 years (CIPS)
.
'"
SURVEILLANCE & INSPECTION: Purpose
DefecUDamage Method
Patrols Smart Product Leak Geotech CP& Hydrotest
Pigs Quality Surveys Surveys Coating
Surveys
3
r
(! Party Damage P R R
Ext corrosion R P R
Int. corrosion R P R
Cracks R" R
Coat ings P
Ground PIR PIR
movement
Lea kage R PIR R R
Sa botage P
P.,,,>,," 2006 R...." ' .
P is a proactive, and R is a react ive method
"Special' pigs needed
'"
LEAK DETECTION: Need'
LEAK RATE in Tons/hour
Product Size (inches) Pressure

(Bara)
0.5 1 2 3
1/
Ethylene 25 70 260 620 80
NGL 14 40 140 330 65
,
Crude Oil 18 48 180 430
,
25
!
Water 15 40 150 360 15
Gas 5 25 90 200 70
... "''''''''."W_ . '_l..."""'.""""'" ....., _ s.t.... ....,L.. .....,"00""''' . _50 "' '''

'"
LEAK DETECTION: Example"
_Offshore pipelines are surveyed for leaks
_ For example, in California, the sea surface above all pipelines that
service offshore facilities must be visually inspected weekly for indication
of leakage, using ai rcraft or boats.
LEAK DETECTION: Types
.1. Simple Systems ('Seeing or
Smelling')
.2. Flow Balance ('What goes in,
must come out')
_3. Acoustic or Vibration Sensors
.4. System Modelling
Metering
'"
LEAKS: Who discovers them?
rf
Onshore Oil Pipelines*
Leaks Detected in European Liquid Pipelines
Detected by: No (average spill %
size, m
3
)
RoW surveyby operator 29 (229) 9
Automatic detection system 25 (188) 8
Third party passer-by 144 (120) 45 ...
Routine monitoring by operator 64 (388) 20
hr
Hydratest 17 (157) 5
Contractor worki ng on line 5 (482) 2
Operator maintenance staff 13 (60) 4
Third party worker 20(110) 6
Internal inspectionsurvey 3 (6) 1
l ",,, " "''' ' ,lOt,,", "'" '''''''od
149
CONCAW E R.""" no. 1102. Fob 2002 . ........""""'"woH..
Onshore Gas Pipelines (Western Europe Data)
"
Leaks Detected in European Gas Pipelines
Detected by: %
Public 42
...
Patrol 21
hr
Contractor 16
District company 5
Company staff 3
On-line inspection 1
Client
1
Landowner
<1
Other 2
Unknown 8
e Pe'""," 2Q06 R. , t!. "
OMINC',*N, GROuP (EGIG) (, ..... G Pi""' no '''''''''''''''''h",,<; R_
1"'0-19011), Doc EG' G" .R OO "
,SO
If
Onshore Liquid Pipelines (USA)'
Leaks Detected in USA Liquid lines
Detected by: %
Local operati ng personnel. procedures, 45
equi pment
Third party (excavator. homeowner, etc) 27
IL
Remote operating personnel including 9
controllers
Computational Pipeline MonitoringlSCADA 8
with leak detection system
Ai r patrol or ground surveill ance 7
Other (induding leak/pressure test) 5
The leaks continued for many hours.
Duration depends on size of leak and detection method. but is typically 10 to 30 hours
G _ ~ _
'"
,,_.""""''''_..._ _ ...... _ ~ n ... ..._ ~ . ~ ...._.__...... _ ...... ".",
REMEMBER: Our Pipelines Were Built a Long Time
Ago So?
_ Old materers . may be low st rengt h,
poor toughness and contain defect s
_Ol d j oining and construction
practices - may have poor welds,
damage, no QA, etc..
_Ageing coatings may lead to
corros.on.
. Poor records may mean pipeline is
not where you think
'
. Olffenng products may have been
carried leading 10 corrosion
. Plpeline may have been modified,
repaired. erc.. WIthout records
. Many dlffenog management l earns
may have cared lor the line
_ Etc.!
o _ ~ _
REMEMBER: Our Pipelines Were Built a Long Time
Ago... Deterioration....
Basic Pipeline Parameters
Penspen Integrity
'I \H iN
e Penspen 2006 Re,,;;!1
154
PIPELINES: Review of Basic Terms and Parameters
Pipel ine
Transmission and Distribution
Fluids - gases (e.g. methane. ethylene)
- liquids (e.g. crude oil. kerosene)
Pipe Diameter
Pipe Wall thickness
Pipeline material and ' grade' - API 5L - ' Grade' can be 'B' " , ' X60' .
Pipeline design code
Product pressure
Pipeline pumps and compressors - they boost internal pressure, and
help 'drive' the product though the pipeline
Design stress/tactor ..; maximum is 0.72 or 0.8
Pipeline protection and deterioration
Leak detection
Inspection, maintenance and surveillance
' 55
DESIGN STRESS, 'SMYS', YIELD STRENGTH AND
TENSILE STRENGTH
T_ I.
I
YotOd
---,
I
,
"""'""
, -
....-

The te nsile propert ies of line pipe mat eria l are
measured as the Yie ld Strength and the Ultimate
Tensile St rengt h
The Pipe Manufacturer ensures the strength of our
pipe is above cert ain 's pecif ied' minimum l evel s.
These specified minimum levels are:
specified minimum yield strengths (SMYS). and
specified minimum ultimate tensi le strengths
(SMUTS)
Ou r actual yiel d stren gt h and ten sil e st reng t h
are above t hose specified
Our design st resses (often quoted as a percent of _
the SMYS) are always well below the SMYS, to give
us a safety mar gin .
C_2OOI_'
....-.... _._-
MATERIAL PARAMETERS
STRESS. (NlmrnA21
80. r--- --
12
l u r ~
Ultimate t ile strength
t
70.
60.
500
400
300
200
100
0 2 8
STRAIN . %
We 'design' our structures in th region. but they 'fail' inthis
region, at muchhigher stresses & strains
C_ 2OOIl _ '
'"
LINE PIPE: Ductile... brittle.. ..
Materials can be described as
'ductile' or 'brittle'
Ductil e materials can strain
(elongate, bend, etc.)
extensively beforefailing
Brittle materials cannot tolerate
large strains
Bones are strong , but brittle
C-"",, 2OOIl _ '
'58
LINE PIPE: Toughness
159
."
T"" ,"'_'".... ....
W_ .. ........
_ ........" ..Sc C<>.oo".,...
'Toughness' is a measure of the abil ity of a materi al
to withstand the presence of a crack.
So, low toughness material (such as glass) cannot
tol erate cracks, and can fail in a 'brltue' manner.
Very ductile materia ls suc h as aluminium, can
withstand large cracks and are high tough ness.
Many material specifications require a certain
toughness level. In pipe lines, we measure
toughness by a sma ll test called a 'Charpy' test.
Thi s is a sma ll impact specimen.
The toughnes s is measured in
(or ft. lbs.).

O_2OOlIR...rt>1
LINE PIPE: Charpy Toughness
Charpy:
A full size specimen is 1Omm x
10mm:
If our pipeline steel is too thi n, we
use a ' subsize' (%) specimen of
10mm x 6.7mm [J
Typi cal toughnesses? 6.7
ol der pipelines ( 1950 to, say, 1975)
will typicall y have toughnesses
(%Cv) bel ow 40J , but
new pipeline steels can have
toughnesses above 300J
''0
LINE PIPE: Effect of temperature on toughness
Toughnes
(Energy
Absorbed
'!ower shelf'
(BRITTLE,
LOW
TOUGHNESS)
'uppe r shelf' (DUCTILE,
HIGH TOUGHNES)
Temperature
161
TOUGHNESS VALUES IN OLDER PIPELINES
Rememoertnis average toughness level of 2:3Off
...__-"",,, 5 (%Charpy, a 20ftlbsJ ...
. mi ni mum _
I!; average
maximum - - - -
X70 >6 0 X52
grade
Grade
X42 B
o
The toughness of older line 80I
15
pipe in USA has been
.= 70 I
estimated as shown here":
USA line pipe should be 60 I
representative of older steels in our ;;
business: 0
" I
USA system is one of the
oldest in the wor ld, and most 30 I
the older systems around the :5 20I
wor ld used USA specifications G
10
and technology. ::
Toughness of line pipe before
the mid 1970s is 20-50ft Ib* (f ull
size specimen), but the newer
'TMCP', cleaner steels now can
have loughnesses of 300 ft lb.
__ _ _ ....., .... '"'- ' _ 'i'C." """"'_""', 162
-,__--.. __ ... . . .... ",..",
FATIGUE: In pipelines
Stalic Stres s
St ress Time
Y\I\J\j'f cycnc S<,,,,
Time
Stress
1_
The load (stress) in our pipeline can
be constant ('stat ic') or it can vary
('cyclic' )
Patlque . occurs under cyclic (changing)
stress of any kind, and can lead to failure.
In pipelines this cyc ling is usua lly caused
by internal pressure or temperature
fluctuations
Not usual ly a prob lem in pipe lines, but
Some gas lines experience large and
frequent pressure cycles due
to changing customer demands
Oi l pipe lines can see some large
pressure cyc les e.g. balching
Laying pipe lines offsho re can
introduce large cycl ic stresses
"' Poe","" 2000 ",,, oil
'63
FATIGUE: From pressure variations
Pipeline pressure can vary significantly during service
Example from operational liquid line:
.,
0
c.
oj
"
:::>
'"
'" W
"
c,
20
-w
~ ~ ~ ~ ---
'[
_01-- _
0 10 20 30 . 40 SO . OJ.() TO 50 90 100 110 . 121l 130 . \ 40 ' SO . 160 , ' 70 ' 80
Days
'"
FATIGUE: Offshore Spans & Risers
Feed-in
Free-span
,
..
Feed-i n
'"
FATIGUE: In pipelines
Why Failures?
The fatigue 'weak ens' the
1\

steel and creates cracks thai
Pressure
Time
can grow to failure, or
0,
the fatigue can cause
Load
existi ng defects (e.g. cracks
in welds) in the structure to
grow to fai lure.
Pipelines? The fatigue can
cause existing def ect s (mainly in
welds) to grow, & can help stress
corrosion crac ks to form/grow, &
also cause failures in dents.
"6
FATIGUE: Assessment
Pressure
0 '
Load
Time
If we have large and frequent cyclic stresses, we usually use 'S-N' (stress
versus number of cycles) curves to ensure we don't fail
Fatigue life is made up of the time for crack initiation, time for crack
propagation, and the short time required for final failure.
The presence of a defect or a 'stress concentration' (e.q.a hole), or a weld
can reduce fatigue life dramatically.
If we have an existing defect, we use fracture mechanics, not 'S-N'
STR.CT1RO
Fatig.e tje a a
Hress Rrge ci
100N'rmi'
Ran Rae Infiritv
Raewth 3 mn darete- t"de 1
Rae v.ith fillet v.elds 2xl
Rae v.ith 2 rrmoeeovmch 1
'"
FATIGUE: Scale of pr obl em
Extracts from 'Western European Cross-Country Oil Pipelines an-year
Performance Statistics' , CONCAWE, Brussels, February 2002
(www.concawe.be):
Very few ( if any) pipelines are bel ieved to suffer from deterioration
due to throughput related effects, for example, metal fatigue
Fatigue failures do sometimes occur when pipelines have suffered
some construction fault or subsequent damage such as dents.
These are relatively infrequent causes of spillage.
However, fat igue failures do occur, particularly from defects in
long. seam welds* :
Gas lines:
BS PO8010- 1 states that a
fatigue analysis is not required if
the maximum cyclic hoop stress
is 35N/mm
2
.... ,..,""'.0< 0< R.,,,,,,,,n" "_Of ' "''' " '" 0' '''''''''' Wtn " ><'0 '"""0< S..m w"'" F.r"", &od<g _'"'
10",",",,,,",,, " """"" "'0''''"''''' , C"","", 2002, IPClOO,",''*'
168
(STRESS) SAFETY MARGINS IN A PIPELINE
' Design Factor' (hoop stress lSMYS)
1.4
Actual failure st ress of defect-
f ree pipe is UTS or >1.25.SMYS
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
o
Safety
Factor""'"
based 0
failure
,eo
Failu re Hydrotest Design
... Ol.... ' ''_... _ _
W< . '" _""" " ' ''' ''. """" , ","<0, "_ ARC" = ,
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES:
Special Pipelines
- us Army's Inland Petroleum
Distribution System (IPDS)
. Iraq, 220 miles in length, 6"
diameter
_ Delivered in 1300 20ft containers
_ 1500 soldiers needed to build it
. 740psi, 700gallons/min
_ 20 pump stat ions on skids
_ Line pipe is 19' lengths,
aluminium,
e ueuverec in containers: 13
containers = 5 miles
_ Snap joint coupling damps
' RK,o<"" ",o. R K,""" ",- 'A"", B"Id. R"""' " F",, ' P.O'l""" To &'O""" Ope<at',," '",0 ;
F' .,0'"' p,,,.,,,. &G.. """"'ai ,' j'''''' "1 2004 i _ ", ,,,,, """""Ja" ""'''''' <XYn
''0
Useful Additional Information
These slides are for information only.
They are based on questions asked by previous att endees,
and they are not presented in class.
PIPELINE DESIGN: Overview (onshore)
_ Select a pipeline route, which is feasible to
construct, environmentally acceptable and offers the
shortest length at the lowest cost consistent with
avoidi ng potentiall y delay causing government
approval or landowner agreement problems;
_ Select a design pressure and pipe diameter to
convey the required maximum flow economically;
_ Select an economical combination of line pipe grade
and wall thickness to comply with the chosen code;
a u se judgment and experience to select an
appropriate corrosion allowance and corrosio n
protection measures;
_ Select appropriate locations for line break valves.
0_2006.....,.'
171
@

9
IUl
fU
!H
172
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES & REGULATIONS The
First Ones....
_ For the USA pipeline industry, the need for a
national pressure pipi ng code became increasingly
evident from 1915 to 1925.
_ In March 1926, the American Standards
Committee (later changed to the American
Standards Associations , and is now called the
Amer ican National Standards Instit ute), initialed
Proj ect 631 at the request of the ASME.
_ The industry's object ive was to make a major
contri bution to improving public safety by
understanding the causes of failures and
establishing guidance, procedures. and methods for
reducing pipeline failures.
_Bul lhere were no Regulations back in 1926..
C_2006_'
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES Recognition
This is a review (-2000) of countries who were asked.. ' would you
accept the use of these codes?'
% 6 0
50
40
30
20
10
o
D A CCEPT
o NEGOTIATE
,..
REJECT I--
""" "'"
-
.c=;
-
-
=
- -
ASME CEN/OTHER ISO
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES -
Above Ground Pipelines
_ ASME 8 31.4 & B31.8 are applicable to both below
and above ground pipeli nes.
_ Expansion (temperature and pressure) can be
prevented by anchoring, to ensure axial expansion
and contraction is absorbed by axial compress ion
or tension, in the same way as buried lines
_If expansion can not be absorbed by di rect axial
compression of the pipe, fl exibility has to be
provides using loops, bends, offsets, exp ansion
joi nts, bellows. etc..
- Above ground pipelines have di fferi ng all owable
longitudinal expansion st resses.
_ The longitudinal compressive stress is added to
the hoop stress to increase the equ ivalent tens ile stress, and this is not to
exceed 90% SMYS .......pressure
--<() \ ))--
CP...-2OO'l _a. l Temperature , pressure 175
Mechanical Properties
176
STRESSING A PIPELINE
I
PIPE IS
'0,
SERVICEABLE
PIPE IS
NOT SAFE
_N OTE: STRAIN, %
_ Mosl Grades oJSteel X80) wil l deform (strain) a large amount before reaching UTS and failing (e.g. 10%),
Howeve r the new high Grade stee ls (>X80j will flot reach these high strains, and may only reach 3 to 5% at UTS
_ This is significant if you are basing your pipeline des ign on st rain rat her than stress, as your margin of safety on
strain will dec rease with increasi ng Grade of re pipe
m
YIELD STRENGTH OF OLDER STEELS
Pipelines are made from line pipe steel of various grades
The higher strengt h steels are known by t heir grade (X numbe r) and specified minimum
yiel d st rength (in Ibflin
2x
1000), e.p. x eD is line pipe with an SMY$ of 60 ,000 Ibll l'"
The lower streng th line pipe are known by their grade (grade) and yield st rengt h category
(A,B,C), e.q .
Yield strength, Ibffin
2
x 1000
Grade B line pipe
has an SMYS of
90
n.....'. "'''''''''''.'0''''.'
35,000 Ibf/in'
80
s... RJ [ "."e'" 'h lctc"' Con' ""
Always check the line pipe
R.., ,,,,,,,".,,,,,,,c .. r""" ""... on
70
P po",e,'
specification - eg API5L
Coo' . . ' CO , e"'\t9". Ma, 'IIlOO" 4J 7
Inold pipelines we often do not

60
Ell Min
know the actual yiel d strength
50
There is some data on old

-
_ Ave
40
North American pipeline steels
O M a x
(see opposite). 30
In general, t he lower t he
20
strength, the older the
10
stee l
0
Grade
@P",,,,,,,,:?'Xl6 R....60"
30 35 4 2 52 60 70
H8
TOUGHNESS - How tough is my pipeline?
An AGA publication 'ranked' pipeline toughness in terms of age weld etc.:
TYPE GROUP AGE GROUP WALL & 0 0 GROUP

Seaml ess, A Post 1970 A 1<7.6mm, all A
D$AW
00
HFERW. IW. A 1960.70 B T>=7.6mm. A
Flash Welded
OD<16"
LF-ERW, other or B Pre-1960 C t<76mm. B
unknown 00>=1 6"'
Category I pipe has no toughness
TYPE AG E SIZE TOUGHNESS
limit
A A,B A I
Refer 10original publication for other A A,B B II
categories.
A C A,B II
$oo VJ_. _"' __
B A,B A
"'
...
1.''''' '9195
...."""..
B C A,B IV
Pipeline Construction
Penspen
Integrity
'"
180
PIPELINES - Cost elements
CRUDE 5% 4%

,,%
37%
Pump St.llon (2 9 %)
Pipeline Cons tructi on (38 %)
L lneplpe & FItti ngs ( 2 5 %)
O La n d & ROW
. Mi s c .
,,%
,.%
,,%
Pump S t a tion (2 7 %)
Plpe ll n_ Con struc tion ( 36 %)
Llne p lpe & Fittings ( 2 2 % )
O LlInd & ROW
. Mls c .
C_ >OOI5 _ ,
..... .--.._- - -
...e- ,""U$ 00 '
""'--"""'....
'"
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION - Cost elements
LAND
. %
La bo ur ( $580, 000)
Mlse.lI . n e ous ( $ 18 0 , 0 0 0 )
Mllt erl al s ( $4 50, 0 0 0 )
::::l ROW & Da ma g ( S70, OOOI
OFFSHORE
=-- ,
La bo u r . Mis c ell ane ous . M. t e,lal
.. "-2OOli ....... '
...-- _..
_...-.--.--
,__* '_ ... _ .... _ _ .. ... _ --- _ ..-.. _ "' .
- " '"
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION - The Challenge of
deepwater
-.
- -.
. " < ' ,..- ' '.
~ -
- 90% of the world's offshore structures
are in relatively shallow waters -
less than 75 metres deep.
_The majority of the world's heavy
deep-water steel platforms are
located in the North Sea on
the UK and Norwegian continental
shelves.
_However, the deepest structures are located
in US waters in the Gulf of Mexico (441metres) and
offshore California (366 metres), compared with the
deepest in the North Sea (186 metres).
_ We are going deeper. What does this mean to defective
pipelines?
deepwater
In 1978, the
greatest
production depth
was 300 m. By
1998, deepwater
productionwas under
way at 1800 m
From W'NWworldenergy_org
''''
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION - Deepwater
Technology
- ,
.li'r=-.
IiifI
--
RiserslUmbi linl
Anchor
From www.WOI1denergy_org
FPSO
ta
deepwater & Decommissioning
_ To date some 1,000 structures have been decommissioned in the US Gulf of
Mex ico:
70% in waters less than 30 metres deep and
. only 3% in waters deeper than 75 met res.
_The largest steel substructure to be removed so far we ighed only 6.000
tonnes (the Odi n platform in
the Norwegian Continental
Shelf). The heaviest
st ructures in the North Sea
weigh well over 200,000
tcnnes
_ What does this mean to
pipel ines?
c p .......... 2OQl; _ a. I
"'6
PIGS AND CLEANING NEW LINES
Pigs playa key role in new pipeline _
A new pipeline will need to be cleaned
This can be done before the hydratest
If a line has no internal coating, brush pigs can be used to remove mill
scale and rust, and the pig's cups and water flowing through the line
will remove the debris
Brush pigs may damage internal coatings
Hydrotesting - Extra Notes
188
Pc n5pen 2006
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES Water Not Gas!
Compan'l<l" of tncrn le'ct. - Pneumatic and Hldrauli<: Tc,Hn,l
There is a
huge
[ n, ' E,> c . . ... . . . ,
'>,u i. .......,;. w.r- r.,.1 .....

. i . ..... . . .. . . ' '', Iu l". t '
.,.
di fference
...
between the
, Jul..) ,Joo"', ( JOGI..) tJo.I..,
energy m a
I' n. " .... 'i'
" . 1'.\'IOKP,p. I >10 " 4 9, , 0- l. n . lo,
vessel
T. " io.
,
(si mul at ing a
Hl d ,"u H< Ww& n.r cro, 4 ... 10. 4 I : I ,,10.
short pipeli ne
I', " i nl

length)
prcssuriscd
with air,
. M,.,
' H'" D,,," " ......
compared to
.,
",,-, .. ,.""" "" .,
.,
r"'.'......
""..
v - \".. .._ ..
.... ""..
,'..-
(he same
-..- ..._ ,....-.,
.,." "
.,.........
,,-
..-._-,,-, ..".. 0 1..... , ,,""_
vessel
., ...._.,,- .,
""....
pressun scd
.,
,"-',-...... , "..,..,....'
.._.._-..,.--...... ,_..
.".
.... -.... ,.... ..." "..... ,.....
-
with water.

l: -<P'''- ").,., , .,If "I"
..-... ....-
Rati o ..f Pn Ulll al k 10 450: I
COST' (2002) OF INSERVICE HYDROTESTING
Some pipelines are difficult to hydrotest
E.g pipelines that cannot be taken out of service, e.g. those that are
not looped
The costs are:
Preparation for testing: $1.250-S5.000Imile for a 16_24
ft
pipeline,
plus
$2,000/mile to conduct the test
Loss of throughput is the biggest cost component for hydrostatic
testing. E.g.:
$7,000/mile for a 24
ft
gas line. to
$90.000 for a 16
ft
petroleum line
cs "' . .... _ . " ...
'"
C P......... 2IIOlI _!l l
' 90
HYDROTESTING PIPELINES mechanics
lmpad of ele vation. Where ee traverses hilly lerra,n, consideration must be given to the
selection of segmel1ts thaI are sectioned for Iesllng - avoid > 3OOfl1ll 8 lest sec1Jon..
Where the P'peIine aoSoSeS nvers . roads. railways and Olher access routes, the thoe. wall sedlons
neee may need to be lesled separately. This may be done before OOI'lstruetJOn or segregated tn:m!tie
maio IIoe aod tested III ,solation.
If !he test is > '" SMYS. ,I is usual to also reccec ee pl'essu.e-volume If the P-V pIoI relT"Ill"'5lioear, the
pipehne should. globally. remaIn elastic. If the plot de'liate$1rom a prewlbed PN rate then ltlI$ IXlUId
be a loss of containment or plaS\IC deformatoon in the pope,
Sma _leaks can often be d,lIieulI to detect; II small change in water/pipe temperature may gIVe the
appearance 01a leak
Standard of lhumtl" use ee temperature measuremeollo COfT'i98"Sllte Iof \his efled.
The plpeline lesllemperalure may be affected by altrtude . fIWf CI'06Slf"l9S. exposed versus buned,
water temperalu'e gradoent etc.
AIr, eov- l rapped or entrained ..... also aff ect the prnsore-1IOlume reeordotIg
If the oecrease in pressure-1IOlumeis nol al1nbutable to the eflects eeseeee about IIlT\i1y be
neoossary 10 shol'ter sections of !he popeline to establish and locate a leak
Aftef test ,og. II ISusual to expel the water using compressed a,r Of 1f1 1he case of liquid lines. !he product
tnat wi. I'\OnIIaIly now
Further dfylrog. mawlly for gas pipelines. is actlleved ....a \tie use of purpose-buill pog$.. l'oealed air,
vacuum. inert gas. or liquid chemical scavengers run as slugs .
Pipeline Operation
'"
192
PIPELINE OPERATION & MONITORING
ec ontrnuous transmiss ion of pipeline
operat ional data to ceotral control
location
ec c mmcnrceucn may be hard-wirM ,
or via satellite. microwave etc
_Al lows rapid detection of major
i ncident s without requiremenl lor
regular inspection
. Int ended for remote cont rol of valves
,<c
.Through the use of Supervisory Contro l and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) equipment , Product Control mon itors volumes, pressures
and temperatures as well as the operating st atus of pipeline tacumes.
. Using microwave , telephone or communication satellites, SCADA
provides the Product Control ope rator with infor mation on the volume
of product fiowing into the system, the volume of product deliver ed to
custome rs, and the abil ity to quickly identify and react to equipment
malfunct ions
. The SCADA equi pment also gives Produc t Cont rol lhe capability to
remotely start or stop certain compressors/pumps, thereby changing
~ vol umes to meet changes in customer demand lor natural gas/ oi l
>93
PIPELINE OPERATION & MONITORING
194
PIPELINE OPERATING Costs
For a typical multi-product pipel ine in the UK:
Land Rates (large corridor of land needed) 32%
Electricity (electric pumps) 30%
Manpower & Establishment & Legal 30%
Maintenance & Communications* 8%

.For ,nlo on ", l _ gas pop.. W True.. Repot1 Fed dal.O show """ 2001 k:>t US
. ....". gascapaal)' pWone<f.OiIand '6 2002. or USAFERC__repono..
C_2006_,
PIPELINE (European Onshore Crude & Product)
OPERATING COSTS'
Total Cash Operating Costs/annum For Pipeline Only (excluding energy costs)
12 l-
c Total Fi xed Cost
g

84 1- ...,
MainteMnc& J
'"
Oll.... ...
rMmi , ole ...
-.all
Coo .. "' Euros
200 400 600 80 0
Repl acement Cost, million
1000
'"
OPERATING - Labour Costs'
Total Hours worked by both staff and contractors - For Pipeline Only
300
=>
'i'
0

-
0
0
0

-
g 100
"-
'"
Replacement Value, million
-Other cosl. (lank
farms , etc" are
additiooalJ
Cost in Euros
200 400 600 800 1000
.,""""",, "_,, _ ...... ..._ _
", ,, -
OPERATING COSTS'
Operating
Costs/annum
For Pipeline
Only. includi ng
energy 20%
-Other costs (tank
farms, etc" are
ad aitiooal )
- Energy is cos t 01
pumps
7%
Maintenance (34%j
o Miscellaneous
II Other Se rvic es (7%)
31%
. Energy (31%)
Non.".." inle nanc e staff (20'/.)
Prop erty Taxes , Insurance
."""""" ' '''Y ...,_......
0.. """ ....". "''''''''' "" ..
Leak Detection
199
LEAK DETECTION Types
_ 1. Simple Systems ('Seeing or Sme lling')
_The simp le systems involve flying, dr iving or walking along a pipel ine and
looking for evidence of discoloured vegetation around the pipeline, or hearinq
or smelling (if the fluid is odorized) a disch arge.
_ Flying along offshore lines may detect leaks in clam weather, but wind
generated waves will obscure leaking products.
_Some offshore pipel ine regulators require regular flights/surface
vessel visual inspection of the pipel ine route every =<30 days
. 'Unofficial' pipeline leak detection is performed by members of staff working
near a pipel ine (e.9. on an offshore platform) or members of the publi c living
near, or passing, pipel ines, e.q. farmers (onshore) fishermen (offshore) .
_2, Fl ow Bal ance ('What goes in, must come out')
_ Simple line flow balances can be used to detect leakages.
_ This involves measuring inputs and out puts of a pipeline.
_A loss of product is deter mined as the difference between the steady
state invent ory of the system and the instantaneous inlet and outl et flows.
200
LEAK DETECTION - Types (cont.)
_3. Acousti c Methods ('leaks are noisy')
_ Noise associated with a leak can be det ect ed.
_These frequencies, caused by vibration, can have frequenci es in excess of
20 kHz. Transducers can be clamped to a pipeline, and by noting signal
strength, the source of the leak can be pinpointed.
4. Pipeline Modelling ('Theory versus Operation')
_ Real time pipeline modelling, which simulates the operation afthe pipeline
and continually compares the expected with the actual , can offer both
detection and location.
_There are commercial packages on the market that may be appropriate to
certain pipeline operations.
_The model is a mathematical representation of the pipeline and will
include such featur es as elevation data, valve and pump locat ions, etc..
_The model can then calcul ate the expected pressures, flows etc., and
compare them with what the measu rements are showing Any
discrepancy may be a leak, and leak alarms can be triggered if this is
the case.
coP"""",o :1006Rev6l1
LEAK DETECTION ON CURRENT PIPELINES
_On old (pre1970s) pipelines there are limited leak detection systems
_ E.g. some form of static leak detection (pressu re decay) and/or
volume balance - based on flow metering.
_ If a pipeline system has no SCADA System it cannot have an active
or on-line leak detection.
_Post 1970s.. . about 50% have some active leak detection system
inst alled.
_The vast majority of new pipelines will have leak detection by dynamic
modelling.
_ New pipel ines in most countries are required to have some form of
active/dynamic leak det ecti on system
C Pe",., :1006R" Gi'
202
Pipeline Hatching, Flow & Erosion
203
'HATCHING'
. Pipeli ne companies ship petroleum products of the same quality in seq uence through a
pipeline , with each product or "bat ch" dist inct from the preceding or following.
Batching is a method for dea ling wi th the different products and product specifications
moving through the pipeline
_ One refined product or crud e oi l grade is injected and begins its journey, then
another, and another
_ Each pipeline establ ishes its own requirements for minimum batch size , based on a
number of ope rat ing factors, such as pipe size, flow rat e, tankage availability, etc ..
Pipeline ope rators must conduct l esting to ens ure that specifi cation s are maintained
ove r the course of the movement and quality must be documented.
_ Typical large refi ned petroleum pipe lines today have from 30 - 50 products regularly
moving on each system ove r a cycle
_acycle is the period of time from pumping of a certa in grade unt il all other grades are
pumped and the init ial grade is pumped again beginn ing the new cycl e,
_H"" . ty ' '''' ty,. of ",00' ''' ",mpod '"'00 "D....
"."'11'" _""'"II" '" """ ' 000 ''"'" 0"" ",00""'0"",,"'" '0"P; D ""...

_,,,,,,,,",,,'. .... " .. ""m""" .....
;",,"""""" ,""'" ", ,,,",,,, '""' "'" pop,",.,." , ,",,"..-.c. , hat coo""' ;o tho ,.." jym." ooof
;01oo1"""m,,..
Uni di rectional and bidirec t ional pigs used in batching
... 204
HATCHING Mixing
_MIXING: There is always a certain amount of intermixing betwee n the first
product and the second at the "interiace," the point where they meet.
_ If the products are simi lar (e.g. two grades of gasoline), the resulting mixture i s
added to the lower value produc t.
_ If the products are dissimilar, such as diesel and gasoline, the -transmrx," the
hybri d product created by intermixing at the interface, must be channelled 10
separate storage and reprocessed.
SCHEDULING PRODUCT FLOW:
.Pipeline operators establish the batch schedules well in advance.
_On a trunk line, a shi pper must normally "nominate" volumes - ask for
space on the line - on a monthly sched ule.
,/' material that will need t o be reproces ed)
..._-
Compatible Interfaces (no need to reprocess)
205
HATCHING Exampl e
5ynt h. ,,,
..
_The Transmountain pipeline in
Canada transports crude , refined
and semi-ref ined products
_Typical products batch train in the
mainline is made up of a var iety of
materials being transported for
different shippers and can be up to
350 kilometres (217 mi.) long.
u""' c"",.
_Batches are between 30 and 100 ,..
kilometres (15 and 68 miles) long and range from 8,OOOm3 (50,000 bbls) to
30,OOOm3 (180,000 bbls ) respect ively.
aprooucts move through the pipeline at about 5 kilometres (3 miles) per
hour - equivalent to a walk ing pace
206
BATCHING 'Interfaces"
_ PROBLEMS - Problems caused by pumping more than one pr oduct through a pipeline
involves mixing of the prod uct s and disposing of the mixed portions (interlaces).
PROGRESS - The progress of the different products and the int erfaces must be followed
so that the products can be taken off the line at the right place_
_VOLUME - The volu me of i nterfaces depends on differences in gravity and viscosity of
adjacent produc ts and on the pressure and velocity of the stream.
_ It also depends on the interior condi tion of the pipe. the number of pump stations,
and the distance travel led by the interface.
arntertace size can be reduced by maintaining a pumping rate needed 10 keep the
heavie st product in the li ne i n turbu lent fl ow.
_The sizealsocan be reduced by putling products in the line in proper batching
sequence and by keeping the line pressurized during a shutdown. Positive
pressure will prevent the speed of the interfaceand the interfacevolumewill be
reduced whether the interface stopson level ground or on a slope,
_DISPOSAL Thedifferences in gravity and viscosity will also effect interfacedisposal.
__ .... "m.'....... _01
_... _ __m_ Th<_ ", .. _.. ,
.,...- _.........._.. __....... ... _'"--
""
BATCHING Delivery Procedures'
_The interface lengthens quickly, as it first starts downstream in the pipeline.
_The farther it travels down the line, the more slowly it lengthens.
_About 65% of the total interface between two products will occur in the first
20% of pipeline distance.
_The dispatcher gives each station the expected arrival time of the interface.
_ Each station report s the first through the final change of colour or gravi ty, al -
say - one-mi nute intervals across the interface.
_ Deliveries to storage or to branch pipelines at intermediate points should be
made from ' heart cctsv'.
_The main concern of the station is sening the proper valves and determining
when the interface has passed.
_When the sampl er open s the delivery valve or branch line, fuel is taken off at
the rate and lime direct ed by the dispatcher.
_ However. the method of disposing of interfaces may complicate the
switchi ng procedu re at a final station
...... ......,..,..,-.....
.... ... ,...,. ",__...
BATCHING Detecting Changes'
_In control of product flow through the pipeline, it must be determined where one
batch ends and another balch begins There are several methods:
_Gravi ty Differ ence, Batch changes may be detected by differences in
gravity of two adjacent products. There may be a great difference, as between
MOGAS and JP-8.
_ Colour Change. Batch changes may be detected by differences in colour of
two adjacent products.
_Dye Pl ug A plug of dye can be injected into a line to separate like products
belonging to different customers. Also, it is used to separate similar products
with little or no colour differences
_Liquid Buffers. Kerosene or some neutral product (in a small amount ) may
be used as a liquid buffer to separate incompatible products. Water is not
used.
Physical Buffers. A physical buffer is an object , such as a pig, rubber ball,
or scraper constructed entirely of polyurethane, placed in the line to separate
batches and cut down on the interface.
FLUID SPEEDS
_Velocities in pipelines vary during the operational stage, pigging
operations and construction pigging operations.
_Typical range of cost -effective velocities are as follows:
_Liquid pipelines 1.5 to 2.5 mls
_Single phase liquid 1.0 to 4.5 mls
_Single phase gas Less than 18 mls (to limit noise)
_Two phase gas liquid Greater than 3 mls and less than
fluid erosiona l velocity
_For on stream pigging the following are typical velocities:
_Liquid line 1.0 to 4.5 mls
_Gas line 2.0 to 6.5 mls
_Online monitoring pig 2.0 to 4.0 ml s
_Construction pigging 0.5 to 2.0 mls
' '0
EROSION
_ Internal eros ion is usual ly caused by particles In t he pipeline fluid Impacting the pipe wall.
_ Erosion will reduce pipe wal l thickness, and it can remove corrosion inhib itor films on the
pipe surf ace, and debris created can block valves . et c..
_ The faste r the fluid flow rate. and the greater the quantity/size of part icles, the greater the erosi on
_Areas of a pipeline thai disturb flow are more susceptible to erosion, e.q. bends or high weld
beads. and area s wnere velocity increases . e,g reduced bores.
_ There are 3 main mechanism f()( erosion:
_ LiqLid impact by drop$ or Jets _ impad by droplets ca.. create shallow craters in duct lle . ne pipe
. Pa rtide impact - part>des > 5 11m can ca use 8tO$IOI'l.
_ CavJtalion Of drople1collapse - cav,lall(ltl is !he grow'lh a'ld (dIapse of bu bbles due 10local
pressure lIuduallons in a liQuid. The colla pse is aa:ompanied by a
rapodflow of liquid and stress Iluctuallons allhe surface.
cal/$lng efO$lOn.
_ For hydrocarbon lines, sand (particl e Impact) from the reservorr is usually the main ercsco
threat. but other debos (e.g, from corrosion processes) can cause erosion.
_ Erosioo usually occurs in high flow rate pipel ines
_ Gas li r>es neve t"ghar now rates lhat liquid hnes. and are therefore more suscepti ble 10erosco
_ AbraSloo can occur on lower flow rate p;pelirtes. ,f suffICient parlides are present. E,g, slurry p,pehnes
_ Erosion can be control led by removing the part icles (e.q . sand screens), controlling flow, material
selection (e..g hard coat ings on a valve) , etc ..
_API RP 14E gives guidelines on the fluid velocities that will caus e erosion.
Pipeline Security
Penspen
Integrity
'"
CL Rew.'l
2 12
SECURITY FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 112001
General
_Terrorism is now a real threat to the oil and gas business.
_ We should never be complacent - remember thai terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre in 1993,
and Algerian Armed Islamic Group terrorists attempted to fiy a j et into the Eiffel Tower in 1994
ernere are 3 types of terrorists 'mmosets'
_ RATIONAL terrorists who perform a type of cost benefit on their attacks to determine maximum
impact versus minimum personal risk
. PSYCHOLOGICALterrori sts who are mot ivated by persona l dissati sfact ion and can not
different iate between right and wrong, do not recognise any views other than their own , and will
show no mercy or remorse
_ CULTURE MOTIVATED terrorists who are dedicated to a religion, rac e or nationality and are
aggress ive to any perce ived threat to their culture; their attacks may include sel f-annihilation in
pursuit of an unques tioning adherence to dogma or propaganda
_ If you are t ravelling abroad , remember t hat terro rists can be motivated by many things, ranging from
rel igion to patriotic fervour, to environment and concern for animal s.
e r nererore. understand the country you are visiting, and obtain the latest security information
(e.q. ).
_ And remember - as security is increased at officia llgovemmentJobvious locations, the terronst
wi ll st rike at 'softer' targets.
_ Plus. __ kidnapping is a $1billion/year business , and increasing - don't get caught..
_ Finally, most security problems are failures of management . therefore ensure security is in place
TO YOUR SATISFACTION before venturing 10high risk areas. Your life - your respo nsibility.
_ ..., O. aooG.. _ . ",,"' II 2002
Pipelines... General
_Most pipeline companies in USA participate in several alert systems , and
coordinate through government bodies to learn of any potent ial terrorist activi ty.
_ Companies rehearse, review and refine thei r security measures on an on-
going basis. Safety and reliability always have been at the heart of everything
pipeline compani es do.
_A pipeline is monitored all day, every day. A pipeline's flow and pressure are
monitored and regulated around the clock .
Companies can deploy extra measures. This may involve calling up
additional manpower or sophisticated technology. The tools used to prepare
and respond will vary from company to company.
Emergency response plans will be in place, as they will be required by local
laws/regu lations.
_Ensure your crisis management plans in not just for a shelf - it must be a
realistic living document
'"
SECURITY FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11 2001
Pipelines.. . Specific
_Actions:
. !dentify process for assessing pipel ine system and facility vulnerabi liti es
- Develop uniform definitions of security conditions
- n eveioo graduated set of countermeasures for each security condition level
. Quick Measures:
_limited access 10pipeline maps/information
. Identify key facilities and secure
. Background checks for selected state and pipeline personnel
_ Security exercise program
. Plan rapid restoration of pipeline service following an attack/sabotage,
_ Some USA pipeline companies are:
_ Controlling access, Using intrusion detection, Reviewing electro nic systems
against cyber-terrcrfsm, Preplanning with FBI/military, Hiring armed guard
_ Future:
e c ovemment'tn oustry partne rship to addr ess security needs. Already start ed
... _ . _ ... _ .... .."..,OIr ..",_.... """".
Risk Management (insurance)
Penspen
Integrity
21 6
RISK MANAGEMENT Past
The 1001used by organisations 10ensure business and sha rehol der value is 'risk
management':'
'the process enabling the systematic identification, analysi s and management of
critical business risks'
Man y energy organisations focus on the 'hazard' risks only
This is achieved by t ransferring the risk of physical asset loss or damage to a
national or international insurer.
Insurers have traditionally we lcomed this type of busi ness. Why?
Oil and gas assets have been good quality over past 20 years
There were many insu rers in the market looking for busi ness in this type of risk.
This has changed..
Ageing infrastructure is failing
$500,000 ,00001 insured physical losses in Middle East in 2001 and 2002 mainly due
to ageing
Int ernational rei nsurance market has reduced from $4 bil lion cap acit y to $1bi llion
to absorb glo bal energy risk
RISK MANAGEMENT Future
Recent catastrophic energy incidents have resu lted in global insured energy
clai ms exceeding global prem iums by 100%
Severa l i ncidents have been att ributed to ageing infr astructure
Insurers wi ll now on ly accept 'high qua lity' risks
Energy compani es now need to use independent risk engi neeri ng reports or
asset valuations to manage this process
However, do we need to insure against every risk?
Energy companies now need to assess all risks, and provide an opt i mum
balance between risk retention (they carry this risk and cost) and risk tran sfe r
(to the insurance market). Don't 'over-insure' .
Thi s requi res an assessment of ALL business risks:
BUSINESS Operational, strategic and financial
HAZARDS Hazards such as fire, explosions and natural perils
We do this by using con sistent risk processes i n a com pany
Identify Risks; Analyse/Measu re Ri sks; Design Against Risks; Implement
Act ion Plans to Reduce/Eliminate Ri sks; Meas ure Success and
Improvement s.
.
- . - r _ . - . , ~ , , . ""-- """
Design Notes
21 9
WHICH DIAMETER AND WALL THICKNESS?
_ Most pipeline desi gn codes use OUTSIDE DIAMETER in the hoop stress formula.
_Thi s gives a conservative (high) stress.
_The more accurate cyl inder hoop stress formula
(using both internal and outside diameter) gives
values of hoop stress <5% different from those
obt ained using the simple formula l or 011>20.
API pipe has a constant outside diameter (Do).
Intern al diameter is Do - 2xwall thickness.
_ ASME uses nominal (specified) wallthickness in its design stress calculation because:
_when the old versions of ASME 8 31 were written, seamless pipe was wide ly used
a r ne under-thickness tolerance for seamless pipe was much greater than pipe made
from plate.
_ The industry did not want to base wali lhickness on the large under-tolerance of
seamless pipe.
_Using nomi nal wall thickness would cover both seaml ess and welded pipe
_ It was justi fied by historically safe practi ce
a other codes in other countries may use minimum wall thickness - check your codes!
220
OVERPRESSURES
_C hanges in flow, or the sudden closure of a valve, will cause pressure
surges.
_Pi pel ines must be protected from these surges (by, for example, a relief
valve ). However, because these surges are inevitable, most design codes
allow them to exceed the design pressure, providing they are controlled.
_Additionally, when setting protective devices on a pipeline , it is
impossible to set them at exactly the design pressure. If they were set at
design pressure, they would always be activating themselves due to, e.g.,
minor pressure changes.
Pipeline design standards recognise this, and these are accommodated
in the allowances for pressure surges. Most codes 'allow' 10%
overpressures.
_ SS 8010 limits these surges to a maximum of 10% the internal design
pressure. IGE TD/1 also limits overpress ures 10 10%, but additionally
limits their durat ion to no more than 5 hours at anyone time, or for more
than 20 hours per day.
'DANGEROUS FLUI DS" - I n the UK
Acetone
Acrylo";lrile
\mmon;a
,\ n;!ine
Br;ne
Bntane
C.,hon \ l ()nox,dc
Crudo oilldcadl
Crudo 0;1 (l;ve)
Eth. "c
Frhanol
Ethylene
Hydrogen
Metharle
Methanol
Oleum
Oxygen

Propylene
X' iene
"0
yes
ye,
0"
"0
yes ;f a) a, a
liq\lid or b) a It'' "hove
7 bur,
ye,
""
p<',,;hly
y", if ' bove 7 b"
'w
)"OS if at"w e 7 bar
ye, i f alxwe 7 bar
ye, i f abow 7 bar
""
y",
""
ye, ifabo"e 7bar
ye, ifaoo"e 7 har
" 0
" lamm"hle I;quid hu' no' lo,ic. Boil, . 156.5
Dcfme<! a, " 'bedule 2
Flan,m, ble and to,;, ga'
f larmn.hle mld 1<" ;<: liquid v"f'o", pre",, 'e
Toxic g"
Flamm. ble I;quid, low varom pre" ", e
("heck vupocr pressure (",h<=<iu le 2 pora J )
Flan1mable gas, not to' ;,'
Flammab le liquid bUlnOltox;C, Bo;1> al n .4"
F1anm' able gas , nol toxic
Flammabk ga,. noll"";,,
Flammable ga, . nollox;C
Flammabk toxie 1;4U;<! but l"w ,'apour pre"", e
Reacts violenlly w;lh w"' er
Sot flammable or to' ic
Flamn,. ble gas, not toxic
F1.mm. blc gas . not toxic
F1a", m',hl ' Ii, Hi I h , I nt H t" " t' B" il, . 11.19'
to be ad ded 10 th,. li, 1.oon
222
1
PIPELINE VALVES
Bl ock val ves may be opened or closed to permit or block the flow of the products in
both directions .
They are required on both sides of pump stations and major waterways (e.q. 100
feet wide or greater).
They are also selectively placed along the mainline 10isolate sections of the pipe
inlo shorter segments.
They may be automatic , remote or manually operated. depending on their function.
Block valves may limit loss of product if a spill occu rs.
Block valves include manual gate valves, remote gate valves and station block
valves (suc tion valves and discharge valves).
Check valves allow product flow in one direction and are designed to be held open
by flowing oil and to drop cl osed automatical ly when product flow stops or is reversed.
Thi s helps controllhe flow of the product through the pipeline and limits the amoun t of
product which could be lost in the event of a leak.
Pressu re reli ef valves are designed to open automatically when thermal or operating
press ure reaches a pre-determined pressure set point. This relieves pressure in the
line and the valve wi ll cl ose when the pressure is reduced below the valve set poi nt.
PIPELINE LEGISLATION - Effect of Pipeline
Failures
. Major accidents can cause pipeline safety programs to change directio n
. , 965. Natchitoches, LA.
The Pipeline Safety Program (OPS) was startl:ld as a reaction to this failure - Gas oocn-o, 17
fatalities
. President Johnson staled in 1967 that g,1Spope/mesafely was to be assured by new measures,
. 1986. Moonds View, MN. long Seam weld fail ure
. Gasoline failure of Williams Pipeline igni ted. 493 barrel released. 2 fatalit ies, Enviroomental
damage,
. Increase m numoer of OPS inspectors " new leglslallon introduced inr;Judmg lise of
IfISlrumen/ed pigs (althou gh they would not have prevented this failure)
. 1993 Reston, VA. Prior excavation damage
. CoIonial Pipel ine had a 8)()CJ barre l release of eeser ioto the Potomac River 7,400 barrels
recovered by cont alnmeot barriers
. 1994 EdlSOO, NJ. Mechanical damage (cracJ( m gouge grew ...mn time)
e ~ s Eastern gas . ne ignited . Injune5. 2 hours to isolate the rupt ure .....th manual valve
. OPS COtlVened Safely Summit on pipeline research
_ 1999 BeN""9ham, WA, Extemal force damage
_ OlympICplpelme . 6 ,600 barre ls of gasoli ne entered a creek and ignited , 3 fatalities
Generarad major public and congressional safely concems.
_ 2000 censeec. NM. Internal corrosion foond Inside c.ce.
_ 1950 gas lIne ruptured 12 fatalities - campers nearby,
C _2lXl6Rn&1
._""""',""" - - ....-....................... _... _-- ,,,'"
,2<
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES Linking i nt o Regulations
_ In 1960, President Kennedy made a broad commitment to consumer safety.
_ This theme was cameo forward by President lyndon B. Johnson.
_The Natural Gas Pi peline Saf ety Act (now called the Pipeline Safety Law 49 U.S.C. Section 60101 at
seq). enacted 00 Aug, 12. 1968. established exclus ive federal authority for saf ety regulation 01interstate
transmission lines and non-exclusive fede ral authority for safety regulation of gathering lines in non-rural
areas, as well as intrastate transmission and distribution pipelines.
_ The mtent of the Law is for stales to assume responsibllity for int rastat e pipeline safely. while the
federal government (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Resea rch and Special Programs
Administration, Office 01Pipeline Safel y (OPS)] retains responsibility for interstal e pipeline safely
. The American Soc iety of Mecharucar Engineers (AS ME) 831. 8 Gas Transmission and Distri bution Piping
Systems Cod e' s 1968 edition was used by the Office of Pi pel ine Safet y (OPS) as a basis for issuing the
Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations as embodi ed by 49 CFR. Part 192.
_ Although the Code may appear to be explicit. its interpretation is not as clear-cut. This is part icularly
true wtl ere il is incorporated into 49 CFR, Part 192. The Code documents standards that were
developed from years of operating experience and empirical data and is the fruit of ccmretrtec
engine91'S reducing complexities into simple practice.
_The Hazardous Liqui d Pipeline Safety Act (HLPSAl of 1979. as amended, authorized the DOT 10
regulate pipeline transporteucn of hazardous liquid s.
_ Bot h of the above Act s have been recoenec in 49 U.S.C. Chapter 60101 et seq . and give the federal
government aut horily over pipeline safely for transport Ing hazardous liquids . natural, and other gases.
225
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES 'Right of Way'
_Writt en agreement s, or 'easements' ,
between landowners and pipeline
companies allow pipeline companies
to construct and maintain pipeline
rights-of-way (ROW) across privately
owned property.
_The ROW varies depending on
the easement, the pipeline system, ._ _...
etc..
_The working space needed during
initial construction may be temporarily L ....;;;;....._ _ .........:.i1
wider
_ Most pipelines are buried below ground in a right-of.way.
_The ROW is kept clear to allow the pipeline 10 be safely operated , aerially
surveyed and maintained.
_ Pipeline companies are responsib le for maintaining their rights-of-way to protect
the public and environment
226
LOCATION CLASSIFICATION USA
_ It is of interest to note that a st udy of fires following a gas pipeline failure showed a
clear trend between burn radius and pressure, but no correlation wi th pipe diameter
(and hence consid ered a secondary effect).
_ The study plotted the radius of the burn area around a pipeli ne aga inst pipeline
pressure, and concluded that an upper bound:
Upper Bound Burn Radius for a Gas Pipeline
Pressure Radius
260 psi 92ft (28.1m)
987 psi 610ft (186m)
_This Table gives a si mple 'rul e of thumb' for safe di stances (ignoring wind speeds.
terra in, etc.): for exampl e. a pipeline at a pressure of 1000 psi would cause burn
damage up 10 a distance of -200m either side of ils corridor, if il fail ed and the gas
igni ted.
_ Most gas pipeline failures do not ignite ; on average, igni tion will occur in less than 4%
of fai lures, alt hough failures in larger diameter pipelines are more li kely to ignite (21% of
pipeline mcoents on pipe of di ameter >16" ignite).
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES LOCATION: AS2885.1
Class R1-Broad rur al
Locations in undeveloped ar eas or broadly far med areas tha t ar e
sparsel y popu lated , where typi cally the area of the average allotment is
> 5 ha
Class R2- Semi-rura l
Locati ons in rural areas developed for small farms or rural residential
use, where typi cally the area ol tha average allotment is betwee n 1 ha
and 5 ha
Class T1-Suburban
Loca tions in areas developed for residential, commercial or industrial
use at which the majority of bui ldings have less than four floors, where
typically the area of the average allotment is less than 1 ha
Class T2- High rise
Locations in areas developed for residential, commercial or industrial
use at which the majority of buildings have four or more floors, where
typically the area of the average allotment is less than 1 na
228
I ~ l l o . = t o,OOOrn'. 2 47 acres
PIPELINE DESIGN CODES - WHY HAVE A
LOCATION CLASSIFICATION?
_ SAFETY: The intent of a pipeline design cod e is SAFETY
. A location classification scheme helps us design a safe pipeline. but how?
.PREVENT THE UNE BEING DAMAGED: We know that the major cause of failures in
onshore gas li nes is damage to the tine (eq.) by contractors digging foundations l or
bui ldings. or farmers digg ing drainage ditches.
a t heee activi ties are necessary, i nevitable, regular.
a'rnererore. we can achieve safel y in a gas line in two ways:
a 1. We can ensure that there are few activi ties around our pipeline that wi ll damage the
pipeli ne, and cause it to fai l (proactive . decrease probability of fai lure)
e z. We can ensure that if our pipeline fai ls there are few people around the pipeline,
and hence reduc e causalit ies (reacti ve,.. decrease consequences of failu re),
_ It is always better to be proactive , therefore the intent of the ASME 8 31.8 location
classifications is to reduce the number of buildings arou nd a highly stressed pipeline , and
hence reduce ali lhe associated activities that can damage my line,
_ The logic is.. . the more bui ldings .. the more activities ... the more limes my pipeline
wi ll be damaged
_LIMITED CONSEQUENCES: An additiona l eff ect of having less bui ldings around the hi gh
stres sed pipeli ne is that - should it fail - it wil l have limited consequences.
229
Software & Management
230
III
=
REMEMBER Software & Computers.... ~ ""
~ =
see
ses
_We are using computers and software to design and o ~ ~
our pipeline
_The Ameri can Soci ety of Civil Engineers reviewed" failures in
52 struct ures attributable to computer errors:
Effect of Error % Cau se %
' Poor sol ut ions ' to problems
63%
Computer
13%
.1-
in engi neer i ng Hardware
Poor performance 6% Software 25%
I ~
Catast rophi c failures
4%
Users
58'%
Unknown effect 27% Ot hers 4%
!
c ...........2<:U"-,
'"
---.... > ~ ...,-
REMEMBER Software & Computers
(c ont .)
a t.essonsv:
. computer hardware and software (operating system, general , and
civil engineering) are not infallible,
_ diagnostic software used to check flaws is not infallible,
_ no amount of testing by the vendor or user will assur e thai hardware
and software will be flawless, but testmq does help reduce the number
of flaws.
_ newer versions of software . because of bugs. do not always perform
as well as older and tested versions. and
_the owner. engineer-of-record. superv isor, etc. should not accept
computer-aided analysis and design done by any user. unless the
results have been shown to be verified by independent methods.
REMEMBER. .. Finally
-Do not assume that you have a perfect pipeline, if it is designed to
'code' :
_CALCULATIONS ARE NOT ENGINEERING
experience. etc .
you must add j Udgement ,
CODES DON'T INCLUDE EVERYTHING - It is a fact thai many pipel ine codes
do not require leak detection systems, do nol require automat ic shut off valves, do
nol requi re internal inspections.
_CODES INCLUDE SOME GOOD THINGS, BUT YOU DON'T HAVE TO USE
THEM - in USA, pipelines must be designed 10carry smart pigs, but operators are
not required to run smart pigs _
_ MANAGEMENT IS KEY...You can have an acceptable pipel ine design.. you
can have the most modern material.. . but you MUST have smart managers both
designing and funning the pipeline'
_SMART PIPELINES, SMART ANYTHING, ARE USELESS WITHOUT
SMART MANAGERS
Corrosion Notes
233
234
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION Cathodic
Protection (CP)
a unjess corrosion is controlled or mitigated, all steels. if buried in
soillwater, will corrode:
e corrosion is an electrochemical process:
8 a currentleaves a structure atthe anode site,
epasses through an electrolyte.
8 and re-enters the structure at the cathode site
8Therefore if a metal object's surface can be turned into a cathode over its
entire surface, then corrosion can be prevented on the metallic structure.
""-''''-'''''_10'_'' __ 01 '. ... _ ...:
cw-._....... __- __..
._..... _--
......
".. .._-
-_.... _.. _,_.....-
o
o
o
o
235
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION Cathodic
Protection (cont.)
_ CP can use either a 'sacrificial' anode ' or 'impressed' current.
El.ECl1OOL Yft
--
I
I
"8
. " /'" .....
... --" _.
ELECTROI,.YT
,.-
- , ... ...
.
-
.. .. ... ..
",_2006_6.,
236
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION - Cathodic
Protection - Summary
ac orroslon is a DC phenomenon related to the energy stored in the metal.
_ Asteer is in contact with an electrolyte, soil or water, releases energy back
into the earth and attempts 10return to iron oxide .
e r o keep energy (metal ) from returning 10the soil, another energy form mus t
be applied onto those buried surfaces thai is equ al to/ greater than the energy
tryi ng to be released.
_ This is the CP system's function, substitu ting a sacrific ial metal 10corrode in
place of the pipeli ne or structure.
Thi s maintains the energy level of the structure
_ To ensu re t he CP protects a steel structu re it is necessary 10 have the steel
at certain negative potenti al wit h regard to the envi ronment in whi ch il is
buried/immersed.
For steel it is - 0.850 V measured against a CufCu sulphate-type
electrode.
EXTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION -
Protected/Overprotected Potentials

Cu/CuSO.
As CP protection current is app lied, the
pipe pot ent ial becomes more negative
and the corros ion rate slows .
When sufficient curr ent is app lied and
the specified criterion is reached,
corrosion stops.
Excessive current is wast eful of energy
and causes overprotection.
Overprotecnon can cause disbondment
of coatings & embrittlementof steels
The original National Association of
Corrosion Engineers specification for
bur ied uti lity pipe lines proposed the
following criteria for detennining when
a steel or cast iron structure is
cathodically protected (NACE
RP0169):
Avoltage of -0.85 v rel"lliv8to a
copper/ saturated copper sulphate
electrode
-0.6
-0.7
0.8
-0.9
.1.0
1.1
1.2
No Protection - Active Corr O'<iQIl
501119 Prot.dion
Some OverprotllCUOIl

238
INTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION Where?
_ INTERNAL CORROSION:
_ LOCATIONALONG LINE - Interna l corrosion is likely in low spots in the
pipeline, and uphill sections, or at riser elbows, where brine, bacteria and
other corrosiveagentscan collect.
. POSITION AROUND PIPE - tnternat corros ion tenos tc occur in the bottom
of the pipeline (around ' 6 o'clock) , especially in gas lines, as the corrosive
substances tend 10be heavier than oil or gas
. 'Top of the line' corr osi on t- 12
o'c lock) can occur under condensi ng
conditions
. PREFERENTIAl CORROSION Prefer ential
corrosion of welds and heat affected zones may
also occur (see Wel d Defects lecture).
INTERNAL PIPELINE CORROSION - Inhibitors
.How can we control internal corrosion? One way is.. .
inhibitors.
_Corrosion inhibitors are substances which, when added to a
particular environment, decrease the rate of attack of that environment
on a mater ial such as steel.
ac crrostcn inhibitors can extend the life of pipelines, prevent system
shutdowns and failures, and avoid product contami nation.
_They reduce and inhibit the contact of metals with their
corrosive environment
_We can place them in oil and gas:
- Several kinds of inhibitors can be used to inhibit the corros ion of
natural gas pipelines and oil l ines
O _ 2 6 ~
'"
Other Information
241
PRESSURE TO STRESS
Usuall y, the main load on our pipeline is from the pressure exerted on the
pipe by the flu id in it. Pressure is a force that will expand our pipeline.
Pressure . When expressed with refere nce 10 pipe, it is the force per unit area
exerted by the mediu m in the pipe
Atmospheric pressure (Patmos ) - The pressure due to the weight of the
atmosphere (air and water vapour) on the earth's surface. The average
atmospheric pressure at sea level (for scient ific purposes) has been defined
at 14.696 pounds per square inch absolute,
Pressure absolute (Pa) - (usually ' PS1A' ) - Pressure in excess of a
perfect vacuum. Absolute pressure is obtained by algebraically adding
gauge pressure to atmosphere pressur e. Pressur es reported in
"Atmospheres" are understood to be absolute. Absolute pressure must be
used in equat ions of state and in all gas-law calculations. Gauge pressures
below atmospheric pressur e are call ed "vacuum."
Pressure gauge (Pg) (usually ' PSIG' ) Pounds per square inch above
atmospheric pressure , P, =P
g
+ Patmos We use gauge pressure in the
pipeline industry
Logon to for more definitions
'"
CONVERSION UNITS
1 inch ::: 25.4 mm
1 mile e 1.6094 km
1 mi le per hour ::: 1.6094 km per hour '" 0.447 metres per second
1 pound (Ib) =0.4563 kg
1 Newton" O.2251bs
1 bar e 14.5039 psi
Weight:
1 cu in of carbon steel" 0.283 lbs > 0.128 kg
1 cu m=7810 kb = 17300 lbs
Flow:
M/sec :::(barrel lday)l275 [)2
FI/see" (barreUday/63.82[)l
o ::: inside diameter of pipe in inches
C_2ODII"*"f."
CONVERSION UNITS
=0 90718 metric
""M
=901,18 1<.'1
= 1,1023 ton ( USA)
2 2Q46 1b
= 1000 kg
=2240 Ib f Long" ton )
z 2000 Ib ('Shorf Ion)
lion (UK)
l ion (USA)
To genmat,., lGWh (1.000 .000 ,OOO wattsl hour) of electllc ity from a 30% efficient power station , you would need:
500 metnc tcnnes 01coal, or
280 metric tonnes 01oil (2100 bar rels oil) or
115.000 th"lr ms of natural gas (316,250 eeoc metres. 11.5 million cubic f,,!!t) .
MASS
"g
1 metric tonne
VOLU ME
, m'
l li1re (I)
1 gallon (UK)
1 gal (USA)
1 BSL
HEAT AND ENERGY
'8_
,
1 GWh
I kcal
3531 It'
=0 264 gallons (gall USA
1 20095 gaIons (USA)
3.1851
=42 gal
1.055 kJ
. 100.000 Btu
34.121Iherms
=4186 8 J
= 159 1
0 252 kcal
= 105.506 KJ
=0.001163 kWh
=0.00)295 kWh
=293kWh
=3968 Blu
'"
CONVERSION UNITS

,"
tre
m
dard
d e
1 barrel ( bbl) 158.96 729 AOJboc metre (see also
lb_
I0.15898729 cubic metres
Sm' ) " 629 barrelS z 0
Nm' . 35.3 $Cf. 37.3
1 banal per day t 48.8 tormes per year"
Normal ecee metres (al
JICITl) at a reference
1 bafTeIper day 158.03036 cubic metres per year (365
of O'C and 1 01325 bar ,
! 628981 barrels
also 5m
3
1 starodard ecec metre (scm,
Sm
J
: Standard cubic me
1 standard cubic metre I0.84 eones of oil equivalent (too)'
(also scm) ill a reference
condition of lS"C and
1 tonne ! 749 barrels' ' .01325 bar See also N
ural
1 cubic metre ! 3531461 cubic feet
OM standard cubic foot
1 wbic 1001 1 1ooo61u (Brit ish thermal unit)'"
per day (sd d) 10 stand
cubic metres per year.
1 cone fool j 0028317 eeoc metres
GSm' (gscm) GIQ3 sian
cubic metres =ooe bil l
1000 cubic metres 1 cubic meier r:A oil equivalent'" cobie metres of gas at
0-01325 bar and lS "C.
Cro
oil :
Nat
gas
18(;\(11"1, 10< OiI-.......lenl are ClIk:u"'lo>d from \lie __C8lonfioc each poIIOIeI.on type
., onII>e0f'0S*<:aIonlic value (GCV) 01!he gll$
Oec>ends on INCOl allloB an:l lhe reIeI""Oll !fie 001
C _ 2006 Rao.io.'
,<5
Pipelines: Their Safety & Why They
Fail
Penspen
Integrity
1
Pipelines: Safety Record
2
.
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE: Safety
. Pipelines are not dangerous
or unsafe, but their design.
maintenance and management
can make themunsafe
---_....
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE: Safety
_I f we know and understand why
pipelines fail, we can stop them
failing in future!
,... _","-
XI(I ' _ . .... . C<><t-.r
3
,
2
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE: Environment
.. ~
----
5
_March, 2006, Alaska
- 5,000 barrels of crude
_The oil spill was caused
by a leak in a small section
of the 34-inch diameter BP
pipeli ne
_ BP now under criminal
investigati on
_Company/individuals
may be indi cted...
_ SP chairman (Lord
Brown) received reduced
bonus in 2005 because
safety performance was
' impaired'
6
3
_August , 2006, Alaska
_ BP commences shutdown
of Prudhoe Bay oil field
following a small spill (4 to 5
barrels).
_ This action wi ll reduce
Alaska North Slope oil
production by -400.000
barrels per day
_ BP Chairman and President
Bob Malone.... the
discovery of this leak and the
unexpected result s of this
most recent smart pig run
have called into question the
condition of the oillransil
lines at Prudhoe Bay..
oP..--. c""(> 2006 Rovll."
'The company u id It Is spending $12 mil lion t his
year 10 fight corr osion, up from $60 million lasl
year .'
,
Exxon Valdez
spi lled 11 million
gallons (257, 000
barrels or 38.800
metric tonoes).
This is eQuiva lent
10 125 Olympic
swimming pools.
It was carrying 53
million ga llons _
OIL SPILLS
.. .
IllS
w
-" '''OS''. ._ "'_"'_",,"-4'"_._'06

the amount of oil spi lled in
marine waters wcrtdwide"
(1990 to 1999) i s 943 million
gallons (2.9 million ton s)
o
50
20
60
10
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE: Environment - Oil
Spills into Marine Environment (Worldwide) *
'E 40
30
O_G......, 2OC R. "Si 1
4
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE: Oil Spills in USA
Onshore Pipelines
_Oil pipeline spills amount to
about 1 gallon per million barrel-
miles (USA Association of Oil
Pipelines).
_One barrel, transported one
mile, equals one barrel-mile, and J
there are 42 gallons in a barrel.
. In householdterms, this is less
than one teaspoon of oil spilled 6,
per thousand barrel-miles.
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE FAILURES:-
Consequences
USA, GASOLINE, 1999, 3 FATALITIES
9
5
PIPELINES ARE SAFE: Transportation-related
Fatalit ies... Perspective
Air
908
Sea
Rail
Pipeline (all ) 18
j
1
j
9 4%
I_ Hi ghw ay . Other I
6% ====:::-Pi pel i ne (Gas) 1
1998 Data from National Transportation Safety Boord
and Office of Pipeli oe Safel y, USA
TRANSPORTATION FATALITIES [Iotale 44,128)
o 200 400 600 800 1000
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: Relative
. Pipelines are 'relatively' safe:
_4 0 x safer than rail tanks, and
_ 100 x safer than road tanks
. From1986 to 1995 the oil & gas system in USA, accou nted for:
_63 deaths and 396 serious injur ies.
_ In Canada (transportat ion safety board) in 1996:
Accidents Deaths
Canadian-registered aircraft. 408 85
Marine. 583 24
Rail way. 1125 107
Pipeline. 27 0
12
6
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: Hazards with
Road/Rail Oil Transportation
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: 'Invol untary'
versus 'Voluntary' risks
RISK FATALITIES
Gas Distri bution 13
Li quid Transmi ssion 0
Gas Transmission 1
Highways (1992) 42500

Home accidents (1992) 19500
..,
Acci dental firearms 700
Accidental poisoning 4100

USA Dala - 1993
It>PO' '"'"'' G"",P ,GOO R. , 611
"
7
LIQUID PIPELINE SAFETY: Latest Data cost
lEI No of Incident s _ Property Damage ( $ M )
o
2 5 0
200
150
100
,
"
,
,
"'

5 0
8 6 87 88 89 90 9 1 9 2 93 94 95 9 6 97 9 8 9 9 0 1 2 J 4 5
us Offoceof PIpeline Safety - all HAZARDOUS liquid hnes ( as of Oct 2006)
~ ~ _ ...- ~ ~ ~ _ _... _"-'--" _ _ .......... , . __ , .... ' ... . . . T . . . ~ "'"
rs
LIQUID PIPELINE SAFETY: Latest Data.. casualties
I_Fataliti e s 0 I nj u r i e s I
4 0
35
3 0
25
20
15
10
5
o
-
1t rill 71
-
II JII II
.,
8687 88899091929394 9596979899 0 12345
US OffICeof PIpeline Salely - all HAZARDOUS liquid lines (as of OcI20(6)
re
8
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY: Latest Data cost
1mNo of Incidents EI Property Damage I
300
250
200
150
100
50
o
~ h ,
T . til
H[
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5
u s Ql'lioe01 PIpel ine Safely - an transmis$iOngas lines (8$ 010<.120(6)
-..--.. _-
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY: Latest Data
casualties
I- Fatalit i e s CJ Injuries I
30
25
20
15
10
5
o
Major increase in fatalit ies &
injuries in 2000
I
JI JI I ~ J n
8 687 88 8 9 9 0 91 92 93 949596 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5
1
US Ql'lioe 01PIpel ine $afety - al trnll5l1lission gas lines (as 01 Oct 2006)
.,._.. .... ._...... _... ,. _c.-.. _.. ".. ---. _
---,,-_.
.. __......-.. ,..............._*"'..... _ .11...... ,, __,
"
9
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: W. Europe
_ In W Europe, the
200,OOOkm gas
pipeline system...
_ had not been
responsible for a
fatality to a
member of the
public, in its
operating history.
until. ..
"' ........01
UfGfttUMnglormln",
- "'''''''\1 tl
--- ~ <t!
~

""----"'",
10
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: Probability of
a Gas Release Igniting
Failure Type Ignition Probability (%)
Pinhole/Crack 2
Hole 3
Rupture (pipelin e diameter 9
of <16
W
)
Rupture (pi peline diameter 30
of >16
W
)
_ CONCAWE collates
onshore oil pipelines fai lure
data on 36000km of (mainly
product) lines
. Pipeline spurs" (greater
than 1m
l)
averages 13 per
year, mosl very small
a Most recent year (2004)
had 5 spills . 35% of which
were caused by third parties
a aeiween 1971 and 2000, a
total of 5 spillages from
these lines caused 14
fatalities. Four of these
spil lages resulted in fires
- e.--... ..... ,-, "'"' _ .... lIM (O""!\' _.".,-.-d' 00 _ 1' Sn.' U
22
11
t r \ SP! I
Pipelines: Why they fail
23
PIPELINES FAIL: Due to hostile onshore
environments
c: P.......... G_lIlOIl_OlI __.. ~ e - - , . . . _
"
12
PIPELINES FAIL: Due to Hostile Offshore
Environments
"<,
.........
PIPELINES FAIL: Variety of Causes
___(io&-.g.tIoooo9o _ _
....
__....... W_DCUSoO.""'-2OCI
25
ze
13
PIPELINES FAIL: Third Party Interference
'Third-party damage ... is ...
the greatest cause of incidents
involving death and injury ..
___ "'_000
___..... __ j _ W ~ .CIo_o- ... __"" ... _ .. 27
,.,
---_.....
What is a ' third party"?
' First party is the pipeline operator.
'Second party is a contractor or agent allowed to work on me pipeline, e.g. for
scheduled maintenance.
Third party is any person/organization without authority to work on the line. e.g. a
farmer ploughing a field and damaging the line
:> _ G""CI X!06 1'l0'V6/ 1
28
14

_...... _.. _............ __........ _._1OIR
1998
Gas line
One ratalfly
www.cdc.gov
30
15
Cheyenne. USA, 2006. One fatality
PIPELINES FAIL: Above Ground Impact
A truck thaI actu ally j umped
over the pipeli ne.
Damage consisted of slight
deformation and deep
gouges but no leak.
Repaired by covering the
damaged section wit h repair
sleeves.
O_G_o1<.Ol RoW/,
I......... ~
32
16
PIPELINES FAIL: Above Ground Impact
In lhi$ c.ilMt " . _ 01 lJuck. Ietl lhe ..,.,d ,
aM hi! lI>It , !)Owl ground p i ~
5yna. 1973
PIPELINES FAIL: Corrosion'
_Corrosion can be anyt hing
f rom:
_ large areas of corrosion ,
where no complete pipewal .1 ~ ~
remains, to...
superficial corrosion,
scattered over the pipe
0.......- e:-2OOll_'
........ ..~ ~ _C_""CJM.",, O-,,-_.. ""._ ..... _ ... , ...,
17
PIPELINES FAIL: Corrosion
Corros ion failures are often
'only' leaks, but we do get major
ruptures also
PIPELINES FAIL: Material Defects (Weld Example)
35
\8
PIPELINES FAIL: Material Defects (Plate Example)
C PenSpel'
PIPELINES FAIL: Natural Hazard Floods
Washout - Argent ina,
loss of support &
protection
J8
19
PIPELINES FAIL: 'Other' Causes Vandalism
_2001 - Alaska, USA
_$17 mill ion clean up, S8 million lost royalties
& taxes
R.,. .. _ .- ..._e-_....... ....
PIPELINES FAIL: ' Ot her ' Causes Vandalism
(cont.)
_Alaska, USA.
' High powered" rifl e bullet (.338 calibre ) penet rates oil
pipel ine.
- >1,000,000 gallons of oil leaked out.
_ Li ne had previously been hit by ' hunting' bullets, and
was 'designed' to withstand them.
Police spokesman says '" Thi s is considered somebody
under the inRuerlGe, with a rifle . trying to see if he can't blow
a hol e in the pipeline . .... And he'll live 10 regrel lt."
_The "per sistent drunk'was imprisoned (16 years ).
s 17million' He wi ll repa y at S10001year. .
.....,.."""""', .. ...... """' ... .... ..... ..-,,... .. '"
20
FAILURE DATA
ONSHORE DATA: USA, 2004
Not. "' at OI' S data <"""96 as cata ;s
"poj.' B<1/ '"",_
21
""'" th.. ,... cI",,,,,,, .. d.t. ,
"""''''OJ",,,;,,,,,
ONSHORE DATA: Gas Lines in W. Europe, 1970-97
CAUSE Number
HoI Tap ByError 5%
Grou nd Movement 6%
Corrosion 15%
ConstruCl ionJMaterial Defect 18%
Third Party Act ivity 50%
Other/ Unknown 6%
W. _ m Europe Onshore Ga s InddeC" C"C-- -
Hot T"P By Error
Groond M"",me "t
o C.on. 'n>el ionl Ma'O<ial
Deleet
Tn,,<l PMy
Total incidents 945
Frequency (No/Year/lOOOkm) 0.48
22
ONSHORE DATA: Liquid Lines in W. Europe
Corrosion
_ Thir d Party
Natural Hazard
o Operation
iii Mechanical
Failure
100% , -.-..-- -...-- -.-..-- -"
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
o% +-'....-r-r- ~ - . - - - ....--1 L-"-"=-=--_ -'
1971 -
2003
1999-
2003
2003 2004
. Hol' .....0. ,. "' ''" ' '' ' ''. "' ,.. c.om_ '" cold h' e, ""'" of the ",,/0( ,"'" ,m",,,,,,,,,,,,ot """,,, " """ ' 0 "'" '''''' 1'''''","
0"" " ' ''''I "9"'01 "". ' at. 0"" '0,. "'. ,"""""''''' I"O""l,'osed 00.", '" ""'''9'''' '0"'0000 '......
ONSHORE DATA: Australia Causes'
External forces are major cause
ID Light ning
1- - - - - - - 0 External Forces
Earth Movement
IIJ Corrosion
Const ruct ion
..
No . of incidents
1110
23
ONSHORE DATA: Australia... Consequences'
No. of incidents
'ueiormauonts main consequence
"
' 0
o
~
Rupture
~
Leak
Deformation
Coating damage
'-
'"
~
0-
l-
I-
a/o
OFFSHORE DATA: UK
Causes of Incidents to Operating Steel Pipelines
O U ~ r
o Pipel ine
,-------------- - - - - - -"
1
0
RS"elY moe
j
rser
1-- - - 1l- n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---1 :c Platform
1- - - - - - - - - ---1
J!l
60
0 50
40
:<1
u
30
.5
-
20
t-- 0
0 10
z
0
24
OFFSHORE DATA: UK'
:. OPFR \ llO:-;:
150
W"
m
,"
"
-
ni"" r
'"
"
"
-
'"
- = as
"
I-
E
"
"
t:
,
- -
OP[ B TI O' -

W"

(""" "" ,""
,,,",,,,,,,,,",

mu"",,"=
Numbe r m
of
inci dents 300
,,,tJ===
'""
e PM_ " G'W p 2000 Rev6i1 ,.. ...,oc<.............._ , ... " "" """,,_," ,_, UK
-..., - ..-- .. "' ''''''''.,.....
...,., ..__ ....
COMPARISON OF USA ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE
INCIDENT DATA: Gas
CAUSE ONSHORE
('!o)
OFFSHORE
('!oj
CORROSION 204 40.9
THIRD PARTY 40.4 35.5
CONSTRUCTION DEFECT 4. 1 5.5
MATERIAL DEFECT 8.6 8.2
OTHER
'Other' causes are primarily
mechanical compo nents (pig t raps,
pressure regulators, etc.). fire and
operat ional error
AGA dal a ( 19R4 1992)
26.4
' 4
' .
, "- " .
25
PIPELINE FAI LS: Different Regions, different
failures
_ Different count ries/operators have differ ing causes of failures, depending
on their environment and social structure.
_For example, an oil pipeline in China has these failure (leaks)
causes over a 30 year period:
30
Weld
25
20
_.-
11----- - - - -------1
O"'Bct
15
10
5
0_--
Pip..
Body

FAILURE DATA: Trends
26
HISTORICAL PIPELINE FAILURE RATES
W Id th W I
Pipelines do fail.
d f h 'I d b d t requenctes can e e er mine or ons ore 01 an gas pipe mes In e es ern or
INCIDENT FREQUENCY
THESEARE
(per 1000km
'BENCHMARK' FIGURES,
year)
AND YOU CAN
COMPARE YOUR
Incident Requi ring Repair 4
PI PELI NE
PERFORMANCE
Failure (Loss of Product) 0.6
AGAINST THEM, BUT
THEY ARE ONLY
Failure (Casualties and/or high cost) 0.16 INDICATIVEl
Alberta, Canada Pipeline Fail ure Frequency (1993-97)":
Water (fresh and salt) - 11.5 per 1000 km
UK data (mainl y methane li nes) give a failure
Muil i phase pipelines _ 7.7 per 1000 km
(loss of product) frequency of ;
Sour gas pipelines _1.9 per 1000 km
1960-2000: O.29/1000 kmyear
Natural gas pipelines 1.3 per 1000 km 1996- 2000: O.09/ 1000kmyear
Crude oil pipelines . 0.8 per 1000 km
F
......... """"""'.-_ .""'"'''''." _. ,_,,.r ... ""...... ,_ .... ... w'J" ....
'..... __,,...J. .. .... ...-... .,.. "
.-...'_"""'_A... r..... " _ _ """.r-., ._"" ... 53
...""...,A......
FAILURE TRENDS: In Liquid & Gas Lines in UK'
_ Failure (product loss) data from UK (2004) onshore lines
(various fluids, but mainly natural gas):
_The overall fai lure frequency over the period 1962 to 2004 is 0.263
incident s per 1000 km.year
_The failure frequency over the last 5 years is 0.028 incidents per
1000 km.year
Cl P""""", G, ou p 200ll Rov(i/ l 54
'UKOPA"' P." .... fou. Dol..... p .pel " " "'00."" L= loojOOn" 11962 . 200')' . R.""" No"' ,,"' R 8099 ,,.,"'. 1" .",,1 200() fN)
27
FAILURE TRENDS: In Liquid Lines in USA'
a u ata on 85% of all the inters tate liquid lines (onshore and offshore) in the USA,
for the period 1999 to 2204 showed:
_ The petroleum pipeline industry has reduced both the number and vol ume of
crude, refined product , and highly volati le liquid (HVL, e.q. propane) spills' ,
_ Incidents fell by 46%
_ Spill volume fell by 50%
. Improved testi ng and repa ir techniques, improved integ rity-management
practices, and an increased emphasis on managing pipel ine risk have led to these
reductions.
e c orrosron spi lls are the maj or cause of spills, but they have conti nued to decline,
led by the reduction in spills from crude oil systems,
_ This decline demonstrates the effect iveness of in-li ne inspection
_Third-party damage accou nts for a greater share of onshore pipe spills (15%)
than of all spi lls
_ This damage is also the greatest cause of incidents Involvmo death and
inj ury
_ Most involved farming activities, not traditional excavations
O... _ ... ,
<- """ """
'S"". of' -.. '" m"" 'Q,........ '"w......... ' 0' '''''''''''
".....''''d '''PO''_'0"...uS " ""' 0''''_
55
FAILURE TRENDS: In Liquid Lines in W. Europe'
. T h i rd Party
1 2
Spil ls/annum
14 ,--- - - - - - - - - - ---, c-- - - - -,
10 Natural Haz ard
6
4
2
o
Corrosion
D Operation
Mechanical
Failure
1 971-
2003
1999-
2003
200 3 2004
Spill rate is 0.14" per
1000kmfyear in 2004
compared to 0.52 spills per
1000kmfyear 1971-2004
Hof'''''''' O", e h,iI"'.''' 'e ,,'e, oon' pa '"" '00010 ,""" "''''' of tho O''''''' <a' ,m""" """"" '" wI', " 0.. '0 "'" ,......
' ,,", ' id' hOVe"'" , .,. """ ,.t . duO to . ,,"""" ""'''''''''''I 0.' "9 d"",," -.,. '" to """""" ' '-
28
FAILURE TRENDS: In Pipelines in W. Europe & USA'
Period Incidents/year/1000km
Europe USA
Gas 1970-79 0.76 1.28
1986-2001 0.30 0.55
1997-2001 0.21 0.55
Oil 1971-80 0.63
.
1986-2001 0.30 0.48
1997-2001 0.21 0.30
Soo ... "" <Jl , 'AMlI""'''' '" """'" """"."'"..... ",,'" L J ~ . ,"""""""""'.... _"'J""''' .,,_W"" J. ", 2""
T ~ """""" """"" """,",,,,;o.,a'>d, ...... , .."to".. " '"""""""",,>ro'"".. ' ......... dot .......... """""""""" .._"""' ''''.
PIPELINE SAFETY: 'Near Misses'
29
PIPELINE SAFETY: 'Near Misses'
'If it ain't broke, don't fix it
l
' Is this correct?
_ Major accidents are infrequent. Hence we often
have to base our safety practices on limited
information; for example, a small database of
pipeline fail ures.
_ Using ' near miss' data can increase this
database
. 'Near misses' and actual failures may have the
same causes ('common cause hypothes is'), and it
can be valid to use ' near misses' to set safely
standards
. 'Near misses' are often ignored as they are low
consequence
_ But.. . 'prevention' does not have to wail until an
accident happens!
E,,,"v. tod,,,,, _ ' 0 an ..hV'.'" " ""h, . UK
h"n.h" oJIvMw.h.. 'P' htm
PIPELINE SAFETY: 'Near Misses" in UK Onshore
Gas Lines versus Gas Losses
1 9 %
1%
4%
21 %
25%
Caus es of Pi peline
Fault s (total = 1768)
'Faults' are defined as pa,t
wall defects with no gas loss.
'Others' are minor
construction damage, e.g.
arCstrikes or gouges
2 3 %
Cau ses of Gas Loss (total
" 239)
'Ot hers' are small leaks from
valve stems and other fittings.
@Pen """ n G"",p2006R..6."
37%
1 3%
W. ,d.
. G, u o . " Mo. o mo . ,
1> 0' "..
5 %
60
30
PIPELINES FAIL: Terrorism, Theft, Sabotage
PIPELINES FAIL: Terrorism'
_The oil and gas industry is the target attacked most frequently by
terrorists
ererrortsts preferred targets:
_Government, dipl omatic and security forces ;
arransportatron:
.Property ;
atntrastructure. utilities and manufacture;
_Retail ;
.Hospitality, leisure and entertainment.
_ Oil and gas production facilities are 'high value' targets, and often
attacked, but these facili ties are relatively easy to secure/protect.
.Pipelines are difficult to protect, and very easy to damage
_ A typical attack may involve 2 or 3 terrorists, three shovels, <5kg explosive .
a roll of wire , and a battery
' MS'ooo, ,"" ''''''' ol T""on<,," 1'1<>1. P' '''' ' 'OM. M. y ~ pp22_27
RBmwo 'kaq' , PpO" "'Wac ,WoM P' '''" ''''',M. y 2001 0022_31
62
31
PIPELINES FAIL: Sabotage
_Sabotage to an oil pipeline in Colombia in 2001 cost
Occidental Petroleum $US445 million in lost production.
Colombia's Carte limon oil pipeline
has been attacked 654 limes by
the National Liberation Army, or .
ELN, since 1986
s..qo,a,Como, 1998

_1973 - Syria/Jordan border.
.Typical explosive device damage
63
32
Iraq: June-August 2003
Main oil pipeline from the Kirkuk
onneios in northern Iraq to Turkey's
Mediterranean port of Ceyhun .
Iraq losing $7mililion/day due to this
sabotage
Iraq: August 2003
Water pipeline
Sabotage suspected.
300,000 Iraqis
without water
66
33
PIPELINES FAIL: Theft
- Theft is a major cause of 'failure' in many pipelines around
the world.
_The illegal taps can be sophisticated and difficult to detect.
_ One approach to reduce theft is:
. Patrol your pipeline at areas of high risk (e.g. near villages or local
criminals)
_ Work with police 10 destroy the ' organised' crime (many of the thefts
are for a criminal with a organisation selling to customers).
_This will requi re special detective work.
_ Review internal staffing (often criminals are working with pipeline
staff)
_ Theft in poor regions can take several
forms
_ Small scale, local opportunist theft
_ This is usually local theft, for local
consumption, by 'amateurs'. Usuall y
highest consequences.
_ Small scale. local compensation claim
_ Driven by compensation gains (food,
farming, eIC.) following a deliberate leak
_ Larger scale , product pipe line theft. local
organised cr ime .
ac en fill road tanker
_ Large scale crude line theft. org anised
crime
ec an be int ernati onal crimi nals. Valved
fittings used. Can fill ocean tanker

Example of the 'cost ' of th eft, In
Nigeria:
Dec 2006: >260 killed In Lagos
May 2008: >150 killed in Lagos
Dec 2004: >20 killed in Lagos
Sept 2004: >60 killed in lagos
June 2003: >105 killed in Abie State
Jul2000: >300 killed in Warri
Mar 2000: >50 killed in Abia State
OCt1998: >1,000 killed in Jesse

68
34
April
"
May _
200 killed inoil
pipeline blast
A new report in 2000 stated
that ... the Niger-Della region
has recorded the deaths of
about 5000 people from oil
pipeline vandalisation and
explosions in 2000. The
president of the National
Associ ation of Niger-Delta
Professionals, Mr. Mietanuno
Jaja, said the deaths and
destruction of property worth
millions of naira resulted from
781 cases of veraeuseuon and
82 cases of explosions of oil
pipelines in the region.
~ V 10, 2000, AIlAfrica.com
Cans left by those who burned to death
35
EXAMPLES OF PIPELINES FAILURES: USA
National Transportation Safety Board"s Pipeline
Safety Hearing 2000 . 1.
_ Over 2.1 million mi les of pi pelines in
USA.
_ In 1999, USA pipelines deliver ed"
_ 13 bill ion barrels (55 8 billion
gallons) of petroleum products,
such as crude oil , gasoline, diesel
fuel and heating oi l, to customers
_ in addition, the number of
customers using natural gas in this
country has exceeded 60 mi llion .
'In... 30 years . we have seen too many
tragedies or near-tragedies that were all
caused by the same fundamental
problems... This... safety hearing (will)
address two of those problems
. pipeline inspection and integrity
verification
_leak detection and response.'
Edi son
72
36
RECENT ONSHORE FAILURE: USA, 2000
Gas Li ne. Unpiggable.
12 fatalities.
86ft crater,
Internal corrosion
(microbes). due 10
poor COITosioo COI1tro1' I.:;,...
No pig cleaning runs,
RECENT ONSHORE FAILURE: USA', 19905
7million lor damages

Gaso\al'\El: 1 year old
M&Chanica1damage Oller
Gramercy. Louisiana
"'P. _.., _-_ .. _ - - ,........ _ .. _- ___ __ ....... ......_'.... .4 ....
Reedy River,
SOUlhCarolina
P""'.... __"O"' _'.'-"'Ib""" l ..-... _
37
RECENT ONSHORE FAILURE: USA' , 19905
Oiese1: Slmi\\ionlor dama9"' rll6P'plI
CO'fOS\oI'I in low \Oll9hll6
SS
\
Knoxville, Tennessee
11\00lor damageJclean-up
Gaso\el1e: $16m' D5AWseam weld edge
COfTosiOn-fa\igue on
Chalk Point,
Maryland
75
RECENT ONSHORE FAILURE: USA', 19905
_ Many of the hazardous liquid and natural
gas transmission pipel ines in the USA are
30 to 50 years old.
_ Bellingham was constructed in 1966
e c eaeceo. New Mexico in the early
195Os.
'AI/hough age alone does not
indicate fha/ a pipeline;s unsafe. it
does make determining the integrity of
pipelines increasingly important.' ..
NTSB
Winchester,
Kentucky
38
PIPELINES ARE GETTING OLDER and this can
happen so.. DON'T BECOME COMPLACENT!
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C """""", C"",,, 2OOII _ '
-n
39
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY Risk
Assessments
_The goal of a risk assessment model for pipel ines and. specifically. pipeline
accidents, that is implemented in a project, is to determine a methodology by
whi ch 'end-of-pipe' strategies can be compared with the implementation of
preventive measures to determine which strategy proves more cost effective.
'End-of-the-pipe' techniques mean that once an accident or incident
occurs they have technology and a response system to deal with it.
_The cost s involved in an accident are the direct costs including property
damage, lost product, fines and clean up costs, as well as other intangible
cost s related to cor porate image , loss to competition etc.
_This accident cost is multiplied by a coefficient representing the risk
connected to the accident. the product of which is considered the "risk
relative cost " of the accident.
_The total costs of two strategies can then be compared.
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY Risk
Assessment
_ Preventive measures, as opposed to end-of-the-pipe techniques, are
implemented before an acci dent occurs and actively work to reduce the
probabili ty and consequences of an accident.
_ Different types of preventive meas ures include preventive monitoring, and
advanced technology.
_ Introducing such measures work s not only to reduce the risk of an accident
occurring but also the cost of an accident if it occurs
_ Liabilities and fines are often lower, reclaiming can be easier and cheape r,
and repair action is more likely to be minor.
_ Different parts of the pipeline carry with them various risks dependin g on
out side influences, soil type, etc. Therefore an effective risk assessment
procedure will take into account the differing aspects of the different pipel ines.
_ This is accomplished by sectioning the pipeline and then performing
different testing procedu res on the various pipeline sections.
79
40
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY
Environmental
_In all pipeline failures, there are also the less quantifiable/tangible costs ,
such as corporate image and loss due to stopped service.
_Shell, for the outcry of the Brent Spare case, temporari ly reduced its
market share in Germany in the following month by 30%.
_Obviously there is also envi ronmental damage, the extent and type of which
depends on size of the accident , type of soil , population density, etc..
_The EPA has a system for damage assessment used in the NRDA (Natural
Resource Damage Assessments) regulations, based on measurable adverse
changes in the physical and/or chemical quality of five major types of natural
resources: suriace water, groundwater, air, geological and biological .
TRANSMI SSION PI PELINE SAFETY: Environmental
Ri sk Assessment
_Risk assessment attempts to take all the environmental variabl es and all
the environmental costs into consideration.
_By using risk assessment, a company can determine what types of
preventive measures are worth pursuing depending on how much they
reduce the probability or consequences of a given incident.
_The extent to which they clean-up, report, reclaim and/or repair depends
on the liabilities and environmental regulations of the specific country
towards that specific industry as well as the individual policy of the firm.
aone of the goals of risk assessment is to encourage the implementation
of preventive measures.
81
41
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY $ Costs
_Whenan accident occurs, there are high costs. According to
'CONCAWE', in the years 1971- 1986 there were
_430 pipeline incidents which caused
_ 26 deaths, 149 injuries and
_ $18 million in property damage.
_A single accident in 1997 on a pipeline carrying petrol
caused 5500,000 in property damage as well 1,200 barrels of
lost product.
_I n 1997 an oil and gas pipeline accident caused $224, 000
worth of property damage.
_ Other costs include fines and restitution.
0_0..-2001;_,
_The Office of Pipeline Safety, USA was formed in 1968 to
establish gas pipeline safety standards (requlations).
_ In 1992 their remit extended to liquid lines and
environmental protection
_ Over 400 people work on their safety programme
_It has a federal budget of 547million (2001).
_ $- 3million is spent on research
_ Pipeline operators pay $85/mile (gas lines) or 574/mi le
(liquid lines) to fund the safety programme
83
42
_On January 1, 1990 an underline pipe connecting Exxon's Bayway
Refinery and a nearby terminal ruptured and released over 500,000
gallons of refined oil into the Arthur Kill, a water body separating New
Jersey and New York.
_The spill affected several miles of shoreline and killed hundreds of birds
in the area. The settlement totalled a $15 million cost to the company over
a five year period. Payments included:
.$10 million for "environmental initiat ives" including the purchase of
new wet lands,
_$4.8 million in restitution to the governments of New York and New
Jersey and a
_$0.2 million criminal fine.
TRANSMISSION PIPELI NE SAFETY Costs
_ In a recent survey by INGAA, USA interstate
natural gas pipelines spent $560 million dollars per
year on safety for approximately 160,000 miles of
pipeline.
_That translates into $3,515 per mile of pipe.
86
43
PIPELINE FAILURE RATES - Statistics can be
confusing....
..
eria was changed
umhLJ
--"""'-
--,......-..
. -
i
- - -
,
Crit
0
-
0
- 1-
- - -
..
ilnnm
..
./' .,::' ,.f' $' #0<" .tI' ,,',. ."
,";,.i .'." ,'#";"
'.
-
..
USA OffICe o! Pi petone Safely Data
COMPARISON OF ONSHORE INCIDENT DATA
CAUSES
US EUROPEAN CANADA US EUROPEAN HUNGARIAN
GAS GAS GAS
0 " 0 "
OI L & GAS
THIRD PARTY 404 282 12.6 21.5 47.5 565
CORROSION
,.,
15 1 11.6 21.7 27.7 11,6
MATERIAl AND
CONSTRUCTION 12.7 9 5
3"
1', 5
'"
12,9
-
-
DEFECT
OPERATIONAL ERROR 26.4 46 .5 41,5 45.4
"
129
INCIDENTS/ l OGO kM YR 0.26 1.85 2.93 1.33 0.83 4,03
AGA dill" ( 19&1_ 1!i>l2)
0: __1OOlI_-'
ee
44
TYPICAL PIPELINE FAILURES & RATES
O)[J]',TRY :\,WOI{ CAUSE OF FAILURE RATE
FAI LURE (DCr 1000 km war)
USA (Onshore gas) External Intcr fcrcr cc 0.16
USA (mshore gas) Corrosion 0.70
USA (Onshore & Offshore oil Exter nal Interference 0.56
WesternIurcoe (Onsbore gas) External Interference 0.6
Western Eurooc (Onshore oil) Corrosion O.X
lfunaarv(Onshore gas) Girth Weld Defects 0.1
Poland(Onshore gas) Corrosion 0.08
as (Onshore gas) Construction/Material Defect 0.33
Czechoslovakia (Onshore gas) Construction/Material Defect 0.13
LATEST ONSHORE DATA - OILIW. Europe (1991 -
2000)
119 Cold lines I
50
40 J/le=
30
20
10
Th ird Nat .. , ,,1 C o""al o" OperaUoaal Mechan ic .. .
e Poo"""" G"", PlOO6" ",,61\
90
HOi lines experience many failures due to external corrosion
45
LATEST ONSHORE DATA - OILIW. Europe (1970-
2000) - TYPE OF FAILURE
' 90% of all
pinhole leaks
are caused
by conosion
Corrosion
causes onty
18%01
rupt ures and
30% of splits
-Third party
damage
causes 52%
of ruptures
S p ilt
PIiIhoIe "Jess lhan
2mmx2mm
nss.Jre .. 2-
15..15,mu/O'%ma.. wide
Hole '" 2-
15.. wide
SpJir = long
If 10% max wide
Ruptur e " :>75mm long If
10% min wide
0'--
5
%
35
20
25
30
10
15
Pinholes give the smallest spill ages, ruptures the largest
st
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE 'Malicious'
Damage
In 30 years, the Western European Oil Pipel ine System (31,000 km) has
had 10 spillages caused by third parties (only one attempt was on a buri ed
pipeline - the others were on above ground sections, or valves. etc..)
CAUSE NUMBER OF GROSS NET SPI LLAGE
SPILLS SPILLAGE (m
3
) (m
3
)
Terrorist Bombs 2
Vandalism 5
Theft 3
Totals 10 2597 1716
92
46
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY W Europe
_Fatal Incidents :
1971-2000 5 spillages (4 fires) 14 fatal ities
_One fatalit y was caused in one theft att empt, wi th no ignition
_A thief dug a pit to expose and drill the line and could not esca pe the
pit as it fill ed with product
_ In all but one of these spillages, ignition was hours or days after the
detection & demarcat ion of the spill area
_The spillages themselves did not cause the fatalities
_ Mosl fatalities were to workers around the spill. or bystanders
LATEST ONSHORE DATA OILIW. Europe - We can
control corrosion in old (cold) oil lines
93
0.25
-No increasi ng trend up to 45 years old
Hlgh incidence 01
crossings. anchor pomts . sleeves, etc..
I_Oil Lines
a.
(/)
0.1 -H---t . - -U- -......- - -..--- - -1
0.05 +r-;
In
0 _5 6 10 11_ 1 6 _ 21 26 3 1 _ 36 . , . 46- 51 _ 56 6 1 66
1 5 2 0 25 30 35 .0 45 50 eo ee 10
("hot oil lines are more likely to fail by (eKlemal) corrosion)
47
LATEST ONSHORE DATA - OILIW. Europe (1995)
CAIJSE NI ;\IRER A'\NLJAL ANr\l },\L
AVERAGE (1991-95) AVERAGE (1971-95)
r-.1ccha nica l Fail ure 4 5.2 38% 3.5 25%
Operational I I 7% I 7"'
'"
Corrosion I 2.6 19% 4. 1 30%
Natural Hazard 0 04 3% 0.6 4%
Third Par ty Acnvitv 4 4. 2 31% 4.5 33%,
Tolal III 13.2 f3.7
Frequency 0.33 0.43 0,64
Ino/ r<'ar / f f}(Jlnm)
Mechanical failure construction faults (Inc, dents from construction) & material failure
(e.q.Ilanqes]
Operal ional - human error, et c__
Corrosion - mainl y external corrosion
Natural hazard - landsl ides, floods, etc
Third party - includes malicious
It>poo""" Group 2000 f(e,(>"
COMPARISON OF CANADIAN ONSHORE I NCI DENT
DATA, VARIOUS PRODUCTS
N. Gas Crude
Water
c ~ """'..,.
_ . ~ ~ ~ . ~
17 0"<, '" \
-> I
Coo,,,,"
ITlalnly intemalrorro';on . _..~ 72 0'"
AI/; >or18. Canada 199 1 ",presenting 208. OOQltm 01 O<1snoro pipel" ",,s
48
CANADIAN GAS PIPELINES (ALBERTA EUB DATA)
,.
,'. ,
,
L
---- ----- - -- .
-
.'

,
:
"
.
.

"

..

... --..
-
_...,.

,
,

..

-
.
, , ,

, , , ,

.. ""
,
l-.,.--
, , , , ,
, , , , , ,
"
-

, , ,
..
.-.
,

, ,
, ,
"
,
,
, , ,

,
TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY USA
Fa ta tit ics,
USA_Gas
I H
l f
14
12
10
8
b
4
!
o
- Onshore
-
. O ffsho re

1
,I
II
I
..
II I I
M = N = N
x x x x
0_Go:Ioc>2OO!i _'
98
49
Offshore Spans
"
,.
"

Data Source: UKOOA 1998 (From review of 293 pipelines covering 7,811 krn.
Total of 33,482 spans, approximately 14,164 had a length greater than 10m and
98% had a height less than O,5m)
Danger from Excavations*
If you are excavating, and there is a chance of unde rground pipelines:
. Always chec k for the presence and location of pipel ines before the start of any
construct ion or utilities wor k If in any doubt always contact the pipeline operate'
_ If a pipeline is known to be present contacl lhe operator as soon as possible and
arrange for an on-site assessment. This is best done at the desi gn stage so an
informed discussion on design, working practices and use of equipment can take
place,
_ Take reasonable steps to verify any pipeline location information given to you and
don't rely on it alone.
_Make sure everyone invo lved in the wor k understands the importance of avoidi ng
pipe line damage and of reporting any near misses , especially if it involves surface
or coating damage to the pipe line
c G<ouo;?OCl6 R", &' 100
'Av_ _ r<an """"","'...... """",.", li SE Books >SBN 071 '"' 74401000 f mmht< r :li....... 'N)
50
Introduction to Fracture
Mechanics
Penspen Integrity l ; ; ~ ~ ~ = ;
1. FRACTURE MECHANICS - PERSPECTIVE &
BACKGROUND
1_2001"-'
1
z
FRACTURE MECHANICS PERSPECTIVE
Best Prac' ices:
Corrosion
Fractu re mechanics
pr ovi des us wi th the
sci ence and models t o
understand the
beha viour of defect s in
struc tures
II is used extensively
<I roon<! the world. and in
most industries
It fOfms the basis of all
the methods weuse in
pipelines.
However. we have
dev eloped our own
methods over the years.
which hav e taken the
complexity out of the
calculations.
But they are still base d
on fract ure mechan ics
SCience
General
Co(Nicatl(Jn
In Pipelines
cooes
Specific
Guidelines
Gouges
Girth Welds
Crack Prop.
1Fracture Mechanicsa
I S8 1791011 API 579 I
IASME B31 II AP11104 Ip NV OS
IASMEB31GII CSAZ184 Ip NV RP Fl 011
I ASME B31GI
I Battelle I
I EPRG I
I EPRG I
3
FRACTURE MECHANICS Perspective
FIRST.. GOOD DESIGN! - All eoglneeml9 structures should be desiqned. built and
operated 10 a recoqmsed cod e or standard,
Occaslooally, detects occur in these structures. and I'acfure mechaniCScan be
these oerccts to determine the StruCtUfC'Sneess 'or purpose
FRACTURE MECHANICS IS NOT A SUBSTI TUTE FOR GOOD DESIGN, BUILD OR
OPERATION - IT IS COMPLEMENTARY
ASS ESS ALL POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES - When applying f racture mechanics to
de fect s, al l potc nnar fai lure mod es shou ld be Identifi ed, Ty pical fai lure modes to be
con sidered mcruoe
F,actL.r&
Fatigue
Yielding Of plast ic collapse
leakage
Corf'OSlOn and crcson
Stress COITOSIOO crading aoo COrr05'On
Buckhng
Creep and crecp,1abgue
Often. a combtnatlOO 0/ 'al lu'e mooes -eees to be eceeeerec.
We will deal W1lh rracn. re. plastic coll apse and fatigue in this pr esentation
,
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Warning
NEVER ASSESS A MESS! - Fracture mechanics can help you assess
defective structures. but you should not apply it to struct ures that are d early
unsafe. or have been badly designed. built or operated.
5
WHY DO WE ' NEED' FRACTURE MECHANICS?
We -:lesogn' ".... .:rue' .r... if>tf"o>' 'Y''''. t...: a .oe\e<:: -f,.... """"""'"
.... laor"' ...... "'90"-. _ >ltesses '" .,.,.,.
, e;'c strength
"0
ctl
.Q
..
Ul timat e tensilQstrongtl1
t
. . ,
5- ....... ...
'1_.oeted;" t!">e ........ .. , <\ _ I ... M
""......... _ s:<,,;r.s- _ -.. ,." "'"- __
.,L- --'
, .
'.
"
: t<... Yield strength
)GO Failure
"0
ctl
o
..
Fail

NO DEFECT:
1<1_2UJ&...... '
6
THE FIRST FRACTURE MECHANICIAN?
load
Quarter
length
Half
length
Drawn wire
Full Length
e t eonaroo da Vinci (1452-1519) tested iron
wires of various lengths:
_He failed a long length, then tested half of
the remaining length.
_ He noted that this half length failed at a
higher load
_ He then tested a half of the remain ing
length (f e. a quarter of the original length)
and noted this quarter length had a higher
load than the full and half lengths.
_ Drawn wire in the 15-16'hcenturies will not
neve been good & regular quality. t.e the
longer the length, the mor e likel y it was to
contain a defect
e rneretore the longest wire failed at the
lowest load because it contained the largest
defect
:<, _ 2IXJi _ .
r
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE
MECHANICS Notches
.The conventional approach to design is
to consider the loads acting on the
structure and the tensile propert ies (yield
strength, tensile strength) of the material.
.This approach is not val id if the structure
contai ns sources of stress concentrations
(e.g. notches) or defects (e.g. cracks).
_ The presence of a notch or crack can reduce
the failure stress of a structure to a very low
level (i.e. well below the yield strength of the
material containing no defects).
1_1.

I r...,... St,.....,."
l'o4'ldSl''''''9'!I
1<,_ 2OOlI 1I__'
.._--_...----
8
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE
MECHANICS Notches
_A defect is a source of a stress
concentration.
_I n a ductile material, plastic deformation
occurs whic h leads to a redistribution of
stresses, blunting the crack and removi ng
the stress concentration.
However, in a brittle material no
redistribution of stresses can occur.
Fracture mechanics is a framework for
estimating the strength of a material in
the presence of a defect
. Fracture mechanics design parameters
include: toughness, yield strength,
applied stress, defect size, temperature,
stress state and the loading rate.
(e) po, ,,,,,,' 2M Rovo; l
,

9
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS
Inputs
MATERIAL PROPERTIES
(FRACTURE TOUGHNESS, YIELD STRENGTH, etc.)
A
DEFECT SIZE ....APPLIED STRESS
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS - The
Mechanics
APPLIED STRESS DEFECT SIZE
_ In applied mech anics we load a structure, and fIIIATEIUAl PROPERTIES
we need a measure of the stress in the (FRACTURE TOUGH"IESS. YielD S T R ~ G T I 1e I
structure caused by this load. This load could 6
be a press ure in a cylind er.
_ We then compare this load to the rnatenars
resistence to the load (its yield strength) ,
_ We then need an equa tion that links thi s load
and resistan ce for failure conditions, e.s. for a
cylinder under pressure, failure occurs when:
. yield stress = PD/2t
_ II is similar in frac ture mechanics.
{Va need a measure 0' the driving force I I the crack. lip.
caused by the remote oacmq
!Je need a measure 0' the materia 5 resi stance to ttus
driving force ::: 15 toughness}
. ..... 00 'i na Iy we need an equation that links this load and
resistance, to qrve us a fai me condition
n
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS - How
Notches Raise Stresses
. Notches/Defects do two things to a structure:
_REDUCE CROSS SECTION - A notch or a defect in a
structure certainly reduces the structure' s failure stress
- as it reduces the cross sectional area and hence the
load bearing capacity,
_CONCENTRATE STRESSES Unfortunately, these
defects also concentrate stresses at their tips or bases ,
and failure can occur at stresses well below a
conventional design stress , and also cause premature
fatigue failures,
_We will look at the effect of both :
enotches' (relatively blunt defects, that create a stress
concentration) , and
. 'cracks' (sharp defects that create stress intensi ties)
_We will start by considering notches, as they are the
simplest and best understood 'st ress rai ser' in a structure
-
-
-
-
tz
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS How
Notches Raise Stresses
I ea f
.
'--..l
o c..o _ ..,.... .......
ress to a plate, I stress > 0fce ar
5S the cross
at distur bs the
I
-
concentrated
called a st ress
/
hole can r i s ~
'/ _'V.
or of three
\8
(e.g. a crack), the
ation. r
ons can lake the
I
_ When I apply a tens ile st
have a unif orm stress aero
section - a uniform 'field'-
_ If J introduce a feature Ih
stress fields , they become
around the feature - this is
concentration.
_ For example. a simple
stresses locall y by a fact
_ The sharper the feature
higher the stress concent r
_ These stress concent rati
material next to the feature to a st ress
nigher than the yield strength of the
material . and cause failure if the stresses
cannot be ' relaxed', e.g. by plasticity.
1<1 _1CIlI _ ,
EFFECT OF NOTCHES - Differing Concentrations
_ Notches create high stresses in a material.
Stress, S = force/area
_They 'concentrate' the stresses.
I
. We can calc ulate, measure, etc ., these stress
concentrations.
,
/i
_ Consider an ellipt ical hole in an infinite plate.
1/ ~
Id ini le
p l ~ l
_The max. stress at the edge of the hole is:
ffi
" _S,,,,, ,= S(1+(2b/a)
\\ 20/;'
/
_If aeb, and we have a circular hole, then
S"",, = 3S
1
_ Note two other features of this equation:
_ If I reduce a. my max. stress becomes very
large.
So,.. as I decrease
_this is approximating to a crack stress nero .
za. my notch
becomes a crack and
_ If I reduce b. my max stress reduces and
my stresses become
eventually become s equal to S
infinite'
1<'_ ...... :>006_"
"
EFFECT OF NOTCHES - Stress Field
Stress field
Stress conce ntration = K
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS -
Failure Modes
OUCTILE
Slow controlled extension; final instabili ty
due 10large reduction in area, Cup -and-
cone failure surf ace charact erised by 45"
shear lip
,",,"" " "

L

]
- - - - - --- -... s trarn
BRITTLE
Fast catastrophic fai lure with no
warning Transverse
cleavage surface - no shear lip.
"'M"''' ''''''"''
,,,f,,..,"
'"
- -

0

" "' '" st r ain

aI s.'r,,""
1' ......1s:", ,.,.,..,; ca.."...
fa,lure , unhk" olucl_
te
BACKGROUND TO FRACTURE MECHANICS
Ductile To Brittle Transition, & Toughness
_Two material properties that are of key interest to us when
we are assessing a structure's fracture resistance are:
_The ' t ransit io n' temperature of th e mat er ial
_For example most new structu ral steels will fail in a ductile
manner (large deformations preceding failure) at temperatures
above OOC, but fail in a more brittle manner (low deformations
preceding fraclure)at lower temperatures.
_ The ' t oughness' of th e mat erial
_This gives us a measure of a material's resistance to defects,
l .e. the higher a mate rial's toughness the higher its tolerance to
defects
2. DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION
BRITTLE (CLEAVAGE) FRACTURE AND DUCTILE
(COLLAPSE) FAILURE
In simple terms. failure can be considered to be the resu lt of two competing , but
related. mechanisms, namely britt le (cleavage) fracture and duct ile (plastic)
failure
Bri ttle fracture is related to toughness and ductile failure is related 10 the yield
strength and the tensile strength,
Line pipe steel is usuall y l ough and ducti le, and therefore. only the tensi le
properties need to be considered (fai lure is 'i ndependent" of Iouqhness).
briNfe
ductile
BRITTLE FRACTURE

- - -
/
Stress
Brittle fract ure is a rapid cracking through a stress ed material The cracks usuall y
travel so fast that you cannot tell when the material is about to break, 1.8. there is very
littl e plastic deformation before failure occurs. e.g glass
Generally, berne fracture is the worst type of fracture
because jl occurs wll hout warning, and IS 100 rapid 10 slop.
In brittle fract ure, the crac ks run close to perpendi cular
to the appli ed stress .
This perpendicular fracture leaves a relativel y
nat surface at the break .
Si rain
20
DUCTILE FAILURE
"
see.o

/ eerrne
I
suese.
Ducti le materials fail with large amounts of plastic deformation while brittle materials
show li ttle or no plastic deformation before fract ure
the crack moves slowly and is accompanied by a large amount of plastic deformation.
The cr ack will usually not extend unl ess an Increased stress is applied, but bnltle fractu res,
cracks spread vefY quickly wilh little deformation
A ductil e failure starts with plast icity at the crack tip
Then sma. mlCtovolCls :;:::c=o-- - --:;-, ... -:#0' .
/orm around al'ld ahead of t he cmck _ . '
DelomlabOn continues and !he ;;:,.f..-....;. U....
m,CfOVOIds enlarge and join to form a
lonlier crack , 4 ;=''1'','
The crack cool.nies 10grow by ... . ... .{ "." +:
thiS mechr\an,sm. ...;, i(
... . " -'.".
F,oaly,Q'ad<propaga!lOOlSrapod ... "", -
:r .... - /.. '.,.
alOf'lga surface tlat rnakesat>oul a ..
45 degree angle ..,tll the lemile .1.
' ... wees axIS. . ' .
.' ,
Tile tlf!W fra<;llJre SU'i ace has a ,J;t
very lI'fe9u1ar appearal'lce (.,.,
.....

. , .. -.
...".... _-
(, _ 1000 _'
DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION

rero Strength
The mechanical properties of a steel vary with temperat ure:
Temp (C) Yiel d {MPaj UTS (MPa) % Elongation
400 500 820 26
200 600 920 22
-60 700 1000 21
Over a short temperature range, it will fail at similar stresses and
strains, if it is defect free
This is not the case if we have a notch in our material, The material
can:
Fai l at lower loads as the temperature
decreases
Exhibit different fail ure characteristics
(ducti le or brittle failure)
Some materials undergo a trans ition from
ductile to brittle behaviou r, under conditions of
decreasing temperature, or incre asing loading rate
Most glassy materials and some engineering
materi als such as mild steer show thi s transition.
Temperat ure
ea
ield Strength
DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION

Materials thai undergo a fracture transition are those in
whi ch the yield strength rises sharply with decreasing
temperat ure
Some materials have a transition... body centred
cubic materials (e.q. mild steel or 9% nickel alloy)
Some materials do not have a transition.. . face
centred cubic material s (eg. aluminium or austenitic
stainless steel ), which generally do not have low yield
strength temperature sensitivity. never undergo a
fracture transition. , ---,
Three basi c fact ors contribute to bnttle fracture:
triaxial stal e of stress (e.q. a notch ),
c::::::> low temperature (i.e . below the t ransition
temperature), and
c:::::::::> a high strain rate .
Temperat ure
DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION The
' Davidenkov Diagram'
Stram Rate
(m.s' m)
,,-
W
,
",
Stress
Yield St reng th
(high stra in rate or

Y;eId (MPajUTS l,,"' Pal
200 400
zeo 380
320 430
530 550
Fracture Strength
Yiel d Strength
Temperature
L- _
The materi al is considered to fail under two compe ting matenal ceccenes: yield strength ancl
brittle fracture strength.
The theoretical Iracture strength in many tunes greater than the measured fract ure strength
due to the presence of micro cracks both internal and external
24
DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION - Effect of
Temperature
fcc materials
DUCT ILE
bee materials (low streng th)
TRANSITIONAL
high strength materials
BRITTLE
Temperat ure
25
3 . TOUGHNESS
1
TOUGHNESS
The failure of a brittle material is
preceded by very little (or no) plasti c
deformation = 'l ow' toughness.
The failu re of a ductile mater ial is
preced ed by significant plastic
deformation = 'high' toughness. St res s
Toughness is a measure of a materials
resistance to the pres ence of de fects .
We use toughness to:
Give us a measure of a materi al's
resistance to defects
In fracture mechanics calculations to
cal culate failure stress of structures
containi ng defects
< ......_nof_'
TOUGHNESS
Strain
We know that in some materials . as we decrease temperatur e. the
toughnes s of the materi al s decreases.
This means the material will onl y be able to tolerate smaller defects as the
temperature decreases.
We also know that some materials are 'tougher ' than ot hers (compare
st ainless stee l, to a gl ass)
We need to be able to measure toughness in a material. We can do this in
two ways:
Qualitative - the toughness will have littl e absolute meani ng , bu t have some
relati ve or quality control meaning
This is the easiest measure of toughness and is used In many irdustnes as a simple
GLo ality COO!rol measure, but It has been used 10 help prevent s1nJctural fail ures
Quantitative - the toughness wi ll have a n absolute valu e, and we can use this in
fracture mechanics
Ttus is more complex, but will allow us to actually predict the failure stress 01a
defective structure We will deal with quantitative toughness laler .
. ......IOtTRU$
QUALITATIVE TOUGHNESS
In the 19'hcentury it was recognised thaI fracture and fatigue were
influenced by the presence of notches or cracks.
Notched bar impa ct test ing of iron and steel was used & established by the
end of the 19
th
century to indicate the ductile to brittle transitions in steels
This allowed more understanding about fracture in materials.
We knew that if we:
Have a triaxial stress field (a notch )
A high strai n rale (e.g. impact load). and D. ..C'SllE
A low temperature,
We could fail a material very easi ly, under very low loadi ng. Hence, impa ct
specimens containing notches could tell us somet hing about fracture and
resistance 10 fractu re.
The great thing about these speci mens is that they could give us information
to hel p us model fullscale behavi our
We can expect materia ls with both high strength and high toug hness to
wi thstand high impact loads
QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF TOUGHNESS
(SMALL SCALE IMPACT TESTING)
Qualitative measures of toughness, based on impact testing of
notched speci mens, were developed before the introduction of
formal measures of fracture toughness and fracture
mechanics test specimens.
Examples include the Charpy V-Notch Impact Test, the Drop Weight
Tear Test and the Izod Impact Test.
These qualitative measures of toughness can be calibrated
against the behaviour of a structure, but, in isolation, they will
not necessarily be representative of structural behaviour (i.e.
necessary to correlate small scale speci men behaviour with
structural behaviour).
I<I_ ZU_ '
29
JO
Charpy
The Charpy V- Notch Impact Test is the
mos t commonly used of these qua litative
measures of loughness for line pipe steels.
It is a 10 mm square cross section of the
material, with a 2 mm deep, 45 degree V
notch in the surface.
The specimen is impacted by a pendulum,
The di fference in height gives the energy
absorbed
f'l

......... ....... t, .".. ['9"""''' ''''' . ~ t .

Charpy
The energy is absorbed in the initiation
and propagation of a flaw, and in the
deformation of the specimen. Remember __
toughness under static loading is higher
than dynami c,so dynamic loading is a
severe lest of a material's toughn ess
32
QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF TOUGHNESS -
Charpy
l<1_2OOIl " ... e. ,
,-
ee -=,-
-,
>...... ..oc.o_ _ ..
......."""'-0""
33
Charpy Energy versus Temperature
Ener gy
Absorbed
Charpy v -Nct ch Impact Ene rgy
upper shelf (DUCTILE)
100 percent
steers
ope-ate on \111 $ 'upper"
shelf, and so are ductile
Percc-itaqe
Cleavage
Fractu re
l<l_:lC05_'
lower shelf (BRITTLE)
a percent
---
Temperature
Effect of Specimen Size
Energy
-
lower shelf (BRITTlE)
Temperature
However, there was a big problem with these small impact lest result s.
The ductile to brittle transition could be raised by increasing the l est bar size.
This had serious implications when applying the results of the small lest
specimen 10 a larger structure
Charpy versus Structural Behaviour
Temperat ure
Energy
Absorbed
Struct ure
Charpy
Specimen
The specimen may behave in a ductile
manner (i.e. 0 perce nt cleavage area ).
bUllhe structure could behave in a
brittle manner at the same
temperature
How do we overcome this?
We ' calibrate' the Charpy on the actual structure
,<i_ >ODIi _ .
FRACTURES IN SHIPS (In Fracture Mechanics
Notes)
Ship hulls used to be 'riveted'
together
In all probabil ity, cracks in steel
hull plates of ships was common
place.
Except that duo to the riveted
const ruct ion techniques of the era, a
crack in a single plate was not
catastrophic and \\IOuld be att ributed to
an occasro nar single bad stee l plate
from the stee l mill or faulty fit -up in
manufacture
A britt le fracture, would only run to the
next rivet ed j oint. lypically not
mom than 20 teet in lengt h, with
noti ceable but not catas troph ic
leakage wIlich cou ld be contained until
the next reasonable scheduled repair
FRACTURES IN SHIPS (In Fracture Mechanics
Notes)
The 'Liberty' cargo shi ps were welded structures. bui lt in the USA
during World War 2 to bring 'liberty to Europe'
Out of 2700 Liberty ships built to supply UK, 400 sustained fractures, 90 of
which were considered serious and 10 broke completely in two.
1000 suffered significant failures between 1942-1946because of low
temperatures. while 200 suffered serious fract ures between 1942-1952
The US Government knew something was
wrong, because the failure rate of the
welded Liberty ships wer e very high in the
North At lantic, while literally
NON-EXISTENT in the warm waters
of the South Pacific,
1
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
Sd1enedady, 1943
New shiP
FoJ/W ", h4roour.
A". temp. was -Je
Water temp. - 4C
tight win ds .
Many of the trectvres
on the Liberty shIps
Imtlared at poor
weld s, nor assoCiated
With d eSi gn de t"il$
The qui ckest a Liberty ship was built 5 days after the keel was laid'
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
The Liberty ships are an example of where the Charpy
specimen has been calibrated against structural behavi our.
The Liberty Ships were the first ships to have an all welded
hull. A large number of the ships failed in a brittle manner.
The ship plates were tested using the Charpy specimen to
determine:
the plates where brittle fractur e init iated ...........
?
the plates where brittle fracture propagated
the plates where brittle fracture arrested
1<: _ :I0OI _ '
?
?
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
The results were:
init iation (source) plates had
an average Charpy energy of
7 ft Ibf
propagation plates had an
average Charpy ene rgy of 10
It Ibf
arrest plates had an average
Charpy energy of 16 ft Ibf
Therefore, to arrest a fracture,
a plate would need to have a
Charpy energy greater than
16ft Ibf.
Also, design changes were
made to remove local stress
concentrations (they removed
square hatch covers).
(el Penspe, 2006 Re' 6i1
THE TITANIC
7 ft Ib
t=:Ifi!tiJ10 ft ib
16 ft Ib
- - ,.,- -
The Roval Mai l Ship Titanic:
Did ; Mflalluq"ical Failul'<:
Came a Night In Remember !
.-~ .. iss:
~ . . : . . > . . . ~
2
THE TITANIC
i
,
,
' .
J
i
J
~
--
;
1
l"
.

-

, ... . ....,.. . (..1JI ... . q Tem p.w.. . ld."... q
_ These are Char py tests from the actual t uamc hull.
_ Compare the Titanic hull steer with a modern (A36) steel.
_ It is apparent thai t he steel used for the hull was not suited for service at low temperat ures,
_The seawater temperatur e at the l ime of the col lision was -2" C.
: e : ~ ~
THE TITANIC
_ The steel used in constructing the RMS Titanic was probabl y the best plain
carbon shi p orate avail abl e in the period of 1909 10 1911,
_but it would not be acceptable at the presenl li me for any construction
purposes and part icularly not for ship construction.
_Whether a ship constructed of modern steel would have suffered as much
damage as the Titanic in a similar acci dent seems problematic.
_N avigational aides exist now that did not exist in 1912; hence , icebergs
would be sighted at a much greater distance, allowing more time for evasive
action,
_ If the Titanic had not colli ded wi th the iceber g, it coul d have had a career of mor e
than 20 years as its sister ship, the Olympic, had ,
_ II was built of simil ar steel, in Ihe same shi pyard, and from the same design.
_ The only difference was a big iceberg
1<1 __2COfi_'
2
LINE PIPE CHARPY TOUGHNESS
Many material specif icat ions require
a certain toughness level.
In pipel ines, we measure toughness
using the ' Charpy' test.
The toughness is measured in
'Joules' or I t. Ibs.).
THE CHARPY SPECIMEN: 'Subsize'
10mm 6.7mm 5mm
10mmiD D D
1/2 213
; ; ; ; ~ ;;Vijj
FULL
The full-s ize Charpy V-notch impact test
specimen is a specimen with a length of
55 mm and a square cros s-section with 10
mm sides.
A V-notch of 45 degree included angle, 2
mm deep with a 0.25 mm radius of
curvat ure is machi ned in the centre of the
length.
Reduced secti on (subsize) test
specimens are also defined, with a width
of 6.7 mm (a 'two-thirds size' speci men)
and 5 mm (a 'half size' specimen).
The notch is machined in one of the
narrower faces
4. FRACTURE MECHANICS
FRACTURE MECHANICS Regimes
Linear Elastic (@e/weMechamcs
In this regime. the crac k driving force is measured by a par ameter
called the stress intensity factor (K,l, is generally a function of the
applied stress . the crac k size and the geometry of lhe component
Elasf!cPlasric Fracture Mechanics
The crac k driving force in thi s regime is measured by a parameter
cal led t he J Integral (J,), or by a displacement, CrOD, J, defines
the work done under the applied stresses in t he vicinity of the
crack. GTOD is a measure of t he st rain at the crac k tip.
Limit Load Anal ysis
For materia ls that are highly ducti le, this analysis method assumes
that the entire cross section althe component becomes fully
plastic before the coset of failure

;
c _ _
;

2
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Defects lower failure
stress
()
( )
_ In fracture mechani cs we want to predictthe fai lure
stress of a defect in a struct ure. So, if we have a crack of
length 25mm, in a cylinder, we wantto know at what (
pressure the cylinde r will fail.
_ For example if I burst the defect free cylinder I migh t find --- ~ = = = =
the failure pressure to be 100bar. (
_ If l tben pressurised the same cylinder with the 25mm crack ~
to fai lure, I might find the cylinder fails at 65bar. -
_ Obviously, it would be better if I had a met hOd for
calculating this fai lure press ure, rather than testing the
cylinders.
_Fracture mechanics gives me this method.
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Linking to Applied
Mechanics
_ In appli ed mechani cs, I compare a remotely
applied stress on a defect free structure, to the yield
strength of the material of the structure.
_ If applied stress--yie'd strength, I assume my
structure is overloaded, and liable to fail
_ In effect we are comparing load (applied stress) with
resistance (yield strength).
LOAD - - RESISTANCE
Ear thquake damage 10
a pipeline
LOAD
> RESISTANCE
Fai lure
LOAD
<
RESISTANCE No failure
1<, _2005_'
2
FRACTURE MECHANICS Method
_We have a similar situation with fr acture mechanics - we apply a load
to a cracked structure and want to predi ct the failure
_ The stress in the cracked structure is not simply the appl ied stress - the
appl ied stress is magnified around the crack tip.
e rbererore. we need a measure of the stresses & strains around the crack tip_
_Fract ure mechanics does this in different ways. such as a measure of the
energy, or stress intensi ty, or displacement local to the crack li p. Therefore , this
is my local stress /strain on my cracked structure.
_The local resistance against these energ ies. intensities, displacements is not
yield strength bulloughness
LOAD -- - TOUGHNESS
_ If local stress, energy or displacement>toughness, I assume my structure i s
overloaded , and liable to fail
a aecause I measure the intensity of my stresses and strains around my crack
tip in different ways, I also measure my toughness in different ways
Driving force
Resistance
LOAD - - TOUGHNESS
LOAD
LOAD
>
<
TOUGHNESS
TOUGHNESS
Failure
No failure
2
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Method Summary
_In applied mechanics I need three things to determine the effect of loading on
my defect -free struct ure:
_1. I need a measure of the severity of any load on the structure. I usually
measure the severity of the load on my structure, by convert ing tho load to a
stress or a strain in the structure
_e g the applied stress in a pressurised cylinder is (pressure x cylinder
diameter)/(2x cylinder thickness)
_2. I need a measure of the resistance to this load in the structure. I usually
do this by measuri ng some material property that is related to resisting the
loads.
- e.9 the structu re yield strength
_3. I need an equation thai links this load to this resista nce, and defines a
failure
_Failure Stress = Yield stress = (pressu re at failure x cylinder
diameter)/(2x cylinder thickness)
_ By knowing these three thi ngs, I can ensure my load in my structure is always
below my calcu lated failure load
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Method Summary
_In fra cture mechanics I need three things to determine the effect of loading on
my defective structure:
_1 . I need a measu re of the sever ity of any load on t he structure, I usually
measu re the severity of the load on my str ucture, by convert ing the load to a
stress or strain 'intensity' parameter around the defect.
_e,g, the applied stress 'intensity' around a defect in a pressurised
cylinder is a function of pressure, cylinder and defect dimensions.
_2 . I need a measure of the resistance to this load around the defect.
usually do this by measuring some material property that is related to
resist ing the cracks.
_e,g, the structure resistance to cracks (tough ness)
_3. I need an equation that links thi s load to this resistance, and defines a
failure failure
_Failure Stress = f(toughness, defect size and shape and structure's size
and shape)
_By knowing these three things, I can ensure my load in my structure is always
below my calculated failure load.
53
2
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Method
Fracture mechanics is the application of applied mechanics to the
problem of predicting the extension behaviour of a pre-existing crack .
Since fracture consists of stable or unstable progressive growth of a
crack, it is only the material which is immediately adjacent to the crack
tip which is actually breaking at any particular instant.
ccnseocenuy fracture mechanics focuses exclusively on circumstances
existing et the crack tip where the discrete volume of material there is
considered 10 break when some cr itical condition is reached
The stresses and strains present in that locali sed volume of material can
only be Iransmill ed 10 it from the surrounding materi al.
So by using the equilibrium and compatibility cond itions 01 elasticity and
plasticity, fractu re mechanics seeks to define the local condit ions under
which the crack will extend but by using global parameters such as load and
geometry
_ In applied mechanics we can consider the loadi ng on a structure in two
ways:
_ Stress
_ Strain
_ Stress and strain are linked, but we have a choice of assessing the
loads on a structure using either stress or strain
_ In fracture mechanics we have a similar situation, We can consider the
loads around a crack in a variety of ways:
_ Stresses at the crack tip
_ Strains at the crack tip
_ Energy in the cracked body
_Again all these three parameters are linked together - as we will find
out later.
_ We will look at modelling the behaviour of a crack ed structure using the
stresses and strains around a crack (the 'load' ), and as a measure of its
toughness rreststance' ).
55
21
r
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Prior to -1950
o
Early fract ure mechanics wor k was done on britt le mater ials
_ Inglis 1913
Griffiths 1921
The Inglis solution for elastic stresses at a crack t ip

Although pri marily an anal ysis of stresses local to an elliptical hole
in a flat plate, this early anal ysis also cont ri buted the case where
the ellipse is collapsed to a crac k and showed that the stresses,
am' at the tip of what is now considered a cra gk were singular in
nature and given by:
I 1 I I
a,=++2m
1
"
1
V Om
,

(Y oS tr.c 'C""C)[, ,ac"
t he ;-,,,: f k ngh
p j, the ' adi" , " f ( u<';ature"' [he "I'
I I I I
r' l P.""",, ,,005 ..1
"
5'
I
(J
The Inglis equation predi cts an infi nite st ress at the crack tip as p---tO
and so a material contai ning a sharp crack should in principl e fail at an
infi nitesimal load. This result caused concern and indeed was the
motivation for Griffith to later devel op his fracture theory based on an
energy consideration rather than one of local stress.
The Griffith energy balance
Griffith used this concept the first law of thermodynamics
(theorem of minimum potential energy) to resolve Inglis' infinite
str ess paradox [Griff ith, 1921]_ A crack will extend only if the
total energy of the system reduces or remains cons tant as a
result. The critical conditions for fracture are thus where crack
extension occurs under equilibri um condition s, i.e. wi th no
change in total energy.
2
Using the stress analysis for an ell iptical hole in a flat plate
of Inglis Griffith obtained for a centre cracked panel :
(
' E' \ "
- 1,
a
j
= - -
na J
,,-f>c-,...
IT" ,he n:m...... ~ ',," "'lOll 'trC"
I: ",ho: da,u.e m ~ u u "f ,f><- ,,, ., ..,, ..1
r. ,he ,,,rlx,," <T.CW'- "f t h,- malln.d
Irwin later modified this to account for some plasticity.
Before proposing an essentially similar approach but which
was more convenient for solving engineering problems.
,
C
" _ lfa-
, - - -
E
I':nc, i':Y rcle", c rale :{ )f" wick ph ,, ill r h n..
,,,,.,, wi,l, ,, cr a,' k "j k ngth !"
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Status in 1950
.Prior to 1950, it was not customary for a fracture failure report
to mention the presence of cracks
- Cracks were considered unacceptable in terms of quality,
and there seemed to be a reluctance to admit to their
presence.
Plus, it was not possible to readily apply the early fracture
mechanics work as it was only applicable to 'perfectly elastic'
materials (e.g. brittle materials such as glass) where plastic
strains were not present; therefore, it was not directly
applicable to engineering materials.
In the 19505 there was interest in fracture in the aircraft
industry in the USA, part icularly in aluminium, but also in the
plast ics used in the industry.
iOl p..-..:- 100& ........"
eo
3'
THE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR APPROACH
r
10 TO FRACTURE
Expe rimental work by Kies, and theoretical work by Irwin found that the stress
fields around a crack tip could be represented by their 'intensit y', K ('K' after
Kies ). And the maximum ' K' a material could withstand - Kc - was its
toughness
He called this a ' K field'
K is a function of applied stress, and the size and position of crack
At failure: (Jc=.1JK
c
2j r::af_5
y
We now have:
0
YJo-
A crack driving force, K K
A tough ness (resistance) measure
0 .
from tests, x,
'"
/
And a methodology that li nked stress,
def ect size and toughness.
Thi s was the start of applied fractur e ,

mechani cs
Distanc e from crack tip

"
r
THE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR K
10
The K field i s the asymptotic crack tip field in an elast ic solid. The K field
char acteri ses the fracture process provided that the process occurs in an elastic
field.
The stresses and strains tend to infi nity at the crack tip (the stress field is
singular , ie. there is a singularity at the crack tip).
The stresses and strai ns at any position around the crack tip follow the stress
intensity facto r, K, for small scale yielding.
J Y
It is related to the di rection of the stresses
in the x.y andZ directions

X
K
1
is the stress intensity factor for Mode I loading, I.e. tensile loading (this mode
openstoe crack surfaces) . The singular ity is _'_

J;
' .
";"101_""".,(0)
(1 = JK (a function of II)
/
.-:.
->.
'" ,
., ,
yield strength
sm:
"
.
r
Distance fromcrack lip
lei ___ 2C06_to
sa
3
THE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR
- Differing Ks
_ We can have three different types of K,
depending on the di splacement of the crack I:::/:
surfaces: ..
- K
1
= opening or tensile mode (this is v/
the most common in engineeringrr-- - -_ 'IV
- K
2
= sliding or in plane shear mode - - - -
- K
3
= tearing or antipfane ./>1
_ Our structure fail s when the appli ed K > / J
reaches the fr actur e toughness of the /
material, 1<.: . Kc is measured on a bend Z//
speci men of thickness B: Kc=FcS/BW05.f(aNol)
F I 1'" s
C' Il a
displacement F
FI2
63
THE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR Stresses
Ie!
I
0
I
Mode I Loading
y

r 0"
IJ
2a
x
At O( (I _ 30)

&. - -
A.' , O( _o _.vn
"
" & .. .. .., )
.. 1fT. _ _
A", a , 0 30
.J. ..1. ([".,..o, = / -, - ,\ .':J _ _ _
" .....- ..... _ .......-. __'" """""_. ...bI ..._ ,.<'9- ......." ......... <ro<o
,p ...e...... -..-..: .. ,.. , ....... ....,.., ,...,....,. ....... 'fOr>:> ..... --.pl
C-, ... l._E.5h< .oa.... L...... .-.a LE....: .......... __ .. __...._ _ , .,..""
......,.... ' ...'_. .F... .... ,.. ..........
Icl ....._l'IlO6 ...... '"
"
3
THE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR-
Equation
r:
10
2h
I
j
2b
1
j
K = Yn(r:a )O.5
Failure occu rs when K=K
c
The str ess at failu re is:
c, = KJY (r:a
c
)O.5
This gives the cri tical crack (or
maximum tolerable crack) size, a
e
Equation
r
(J
I
cr
1
The K field is a function of the defect
size/s hape, and the structures size/shape
If I have a cent re cracked panel, of width 2b
and length 2h, my stress intensity factor is:
K= Y(T( na)0.5
alb hlb Y
2h
2a

0 inf. 1
0 3 04 1. 5
07
05 3
j
2b
j
So, as I increase parameters, my K varies
It will reach a value that I cannot exceed - the
toughness
66
3
Critical (Toughness) Values
K, (MN/mJ/ 2)
Cu, Ni,AI
PV Steel
Mild Steel
Fibre Glass
Cast Iron
Granite
Cement
Ice
100-350
170
140
42-60
6-20
3
0.02
0.2
r:
STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR - Example
~
1
o ~
I

An ai rcraft wing is made from an alumi nium
alloy which has a yield stress of 200 MPa,
and a measured toughn ess (Kel of 120
MPamo
s
It contai ns an edge crack, and we can

Edgti crack
assume a Y valu e of 1.12 for this crack.
.>:

The aircraft designer requires a safely factor
of 2 on his/her desi gn stress, which is equal
a, 10yield strength. I.e. 100MPa.
What is the maximum crack size (a

c
) we can
tol erate?
K
c
;: YO
nom(rt
8
c
)O,5
j
I

a
c
=(1 1r: ) (KjYa
norn)
2
c r ~
Thi s gives the critical crack (or maximum
tolerable crack) size, a, of a.37m
<:.........-:IOOli R..... '
se
3
5. THE PLASTIC ZONE AROUND A CRACK TIP
LEFM*?
.By 1975, LEFM was fully codified in the standard ASME SECTION XI
(used extensively on nuclear pressure vessels)
_This aimed to meet requirements of ASME Section Ill , App G (used
exten sively on pressure vessels)
.App G of ASME III was to protect against what they called 'non-
ductile failure'
_ It was aimed at heavy section welded pressure vessels:
_OK for thick structures and brittle materials.
_ In a metal , there is no such thing as plasti city free failure.
_LEFM is therefore only a mechanical concept, and bears no relat ionship
to the failure mechanism
_Crack tip plasticity sets the criterio n for cracking, not remote plastici ty.
OJOl ."om ,,, "",.
69
3
THE WAR AGAINST PLASTICITY
"
"
e

"
",,<:,t; H'Q-I I:rRE ,....-nJ
",,' tR,A"' .'''' " " TE.. ,u ' 00
r' U lo"r . :.-1::_ .... <TIi'-"
lEF",
._C OO Jrr'll"
.. ..
.... .,lfi SI .. t " .....
,:>;.. ...,1; ! r ......'.
'>;,:COi L " _ ' tl'ti"," ;;'..":;rrLC
.,T>< ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,... _ rr,<,N..
......-s l/C' .... ..-V' _.:.. y
f'uoH , C
THE ROLE OF PLASTICITY
. "-I(.J y c:- .<I).
Failure
,
_So. as I increase
,
Stress
,
toughness. LEFM
,
Plast ic conepee
predicts ever increasing
0,
---

, (limilIOad)
failure stress.
,
_This cannot be correct .
,
,
_ The problem is that the
,
increasing
,
LEFM equation has never
,
,
toughness
,
heard of yield strength. and its
,
,
,
t heory is invalidated if we ... LEFM
-
have yielding . i e. plasticity
---
-
_ As we load up a cradled strvctu'e, a 101 01the energy ,s absorbed 0, Defect size, a
plashc deformation (ll'()l,or'l(l the crack t,p.
_ This allows me stresses to "rela ' and " prevents stres ses (JOInQ atlOve the l" e1d sl'el'lglh.
_ 1\ also enSU'e$Il\at" 1have exte nsive p1aslocrty. the Dad 0' the crack ed structu'e wiI correspond to
ceastc collapse" (Of readles a limit Joad"). I e the structure wiI fa,1 by O'o'erload on its remaooll lig.ament and
the e'l'ed aI!he CllId< IS10SImply ,educe ee Ctl) sectIOnal area 01 the SlructlJl e
_ Note !l'os ISa SImple VIeW ai-plastIC coIapse- - _ 1 tall<about me later
_ Thrs IS good news for lI1e slruclure - plaslOClly allows hogne< lallure loads
_ BuI ll is bad news lor linear elaslic fracture me<:M.anlCs. as LEFM rebes on the stress Slngulat1ly' stresses 90"'9 to
...tlnily al the crad< IIp
. He nce . ;nvil kda:es my l EFMmodels
:c1_.......,.,.R..,;;'
n
3
6. CRACK TIP OPENING DISPLACEMENT AND J
THE ROLE OF PLASTICITY & CRACK OPENING
-
. ",I1Om E E, plane stress , or E = EI( I -1"), pla"e strain
_l I t he material's fracture toughness [m terms of crack tip opening
cis ntacomcnt). is 1\ ' failure occu rs ",'hen (, > (\
(e) Peo,p." 2000 R.,5i1
r
3
CTOD
_Crack opening displacement is simi lar to stress intensity in that it is a
function of crack length a and load ( e.q. remole stress, (l )
_The advantages of ClOD as a crack char acterisi ng par ameter is its
applicability over the whole range of loading , from li near elasti c fracture to
plast ic collapse.
_Cl OD can be used in the same way as st ress intensity:
. you can obtain configuration factors ('y') for non -infinite shapes
_ Acritical maximum ClOD ( t\ )is a material property. and so on.
CTOD (f
_We can easily visualise ClOD by considering the specimen we use to measure o,
_The specimen is thickness B
Cl l
F/2
+v;

Displace ment.V
F
.sc=[1\ +[O.4(W a)VJ f[04W+O.6a+z) where Kc=FcS/BWoS.f(alW)
etastc opening plastic opening

te
FRACTURE MECHANICS - STATUS IN THE 19605
and emergence of 'J' and 'CTOD'
_ The early work of Kies and Irwin was used in the aircraft industry.
In the 1960s there was a great interest growing in the safety of
nuclear power plants.
_These plants used pressure vessel grade steels of very high
toughness, and the exist ing LEFM was not applicable to these
steels.
In the late 60s , Jim Rice developed a theory ('J') that allowed the
crack driv ing force to be quantified in a material exhibiting duct ility
(e.g. a pressure vessel steel)
_J is a measure of the 'energy release rate' as the crack dri ves
forward, and is resisted by the material ahead of the crack. J
characterises the stress-strain field around the crack.
FRACTURE MECHANICS - STATUS IN THE 19605
and e me rgenc e of 'J' and 'CTOD' (cont.)
.At the same time researchers in the UK developed the 'crack tip
opening displacement (CTOD)' to measure the toughness of a
material, merely by measuri ng the displacement at the crack tip
.In the early 70s, researchers Begley and Landes were able to
characterise J as a fracture toughness, Jet I.e. the material 's
resis tance to the crack dr iving force.
The relationsh ip linking toughness (J), flaw size and stressing to
elast ic plastic materials was later (1976) established. At the same
t ime, the UK established this linking for CTOD.
_Hence, in the early 70s we now had fracture mechanics
approaches that was appl icab le to tough materials .
78
3
THE J INTEGRAL AND CTOD

Vp Drsptacement. q or V
F
Bot h J and 0 (GTOD) are valid fracture toughness parame ters for an elastic-plast ic solid.
J and 6 are relat ed ,} = ma , ('i
m is a h mctlon of the strain hardening characteristics of the material and the constra.nt (i.e. the geomel ry
and the stress sta:e). II vali es between 1 and 2
For elastic behaviour : KI _ J _ -
.. -. -ma , d
E' " E lor plane and E' = EIl - v' for plain strain
I can measure J and CTOD on a bend specimen of thickness B:

+ 2UJB(W-a)
;\=[ K,,2(1-v
2)
/2o
yE
] +[04(W-a)V
p]/
[O.4W+O.6a+z)
elastic J,6 oeste J,ii where Kc=F
CONDITIONS FOR FAILURE
A crack ed structure will fai l if the applied K or ClOD or J reaches a crit ical level.
This level is called the materi al' s fracture toug hness
Fracture toughness is a measure of the abi lity of a material to contai n a crack -
the higher the toughness, the more resistant is the mate rial to the presence of a
def ect.
The f ract ure toug hness can be measured in terms of K, CTOD, G or J.
In ter ms of K:
Kr<K"
K! 2:: ,
No failure
Failure
The fracture toughness of a material is dependent on many things incl uding:
temperature, sect ion thickness , orientation, etc..
If we have britt le material, we can use any of the above approaches and
measu res of toughness to determine if our structure will fail. If our material is
not brittle (and most modern structural mate rials are not ), we use CTOD or J.
88
4(
7. FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TESTING
Fracture toughness is a measure of the resistance of a materi al to fracture
when a crack is present.
Fracture toughness is measured using standard fracture toughness test
specimens (e.g. single edge notch bend specimen or compact tension
specimen).
There are a number of standards that specify the procedures for fracture
toughness testing. including American Socie ty for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the British Standards Institut e (8 SI), the International Institute of
Standards (ISO) and the Japan Socie ty of Mechanical Engineer s (JSME),
Existing fracture toughness standards incl ude proc edures for K
IC
K-R curves,
~ J-R curves, Cl ODand K ia testing.
7. FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TESTING
82
4
CTOD Testing
CTOD testing
Weld metal and HAZ (detailed HAZ study) tested at _10C
....... ." "",,"" M...,
... ,.,
- "- I. J
B3
CTOD Metallography
erao metallography, cleavage init iation sites

4:
CTOD Equations
w
3
5
r: ~
/ -"-' = w'w [1.99- -"-(I- -"-X
2
.
IS
-3.9_' -"-) +2
l
-,,-))]
-l il') ( X )1 < /I' IJ' W 'l lr
21 + 2 " I _a
IV If
l < _ ~
CTOD Equations. example
_Example of ClOD calculation from a material test
eThe 3-point bend test (SENB3) showed some plasticity in the load-
displacement data but finally failed by fast fracture
_Material data: E = 207000Nmm-
2
, v = 0.3
e'rest and specimen data:
_ V
p
= 1.15mm
p = 22.6KN
Ciy = 450Nmm-
2
Span, S, = 4W
Dimensions, B = W = 25mm, a = 12.5mm
. r
p
= O.4
(<)_2006_,
es
86
CTOD Equations - example (cont)
Total CTOD
0= be + op= O.347mm
Dominated by plastic
component
0.329111111
(115X04X125)
(04X'2.') +125
r (w -il)V
j - P I'
c ,, - ( . )
r, W-a +u
Calculation of K
/ .:!...) computes 10 10.65 for = 12.5 = 0.5 and S = 4W = l OOmm
lw W 25
K p / 22.6'-"3/
, RJW' lw 25m' lw
Elastic componenl of eraD
J = K/(l- Il) = (1925,2)"(1- 0.3') = 0,0 ISlmm
(2X450X207000)
Plastic component of eraD
CTOD Specimens and 'constraint'
Full
Scale
Or internal
pressure
Wid e
plate
SENB !
t
Lower Bound
(Conservative)
Constraint
Pmf R Denys
8. PLASTIC COLLAPSE
PLASTIC COLLAPSE
89
This is known
as plastic
collapse, and
is usuall y
govern ed by
the material's
strength
propert ies
NOT
toughness
_My material may be so tough, that the corecr will no! fract ure my structure
_Thonk of copper or alumini um that are not usually affected by notches/defects
_ If my material deforms. it fails by collapse ot the l.qament below the defect
_ This ligament goes fully plastic, and fail ure i$ by overlodd, e.q. the Sl ,t:SS
reaches UTS
Stress
----
DEFORMATION
fail
if my material can deform
f r ~ ~ i ~ i t Will.collapse
90
4:
PLASTIC COLLAPSE
_Our defect in our pipel ine can ' collapse' in various ways.
_ For example. a part wall defect in a pipeline can fail through the wall, and leak, but
it will not cause the pipeline to rupture . The pipe is leaking. but it is not destroyed I
_This is a 'local' coll apse rather than a 'global' collapse
ac onsoer a plate containing a defect - it can 'collapse' in various ways
I
I
I
B B
m
, ,
t

Local Net Gross

Collapse Section Section
Yielding Yielding
Collapse Collapse

at
PLASTIC COLLAPSE IN PIPELINES
Local (Yielding of remaining ligament
Global , NSY (Net Section Yielding)
Global , GSY (Gross Section Yielding)
92
PLASTIC COLLAPSE EXAMPLE PART WALL
DEFECT IN PIPELINE
20
,,'
----- -
_. J _
d
I--
I
d I
1- - -
1M
(Y,
a
where
u,
0
-
0
a
d
0
t
0
A
0
A,
M
0
failure stress
fl ow stress (-(cry + 0UTs)/2)
defect depth
pipe wailihickness
cross sectional area of metal
loss
original cross sectional area
Folias factor (bulging factor)

XI = r
9. FRACTURE MECHANICS METHODOLOGIES
(e: Po,,,,,,, l000Rev(i; '
4-
FRACTURE MECHANICS BSI BS 7910 & API 579
The British Standards Insti tute have produced a complet e fract ure and fat igue
assessment document - SSt BS 7910 (formerly PO 6493).
It presents procedures for conducting an 'engineeri ng cri tical assessment' ,
whereby you can assess defects in structures using 'fitness for purpose'
(fracture mechanics) methods .
857910 presents procedures for fract ure, collapse and fatigue methods, but it
focuses on fracture and fatigue. A variety of fracture approaches can be used
(Cl OD. K, J).
This document is highly recommended for use on any structure. However, it is
rarely used on pi pelines (other than girth welds and fitt ings ) because our
pipeline steel is ducti le, and t herefore we are mor e interested in ductile failure.
The pipeli ne indust ry has developed its own methods over the past 40 years.
and these are internationally accepted
Therefore, use BSI BS 7910 - it is a good document - but we have ' better'
methods for pi pel ines, that will give us more accu rate predictions. BS 7910
recommends the use 01the pipeline methods,
API 579 has been published, givi ng general Ifp met hods for process plant.
The British Standards Institute have produced a compl ete fracture and fatigue
assessment document - BSI BS 7910 (formerly PD 6493).
It prese nts procedures for conducting an 'engineering crit ical assessment",
whereby you can assess defects in structures using 'fitness for purpose'
(frac ture mec hanics) methods.
BS79 10 present s procedures for fracture, collapse and fatigue methods , but it
focuses on fractu re and fat igue, A variety of fracture approaches can be used
(CTOD, K, J).
This document is highly recommended for usc on any structure. However, it is
rarely used on pipelines (other than girth welds and fittings) because our
pipeline steel is ductil e, and therefore we are more interest ed in ductile failure.
The pipel ine indus try has developed its own methods over the past 40 years,
and these are internationally accepted,
Therefore, use BSI BS 7910 it is a good document but we have 'better'
methods lor pipelines, that will give us more accurate predi ctions. BS 7910
recommends the use of the pipeline methods.
API 579 has been published. giving general ffp method s for process plant
4:
These documents attempt to describe a failure by both fracture and

collapse.
E"" '9'
This is reasonable:
If my material is duct ile, il will collapse
DUCTILE
If it is brittle, it will fracture.
But, I must al so be able to describe a failure
TRANS' "
in the transition region of my duct ile brittl e

behaviour in some steels.
This is done by my failure

BRITTL E
assessment diagram.
,
Temperature
:\
' FAD'
i
I can describe all my

fai lures in one diagram
,
ISAFEI
" .
m
0
'I' t"'d
,
" ,1. ,,,,.,:u ," 10.J
(e) PO" _ ' 20C6R0>6i l
97
FAILURE ASSESSMENT DIAGRAMS
"'
".-- - - - - - - ,
'- .r:...
1.D
i
"I
My material can fail by britt le fracture, but in most structural materials, plast icity effects
precede failure, and, in the limit, gross yielding effects predominate and failure occurs by
plastic collapse.
Therefore the FAD accounts for the range of possible behaviours, i.e . elast ic fracture,
plastici ty effects through to plast ic collapse.
In this diagram, t he proximit y to fract ure is given on the vertical axis as the rat io of applied
stress intensity. K" to fracture toughness, K",,,:
K, " KiKmo;
If K, :: 1, failure is predicted to occur by brittl e
fract ure,
The proximit y to plastic collapse is given by the ratio
of applied
net sect ion stress. 0 0 ' to now stress 0 ,( flow
stress is a stress between
yield and UTS)
S,=" /'"
i e. if S, = 1, fai lure is predicted to occur by
plastic collapse.
""''-''"''- '"''
S,
98
4
FAILURE ASSESSMENT DIAGRAMS
O,t 0,6 0 9 1.0 1.7
5, "'
u
A failure locus provides the connecti on between Kr
and s-
Any assessment point falling 00 or below the failure
"I ]
locus means that the
flawis stable and is not a significant risk of fa<ll. re. ,.o,'-- I"o'$"'s",",' lin..
Assessment poin ts above the failure locus represent J / .
unacceptable 8.8-
flaws which may cause failure. f
For materials which fracture in an elastic-plastic o.&-
fashion, alternative f
fracture toughness parameters have been proposed : u .
J, and the crack l ip
opening displacement c'ron.
Cl OD testing and assessment procedures are popular
in the pipeline industry
When these parameters describe fracture, KI and
Klc are replaced by J or CrOD usi ng suitable
relat ions. However, the principle of the assessment
procedure remains the same.
(el P OffiPO" 200fi .....
FRACTURE MECHANICS Perspective
BeSf Pract ices:
Corrosion
Fracture mechanics
provides us with t he
sc ience and models 10
understand the
behaviour of defe ct s in
st ruct ures
It is used extensively
around t he world, and in
most industries
It forms the basis of all
t he methods we use in
pipelines
However, we have
developed our own
methods over the years.
which have taken the
Ol.t of the
caicclancns.
Bul lhey are based
on fract ure mechanics
Science
General
Codification
i n Pipelines
Codes
Specifi c
Guideli nes
Gouges
G!lfh W91ds
Crack Prop
1Fracture Mechanics I
IBSI 7910 II API 579 I
IASME 631 II API 1104 IpNV as
IASME [ CSAZ164 I p NVRP F1011
IASMEB31(31
I Ballelle ,
'00
Penspen Integrity
INTRODUCTION
How to Assess Fatigue
1
,
INTROOUCTION - Structures can be Subjected to
Static and Cyclic Stresses
Stress
Stress
Static Stress
Time
II' f\
v V V
Cyclic Stress
f ~
Time
INTRODUCTION Many Structures Are Subjected
To Varying Stress
St ress
"............ ..",.-,
= 0"",. - Om...
= (omax- 0m,n) I 2
= (omat + am.., ) f 2
= am., 10m" .
= (Ja In",
...... ...... .. .. .. . , (l m
Time
= stress range
= stress amplitude
= mean stress
= stress ratio
= amplitude ratio
- .. __..-..
,
INTRODUCTION - Metal Fatigue
As iron and steel structures came into wide spread use, engineers were
faced with failures occurring well below the tensile strength of the
materials.
The materials were ductile , but the failures exhibited little or no ductility.
A tensile lest on mild steel would be expected to show 20%
elongation
_but these fai lures exhibi ted no visible signs of deformation.
However, these struct ures had been 1 ri-
subjected 10 repeated stressing
(cyclic stresses). Hence, engi neers t ceo < j r t ~ r t t ~
were introduced to 'fati gue'. I
'Met al fatigue' was reported by
railroad engineers in the 18805 .
A number of accidents involving failed train axles led engineers 10
describ e the parts as being "t ired:' or "fatigued."
INTRODUCTION - Early Metal Fatigue Studies
Testi ng to evaluate the fatigue resistance of metals started in Germany
as early as 1829.
Most of the early failures de.... eloped in machine part s which were
subjected to high frequency repeated loading.
However, it was identified that other, larger structures could fail due to
fatigue
e. g. Sir William Fairburn studi ed the fatigue design of wrou ght iron
bridges in 1860.
Fatigue failures have two areas:
the progressi ve development of the
fatigue crack, followed by
fai lure when the applied stresses
cause structural overload .
"'1'-"-- '."'-
-_rr .....
F. g-.. ~ ~ I
~ ....... .. _"' _,
-
_..__.. ..-
,
INTRODUCTION - Why would pipelines 'fatigue'?

Presscee
_ , Time

' I' J
".Q l i l \ ';1 ,
- I JI'l .r I t i l / J ' I
I ..., . J. , _L . , " , :.. ..
t II ' "1' \ :1 " ' \
: - -1 .., I .. -t r -,
I . , ' . I' ... ... . ,<l
\" , I:'
L
.. \ r t
-;... - - --. I
_ The press ure in a pipeline is not
constant. For example:
_ 1\ can vary due 10operation.
e.q. a pipeline carries various
products {batches) will have
varyi ng pressures at varying
t imes.
($)"")SE)
_ It can vary due to demand,
e.q. a pipeline that is
supplying a region that uses
the energy during the day
(lowering the pipeftnes
press ure). but not using it at
night (all owing the pipeline's
pressure to increase)
O IP,p;o' '''o ........ ".to,.,.
INTRODUCTION - Why would pipelines 'fatigue'?
(cont.)
I
- ,... .. -
._-- .-----.
/- -
\
e
.....
-
_ When we l ay pipelines offshore. we
can have severe loadings due to
waves
_These waves move the lay
vessel and impose stresses on
the pipeline as it is lowered onto
the sea bed
a 'tensiooers on the lay vessel
withstand the high loads. but the
pipeline can be highly stressed.
and these stresses vary wit h
wave height. movement of
vessel, etc.
a consequenuy the girth welds
can be under high cyclic stresses
_ There are many other causes of
pipeline ratigue (see later notes)
INTRODUCTION - Effect of Fatigue on Metals
. Fatigue loading on a structure can do two things:
_ It can create cracks that grow 10fai lure
_ It can assist existing cracks 10grow to failure.
ew here we have no cracks present , or very small defects in the structure, we use
t he ' SoN' approach to asses fatig ue.
ew hen we have a crack in the struct ure, we use fracture mechanics to assess
fatigue
INTRODUCTION - Structures Can Contain Cracks
.
,
The world's first large iron

structure was the Iron Bridge.
near Telford ill Shropsh ire. Built
in 1779.
Note arch to give stiffness Hnd
strength , and note cracks in
joints.
INTRODUCTION - Pipelines Can Contain Defects
_ .'
Corrosion In b<><l1
"
fal 'g..e

W. 'd
. "
Hig!> pH sec In pi pe bo dy
"
...
INTRODUCTION - Effect of Fatigue on Pipel ines
Extract s from 'Western European Cross-Country Oi l Pipel ines an-year
Performance Statistics', CONCAWE. Brussels. February 2002
(WNW concawe.be):
Very few ( if any ) pipeli nes are believed 10 suffer from deteriorati on due to
throughput related effects, for example, metal fatigue
Fatigue failures do sometimes occur when pipel ines have suffered some
construction fault or subsequent oamaqe such as dents.
The se are relat ively inf requent causes of spillage.
12
.. _--,... ".- ..,.....,--_...... _.""'.....,- --
INTROOUCTION - Case Study on pipeline fatigue
fail ure
_ 1970 USA gasoJene
pipeline.
_28",0.281".705psi
operating pressure
_Fail ed in 2000.
$18million clean
up/damage bill
_The NTSB concl uded the
probable cause of the
pipeline fail ure was:
ecorrosion-cw cycl e
fatigue cracking that
initiated at the edge of
the
longitudinal seam weld
at a pre-existing weld
defect
ASSESSMENT OF FATIGUE - 'S-N'
7
INTRODUCTION - Case Study on pipeline fatigue
f ail ure
_ 1970 USA gasolene
pipeli ne.
_28 ",0.281".705psi
operating pressure
_Failed in 2000.
_ $18mi llion clean
up/damage bill
_The NTSB concl uded the
probable cause of the
pipeli ne failure was :
ecorrosion-ow cycle
fatigue cracking that
initiated at the edge of
the
at a pre-existing weld
defect
ASSESSMENT OF FATIGUE - 'SN'
"
7
"
i
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The SoN Curve
Fatigue is made up of three stages : i nitiat ion, propa gation, failure
Al l these stages are described by a cyclic stress (8) versus number of cycles
(N) 10 failure, givi ng an 'S-N curve
The S- N curve uses logarithmic axes
The 'mean' S-N curve
represents a 50/SO
chance of failure,
and a component
designed on the
basis of a mean
curve has an equal
chance of failure or
survival.
"' '''''''' . _ , _ """"""""O<IO(IO(llOtOOOOOOOOQ
_oIC......... N
0_ 2005 _
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The SoN Curve
rs
The S-N curve is based on ~ ..",
.
.
- \
: .
8 . 0.
-o
~ ~
Number of Cycles, N
- ~ _
.-...,---- '_0'., __,
._.........---
c_o., _
.-
,
...... _,.
......... -
te
8
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - SoN Curve's Endurance
Limi t
Fatigue fai lures in the range 0,5 cycles to 1000 cycles are cal led 'low cycle
fatigue'.
'High cycle fatigue' is for greater than 1000 cycles.

At 1000 cyc les, the fatigue strength is typically a.BUTS
Steels show a 'knee' in their S N curve, This is called the endurance limit or
fatigue limit. The S-N curves for non-ferrous or al loyed material s do not have
this knee.
The endu rance limit of ferrous

steels with a UTS less than
"'
~ ~ , , ~ m
1400 Nmrrr s is between 35 and

60% UTS. A good
~
~
'rule of thumb' is the lesser of :
~
50% UTS or
700 Nmm? at 1,000,000 cycles,
o
,,'
Number of Cycles. N
coP",,-o ~ R",, &1 H
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The Effect Of
Discontinuities on S-N Curves
Metal fatigue is the process by which:
a crack can formand grow under repeatedor
fluctuating loading, or
an existingcrack can grow under repeated loading.
All structures contain 'st ress concentrations':
notch, surfaceroughness, a hole, etc., i.e. anything
that causesa discontinuityin the structure.
The stresses aroundthesediscontinuities are highly
concentrated, and are very high adjacent to the discontinuity.
Under static loading, the stress concentration in a ductile material will have no
effect, because the amount of highly str essed material is low compared to the
material at nominal stress (the materia l is constrained by the surrounding elastic
material).
In plain material, most of the fatigue life is take n up in i nitiating the defect. In a
structure containing a defect or stress concentration, most of the fat igue life is
taken up i n propagating the defect.
9
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The Effect Of Stress
Concentrations on SoN Curves
Fatigue Ufe at a
Stress Range of
180 N/mm
2
lnfinil
10
10
Plain Plate
Plate with 3 mm diameter hole
Plate with 2 mm dee V notch
In mal erial containing no maio" defect s, fatigue life reduction
is caused either by surface roughness, ()( stress
concentrations.
We know that any stress concentration Of 'disconti nui ty' can
reduce fatigue lives .
All structures contain 'stress ccocennenoos':
notch, surface roughness. a hole, etc.. l.e. anything that
causes a discontinuity in the structure.
The stresses around
these disconti nuities are
high ly concentrated , and
arevery high
adjacent to the discontinuity. STRUC TURE
Unde r static loading. the stress
corcennauon in a duct ile material ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i ~ i a ~ ~ ~ S
will have no effect, because the
amount of highly stressed
material is low compared to
the malerial at nominal stress
(the materi al is constrained by the surrounding elasti c
material).
"
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The Effect Of Welds on
SoN Curves
I til- '
Welds in structures reduce fatigue lives.
In welded structures we nave two obvious
sources of stress concentrations:
the weld shape, and defects in the weld,
particularly at the surface.
In welded structures the fatigue life is dominated by defect growth, not
initiation.
Welded joi nts can contain high residual stresses (that ensure that all
cyclic stresses are tensile), large stress concentrations, and crack-see
defects, resulting in STRUCTURE Fatiguelife at a
a major reduction in Stress Range of
fatigue life. 180 Nlmm
2
Plain Plate Infini
Pratewith 3 mm diameter hole 10
Pratewith fillet welds 2x1
Plale with 2 mm dee V notch 10
10
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - The Effect Of Welds on
SoN Curves
The fatigue life of a weld is affected by:
stress range.
the type and shape of the weld.
a The type of weld "";11dictate the chance of defects being present. and the shape wi lt
dictate the size of stress concentration, and also affect how easi ly the joint is
inspected .
the presence of defects (over and above those inherent in the weld's
workmanship limits)
misalignment and other local stress concentrations
size: fatigue life decreases with specimen size. This is well known in
machine components (in bending, you have a higher stress gradient in
a thin plate, giving rise to a higher fatigue life than in a thicker plate) . In
welded joints, this is due to weld joint dimensions increasing stress
concentrations
The fatigue life of welded joints is not greatly affected by:
yield strength
mean stress or post weld heat treatment (when the loading is fully tensile)
0_ 2110& _ '
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - Which SoN Curve do we
use?
We use our S N curves when we have a weld that is free from 'significant'
defects.
Thi s is diffi cult to define.
The tests that the S-N curves are based on will have used specimens welded
using standard procedures, hence they will contain typical workmanship
defects.
For example, fillet welded join ts will have sl ag intrusions of depth 0. 15-0.4 mm
at the weld toes. These cannot easily be detected by conventional NDE.
However, the test welds should not contai n significant (e.g. cracks) defects,
that can be readily detected.
The 5-N curve we choose must be applicable to our material , detai l and
envi ronment.
The 5- N curve we use must allow for scatter in data.
An S-N curve twostandard deviations (SO) below a mean curve (assuming a
log-normal distribution) is the lower 95.4% confidence limit, and represents
approximately 2.3% probability of failure , or 97.7% survival probabi lity. 3 SOs
below mean wou ld give us about 99 .8% probability of survival
We usually use the ' mean - 25D' curve in design.
0_2110&_
"
11
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - Different Codes,
Different SoN Curves
~
,
I
I
,
I
I
IiI---
I
, OOEC""", B
I to
coo o o 1000ooo o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Number of Cycles, N
""'"
'"
&
c
;:.
roo
~
.s
~
C_2lXJ(;_
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - Choosing the Correct S-
N Curve
The S-N curve we choose must be applicable to our materi al , detai l and
environment
It is normal to use the ' mean - 250' curve in design ...
We must be careful when we select an S-N curve:
Different codes have different S-N curves.
Some codes use plai n materia! tests as a basis for their S N curve , while
others use welded specimens.
Some code $oN curves do not specify the conservatism in the curve or any
added safety factors.
If you do not know the origin. basis, applicabi lity and built-i n safety
margins in an S-N curve ... don't use it!
The most widely used and accepted weld S-N curves were proposed by
The Welding Institute (in the UK). These have been widely accepted in
many structures (bridges, offshore structures, pressure vessels, etc.).
Theref ore, you can use these curves, or develop your own SAN curve by
testing your weld design.
For large welded structures, testing will be very difficult.
"
12
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - 5-N Curves for Welds
.
.
e 50
Vi 40
"
20
10'
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - SoN Curves for Welds
es
Fatigue life (Limit) is 20,000 cycles
200 Nlmm
2
Time
f-+I-++-I-+-t-- - - - - - - - -'-

O_:IIlO8_
1 Cyd e
*

"
"..
" ..
20,000 cycre s
"
13
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT SN Curves for Pipeline
Girth Welds
.'
'.
' _ .. ... .".. a...
000> _ .._ _0' 51.. _ OrtOOP. SWOO'
_____."_ "O ,''... ...... D"I 'OX.. ...
_.:.":::':.:$__ . 0.' 51... ....., fl1.' '''
WI.- O.1 , IU " P SWOCP
-. _''''IO,l-'.- . 01 >'11.3"' '''
-. .""'.._ . '"'- . 0' '1' 52P
.... ' 0

3 6 08.10" .'<. 1.026.U/
5 0 34 X10:' N>102ll .,o"
3 '0," 10
J 6.33 < '10"
J 253. '10" . ... ,026 ".
5 t.(Xh1(l" . N>l-Oa .1ff
3 03 .. '10"
(:1...
OII .CO'
DI OCt''$'N>O'
QI OCI'1m-<:P
EI' , ...
" U4P
Fll .""SW'O'
"" .,..,SW<CP
'1' 52P
Endur ....ce. cycles
O _ 2008 R
*_1_ 0__...' ,, ....._... _
- -_..... _-- ,_.
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT Applying Additional
Safety Factors to the SoN Curve
The use of a ' mean2SD' curve gives a safety factor .
Additional safety rectors can be added to acco unt for uncertainl y in design
detail, inspection problems, or consequences of failure. ..
The choice of this addi tional safely factor is complicated.
NORMAL DISTRI BUTION
..
f
\
0 \
I
,
Da t a
0'
j
\ wi t h i n t he
lJt and a r d
Xdev i ation
0
I
". lU \
0
" /
\
..
.y O.ll \ 1'H'
O_ll
0
1.. ,t_/
\ .
,
-2 - ]
STANDARD
o . ] +2 3
DEVI ATIONS
.,
14
FATIGUE ASSESSMENT - Example of Code Guidance
(DNV 1996 - Submarine Pipeline Systems)
Consider all stress fluctuations (induding during construction).
S-N Curve to be used must be applicable 10malerial , detai l and environment
S-N Curve must be based on mean curve of log(N) with the subtraction of two
standard deviations
This fatigue strength is further reduced by an 'allowable damage retio : which
depends on ' location, accessibility for inspection and repair, inspection strategy
and consequences of failure'.
Normally, all parts of the pipeline system are 10be considered as not having
acce ss for i nspec tion for fatigue cracks, and ther efore the fatigue lives must be
reduced by a factor of 10 (allowable damage ratio = 0. 1).
If an inspect ion scheme can be shown 10 be able to detect critical fatigue
cracks. an allowable damage ratio of 0.3 can be used.
The fatigue life can be determined usi ng an Engineeri ng Critical Assessment .
e.g. BS 7910 : 1999, with safety factors applied to defect size.
THE GUIDANCE ON THE CHOICE OF THE S-N CURVE IS REASONABLE. BUT
IS THE BASIS OF THE ADDITIONAl SAFETY FACTOR OF 10 REASONABLE?
C_ 2Ol6-.
ASSESSMENT OF FATIGUE - Fracture Mechanics
"
so
15
THE LINK BETWEEN APPLIED MECHANICS AND
FRACTURE MECHANICS - Static Stresses
Stat ic Strength Design (Defect Free) - We
design most structures on a strength (design
strengt h equals percent of yield strength)
basis.
This design is based on the assumption that
the structure contai ns no maj or defect
Wecan base our design on applied stresses
and yield strength
Static Strength Design (Defect Present) - If
the structure has a defect such as a crack, we
cannot use strength alone to design.
We have 10 use 'fracture mechanics' , which is
the part of Applied Mechanics dedicated to
understanding fracture.
Fracture mechanics design is based on
applied stresses and toughness as well as
yield strengt h
\
THE LINK BETWEEN WELD SoN CURVES AND
FRACTURE MECHANICS
An SoN Curve for a weld describes the
propagation and failure of a weld
containing insignificant defects, under
specified loading and envi ronment
conditions.
The S-N curves were not developed
using cracked specimens.
The S-N curves assume only small,
insignifICant defect s are present in the
weld
If I find, or I am expecting, defects in my
weld, that would be bigger, or different
from those tested in the developmen t of
the origi nal S-N Curve. then I must
consider another approach - fracture
mechan ics
Use S-N
Use
Fracture Mechanics
16
PREDICTING FATIGUE LIVES USING FRACTURE
MECHANICS
If weha....e a defect in a structure we can Stress CycIie5
predict its behaviour wi th fracture DJJfjJ eess
mechanics.
The load ing can be static (causi ng fracture
or collapse), or cycl ic (causing fat igue
crack growth).
Time
In fatigue fracture mechanics, we consider ~
a defect present in a structure, and 'grow'
the defect using fracture mechanics laws.
The defect grows under imposed cyclic --'
loading, and we can pred ict when it
reaches a size to cause failure.
Therefore, we start with an 'initial' d e f e ~
(e.g. a weld crack), and grow it under
cycl ic loading (e.g. pressure cycles in a
pipeline), unt il it reaches a 'final' defect "-__---"
size, that causes failure (fracture or
collapse).
PREDICTING FATIGUE LIVES USING FRACTURE
MECHANICS Methodologies
The calculations are well -establi shed, and
documented in recognised codes such as
BS 791 0 : 1999 or API 579
The calculations are complex, and require
both a skilled engineer, and suitable (but
simple) software.
The skilled engi neer is required to:
ensure that all the inputs to the
calculations are reasonable (e.g. initial
defect size) and
that suitable safety factors are added to
the results, to allow for any
uncertainties, and the consequences of
failure.
BS 7910
or
API 579
t?
17
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS Basics
,
~
' -
'.
" ~
,..
, -
~
rut ~
fr a.cture
number cf cyol es, N
_ We have consi dere d the fai lure of 'defect free' structures using the SN curve.
_ However, most structures contain some type of defect. Therefore, we need
to underst and how a crack can grow unde r cycl ic loadi ng
_ This is called fatigue crack growth . and it can be explained and predicted using
fracture mechanics,
_ The fi gure opposite shows how a crack increases in r---- - ----.--,
size under a cyclic load of constant amplitu de givi ng
a cyclic stress of 60'.
_ The crack is small (3

1
) initi ally, and grows in _
a stable, controlled manner until the critical crack -;
size is approached - when crack growth rat es ~ !J. a constant
incr ease and failure occurs. ;:
o
_ For a given material , the inst antaneous rat e
of crack growth (the slope, daJdN). is found 10
depend mainly upon the stress intensi ty range,
t"K, (function of stress, defe ct size, structure)
_This is to be expected as the the near tip
f iel d (charact erised by K ) affect s crack advance.
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Growth of
Cracks under Cyclic Loading
~ K describes
this region
Initiati on Failur e
number of cycles, N
18
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Measuring
da/dN
C P.....".., 2006 R...61'

; ~ : = : / / / / / / / ;
Number of Cycles. N
de
Slope = -
4V
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Measuring
Stresses at Crack Tip
1"l, oP""", 1'7'0
.,~ ..'. ,
~ ..l"'",,, ,....
--.
"".'"..
"
Stresses at crack tip are very high
(>yield) .
We need a parameter that represents
these stresses.
In Fatigue Fracture Mechanics the
r.arameter is 'K' - stress intensity. factor
C P..-- 2006 Ro, 611
19
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - daldN versus
~
_ The stress intensity range is the main con tributor
to growth rate . We obtai n a crack growth curve for
Z
each material.
32
K,
_There are three stages:
'" _I. Init iaUon Usually iii crack exists, and therefore,
"0
the i n ~ l t i o n s1age is zero,
rn
However, below a level (threshold) of M<: 0
-
.....e do not hll"'" any crack growth .
I
../
_ II. Sta ble Pro pagat i on,The crack grows in a
pr edict able and stable manner. The material
characteristic crack growth rate vs intensity
t
1
range is approximately Iog-Ioglinear
throughout stage 11 10 give:
II III _da/dN = c sx-
this is the Paris ",uafion. C and mare
COfISlalll material properties
. 1Il . Instabi lity. This stageccccces a $nI;l1l
part of the fatigue life. as the instability is
Threshold K
rapid & late in the fatigue life.
log ~
_The onset of this ast stage is dict ated by the critical
crack size being approached.
K.... in the stress cycle" the fracture toughness K"
C _ 2OOlI_611
as
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Applicabili ty
Fatigue fracture
mechanics applies in
the linear portion of the
curve
da ; rl tJ(J"
d... ....,
,
p.slIain ---:--.. p.s""""
Conditions for final
fai lure approached
IOg AK
m is variable, it is typically 3 for structural steer: 3 is often used for aluminium alloys, but m
can be higher. A typical value for C in struct ural steel is 3)(10-
13
N/mm-
1112
(for length
measured in mm). Note tnat daldN" 0 when aK below the thresh old .
20
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Calculation

(il K)
To calculate the fat igue life (N) of a known defect using
fatigue fracture mechanics we will need to know:
the cyclic stresses, ~
the initial defect size (either assumed, or measured), a
a 'Y' calibration for ourcrack and structure, and
C and mfor our material, environment and stress level.
These allow us to calculate the cyclic stress intensity factor:
(Paris Law)
We generally use the 'Paris Law' for the whole range of
da/dN (this is conservative at low K, and only a small
amount of time is spent at high K):
da =c(L1Kt
dN
At low K, we have a 'threshold', where the crack does not
grow (analogous to the endurance limit).
Typical values for welds are:
Me
o
= 63 Nrnm?", R> 0.5
M
o=1
70 -214 Nmm
3
-2 .0:::;R 5:0.5
M
o
= 170 Nmrn?" , R< 0.5
"
21
(Growth)
t, at
q..
fatigue life
defect size
applied cyc lic stress
compliance factor. a function of the defect
size and the geometry of the structure
fatigue creek growth constants
=
=
=
=
=
do
C,m
Int egrating gives
dN
M( = !:J.oY.JJll1 . ,
N = f do..
<I. C(L'i a)'";r2'Y"'a'2
N
a
'G
y
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Final Defect
Size
The fat igue calculation is complex as it generally requires numerical
integration (or some other form of iterative solution) to calculate ea.
We will also have to calculate the defect size at which the structure foils
- this will defi ne the 'final' defect size (a,) in our fatigue calculation.
This calculation will require a failure analysis (e.g. using BS 7910 :
1999 or API 579)
22
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Example
EXAMPLE
Consider a flat metal plate
under repeated tensile-
compressive cycl ing in which
the mean stress is 25 MPa.
If: 8
0
=0.25 mm, a
c
= 5.0
mm, m =4.0, A =5 . 10.
15
, Y
=2.0, and N, =3.2 .10
5
cycles .
Find: Estimate the maximum
tensile st ress to yield the
fati gue life prescribed
" lIT'
/::,. 4D 1 J d'
( a ) '" (S* 10-
B
)rc
41
{1(3.2 *lO
J
)(20
40
) 1' Olo... 7
(60)0 '" = - 3.96 *10
6(200
- 4000)
a
tsa ((-396 - 10')(-3800)"
6.a = 350MPa
--
__.......-"'""._>o::2IoooO'l ....... _
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Calculations
for Pipeline Defects
..
in a pipeline we
follow the procedure
we have summarised earlier. '\.
M
If we do not know the initial size (a<> of a defect in our pipeline, we can
still estimate the fat igue life of the pipeline. by assumi ng a defect is
present in our pipeline that has 'j ust' survived the pre-service hydrotest
(for an axial defect), or 'j ust' survived the laying pr ocedure (for a
circumferential defect, e.g. in a girth weld). etc..
This will be a conservative approach because the defect we are assuming
is hypothet ical . and is the largest possible.
The final defect size (a
f
) is calculated using an appropriate fai lure
criterion, e.g. the Battelle part wall failure criterion for axial defects.
The final defect size will be calculated using the max operating pressure (to-
axial defects) , or max axial stress (for eire. defects) in-service.
lf we have I
det ected a defect a'lal .
23
using a 'hydratest' defect
LOW LEVEL HYDROTEST
(e.g. 9O%SMYS)
I . l-
HIGH LEVEL HYDROTEST
(e.g. 105%SMYS)
~
'--- 1HYDROTEST 1 _
__~ ~ ~ ~ OPERATION ~ ~ ~ ~ __
L! ".
I
FATIGUE I
CRACK
____~ GROWTH _
Therefore, a high level test ensures that a larger margin for defect growth is
avai lable, and hence a longer fatigue life.
using a 'hydratest' defect
11",<1/
Note that not all defects are 'credible' , For example, a defect of depth of 99% wt
being present prior to the hydrotest is incredible. More credible defects are long
shallow corrosion (from poor storage),long shallow scratches, axial weld defect
related 10weld geometry. process. mi ll lest and inspection limits, girth weld defects
related to inspection limitations during construction, etc..
24
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Final & Initial
Defect Sizes for Axial Pipeline Defects
1- G
j
(JII YDROTEST _ t
-
(J 1- Gj _1_
t M
where
a
if
a
t
M
=
=
=
=
=
hoop stress
flow stress
defect depth
pipe wall thickness
Fo nes factor (bUlgi ng factor)

"
FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Final & Initial
Defect Sizes for Axial Pipeline Defects
.. .. ..
OPERATING PRESSURE(72 percenl SMVS)
HYDROTEST RESSURE (100 percenl SlAY )
I I
.. .. .. ..
01
0 1
"
of 01
l os
.. u
OJ erectssurviving
grow to I.",,"
2c1(Rt )"O.5 (nonnalised def ect length)
r:
O_2OJt_
se
25
LINKING SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE
MECHANICS
MECHANICS
In (fatigue) fract ure mechanics we wi ll model an

initial defect size , and then impose cycl ic loading
onlo this def ect. .
II will grow 10 a size that will cause failure.
An S-N Curve for a weld does the same thing.

The weld will have small defects in its

surface (e.q. slag intrusions at the weld loe),
and this ' initial defect' will grow under cyclic
loading .
It will eventually reach a size 10 cause we ld
failure.
Therefore, a weld S- N curve is merely an

experi men tal descri ption of crac k growth and
failure in a weioment . whereas fracture
mechanics is an analytica l description af the
same event.
"
"-2001_611 sa
26
LINKING SN CURVES AND FRACTURE
MECHANICS
The problems we have in comparing the two approaches (and obtaining
agreement in observed and predicted fatigue lives) are:
we do not know the size or locat ion of the small 'initial' defect in the weld,
it is very difficui l lo model small defects wit h fracture mechanics,
it is di ffi cult to calculate the stress concentrations i n we ldmenl s,
it is difficul t 10 modellhe residual stress fields in the we ld, and the growth of
a crack through thesecomplex fields,
all fal igue testingis prone to scatter, and any comparison between theory
and experiment would require extensive l esting and ana lysis, and
we may nol be compari ng the same type of failure, e.g. an S-N curve may
define 'failure' as first indi cation of crack ing, whereas a fractur e mechanics
an alysis may use complete failure.
0_2005_ _
MECHANICS - Comparing Predictions
SoN curve for a
u1 /"" seam weld
/

w
w
LOWER BOUND
:;;
o

.>
Fatigue curve calculated using fracture mechanics. with the
hydrolesl level to define the initial defect size
NUMBER OF CYCLES
0_2005 _ _
27
SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE MECHANICS -

Safety Margins in SoN curves
In S-N Curves we have many unknowns:
thei r origi ns may not be known (type of specimen (wel ded or plate ),
thickness, env ironment, treatment (e 9 grinding), et c.,
weld quality, and inherent defect s may be unknown,
the tests wi ll have been conducted over a limited cycle range , and
extrapolati on may have been necessary in low cyde regime , and very high
cycle regime,
the tests will have used simple (tensi le or bending) constant amplitude
loading, whereas real structures will have a complex loading spectrum,
differi ng failure cri teria are used in tests, e.q. cyctes to first indication of
cracki ng, or cycl es 10 complet e severance,
etc..
Some 'unknowns' will be included in the S-N curve (e.g. mi salignment ).
However, an unknown such as misalignment is likely to be larger in a rea l
structure compared to a laboratory specimen,
When we apply our S-N curve to our structure we use the 'Mi ner' rule to deal
with stress spectra; this rule can be i naccurate.
We are trying to predict the fut ure behaviour of our structure.
Therefore, we add further safety margins onto our mean-2SD S-N curve.
Safety Margins in Fatigue Fracture Mechanics
In a fracture mechanics calculation we have less unknowns , as we know:
the defect pres ent,
the stress field,
the size of the structure. etc..
We can also include or model :
uncertainties in shape, e.q . mi sali gnment
failure,
environment,
complex loadi ng, et c..
Fatigue fractur e mechanics still has uncert ainties (e.g. the select ion of the crack
growth constants C and m ), and safety factors must be applied .
The fatigue fracture mechanics calculations in BS 7910 : 1999 recommend
safety factors on certain parts of the fatigue calculation (e.q. a minimum safety
factor of 4 is required on the parameter C), but it states that the use of its
recommended constants will give a survi val proba bi lity correspondi ng to 97.7%,
l.e. the same as a mean-2SD S-N curves.
No add itional tect o- of safety is explicit ly stated.
28
log ""
SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE MECHANICS
Should My FM Calculation Predict My SoN Curve?
SoN Curve L)
My SoN curve has used many welds: I
containing a certain type , numbel' , shape
and size of ('inilia!' ) defects
having various stress concentrations --- - -
(SCFs) due 10misalignment, etc.
certain cyclic stresses, applied in the
laboratory
(usually) of unknown qual ity, strength and
touqbness.
and the curves will have been plott ed using
regression methods, and lower bounds.
Fracture Mechanics calculation
My FM calculation requ ires experimentally
derived parameters (C and m), an accurate
measure of the initial defect size. good
measures of SCFs and applied stresses
and knowledge of material properties such
as toughness and yi eld strength
Should My FM Calculation Predict My SoN Curve?
Agreement?
If my fracture mechanics calculations can model all the above, and if my
fracture mechanics calculation has very accurate model parameters, then I
shoul d obtain reasonable agreement.
Likel y?
It i s unlikely that I will be able to model all the above, and accurately predict
an S-N Curve , unless I conduct many calculations, or I have exact data
from the tests that made up the S- N curve.
!
,
!
g
l O WER BO UNO
, < , . _ .. m-..", ... ,n.
n _ ' _ . , 0"'" .'..
29
SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE MECHANICS - What if
my FM Calculations Predict Longer Lives than my S-N Curve?
If you are calcul ati ng the fatigue life of defects larger than those allowed in a
welding (workmanshi p) specmceuon. you expect your fracture mechanics
calculations 10pred ict shorter fatigue lives than the S-N curve.
However , reme mber to be consistent.
If you are comparing you r fracture mechanics calculated fatigue life with an
S N curve, they must contain the same safety factors.
There is no point comparing a mean-2SDSoN curve to an accurate fracture
mechanics calcul ation.
II is basi 10view an S-N curve (without safety factors) as the maximum life you
would obtain from a fracture mechanics calculation, under identical load s and
geometry, as the S- N curve wi ll be based on specimens with sma ll defect sizes.
Unless you i mprove the fatigue strength of the we ld (e.g. by toe gri nding), the
fatigue lives from the S N curv e can not be exceeded using fracture mechan ics
calcul ations.
O ~ I X l _
SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE MECHANICS - Small
Defects
SoN curves of we ldme nts are a good description of the fatigue life of that
weldment when it contains defects (e,g . small slag int rusion s at a weld toe) tha t
ar e not readi ly detected by conventi onal non-destructive i nspect ion, ..
They ar e equivalent to fatigue fra cture mechani cs calculations of the weldment
using very small initial defects (e.g. < O.5mm deep).
The re is no requirement to apply the same saf ety factors to fatigue lives usi ng
SN curves or fracture mechanics.
Safety factors should be induded to accommodate uncertainties in each of the
approaches.
30
GUIDANCE IN DESIGN CODES FOR ESTIMATING
THE FATIGUE LIFE OF A PIPELINE
Both 858010 and lGEfTD/ 1 have guidance on fatigue. A limit of 15000 cycl es, al a maximum
daily variation in hoop stress of 125 Nfmm2 is quoted. Smaller and larger stress ranges are
allowed . The number of cycles at the specified stress ranges are factored (multiplied) by this
factor C. The sum of factored and unfactored cycles should not exceed 15,000 cycles.
-.R.nge (WWlon'l h oot... C
~ 2.5'
125 - 145' 1.5'
105 125
1'0 ' 05 U
)510 0.2
O- llS 0
. r-tOIO_ fWlIIeS ..., tBcIcn are ~ in IGETDi1. bUt nol in as80'0
Thefatigue life of a pipeline , as given in the above table. is based on the assumption that a
delect survives the high level pre-service hydrotest. This defect can then grow due 10 fatigue
cycling. The limit it can grow to is dictated by the maximum operating pressure.
Consequentty. the above table assumes a high level test , and the stress cycles as given. The
cal culations use basic fracture mechanics laws (validated against experiments), wi th a safety
factor of 10 to accommodate the uncertaint ies associated with these type of calculations.
DEALING WITH COMPLEX CYCLIC LOADING
"
"
31
DEALING WITH COMPLEX CYCLIC LOADING
rfl
'vv
r ROO
"
"' - ,-_.....,.
-
,.
-
;'
X
tr-
!.
-
J-

-

-
.
~ ~ ~
-
I
j -
I
l oading on a pipeline will not follow a
regular patter, such as a single '- Stress
pressurerange, over a constanttime _______
period.
It will be complex
Therefore, we need to be able to
analyses and simplify complex loading
histories, and then use the simplified ""-
history in our S-N analysis, or fracture
mechanics analysis \
'.
COMPLEX CYCLIC LOADING: 'Cycle counting'
We need to simplify comp lex load histories into a
numberof stressrangesand cycles
We use met hods called 'ralnflcw' or 'reservoir'
methods to do this.
These methods require software
In the Reservoir method :
Complete stress (or load) cycles are counted using
this met hod.
The stress waveform must be expressed so that it
starts and finishes at the same value. which must
be the maximum peak .
The waveform is cons idered to represent the profile
of the bottom of a reservoi r filled with water.
The way in which the water would empty from the
reservoir as successive troughs are drained defines
the cycles to be counted.
The height of the column of water that is drained
defines the stress range.
complex cycli c loadi ng
----------- t ime
one cycl e
maximum
val ue
minimum
value
c _ OOOB R0V6/1
sI mple cyclic loads
32
RESERVOIR CYCLE COUNTING METHOD
Imagine that a hole is
made in the deepest
trough first.
1. The first cycle is
defined by the depth of
water thai is drai ned oul
by that operation giving
the stress cycle
represented by d 0
1
.
2. The next deepest
trough is t!'len dr ained.
gi ving the stresscycle:
AO":. and so on, counting
a stress cycle after each
trough has been drained
until the reservoir is
empty.
deeper
time
es
COMPLEX CYCLIC LOADING: 'Miner's Rule'
si mple cyclic l oads
mulmum
value
minimum
value
----- - - - '-'.'- . -
Stress
Now we need to change these many stress ranges one eycle
and cycles inlo a single stress range and single
number of cycles, to allow us 10 use a S-N curve, or
simplify our fractu remechanics crack growth
calculation
We use the Palmgren-Miner's rule to do this.
We assume that the 'damage' at a given stre ss level
is equal to the 'cycle rati o'
The cycl e ratio is the ratio of the number of cycl es
at a giv en stress level, n, to the fali gue life in
cycles at that stress level, N:
n n n " n
-' + _ 2 +... _ ~ ~ l or L - ' ~
N
1
N
2
N ~ , Nj
n, '" no. of cycl es at a given stress range
N, is expected fat igue life at that stress level
Failure is assumed tc occur when this sum >=1
si ngle cyclic load
33
COMPLEX CYCLIC LOADING: Summary
COMPLEX CYCLIC
LOADI NG
-
CYCLIC COUNTING
METHOD
II number of indIvidual
cycl es of different ranges
MINER'S RULE
II number of cycl es of II
single stress range
reservoir cyc le counting
rai n-flow cycle counting
0_200II_
1. S-N CURVES, or
2. FRACTURE MECHANICS
"
34
Fundamentals: How to Assess Defects in
Pipelines
Penspen Integrity
' eM
INTRODUCTION
1
2
Defects fail pipelines
Nole ,..... 0f'S ..... """"9"" do" ;.
"""" 001""';sed
load
INTRODUCTION: Fracture Mechanics
Science acture e ies
General
881791 A 1579
Codificafion
In Pipelines
ASME 831 A 104 NIJ: GS F10
Codes
Specific
CSAZ184 NV RP F10
Guidelines
Gouges
Crack Prop.
Best Practices?:
Corrosion
Ginh Welds
Fracture mechanics is
t he science and models
of the behaviour of
defects in structures
It is used extensively
around the wor ld, and
in most industries
It forms the basis of all
the methods we use in
pipe lines.
However, we have
developed our own
methods over the
years , which have
taken the complexity
out of the calculations.
But t hey are still based
on fracture mechanics
NEVER ASSESS A MESSI Fracture mechanics can help you assess defecti ve structures. but you
CPM...., 2OIl! should not apply illo slructures Ihal are dearly unsafe, or have been badly designed, built Of operated. 4
2
INTRODUCTION: Defect Assessment
FIRST. GOOD DESIGN! - All engineering
structures should be designed. built and
operated 10a recognised code or
stanoarc.occesionany. defects occur in these
structures, but. ..
Defect assessment IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE
FOR GOOD DESIGN, BUILD OR
OPERATION - IT IS COMPLEMENTARY
ASS ESS ALL POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES:
Fracture
Fatigue
Yielding or plastic coll apse
l eakage
Corrosion ancl erosion
Stress corrosion cracking and
corrosion fatigue
Buckling
Creep and creepJfatigue
Often, a combi nation of failure
modes needs to be considered .
INTRODUCTION: We are assuming 'ductile'
materials
We will consider ' ductile behaviour" in this presentation
5
Ener gy Absorbed
lower shelf (BRITTLE)
Temperature
' Impact' toughness
specimens are used
10 plot these curves
__2001 _ 1!11
-c..ew.lracue"_ Ill. .........Iion, grootAA _ 01_1hNcl 01a. cno<i.

6
3
MEASURING 'DUCTILE' & 'BRITTLE' BEHAVIOUR:
DWTT
We use a 'drop weight tear test' (DWTT) speci men to determi ne if line
pipe is ductile or brittle
O_:IOOI_&,1
..._---- - -
MEASURING 'DUCTILE' & 'BRITTLE' BEHAVIOUR:
Charpy
We use a ' Charpy' specimen to measure the (ductile) toughness of line
pipe IF
/ " .I'IoJ/
O_2OJI_lV'
r
8
"'
4
POSSIBLE LOW TOUGHNESS PIPELINES
Modem line pipe steels are ductile. and failure is generally cont rolled by
the yield strength or 'plastic collapse', not brittle fracture. The following
applications MAY be susceptible to brittle fracture initiation.
Materials manufactured prior to 1927.
Any material that has been shown t o have a full scale ini tiation transit ion
temper atu re above the operating temper at ure.
Materi al of thickn ess greater than 12.7 mm, unless the fu ll scale ini tia tion
transiti on temper ature is below the oper ating t emperature.
Def ects In mechani cal joints, fabricat ed, f orged. f ormed or cast fitti ngs
and attached appurt enances.
Def ects in bond l ines of f lash welded (FW) or low fr equ ency electric
res ist ance welded (ERW) butt-welded pipe.
Older Stee ls :
' Lap welded' or 'f urna ce butt weld ed' pipe;
' Semi- killed' st eels (older steel s that did not recei ve modern processi ng).
0_2001_""
... _ """"v_8:l,.c.r __.. _ ............_ 9
LINE PIPE FRACTURE BEHAVIOUR
0__2OOlI_""
5
FRACTURE: 'Initiation' and 'Pro pagat ion'
_A defect in line pipe can fail by 'initiation' then 'propagation'
. 'Initiation' refers to the growth of a defect under rising pressure,
cyclic pressure, constant pressure, and environment, to the point
where it penetrates the pipe thickness and produces a leak or a
rupture.
'Propagation' refers to the rapid axial, or in high secondary stress
conditions, circumferential, extension of a fracture once it has initiated
or penetrated the pipe wall
cl_2\lOII _'"
_.,_.._0-'_... -...... ""'- _ 11
FRACTURE: 'The 'Transition Temperature'
tz
DUCTILE
temperature
tr ansiti on
temperature
Brittle
BRITTLE
..", .-..... ....""
--..... _... ...,..
. The 'transition temperature' is the
temperature at which the fracture
mechani sm changes from ductile to brittle,]
6
FRACTURE: ' FITT' and ' FPTT
temperature
T
FPTT
is
greater than T FITT
_The fracture
'initiation' transition
temperature (FlI T) is
the temperature at
which the fract ure
'initiation' mode
changes.
_The fracture
'propagation'
transiti on temperature
(FPTT) is the
temperature at which
the fractur e
' propagation' mode
changes.
e ...
FPTT
FITT
,t1---
I 0
o
I 0
o
I '
,
-'"
initiati on
:: - ;--- -
. propagation
ta
Ductile
FRACTURE: The 'FITT"
_The fracture initiati on trans ition
temperature (FlIT) is the dividing
line. where the fracture ini tiat ion
mode changes from ductile to
brittle, as the temperature
decreas es bel ow the FITT.
_ II depends on loading ral e on
the defect (see next figure)
_ It depends on the type of defect
_ It depends on the thickness of
the structure
~ Chaopy I 0
_. _. - I
. : : : . - _ . ~
FITT
Temperature
O_2llOOl_1II '
Drop Weight Tear Test (DWTT) specimen
_ . j _ ~ . "_C-'-..," . :II. ""' ,.,
7
FRACTURE: The Variables
)
~
o
throug h-wall
defect
t emperat ure t emper ature
-e
-1!
o
11
C_2OOI_..'
also, decreasing
thickness in Charpy
or DWTT specimen
temperature
-...""'"_.. _.... _ ~
"
FRACTURE: Using 'OWTT' specimens to determine
'FITT'
Temperature
A
Charp;:'-notch
test specnn en
l he or ientation of tom
specmens 's the same
I
FITT
OL- ------JL---=-_
DWTT test
specime n
(flattened)
F
11- - - -
_ For most pipelines, the FITT can
be estimated from 'DWTT' curves .
_ Early work indicated that the FITT
is - 33
0
C* below the temperature for
85% shear area on a own
specimen.
_But note that work by Battelle" has
shown thalia ensure failure of a 85%
defect is governed by the UTS of the
material, a typical toughness (full size
Charpy) of 60-75 ft Ib (81-102J) is
needed.
_ Not e that these levels need to be
calculated. and that they wiDensure
collapse at the UTS (which is higher than
ue conventional now stress weuse in
our equatiOOs - see later)
0_2001_.. '
_ ., . .... .. .. ~ _ e o T __.. -..
.... - """'_ ........" .....-.'-
-.-...... T ~ __.... _ ......,
~ ~ _ .."'""_.-. "- .-:.,,- -
8
FRACTURE: Using 'DWTT' specimens to determine
'FPTT'*
Temperature
FPTT
F
specimen
(flattened)
DWTIlest
0'-- -'--------=_ _
85%
]
" m
s:
<Il
_Full scale tests have shown
that the DWTT can be used to
predict FPTT.
_The FPTT is typicall y taken
as the temperature at which
100
1- - - - -
the DWTT f racture
appearance is 85% shear.
C Ponspon 2006 R"" 611
17
ENSURING DUCTILE BEHAVIOUR: Using 'Charpy'
specimens
_ Recent work' investigated corrosion in low
toughness pipe S
_ It used 'FPTI' (defined in the work as the temp. E
corresponding to 85% shea r area on a Charpy) "g
_ 'Rule of thumb' is thai carbon steels operating c%
>60
oF
below the FPTI may be susceptible 10brittle ~
fracture a.
II was concluded: B
_from tests {on steels at temperatures up to 208F
below FPTI). and
eservtce experience
_ thai ducti le behaviour can be expected al
temperatures below the FPTI
_The work concluded that current corrosi on
assessment methods could be applied to line
pipe made after 1947, assuming the FPTT is not
excessi vely high
'FPTT'
Temperature
Soo ",_ ",__. ~ , __~ l _ E , , , ~ _
""' '''''C-..''''' "_ "'CO>'"
a s erecnve corrosion In old ERW matenals ISan
exception
C Pon-,2006 R&>' 6Il
18
9
HOW A PART WALL DEFECT FAILS
0_2001_&11
HOW A PART WALL DEFECT IN A PIPELINE FAILS
ts
p ....... _"". Pa rt Wall Defect
l ' ' ,

b.tt ......,_ .... ,......"l
' 9""' _ .... . .".... 001"" '...
Defect

......_w.. .Leak
...._.-.........-.-
I ,.. _w.. _-._ __ .... _.__........
0_2001_11'
20
10
EARLY WORK ON PIPELINE DEFECT
ASSESSMENT
o p ~ 2000 flov 6/1
BACKGROUND TO METHODS FOR ASSESSING
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Early Work
21
---- - --
The methods we will describe for
assessing pi peline defects are based on
research work undert aken at Battelle
Memorial Instit ute (in the US)
In the 19605 and ear ly 19705, Battelle
(on behalf of the American Gas
Association (AGA conducted.
Over a 12 year period, up to 1973,
ove r 300 full scale tests were
completed.
92 tests on artificial through wall
defects
48 tests on art ificial part wall defects
(machined V-shaped notches)
splpe length
22
11
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Tests
_Battelle developed:
a'semr-ernoocar failure
criterion for through wall
defects
esemr-empmcer failure
criterion for part wall
defects
through-wall defect
part-wall defect
,'-,,---,
;p
.....':\ \.
. . .
..............
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Failure Mode
The Battell e wo rkers noted that li ne pipe with defects failed in two basic
ways:
'Bri ttle' ('toughness dependen t) - these tests failed at low stress (pressure),
with low deformation. To predict the failure of these tests
you needed a measure of material toughness.
' Ductile' ('strength' dependent) - these tests failed at high siress. with
deformat ion. To predict the failure of these tests you needed a measure
of material yield strength.
DUCTILE
Fortunately, most line pipe (certainly that
S IreSS
FAILURES
bought to a good modem standard,

- DEFORMATION
e.g. API 5L) failed in a ductile manner.
"
This is good, as failure is preceded by BRITTl.F'
deformation, and failure is at high stress.
Very old, or poor quality line pipe
could fail in a more britl!e manner

"
12
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Failure Mode
A ductile burst failure has a
disti nct bulge at the burst
location.
A longitudi nal fracture extends
over the length of the bulge
and terminates near the end
of the bulge.
The end of fracture tums at
roughly 45 degrees from the
pipe axis at each end.
The failure surfaces have
sharp edges
Ductile
Brittle
Figures from API 1111
25
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Dependence on Toughness
0.8
1.3
Scatter
Strength
Dependent
I
- 27J* (FuJI Size Charpy)
(20 n ib)
Very old, low toughness line pipe & welds are not covered by our
fundamental equations.

ill'"
.::: (JJ 1

Toughness +--
Dependent
:o
13 e
<til.
o
Toughness
cl_2OOI_s-1 "Thio . _ buf:.-.nol
t:oI:opse_ UTS. k __ __IhouklIle"'"
26
13
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Dependence on Toughness
..
"
..
..
..
..
..
",
"
..
"
..
"
Strength
Dependent
I
-27J (Full Size Charpy)
(20 fl lb)
Toughness
Dependent
0 '-- _
O_:!tIOG_&,1
Toughness
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Theories
Many other organisations have since conducted tests to confirm
the validity of the Battell e workers pioneering research.
The early work compared the measured failure stress of pipeline
defects with that predicted using various for mulae proposed by
the workers.
If 'predicted' by theory = 'measured' from test , then the theory
was good.
28
14
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Test Results
r-
Predi cted Failure Stress-
Iyiekl Slrength ('lloJ
Non-conservative
prediction
... _ ,,,,,,,,,,
o .. _ . .... ..

Conservative
prediction
. . . . - -
Measured Failure StresSIyieId strength ('%)
C_20J5_... 29
FAILURE OF A THROUGH WALL DEFECT
O_2006_lIIl
30
15
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS: Leak or Rupture
C_2OlI_'-'
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS -
Defect Dimensions
_ First of all we will consider
the 'through-wall' defect in a
pipeline.
Yes, this is a leaking
defect. so it is not a
practical defect to
'assess'.
_ However, it is simple, and
. when we assess a through
wall defect we are assessing it
to see if it will remain a 'leak'
(no fai lure) or ' rupture' (a
failure)
o
-_.. ..-

O_2C05_lVI
32
16
Defect Dimensions
through-wall defect
1
I (or 2c)
'I

""

"=I
II _ww
I (or 2c) = defect axial length
t = pipe wall thickness
O_2OOIl_1II1
33
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - 'Bulging'
When a through wall def ect
is pressurised, the tips are
highl y stressed, due to:
the lack of a hoop stress along
the length of thedefectto resist
the internal pressure, and
resistance 10 bulging.
High
stresses
C _ 2OOIl_lIl
17
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS: 'Bulging'
Defect bulges outwards before failure
<,
FLUID PRESSURE
This bulging plays a major role in the defect's
failure. so we wi ll need somemeasureof it.
o_:ruoa_..,
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - Failure Equation
35
OJ 1
- =M
a
""-? .
where
(,.
......
. .
'" .:
......
So. we need to understand:
. Folias Factor
_Flow Stress
C _ 2OOlI_ ell
= hoop stress (a
o)
in pipel ine when through-wall defect
fails
=flow stress
=Folias factor (bulging factor)
18
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - Folias/Bulging
Equations
_It quantifies the bulging we see around a defect in a pipel ine. as it fails
under pressure loadi ng. e
_ It is a stress amplification at the ends of the defect ..
_ The longer the defect, the larger the bul ging "
_There are various approximations to Fol ias' solution:
{2c
'
M 1 0 4
Early lower bound
= +. =RI
v ru approx imation
O_2OOII_lIIil
defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
Devel oped from
Theory
(most precise)
Where:
2c =
t =
R =
Lower bound
approximation to
above
i 2c z
1+O.2"\. JRi
At =
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - Folias/Bulging Graphs
..
J8
The longer the defect, the
larger the bulging
. 2c1(RI)05is
a sln.ple way
of plotting
' normalised'
defect length .
_This
'normalised'
length has no
units, and
allows us 10
produce plots
for any 'R'
and 'r. in any
units.
.. .. o. 'u ..
2c1(Rt)o.5(normalised defect lengt h) :..........=..-
..
00
00
00
"
00
00
..
..
..
M"
00
19
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - '2c/(Rt)a.s,?
. What does '2c1(Rt)05' mean?
. '2c is the length of the defect.
. 'Rt' is the pipe geometry. For example:
. If R =12 inches... t =0.33inches... Rt =4
. (Rt)O.5= 2
. '2c1(Rt)O.5' =2c12
. So.. . if I have a 6 inch long defect in a pipe of 12 inch radius
and 0.33 inch wall thickness... '2c1(Rt)O.5= 6/2 = 3
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - The ' Fl ow Strength'
39
The flow stress is an empiri cal concept.
It was introduced during the early work by
Battelle on the development of failure
criteria for part wall and through wall
defects in pipelines, as a means of taking
into account 'work harden ing'
As the stress increases above yield
strength. the steel har dens as it
deforms. and can withstand more
loading.
We can view flow stress is when
plastic flow begins around the erect
~ _ ; I l l I I _
" PLASTICITY
'WORK' NECKING
HARDENS
ELASTIC
"
20
Stress (0)
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - The ' Fl ow Strength'
typical engi neering stress-
strain CUNe for line

ultimate . pipe steel
tensile ./
strength yr>'''-- - - - - - ---''''''' ",.---- elastic-perfectly plastic
yield -- ----- flow " material
strength strength
Strain (el
_Battelle used fractu re mechanics to develop a fai lure criterion, assuming an 'el astic-
perfectly plastic' materi al. However, line pipe steels exhibit work hardeni ng.
_As a means of approximating work hardening in a single parameter, the concept of the
flow strength was proposed.
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - The 'Flow Strength'
YIELD
..
t he fl ow stress is
somewhere between t he'"'
STRENGTH yield and tensile st rengt h
/
'->

STRESS?
I
TENSILE P
STRENGTH
0 ___....
"
21
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - The 'Flow Strength'
- - - { -- flow
strength
.. .. . . ... ..:.: .."' ... . . ---
The flow strength is not a precisely defined term
it lies somewhere between the yield strengt h and the ultimate tensile
strength of the material .
A number of diff erent definitions of the flow stress have
been proposed
They often depend on what form gives the best fit to the
experimental data.
The following have been quoted in the published literature:
. o-y + 10 ksi
_1.1 0"y
_1.1 50"y
_ (O"y. 0", )/2
. 0.9 au
C POMpM 2006 Roy 611
lT
y
+ 10 ksi (+ 68.95 N.mm
2
)
1.1ay
1.15ay
(ay ..O"ull2
O. 9au
"u
(
2C)' ( 2, )'
M = 1 + OJ 14 --:nr; - 0.00084 -:j'ii;
HOOR stress at O"{; ==M-1 CL
.>
Or, we can plot this as a curve...
CI_ ","" 2006 Rov6l1
22
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS - Failure Graph
"
ThiSleak rupt ure boundary is net sensitive to preS$uri$ing medium
cor
RUPTURE
LEAK
2c/(Rt)"O.5
,
Th., "' ''' um.. . """ .".." ot

1 . S . ~ . . _
What does 'hoop stress at failure' mean?
The predicted failure stress (a
r)
is simply the hoop stress in
the pipeline that will cause the defect to fail.
The nominal hoop stress in the pipeline is a
o
and is equal to
pD/2t.
So... if my predicted fai lure stress (a
r)
is 400N/mm' , then
the hoop stress (a
o)
to cause failure is 400N/mm'.
If the hoop stress 0' 0 in my operating pipeli ne is < err then
the defect in the pipeline will not fail.
If the hoop stress a
o
in my operating pipeline is ~ a
r
then
the defect in the pipeline wi ll fail.
I calculate my fai lure pressure from my failure stress by:
PI= a,2t1D
23
THROUGH WALL DEFECTS Summary
boundary is J>ol $OOI'li"" t<II'<essurising mooium
I ?,- IIri I
[J
"

Example No.1: Calculation
_ I find a defect that is through my pipe wall.
_ It is 6 in length (2c) (remember it is through wall
so its depth is 100% t).
_ The operating pressure (P) is 834 psi
. Operating stress =rr =PDl2t =634x36/2xO.5 =
30,OOOlbf/in
2
_ Will thi s through wall defect either leak (no fai lure) or
rupture (fail)?
(J
0_2005_611
"
24
Example No.1: Calculation
CY
f
t36" Diameter (2R) 0.5" t, X60. Operating Pressure =834psi
. Defect =6 inch in length (2c), Operating stress = 3O,OOOlbflin
2
8 1want to calculate the failure stress of my defect. 0' 1
8 1f operating stress < Of the through wall defect will not failure (it will
'only' leak)
_ If operating stress> of the through wall defect will fail (it will rupture)
- cr= 1.15x600oo =69000 ibffl n'and 2rJfii.i = 6/ ;;8xO.5 = 2
_M P/"1 ... 0.26 (2}2 = 1.43 therefore M" =1 /1.43 =0.7
- ala= 0.7. therefore, 0", =69.000 x 0.7 = 48.3101bflin
2
8 Failure stress =at= 48,310 Operating stress =0"9 =30,000 ap oa
8Therefore, t his through wall defect will not fail (it will ' only' leak and it
will not rupt ur e).
e I/,
Example No.1: Calculation using Graph
_ From previous page. 2cl ft. 2
_ From this graph I obtain M-l " 0.7
_ If M-l =0.7 =c r f f ~ and now strength is 69,OOOlbflin2.
_Failure Stress. 0', =0. 7 x 69,000 =48,300 lbfli nl
_ This fail ure stress is above my operating stress (30,000 lbflin
2
)
_ Therefore my throughwall defect leaks and does not ruptur e.
50
".
".
It 1<0.) 1'.( k J-tI.oooo.o J.: J
'l71 " ~
2c1(Rt)U (nonnOil l ised defect lengt h)
..
M-l
..
..
- "
..
..
..
"
"
"
..
.. ..
f
0 _ _ _ &<1
25
Example No.1: Calculation using Graph

2c1(Rt)AO.5
_ 36" diameter, D (radius. R '" 18"),0.5" wall thickness (t), X60
_6 incillong;roughwall defect
_ 2c/ Rt = 61 8xO.5'" 2
_The operating pressure (P) is 834 psi ::: 30,000 Ibllin2
_Operat ing st resslyield strength Is 0.5
_Nol e we put the operating stress along the y-axis , as we
are determining if this defect will fail at operation
_ The point falls below the leak/rupture boundary
_Therefore this defect will no fail . it will only'leak.
I
RUPTURE (failure)
LEAK (no failure)
"
-
51
FAILURE OF A PART WALL DEFECT
C_llXIlI .... ....
sa
26
A PART WALL DEFECT
0_2001_..'
I
2.
::
d '
part -wall defect
I
)
53
PART WALL DEFECT - Defect Dimensions
Maximum
defect dept h, d I (or 2c)
1 I "I
=rr------r--II
d =
l (or2c) =
t =
III _ 2001"'- ..,
defect depth
defect axial lenglh
pipe wall thickness
27
PART WALL DEFECT - Defect Dimensions
I (or 2c)
Defect area
1
: = ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ---,I
d =
l(or 2c) =
t =
defect depth
defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
55
PART WALL DEFECT - Failure Process
~ .
~ .., i .
__2006_611
56
28
PART WALL DEFECT - Failure Process
. A part wall defect in a pipeline fails as follows:
_ The defect 'bulges' as the pressure in the pipel ine is increased
_ Apart-wall defect bulges less than a through wall defect of the same
length, because the material in the remaining ligament resists the
internal pressure
_The ligament below the defect plastically deforms
. ' Stable' crack growth starts. and the pressure continues to increase
_ If the pressure is stopped during this growth, the growth stops
. 'Unstable' crack growth. leading to a leak or a rupture
O_2lXJe_1I/1
PART WALL DEFECT - Background to Failure
Equations
The early workers at
Battelle conducted many
full scale tests
They found that simple
equati ons could describe
the failure of defects in
pipelines.
They compared thei r
predicted failure stresses
of pipeline sections
containing part wall
defects
They found a good
correlat ion with the
measured fai lure st ress.
O_2\lllt_....
,.
Predict&d Failure Stress

","",_(%1
.--...._..
o __.... _
58
29
PART WALL DEFECTS - Failure Equations
d
A
ae
,d
1- -
"
1- - - .
uf = I u
t
=
A,
"
d 1
0<
A 1
<T
1- - -
<T
1- - - R
1 M A, M
where
- -- - - - - - - - - -
u,
=
hoop stress al failure
a =
flow strength
d
=
defect depth
t =
pipe wall thickness
A
=
cross sectional area of metal loss
A,
=
M
=
These equations apply
to internal and external
defects
O ___1W1
59
PART WALL DEFECTS - Failure Curves
FAIL
NO FAIL
FlowatrooQth 1.15" ,
.:::::::::::::::-------- d,....lt =0.4
05
0."
0.7
08
0.'
0.95
0 ..'
a
2c1(Rt)AO.5

30
PART WALL DEFECTS - Failure Curves
"
2c
1.0_40(* r
'11." "rola
"'i
It
FIow..nnglh. 1 1 ~
:;
,
~
C
e
;;:) ot
-e
AJA" '" 0.4
:;;
0.'
~ o.
o.
e
en o. 0.7
2
0.e

0.9
0.95
,

A." a 2c.t
e_1OOlI_.. '
2c1(Rt )"O.5
et
d
a / =
I - -
PART WALL DEFECTS - Pressure/Stress
I
used in Failure Equations
a
d 1
1- - -
1M
_If you are calculating the FAILURE STRESS (or pressure) of
a known defect in a pipeline, thi s predicted fail ure stress must
be compared to the maximum operating stress in your pipeline.
_ If the predicted fai lure stress (or pressure) of a defect is below the
maximum operating stress (or pressure), the defect will fail the pipeline.
_ If the predi cted failure stress (or pressure) of a defect is above the
maximum operating stress (or pressure), the defect will not fail the
pipeline.
_Remember that the maximum operating stress in your
pipeline may occasionally be above your MAOP and
your design stress.
_This maximum stress (pressure) may be governed by
settings on relief valves, leak detection systems. etc.,
And this maximum stress (pressure) may be > design
e_2llOe_....
62
3 1
PART WALL DEFECTS - Example using
Failure Equations
d
I - -
I
d 1
1- - -
1M
=83% SMYS
-2
=69.OOOlbflIn2
d/l:"O.5
:60,OOOx1 .15
-
M
-a
U
a
,
20
Contains a part wall defect of depth (d) of 0.25", and length (2c ) of ~ Toughness (ev) '" 30ftlb
'" failure stress
'" flow strength
" defect depth '" 0.25
:: pipe wall thickness
'" 6 2c1(Rt)"O.5" 61/18xO.5Y'Q.5
:: Folias factor (bulging faetor) .'-1- 1+0.4{ Ji;r"1.61
1-0.5,11-0.5(111 .61) "0.72
0.72x69.000 " 50,000 Iblliw
FAILURE STRESS IS . 83% SMYS
~ _ : I O l l l _ l I l
Is this 'Acceplable'
OJ
PART WALL DEFECTS - Example using
Failure Curves
-' "
............... ............................
. " .
.................. .
0.7
05
0.6
08
0.9
0.95
d/t =0.4
.............. .
. .
. .
............
6"
,
.............................................._..
........-....
._- . .
-"--
- '"
-----
I calculate my ---.....
2e1(Rt)AD.5
,
.-
-'"
2cJ(Rt )" O.5
0_2OOt _ ..l
32
PART WALL DEFECTS - Leak/Rupture
,-
I
RUPTURE .-
,
-

t , '

I
0
I .
, .

I

I
! .

! u , = ,U-'ij
I .
,
,

LEAK
,

Battelle test data
65
PART WALL DEFECTS - Failure and Leak/Rupture
"
,
-=
2c1(Rt)"O.5
dfl =0. 4
0 5
0.6
0.7
0.8
66
33
PART WALL DEFECTS - Leak/Rupture ' Thr eshol d'
or 'Boundary'
..
..
..
..
..
_.
-:
_As part wall defects increase in length.
they are more likely to rupture. t. '
8 We can see from the figure opposite,
that the leak rupture curve is starting to I"..
plateau at a stress of about 30% SMYS.
.Historically, this '30%' has been i
consider ed the leak/rupture thresh old
or boundary:
_Defects of any size, at stresses
below 30% SMYS will leak rather than rupture
This boundary does not actuall y exist. and the long defects at this stress
level would release significant amounts of product, equivalent to a rupture,
although the defect would not propagate along the pipeline.
a Recent work at Battetlle" indicates that the 30% SMYS threshold is
reasonable for corrosion defects , but mechanical damage defects may have
a lower threshol d (25% SMYS)
0_2006 _ 61 ,
"
PART WALL DEFECTS - Summary
_.
hoop stress at failure

flow strength
defect depth
defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
Fouasfactor (bulging factor)
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
d
I - -
I
d I
1- - -
1M
"2-
a
d
2c
I
R
M
a f =- ---,-',- 1
a
Where (e.g.): M =
.. _ 2OOI1Iow 11/'
ee
34
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
0_2OOII_lI/l
CIRCUMFERENTIAL DEFECTS
69
zc defect longi tudinal (axial ) length
d defect depth
t pipe wall thickness
o pipe diameter
C_2OOlI_..,
part-wall defect
2,
35
INTERACTING DEFECTS
pert-wan defects
defects are said to interact when the behaviour of the
defects considered together differs to that of the defects
when considered individuall y
e_2OOlI_....
"
SAFETY FACTORS ON PIPELINE DESIGN
PRESSURE
_We MUST apply a safety
factor to our defect
calculations to
accommodate:
eo vercressores (<10% of
MAOP),
_Time dependent effects
5% of failure pressure).
_ Mal erial variations (e.g.
SMYS aod w.l.) ,
e unceternees in defect
equation,
euncerteoues in defect
measurements,
_Etc.
"Ac tual failure stress of detect-tree
pipe is UTS Of >1.25.SMYS
o
' Desig n Factor '
(hoop stress/ SMYS)
1.4 ,-----------1-----,
1.2
1
0.8
0.8
0.4
0.2
Design Hydrotest Failure
__2005_&11 _ ..... ' R -'OO
__ .-o." _ _
12
36
SAFETY FACTORS IN PIPELINE DEFECT
ASSESSMENT
Becauseof uncertainty in defect measurements,
operational parameters, material properties. etc., it is usual
to apply a safety factor to defect failure calculations.
This safety factor is generally (e.g. ASME B31G) taken as
1.39
This means that if (e.g.) your failure pressures is 139 bar,
the 'safe' pressure would be 100 bar.
This assumes NO FURTHER GROWTH OF THE DEFECT
IN QUESTION.
If your defect is growing. you must establish the final (end
of growth) defect size. and use this final size in your failure
calculations.
0_2OOlI_."
OTHER TYPES OF PIPELINE DEFECT
ASSESSMENT
0_20010.......
DATA STA( a :s
37
-------------------
BACKGROUND TO METHODS FOR ASSESSING METAL LOSS
DEFECTS - TOUGHNESS DEPENDENT
,.
c TOUGHNESS OEP(NOENT FLOW STRENGTH DEf'ENOENT
, ,
w
ill
wjt
-
110
"
Q
"
C .!2 EJr
c
K, l;r M -
'
-
W
' A t Mal
li:1 " In scc 28
Y
0"0: a
&'0'"1
OJ
"
, ,
'::' ".'n

.,
;
Li ne pipe with lower

,
"
I. toughness tailed .
;
.
.
with little
.\f",
,
"
deformation , and

... ..
these failures were
"

' ..
. described by this
.
I , .
"
dependent (Cv)
. relali onsh;p. Those

"
. that failed with large
deformation were
.. described by the
to"""' h .... ...."" flow strength (tens ile
.. properties)
"
,
C. I<h & TOUGHNESSI dependent
_ '_ ("..m,,;... relationship.
",'

76
-
38
BACKGROUND TO METHODS FOR ASSESSING METAL LOSS
DEFECTS - TOUGHNESS DEPENDENT
77
'Ln sec' equation
is close to a
lower bound for
part wall defect
tests
tn sec' equation
s a 'good' fit to
wall
feet tests
"
._-
0 __
11 ' 0
c,-;{E.
..'

"
C._ E_
:.0 ' --
--_....

," --:-T" LL .L -"- -'- -'
, .; 0
..
MtT. '" U,'"

I
"
0
0

_ _ I
0
<>8 .
0
0
'0
0
' 0
"t

..

0

o
-
- .
"
.-, I
..
Tloey... o.
j
,
-..
,-
I ..
0 ,
O_2O_vt
METAL LOSS DEFECTS - Cv versus K
..
G=K' /E
Note:
We usually take our
Charpy speci men from the
transverse direction of the
line pipe, well away from
the weld, and as we do not
'natten' our Charpy, it
usually is ' subsize' (less
than 10K10mm cross
section) due to the thin
wall pipe
.' .
roo __
. .... _-
.:te./A -.
..
re
-
39
SMYS, SMTS and the FLOW STRENGTH
,.
-
"
,.
,
,
-
I
-
,
;
,.
,;
>
,.
,.
,.
Cl 200lIR.., $'1
->:
I ~
, 'oSUYS
v
$.\1>"$....'"
c ~
~
0
._,
0 IS...5.5....,5)'2
e
'"
."
'"
. ~ .00 ..,
".
. 00
,-
zs
40
How to Assess Corrosion Defects
Penspen Integrity
O Pe n....... 2"'" Rev<lll
LECTURE
1
Introduction
Axial corrosion defect assessment

Circumferential corrosion defect assessment
Published methodologies for assessing
corrosion
Summary of publ ished methods
ASME 831G
Modified 831 G
. DNV
Other considerations
Constructing acceptance charts
2
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION: What is Corrosion?
3
Corrosi on is a time dependent,
environmentally-assisted mechanism that
causes a metal to deteriorate by reaction
with its environment.
Corrosion results in:
metal loss.
The corrosion defect can have a
smooth or irregular profile. and
possibly contai n blunt or sharp
features.
sometimes cracking.
,
2
INTRODUCTION: What Causes Corrosion?
Corros ion requires four factors to be
present:
anode;
cathode;
metallic path connecting the anode
and cathode (e.q. a pipeline);
an electrolyte (e.q. soil and
groundwater for external pipewall
corrosion. or unt reated crude oil for
internal pipewall corrosion).
If any of these factors are not present or
prevented (e.g. coaling a pipel ine), then
corrosion cannot occur.
---_....... -
5
INTRODUCTION: Major Causes of Corrosion
Corrosion can be caused by galvanic attack, or it may be chemically
induced (e.g. microbiological induced corrosion) .
Galvanic corrosion is associated with the fl ow of current between"
two metals (one an anode, the other a cat hode) in a common
electrolyte
Most metals contain both anodic and cathodic areas (e.g. old
pipe connected to new pipe),
e n can result in large areas of general corrosion, local pitting,
and/or selective corrosion.
-"""'-- _.....
6
3
INTRODUCTION: Major Causes of Corrosion
Corrosion can be caused by galvanic attack, or it may be chemi cally
induced (e.q. microbiological induced corrosion) .
Microbiol ogical Induced Corrosion (MIG) is from bacteria that is
always present in soil. water, etc..
The bacteria do not cause the corrosion - but they create changes
in the electrolyte, e.g. by changing sulphides into sulphuric acid.
MIC typically has a rougher surface with axially ori entated
ridges.
MIC .. ..-go. ...... s_...._._

0_200ll Rov5I'
INTRODUCTION: Corrosion Types
We can have corrosion in a variety of
locations:
Internal (pipewall) corrosi on
External (pipewall) corrosion
Corrosion in the parent plate
Corrosion approachinglinlcrossing girth!
seamwelds.
It can be in differing orient ations:
Axial
Ci rcumferential
Spiral
Random
It can result in.. .
a single corrosiondefects
colonies of interacting corrosiondefects
7
8
4
INTRODUCTION: Corrosion Types
INTRODUCTION: Preferential Corrosion at ERW
Welds
9
Electric resistance (ERW)* or flash welded
(FW) seam welds are suscept ible to
'preferential' corrosion.
The bond line corrodes preferentially to the
surroundi ng steel. It can produce a 'sharp' V-
shaped notch along the bondline (external
and internal surfaces can be corroded) .
Note that this is predomi nantly a problem
with older ERW and FW line pipe.
--_.. __.._----_._-_.-.. -_._---
-_.. _--- _.. _----...~ _ .. _--
_..... _--_ -_..--- ---
5
INTRODUCTION: Preferential Corrosion at Welds
Preferential corrosion can occur
at welds (girth and seam).
' Narrow axial external corrosi on'
can occur along longi tudinal welds
in wrapped pipe
Cauti on is requi red when assessing
corrosion in low toughness
corrosion coincident with weld
defects.
0_:10:16_
INTRODUCTION: Environmental Cracking (HIC,
SCC and SSCC)
11
Environmentally assisted corrosion, such as
stress corrosion cracking (low pH and high pH
Sec). hydrogen induced cracking (HIC), etc. ,
must be assessed using a di ffering
methodology to that described subsequentl y,
because the degradation mechanism causes
cracki ng, bli stering, et c..
Hie . sec. SSCC are covered in the ' How to
Assess Cracks' part of the course.
They are usually controlled or prevented by
materia l selection, control of product , etc., and
their act ual assessment is rare.

t
) '
l
I
... "0.-. _ " .J . . e.- _
"
6
'Toughness' Dependent ' Flow Stress' Dependent
i (Using flow stress = (yield + UTS)/2)
-27J (Full Size Charpy)
(20 fl lb)
~
. , .
.....
0
1.3
Scatter
0.8
..
..
..
..
..
..
f. Chpy fFvI,...,
R'
o
Very old. low toughness line pipe & welds
are not covered by our equations.
Toughness
13
- Grade
"
' 00
so
.. -
!
" .
., .
I
SO ~
..
30 f
"
II .. .. , .
'"
Charpy f ~ s-,o ..
!f"---.>.--- -e
,
C = - 7ft Jb or.- 9 J
'"
,
t
r
,
r
t
~
,
,
~
,
e
__iOVCfa9" impac! energy
-Go- avemge she..........
" .",
"
.. 18
18
1; 1.
I II
i 10
; .
J 8
u
~ ,
Examp le of ' old' line
pipe toughness in USA
" , - - - - - - - - ----::--::------:,........,
R' ..
INTRODUCTION: Effect of Toughness
0_2OOlI __
_ . _ . - , ~ -.....-.---_..... _ - ~ ... _------,-
----"" ..',, _.-
"
7
INTRODUCTION - Definition of Corrosion
Dimensions
d =
2c(orf) =
2c' (or l J =
t =
D =
defect deplh
defect axiallenglh
circumferenl iallength
pipe wall thickness
pipe di ameter
circumferential extent
2,
C
J!
"
c
e
.!
E
,
l::! l ongit udinal extent
U
longitudinal extent
I- 2(: . :
d
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECT ASSESSMENT
._-- 16
8
CORROSION DEFECT - Axial Dimensions
2c (Of I)
1 f
T F - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - I I
I. 2, .1
. ~ ; S;;;.A 02
d
d =
2c(orl) =
t =
defect depth
defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
17
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS History of
Assessment Methods
The methods for assessing corrosion
defects are based on research at Battelle
Memorial Institute (USA) in the 19605 &
70s, for the American Gas Association
(AGA) .
Up to 1973, over 300 full scale tests
were completed, includi ng:
92 tests on arti ficiallhrough wall defects.
48 tests on arti ficial part wal l defects
(machi ned V-shaped notches).
They developed:
a failure criterion for through wall defects .
a failure criterion for part wall defects.
Subsequently, more tests, and numerical ~ ~
analysis, have been used to further ~
validate, and develop methods for
assessing corrosion.
9
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS - Failure of 'blunt'
defects
A blunt defect such as corrosion can fail in two ways in line pipe (excluding
cleavage failure)":
As t he load (pressure) increases, local wall thinning will occur in the remaining net
section, This local wall thinn ing could continue, leading to necking of the wall and
failuredue to void nucleation, grO'Mh and coalescence. similar to a tensilelest
specimen, and hence fai lure is domi nated by the ultimate tensile strength (plastic
col lapse )
A crack coul d init iate at the base of the defect due to the presence of micro-stress
raisers (e.g. local surface irregularities causedby a corr osion mechanism) throogh a
process of void nucleationand growth .
Thebehaviour al'\et!he initiation of II c:rad< would depend on !he IQughness of the matenal:
In II high toughness malenal, m alion would be to a higher load and fum-
stable duetile tearing would be sJov,er. or a g..,..,;ng c:rad< oould blunt; wal l lt1inning
would CQIlbnue and the lailure load would tend to that of plasbc co/Iapse.
In a Iowef toughness matenal. once initi aled. the crack would by stable ductile
tearing, reduci ng the remaining walilhickness and hence reducing \he degree of wall
thinni ng that occurs before failure.
The load at failure would be less than that predicted by the plast ic col lapse hmit
state because of the stable duct ile tearing
.......... _ .. '..._ _ .._ ..._ ..--..._ .... ' _ -.. .. ""'.......... ...-1'-1
_______ .., ._
.....,_..... __.. _ .._ .. __....... _ .. _-..... ... _ ,tItl
_______...... ,
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS - Failure Equations
19
d
I
d 1
1 - - --
1M
A
A
o
A 1
1- - -
A
o
M
These equations apply

to internal and external
defects
'"
=
a =
d
=
t
=
A
=
A, =
M
=
01'...-2005_'
(In terms of defect area)
hoop stress at failur e
fl ow stress
defect depth
pipe wall thickness
cross sectiona l area of metal loss
These equations are known as the 'NG18' equations, after
the project number used to deveiop the equations at Battelie
20
10
d
1- -
,
d 1
1- - -
t M
' oog
"""",
-
extensively.
'"""'''''''''
-..",
....
A$ buIgiI'Ig
--
,....
""'"
__u,

...
.. ..
2,
.. ..
LEAK RUPTURE
..
..
..
..
M-'
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS -
Folias/'Bulging' Factor
2c1JRt (normalised defect length )
21
:::::::::::::=-------------1dlt 0.4
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS
Failure Curves
"
d
1- -
,
d 1
1- - -
I AI
EA:L
o FAIL
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0'
0 95
, ,

,
2c1JRt (nonmalised defect length)
_... _-,---
22
11
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS The curves are
applicable to both internal & external defects
d
I - -
I
d I
1- - -
1M

ItH ERNAL CORROSION
1
..
i
TEl
IT
IT
1, <"
23
CORROSION DEFECTS - Why Don't Pits Fail?
Radial stress is small
Defect does not want to fail ' outwards'
"./
/"
Small defect cannot move to fail.
It is restrained by the elastic mass surroundin "I
O_200S_1II1
24
12
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS" " - Leak/Rupture"
"
RUPTU
2 3 5.
2c/JRt (normal ised defect length)
d/l .. 0.4
. 5
'.6
.,
D_2ODIl_l
-----,-- 25
.... __.. ... _l__
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS - More Likely to Fail
as a Leak
ec orroston is a time dependent failure.
_It can preferentially cor rode to a leak, even when its length is sufficient
to cause rupture
- So, corrosion 'prefers' to leak, but
corrosion CAN AND DOES rupture
Overall length should cause rupture
Very deep area in pit corrodes to a pinhole and leaks

26
13
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS Pressure/Stress to
use in Equations
_I f you are calculating the FAILURE STRESS (or pressure) of a
known defect in a pipeline, this predicted failure stress must be
compared tothe maximum operating stress in your pipeli ne.
_If the predicted failure stress I d
(or pressure) of a defect is "'-J a I - -
below the maximum operatiny ' _ 1_ = t
stress (or pressure) , the defect ~ = ~ ~ __1_
will fail the pipeline. ~ t M
_I f the predicted failure stress (or pressure) of a defect is
above the maximum operati ng stress (or pressure), the
defect will not fail the pipeline.
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS Pressure/Stress to
use in Equations
1- ~
I
d 1
1 - - - -
1M
CY
f
= - = - ----;-'--;--
CY
/
a operating
_I f you are calculating the DEFECT SIZE that will fail at the
operati ng (hoop) stress of the pipelin; , the operat ing stress is
used as the failure stress cc in:.: t:.: h:= e-=e:..: q'7u=i!ll( i:= o:.: ns"'.'--- -,-,-,
_ Remember that the r
maxi mumoperating
pressure (stress) in your
pipeline may occasionally
be above your design
pressure (stress).
_This maximumstress (and hence maximum internal
pressure) may be governed by settings on relief valves, leak
detection systems, etc., and this maximum stress (pressure)
may be higher than the design stress (pressure).
e>_:lOOI-.
28
14
CORROSION DEFECT: Not axially-orientated (but
ma in dimension is axial), internal pressure loads
Corrosion can be ' non-axial': depth/area is the
same, but length needs to be ' projected' to give
an equivalent length.
Use this equivalent length in equations.
Equivalent axial length
For defects not aligned with the longitudi nal axis,
projecting t he defecllength onlo the longitudi nal
axis will be conservative.
29
CIRCUMFERENTIAL CORROSION DEFECT
ASSESSMENT
-
15
CIRCUMFERENTIAL CORROSION DEFECT Loads
Int ern al
pr essure
Internal pressu re induces a hoop stress and an axia l stress . The hoop
stress is at least twice the axi al stress, depending on the end restraint.
Thermal loads, ground or pipe movement, loss of support (e.g. spanning),
bends, supports. etc., can induce axial and/or bending stresses.
at
CORROSION DEFECTS IN CIRCUMFERENTIAL
DIRECTION
_AXIAL stress, NOT hoop stress may be the major stress acting on
defect.
e o nen you must check for failure due to both hoop stress & axi al stress.
_Axial stress is from internal pressure, thermal stresses, ground movements ,
etc..
l ongitudinal
32
length
failure ceterce for
longitudinal extent
uses internal pressure
16
_ . ~ -.- '
'--"---"---
_ . _ ~ ~ . ~
The theoretical model was compared
with the results of tests of part-wall
notches, slots or cracks under internal
pressure, and internal pressure and in-
plane bending.
Kast ner et at pubflsned a fai lure
criterion for a single, circumferential
part-wa ll defect subject to internal
pressure, axial and/or bending loads.
This is now the most popular method for
assessing circumferential corrosion
The failure criterion was developed for
internal pressure loading only, but has
been shown to be applicable to any
axial load by replacing the axial stress
due to internal pressure with the tota!
axial stress.
CIRCUMFERENTIAL CORROSION DEFECT:

Background To 'Kastner et al.'
33
CIRCUMFERENTIAL CORROSION DEFECT:
Kastner et al. Equation
ze
8 = ~
R
"!.
=
or =
d =
2c =
t =
R =
lJ(;r - ,8[I -lJ])
rpt + 2[I - lJ] sin (,8)
d
1] = 1- -
t
axial stress at failure
flow stress
defect depth
circumferenliall ength of defect
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
17
CIRCUMFERENTIAL CORROSION DEFECT: Typical
Use of Kastner at al Equation
' .0
09
I! 0.8
a
: 0. 7
<
0.6
"
'i 0. 5
a 0.4
"
.i 0.3
-.;I 0.2
0'
"(' -/1(1 -"))
iY = "H 2(1 ")'in(p)
0
UNACCEPTABLE
() / Kastner et al. (X42)
/ / Kastner etal. (X65)
ACCEPTABLE
Hoop Stress from press ure loading
0.0
0,0 0.2 0,4 0.6 0,8 1.0 1,2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 30 3.2
nor malised defect cl rcumfere nl iallangth (c/RI
WHEN DOES THE CIRCUMFERENTIAL EXTENT OF A
CORROSION DEFECT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED?
_ Corrosion can have axial extent and circumferent ial extent
ar heretore. it can fail due to hoop stress and axial stress
a under pressure loading only, the axial dimension is the critical dimension,
and unless the circumferential length > axial length, you need not consider
the circumferential failure.
_ If you have extemalloads (e.g. mining subs idence or spanni ng) you must
conduct the two calculations:
_ Failure under pressu re loading
_ Failure due 10 the axial loads
35
36
18
PUBLISHED 'METHODOLOGIES' FOR ASSESSING
CORROSION DEFECTS
~
CORROSION ASSESSMENT METHODS
_The equations we have covered (e.g. the 'NG 18' equations) are ' classic'
or historical equat ions.
aThey are very good!
_But we have to choose a flow strengt h, Fcltas factor, safety factor, etc..
_This may be difficult.
.Plus, they do not tell you if a specifi c defe ct is ' acceptable'.
_Therefore, organisations have produ ced guidance documents that
present a complete procedure for assessing corrosion.
e'rt ese methods are used extensively for assessing corrosion dala
reported by pigs .
0_2001_
38
19
PUBLISHED METHODS FOR ASSESSING
CORROSION
' OLD' METHODS
ANSI/ASME B31G ~ ~ ~ ~ l l
modified 8 31G
RSTRENGTM(Remaining Strength of Corroded Pi pe)
' NEW' METHODS
SHELL 92
Line pipe Corrosion Group Sponsored Project (LCGSP) [DNV-RP-
F101)
DNV Joi nt Industry Proj ect (DNVRPF101]
PCORR
PCORRC
Pipe Axial Flaw Fail ure Criterion (PAFFC)
API 579
' OL D' AND ' NEW' PUBLISHED METHODS
39
The 'old' methods for predicting the burst
pressure of a corroded pipeline methods)
were, predominantly, developed & validated
through full scale test s on older line pipe
steels.
these methods are biased towards older. relatively
lower toughness. steel
these methods are generally applicable to older,
dirtier steels and should be used whenever there
is a doubt rega rding the applicability of the ' new'
methods.
The 'new' methods were developed and
validated through tests on modern, high
toughness, line pipe steels.
These methods are biased towards the behaviour
of modern, high toughness, line pipe steels.
0_2OOlI_611
OL
20
' OLD' AND ' NEW' PUBLISHED METHODS
The 'new' methods should not be
considered if any of the following apply:
the:y, thickness speci men size upper shelf
Charpy V-not ch impact energy is tess than 18 J
(13 ftlbf (the full size equivalent is 27 J*). or
the mi nimum elon gation requirements in API 5L
are not satisfi ed, or I
line pipe steels suspected of containing a
significant number of inclusions, second phase
particles. or other conta minants (i.e. 'dirty' steels);
typically this will exclude lower grade line pipe
(grades A and B) and some older vintage line
pipe.
0_2OOI!_1 41
"SM __"'_"'''' __''''''
MAJOR PUBLISHED METHODS FOR ASSESSING
CORROSION
-
We will now concentrate on ASME 831 G, modified
B31G, and DNV-RP-F101
All these methods assume:
the corrosion defect is blunt, Le. it contains no sharp,
crack-like features.
the failu re of a corrosion defect is assumed to be due to
plastic collapse (i.e . controlled by the tensile properti es of
the line pi pe steel).
the failure is under inl emal pressure loading.
Only DNV RP-F101 considersthe effects of other loads.
The methods differ in certain of the assumptions and
simplifications made in their deri vation:
defect profile
flow stress
geometry (bulging) correction fact or (' Folias' factor)
0","- __
(
) CO. LAPSE'
J RESSURE'
21
IDEALISATIONS OF A CORROSION DEFECT
PROFILE
43
PROFILE - ACTUAL AREA
.-or--"'- - - - - - - - -----------,,,
m ~ l , l
-'-'------ - - - - - - - ------ - ---'
A
"_2OOlI_'
22
PROFILE - RECTANGULAR PROFILE
,
tot,,1
I' 1
-r-r-r-
/

,
t:
,
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ "'* * _____
--'--
= ltuta,dmax = d m<lX
A,
:
t
CPo_20CJ6R",,6I1
45
IDEALISATIONS OF A CORROSION
DEFECT PROFILE PARABOLIC PROFILE
I
row1

--'--'----- - - - - --- - ------- --'
= dm{u 'lOlal = 2d
A
o
3 / /(>1<111 3t
o poo""", 2OCJ6 "0'1611 46
23
COMPARISON OF RECTANGULAR AND
PARABOLIC PROFILE
I '.." I
.
I I
~
~
/ ;
,
/.-/
,
m ~
,
,
:.---
,
,
,
.
-
~
-- -----
, -.
--'-
0_ 2OOli _
"
ASME B31G
"
24
ASME B31G: The Background
In the 19805 the pipeline industry identified
a need for sta ndardised guidelines for the
assessment of corrosion in pipelines.
ASME producecl ASME 831 G for the
assessmentof corrosiondefects
ASME used Ihe Battelle" work on corrosion
It is applicable to corrosion in Ihe body of
line pipe which have relatively smooth
contou rs and cause low stres s
concentration(e.g. electrolytic or galvanic
corrosion, loss of wall thicknessdue to
erosion).
It is not applicable to corroded girt h or
longitudinal welds or related heat
affected zones .
C_2OOI_
_ ~ <
\\ ASME B31 G: The Assumptions
"'="'.
-_.. __...
... _--
Manual f or Det ermining
t he Remaining St rength
of Corroded Pipeline,
~ _ .. _n,_
~
,,,
as
I Validated on 47 full scale tests containing actual corrosion
Maj or Assumptions/limits in ASME B31G* :
Maximum allowable depth is 80 percent of
nominal wall thickness.
Assumes a flow stress equal to 1.1 x SMYS
'Two term' Fettes factor.
Assumes a parabolic defect shape
for short corrosion (defined as M :s; 4.12),
and a rectangular shape for long corrosion
(for long corrosion the parabolic shape
assumption becomes invalid).
Acceptable defect size calculated for a
stress level of 100% SMYS.
80%
~
__... __ __ _ASUlE I31G. o o _ ~ .. JO"' _
_ "",,0 375 _"" (,2 T... __.. l_ASUEBJ 'Gl
50
25
ASME B31G: The Equations
(J = l.l x SMYS
M = l+O {hrJ
a,
o
d
2c
t
o
M
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
flow stress
corrosion defect depth
corrosion defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
pipe diameter
Fo nes factor (bulgi ng factor)
ASME 831G is
now widely
accepted in other
standards. e.g.
AS 2885 .3
51

'PASS' '------I
52
100%
SMYS
'failure'
line
7 6
UNACCEPTABLE
'FAIL'
2
."
0 1
00 _ _ - --1
o
0.9 80%
5.
8

=
0.7
0. 6
':i
$ 0.5
5
0. 4
o
t; 0.3
e
0.2
ASME B31G: The Graph
1.0
3 , 5
2c1JRt
L-------, De w.... "' ITen gth PaO; ,. ;;m;;; .;;; 1e ;;'- - - - - - - ---'
0 _
26
ASME B31G: An Example
09

0.8
U
:E 0.7
I-
- - - - - - - - - - : - - - --- --_ . ,_ j <". ... . .
.......... ........
--------- j --- -------:- -l- + + .
--------, - --- -- --- ------ ---- . --
"j r":
-- --- -- -- - - -- -- ----- .
......::......... 1, T
-.". ,"
'00
Corrosion Length (mm)
53
27
'ESTIMATED REPAIR FACTOR'
It::- J
An intelligent pig inspect ion report will sometimes refer to the ERF
(esti mated repair factor) of a defect.
The ERF calculation is another way of expressing an ASME B31G
assessment.
If the ERF is less than one the defect is acceptable to ASME 831G.
If the ERF is great er than one the defect is not acceptable to ASME
831G.
P is the design pressure
P' is the safe operating pressure
f' =
ERF = MAOP
P'
for 8$ 4.0
for 8>4.0
s=
P'i3 the safu
opMWng PfflS!iUre.
nollhe failure
"""""'"
" TI
L l f Q l ~
0 _
MODIFIED B31G
55
se
28
MODIFIED B31G - Background
The original B31G criterion has been modified to reduce the
perceived conservatism in the model. The modified criterion
is referred to as modified B31G. The criterion is
incorporated into 'RSTRENGTM' ,
f Validated on 86 full scale tests with actual corrosion defects
Maximum allowable depth is 80% of
nominal wall thickness.
Assumes a flow stress equal to SMYS + 10 ' ksi' (68 .95
Nmm
2
).
Three term Folias factor.
Assumes an arbitrary area ,.
approximat ion, ItfMdIJ!
corresponding to a factor of 0.85,
0_ 2ooe_'
'kosi'" 1OOO}( Ibf/in2 " 6.9N1mm'J
1Oks;" 10,000 Ibflin2
MODIFIED B31 G - The Equations
a/=1 (J = SAfYS + IOksi
1-0.85- -
t M
'k,i' It 1000 Ibllin
2
'10kal' " 10, OOOlbfl ln
2
' 10 k.1' .. 69Nlmm
2
At = I+O,627{k )' -O.00337\ k )' for C7>iy !>50.0
The series solution is unstable at high values of (*')1 therefore:
+33 for ( / )' > 50.0
1:7, = hoop stress at failure lDi
u " flow stress
d = corrosion defect depth
I = corrosion defect axial length
o = pipe diameter
M = Fones factor (bulging factor)
58
29
1 1 0 8 5 ~ j
MODIFIED 831G - The Graphs
I
a
f
0: (7' d I
1-0.85- -
1M
1.0
0.9
:: 08
" 0]
~ modified B31G (X42) a
l- 0.6
..
modified B31G (X65)
~ 0.5
<
~ 0 4
C
a 0.3
e
8 02
ASMEB31G /
0 1
I
0.0
0 1 2 J 4 5 6 r 6
2clJRt
fin-
e _ 2OOlI_611
59
MODIFIED 831 G - 'RSTRENGTM'
The modified B31G criterion is incorporated into n
commercial software called 'RSTRENGTM'. ~
RSTRENG (Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipe ) was
developed to allow the assessment of a ' river bottom profile'
of the corroded area
This means you can use actual defect shape in
RSTRENGTM and not use the '0.85' factor
I '- I
I ~ I
It gives more accurate pr edictions than the simple modified
B31G criterion.
RSTRENGTMdoes both a modi fied 831G and a ' river
bottom' calculation.
RSTRENGTMdoes ot her calculations (see later)
0_2006_1
60
30
DNV RP-F101
C p"""""" 200Il " ov6l1
DNV RP-F101 - Background
Based on the results of the Line
pipe Corrosion Group Sponsored
Proj ect (BG) and a DNV Joint
Industry Project.
Guidance produced for the
assessment of:
single defects
interacting defects
complex shaped defects (i.e. assessing
theactual profile of the defect)
combined loading
The BG and DNV work was
combined to produce DNV RP-F101
61
62
31
Check
toughness
""'oro
applying
DNV
DNV RPF101 Background BG Work
Extensive research programme by BG:
t
>70 f ull sca le t ests on defects, and
>over 400 numerical analyses (computer model s of defect s)
Guidance produced for the assessment of:
single defects
interacting defects
complex shaped defects (i.e. assessing the act ual profile of the defect)
The equati on for assessing a single corrosion defect has the same basic
form as the Battelle part wall failure criterion,
but the geometry corr ection factor has been modified (based on the resu lts of
the numerical analysis).
The flow stress is defi ned by the ultimate tensi le strength of the li ne pipe
steel
with an adj ustment of xO.9 recommended to give lower bound failu re
oredicuons.
DNV RpF101 Background DNV Work
DNV Work:
, 12 full scale tests, pressure & other loads _
" Numerical analyses (computer models of defects)
Guidance produced for the assessment of:
sill9le defects
combined loading
Not proven on Grade B or below, or low toughness line pipe
The DNV equ ations assume ' plastic coll apse' failu re.
Modem liM pipe should fail by ' plastic collapse'
'Plastic collapse' can be expect ed when a minimum toughness
is achieved
This has been estimated:
by aartese' as a fun size Charpy 0160 1075 ft.lbf (82 102 J ). which is similar
10 .. .
a ~ Charpy value of 45 ft-lbs (about 60 J)"
63
C _ ~ = l _ _ J "_"""' ._.. __'. 64
...... ,.. ,_.,"' '-_ ___. """, ....... _e-;.-o,.. _
32
ONV RPF101 The Equations
[
d ]
1- -
" r =O .9UTS I - f ~
P = O. 9 2IUTS [ 1-
7
]
r (D - I) I _ ~ - -
I Q
P, failurepressure
Note: The DNV methods
=
a, = failure stress
havenot beenproven on
d
=
corrosiondefect depth
older line pipe steels,
I = corrosiondefect axial length
and line pipe steel with
0 = pipe diameter
low toughness 60J).
Q
=
lengthcorrectionrector
UTS = ultimate tensile strength
O_2lM_ '
es
ONV RPF101 - The Graphs
[
d ]
I --
o r O.9UTS 1- ~ t ~
DNV (X42)
DNV (X65)
modified 831G (X42)
modified B31G (X65)
ASMEB31G /
0. 1
1.0 'T'"-- ~ ~ ~ - - - - - _ _
0.9 j:=i;"
:: 0.8
..i 0.7
<
I- 0.6
..
0.5
g. 0. 4
C
j 0.3
~ 0,2
2 3 , 5
2cllRt
6 7 6
66
33
DNV RP-F101 - Comparison wi th other Published
Methods
pseudo modified B31G (X65)
DNV (X42)
DNV (X65)
pseudo modified 831G ( X42 )
1.0 ,..-- - - - - ----------- - ---,
0.9
: 0.8
o
0.7
0.6
i 0.5
5
0.4
c
j 0.3
0 2
B 7 6 3 4 5
2t1(R1)"O.5
2
0.1
0 0 _ _ -------'
o
0_2005-.
67
DNV RP-F101 - The Equations
6 [ = 0 9UTS
Q=
[
1 d ]
p = 0 9 21UTS - t -
[ (D-/ )l_d J...
I Q
Spreadsheets?
P,
C;
d
I
I
o
Q
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
fai lure pressure
fai lure stress
corrosion defect depth
corrosion defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
pipe diameter
length correct ion factor
--
._-
- -
..". -
68
34
SUMMARY OF METHODS FOR ASSESSING
CORROSI ON
C Pon..- 2006 Row6l1
69
CORROSION
method basic ' fl ow defect shape 'bul gi ng' factor
equation stress'
Batte lle ' NG-18' l7y + 10 ksi rectangular (dlt) or

IJl.OM{ 1f:r-ooom{j&-r
defect area (AIA
o
)
ASME B31G NG-18 1.1SMY$ parabolic 2/3(dlt)
J"'HM
modified NG-18 SMYS +10 arbitrary O.85(dft)
IJI+om{*r-ooom{*r
831G ksi
RSTRENG NG-18 SMYS +10 effective area and
I -o.oom{Tri)'
ksi effective length
DNVRP- NG18 O.9SMTS rectangular (dft)
J''{zl' F101 Exact area
C P_ 2006 """5i ' rc
35
CORROSION
"
.,
ASMEB31G
d
1 - -
1
d 1
1- - -
t AI
_.
"
I:
------I:
... , , , . . . , I"
"
-
..
Mod ASME B31G "!- .
DNV
"
ASSESSI NG CORROSION - Further Considerations
72
36
ASSESSING CORROSION - Further Considerations
Using the actual defect
shape in calculati ons
Assessing a colony of
interacting defects
0_2006_1
73
ASSESSING CORROSION - Further Considerations
37
USING THE ACTUAL SHAPE OF A CORROSION
DEFECT IN ASSESSMENT METHODS
Exact area method
RSTRENGTM
DNV RP- F101
(Finite Element Analys is)
.....-
0_2OIl6-.
DEFECT - Exact Area Method
75
c

A
I - -
A -
o
A 1
1 - - -
A
rl
A1
76
38
DEFECT - 'RSTRENGTM'
When the modified B31G crit erion was developed, a method for
assessi ng the actual shape of real corrosion defects was also
developed, based on the effective area method.
The effective area method and the simple modified B31G
method are incorporated into software referred to as RSTRENGT . .-
For simple hand calculations a geometric shape approximation is
recommended (this method is often ref erred to as modified B31G), in
which the defect area is assumed to be O.85dL.
The RSTRENGTIoI method is used to obtain a more accurate estimate of
the failure pressure of a corrosion defect. by taking into account the
actual (river bottom) profile of the defect.
RSTRENGTM has been validated against 86 burst tests on pipe
containing real corrosion defects .
DEFECT - RSTRENGTM's River Bottom Profile
77
39
DEFECT - RSTRENG
The RSTRENG method is based upon the effective area and effecti ve
length of the corrosion defect. Any shape of corrosi on defect can be
assessed. all that is required is a river bottom profile of the def ect.
Determining the corrosion defect profil e requires a large number of depth
measurements 10 be taken at regular int ervals along the length of the
defect (tracing out a river bottom profile).
The defect can be a single defect or a composite defect formed through
defect interact ion.
The procedure is based upon cons idering various subsections of the tot al
defect profile, and predicting the corresponding failure pressure. This
process is repeated for all possible combinations of the various
subsections.
In most cases , although not all , RSTRENG pr edicts a minimum failure
pressure that is less than the value predi cted using the exact area , total
length method.
C_ 2OOli_
DEFECT - RSTRENGTM's Method>
oRSTRE.SG"I n'l"':r (ombi,..,tion 0/ A/Ao and I
(om binatio n gn';ng lo .. ....sz/ailurt . lrtH is
if '" SMYS + IOksi _
A
I--
A,
A I
1- - -
A, .1f
": =--i'-,
a
1
1,2
1,2,3
1.2,3,4
1.2,3,4,5
1,2,3,4,5,6
1,2,3,4,5,6,7
1,2.3,4,5.6,7,8
2
2,3
2.3,4
2.3.4.5

80
__ __<--.. .. ..'G_ .. ' __.'..... "'"
40
DEFECT - DNVRpF101
The basic principle is to consider the actual profil e as a
collection of 'pits' within 'patches' .
The assessment method then determine whether the defect
behaves as a single irregular 'patch' , or whet her local 'pits'
within the patch dominate the failure. Potential interaction
between the pits is also assessed .
A progressive depth analyses is performed.
The corrosiondefect isdivided into a number of increments based
ondepth, and modelledby an idealised 'patch' containing a number
of idealised 'ons'.
The idealised 'pits' in the equivalent pipe are assessed
using the interacting defect method .
DEFECT - DNVRPF101
"
- I-I-
'l l
' -1-+-- - -
-, '-- - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - --'

c _
82
4t
DEFECT - DNVRPF101
1-'

",,--1
...;/--i-
,.4- - - - - - J-.
;
"-1',,- ,
,
, I ,
I
I
.
t,
I

I

Spreadsheet?
ASSESSMENT OF GROUPS OF CORROSION
DEFECTS
83

..
42
DEFECTS - ' I nt eract ion' Distances
d'i
_ L .-_,_------,-----.""'-
0_2005_'
DEFECTS - Interacting Defect Size
85
L
990 J
- ~ _..'-:_' L- - - -r - - - --
: 0 : cS
' "
, "
, "
, "
: : I ,
~ I 1 ~ :
,
Length
Width
43
CORROSION DEFECT (DEFINITION OF DIMENSIONS)
[ADJACENT (INTERACTING) CORROSION DEFECTS]

I Defect 1 :
\ /:
__ __ l -----,-_
Pipe Axis
---L--_ ------ -- ----- -

, -------
,
,
,
, Defect 2
Penspen Group Ltd
s


DEFECTS - Published Methods
RSTRENGTM
DNV-RP-F1 01
co p""","" 2006 R..61'
DEFECTS - Simple Rules
SOME SIMPLE INTERACTION RULES ARE:
For in-line defects , if the axial separation is less than the length of the
shortest defect then the defects interact.
The length of the combined defect is equal to the sum of the length of the
individual defects and the separation between them.
For circumferenlial ly spaced defects, over lapping in the longitudi nal
direction, if the circumferential separation is less than or equal to the wal l
thickness then the defects interact.
The lengt h of the combined defect is equal to the overall longit udinal length.
_ oJ ,." .. PoI_ "',,,.
""-'" ... .. __.... ... _"
' c....
87
88
44
DEFECTS - Simple Rules
There are other simple rules . For example:
For in-line defects, if the axial separation is less than 1- (or t) the
defects interact .
The length of the combined defect is equal to the sum of the length of
the individual defects plus 1".
For circumferentially spaced defects, overlapping in the longitudinal
di rection, if the circumferential separation is less than or equal to 61
the defects interact.
The length of the combined defect is equal to the overaliiongi ludinal
length.
P
<1" (25mm) or <t
O_:lOllIl_
--_.... _--_.__... .. _.. _-
__. .. e.---. .
89
DEFECTS: Simple Rules for axial corrosion
2c, m
. mutmmumumm j.
... m t
V
2c =2c
1
+s+ 2c
2
You then use
'2c' and 'd' in
your failure
equations
! s , 2<:. -I
2c,
I ' . j - - ,-
": ) )
d.I- ---..
90
45
ASSESSMENT OF CORROSION ON WELDS
It is generally considered that
longitudinal corrosion across seam
welds (other than autoqenous". e.g.
ERW and FW) can be treated as
corrosion in parent plate (BS 7910.
ASME 83 1.4), with supporting test
data":
Weld properties must be similar to the
line pipe [<!:strength, <!: toughness]
Weld must be free from other defects.
DNV RP F-101 can be used on seam
and girth welds (see code for
conditions)
Compressive longitudinal stress can
reduce burst pressure.

.... __... _.... _--
-...-- _.._------ _._----------
_.__.__.....,- _.__.. -._.._-
"':.._.____ 91
._.__.._-------_._-
.._.__.. __._---'---"'-""'
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON BURST STRENGTH
OF CORROSION - External Loads
DNV-RP-F101
The method assumes that the failure surface follows a Tresca
criterion, i.e. a tensile axi al stress does not affect the burst pressure,
but a compressive axial load reduces the burst pressure in a linear
manner.
A rectangular defect profile is assumed.
The met hod is only applicable if the total axial stress (including the
cont ribution due to the internal pressure) is compressive.
92
46
OF CORROSION - External Loads
Tensile (internal pressure)
failure criteria
Combined pressure
and compression
Compressive failure
criterion 93
CONSTRUCTING PIPELINE DEFECT ASSESSMENT
ACCEPTANCE CHART
47
A PIPELINE DEFECT ASSESSMENT ACCEPTANCE
CHART - Step 1 Failure Line
' .0
I
CRI TICAL DEFECT SIZE AT 72% SMYS, NO SAFETY MARGIN
"
d
:!...L =
1 -

- " DEFECTS IN THIS AREA WOULD FAIL
,
0
"
a-
d I
.. 0.' I -
---
"
,
M
"
,! M
"
DESIGN PRESSURE (72 percent SMYSj
" "
s
'l5 o.
;
l o.,
e I DEFECTS IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT FAILJ
" ,.
"
"
> .,.".".
"
e.e
"
ae
"
<0
"
00
"
00
2e1(Rt)" O. 5 (normalised def ect length)
O _ ....., :IOOlI Ro.-5l1
95
CHART - Step 2 Safety Factor
' The maximum pressure a
pipeline will experience, may
be well above MAOP. ...
-Most codes allow (typically)
10% (of MAOP)
overpressures.
' Methods such as ASME
B31G have built-in safety
factors that allow for these
uncertainties, but it we are
produci ng our own failure
curves , we MUST use the
maximum pressu re the
pipeline will experience as the
failure stress , and this may be
>MAOP
Failure
linei>iPe Os UTS or
Actual failure stress of defect free
Hyd rot est
Overpressu res
1
o
Design
0.5
1.5 ,------,-;;:= = = = = = ,
C P.....,..,2006R..61,
T "",",... ,- ... .."."_,_ ;. " ...."," """",, "",, _ "",_""",",
"-""_ _
48
CHART - Step 3 Acceptance Line
HYDROTEST PRESSURE (100 percent SMYSj
CRITICAL DEFECT SIZEAT 100% SMYS. NO SAFETY MARGIN
1
M
d
I -
..
d
1 -
"
..... -
.. .. ..
"
DEFECT S IN THIS AREA WOULD NO
FAIL AT 1000/0 SMYS
..
..
"
- "
"
"
u
.e
"
-e
"
.0
'a ..
..
oS
-e
..
"
..
..
2c1{Rt )"O.5 (no nna lised defect length)
C_2OOI-.
"
A PIPELINE DEFECT ASSESSMENT ACCEPTANCE CHART -
Step 4 Failure, Acceptance & Safety Margin
..
I
"
I
d
- "
-
-
s:
Failure
I
"
- - d 1
" -8
01 1
-
---
t M
u
r
..; o.
:-- "
DESIGN PRESSURE, (12 i fOlOl'l lSMYS)
. ..
e
ii o.
SiEl y Magn
E
t:
";' n

HYDROTEST PRESSURIZ( 100 SMYS)
Acceptance
..
"
.. .. .. ..

.. ..
"
..
2c/(Rt )AO.5 (normali sed defect lengt h)
C_2OJI_l
98
49
CHART Failure, Acceptance & Safety Margin
..
I
"
d
- "
'!....L. _
I - -
<
,
"
" -
d 1

1 -
--
X
,
"
"
..
DESIGN PRESSURE In peroenII SMYS)

i n
X
Ii , .
stay Magin
nC OCf'PIo!::Je
E
! u

HYOROTEST PRESSURE ( 100 peroenl SMYSj
X
Ilazphbk.
..
"
"
..
" "
.. ..
"
.. ..
2cJ(Rt)AO.5 (normali sed defect length)
O,,- 2ooe_'
99
CHART - Failure, Acceptance & Safety Margin
' .0
09
0.8
:: 0.7
!
0.6
s
0.5
a 0.4
i 0.3
... 0.2
0 '
0.0
o 2
FAILURE
3

6 7 6
MAOP OR
DESIGN
PRESSURE
(72% SMYS)
HYOROTEST
PRE SSURE
1100% SMYS)
0_2001_
norm.alised delKtlongitudln;ll"ngth (2c1(Rt)"")
' 00
50
CHART Example
'11
{
0" S
I [ J
'"'
u
f
= O.9UTS /1
I
1'\1
1- - -
I Q
<,
-
-
- ._-
._... _--
-
I{
f.
efor
1\" I

I

on l1 y
,
--MeAt r-.
.'
I I
.. . I
o
o
o
o
0
!0
l o
O_2OOt_
CorrosionLength(mm)
'"
PIPELINE DEFECT ASSESSMENT FIELD CHART
Example
102
51
ASME 831 G - Curve for Obtaining 8
4.0 +-- ,
30
2.0
B [ d/' J' 1
= 11 l.ldll-O.15 -
L 5, 1.1 2B.[i5i
'03
'.0
0.2 04 0.5 0 8
"4
52
CHART - Failure Line
FAILURE
\l
..
D"-2OOIl 1l<o'6l 1
A defed c:I depth 6O%wt, and
or tllis length, will allhis
stress
2c/(Rt)"O.5 (normalised defecll ength)

u,
u
d
d 1

"
..
'"
AXIAL CORROSION DEFECTS - Failure Curves
For a short shallow defect, or no
Po
defect, the failure pressure i s equal to
the failure pressure of the plain

(undefactlve) plpe:
..
[Pol
5
For a very long
defect. the
c, failure
..
Increasing
pressure is
defect
equal to the
depth
failure
pressure of the
reduced cross-
2 section (as jf it
were a plain
(undefectlve)
pipe):

2c/JRt(normalised defect length)
D_2OOIl _ '
",.
53
OF CORROSION - Long Areas
Some work has shown thai defects longer than approximately the pipe
diameter behave as infinitely long defe cts:
Ot her definitions of infi nite defects are. .. 8(01)05, 0.750 , and 4.48 (01)5,
(90.2 Dtf 5
"
Tests" at Petrobras , have shown most
.
.. _.-
,
,, -
assessmentmethodsto be

" -
, ,.. _-
conservative wnen assessing i
,
-
.
,
,.. ....-

longcorrosion;
,,-
ASME 8 31G could be overly conservative

I

,
"
RSTRENG Effecti ve Area and the

l "
, '
DNV RP-Fl01 (Part B) are conservative
I
" .. , .
"
RSTRENG (using O.85dL) is

I ..
'. non-conservative.

" "
' -
.
,
" .
"
"
I
.
,
..
"
"
" "
..
" "
..
"'.", e...., P,..... . ,,",POl
...--_...._-_.._- _._----_._.----
0_ 2OOlI _'
_.__ ____ R'. __' _ _" _._. ____ R'.
'"
_ _ ._-- -
.. -----,--
OF CORROSION - Long Areas
All the main methods (ASME, DNV) allow for long defects.
The long defects tend to infinity, therefore the M or Q factor tends to
infinity, and the equations go to:

Failure stress =Flow stress x (1-<111)
1--
0_2001_
,os
54
DNV RPF101 Safety Factors a, = O.9UTS [1 ; ~ ]
Two alternative approaches are given for the assessment
of corrosion:
The first approach in accordance with the safety philosophy
adopted in the DNV Rules for Submarine Pipeline Systems
(DNV96).
Uncertainties associated with the sizing of the defect depth and the
mater ial properties are specifically considered.
Probabi listi c calibrated equations (with parti al safely factors) are
given .
The second approach is based on the ASD (Allowable Stress
Design) format.
The calcul ated failure pressure pressure is multiplied by a single
safety factor based on the origina l design factor.
Consideration of the uncertainties associated with the sizing of the
corrosion defect is left to the j udgement of the user.
O Pon-, 2006 Re.61'
EXAMPLE OF EFFECT OF EXTERNAL LOADS ON
DEFECTS THAT FAIL UNDER AN INTERNAL
PRESSURE: Failure Curves
109
Wide, circumferential defect
'0
0.9
~ 8
~
.l: 0.7
0-
~ 0.6
"
"<ii 0.5
"
0.4
.e
'a
E 0.3
e 0.2
0.1
"'-"' -_, no com:d-p,eSSive stress (0, ;"0) (1
---- - ~ _ p" rrJ2
------
--- -------------------- -------
This is a sub-sea pipeline, that is subjected to compressive stresses
from temperature changes. Compressive stress decreases the
d feet size that fails at the internal pressure
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
normalised defect longitudinal length (Zel (Dt )" ')
Unrestrained
Partially restrained
Fully Restrained
'"
55
Penspen Integrity
..---.......
LECTURE OUTLINE
How to Assess Gouges
1
Third Party Interference
Protection
Gouges
Not es
0_2001_
,
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE & DAMAGE
__2OOlI_,
a
One of the main causes of the failure of onshore
and offshore transmission pipelines is 'Third
Party' or 'Externa l' InterferencelDamage
Also known as Mechan ical Damage/Int erference
It is the major cause of transmission pipeline
failures in North America and Western Europe.
Third party interference can cause:
a puncture
a metal loss defect (such as a gouge), or
a geometr ic distortion of the pipe shell (such as a
dent), or
a combination of the a dent and a gouge
Dents containing defects are more severe defects
than dents or defects in isol ation
They can have low failure pressures & short fatigue
lives.
Consequently dents with defects are regarded as
the most severe form of mechanical damage.
0_2OOlI_
2
0_2005_ ,
DAMAGE: Punctures, Gouges, Dents
_The number of times
people dig into the
underground infrastructure
illustrates the huge
frequen cy of excavation:
ethere were an
estimated 13 million
excavation notices
issued to utility
operators across the
United States in 1996*
_The actual number is
higher because some
excavators do not use one-
call notification services.
---_......
._ '_ ,,,..-......"' _ _ """' __...' N'... '..,""""TSM;....''O ,"'
(.I
3
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE - Example:
Puncture
This3rdparty damage- was
caused by a constructor
beginningwork before the
agreed time in a One Call
notification process
This third party damage* was
caused by a constructor who failed
tousethe One Call System
,

1.8 00.1122.1 118 1
w_. uncc.org
..", .Ooo __
@Penspen
Reputable, safe
equipment that works
close to our pipeline
can gouge it, if not
carefully driven
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE - Example: Gouge
,
4
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE - Work on Pipelines
Can Cause Damage
s
TYPE OF MACHINERY CAUSING DAMAGE
S
TO UK ONSHORE PIPELINES'
~
TYPE OF MACHINE No. OF DAMAGE No. OF FAILURES:
I NCIDENTS FAILURES I NCIDENTS
Back Acter 165 3 0.02
~
Digger 137 6 0.04
Others 60 4 0.Q7
~ ~
Powerdrill 21 9 0.43
Plough 11 3 0.27
Trencher 10 2 0.2
Drainline 9 1 0. 11
None 7 0 0
The use of Back Acters and Spike 6 0 0

Digg ers acco unt for -54% of al l
Tracks 6 1 0. 17
damage incident s and 28% of
pipeli ne failures. Drag line 4 0 0
The use of power dri lls

Scraper 4 1 0.25
acco unted fOI <4% of all
recorded damage i ncidents, but
Bull Doze r Blade 4 2 0. 5
- 43% of pi peline failures.
Unknown 110 0 0
TOTAL 564 32 0.06
C P_2OCJ6 " ..61' 16 M__ _ . ~ W __' _ "'_ " "" -"" _ ""' _ __' _ __ " _ _' _ _ _ _ _ _ ""_
--'
5
METHOD OF DISCOVERING DAMAGE FROM THIRD
PARTY ACTIVITIES' (UK onshore pipeline data)
The air patrol gave t he first sight ing of activity In 30 - 60% ctincidents.
' A consi derable number or activities were missed because of their short duration.
' Between 60% and 90% of the lolal encroachment acti vities lasted less than 2 weeks.
DISCOVERY METHOD No. OF DAMAGE No.OF
INCIDENTS FAILURES
Site Contractor 150 16
Ground Patrol 138 0
Other 130 8
PearsonSurvey 63 0
Air Patrol 29 0
Unknown 25 3
Public
,.
3
On-line Inspection 13 0
Police 2 2
TOTAL 564 32
.
C _ 2llO5"-611
... _._._.. __._-_.-.. --- .. ... _.
tt
FAI LURES DUE TO THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE
1989 - San Bernidino, California, USA
14 in. diameter gasoli ne pipeline at 1680 psi,
Dent and gouge damage ruptured
causing twofata lities.
1993 Reston, Virginia, USA
36 in. diameter fuel oil pipeline failed ,
9000 barrels of oi l cont aminated the
PotomacRiver.
The damage wasabout1Q years old .
1999 - Bellingham. USA
16" liquid tine failed. Three fatal ities .
Damage was dents and gouges from
third party interference
2000 - Abi lene, USA
12 in. diameter natural gas (?) pipeline owned by the Mobi l Pipeline Company failed
resulting in ooefatality (a police offICer).
1993 - Tejertas. Ven ezu ela
Contractors install ing fibre opti c cables sever a natural gas pipeline adj acent to a busy
road . More than 50 people killed in resulting fire. Two contractors j ail ed for 16 years
O_ _
"
6
THE EFFECT OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE
TIMING-
IMMEDIATE FAILURES: Mechanical
damage can result in immediate
failures. by equipment punct uring the
pipe line
But- 20% of the time. the equipment
fails to puncture the pipe, Of cause
damage severe enough to immediately
rupture il
DELAYED FAILURES: Medlanical
damage in a pipeli ne can cause
'delayed failures'
Only about 20 to 33% of mecharjcal
damage incidents result in 'delayed'
failures (failures ocaming some time
after the damage event)
but these have had serious
consequences.
------
_ "__
.. . __.. '-_""... _ e-.._ .., .... ... _
_ .. ...".,., e- __
THE EFFECT OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE (eont.)
COST: The immediate fai lures tend to
result in a lower cost. This is because:
work is ongoing on the line. and
the operator is usually aware of acti vity.
and can respond to it quickl y {e.q.
reduce the pressure and close valves)
This is parti cularly true of oil pipeline failures.
where the cost of an immedi ate failure can
be a fraction (say a third) of the cost of
delayed failures
SAFETY: Immediate failures have the
most severe impl ications for safety
fOf gas pipeli nes the immediate failures will
cause the vast majority of casualties
delayed failures usually mean that people
(those causing the damage) are no longer
around . but resid ent population sU at risk
"
7
THE EFFECT OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE: Delayed
Failure*
_A delayed failure from mechanical damage:
, ._ ....P'........ '_ e...- a,. _ t>a<n_ ._ ""'"_ T_ W'"""""'._ ""' ,.,
:rooo_.__... s-,,,,",,,,_,,,,,
"
'"
THE EFFECT OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE:
Leaks versus Ruptures"
_ Mechani cal damage causes more ruptures than leaks.
ac orrosrc n causes more leaks than ruptures.
No. of Failures No. of Failures
Da ma g e by
o. .... U.
. w.,..
_ Ot U ,
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
o
_ In' Co rr o _lo n
D h . C.... o . 'on
D. ma D_ by o'he , .
C... ttuetlon D. ma g .
_ W. ld
_D.h..
=..
-
LEAKS
. 'n' ".. " ,.. "
800 .,,-r- - - - - - - i 'C h. co n
700 .u-- -
600 J,-J-- -
500 .u-- -
400 .u-- -
300 .u-- -
200 .u-- -
100 m ""iJC

RUPTURES
8
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Cover
_Depth of cover is an effective method of
protection.
a c oces require a minimum depth of cover of
e.q. 0.9 m (2' 11") - 1.1 m (3' T')
_ Research work* showed that the likelihood of
damage is reduced by a facto r of 10 (rural
area) and 3.5 (suburban), as the dept h of cover
is increased from 1m (3' 3") to 2m (6' 7").
"
"
J,
j ,
./
!'
----
,
.
,
" " " "
. ..
_..,- ..
"
9
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Wall thickness
_Increased pipewall thickness offers
protection against damage.
_ For example very few (about 5%) of excavati ng
machinery used in suburban areas wi ll be able to
penetrate 11.9 mm (0.469") wall.
_This accounts for the small proximity distances
speci fied in some codes
()
C_2OlI_
More Protection
}
"
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Wall thickness and
Resistance to Puncture
. Pipelines have inherent resistance to
puncture from excavat ing machines.
_The draft AS 2885.1 gives the followi ng relati onships
(Secti on 5) for Pipeline Puncture Resistance (kN), R
p
:
. R, =N{ I .17-0.0029{DItJ}.{L + w}.{t. + <rJ
- Digging Puncture Force, Fp (kN) = for WS20,OOOkg
_Digging Puncture Force, Fp (kN) = f .5{O.0231496.YlJ826007) for W>20.000kg
.t.
. D
_L,w
.u.
. N
N
. w
=pipe wall thickness, mm
= outs ide pipe diameter, mm
=length, width of digger tooth ,
(obtained from a Table)
=ultimate tensile strength, MPa
=1 for single tooth penetraton
= 2 for twin pointed 'tiger' leeth.
=operating weight , kg
R, Risk of puncture
Negligible
<e1.05F
p
to 1.10F
p
Low
2'O.98F
p
to 1.05 High
F
<0.98F
p
Certain
10
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Sleeves
. Pipelines protected by sleeves are no longer popular due
to difficulty in maintenance, and the possibility of corrosion
(and the difficulty of finding it).
_Thicker waited pipe is preferred , although care must be taken in
installing the pipe, and the coating must be closely monitored
O_2OCl5_
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Marker Tapes
"
_There are some threats ,
for example horizontal
directional dri lling, or deep
ripping, where buried
marker tape is clearly not
effective .
......... __._.-
-
,-
-;: e:=:
11
PROTECTION OF PIPELINES: Marker Tapes &
Protective Plates/Slabs
T ~ p t of Preteeti on ~ o of Summaryef Tesrs DamaKt
I<"!iU Reduction
Faeter
No Protect ion 2 Pipeline damaged in
both tes ts
Warning Tapes above the pipeline
,
Pipeline damaged in 1.67
three tests
3 m wide concrete barrier above the 16 Pipeline damaged in 5.33
i cline three tests
3 m wide concrete barrier above the IS No pipeline damage
' IS
i cline. combined with warning ta cs observed in an lest
3 m wide yellow striped steel plate above IS No pipeline damage
' IS
the pipeline combined wit h warning observed in any lest
ta es
C_2005_
GOUGES
1'_2001_'
-
"
12
GOUGES
A gouge is surface damage to a pipel ine", caused by foreign objects removing
part of the pipe wal l.
A gouge is a mela l loss defect.
line pipe stee ls are highly resistant 10part wall defects, and such defects
They record high failure stresses due to the inherent ductility and
toughness of the steers. PROVIDED they are not associated wit h a dent.
C_2OOI_'
..._--------_...
_ "" "1IO_...__ ..... ~ ""'_'"""7""
as
GOUGES - Cracking & Hard Layer
Cradl ing
Gouges are treated with caution
because of the possibility of :
Associated denting:
Cracks can often form due to
"reroundlnq" of the dent. and _______
The risk of a work hardened layer /--V - - ......
below the gOUT ,/ ---------"'"
13
GOUGES - Cracking & Hard Layer
Cracking
Hard layer -1 -'
The risk of a work hardened layer bel ow the
gouge:
This ' hard layer' is caused by the heat of
the damaging process and the plastic
deformation.
Max depth is - n.smm
This har d zone may reduce the local
ductil ity and may crack as the indenting
f orce is removed and the pipe atte mpts
to regain its original shape.
C_2OClS_
AS 2885.1 says: 'Some references suggest thai only vel}' large
plant can gouge the wall thickness to a dept h of more than 4 mm.'
"
GOUGES - Cracking in hard layer'
_Note cracking along edge of gouge
" ' 8 Note brittle cracks initiated in cold

worked zone. This zone if hard and high
strength - may be susceptible to
environmental cracking
"-""""""' ....... OI_Goo __ ..... """ . ..
"
14
GOUGES - Hard Layer
. In the gouge', we have:
aplastic flow,
emetat tr ansfer,
seven re-melling due to the heat of
friction would have occurred at the
contact point.
_For some depth we have a microstructure
that is crushed & severely cold -worked,
loca lly degrading the ductility & toughness.
_ In the assessment of a gouge, accountwill
need to be taken of any hardened layers
below the gouge and the effect of low
toughness material.
_This may requi re an assessment of the
line pipe toughness prior to assessment
or inspection of the defect.
'Note the severe ly crushed
microstruct ure in the gouge just
below t he pipe surface
GOUGES: Effect of Toughness
There is a risk of failure at a low stress if

a metal loss defect is present in low
toughness line pipe, due to low ductility
or brittle fracture initiation. For example:
Tests by British Gas. showed part wall defects
in lower toughness line pipe (213 Charpy =20
J or less) recorded lower failure stresses than
simi lar defects in higher toughness (greater
than 213 Charpy =42 J) .
The effect of the toughness and the hard
layer on the line pipe steel has been
investigated experimentally.
Research work in Canada (carried out by
CANMET) concluded that the deformed layer
assoc iated with the gouge was not deleterious
in line pipe with a Charpy toughness of
greater than 20 J.
15
GOUGE A Longitudinal (Axial) Defect Dimensions
2c
d =
2c
=
t =
R
=
D =
defect depth
defect longitudinal length
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
pipe diameter
"
GOUGE A Circumferential Gouge
16
GOUGE A Circumferential Defect Dimensions
2c
.....-.....
d
2c
t
R
D
=
=
=
=
=
defect depth
defect cir cumferential length
pipe wall thi ckness
pipe radius
pipediameter
C_2lXli_
---.. __....... -
AXIAL GOUGE - Collapse and Bulging
_The methods assume that
fai lure is controlled by 'plastic
collapse'
_Opposite is a failed gouge
in laboratory test
_Note extensive deformation
(plasticity) and'bulging' ---
L---=::I LJiI-.::I
....---..,.
17
AXIAL GOUGE Assessment Model
-I
}
.,
I
M
j 2c )'
I +O.2'\. JRt
Af =
0;
;
<T
;
nowstress
d = gouge depth
2c
;
axial lengthof gouge
t = pipe wa!lthickness
R
;
pipe radius (=D/2)
M
=
as
Il
AXIAL GOUGE Test Data
Iii-
\
ow
"
a. . .... TOIl' 11 111J1
,.0
CANMET T....
... rw" ge2
. 60._,_
e
l' CSI.l S"""l EUROPII'E 2000
;;) 120 ,/
)( 1-10."... .. ...192 :
)':"
..
d
UNCONSERV4TIVE ;,
a t =
1- -
I
"
d 1

.. <T in I
1- - -
f

1 M
.a CO+lSERV4nve
..
.' ..

V
"
'D

..
eo ec eo

,.
...
'.
Measu red Fail ure Stre ssNleld Strength, %
O _ 2OOlI Ro. fW,
ae
18
AXIAL GOUGE - Basic Assessment Model
d
1- -
,
d I
1- - -
, Ai
0.8
0.'
0.95
0.7
0.5
0.6
dft '" 0.4
FAIL
NO FAIL
,

, ,
. I- -l
Cl_OllIOIl_ 2cJ(Rt)"O.5
---",,,._-
"
AXIAL GOUGE Leak/Rupture Behaviour
19
AXIAL GOUGE Leak/Rupture Behaviour
Gougelength
"
LEAK
RUPTURE
B
f I
-=M
CY

,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
2c1(Rt)"O.5
---_.",._-
CIRCUMFERENTIAL GOUGE Assessment Model
..
d
7] = 1- -
t
axial stressat failure
flowstress
defect depth (with allowancefix hard
layer and cracking)
circumferentiallenglh of defect.
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
7] (ff - ,8[1-17])
rpt + 2[1- 7] ]sin(,8)
=
=
=
=
=
=
_CY_
f
- --'--'-----.---'----'---,-----'--7----c I
CY
8 = ~
R
"!.
a
d
2c
t
R
20
CIRCUMFERENTIAL GOUGE FAILURE Case Study
_March 1997; Reduce pressure in transmission line:
. Pressure reduced lo 30 psig in 20" pipeline due 10road c:onstruclion wort< in the area
_May 1997: Directional drilling operation
. To instal an S" diameter steel nalural gas distnbution main para llel to the transmission pipeline.
_ July 1999: Failure
. As opeI'3tor began 10 return the 2Q.fndl tnl nsmission pipeli ne tolui service.
"'._---,.,._.. _--...
---_.. ._.. ~ _ _ _ _ ... _---
__. 0_. ._-_.._-_ ..__..__....--
...... --.-.- ..._.. _-.--_.. ---.------.-
ASSESSING A GOUGE - Notes
"
21
1. ASSESSING A GOUGE - Assessment and
Consequences
_ASSESSMENT - Gouges can be assessed
providing your pipeline has a toughness >20J.
_ Nol e thai a gouge needs to be checked for
possible fatigue crack growt h in some pipeli nes
(e.g. some liquid lines).
_ Allowance (e.q. adding O.5mm to defect depth)
for the hard layer or sub surface crac king is
advisable, if they are to be remain in the pi peli ne,
_Also, ensure there is no risk of environmental
cracki ng, and no problems from cyclic load ing (see later).
_CONSEQUENCES
_ Think carefully of the consequences of 'getting things wrong' . If your
damage is in a pipeli ne in a 'high consequence' area, you should inspect the
damage dosely before assessment , and include appropriate safety factors in
your assessment.
2. ASSESSING A GOUGE - Inspection
_ If you detect a gouge in the field, you should check:
_ FOR SURFACE CRACKING
ar here may be some crack-like indications (spalling) caused by the ...
damagi ng object.
_ If the crac ki ng is deep, it may be indicati ve of a gouge that has cracked
due to denting (the denting may not be visible as it may have been
' pushed out').
_ Thi s is severe, and requires repair.
,
--- ---''' -' ...
22
2. ASSESSING A GOUGE - Inspection (cont.)
. If you detect a gouge in the field, you should check:
_ FOR EVIDENCE OF DENTING
_The impact may have also dented the pipe.
_ Residual denting around a gouge is severe - see later
0 _
3. ASSESSING A GOUGE - Inspection with Pigs
. PI G DATA: Most meta l loss pigs are designed
to detect corrosion defects, and may be inaccurate!
unrel iable in the detection of narrow defe cts
such as axially-orientated gouges,
_Some cttne newer pigs (e.g. the ' TFI' pigs )
can detect axial defects.
_ Always consul t your pig provider .
_ Some pigs can del ed geomet rical anomalies
(e9. denting) and some pigs can detect metalfoss __.... _
(e.q . corrosion).
_ Ha.vever, there is no curr ent pig thai can do both.
Therefore. if you are basing your gouge
assessment on pig data, you must be confident
that the pig has found a gouge and any associated
denting (if present).
You may need to excavate and inspect gouges,
to confirm dimensions, and absence of cracking
and/or denting "-"11.. .. __
0""'- 2008_ 1 46
23
Areato be
removed
4. ASSESSING A GOUGE - ASME B31.8
_ASME 831.8 (2003) has changed its gouge
requirements: it requires gouges of any depth to be
repaired
_ASME (1999) formerly allowed gouges of 10% wall
thickness to remain. provided they were not
associated with a dent.
8 This more severe approach is in recognition of the
known severity of mechanical damage. and the fact
that a residual dent may be overlooked around a
gouge ,
_ Other standards are not as severe, e.g. AS 2885.3:
8 Gouges, grooves, notches <0.25mm 'harmless'
. >0.25mm but S10%wall thickness can be removed by
grinding
_Wall thickness loss due to grinding may be assessed
in the same manner as corr oded pipework .
.. '_.I1_"' _e.-.. _ I),..... .. ..._
_ eono..-. 0" 2<m. e-_ O'C:!OOMl'l
5. ASSESSING A GOUGE Repair
_REPAIR - Gouges can be removed by grinding (grind depth not too
exceed limits calculated using previous equations + safety margin), or
repaired by sleeving.
_G RINDING - grinding a gouge can remove hard
layer (elimina tes possible cracking problems and
possible problems of environmental attack of the
hard layer) .
_ If you have ground your def ect, and
it is clear of cracking, and acceptable to your
standard equations (with a safety margin ), you
can recoat and not repair
Ground area can be assessed
usingASME B31G
I
24
ASSESSING GOUGES: Summary
Gouges:
Burst: Use Battelle equations but allow for
any hard layer/cracki ng ('d..')
Remember to incl ude a safety factor when
using this equation
Fatigue: Use as 791 IAPI 579 t assess
your gouge for fatigue -grOwth. if the
pipeli ne is subjected to cyclic stresses
Caution:
No denting must be present in the vicinity
of the gouge.
ASME 831.8 does not all ow gouges: they
all must be repaired.
1_ d +d,
_"_I = _--;--"';---;-1
" 1_ d +d, _I_
I M
"
25
1
Penspen Integrity
How to Assess Dents*
T.... lectJre_noe elIectgf ""'....... pr-...on __ pressure
_
_ _ _ _ 11_1
LECTURE OUTLINE
Plain Dents
1
Burst Strength
Fatigue Strength
Dents containing welds
Constrained Dents
Rock Deni s
Dents and Gouges
Dressing Defects in Dents
Other Geometri c Defects in Pipelines
i
,I
,
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE - Example: Dent
Thi s dent was detected by a 'smart pig' .
26" line in Japan,
The dent was at the 4 - 5 o'cl ock
posi tion, possibl y caused duri ng
installation.
Note how close this damage is to a
mOlorway toll booth
__...... ..-..... _0
a
2
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE': Scale
We know thatthird party damage is a major
cause of pipeline failu res
Dents are found in the majority of (>80%)
pipelines inspected using smart pigs, with
50% of pipelines conta ining 10 or more dents
A review of pig dat a from 63 pipelines
revealed:
9851 dents of unknown sizes were
reported by meta! toss pigs
2389 (24%) of these 985 1 dents were
reported by 'caliper' pigs thai are
specifically designed to detect dents, but
note that it is assumed that these caliper
pigs were only reporting dents of depth of
over 2% pipe diameter
This suggests that 76% of the 985 1
reported dents were <2% pipe diameter in
depth
>80% pipelines
contain dents
cK-_
Most have depths
of <2% pi pe
diamet er
This gives 1A
dents/km
s
'"'
THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE': Scale (eont.]
These dala give a dent frequ ency of:
1.4 dents/km, of which...
0.3 dents/km are >2% pipe diameter in depth
Most of these dents were in the botto m (bet ween 4 and 8 o'clock) of the
pipeline
The deeper dents were in the bottom of the pipe (33% of bottom-of -the- line
dents, wer e >25mm in depth, against 6% of dents in the top-of-the-pipe
(between 8 and 4 o'clock)
There were no trends between pi pe di ameter (D) and dent frequency, pipe
grade or age.
There were more dents and dee per den ts in pipe of high 011 ratio (tewan
thickness), which are more flexi ble and less resistant 10 denting.
The met al loss pigs repo rted no weld or defect in 94% of their reported dents,
but noted 2.8% had metal loss defects (most in the bottom of the pipe), 1.8%
were associated with the longitudinal weld, and 1.5% associ ated with the girth
welds
C P..,.".n 2006 R..61' s
"
3
PLAIN, SMOOTH DENTS'
--'.--'--_.-'''_,-,- ..... __.. -.... _
A ........ ... _ ..... ...... _
_ _
DENTS IN OPERATIONAL PIPELINES: Example

,
4
PLAIN DENTS - Depth and shape
The DENT DEPTH is the most significant factor affecti ng the burst strength
and the fatigue strength of a plain dent.
The SHAPE (length and width) of the dent does affect the stress and strain
distribution in the dent, and the geometric stiffness of the dent ,
bullhese effects do not appear to be as important as the dent depth
Length
._-
PLAI N DENTS: Dimensions
O_;!l.IOII _'
=
=
=
=
Width
----+ --
~ .
dent depth
pipe wall thickness
pipe radius
pipe diameter
tt
tz
6
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS
Plain dents do not significantly reduce the
burst strength of pipe.
The effect of a plain dent is to introduce high
localised stresses, to cause yielding in the
pipe material and wall thinning in the dented
area.
The high stresses and strains caused by the
dent are accommodated by the ducti lity of the
pipe.
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS
Full scale lests have connrmeo that plain dents do not generally affect burst
strengths of pipelines:
On pressurisalion the dent attempts to move outward, allowing the pipe to
regain its original circular shape ,
Provided that nothing restr icts the movement or acts as a stress
concentration (e.g. a gouge or a kink), then the dent will not reduce the
burst strength of the pipe,
7
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS: Depth Limits
Empirical limits for plain dents under
static internal pressure loading have
been deri ved from ext ensive full scale
testing.
It should be noted that all of the dent
depths in the full scale tests were
measured at zero pressure.
Therefore the empiri cal limits may
need 10be corrected for spri ng back
if appl ied to dents measured in
pressurised pipe.
BURST TESTS ON PLAIN DENTS - Test Data
....
I
IT
1,1
*.
...... .. ... FAI LEDINDENT
....

.. FAILED IN DENT
""
i 140
\ .,
j 20
Ban. 119811
Bnb$I'l Gas (1982, 1983)
CANMEr (1979, 1982)
... ONV(I982.2000)
* SES(1997)
... FAILED IN DENT
FAI LED IN DENT .
e
"'"
o.t 0. 15 oz
"" '" ""
0 45
oenc D8p1h1P1p" D1 ....c.. (HID)
te
8
Full scale tests by British Gas, Battelle
and others, indicate that plain dents
of less than 8.0% of the pipe diameter
(measured at pressure) do not
significantly effect the burst strength
of pipe.
In the Brit ish Gas tests, plain dents of up to 24.0% (measured at zero
pressure) did not significan tly reduce the burst strength.
Note that this depth (8%) is for BURST (static loading) strength and
does not include allowance for FATIGUE loading ( see later).
If your pipeline has fatigue loading (e.g. pressure cycling), thi s
'acceptable' 8% dent size may be decreased.
e 2006
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAI N DENTS: Notes on
Dent Depth Limits
It should be noted that a dent of
depth 8.0% is a technical limit
this depth may restr ict product flow,
prevent the passage of pigs along the
pipel ine
The high strains associated with deep
dents may disband coatings
Because of this, dent limi ts in
pipelines have tradit ionally been
restricted to 6% diameter"
"" ..._ OIIlJ_C
..", ,--_..............
..,.."..""_,__",, _ o"_"""""_' '''''' . ' __''' '''' '''_o-.. ........' ....
_ ... _ .............,_...._
"
"
9
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS: Notes on
Dent Depth Limits
NOTE: Full scale tests on plain dents
on welds and dents containing defects
have demonstrated very low burst
pressures (see later)
Dented seam welds have shown failure
stresses as low as 7% SMYS
NOTE: A recent field survey" of dents
detected by geometry pigs in a 16"
pipeline stated that more than half the
dents contained gouges
Sf I]
>50% contained
gouges
C Pon..,." :/OOl,l R",, & l
rs
I
BURST STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS: Estimating
, Strains in Dents (ASME B31.8 App R)
We can also ' accept' dents based on the strain caused by them (ASME
B31.8App R ) :
Bending strain (eire. direction), C
j
:::
WI{11"') - (1IR, )]
Bending strain (long. di rection). 8
2
:::
-V2R
2
Extensional strai n (long . direction). 83 :::
[1 f2).[d/Lj2
SeeASME 631.8 for summation of all these strains
(
.,,"" " ' " '' ''''
IR,
Ro ::: nominal pipe outside diameterl2
L ::: dent l engt h. d = dent depth,! ::: pipewall IhicknessJ
The ASME strain limit in a cent is 6% This is based on: ASME 831 allows strains of up to 3% in field
bending: and the chance of cracking or puncture of linepipe increases after 12%. Therefore. 6% was selected
byASME,
... '" _ ,, __.0< . . ..... . ......, _ ...... _ , "' _"""-. __""-.'""'"'. _ "" """."" ,
C P__2lX:OlR..6Il 20
" __. ... . . ... .., .... ..-..' ,,__ , _ '-_ e-- .,.,.., "'""" "'"' "'" "_ O'<.,.,.,,,,, IN)
10
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS
A dent in a pipel ine
causes a high localised
stress and strai n
concentration.
Under cyclic pressure
loading there will be large
cyclic stress and strains
localised in the dent.
Cyclic pressure fatigue
tests on plain dents in
pipes indicate that plain
dents reduce the fatigue
life compared to plain
circular pipe .

Pressure
"' - - -
Time
"
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - Depth
and Mean Stress
Eff ect of dent depth:
The greater the dent depth the shorter the fatigue rife. .
Effect of mean stress:
In some of the tests in which the
maxi mum stress was high, the
Stress
dent was pushed out during the

fi rst cycl e, and the pipe
Mean
regained its cir cular shape. Stress
Consequently , no fatigue failure
\
VI
occurred.
The fatigue life of a plai n dent is
Time
dependent on the mean stress level
higher mean stresses promote
re-rounding of the pipe.
C_XIOI_.
n
t t
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - Length
Effect of dent length:
In long dents, fatigue cracking is long itudinally or ientated and usually occurs
in the centre of the dent (but often
sli ghtly displaced to one end).
In short dents, fatigue cracking
usually occurs around the flanks
of the dent.
The different behaviour is due to
the fact that the location of the
peak stresses and strains is
different in a short dent and
a long dent.
C Pon""",, 2006 Il ... 611
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS Multiples
Multiple dents - dents overlapping can lead to fatigue cracks in the
'saddle' region between the dents, and decreased fatigue life
see API 1160, App. A
'Saddle'
12
I
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - Models
The European Pipeline Research Group (EPRG) has developed an

empirical model for predicting the fatigue life of plain dent.
It calculates the fat igue life of a plain dent using the fatigue life of plai n pipe
(from SN curves), modified for the stress concen tration due 10 the dent.
A semi -empirical model for assessing the fatigue life of a plain dent has
been developed by Fowl er at SES (for the AGA)
S N curves modified for the stress concentration due to the dent are used.
t-------. Fatigue Failure
!
~ / n .. ~ ... l h o " ' ;9"0 ,. ,, " ,. 10M
!
No Fatigue F a i : ~
1
....-. .. C"a.. . ..........-
cl_1OOlI_' ~
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - SES
Model
The SES fatigue model is based on an S-N curve, modified for the
stress concentration due to the dent.
A 'st ress intensifi cation factor' has been derived from FE analysis to >
account for the stress concentration due to the dent.
It is a function of the diameter to wall thickness ratio (O/t ), the ratio of
the dent depth to nominal diameter, and the average pressure.
N = 2.0X I 0
6
( [ I'>. CY.' ]1'>. 1 )-3.74
I'>.p P 11400
N
l:J
=
=
=
predicted fatigue life of plain dent
' stress intensificalion factor' (from
Tables in original reference).
cyclic pressure, psi
[EQUaOOn given above is baMid on APl-RP2ACu....e X1
13
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - SES
Model versus Test Data
F
Note
Scatter
.,
UNCONSERIJATIVE
1000 11 -
100 L-Ll.JJ.J.:
1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000
Number of Cycles A TUAL F T G
PREDICTED
F TIGUELIFE 1000000
EPRG PLAIN DENT FATIGUE MODEL
The empirical EPRG fatigue model is based on an $-N curve , modified for the
stress concentrationdue 10 the dent
The S-N curve is for long itudinal submerged arc welded pipe (taken from DIN
24 13).
The stress concentration factor for the dent has been derived by comparison
with EPRG and Brit ish Gas lest data .
It is a function of the diameter to wal1lh ickness rat io. and the dent depth.
The equat ion for the fatigue life (in SI units) is:
COIIDR.I.. ... _oI"' __
01 _ "' E_ _ . .."..EF'RGIPI<C",. __
T_ _ .... on""" ".. ...... ,...
14
EPRG PLAIN DENT FATIGUE MODEL (contd.)
The model is based on tests in which the damage was introduced at zero
pressure; the dent depth is that after spring back, measured at zero pressure.
Therefore, a correction must be made for den ts introduced at pressure and
measured at pressure.
The model does not predict the experi mental observed effect of mean pressure
on the fatigue life of a plain dent.
The model is nol directly applicable to loadings giving rise to high strain-low
cycle fatigue behaviour, Le. reverse plastici ty.
t pipe wall thickness, mm
o outside diameter of pipe . rom
H
o
dent depth measured at zero pressure, mm
N predicted fatigue life of plain dent
R ratio of minimum stress in stress cycle to maximum stress in stress
cycle (= u"../u"",;r)
O'u ultimate tensi le strength, Nmm-
2
2a
A
equivalent cyclic hoop stress range corresponding to R =O. Nmms
0"'--2001_' 29
FATIGUE FAILURE AT OF A DENT: Case Study
.
-_.. _ ~ _ _ .._ ~ _ ..... --
-
-
I-
I-
J-
00 ".
Failed in 2001. as a rupture. three months after
damaged introduced.
Calculated fatigue life usi ng EPRG model is 6 months
Product pipeline. Built in 1980
Diameter = 12", wall thickness = 0.25",
Max pr essure = 1100psi ,
Mi nimum pressure = 400psi,
Grade =X52.
2 cycles of 700psi/day
Dent ed due to tree falli ng on it. T
Dent depth = 1", Dent length =
No surface damage.
Stress analysis of dent concl uded high strains are
in dent (strains<0.021).
"
15
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN
DENTS - ASME 831.85 Guidance"
'\
LIqUId? .-
.'
Tests have shown that dents of (residual)
depth 2% pipe diameter or less:
have long fatigue lives (100,0000- 1,000,000
cycles)
even at high cyclic stresslevels (36-72%
SMYS).
This fatigue life woul d be considered 'infinite' in
a gas pipeli ne
A fatigue failure of a shall ow dent in a gas
pipeline has never been reported in the USA*
This may not be the case in liquid lines that
have different. more severe cyclic stressing
There have been report s of failures of rock
dents in liquid lines, a few years after the rock
has been removed
Gas C:> 2%D
.. J_ _"' _c....... .. _ BJ' I "" __..... ..,_

FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - Case
Study
f fE 1997
0.25", crude oil line
aconeuucted in 1975. Pressure = 606 psi
_In 1997. a contractor's magnetic flux standard ...
resolution inllne inspection tool was run
_Excavations were made at locations along the pipeline
where the inspection 1001 indicated significant anomalies.
_At the site where the pipeline ruptured, the 1997
inspection data showed an anomal y that the contractor
had interprel ed as a "dent."
_The pipeline had not been excavated at this location
because the dent did not appear to meet the repai r criteria
being used at the time.
_T he repair criteria used required that, for a dent to be
repai red, it had to be deeper than 2 percent of the outside
diamet er of the pipe.
_Failed in 2000. $7million damage/clean up costs
16
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF PLAIN DENTS - Case
Study (cont)
_ The dent was consistent with contact with a hard object
_no hard object likely to have caused it (such as a rock) was found
_ The rupture was on the bottom of the pipe.
e'rrans-qraoutar cracks: appearance typical of fatigue progression were present.
Maximum depth of the cracks was 90-95% of the pipe wall thickness
.Primary and secondary origin areas of fatigue cracking were found at the edges of a
dent, in the pipe wall. Secondary cracks were in the vicinity of the twoorigin areas
_NTSB Conclusion: pipe
failed due to fatigue
cracki ng
_Due to a dent in the
pipe that was subjected
to high local stresses
from fluctuating pressures
within the pipe.
Soo N' SO R_ """,,- P..~ H ""'- _
DENTS WITH WELDS
17
DENTS WITH WELDS
Full scale test s have demonstrated that dented
seam weld s can exhibit very low bur st
pressures
Fail ure stresses as low as 7% SMYS have been
reported
Similarly, dented girt h welds would be
expected to exhibit very low burst pressures
The low burs t pressures are caused by cracking
in the weld as a result of the large stress and
strainsassociated with the dentingprocess.
The fatigue life of a dent contain ing a weld can
be considerably lower than the fatig ue life of
an equivalent plain dent
See Pipel ine Research Council International
Report PR2189822. ' Guidelines for the
Assessments of Dents on Welds'
I '"
[ I c....u
... - '\
[Q I
DENTS WITH WELDS - ASME 831.85 Guidance'
Tests on low frequency ERW and DSAW welds
in dents, and deep dents on girth welds have !It
shown low fatigue lives. IiiIJ
Genera lly, dents on girth welds or ERW , or DSAW welds have fati gue lives
of about 20% that of a similar plain dent with no weld.
Old weld s such as acetylene welds or severely flawed arc weld s may
have poor fatig ue lives .
If the longitudinal seam or girth weld is good quality. ductile and and
free from major defects (e.g. the girth weld is to API 1104), the fatigue
life can be good:
Some tests on (the bett er quali ty) high frequency ERW welds in dents have
shown good fatigue lives.
Work in me '90s for OPS in the USA also supported the view that shallow
rock dents on girth welds in gas lines were not a maj or problem
0_ 2OOlI _ ' ...1_.. II_.. _ e.-.. _II3' .... _ .... _d .... _
_
18
DENTS WITH WELDS: General Guidance in USA
IS2%D
API 1160 and ASME 831 .88 have differing guidance
on dents affecting longitudinal and girth welds:
API 1160 req uires dents affecting welds to be
'report ed and mit igated' within 6 months;
ASME 831.8 infers that dents affecting welds are
insigni fi cant if they are s2% pipe diameter in
dept h.
The USA's Pipeline Safety Reg ulati ons for gas and
li qui d l ines (CFR 192 and 195) both infer that dents
of depth :52% pipe diameter containing a weld are
insignifi cant.
Al l these guidelines wou ld require that the weld is
good quality (i n particular. ducti le) and free from
defects (e9 acceptable to API 1104), and with the
pipe coating unaffected by the denting.
...,_ _ .._ o-..._ IJ' I "' _
_ e:...-0<l2002.e.-k _10<:_:1":12
'CONSTRAINED' DENTS
19
UNCONSTRAINED AND CONSTRAINED DENTS
Recent work. sponsored by API (and published
as API 1156), has looked at the behaviour of
const rained and unconstrained dents.
An unconstrained dent is free to rebound
elastically when the indenter is removed
and free to reround as the pressure is
increased .
A constrained dent is one that is not free to
rer ound or rebound (because the indenter
is not removed).
A rock dent is an example of a constrained
dent.
Constrained dents and smooth unconstrained
dents do not significantly reduce the burst
strength of the pipe.
NO CONSTRAI NT
-----------
CONSTRAINT
UNCONSTRAINED AND CONSTRAINED DENTS
The most likely failure mode of a constrained dent
is by puncture, but only if the indenter (e.g. a rock)
is suffic iently hard and sharp, and the bearing
load
is high (and increasing).
The fatigue strength of a const rained dent is
greater
than that of an equivalent unconstrained dent.
In the API study , no fatigue related failure of
the sharp constrained dents was produced.
_ Fat igue cracks in constrai ned dents _ Fat i gue cracks in unconst rained
in itiated at the insi de surfa ce. dents in i ti at ed at t he outside surface
20
SIGNIFICANCE OF ROCK DENTS
In relat ively thin walled pipe, most dents
will reround to less than 5% diameter
when the pressure is increased to 72%
SMYS .
At 90% SMYS (e.q. f ollowi ng a hydratest),
the dent is likel y to be less than 2%
diameter.
Consequently, a dent bigger than 5%
diameter in the bottom of the pipe is
probabl y a rock dent.
Rock dents are very common, but of
little consequence per S8.
The dent is constrained, the weight of the
pipeline and the presence of the rock
prevents the dent from refounding.
..
SIGNIFICANCE OF ROCK DENTS
USA experience" is that rock dents are rarely associated with surface
damage.
"
Rock dents are -,>.J""-/
bottom of a pipe". -
However they can cause failure (usually a leak); the pipe can be punctured (if
the rock is sharp and bearing load is high), or any associated coal ing
damage can lead to a corrosion failure .
If the constrai ning obj ect (the rock ) is
removed then the constrained dent
wi ll become uncon strained.
Mechanical damage
is likely to be at the top.
A dent reported as greater than 5%
diameter is probably a const rained
rock dent, or a buckle.
... -
-e....- ..... ..... _ "' _
21
SIGNIFICANCE OF ROCK DENTS - Multiple Dents
..
-""""",,-_. -,--,..----'-
__
Note that multiple restrained dents (e.g. rock dents) in liquid lines may be
a problem" :
Thi s is because the 'saddle' area between the dents is not restrai ned , and can
move and cause fatigue fai lures in lines thai are heavily fatigued, i.e. some
liquid lines.
Guidelines are:
if the dent cent res are separat ed by less than one pipe di amet er, they
will need t o be investi gat ed
Investigation will involve removal of the rock (l.e. remova l of constraint) and
this wi ll likely lead to a repair
Note that no reports of fatigue failures in mul tiple dents in gas lines have
been reported' .
o_xa_
...J_ _ .. _O'-..._ ..,I .... .. . .._

.<k . . . ... ,.
. .
,
"" . ';
- -

SIGNIFICANCE OF ROCK DENTS - with corrosion
Tests on corrosion in rock dents have
shown the dent and corrosion to have
high burst strength due to tile dent
preventing the corrosion bulging.
The failure pressure of this corrosion was
conservauveiv predicted by RSTRENG
Therefore, it is possible to assess corrosion in a restrained dent by using
corrosion equations, and ignoring the oent' .
Note that corrosion protection will still be needed around the rock dent
to prevent further corrosion and possi ble SCC.
Environmentall y assisted cracking has been observed in dents in liqui d
lines"
... J_.. "_d_e.-.._e.)I.I ... _ .... ..
__C<rI..- Ool2OO2. e-..,..IPC 2002--21122
22
SIGNIFICANCE OF ROCK DENTS API 1156
API 1156 concludes that unconstrained dents of
2% pipe diameter, have good burst and fatigue
strength.
The presence of a stress raiser, or a weld in
the dent, reduces the fatigue life.
API 1156 concludes that constrained (rock)
dents have good burst and fatigu e properties,
and suggest that removing the rock is not ,
generally, a good idea .
"Constrained dents less than 6 percent in
depth are not a problem, unless they involve
a sharp obj ect whi ch might cause a puncture
or they interfer e with operations such as
pigging .-
ROCK DENTS or MECHANICAL DAMAGE'?
u .
Shape: rounded profi le rather than long and narrow;
Clock position: most rock-induced damage occurs on
the lower half of the pipe;
Depth: 2% of the 0 0 or greater;
Ext ent: signifICant amounts of ovality or indentation extending over several
feet of pipe.
MECHANICAL DAMAGE:
Shape: long & narrow aspect ratio, or several parallel
or adjacent similar features, crea selike shape;
Clock posit ion: most encroachment impacts are in the top half of the pipe;
The physical lay of the pipe line - an indicated "sag bend" where the line
crosses nat terrain may represent creases from backhoe scrapes being
confused for mild ripples in a field bend;
Proximity to above-grouncl feat ures where earthmoving may occur: e.q.
nearby road crossings or recent construc tion
ROCK DENTS
"
_ ~ C ' __""_'''' ' '_
23
POSITION OF DENT: API 1160' for Liquid lines
8 o' clock
ACTION:
immediate
concern
within 6 months
ACTION:
within 6
months
DENT @TOP
- dents with any indicated meta l
loss
- dent depth >2% diameter
- dents that affects pipe curvature
at a girth we ld Of a longitudinal
seam weld
DENT@BonOM
dent depth >6% diameter
- dents with meta l loss
- dents that affects pipe
curvature at a girth weld or a
SODOM
4 o'cloc k
Note: _IealI'ICMn" is ..._ 30 GayS.
"*""__s,-_... _ ....... " .._ l T l l _ ~ f ...(_
-"" 200' __lmes""voo_
DENTS AND GOUGES
24
DENTS AND GOUGES
When a pipeline is impacted, it can be both dented and
gouged.
A dent under internal pressure causes high stresses and
strains.
In the case of a pl ain dent, these stress and strain concentrations
are accommoda ted by the ducti lity of the fine pipe .
.,
DENTS AND GOUGES
The stress concentration and the
large strains caused as a dent
moves outwards under the
action of the internal pressure
causes ductile tearing of any
defect withi n the dent
The teari ng goes through the
remaini ng ligament.
Defect
I
Teari ng
25
DENTS AND GOUGES Dimensions
t
'"
: .
. .
, .
.' .-'
....---.
>: \/--
.'
:
: .
, '
, '
, '
.... ... :, , .
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
, '
-'" "
"" ---i--_
d
I
D
=
=
=
. defect depth
pipe wa ll thickness
pipe diameter
H
R
=
=
dent depth
pipe radius
DENTS AND GOUGES Tests
Dents combined with
defects can fail at very low
pressures.
The struct ure comprising the
dent and the defect is
complex and unstable.
Dents combined with defects
are a very severe form of
damage.
Full scale tests indicate that
dents combined with defects
can record very low burst
pressures and short fatigue
lives
26
DENTS AND GOUGES: Full ScaleTests
__dCMO
DENTS AND GOUGES Model for Burst Strength
British Gas developed a fracture model for predicting the
failure stress of a combined dent and gouge.
The fracture model is based on extensive testing
The model gives a best estimate of the failure stress of a combined
dent and gouge defect, not a conservative estimate.
The scatt er in its predictions (see later slide) indi cate it to be more of
a research tool than a practical model,
Its use in the field is not recommended- without expert
help.
... , _ _ .. _ e-.... ......,_ . ... __... _
_ _""'nJl-17,n
27
DENTS AND GOUGES - Model for Burst Strength
J}]
a=I.l5<7,(1-1)
Y, = LIZ-023(7)+ IO.{ 7)' - ZL7( 7)' + 30.4(7)'
Y, = 1.1 2-L39(;)+ 7.3Z(;)' -13.l(;Y+14.0(;r
K, = 1.9 K, = 057
hoop stress failure (Ib/li,,:')
plastic colla pse stress of i nfinitely long gouge (lbflin
2)
yiel d st rengt h (Ibllin')
fracture Area of Charpy (0.083 i n' for a 2J3 Charpy specimen)
Young"s Modulus (30,000, 000 Ibf/i,,:')
2/3 Charpy toughness (ftlbf)
maximum or average depth of part wall defed (in)
dent depth measured at zero pressure (in)
pipe wail lh ickness (in)
outsid e radi us of pipe (in)
DENTS AND GOUGES Test Data versus Model
' " >II ., 'II '" '" '" '" '" 100 '" , ., " " " "
Iii
MEASURED
O.C ONSERVATI VE
, -
" :.,
roo
u
-,
0
UNCONSE RVATlVE

c 0
0'
0
c
... J
o . .. .:J
. .., .. .:.
- - e. ... -
ooOO
Measured Fail ur e St ressfYield St rength, %
'!'. . ' ......

.". .
- . 1"

E. lI.... Ga>T.." C Ba'''''' I1'' ' I ' ''''' CANMET ' .,.. . Sf S l
T<,,,,,,G',, 0 ""'_ V..." T....
n ooOO
oo OO
.'
,
PREDICTED
"
'-
"
a
0
-e
..
"
ii

.a

'a
u,
-e
B
0
"
O P_ 2006 Re.6I'
28
DENTS AND GOUGES Fatigue Strength
Fatigue life
1000 -1 ,000,000
O -30,000
En mples of Effect of Damage
on Fati gue U fe
Damage
Dent
Dent & Gouge
Full scale tests have shown that dents combi ned with defects generally
have very low fatigue lives.
The fatigue life of a dent containing a gouge is difficult to predict.
Full scale tests indicate that the fatigue life of a combined dent and gouge
can be of the order of between ten and one hundred times less than the
fati gue life of an equivalent plain dent.
In some cases even shorter fatigue lives have been observed duri ng
testing,
Work by the American Gas Association (AGA) have shown that the
presence of a gouge as small as 5% of the wall thickness can reduce
the fatigue life of a smooth dent by a factor of 40.
r::-----:----::=-----::::-----,
C __2alII-.
"
DRESSING DEFECTS IN DENTS
se
29
Fatigue li fe
DRESSING DEFECTS IN DENTS
It is possible to restore the strength of a dent containing
damage by grinding (dressing) the damage.
ASME 831.8: Grinding up to:
depths of 10%1, to any length, and " 4O%t iii
li mited lengths up 1040% t _
Has been shown to be safe.
A further limit of dent depths less than 4% has been stipulated for
these grinding repairs".
A formul a used for calculating acceptable grind lengths is given in
the publ ication below*, ASME 831.8 & CSA Z662
Examples of Effect of Grinding Damage
on Fatigue Life
Damage
Dent & Gouge
Dent & Grind
0 - - 100,000
- 1000 - - 100,000
C_20J5_,_... _.. ...... .. __., _
""..... '--""''''''.,.,.,
DRESSING DEFECTS IN DENTS - Safety
ss
Note that any work on a pipeline, includi ng grind ing
is hazardous, and that a dent may become unstable
as the grinding progresse s.
Ensure pressure reductions and safe working
practices if grindi ng a defect on a pipeline .
30
SUMMARY Fatigue strength of plain notches,
plain dents and dents and defects
,.
"
Examples of Effect of Damage
on Fatigue Life
Damage
Gouge
Dent
Denl & Weld
Dent & Gouge
DENT
& NOTCH
(Equivalent) Number of Cycles

"
OTHER GEOMETRIC DEFECTS IN PIPELI NES
31
LARGE DEFORMATION, KINKS
Pipelines can undergo extensive deformation - e.q. an anchor
dragging an underwater pipeline.
These large deformations need to be assessed using structural analysi s
A kin ked dent is a dent which contains rapid changes in contour, i .e. it
is grossly distorted.
Kinked dents would be expected 10have very low burst pressures and
short fatigue lives.
ea
WRINKLES, RIPPLES, BUCKLES
Somet imes pipelines contain wri nkles or
rippl es (local deformation with outward
bulging or inward symmetry) or bu ckl es
(a wrinkle/ripple that has large
deformation in the pipe)
API 1160 defines a buckl e as deformation I : : : : : ; : ~ : ~ : ' : ~
wi th amplitude >lio (25mm)
API 1163 considers a wri nkle as a smooth
localised bulge on the outside wall of a
pipeline with a height greater than one wall
thickness (I)
API 1163 considers a ripple as a smooth
locali sed bulge on the outside wall of a
pi peline wi th a height no greater than I
o
0_2OOlI_'
32
WRINKLES, RIPPLES, BUCKLES
A wri nkle bend is a field bend with
smooth localised bulges on the inner
radius
They are no longer allowed in high
stressed pipelines
Some old failures in wrinkle
bends thought to have been
caused by ground temperature
and line pressure
() 8'........ (.)
~
RIPPLES
Recent" recommendations on
8
::=0
rtppt es in field bends: 0:==
Gas Lines: Shallow ripples having
crest-to-t rough dimensions
up 10 1% pipe outside diameter (00) for
gas pipeli nes operating at stress levels> C
1 to 2% OD 47,000 Ibflin' , Gas
increasing to 2%00 for gas pipelines
operating at < 37,000 Ibflinl
Hazardous Liquid Lines: Shallow ripples
having crest-to-trough dimensions
Liquid 0.5 to 2% OD
up to 0.5 % pipe 00 for hazardous liquid
pipelines operating at stress level s >
47,000 Ibmn' ,
increasing 10 2% 00 for hazardous liquid
pipelines operating at .c 20,000 Ibfli n
2
.
co _ 200ll ... ..ell
-.o J _ ~ _ _ . - __"_'''_',.
ee
-_.. _ ~ -""""-'''''''''''-'-''--'''''
33
ASSESSING DENTS: Summary
Plain Dents
No big problems under static loading
Fatigue loading can be a problem,
especially i n liquid lines
Use EPRG or 'SES' model for fatigue
life
Dents on We lds
Low failure stress and short fatigue lives
Dent and Gouges
Very severe damage and low failu re
stresses
Very short fatigue life
EPRG mode l for bur st strength, but
inaccurate, probably better to repair
C_2006_
~ _ .... ~
0_20:15__
ea
34
TEST DATA
FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF DENTS - Test Data
es
".
[] ",_ T_.
"."
""""'ET _
' _ <>- T. "
[

. . .... T_
o SEU _
*U
ri

I i
E
.!!!
0
.
I'
I
a
,

a:: ".. ,

8
I
I
I a , 0"
11-
i .1 . I
..

.... -.. - ..t..
0
I I I
.
:

-
..

r:
I I
II

-
- - --
-
(equivalent) Number of Cycles
-
"
35
BURST STRENGTH OF SMOOTH DENTS AND
DENTS ON WELDS - Test Data
I
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0-35 0.4 0.45
Dent DepthIPipe Diameter (HID) . DENT DEPTH.
I ""
c
VERYl OW
FAILURE
STRESSES
DID NOT FAIL

.', . -- ".
, .'" .. -"
\ '\---- _'-
, .,.
".' ,' ''''
.;... "
:....
o "
o 0.05
180
FAILURE 160
STRESS
140

100
80
60
..
u,
40
20
0 __-
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF DENTS WITH WELDS-
Test Data
o.
."""' ......", .....,
I
ENT
ea ..... f-
EPTH

.,
i .11
, ,
! t. ,.
rtmr '
a.,.
I
"
f .'
,
Itl
1.
I o.
I I ' . 111' 1
1
:
"
...':.", I ....t.: 11:n-

,.
I
. . -

... I J1111111 I
IGUE u"
I I IIllill!. I
VES
o
o
VER
FAT
LI
C_2006_
If ' OIl
.----"""")
,- -
FATIGUE LIFE
za
36
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF SMOOTH DENTS
CONTAINING GOUGES AND PLAIN DENTS
III
Fatigue Life
1000 -1 ,000,000
0- - 30,000
l _ .. ..... _ -. 'P'RlI

III f- UlI
HH
i-+tii1i'iii';===-........::J.,....---.,
I
I.' 1--+t1+ttHH Examples of Effect of Damage
on Fati gue life
I 0'2 i Damage
J I . I ::'9j
e
f=++i1iiill--'-- - ---'
l '" I k - I h Iii I
o. 1--+-f+lB iI-----:-'
II. I. ' i..
I
:. -) .
VERYLOW '':': f- I . j' I Ii.
FATIG' , ...-- '1:tl11i ri- ' 4 . H. ++fl8
:11 11ll
.. ,.
I FATIGUE LIFE'!
"
FATIGUE STRENGTH OF DENTS
CONTAINING GRINDS: Test Data
0.-
J
o.
.. ...
& - .
""'0
'E .. . ..
&
rit!
l
V DEFECTS
AFTER
(r
r
GRIND
II
REPAIRS
Examples of Effect of Damage
(J ... ' 0."" on Fatigue Life
o ....
Damage Fatigue Life
" '" 0 0.15
... . 0."'"
Dent & Gouge 0- - 100,000

_ 1M _on
... _ 0.:10 Dent & Grind - 1000 - - 100,000
.. ... . O.3!I

.... 000
;;-+
I 111111 1
_.-
I
. -I' II IN DENT
,
I I

I
II
FATIGUE LI FE
..
OPoo_ ." -*f
- -
"
37
FATIGUE OF PLAIN DENTS
API SN CURVE USED IN SES MODEL
I l ~ Y L I
000
S.J:8 ESS, S
'"
-
I 111 11
m
0
1IIIIr 11'
I
1III1
,
'00
~
,::m:
'"
-
g
u
~ ,
c
I I I ~ I
I I
I
I II I III II n
"'0000 '00000 '00000o '00000oo
rooocoocc -ooccccooc
Number of Cycles, N
I FATIGUE LIFE, J,iJ
0_ 2OOlI _ '
te
38
FATIGUE OF PLAIN DENTS: EPRG Model versus
Test Data
a _ T_
o CNAT T_
.--- ._-
SES _
~
100000
S
~
u
;S 10000
1;
100
10
100 1000 10000 100000
' 00000o
C_ 2COli _
Number of y l e ~ ACTUAL FATIGUE LIFE
n
SPRING BACK AND REROUNDING OF DENTS
C_2O:l5_'
"
39
SPRING BACK AND REROUNDING
The effect of internal pressure is to stiffen the pipe, increas ing the
resistance to deformation.
For the same maximum instantaneous dent depth, the remaining dent
(after the removal of the indenter and spring back) when denting at zero
pressure will be deeper than tile remaining dent when denting at
pressure.
The dent depth changes as the internal pressure changes.
In many of the full scale tests on plain dents and dents containing
gouges, the dents were int roduced at zero pressure
And the dent depth after spring back was also measured at zero
pressure.
The resultant empirical or semi-empi rical models are, therefore.
based on the dent depth measured at zero pressure.
In pract ice, the majority of in-service damage (e.g. dents) wi ll be
introduced into pressur ised pipe, and the depth of the dent will be
measured in the field whilst the pipe is pressurtsed.
O_2OOlI RO6'l
SPRING BACK AND REROUNDING
spri ng back - (also referred to as 'rebounding') the reduction in dent
depth due to elastic unl oading that occ urs when the indenter is removed
from the pipe
reroundl ng - the change in dent depth under internal pressure
The terminology of spring back and rerounding is adopted in order to
distinguish between:
the change in dent depth associated with indentation and the
removal of the indenter (spring back), and
the change in the depth of a pre-existing dent (i .e. after indentation
and the removal of the indenter) under changing internal pressure
(rerounding).
ec
40
Spring Back and Rerounding, Dent Depth
,----,---.---...- ""' -------------------------------"' ---"' -- ,.--- -
Hr Ho Hp
Hp> Ho >Hr
Hp. ",stanlanloous (......>:inun) llenI doplh <!Unn9 in'c>IIC:t (1fIden'. in COI'IIact wiIh pipelin8)
Hr _ _ depI'I.......,..;"g an.. elf__(_dolPh --..red at pt llSStlm)
Ho d _ (deonIoe'..-nod 8\-., pressure)
0_2005_
Spring Back and Rerounding, Load and
Displacement
..

Hp
ea
41
Spring Back and Rerounding, Internal Pressure
and Dent Depth

"""'-Joding
He Hp
..
A REROUNDING CORRECTION FACTOR
An empiri cal rerounding correction factor has been published by the EPRG.
=
=
1.43H
r
i
dent depth measured at zero pressure
dent depth measured at pressure
C_2OOll_1 """""'V""""""' .a-.. , _ ...... ' __.. Sot
.. CooNd> ' ..
42
How to Assess Cracks
Penspen Integrity
Cl ....n.poon2001 R...611
"._"'><;<: .....,"'..-..........,..... .,....... - _..,_ e-.>o. _ .. __
_ GIN. " " w ,'_<--on_e.-.o_... ".. ........_
"""'__...'.0''''' = ,'''',... , <1$00
... __""s<;<; .. _ ...... ' _ ....... __""... .... ....
1
CRACKS IN WELDS OR FITTINGS
2
WELD/FITTING CRACKING
.If you detect cracking in
your pipeline, it is usually:
_in weldments
_in fittings, or
. will be environmentally
created.
_Cracks in weldments (other
than girth welds). and in
fittings, should be assessed
using fracture mechanics
methods, e.g.:
_SS 7910 or
_API 579
Crack
3
WELD/FITTING CRACKING: General methodology
,
_.
,_. ....
U '2 , . t. t. U . 2
L". COLLAPSE
2. FRACTURE ASSESSMENT
~ ~ T U R
..
..
, ..
log ,j}(
.'
1. DEFECT
F. UlIUOfTom 0
Hook C..,;k
1"s."mW. ld
3. FATIGUE
ASSESSMENT
"
~
2
CORROSION - Some basics
C_2OOli_
CORROSION* - 'Galvanic', 'SRBs', 'Sweet', 'Sour',
'sec'
ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT SOUR PRODUCT SWEET PRODUCT
Galvanic
Bacteria +
H
2
S + wat er CO
2
+ water
sulphat es
I...( L""'"'''''.'
9
< -t
..
External lote mal
''''''''''''
Internal
-{ re-"" ]
I...( J
(
Erlema!' "
E"""""
<,
lntemal"
--------
CRACKING
5
' There are other causes of COO'OSIOO and <:racking in PIpelines
' It is po$$ible. but .........sual. to have(SSCC)<:racking on the
external surface of the pipe. due to SRBs
ThIs crad li ng could be se c (see lal er) or HIC (see later)
s
3
EXTERNAL CORROSION Galvanic
Anode -lose electrons (corrodes)
Cathode - gain electrons (prot ected)
(Molecular) Hydrogen (H
2)
cannot enter
"...
(Atomic) Hydrogen (H' ) can enter steel
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL CORROSION - 'SRBs'
r
Most soi ls & water contain bacteria: they
are usuall y not a corrosion problem.
There are exceptions ...
Sulphate reducing bacteria (SRB):
bacteriathat reducesuionates to sulfide.
which reacts with hydrogen (produced by
metabolic activities, or by cathodi c reaction of
corrosion process) to form hydrogen sulphide
(H
2
S).
they create a corrosion process similar to the
pittingof sour corrosion.
SRBsneedsuionetesaround: no sutchatee.
no problems.
e
4
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL CORROSION - 'SRBs' (cont.)
The SRBs grow in the absence of oxygen
(anaerobic'), feeding on the fatty acids
that may be present in produced water.
They only grow in the absence of
oxygen, but oxygen does not kill them.
They produce large amounts of sulphide
as they grow & it is this sulphide that
causes corrosion.
the corrosion is primarily in the base of
the pipeline, local to the SRB colony.
SRBs cause localised corrosion, filled
with black sulphide corrosion products
C P""'P"" 2006 Rev6l1

9
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL CORROSION -
'SRBs' (cont.)
Sulphate reducing bacteria (SRBs) are
micro-organisms that chemicallyreduce
sulphate ions in the water to sulphide.
These bacteria are 'non-pathogenic' (i.e. they
are not capable of causing disease)
The corrosion reaction involvi ng HzS
produces mono-atomic hydrogen (HO) at
the corroding surface that should
combine to form Hz gas,
but the presence of sulphide species retards
or poisons this combination reaction sothat
the hydrogen diffuses into the steel
5
INTERNAL CORROSION AND CRACKING - 'Sweet'
and 'Sour'
INTERNAL CORROSION - 'Sweet' and 'Sour'
11
'SOUR'::: 'Sour' gas/oil is high in hydrogen sulphides/sulphides
'SWEET'*::: 'Sweet' gas/oi l is low in hydrogen sulphide/sulphides.
SOUR
H,S + Water
SWEET
CO, + Water
Conp e on
' The process fe>r ",moving hydrogen sulphide from sou, gas is coITJlllOflly refelled to as 'sweetening' the gas.
6
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sweet
Sweet Corrosion is a corrosion process
that reduces the pipe wall by the presence
of water which is made acidic by the
presence of carbon dioxide in the product
SWEET
It producesgeneral metalloss
Sweet corrosion will be the most likely CO2 + Water
corrosion process, if there are low levelsof
hydrogen sulphide in the product
As hydrogen sulphide levels increase, (cor-pslo __)-
sul phide scales are formed on the metal \:
surface andmetal loss becomes
localised and concentrated.
Iron sulph ide scal es predominate when
the ratio of CO
2
:H
2S
is less than 500:1
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour
"
Sour Corrosion is a corrosion process
that reduces pipe wall by the presen ce
of wat er and hydrogen sulphide
The transition from SWEET to
SOUR corrosion will vary with
product chemistry. operating
conditions. etc..
NACE" quote a level of HzS as
0.0035 bar (0.05psi) for this
transition.
In sour conditions there is the
additional risk of hydrogen induced
cracking and sulphide stress
corrosion cracking.
SOUR
H,S + Water
L(cra/ kng )
"
7
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour 1. Corrosion
In a sour environment we can have:
Pilling
From deposition of solid sul phides. or
breakdown of the sul phide film that may
form on the pi pe steel
This type of pitting may occur anywhere
within the pipeline
Mosllikely at 6 o'clock position as this is
where the sulphides are most likely to
settle
e_2OOII_
15
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour 2. SSCC
Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracki ng (SSCC)
Can lake place when a susceptible metal i s

subject to a sour envi ronment and level of
- ~ .........
stress (the stress may be residual or applied ).
STRESS
II is defined as brittle failure by cracking under
the combined aclion of tensile stress and
corrosion in the presence of water and
H, O + H,S
hydrogen sulphide.
The cracking is thought to be caused by the
I H -+ H+.
embriltlement of the metal by hydrogen.
SSCC is found to attack higher strength
SSfC
materials (act ual tensile strength of :!:550MPa)
weld "-
Hence , it is often associated with weld heat
affected zones and cold wor1c.ed sections, 1-
\ ;;L
v.t1ich tend to be stronger than the standard
line pipe.
O_2OOll_,
rs
8
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour 2. SSCC
Hydrogen cracking
Few SSCC failures have been
reported in pipel ines
mosl are associated with hard spots.
AS 2885.1 says that the susceptibility
of steels to SSCC is indicated by a
hardness of more than 22 HRC
(Hardness Rockwell C)
by limiting the hardness of the steel to this
value, failure by SSCC is avoided
NACE MR0175 contains more
information
0 _
_ produced by Itle cottOIion rNClion '" iron.usuaIIy-.t>one 10 bm
lI"" rroIeculet.. ill ". at sulphide. toe hydrogen
_.". hydrogenllloms cduwno1l'e __
_ 1..... 'I:>a.'Ilon ...........
"
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour 3. HIC
me
\\
11"--. i
I
Hie is most likely to affect susceptible steels where an
iron sul phide film has developed and hydroge n is present.
It is not dependent on stress.
Most corrosion processesproduce H
2
Acid corrosion l akes place at the steel surf ace and hydrogen is evolved.
Atomic hydrogen (hydrogen iOns) is absorbed into the steel, then diffuses through
the steel.
Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC")
The ions migrate into sates within the steel , such as voids or inclusions
The ions combine to form hydrogen molecules: these molecules are too large to
diffuse out of the steel
The pressure builds up t )
(up 10 18.6MPa (2700 psi)) and
cracks and blisters appear --
----
W. __.HIC...... _d...._.n...,_....-...... __
...--_... --
18
9
INTERNAL CORROSION - Sour 3. HIC & Blisters
HIe causes blisters in the pipe wall around manganese sulphide
inclusions within the steel from ils manufacture.
Hence, Hi e does not tend to be found at parti cular locations, such as
weldments.
If the Hie cannot propagate paral lel to
the pipe surface, it may link up 'With
cracks 00 adjacent , parallel
HIe II Ie
AS 2885.1: The best approach to preventi ng Hie in newpipelines is 10 use 'd ean' steels
with modifi ed inclusion shape that do not have suitabl e sites in their microstructure for
hydrogen to accumul ate and cause cracking. NACE TM0284 gives guidance and lests .
Steels pass ing this test are called ' HIC-resistant steels
... e...-_ _
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTED CRACKING (EAC):
Assessment
_Environmentally assisted cracking
can occur to both the internal and
external surfaces of a pipeline
_On the internal surface, we can
have sulphide stress corros ion
cracking (SSCC) , hydrogen induced
cracking (HIC) , etc.
. On Ihe externa l surface our main
problem is usually stress
corrosion cracking (SCC)
_All these type of envi ronmental
cracking/corrosion must be assessed
using different methods to those
describe previously, because these
degradation mechanisms cause
cracking, blistering, etc..
_.-._-
--
Internal
Corrosion
External
Hy<lrogf>n a.d<Ing doe._
_ ", -.Jorap(JIied Rt'iI....
__cno<:l<lI
20
10
Cracking
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING: Symptom - Cause
Generally, we design against corrosion cracki ng,
Crack initiati on is considered unacceptable. due to
rapid subsequent propagatio n.
Consequent ly, cracking in pipeli nes is not usu ally a
defect assessment problem ;'_....
It is a symptom of something wrong - you
need to isola te the cause & prevent/control it
Three factors contribute 10this cracking:
Material microstructure
Environment
Appl ied stress
We solve the cracking problem by changing
or controlling these factors
Therefore , avoidance of the problem may be
achieved through
malerial select ion
keeping the stress below lhe critical level for cracking
Modifying lhe environment (this is only occas ionally
possible)
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING: Solutions
21
Internal cracking/blisteri ng
use steels with low levels (sulphu r & phosphorous) of
impurities
modify environment by reducing hydrog en
use surface coatings & inhibitors
Hydrogen embrittl emenl
use lower st rength (hardness) Of high resistance alloys
careful selection of materials of construction and plating
system
heat treatment to remove absorbed hydrogen
see
See later
EVALUATION OF H DAMAGE
There are various laboratory
(e.g. slow strain rate) tests
_ e-..__
suass onenr.tr&d
HIC is "" ""'1of
t",nsg"",,ufM
clH, -s<'crKI<s
""" .r.d inl!l'!l
/IIto .lI>.oc.\;M...
dftclion
22
1\
INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING HIC and
SSCC SUMMARY
Pipeline Carri es Sour Product with II () :' c, .:----r
. ;: - .
.._-- ----
. orroston ofpipewall due I
reaction and formation of
-
H
l
can enter steel and cause damage and cmbriulcmcm.
iron sui hides and II
SSl
C
weld '
II leI _. I Two types of crack ing ca n occur I
'\
\\
- ] [HYdmgon Induced Cracking I
ISulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking
'HIO 'SSCO
HIe IS stepwise cracking causcc oy t1
2
SSCC usually occurs in welds because
diffusing into the steel and enterin g voids it needs high stresses and
"n. , " . . hie h vicld strcneths/hardness
IThe sol ution is to select the correct (resistant) I
nine materials and cont rol nroduct oualitv

23
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING - External "
-We can I>a>'lI " v""iely of 0" !he " xlern,,1.,,,f_01.. pipeline. '.g. hydn>Ql'l'l... &d<ing
at " l>ar<l spot. We";l1'lUiddy <XN but most of !hol next .Ud,"";11 concenIrate on sec
"
12
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING - HACC' (
Cathodic protection systems protect the external surface of
the pipeline from corrosion.
But if the potential is too negative, hydrogen can be evolved on the
surface if the steel.
Even when CP levels are within recommended limits, hydrogen can
be evolved from small, narrow coali ng defects in lower resi stivity
soils in some situat ions
Hard spots or mechani cal damage on a pipe' s surface will
have high hardnesses
These areas can be attacked by the hydrogen from the CP and lead
to 'hydrogen assist ed cold cracking (HAeC)
O_ 1llDIl _
... _.
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING - SCC
25
A corrosive environment can crack materials
Stress corros ion cracking (SeC) is an example
sec is not unusual - many industries have sec
Nuclear reactor tubing can have sec
Brass, Aluminium. Magnesium can support sec
In the 'old' gas industry, we sometimes had internal
sec in our pipel ines from the ' town' ('coal') gas ---
The 'town gas' was 35% CH
4
45%H
2
15%CO
2
, 5% CO,
t race water and 0 2'
Pipeline steels and pipe welds can have external see
Soil and water can be acidi c, neutral or alkaline. and the
degree of acidity or alkalinity is measured on a pH scale
that ranges from 0 (most acidic ) to 14 (most alkaline).
Tap waler is typicall y pH=7, which is 'neutral'.
26
13
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING SCC (
The outside surface of the pipeline can be cracked because of ' stress
corrosion'. It can affect both gas and liquid lines.
What is sec in pipelines?
The sec is usually in clusters of cracks
The indi vidual cracks have typical lenqtr tdepth ratios of 4 to 8
Cracks l end to interlink 10form long, shallow flaws
Fracture faces are covered in magnetite and carbonate films
- -
-
-
--
.. ." --,-
" ----_sec
.......-
I .
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING SCC (
sec is a corrosion process - crack-like defect s (rather that corrosion pit s)
are formed.
It need s three things to occur:
Mi crostructure - all line pipe is susceptibl e (although tensil e strength may
increase risk)
Environment - Any soil type can support sec, bul weVdry conditions, or
conditions Ihat damage coating are more susceptible. Continually wet
conditions (e.g. rivers ) have low incidence rate.
Stress level - Risk of see increases with stress MATERIAl
although there is no lower threshold . Local stress ( \. - _ _ --::-.) ESS
raisers (e.g. gouges) are conducive. Stress cycl ing \ J_
assists see - it breaks the protective oxide film at ENVI RONMENT
the crack tip and re-exposes the lip 10 the environment.
There are assessment methodologies evanebre' . but we usually try 10
avoid sec, or control it.
.... e'_'. __... __... _ _ __.'''' '''' '''''",,_
ae
14
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING SCC
( I
;;;;;
:>
Material:
Depends on
microstructure,
mposlffon.
etc

corrosive.
but might be very mild

29
-
ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKING - Stress Corrosion
Cracking (SCC) i n Pipelines
MATERIAL
=- - STRE S
ENVIRONMENT
'Perhaps the hardest type of defect to deal with Is s rress corrosion cracking...
the main problem Is that no reliable model exis ts to define crack growth.'
PIP:ell ne Rules of Thumb Handbook. 4'" Ed. Gulf Pub li shing. 1998
30
15
sec has been well known for many years in pipelines
Has occurred in many types of line pipe (yield strengths of 241MPa to
483 MPa)
The first documented case of sec causing a pipeline failure was the
Natchi toches, Loui siana. incident in the 1965.
This rupture was caused by high-pH sec & caused a gas release & fire
resulting in 17 fatalities
,--_._----
31
The older type of stress corr osion cracking
('high' pH , or 'classical' ) only occurs in a high
(>9) pH (alkaline) environment
It is associated with high temperatures.
In recent years, there have been an increasing
number of pipeline failures
Caused by a different type of sec. in
environments with relatively low pH (' near
neutral' or ' non-classical') of about 5.5-7.5.
pH is a measure of the aci dity or al kal inity of an aqueous
solution.
It is defined as the negative log (base 10) of the hydrogen
ion concentration.
Water with a pH of 7 is neutral; lower pH level s indicate an
increasing acidity, whi le pH levels above 7 indicate
increasingly basic solutions.
()
....
, ,
t
/'
,
)
HighpH$CC
32
16
Most see cracks are axial
When circumferential sec is
found . it is in areas of local
high stress concentration,
e.g. a dent, or high external
stresses, e.g. mountainous
regions.
Very few fail ures attributed
to see around the world
sec accounts for <2%* of
total failures in USA gas
lines . It accounts for 17% of
total failures in Canada
Can occur in both liquid and
gas lines
"$CC ..OPS .. _ r>:_"--l. .....
_ ...... .....J_ ""' '''''''', >"'9""_""''''''' _
--
33
sec along t he f usion line of
a weld ('toe crack' )
'T''T''''T''''T
7 8
' 10 810 910 20" 1
1m Il UIUtllllllllH III11Wlllllilull
Single sec
...
- -
,- ..-'
;" ---
-;.. -
---, sec colony
_ u_ .. "-... __ ..... _<_<_.. __ _ --...'""".. _ . _ . .... T _
t 7
TYPES OF STRESS CORROSION CRACKING: High
pH SCC
SCC: History of High pH
35
HIGH pH sec:
The pri nci pal factor thai would
cause high pH sec is coating
condi tion.
The first documented case of
sec causing a pipeline failure
was the Natchitoches,
l ouisiana, incident in the mid
19605 (1965?) .
Occurred in USA, Italy,
Australia. Iraq, Iran, Canada,
Saudi Arabia , Pakistan.
Coal tar and asphalt coatings
sometimes susceptible (see
API 1160. App A)
Mainly occurs on gas lines,
some 00 liqui d lines
._--
_ _ .... ocrr .. _ .. occ _
- .
36
18
SCC: Factors Contributing to High pH
a For high pH sec, high temperatures accelerate
cracking.
a - 90 percent of the service failures and hydrostatic
retest failures occurred wi thin 20 km of compressor
station discharges where the temperatures and
pressures are the highest.
a High pH cracking is axially-orientated
_sec has occurred at operating stresses from 58 to
80 percent SMYS (average is 69 percent SMYS).
a The coating types involved vary with ditch-applied
coal tar and asphalt being the dominate coatings.
The environment detected at the pipe surface in
high pH sec incidents is a mixture of carbonate and
bicarbonate solution.
aOften occurs in bottom half (3 to 9 o'clock) of pipe
37
SCC: Environment ' of High pH
ew hen pipeline steel is exposed to the surrounding environment due to some form of
coal ing failure, it is vulne rable to corrosion.
ea ecause soil corrosion is an electrochemical reaction, CP is used to mitigate ..
corrosion by passing an electrical current through the soil thus giving the pipe a
cathodic potential.
_Aconcentrated carbonate-bicarbonate (C0
3
-HC0
3
) solution has been identified as
the most probable environment responsible for high-pH SCC.
_This environment develops as a result of the interaction between hydroxyl ions produced
by the cathode reaction and CO
2
in the SOil generated by the decay of OI1lanicmatter.
_CP causes the pH of the elect rolyte beneath disbonded coatings to increase. and
the CO
2
readily dissolves in the elevated pH electrolyte, resulting in the generation of
the concentrated C0
3
-HC0
3
electrolyte.
Alkaline envirc nment . ., OH- + CO
2
=HC0
3
-
HCOi + C0
3
2- + W
et acoratory tests on small specimens indicates t hat this form of SCC is temperature
sensitive and occurs more frequently at higher temperature locations (> 100F).
._-_. _"-0--",_... ...... """_"""' .... _...._ -.:o .. __
38
19
SCC: Environment' of High pH
. High pH cracks usually occur on gas lines
eapecmc potential range is -600 to -750mVo;s
_Most failures have occurred on pipes coaled with coal tar or asphalt. which
is permeable, degraded or disbanded
. High temperature allows faster crack growth rates, and coating damage is
more likely at high temperatures
39
SCC: High pH Cracking in 'Intergranular'
StrKS COnoslon Cradling
'-
:I- r

,
K

-
'-

a Hlgh pH sec IS not usually associated
with welds
. High pH cracking is usually ' intergranular' and narrow
. (Iow pH cracking is 'transqranutar'" and wider, with less branches)
I.....rgran.u' Of
C..
20
scc: T ime for High pH SCC to Fail
_The initial average service life to first sec incident in USA was 21 years
with a minimum time of 6 years.
Average age = 22.9 years ; Standard Dev. = 10.0
43 Incidents
0-6 7-12 13-18 19-24 25-30 31-36 37-42 43-48 49-54 55-00
Service Lif e to Fir st sec, years
scc: Time for High pH SCC to Fail
41
_ The time per iod to the initial sec incident is
dependent on:
_the degradation of the coat ing
_the cathodic potential range necessary
for cracking to occur
_the maximum operating temperature and
_temperature variations of the line
segment, which infl uence the coat ing
degradation
_ the soil stress imposed on the coating
from the temperatur e changes
_chemical activity of the env ironment
_the stress level and pressure fluctuat ions
21
scc: Needs stresses and strains
_ The initiation and growth of see requires
the application of stresses that induce
plastic level strains.
_Plastic level strains can occur from:
_ the application of a number of
pressure cycles,
_ from the strain concentration
associated with a dent, at the edge
of a weld reinforcement, or
_ from a pit on the pipe surface that
has been produced by corrosion.
O_2OOI!i-"
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SCC'
see
-
Environment Materials Stress
I
I
I
O_2OOI!i-" T
-_..._d._._ _-f""" cP -
-Soiltype
Drainage
Topography
' pH
-Pipe- to-sodpotential
-Redox' " potenti al
' Resistivity
Temperature
' Carbon dioxide ' ?"
Coating type
Coating condi tion
-w eld type
Microstructure
' Inclusion type
' HAl versus body
' Pipegrade
Hoop stress
' Geotechnical
-Resjdual"?"
' Construction
MiII
' Dents
' Gouges
' SCratches
' Cyclic component
..
22
CONTROL OF High pH SCC - from PRCI
. High pH sec can be both predicted and controlled by using a protocol
developed by Pipeline Research Council International (PRe l ). The
parameters are:
eating
_ Coating, soil . and moisture,
.
_ Maximum temperature.
_ Surface coating preparation, /'= <,
Hoop stress,
_ Stress fluctuation level .
_ Cathodic potential level , and
_ Initial test pressu re level.
_ Each of these parameters is given a 'weighting', and the likelihood of
high pH sec can be determined for your pipeline.
e_2OOII_'
CONTROL OF High pH SCC - from ASME 831.8S
(see also NACE RP0204 SCCDA)
ASME 63 1.8 supplement gives an initial risk assessment
protocol for high pH SCC' as follows:
1. Operating stress >60% SMYS >60%
2. Operating temperature >100
0
F SMYS
3. Distance from compressor
station S 20mi les
4. Age Oyears
5. +AII coating systems other
than FBE oabo ears
If All of these are present then the pipe must be assessed for SCC.
In addition prior indications of SCC (inspections. failures) should
be eval uated unless conditions that led to them have been
corrected.
Conventional survey techniques should be used downstream of
compressor stations to find areas of disbanded coating for
excavation and inspection.
0 _
-The saonecnwia be used b. mil_on_pH sec
_ OOT_ on SCC __010 _ _ ....... .".
"
""
23
CONTROL OF High pH SCC - Note' on CP
The CP current collecti ng on the pipe surface at disbandments, in
coojunction with dissolved CO
2
in the groundwater, generates the high-pH
sec envi ronment.
CP can also place the pipe-t o-soil potential in the potential range for
cracki ng.
The potential range for cracki ng generally lies between the native potential of
underground pipelines and the poten tial associated with adeq uate protecti on
(850 mV CSE).
Based on field pH measurements of electrolytes associated with near
neutra l-pH sec colonies , it has been concl uded thai this form of sec occurs
in the absence of significant CP either because of the presen ce of a shieldi ng
coating or high-resist ivity soils that limi t CP current 10 the pipe surface .
Based on the available labora tory and field data , it can be concluded that the
polarized pipe- to-soil potent ial of pi peline segments that are potentially
susceptible to high-pH sec should be maintai ned above (more negative
than) -850 mV ees.
0_2008_
.. _'''T_
---...........--..._-,
TYPES OF STRESS CORROSION CRACKING:
Low pH ('near neutral") SCC
"
24
SCC: History of Low pH ('near neutral')
l OW pHsec:
Since 1972, Canadian standards have allowed pipeli nes 10be operated at
80% of the hydrates! pressure
Thi s allows 80% SMYS operation in
certain (remote) locations.
No major problems occurred until 1985,
when stress corrosioncracking
caused a number of failures.
Of the 17 reported failures on
Canadian pipeline s operating
between 72 and 80% SMYS, the
major cause (7 cases) was sec.
This is surpris ing: the major
cause of incidents on most
Western World pipelines is
lhird party interference. and
sec is a relatively minor prOOlem.
In 1986 we only knew about one type of sec - tvgh pH!
SCC: Failures in Canada
49
1954 - 1984
1985 - 2003
""
__2001 _ .
50
25
scc: Low pH ('near neutral') Failure
.From 1977 - 96 there
were 22 SCC failures in
Canada
.15 on gas lines
_6 circumferential cracks,
_9 longitudinal cracks
.7 on liquid lines
.1 2 ruptures and 10 leaks
'Typically, low pH sec is eeeccieteowe
very shallow metsucss. It is toone! where
there is a local absence of CP, 'Ari th a coating
missing (in wet anaerobic soil ). or disbonded
'see failure of gas line - USA - 2003
'More low pH sec failures on gas li nes are
reportedin Canada. But. there are 4x as
many tape-coated gas lines as liquid li nes in
Canada. Hence. liquid lines are 2x likelyto
crack than gas lines, on a mile per mile basis.
0_2006-.
51
SCC: Factors for Low pH ('near neutral')
The SCC causing these failures is
called 'low pH SCC'
It has an increased tendency to
occur at higher stress levels.
However, these sec failures have
not been confined to high stressed
lines
sec has caused failures in lines at
stresses down to 53% SMYS.
-l ow pH sec gives transgranular (sometimes called
'quasi transgranutar) crack s.
-These cracks are similar to corrosion fatigue cracks.
-corrcso n fatigue cracks are fatigue cracks accelerated
by the corrosive environment.
52
26
scc: Factors for Low pH ('near neutral')
Most (94%, of these Canadian sec
failures were associated wit h ' stress
raisers'; mechanical damage (gouge,
dent ), signi ficant metal loss due to
corrosion, or a weld.
Addi tionally, the failures were pr imarily on
disbanded coatings and on field applied
PE tape coaled lines installed between
1968 & 1973
Tape coatings have high CP resistance
which prevents otsbonoeo areas from
being cat hodically protecte d.
No reported failures on fusion bonded
epoxy pipelines
This cracking has also occurred in USA.
Brazil. Italy, Russia, etc..
"Fl(!l(I.-applied tape coaling
cl_2OOlI_'
..... o- e-"' -._.,...-_ __
- - - . - ~ ~ . - ....... . . . - ~ -
53
scc - Factors for Low pH ('near neutral')
r All steels
at.ow pH see has a dilute carbonic
acid environment (5.5 to 7.5 pH)
_ Low pH see can be either axial or
transverse to the pipe axis
_A wide range of pipe sizes, grades
and manufacturing processes were
involved, which suggests specific pipe
steels or pipe mills cannot be identified I
as contributing to see. "" rJI
_The see incidents have occurred at
locations remote from compressor
stations" suggesting temperature is not
a factor.
"l ow pH sec is ....,.. ............ the _ arge 01 aCOtfV'l'$SCII' st._ '"
__ lI>8 _ arg.. """ """'''''' of ~ staOOos Io<liquid Ionn
27
see - Environment* for Low pH ('near neutral')
_Near neutral SCC was not documented until the late 1970s and was first
identified on buried pipelines in Canada where tape-wrapped pipe
contained wrinkles in the coating that trapped water with a pH between
5.5 and 7.5.
_The cracking environment appears to be a diluted groundwater
containing dissolved CO
2
, The source of the CO
2
is typicall y the decay of
organic matter and geochemical reactions in tile soil.
_This form of cracking occurs under conditions where there is little, if any,
CP current reaching the pipe surface, either because of the presence of a
shielding coati ng, a highly resistive soil, or inadequate CPO
_Typically, the SCC colonies initiate at 00 surface locations where there
is already pitting or general corrosion,
The mos t obvi ous differences between the two forms are the temperature sensitivity of
high-pH sec, the fracture morphology, and the pH of the pipe environment.
"Near neutral see occurs at a free corrosion potential of 760 to . 7g0mV
ccs
_e-.e.-",_." F ~ _ F _ _ __s----......_ _... __
.""'"-'9_~ c.-.., ._ASIoIE Fe 2ta ~ 2<XI6
55
scc: Time for Near Neutral Axial SCC to Fail
16 ncidents
Hoop
stress
2125 te-a ." c-s
5
o
~ 25 1---- - ------ - - - - -
"
g; 20 t---- - - ----,::::-- - - -
~
~ 15 1----- - --
10 1-- - - - - -
Service life to First sec, years
"
28
see: Time for Near Neutral Transverse see to
Fail
_The initial average transverse SCC pipe age is 3.8 years less than the initial average axial
SCC age.
_This difference may indicate that the stress level in the transverse crack case is higher than
the axial crack case causing the cracks to grow faster or more continuously.
"
Transverse crad<
fromCEPAsecRecornrrencIO<l
P"",_Addendumon
Ct<:uJTfe<...,bal SCC
Transverse
cracks
21-25 11_15
'''''''''
f----I-
70
so
so
~
~
"
c
e 30
c,
20
70
0
Service Lif e to First sec.years
A"9 Age " 17.6 years SO " 4.8 years
0_2006 _ ,
see - Low pH (Near Neutral)
_ Coating has a major
role in low pH SCC.
_PE tape coating and
shrink sleeves have
been involved in over
80% of the Canadian
see failures.
LaboratOl)' tests show
polyethylene tape coaling
shields CP current
whereas FBE and coal tar
coatings do not'
0_2006 _ 61 '
---"'-.. ' .-..-.,.. ..__ __... _ ~
_ _ ... _ _ ....... _ . 0' _ .... , ... ,
',-. ~ . _ ~ __,,- ' _.0.--.""""-
~ - . . -
se
29
see Low pH (near neutral) - Key factors (NEB)
_ The National Energy Board of Canada
concluded that
_sec initiates as a resu lt ofthe
compl ex interaction of three
conditi on s:
_ 1. a potent envi ronment at the
pipe surface
_ A number of soil and groundwater
propert ies then playa role in
producing a pole nt environment at
the pipe surface.
_ 2. a susceptibl e pipe material, and
_ 3. a tensi le stress".
_ All three cond itions must be present
to- sec to occur.
see
~ _ , _o:ar;o"-b_"_ --.y.... _""' __... _ 59
"" .......,. __"" _ _ "' F\w;>''-'''' .... _d_"' __.... _._
see Low pH (near neutral) - Key factors (NEB)
_ The National Energy Board of Canada
concl uded that:
_ For sec to attack a pipe surface.
there must be a breakdown in the
pipe coati ng and the CPo
sec at It1e base of a pil
30
see - Low pH (near neutral) - Key factors (NEB)
_The National Energy Board of Canada concluded that:
_sec in Canadian pipe lines
is primarily in pipelines built
in the 19605 & 19705, using
polyethylene tape as the coating.
_ 73% of sec occurrences
were on polyethylene tap e
wrapped lines.
aThis coati ng has tended
to sepa rate (disband) from
the pipeline and allow
moisture to contact the
pipeline.
a aecause polye thylene
lape is an insulator, it shields the pi pe steel from cathodic protection
current, even if it disbands.
see Low pH (near neutral) - Note on tape
coatings
ar ape coatings, such as the polyethyl ene-back ed tapes used
predominantly in the early 19605 to 19805, are spirally wrapped around
the pipe with an overlap at the helix line.
'Tentinq " occurs between the pipe surface and the tape along the ridge created by
longitudinal, spiral, and girth welds
_Tenting also occurs at the overlap between the helix of the Map.
_When the tape disbands from the pipe, moisture can accumulate
beneath the tape surface, particularly at 'wrinkl es' and 'tenting' in the
coating.
_ The tape itself has high electrical insulation properties, thus prevent ing cathodic
current from reaching ent rapped moisture beneath the tape at the pipe surface.
_ In Canada, about three-quarters of report ed near neutral-pH SCC-
related service incidents have occurred under these tape coat ings.
_ The cracks tend to occur at or near the toe ot the seam weld where stress is
concentrated and water has access, as well as where the coaling has been damaged
or disbanded
61
62
31
see - Low pH (near neutral) - Note on coal
tar/asphalt coatings
_ Asphalt and coal tar coatings are relatively thick and can be brittle .
_The coatings can disband. especially due 10poor surface preparation.
_ Over l ime, the volatiles can disperse. leaving Ihe coating relatively brittle.
_ Unli ke tape coatings, when these coatings disbond, they usually, but not
always, become saturated with moisture and conduct cathodi c current,
thus protecting the pipe.
e s o, when these coatings are ' aged' are permeable
_ If the coating is brittle, it may break into pieces. also allowi ng a path for
the cathodic current protecti on.
_sec might still occur when tile soi l is so resistive that the cat hodic
current cann ot reach the pipe.
_ For these coating types, there is no preferential location, but SCC might
occ ur wherever disbonoment or holidays occur
__ ... . ,., __
see - Low pH (near neutral) - Note on other
coatings
. 11 is generally agreed that fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) coati ngs, whi ch
are often the coating of choice for newly installed pipelines in the United
St ates, are an effective protection agai nst SCC.
This type of coa ting (FBE) is a permeable coating that allows CP to
reach the steel"
. " Extruded polyethylenes and three layer composites also appear to be
effective", except possibly at tape-wrapped girth welds.
These types of coating are impermeable, shielding coatings that
remai n tightl y bonded to the line
Researd! indicates IhaI gnt-blasted surfaces are geoeraIy mote resistant 10high-pH sec inibalion
than miI-scaled surfaces. primariy beca use gnl bIa'sbng imparts a oompressive residual stress., !he
pipe surface.
The rnajon!)' of FBE coatings are applied in coabng millsover gril-blasled surfaces.
The older bilurNnoo.r$ coatings WOlfe freQt>efl1ly applied Oller ee dl!dl on surf3Oe$. More
bituminous coatings have eeee applied ., the m.lI using a 0JfllrI'lerCia1blast cleaning
_ _ _ _ .
, . _"-, ...
63
32
SCC - Management
65
CONTROL OF Low pH SCC: Selection of
Susceptible Segments*
Pipeline segments that
have/are"' :
1. Operating stress >60% SMYS
2. Age 0!: 10 years
3. All coating systems other
than FBE
If ALL of these are present then the
pipe should be assessed for sec.
In addition prior
indicationslhistory of sec
(service, hydratest failures, etc)
should be evaluat ed unless
conditions that led to them
have been correct ed.
0_200II_0111
"s..OOT Wo<MI'><X>OtI sec. 2003
1_lhe JolY> A ee--t.
CNotman d w..cE TG 273 0tI sec OAt 001
"'_""SCC __Z003
------ 40..... a private discI.oMoon """ Or R F_: this
is tile same criteria (."""'1'1--...... , _ is
831 sec
33
CONTROL OF Low pH SCC - Note' on CP
Near neutral-pH sec is most preva lent on pipelines with shielding coatings
(e9- tape) and has occurred where the pipeline is appare ntly protected
based on CP informat ion.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile 10maintain adequate protection to avoid sec
and corrosion al or near holidays,
Effective CP also wi ll minimize the occurrence of near neutral -pH sec with
non-shielding coatings.
e ~ ... 0.. _...,. . .. __.-.__
___...."...... _ e-.o.. __
SCC GROWTH RATES'
High pH and near neutral-pH s ec have grow1h rates in the range 2 x
10-
91
0 2 x 10-
8
mm/s (0.06 to O.6mm/yea r)
These data are from field excavati ons
C_2OOli_'
ee
34
ALL see - Mitigation & Management
. If you suspect you have sec. you can mitigate:
. Improve CP, Temp and Pressure Cycling.
This slows down the growth.
Repair and Recoat
escme repair methodssuch as welded sleeves are
considered acceptable, but others (e.g. Clockspring)
are not yel considered proven for cracks.
_ Retest and Recoat
_ A hydrates! (e.g. a 'spike' test } will fail large defects
_ Test (2-6 years) to 11 0% SMYS to remove near crit ical
defects
_ Retest raises 'proport ionallimil' which helps reduce
future local ised micropfastici ty on the pipe surface
a s erecnve replacement
_E.g. near populated areas. to reduce overall risk
_ Replace or Loop Affected Areas
_ Smart Pigs & Selective Replacement
e sone pigs can det ect cracks
C_21X16_'
ALL see & HYDROTESTING
. ASME 83 1.8S-2001 require
that all indications of see are
addressed immediately (within 5
days of reporting)
. ASME 831 .8S requires
hydrotesting to mitigate see
threat.
_The literature suggests a
hydratest to 100%SMYS OR 1.5 X
Design OR a Calcula ted level
_24 hours or when you are
confident of max pressure
- Do not cycle pressure
Tape wrapping
""",,-..,.....,"""""""-"'..
....- .. _ ...-)

,1S\l 1
KJ 1.1l. 'i ! OOI
Srp PLEME.. 'H TO IU UI
"' S, SI 1:\1
I',TIGRlT Y
",
(; .-1. S
---
._-
-----
-
69
35
SETTING HYDROTEST INTERVALS FOR SCC:
Illustration
A.., " 2c.t
1. 0.t.O [ " )'
'TiC
0.8
0.6
07
0.'
0.95

, ,
::::::::::::=--------- ~ d--lt '" 0.4
0.5
" r - - - - - - - - - ,-- - - - 2c ----,------, .
d ~ ~
2c1(Rt)"'O.5
" _ 2OIl6 _ ' 71
In _ ....,..,!low SltftIgIt>,;; ~ 1 , 5<J altl>ougIl1M..- oh,IIW""IfI _ """may be _ <L. ~ ...... ff!(lla(Je(I_Ai ....
SETTING HYDROTEST INTERVALS FOR SCC:
Illustration
"
..
" a , -
-
~
..
Failure of see -- .
J I a-
at operation
I ---
u
"
/
,
"
u
~
..
u
r--
-e DESIGN PRESSURE (72 pe1"CeI'II SMVS/
..
..
E
..
Growth ,
E.
" /
'ii HYOROTEST PRESSURE (100 ~ SMYSI
..
Failure of see
"
on hydrotest
..
..
"
..
"
..
"
..
"
..
2e1(Rt )AO.S(normalised defect length)
0_ 20'& _'
72
In l'"s eumple. _ ....ength = I .1!m, ..,hDuQ/I ...... "",an of """""I.. atl(l yield may be be"...
36
OTHER CRACKLIKE DEFECTS IN PIPELINES
IC> Po""""" 2006 R....6Jl
.Pipe is often transported long distances by rail, road or
ship
_In the 19605 a number of leaks and breaks originated from
cracks in the pipe wall, caused by fatigue loading during
transportation by rail.
_The fatigue cracks were caused by repeat stressing - the static stress is
caused in the lower levels of pipe by the weight of the pipes above, and the
repeat loadings were produced by vertical accelerations,
_Hence we must adopt good loading practices if our pipe is to be
transported.
_API published guidel ines (API RP 5L1) as far back as the 1960s*
'RAILROAD' CRACKS
37
INCLUSIONS
_ Inclusions in the pipe body are not considered significant if
they have passed a pre-service hydrotest
_ However, they may be a site for hydrogen cracking in sour service
pipelines
Inclusions
HARD SPOTS
/
H'
_Hard spots (dollar spots) are local hard zones caused by excessive local
quenching during roll ing.
_They are typically <10" diameter, and may cause local out of roundness
_thi s is because their high strengths prevent them from yielding in the
expander and duri ng the 'U'i ng and 'O' jng in the pipe mi ll.
_They can have tensil e strengths of 130,000 to 200,000 psi in the centre
port ion
_The high hardness can lead to cracking if exposed to a hydrogen charged
envi ronment.
_Generally, Ihey are not a problem, but they do increase susceptibility 10
other types of defects/cracking.
Hard spot \
( ) 6 )
re
38
r
HARD SPOTS (cont.)
_The most common cause of failures associated with hard
spots has been hydrogen stress cracking.
_For hydrogen stress crackin g to occur, three conditions must be
met
_asteel of high hardness and high strength (the hard spot)
. sufficient sustained tensile stresses (hoop stress), and
_asource of at omic hydrogen (probabl y from the CP react ion)
Hard spot Coating Poor Hydrogen cracking
\
W
o
C]"
HARD SPOTS - Case Study
. PIPELI NE - Canada, 762mm, X52, gas pipeline. buill 1957.
Hydrotesl ed in 1957 to 8.1 MPa. Pipe coal ing =asphal t enamel.
. Ruptured in 2000, at pressure of 5.6 MPa.
_ INSPECTION - Line inspected for metal loss in 1981, 1991 and 1998 using
a MFL pig.
_Near the rupt ure locat ion, the inspections had revealed two dents and some
minor corrosion
. PROTECTION - During the last 10 years some pipe-to-soil potenti al
surveys indicated that the CP current reaching the ruptured section of pipe
was lower than the industry standard.
a r t iese locations checked using pig data - where required. suitable remedial
action (e.q. increasing the rectifier output ) was taken .
PREVIOUS FAILURES? - In 1996, a leak occurred on the mainline.
_ A metall urgical report indicated tnat the leak had initiated in a hard spot
created during the origi nal pipe manufacture.
0_2006_1
78
~ _ .. <:..- _-....- .......... _ ..... '"
39
HARD SPOTS - CASE STUDY (cont)' ()
_ FAILURE IN 2000 No coating remained on the section of pipe where
the fracture originated.
_The coaling on the pipe secti ons both upstream and downstream of the
rupture locat ion appear ed to be intact and adherenl lo the pipe.
_ Shallow surface pitting corrosion (undetectable by the in-line inspecti ons)
had occurred at the four o'clock position coincident with a localized area of
higher hardness, or hard spot . on the exterior surface of the pipe.
_ Cracking had initial ed in the hard spot.
_The most common cause of failures asso ciated with hard spots has been
' hydrogen st ress cracking'.
_The shallow external corrosion which occurred in the hard spot would have
increased the stress in the pipe al thal localion and probably facilitated the
initiati on 01surface cracks.
LAMINATIONS

f1_AR . _." f ""
"""""',G " .'.-OIP'P"_
""-"R_ "' _ .. ........
_ "''-_.","_0..
...""'......,'""",'....
60
40
LAMINATIONS
atamlnattons are manufacturing
defects:
_They have survived the mill
hydrates! & the precommlsslontnq hydrotest.
PIPE MILL TEST
Jam
FIELD HYDROTEST
_The hydrates! is a proof load for internal pressure. Therefore, the
fact that a lamination has survived the hydrates! may not be relevant if
the pipeline is subject to bending or other forms of loading.
atamlnanons that are not in a hydrogen-charging environment, and are
parallel to the surface of the plate are not structurally signi ficant.
LAMINATIONS (cant)
a t.amlnauons inclined to the plate, or multiple laminations through the wall
thickness may cause a leak path
_There have been failures due to laminations when they have been
orientated at an angle to the pipe wall: they reduce the effective wall
thickness and have caused failures.
_Usually the failures occur during the pre-service test.
_Beware welding onto laminations (the lamination can open up and cause
a leak path.
_Beware of laminations associated/adjacent to weld or other structural
discontinuities - they may lead to failure.
82
41
BLISTERS
a t armnauons in line pipe
carrying sour product can
be a probl em :HIC, blisters
_ Guidance for
hydrogen charged
bli ster s and lami nations
are given in API 579
_ API 579 gives
acceptance limits,
and conditions to
be met for
acceptance
,,_...... _,
83
0_1006_'
84
42
GROWTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRACKS
K
Fai l
Grow
Any crack Initiation of environmental cracking, such as sulphide st ress
cracking of carbon steels, is usuall y considered unacceptabl e due to the
rapid rat e of subsequent propagation (growth). However, we do have some
fundamental understanding of their growth under static loading:
Environmental cracks grow due to the environment, but they can reach a size
when they can start to grow by a fracture mechanism.
The stress intensity (1<;) of the crack at this size da/dt
exceeds a critical stress intensity lor crack growth,

If the Ki value of a crack exceeds Kiscc t he crack
will INITIATE AND GROW at a rate dictated by
the material. environment , etc.. Hence,
if 1<;<1<;"",_the crack will not grow.
II I<,>K,,,,,, the crack will grow, The RATE OF
GROWTH (daldt) wil l dictate how long the crack takes
to fail the structure,
The structure FAILS when K;=K..: (the fracture
toughness) (assumi ng that K;.,>K;scc)'
You can measure K.scc. K.c and daldt in the lab.
See API 579 and BS 7910
C_2006_
85
HIGH/LOW pH STRESS CORROSION CRACKING
OBSERVATIONS OF ONE EXPERT
h "w 1,0" II sec
"
II sec
1.0<.'10. M ('<tfll ""umxl hc<w= :h< ooml"' ''''''' " """ . nOJ ,lit f.-I ..Iv< '10 ['<"m! "" <,,,,<d ix<,,,,," ,lit " ,".""."" "'"...
_ J1 ..... T>< J \ % ""C" <rod" 0... . "'" .00 20 km_,,,,,m
fi"", ' ><""ion
..."",i.>tod ....h -.'&y "'..... "'.........." "'. ...1/< to ....""i.1od ...rth. h"""", _<ky "",10, '" . ...., "'"'"
,lit .... or . ..... .. i_c. """ "" hoc....... "n..lb Hili "'" clo, ... ,b ,,,"i"g< .. '" ,]0" I"" <It.""" n, '.'., ""'" ,o.hott"""
to ""'" '"'"
.. ofilill>. 8bioll,1o' ""b , to ..--< .u><
"
n_.
r .""" .""'.factor
,.
"'<c. "'.......StC
F.............. 0"... _..- -.""....b . _ .1 pit .. "" ' ..... "U.l to .... ""'h ..
"
,"lmc eo><r "'"" 9
c..-r-..... o.:a.-. .. ,0<'-' <if . __p_ ia1Of """""' .. "" "- R_ ..... lndoI_-'I.()OO...
____(cnodaIoJ.lli<-..ooy _ ,(),)l .. .() 9 ,
0 7\ ,-self
SU .
C..OIoe'(_
T. _ .."""" ___!)\'O_"'................
0..,-,,1_ ...... <001 ... >lid f'L .....
C1'...... __ ...........-_-
_ ......... ___
-

.-

lJ'l"COlll- _____"' ..............
ll1"'*8lo ___".. .. ..
--
......... ...... v <ry ..... "",k._.._

..... -
1I;........... ... _"'O'I ... ... R,_<Q.'\l_"'..-o:,doo'_ ""
........ <n<t_
-..,.,<Jt",,1co _C'>d_
--
_____ oq"S' IYS ..-"",, __
s.n- ...... ..-_.. .. S'4H..
-
............ -..."",.._............ .... ....... --",,-_..
. .. ...n , .._ ....... 21 ).O,.... ......... "".1l-9 ___. ...ol6 .. )

C.. .... 011""" ....,-

CGII.f 16 ... ._-.._ , .--GR """ Tooc,,*,",,_ 1 (-01 .... _
C"-2006 _'
86
43
MANAGEMENT OF ALL see
Determini stic:
,
--
Probabilistie (given that sec conditions ('liabil ity) arc present):
- _.
_.
-
~ - -
~
-
. ~ ~
-
---
J""Ero SMAU.
-
-
~ ~
- ~
ro_
-
~ O
ro_ro
--
- = ~
- ~
'0_
._-
44
How to Assess Weld Defects
Penspen Integrity
.. __.......,
INTRODUCTION - Hydrotest Stresses in Welds
1
_Girth welds
".
manufactured in
the fiel d. and the
stresses created
by the hydratesl
will be <50% of
thai experienced
by the
longitudinal
seam welds
2
INTRODUCTION - Line Pipe
. Pipelines are made up of sections of li ne pipe welded together.
_The line pipe is delivered in lengths of about 12m to site from a pipe mill.
_The line pipe sect ion is manufactured to a standard
(e.g . API 5L) , and is a low carbon steel. It can be:
. 'Seaml ess' (i.e. it has no weld) - seaml ess pipe is
usually smaller diameter 24"), or ('l
~ ~
. 'Welded' made from steel plate ~ ~ i
whi ch is formed into a circle (like 0-
0
~ '\;
cigar ette paper) or wrapped in a <J.. a ~
spiral shape, and welded at the ...
pipe mill . There are various types
of weld used. but they can be
summarised as either:
_ Longitudinal
. Spiral
INTRODUCTION: Longitudinal/Spiral Welds i n Line
Pipe
_Line pipe welds are made under factory conditions, are
inspected, and also tested at the mill.
_They are unlikely to contain large defects or be a failure problem
when they arrive at site.
_ Al so, after being welded into the pipeline, the line pipe (and its
longitudinal weld) is subjected to a pre-service hydrotest that would
'find' larger defects or poor quality welding.
3
2
INTRODUCTION: Longitudinal/Spiral Welds in Line
Pipe
The he al affected
zone (HAl) is that
pari of the parent
metal where lhe
meta llurgical
properties have been
changed by the heat
of welding
HAZ
parent plate

toe
seam wel d
double submerged
arc weld (DSAW)
0_200II_,
5
INTRODUCTION - Field Welds (Girth Welds) in Line
Pipe
_The line pipe is welded
together 'on site' or 'in the field'.
These circumferential (girth)
welds will not be as good a
quality as the factory welds.
Capping Pass
6
Root Pass
(or 'stringel"' bead)
oItllese pas _
may be ..., by ddletenl
wel dIng IN....Iong.
pipelIne wrNd Hot Pass
(or secood run)
' Fi llers'
0_200&__
3
INTRODUCTION - Field Welds (Girth Welds) in Line
Pipe
girth weld 'Y
shi elded metal arc
weld (SMAW)
HAZ
parent psate
......... root
too
The heat affected zone (HAZ) is that part of the
parent metal whe re the metallurgi cal propert ies
have been chan ged by the heat of welding
C_:lOO5R<rv6l1
7
yi eld strength of weld g reater
than thaI of parent plate,
aod
lensile strength of weld greater
than thai of parent plate
OVERMATCHED
INTRODUCTION - Undermatching and Over
matching in Welds
~ ; ; ; ; ; ~ ~
UNDERMATCHED
yield strength 01 weld l ess t han
thai of par ent plate .
aoo
tensile strength of we/a less
t han that of parent plate
parent
plate
HAZ
weld
MATCHED
yield strength of weld equal t o
that of parent pl ate.
aoo
tensi le strength of weld equal
to that of parent plate
8
4
INTRODUCTION - Stress Concentrations in Welds
misalignment due to
wall thickness
mismatch
~
----T----
misalignment
or axial misalignment
due to out-of-roundness
or diameter mismatch
9
LINE PIPE LONGITUDINAL SEAM WELDS
weld
5
PIPELINE LONGITUDINAL SEAM WELDS Defects
_The main problem with defects
remaining in a longitudinal weld is
that they may be a source of fatigue
cracking
_ If a pipeline has its internal pressure
cycled. it will cause cyclic hoop stresses
in the pipewall .
- These can cause defects in the
weld to grow in size
_The defect may grow to a size that
can cause failure
_ Modern line pipe is free from these
large defects.
~ . ~ _,..", ... ", _ _ . ,_, ._ _ er-_..,-.-
ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDED (ERW) LINE PIPE
7
ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDED (ERW) LINE
PIPE'
_ERW line pipe is made" by cold forming
previously hot-rolled plates or strips into
round "cans" and joining the longitudinal
edges of the cans by a combination of
localized electrical resistance heating and
mechanical pressure.
_The heat-softened edges were forced
together extruding excess material to the
outside and inside of the newlyformed
pipe.
_ The excess material was immediately trimmed
away leaving smooth surfaces or at most a
small protrusion along the bondline.
.... _--_..---"'..,
____.. _..'"w_... __,,_..... __
---.... ----,'*',.. _""""'-.....-,
--,.. _...."""' _ .. ....... ~ .. --"""""' ..... ""
-
ERW LINE PIPE: Weld
Heal Affected Weld line
Zone Pipe
,<
"
,
\.
.The process resulted in a narrow bondline and an associated
local heat-aff ected zone.
.,
te
8
ERW LINE PIPE: Quality
Line
Pipe
Weld
Heat Affected
Zone
_ The purpose of this was 10eliminate
zones of excessive hardness from the
initial weldi ng process
a'rhese zones could be
susceptible to various forms of
environmental cracking.
a ERW line pipe thai is not heat treated adequ ately may crack
. Prior 10 1960, many sizes and grades of ERW pipe were tested by the
manufacturer to levels of only about 75 percent of SMYS, so large defects
could survive
a ln many instances in the past. and in all cases with modem ERW
materials, the bondline/heat-affected-zone region was also subjected to a
'post-weld heat treatment'
_ ERW line pipe must be treated on a case by case basis
_ Some 'ol d' ERW line pipe has poor welding, other has good welding,
0_:1006_ ... _-_ . ,
_..._._-,,---' . ..._-------
..----...... _---_... __... -
-'--"--
OLDER ERW LINE PIPE': Defects
(".ERW line pipe made using ee more modem Ibgh frequency (- 400, 000 Hz)
DC, or high frequency inductance (HFI) methods should not have mosI of tnese
problems)
e oicer (up to the 1960s) ERW line pipe manufactured using low
frequency' (60-360 Hz or less) AC, or DC, or
e any ERW line pipe made using ' dirty' (high percentages of non-metaltlc
inclusions) steels may contain defects such as:
. 'Cold Welds' (caused by a lack of fusion between the parent plates
due to inadequate heating and/or pressure during the welding process
. 'Stitching' (non-uni form heating results
patches on the surface where no bond exists) .
Plate Misalignment ,
. Heat Treatment Misalignment (the bond line can
become twisted as it moves through the rolls) HookCrack
. 'Hook cracks ' (metal separation around ~ ..... ....
non-metallic inclusions in the plate. Inclusions follow the weld flow and
cause cracks)
18
-,..- ...... _.. - - - - ~ - - - - - ~ .... _,-
9
OLDER ERW LINE PIPE: ' Col d Welds'
.Dirt, grease, scale, or other oxide films on the skelp could and
often did cause enough interference to prevent adequate
heating at the bondl ine interface.
Momentary reductions or loss of current could and often did
result in isolated or repeated areas of nonbonding called "cold
welds".
_Cold welds could be partly through the wall thickness or all of the way
through.
_ Even if a through-wall cold weld was formed. it might not result in a
leak. because typically such areas were completely filled with a scale that
formed from the surfaces being exposed to oxygen while at a high
temperature.
_Asignificant number of cold welds in close proximity could sufficiently
reduce the strength of the bondli ne that a rupture would occur when the
pipe was subjected to pressurization.
_.. __._-,.-- - _...._---------
.. . .-.. _._.4_
-,-_.. _-
OLDER ERW LINE PIPE: Corrosion and Fatigue
ts
e'rhess ERW welds can have problems in service:
.Preferential corrosion" along the ERW line
aparticurarty found in high sulphur materials that have
not been heat treated, as they are more susceptible to
corrosion due to the microstruct ure and the presence
of non-metalli c inclusions.
_The weld area corr odes at a higher rate than
the surrounding material.
_The result is the formation of a v-sneoec groove
along the weld line).
_Do not assess usi ng RSTRENG, etc.
_Fatigue (if the pipeline is subjected to a cyclic
loading regime)
_ Summary- All pre-1970 ERW pipe and lap welded pipe
is considered susceptible to longitudinal seam failures
"-- ---_.... _-
- __... _ .. _ .... _ .. 00,._
--_.... _-
20
10
OLDER ERW LINE PIPE: Hook Cracks and Fatigue
Hookcrack
Fatigue crack
Inlernal
pressure
Weld
/'"- -
..... ~ _ ..
hoop
stress
"
_ G _ ~ __" ..__~ ..,...,._
ERW LINE PIPE: New (High Frequency)
_From 1962, manufact urers began to
convert ERW mills from low-frequency
welding equipment to high- frequency
equipment (450,000 cycles) .
aAfter 1978. it is believed that few if any low-
frequency welders were still being used.
_With the use of high-frequency current, the
problem of contact resistance is virtually
non-exi stent.
_ As a result, high-frequency-welded pipe tends
to be relatively free of the bondline defects that
were common in the low-frequency and d.c.-
welded material.
High
Frequency
No bondl ine
defects
C_2OOI Il_'
_ ...____J"' ' , . _
..~ - - , .... _--,-_... _.._... -
-,-----_.. _- - - ---_..
""'"--"'---'--
22
11
ERW LINE PIPE: New (Cleaner Plate)
_The use of cleaner plate materials
(low sulphur) has eliminated problems
such as hook cracks, and grooving
corrosion
_Hydrotest failures per mile decreased
from levels as high as 6.5 per mile in
the 1940s, to a level of 0.01 per mile in
1970 for pipelines tested to levels of 90
percent of SMYS or more.
Clean
Plate
No grooving
corrosion &
hook cracks
_.. -_.__.. _-------------
.. _-_...... _---_... __... -
_._----_.._------_... ___00 '_-
ERW LINE PIPE: Summary
23
Low
Frequency
Method
High
Frequency
Method
_ Solution
Poor quality
plate
Bondline
Problems
Hook cracks & _
grooving corrOSIon
I
Solution
Clean
plate
"
12
ERW LINE PIPE: Managing Integrity of Old ERW
lines* . Do I need an Assessment Plan?
Does my ERW pipeline need special assessment?
ERW Line Pipe can be categorised:
1. Clear evidence shows that time-dependent
dete rioration of seam anomalies is occurring
Pipeli nes in this category wi ll require a special
seam-integrity assessment plan .
2. No direct evidence of ERW seam deterioration, but
cond itions of ope ration and attributes of the line
indicate seam deterioration is likely.
These pipe lines will require a study of the
attributes, the operations, and the resu lts of
other integrity assessments 10determine if a
special seam-integrity assessment plan is
necessary.
3. Clear evidence that no time-dependent seam
deterioration is occurring.
No special seam-lnteqrtty assessment plan is
needed for segments in this category
- -

'__'...h''' ....",. _ .
"'" ",...,

.... ",
_ . , .... ... ""' _ _.', 00 ... ... _ .
--
ERW CASE STUDY'

- Built in 1966, India. "' ,..,.
_ERW. __I
_Hydrotested to 114 kg/cm2 in 1966. i,
_Hydrotested to 76 kg/cm2 in 1983. \C
_Failed in 1997 at 47 kg/cm2
_Failed along ERW weld. ,
eccrrostcn on both external ""' ....
internal ERW surfaces
25
C _'POI' 2006 Ro, 6I1 2 6
,..... _ ".Croo. ""'''''Y ...... eo.. """Y s", .".",."....,.. Konnon C,'-'rwno " ....,_.,..............
13
ERW CASE STUDY
_ Defects seen on fracture surface - lack of fusion due to improper
edge preparation during the welding of the pipe which have
subsequently grown due to general internal corrosion.
_Cleavage fracture on the fract ure surface indi cat ing low toughness
weld .
During the long service lif e of the pipe,
both the lack of fusion area have
undergone subcri tical growth due to
corrosion I erosion on the inner surface
which is possible in view of the 6' 0 clock
position of t he ERW seam
Note small opening at fracture
0 _"""" lOO6Rov6l1
h A ~ , "' . em.. 000",,>, ' 1M"' ,," ~ I l UO[>" " " ,' .... A.,... >Iu<>f _. """"""""'" ""...... C,..."..-., . "' '' '"1' ....... ""...
ERW CASE STUDY
_xeD, 10" diameter, 0.5" wall thickness oil flowline
ERW fine pipe
_Failed from hook cracks
.Pressure increased to well shut-in pressure due to. . .
sudden shut down of gas and oil separation plant
27
za
14
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS
X65 with stainleu steel cladd ing
C_2OOi_
29
INTRODUCTION: Defects in Girth Welds
30
15
INTRODUCTION: Girth Welds History
_ The use of steel pipes and the
introduction of electric arc welding in
the 19205 established the techniques
for modern pipelaying and today we
have soph isticated automatic wel ding
bot h on and offshore.
a Advances in pump technology
eventuall y made it possible to move
oil cheaply and quickly at pressures
of up to 2,000 psi and beyond.
_ With the advent of high tensile
steels it is now possibl e to weld XeD
pipe and soon we will be welding
Xl00
at
INTRODUCTION: Girth Welds Standards
. Pipel ine girth welds are
welded using a standard
that cont rols the procedure
and materials.
_The most common girth
welding standard is 'API 1104'
a This API standard was based on the
standard ' Unfired Pressur e Vessel Code' ,
which was adopted by ASME in 1931.
a API first adopted
radiography to inspect
girth welds in 1953.
-.... _-
...._,-
32
16
INTROOUCTION: Girth Welds Welding DLJ
SlI' ..... .... ..,. __....
--
--.----
-
_ The we l ding crew begins the process of joining the steel pipe into one continuous
pipeline using manual, semiautomatic or automatic welding procedures.
_Welds are then x-rayed using x-ray machines 10 assure pipe joints have been
welded together properly.
_ After the welds are x-rayed and i ns pected , the pipe is cl eaned and coated to
prevent corrosion.
. Mosl line pipe is coated at the coali ng plant with a hard baked-on epoxy or
extruded polyet hylene coal ing 10 prevent corrosion of the steel. It is only the
welds thai are coated during construction.
..... ,J!!lI- .....

1;_20015 _ _
33
INTROOUCTION: Girth Welds Types of Pipeline
Welding... 'SMAW'
_We use two methods for welding line pipe in the field
_ 1. Manual arc welding - the most common process
e also known as SMA(shielded metal are,
or stick) Welding
aerecncde rod is ceramic-covered metal
md
a e'ectrooe rod melts and is added to
weld metal (it is called consumable)
_ the electrode covering melts
(covering the weld pool with liquid
flux) , and also gives off gases which
help wit h the shielding
_ aMer welding is finished, the welder chips off the solidified flux (slag).
2. Gas metal arc (GMA) W elding...
17
INTRODUCTION: Girth Welds Types of Pipeline
Welding 'GMAW'
. We use two methods for welding line pipe in the field:
_ 1. Manual arc welding - the most common process
_2. Gas metal arc (GMA) Welding
e arsc called ' MIG', or ' metal inert gas' welding
. rol1 of wire used as consumable electrode
_ flow of inert gas (argon, helium) through welding torch towards
workpieces, 10shi eld weld from atmosphere
_ may be manual or automatic
0 _ 2OD$ _
INTRODUCTION: Girth Welds Types of Pipeline
Welding
35
- SMAW - Manual
_Gif1h """9ldong is a produc:bon line oonstrudion W11h tile worI<fon::e passing alongthe n . with
each section doing its own part of the worI<. 80ltl SMAW and GMAW processes utilise the W1rt1ca1
dO'M1 method of welding. Toenable this for SMAW, the eIect7ode$ are usualy cllhe
type. This can lead to ptOblems due 10the tUghlevel of produced by the process.
_ Mechanical wekhng uses a low hydroge<l process. but the equipment has III be specially made
rot pipelif\e$. Mechanical welding can produce high quality ....elds at a high worI<rate, but needs a
large number of _Ids to be oconomic .
0_20D5_'
36
18
GIRTH WELDS: Assessing Defects
Somet imes we need to assess
defects in pipeline girth welds:
On new constructions - e.g. using a new
weldingJinspection methods and creati ng
or finding new or mor e defects.
On finding a defective girth weld(s) during
an in-service inspection.
A failure due to a defective girt h weld
occurs (failure investigation)
GIRTH WELDS: Failur es?
37
Generally, pipeline girth
welds are not a problem in
pipel ines:
they are not a major causeof
failures
only 2% of all fai lures in
USA gas lines are due to
girth welds.
the majority give leaks not
ruptures, and there has been no
recorded casualty/fata lity
caused by them in the USA.
38
19
GIRTH WELDS: Axial Stress
When we have defects in pipeline girth welds we are interested in
AXIAL stress
Internal pressure gives an axial stress
Extemal loads such as ground movement, or installation, gives axial stress
Axial
loads
7

loads
interna l
pressure
39
GIRTH WELDS: Defects
,""" cap
>
Lack of cap fusion
porasi!
0
J.....l ack of sidewall fusion
crack _
l -(/
Lack of inter-run fusion
slag
l ack of root fusion
root
--,"'"'
_ .... __..
----
20
GIRTH WELDS: Defects in ' Old' Welds
<__.. ",-.... ,,0000<_. _
_ C."'"",",,",, _ ... d_ E......-..L_ .'"
GIRTH WELDS: I nspect ion using X Rays
. We inspect new girth welds by:
. X ray (most popular)
a ultrasoruce
-----
'I' 'i . J
,
.. ~
r __
~ r a of broken arm
"
2\
GIRTH WELDS: Inspection by X.rays
. Radiography (gamma or X-rays) is most commonly used to check the
quality of welds.
I x""
' ).
""0')
Incomplete penetrat ion from 5 to 35cm
film
Non-planar deleel
\
J
Planar deled
GIRTH WELDS: Inspection by X-rays
_Afilm (negative) is placed on or behind the weld and the radioactive
source is placed on the opposite side (with the weld between the film and
the radioactive source) and allowed to expose the film.
_This exposed film is developed.
_Afilm interpreter checks this developed film to determine if the
quality of the weld is in accordance with the predetermined
assessment standard.
-.
v
..
\\ \
I I
44
___
22
GIRTH WELDS: Inspection by X-rays
. Radiographic inspection of girth welds, introduced in 1948, soon became
the universal tool for inspecti ng a portion of all field girth wel ds. and
became mandatory under API Standard 5L in 1963.
_ For some pipel ine projects, such as the TransAlaska Pipeline. all girt h
welds were radiographed.
By the 19905, the portion of welds inspected in this manner typically

I
1n' <Mqualt (It l..a<:k of P. n.....tlon
45
'-ogoo '._ _ ... " _ " _
Transducer ("probe')
welds by:
e x ray (most popular)
. Ultrasonics
_ Sound waves move
thr ough the inspect ed
material .
Normally they follow a
straight line. but when
they hit a defect, the
sound waves are
reflected.
_The operator of the
inspection system can
read the characteristics of
the defect on a screen
GIRTH WELDS: Inspection using ultrasonics
. We inspect new girth
23
GIRTH WELDS: Cracks
. Most welding standards require cracked" welds to be cut out
____..-d_"'"9'I.0 g _ c,..... _
r-
,
I'
1
root
---4--
nJ-
All wel ds contain defects. Therefore,
welding standards allow some oet ect s.:
Ameri can, Canadian and European
Standards for Girth Wel ds allow similar
levels of defects.
These levels are 'workmanshi p' levels.
Old welds can contai n defects much lar ger
than these workmanshi p levels.
We know that these defects are usually
insignificant because they have not failed .
GIRTH WELDS: Acceptance Levels
"
24
GIRTH WELDS: 'Workmanship Levels'
Defects in girth welds are usually assessed
using the weld fabrication code/standard.
These codes (e.g. 8S4515. API 1104) allow
some ' planar' and 'non planar' defects.
non planar defects are sl ag, porosity, etc., and
planar defects are lack of side wall fusion, etc.
Non planar def ects are not usually a problem,
but indicate poor quality, and they could mas k
the presence of more serious defects.
Planar defects can act like cracks, so we do not
want large planar defects present.
All welds will contain some defects, so the
codes allow a reasonab le level of defects to
remai n.
o_xa-.t.',
GIRTH WELDS: 'Workmanship Levels'
API 1104
8514515
"
Typical workmanship levels are:
25 mm length for defect s on the
weld surface
50 mm for defects embedded in
the weld
Cracks are not usuall y allowed;
cracks can indicate bad welding.
poor material , poor quality control,
etc..
Cracks are usually repaired.
50
25
GIRTH WELDS: ' Workmanshi p Levels'
Sometimes we have defects in our
girt h weld that exceed our
workmanship levels
If we want to avoid unnecessary and
expensive repairs, we must use
'fi tness-for-purpose' methods to
assess these defects.
UK, Ame rican , and Canadi an
codes specify and allow their use.
as 7910:1999 gives fitness for
purpose met hods
The ' EPRG' have published the most
complete set of ' fitness-for-purpose'
defect level s for girt h welds .
0 _
___"_0
>25mm
BSI 7910
EPRG
51
GIRTH WELDS: Summary of Defect Assessment
. You can assess defects in pipeline girth welds using either:
Workmanship
Standards
I
e.g API 1104 or
BSI4515
or
Fitness-for-purpose
Methods
I
e.g. BSI 7910 , API
1104, ' EPRG'
wa SI 7910 IS a comprehensive fitness for purpose document - giving

procedures for the assessment of defects in most structures.
_ 6517910 details specific guidelines for defects in welds.
Wit has an appendix (informative) for pipelines and pressure vessels.
_ This appendix directs the user to the 'EPRG Guidelines' for assessing defects
in pipeline girth welds
_ The EPRG Guidelines are based on analysis, full scale and model testing
_ Considered ' state of the art' .
_ Adopted in AS 2885.2
2,
GIRTH WELDS: Strength of Girth Welds with
Defects
GIRTH WELDS: Defects in ' Ol d' Girth Welds
A European onshore gas pipel ine operator inspected 68 welds in an 18"
pipeline:
GIRTH WELDS % UNACCEPTABLE TO
CURRENT CODES
Fabricated Before 1968 70
Fabricated Between 1968 and 1972 10
Fabri cated After 1972 0
Clearly, older girth welds may contain unacceptable defects.
These welds are unacceptable to workmanship standards, but they are not
necessa rily unfit-for-purpose.
Clearly, ther e is a need for detailed fract ure mechanics analyses to
determine the scale of this type of probl em, and avoid unnecessary
repa irs.
C PMspon 2006 Ro,611
53
GIRTH WELDS: Defects in ' Ol d' Welds
DEFECT TYPE NUMBER DETECTED IN 68 WELDS
Root Concavity 245
Incomplete Root Fusion 177
l ack of Root Fusion 107
Cracks 79
Total Defects (planar and non-planar) 1,743
All the welds were tested - full scale -
in tension
!.",.'J
MOSffailed at > yield.
But some welds containing CRACKS
fai led at stresses bel ow yiel d.

GIRTH WELDS: Defects tested in Bending
p=3.-
R,
--
--
--
--
---
a

t
"I - p(l - oJ)

P 'pr + 2sin p(l - 'I)
PR,
p= 2,JJ
Predicted using Kastner Equation
1.0 09 0.8
0.7 06
0.5
. .,

._-,-----; -..
,
Predict ed Failure St ress/1.15X$MYS

OL--,,...,-_ ,,..,-_ -:-=_ ....,...,_ -:-:---'
0.4
Cl 0.6
u,
;; 0.4
0.2
56
28
-----_.
GIRTH WELDS: The ' EPRG' Guidelines
GIRTH WELDS: Basis of 'EPRG' Guidelines
_The EPRG published guidelines on defects in girth welds in 1996:
. 3R International, 35, Jahrgang, Heft 10-11/1996
_The EPRG guidelines give us a choice of three 'tiers' or level s of defects.
_ Each of these tiers give differing sizes of 'acceptable' defects
_The user chooses the level he/she wants 10 use
Tier 2: Fitness for purpose
Tier 1: Workmanship Levels
Tier 3: Fitness for purpose
Bigger
defects
allowed
58
GIRTH WELDS: Basis of the 'EPRG' Tiers
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3
PLANAR BS1 4515 WIDE PLATE FULL SCALE TESTS
DEFECTS'
AP111Q4
TESTS
NON-PLANAR BS1 4515 BSI4515 BS17910'
DEFECTS
BS17910' FULL SCALE TESTS
INTERACTION BSI 4515 BSI4515 BS1 7910'
CRITERIA
BS17910' FULL SCALE TESTS
ACCUMULATION BSI 4515 BSI 4515 BS17910'
CRITERIA
BS1 7910' FULL SCALE TESTS
"Cracks are not allowed
'wide plate' - -
C_:ll105-.
8$ 1PO 6493 was used. which is now a SI 7910
59
GIRTH WELDS: Basis of Tier 2.. 'Wide Plate Tests'
W"",,,'"-.., _..-......,.<1 GO"l _"""".., d "'" 00<7>0
eo
3C
--- - - - --
GIRTH WELDS: The ' EPRG' Toughness
Requirements
_ EPRG guidelines require a toughness
measured in Charpy V for TIers 1 and 2. and
' CTQD' on TIer 3
_Tier 1 and 2 require Charpy of 11.. ....
(min), 40J (mean).
_Tier 3 requires crouof O.1 0mm(min),
O.1 5mm(mean).

_ Denyl I'IaS__h _ 3O/4(IJ Iimts ,., be equr..*'!",
002901l.053rm> ClOD.
- noIye1 beer1ll't""b". EPRG
-
._ _T__.. __._. _ _ R.-_._
_
GIRTH WELDS: The 'EPRG' Guidelines
1\'PO011I. """ ...."t TIEIl 1 (nolo ' .1 llER l
I
TIER 3 Inol o!>.)
,- .", '/'10M IJlocl<nfts (I)
,.",.tI>i<;..,.... """_ tM
"

-
--

-_...... S..-taeob<e-.
-
Clefoct>.-t>e Ire....,
r....gft_.
"-

""
"'"""" >30J
crcc I crcc c, __ .....
CTOO ,010 ......

rdCTOO_Iot .......... a1 m..........
'-
"""--
.. __.. .._...-"'_._I..... ___.
---
_ ...... >_____
,.........,.... -
s

T_ eon l>o......, _ 1Iy YS(_l >YSlppe)
-..
1lpOCIOI __1O_
_ ,_C"' ..,-......... _'-. __...
-
y ...... _-
I
-
IT
--
__ d
,-

S_'V
--

"'-............".............. _--
-_. 100"4 non--'"
__...,.be_
n. __ __"" _____.'"
"
AS 2885.2 extends the Liseof r I8l' 2 to X80 and wall thickness down to5rM'l
62
31
GIRTH WELDS: The 'EPRG' Guidelines
Type of Deleet Tier 1
Tier 2

AcceDtance criteria Limit criteria limit c rite ria
Ext ernal Profi le Excess weld metal should be uniform and not more than 3 mm in
height. It shouldITIE!fge smoothlywith the parent metal, and not
extend beyond !he original joint preparation by more than 3 mm on
each side . No area should have the weld face lowef than the
a(f aeenl surface,
Internal Prom. The root bead or any ooocavilyshould merge sll'lOOlhly into the
adjacent surface but at no poin t should the weld be thinner than the
'iOe thi ckness
Rool Concavi ty Length 25% weld circumference
Total 1.5 mm or 0. 1 I (lesse r)
UnderClIt ell Len Ih SOmm
'"
Fi ure 1
Tota l 50 mm in any 300 mm or 7 xl inany300mm Figure 1
15% circumference
less en
Undercut root L h 25mm r t F' ure 1
T"""
25 mm in 300 nvn or 8% 7x tinany300mm Figure 1
circumference ressee
Undercut (Cl p, Dopth , mm or 0. 1 I (lesser) assumed 10 be < 3 mm

AS 2885.2 reduces embedded defeel eeeeceeoce \eogths 1025mm lor t<7mm 63
GIRTH WELDS: The 'EPRG' Tier 3
INTERACTING PLANAR DEf ECTS
INDIVIDUAl. PLANAA DEfECTS
{ TOTAL ALL DEfECTS
cracks not
permitted
-,-y-;'-- - - - - - - ---t
(' TOTAl. ALl DEfECTS

1 1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 11 11 11 19 M 21 22 n 25
Mini mum or mlla$ured wad thlckne$$, t , mm
32
GIRTH WELDS: The 'EPRG' Tier 3
I I
!
TOTAL ALL PLANAR DEFECTS (maximum 25%)
2c"2.183t-3.383
I
r- TOTAL ALL DEfECTS (maximum W ':'.)
( 2c_3.912t+O.312
INTERACTING PLANARDEFECTS (mUimum 2S'kj
2c l.490t -l.133
r - - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
c
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 M 21 22 23 ~ 25
Minimum or measured wall thic kness, 1, mm 65
GIRTH WELDS: Using the 'EPRG'
E
, ...-
I
Guidelines
..
@
~
Hk
-
API, eSA and BSI all give guidance on pipeline girth

~ :
weld defect limits, but the EPRG guidelines are well
,
"
" " "
.. ,. ..
"
... ". ..........0"..... _ .. ......'
validated against recent test data. and they are easy to use.
.
EPRG LI MITS:
Tier 1 can be used as the welding specification, Tier 2 as a concession, and

Tier 3 when there is a big problem!
The Tier 2 or 3 limits of the EPRG guidelines would not genera lly be
specified at the construction stage in a welding specification; modern girth
welds should easily meet current workmanship standards.
Recommended that the new limits in the EPRG guide lines be used for:
special applications where longer def ects are anticip ated (e.g. new
processes)
as a concession by the pipeline operator (in conjunction with penalty
clauses) to avoid unnecessary repairs"
as an insurance policy for cases where a defect is detected during post-
const ruction audit or during in-service inspection
I> P""..- 2006...."' ,
"Two projects in Austral ia in the eany 2000s would have saved SAl
00
mi llion and $AO.75 million if Tier 3 had been used
GIRTH WELDS: Arc Strikes
Me"n depth" 1,36mm
Max length 2.4mm
Hardness can be >500HV
(WTlATN32)
An arc ' strike' can cause an arc 'bum'
Arc bums are localised melting of the
line pipe, produced by arcing between
an electrical contact and the line pipe
The y can cause:
a small depression in the pipewall .
an area of local hardness
hardened layer may increase
susceptibi lity to environmental
cracking'
on thin wall line pipe, the hardened
zone may extend through the wall
and increase chance of Hie on
interna l surface,
possibly small cracks.
GIRTH WELDS: Arc Strikes Assessment & Repai r
Welding codes and regulations requir e arc burns/strikes to be removed,
e.g. by gri nding. However:
The y are generall y not considered a problem". if coated:
They do not cause service failures"
The area hardened/cracked is very small and insignificant
But it is good practice is to grind them away_
Ensure lhatlocal wall thickness is not reduced below minimum specified
Gri nd depth and length
should not exceed limits in
A$ME 831G
-_ _.._...-._ -.. __ --_.,........ _.. _._.. _-
_ _.... __ .u_.... __
__ .._ .. __
-,._--.-_.._.. _---..----- -0"'--?? .. """, . "", .. -.-__",.--... ....
68

GIRTH WELDS: Additional information
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN
69
__
7lI"IrOCI:d ()IO.r- E...--r. _:DII . .... ... _-.
OWAOt, T.&l .... -.............. .
3
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN Historical
Fatigue is not usuall y a primary concern in transmission pipeli ne gi rth
welds.
l iquid lines do pressure cycl e. but this has small effect in axial stress direct ion
Some offsho re pipelines (e.g. at spans, or deep wat erlfloating structures)
can experience large axial stress cycles, and also offshore pipel ines can
be heavily cycled during laying.
We can assess the fatigue life of a weld in two ways:
'DEFECT-FREE' We usually assess the fatigu e life of a weld using 'S- N'
curves, where we 'classify' each weld according to ns shape and process
(Class 'A' has high fatigue life, 'W'low).
DEFECTIVE - If we have a defect (in excess of workmanship) in the weld we
cannot use SN - we have 10 use fracture mechanics, e.g. 887910.
The following slides present the 5-N approach , therefore we are
assuming a good qual ity weld, with no significant defects, or defect s in
excess of recognised standards (e.q. 854515 or API 1104), operating
withi n desi gn conditions.
71
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN Historical
"
-=
a ... . (
..'
-=-
/'
End...-. ....... .
= -

..
Girth welds are usually 'single sided' (made from one side)
We know that the condition of the root
of a weld, and any misalignment _ _ -r-t
maj or effect on fatigue life ('N'); '"
there fore, girth welds have been
traditionally cl assified as similar
to fillet welds. This is a severe
cl assification, and leads to: 1
Class F f()( single Sided girth t' '.
welds madeon a permanent
backing strip
Class F2 for
single sided welds with
no backing stri p (I.e. ass umes
possible poor root and misa lignment )
There is now evidence to show that >0 L __
these welds have good quality root s '"
and misalignment can be controlled.
n
31
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN - Recent Data
73
\-0
-)
.
.'.

. _ .Ro.l._ '.
'-' R_", '_
I- """,,",R_'._ .'. ' '_ ,R.O...... __...
C_ .R. ,. ,' '''
1
f .
Recent data on singl e sided girth welds (up to 16mm thick).

Fatigue fail ure always initiated at the fool
All the results are above the F2 line, and Class E looks a reasonable classification
provided full root penetration is achieved.
Most girth weld fat igue data is confidential, but it has been recommended' that:
Use Class F2 but do not indude stress magnificat ion factors (SMF) for mi sali gnment
allowed under fabrication Use Class E but incl ude ..
the misalignment (e) _
P\ale misaligrvnenllotmuloo are
in as7910. bullhese may
be conserva live due 10 !tie
constraint 01tt>e sheI
struo::ture. AIIemativeIy. _.
SMF . 1+(3(aIl)elql(-{0JI)"'''n
D. diameter, I" wl
Gi rth welds 'With temporary
backing can be considered-
ClassE
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN - Guidance'
The design of girth welds using S-N data assumes fai lure from Ihe weld cap or root
They do not cover fai lure f rom identifiable defects.
Such defects (e,g, in excess of workmanship limits. or surface breaking crack.li ke naws) can reduce
fatigue life. Example acceptance levels /of noo-pl anar defects are (BS 7910):
Dni .0. .. 18.. oce Un l i mi
I' . ...... " % . n .. Slot ind ;o. knfllo, nll n l '_....'"
rod'
" '

""'.t.
.
D
,
"
O.O2}
, ,

, ,
"
O.OJ}
,. ,
"
" G
,
p.;., l _
"
___
__""" 1"",,

......1 :,",,,":5am 00
.- ,
x..
\10". >1, .,
,"""'-_.. ' Oll'.'..... ....-..........'_I........ ,.;,j
...............M)
"""" on", , - "" ,, _
"",,,,,,,,""<1"- F.. ,Pf f.,',., ....""" ....... tom " ' I............' ,,'oul
...........' ..,'. ("1'
Guidance can be given for the fol lOWing range of Pipe geometry
"'..._.-.._--,.,,-""""'....
_ .. _"'"' ...... . v
_... _,-,-""'" ......., .....
or.I.WI'''''''H'' '
3
GIRTH WELDS: FATIGUE DESIGN - Guidance
HQ)
-c:
- .. - ""*""'" (SW' CPI
The proposed guidance is:
*
._c...... _"'... _ _
.. ...-
-..-.--. En ,.p
c.. ..... ....... .l:., .t ' n."p Sw>cp
"'U".,-
'''''RP
. ........ ' ''''.[' 1' .... ...
,,.
... """",,-,- o_P __... _
- .. _-"'_..... _-
-----__- .-_,....,
Endurance, cycl es
"
--
--
'" ,,.
------------------
c...gnS.. c ol _
""',"'''' $"' .."..... ""--,

D'1.00PSWoO' J S('h10" " "Cll'6" o'
[)'1JXPSf;-<:P S .. . UI2S " r1
. 11'''' J 1,11401.
' '',:lOP ) 5 3h I."
1'I'1.:loIPSW..:P :I .... ,.(W. ,,'
ff1 .:MPSW<O' S ', 00. 10" ,N . HilS, 1ft
' 1''SlP J 'l' ..o"
'.
. ' 1(",' ;5 = 1" (3(efl )exp(-(OIl ,-oS]1
_ 0 =diameter. I z wt "s
_ CUI\If! Sare for 1<16mm.
_ l rJCf easing thickness can .;
decrease fatigu e l ife. '"
_ If 1>16, the stressrange Ii
obtained from the SoN :;
curve should be multiplied:
by (161t)'l ' 5 ;;
_ e is mlsalognment
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS: Welding Informat i on
zs
3,
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS - Line Pipe Grade
. When welding grades of steel up to X65, the normal
procedure is to use a 'manual' - shielded metal arc welding
(SMAW) - process, with cellulosic electrodes running in the
vertical down direction.
The higher strength, pipeline steels, particularly the X1 00
grades, cannot be fully welded using cellulosic electrodes
during welding, since the large amounts of hydrogen
generated by these consumables during welding can lead to
hydrogen cracking of the high strength weld metal.
ec onseouenuv a change has to be made toeither lowhydrogen
consumable for SMAWwelding, or the process must be changed togas
metal arc welding (GMAW) or flux cored arc welding (FCAW) .
0 _
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS - Direction
.Downhill weldi ng
_ Downhill welding by cellulosic or low hydrogen electrodes is applied
because of highefficient welding as highcurrentand high welding
speed.
_ Downhill welding can be applied to all passes.
_ This method is most competent for welding of large diameter (more
than 254 mm).
Uphill welding
_ Uphill welding is lower efficiency because of low currentand low
welding speed. but the qualityof the weld is much better than downhill
welding
77
78
3\
--..---- ---
...-.s_O__ .. __.._ .
_.. """--------,..._---,.....
......... _-"'.. _-~ . - - ~ - - -
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS - Pre & Post Heating
. Preheating
. Generally it is unnecessary for line pipe (mild
steel) to be preheated
_ it is necessary for thicker pipes . hi gh tensile
strength steel pipes and low alloy steel pipes to
prevent hardening of the heat affected zone, and
cracking .
Post weld heat treatment (PWHT)
. Pipeline girth welds are not PWHT as they are
usually thin walt"
_ It is usually unnecessary to post weld heat treat
('stress relief ) pipes and line pipes. unless (see
ASME 631.8):
_The steel has carbon content> 0.32%, or
ec arton equivalent of 0.65%, or
_Thickness' >1.25"
__010:III_'
GIRTH WELDS - Electrodes: Types
a c enutosc electrode
_The weldi ng speed for rool pass of cellulosic electrode is 20 to 50 em/ min.,
which i s high speed compared with other types of elec trodes. <ao
_ However, the diffusibl e hydrogen content is aboul 30 to 40 ccliOOg and
higher than other types of electrodes.
_ Accordingly we need sufficient control of preheat and interpass temperature
for the purpose of weld crack prevention in case of applyi ng to high tens ile
strength pipes and welding in very cold regions.
_ Low-Hydrogen Elect rode
_ The welding speed for root pass of this type is 15 to 35 em/ min, which is
slightly lower than cellulose type.
_ However the deposition rate of low hydrogen electrode is equal or more
than cellulose type_
_ This method has good crack resistibi lity and high efficiency
0_2*_
4C
GIRTH WELDS - Electrodes: Classification
_Consumables for shielded metal arc (SMA, or manual metal-arc)
weldi ng have an AWS classification
. For example, E6010 or E7018A2 :
_E just means electrode,
a First two (or three, in case of 5-d igit spec) digits describe the UTS of
welded material, in ksi,
a third digit describes the welding positions possible. 1 is all-position and
2 is flat and horizontal only,
a fourth digit describes something about the coating compositi on and its
effect on weld characteristics.
PIPELINE GIRTH WELDS - Residual Stresses
. Pipeline girth welds wi ll contain ' residual' stresses'
_These are st resses created during the welding's heating and o o l i ~
process
e'r nese stresses can increase with increase in the welds size and l or
thickness
_They can be reduced by ' post weld heat treatment' (PWHT)
. Pipeline girth welds are not PWHT as they are usually thi n wall
_ It is usual to assume a level of yield strength residual stresses in a weld
that has not been PWHT
_ In single sided gi rth welds, it has been shown that residual stresses at
the root decrease and may become compressive as thickness increases
above 25mm- .
"
O_2OOlI_
.. _._"--.. _--_.. _--..._..-
---_.__ _--,.-.
82
41
GIRTH WELDS: Defects
~ ~ ~ ~
frcorrplele Joint }
Penetration
ERW LINE PIPE - Managing Integrity of Old ERW
lines
83
..
lines* - Assessment Plan Overview
--
--
-
Deciding if an ERW
Seam Weld Integrity
Assessment Plan is
Needed
-=
-
-
.,._- _...__. __... ..._- '... _-_.
--
ERW LINE PIPE - Managing Integri ty of Old ERW
lines .. Do I need an Assessment Plan?
_Step 1: Do I have a problem pipeline?
a consloer diameter ; W.T.; grade; age; manufacturer; MOP; hydrostatic-test
history; service failures; in-line-inspection history; coating type; CP history;
operating pressure cycles ; type of product: seam type (low-frequency. elc.?) .
Age alone cannot be used to determine if a plan is needed, but it is a
considerat ion.
_For example, a 1940s-vintage pipeline may warra nt an assessment if it is
subjected to aggressive pressure cycl es or if it is found to be significantly
affect ed by corrosion-caused metarloss.
_ If yoo have modem ERW, or low pressures, etc., you wi ll not need a plan
_ Step 2: History of service failures resulting from seam-related problems.
_ If a fatigue-related failure, or groove corrosion failure has occurred after the
line had been tested to a pressure level of at least 1.25 times the MOP, a
seam-integrily-assessment plan should be developed.
en the line has no recorded seam- related service failure, or any seam-related
service failure is expl icable as a non-time-dependent event, the pl an is not
necessary

.._-----_... """ -_.... _- _.
--
85
86
.....

""'"
...,

-
......
.........
es, n
" "
, ,
-

"

.
".
.. ,..,
'"
zso " ;,';;.<";;'
as-as
,..
..
I ,..
-
"'"

'" '"
d'*
lines" Do I need an Assessment Plan?
_ Step 3: Pressure Cycling
. Is the MOP relatively high (50- 72% SMYS). intermed iate (30-49% SMYS). or
low (<30% SMYS)?
_ How severe is the pressure
spectrum?
_ Aggressiveness of pressure
cycles can be crudely categorized
for particular environments as
shown in the Table opposite.
_ If fat igue failures have occurred,
or if the pressure spectrum falls
into the aggressive or very
aggressive category, a seam-integrity assessment plan should be developed.
_If no failure invotving fatigue crack growth has cccorree. and its pressure cyde
aggressiveness can be shown by analysis to be inca pable of causing the margin of
safety demonstrated by its last hydrostatic test to be eroded within twice the
expected life of the pipeline, no plan is needed.
.._------_... _-_.... _-_.
--
lines" Do I need an Assessment Plan?
_ Step 4: Test Pressure
_The test-pre ssure history of the line should be reviewed.
_ Any in-service seam fai lures (leaks or ruptures) that occurred well below
1.25 x MOP, or below the level of a previous test need investigating.
_ TtIeYcould be fatigue-enlarged defects Of selective seam corrosion.
_ The causes of all l est breaks Of leaks should be determined
_ If the test failures are due to time-dependent defect growth (fatigue Of
selective seam corrosion). an assessment plan should be developed.
_ If hook cracks or offset skelp edges are revealed by test breaks but no
evidence of fatigue is foonc:l , the pressure cydes on the system should be
reviewed 10 see if fatigue could become a problem.
_ If the pipel ine has no test breaks when tested 10 a pressure level of 1.25 x
MOP, it does not require a plan.
e u breaks occurred at test pressure levels 1.25 x MOP, and large
pressure reversa ls are extremety unl ikely. it may not be nece ssary 10have
a plan .
.
,._- -- -- _.._-- ---- '
--
"
..
4'
lines . Do I need an Assessment Plan?
_ Step 5: Corrosion
_ A pipe line with a known serecuve-searn-corrcecn problem requires an
assessment.
_A bare pipeline, a pi pel ine with poor coating. or an extensively disbonded
coating could be a candidate,
_ If extemat or internal corrosion is found, the potential exists for selective-
seam corrosion..
_ ERW seam made before about 1980 may be more susceptible to
selective-seam corrosion.
_ If the operator is confid ent that no selective-seam corrosion is occurring, no
plan is needed
_Transporting only non-corrosive products ensures that no internal
corrosion can aff ect the seams.
, _ . _ - - - - - ~ - _ . _ .. _.. _.
--
89
4 ~
Fracture Propagation and Arrest
Penspen Integrity
1
FAI LURE BEHAVIOUR OF PIPELINE DEFECTS
1".... """""" ".. Part-Wall Defect

g. .... Propagates
_""'.,""'''''I''.....
...".. """'_ _'.. .. __...... "'"
""'.<n... '",...... """"' PAAT W'"-'-"".ECr ....
... ".. _in. Thr ough.Wall Defect
>
...... ,... OUC...w..... DEfECT Rupture
""""''''' ;'lm;l,'''. '.. "' Hogh."' .... _
p"," ""'. L"",T""""
'- mo "'ROUGfl-W"'-lDEfEcr An-lists
..--- " , p" H9"..-
...."'ooMl _
FRACTURE PROPAGATION IN PIPELINES'
In the late 19S0's/early 1960's there were a number of
long failures in in-service pipelines, e.g.:
in 1958 a 26 inch Venezuelan gas pipel ine from Anaco to Cara cas
suffered a 5.6 km (3.5 mi le) brittle fracture, and;
in 1960 Transwestern Pipeline Company 30 inch, X56 pipeline
suffered a 13 km (6.1 mi le) britt le fract ure

C_2CJ05 _,
TOUGHNESS IN PIPELINE DESIGN CODES/LINE
PIPE SPECIFICATIONS
Pipeli ne and line pipe

DNV OFFSHORE PIPELINE DESI GN CODe
standards often specify a Wall <=30mm
'toughness'. Why?
Thickness
This toughness is usually in

Outside diamet er (mm)
terms of 'OWTT or 'Charpy'
<=610 1<=820 1<=11 20

SMYS Charpy Toughness (J)
245 40 4. 4.
290 40 43 52
We need to specify a level of

360 50 61 75
toughness to ensure a
415 64 77 95
' running' fracture wi ll be
'arrested'
450 73 89 109
485 82 100 124
555 103 126 155
,
,
TOUGHNESS & FRACTURE PROPAGATION
TOUGHNESS - Transmission
pipelines must have sufficient
tough ness to arrest propaga ting
fractures.
Specifyi ng an adequat e
toughness 10 ensure the arrest
of propagating fractures is a
design consideration.
SCOPE Crack propaga tion is
a problem in pipelines
conveyi ng gas or liquids with
high vapour pressures, NOT
liquids.
We do not apply crack
propagation toughness limits
to welds
GAS
OIL
__.. cw__, .. _ ... _
... _---""'---_.. _-
s
TYPES OF FRACTURE PROPAGATION
TYPE - A propagati ng
fracture is described as
either brittle or duct ile,
depending on the fracture
mechanism (this can be
determi ned from the
appearance of the fracture
surface).
EFFECT - Both types of
fractu re propagation can
result in fractures
extending for long
distances.
CONTROL Crack
propagation is cont rolled
by specifyi ng mini mum
toughness requirements.
Toughness
(Energy Absort>ed
In Test)
Low Toughness
Defect
Stress
TRANSITIONAL
Tempera ture
__..-.. __csu....-._ ,__'- .._ .... _
..... _-------_...... _.. _-..
s
'DUCTILE' & ' BRITTLE' BEHAVIOUR: DWTT
-------
' DUCTILE' & 'BRITTLE' BEHAVIOUR: Charpy
0_2'001I_'
,
INSERVICE FA I LURES
Brittle Crack Propagation
1960. New Mexico, USA brittle fracture
extended for 8.1 miles (13km)
in a 30in. X56 gas transmission
pipeline of the Transwestem Pipeline
Company.
Ductile Crack Propagation
c. 1970s. USA - ductile fracture
extended for 1864 feet (56arn)
in a 16in., 0.219io. wall thickness,
5LX 60 ERW gas transmission pipeline.
13km
O.57km
,
Crack speed
BRI TTLE FRACTURE PROPAGATION CONTROL -
Basic Concepts
Brittl e fractures propagate at very high speeds in excess of the speed of
the decompression wave of the methane gas (400m/sec (130OfUsec)
the tip of the runni ng brittle fract ure will expe rience the full press ure
existing in the pipeline at the time of the incident that caused its initiation,
as the gas cannot 'exhaust' from the pipe at speeds higher than the
acoustic velocity.
Arrest occurs when the fracture speed is less than the decompression
speed
We find that the lower the temperature of the pipeline. the faster the
fractu re speeds
So. we need to ensure that the pipeline is not a brittle material.
O_2(g_
"
,
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION CONTROL-
Basic Concepts
-
Ductil e fr act ures run at lower speeds;
These can be below the speed of the decompression wave.
Hence, the first requirement in preventing any running fracture in a
pipeline is to ensure that any fracture will be ducti le
However, despite travelling at speeds lower than the decompression
speed, it is possible for ductile cracks to propagate indefini tely
because of the nature of the decompression process.
This is because the gas expandi ng in the bulging pipe immediatley
behind the crack tip provides energy to propagate
So, we also need to ensure the ductile pipeline has suffi cient
TOUGHNESS to arrest a running ductile fracture
tt
THE CONTROL OF PROPAGATI NG FRACTURES
1. Specify a minimum toughness requirement to ensure that brittl e
fracture propagation does not occur. E'*\ly A_
I . g ~ . . . . . . . . .
->
2. Specify a minimum toughness
requirement to ensure that ductile
fracture propagat ion does not occur.
DUCTILE
Temperature
BRITTLE
Alternatively, specify a minimum
toughness requirement to control the
length of a ductile fracture, i.e . reduce
the probabi lity of a fracture of a given
length to an acceptably low level
(e.g. a 5% probability of a fracture 3 pipe lengths).
The acceptable length will depend upon operational and maintenance
considerations.
0_2006_'
"
(
CHARACTERISTICS OF RUNNING FRACTURES IN
PIPELINES
400- SOOfp$ 800 - 1500 Ips
Fracture Speed
>1500 Ips
r
DlJctile Shear
1 Crack Path
Arresl Possible
'6
Fracture Appearance
Mixed Fracture
Fract ure patterns
1 2 Paths Multiple Paths
-"""''''"'
'So'W __at __
lB&.a"-.E"BVU,_,,-e-.c:or-_eo: __
"
Fracture Speed Versus Fracture Appearance Data
from Full Scale Fracture Tests
3000
30" x0.375
11
X52

-

" .
: 2000 .1 '
a.
(J) tr:\- \
CD 1500 .. .. .
"
U 1000
c
LL 500
o
Full score Fracture Appearance. % SA
.,.... ...... ....TA , ....EY."'A.F_eo.- ' _ _G.o_.-__ID..... _ _
-.--..e-.-al-: aI""-"._"","''' l "G-'._ 201, _'9!n
"
BRITTLE FRACTURE PROPAGATION
Extensive bri ttle fracture propagation occurs because the speed of a
brittle fracture is greater than the speed of the decompression wave in the
gas (circa 396 ms-t (1300 fts .' ) for methane) ...
The crack tip therefore sees the full line pipe pressure and so can
propagate indefinitely
--
Brittle fracture propagation is driven by the elast ic energy stored in the
pipeline wall (a functi on of the applied hoop st ress)
We ensure a pipeline does not have propagating brittle fractures by
measuring its toughness usi ng a The 'Drop Weight Tear Test' (DWn)
rs
THE DROP WEIGHT TEAR TEST
p"_._.r
a_ ""lIuated;"
cenls1l parl of
J'---
A

t.
V u
The drop weight lear test (DWn) specimen is a full thickness test specimen
with a 5 mm deep pressed notch in the centre of the span.
The specimen is fractured in a single impact by a falling weight and the % shear
area is evaluated in the central portion of the fracture specimen.
This type of specimen is sometimesknown as a pressed-notch own
specimen. '''''"' . ...' 0
"
The DWn specimen is an impact specimen, so we can measure the energy
absorbed in the test

aema
Energy abso<bed decreases with decreasing tempera lure
"
The Dwn specimen is also inspected after the test, to determine its 'shear
area ' or '% duct ility'
r o
;
' 00
- - - ----'
Temperat ure
C_200S_
"
".
o
%Shear Area
Temperature
DUCTILE
. ..rna
Energy
Absorbed
The own characterises a material's
resistance 10 brittle fracture
propagation.
The percentage shear area of a DWn
speci men (or the transi tion
temperature) is related to the
toughness of the steel.
Experi ments have shown a
correlat ion between own
transition temperat ure
and f racture speed. and between
the shear area of a DWn
specimen and the fract ure speed.
Therefore DWn models full scale
behaviour
We conduct our OWTTs on the line pipe. AS 2885. 1 states that propagating brittle fract ures in
Ioogitudinal welds (ERW or SAW) have not been recorded in operating pipeli nes 10 dale. Plus.
Ioogit udinal welds are offset at girth welds, eliminating a fracture path.
C>_2OOlI_'
10
---- - - - - - --
PREVENTING BRITTLE FRACTURE
PROPAGATION
Brittle fractu re propagation is prevented by specifying a minimum

toughness to ensure that the line pipe steel is on the upper shelf of the
transition curve at the minimum operating temperature, i.e. the fracture
propagation transition temperature (FPTT) of the steel is less than the
minimum operating temperature.
Energy Absorbed Of
The FPTT is normally taken to %Shear

correspond to the temperature

at which a DWTT specimen
exhibits an 85% shear area
85%
fracture.
This requirement Operate your pipel ine
ensures that the line pipe
above this temperature
steer can not sustain a
propagating brittle fract ure.
FPIT
Temperat ure
e_KIOI_l
"
DWTT FRACTURE APPEARANCE AND ' FPTT' -
DWTT MODELS FULL SCALE PIPE TESTS
I
0.9
s:
... a.a
i
i 0.1
". 0.6
0.$
,
l"
, 0( 0.3
,
0.1
e0. 1
OWTT ...
""'-rt.U SCAlE
4 !J -30 -20 - \ 0
.,' n:rement from rPH; r
o
FPTT:
Fracture propagalion
tralls.itiontemperature
10
0 t_.J ..__ _v_e-_.. .... _._... __
_ 4_ _ _.. _
11
PREVENTING BRITTLE FRACTURE PROPAGATION
- WHY ' 85% SHEAR'?
o 20 40 60 80 100
% Shea r fracture .rea (DWTT, PN spedmeo)
.I&!!!
PIPELINE
TESTS
D
D
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
owrr
Comparison of PN-DWTT end Wesl tnt
res ults III Wesl Jeffers on t est temperat ure
f or wall thi cknesses above 19 rom
---._.... .. _-,... _"'_.... _-_.......
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION: Why?
Ductile fractures propagate axially,
usually along the top of the pipe
They travel slowly; 30D-900fUsec (91-
274metreslsec).
This slow speed allows time for:
the fractured pipe behind the crack tip
to bul ge and cr eate a high
longi tudinal stress at the crack tip,
ovansanon of the pipe ahead of the
crack, & elevated hoop stress
es
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION: Why? (cont.)
-.-
Therefore, ducti le crack propa gati on is
dr iven by:
the elastic energy stored within the
pipe wall and
by a transfer of energy from the gas
to the crack tip by bulging
immediately behind the crack.
Hence, despite travelling at speeds
lower than the decompression speed. it
is possible for ductile cracks to
propagate indefinitely because of the
nature of the decompression process.

ss
1,
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION: Tests
Since the 19705. there have been a large number of full scale tests to
investigate the factors that influence propagating ductile fractur es.
The investi gations have relat ed Charpy V
toughness to the abi lity of a pipeline steel
to arrest a ductile fracture
This has led to a number of empirical and semi-empi rical
criterion for predicti ng the Charpy V-Notch impact energy
necessary to control ductile propagation.
reservoir
high to ughn"n
pipe (to arN!sl )
low toughness
Init i ator pipe
high toughness
pipe (to arr est) reservo<r
THE CHARPY SPECIMEN
The full-size Charpy v-notch impact test
ea
1/2
5mm 6.7mm
55mm
FUU
l Omm
specimen is a specimen with a length of
55 mm and a square cross-section with 10
mm sides .
A V-notch of 45 degrees incl uded angle. 2
mm deep with a 0.25 mm radius of
curvature is machined in the centre of the
length .
Reduced section (sub-size) test
speci mens are also defined, with a width
of 6.7 mm (a 'two-thirds size' specimen)
and 5 mm (a 'half si ze' specimen).
The not ch is machi ned in one of the
narrower faces .
We condud our Charpys on the line pipe. AS 2885.1 suggests that propagating ductile
fractures in longitudinal welds have not been recorded in operat ing pipelines to date. Plus.
longitudinal welds are offset at girth welds , eliminat ing a fracture path.
l'
THE CHARPY TEST
The specimen is fractured by one blow from a
swinging pendulum.
The (impact) energy absorbed is calculated
from the difference in the maximum height of
the pendulum at the start & end of the swing .
The energy is absorbed in the initiation and
propagation of a flaw, and in the deformation of
the specimen.
-
THE CHARPY TEST
0_2001_.
..
r"'"
I
"
so
15
CHARY TEST: Effect of Temperature
Energy
Absorbed
100percent
Charpy V-Not ch Impact Energy
Pipe line steels usually
operate on \his 'Upp6f'
shell, afld so are ductile,
.. O.. percent
Temperature
Percentage
Brittle
Fracture
CHARPY SPECIMEN BEHAVIOUR VERSUS
STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOUR
Energy
Absor d
0_2OOlI_
Charpy Spec i men
Str ucture (e.g
_-- 25mm th ick
pipeline)
The specimen may behave in a
ductile manner (i.e. 0 percent
deavage area ), but the
strucnwe could behavein a
brittlemanner at the same
temperat ure.
Hence we need 10 CALIBRATE
our small Charpy tests -Mth full
scale behaviour
Temperature
FRACTURES IN SHIPS (also in 'Fracture
Mechanics' Notes)
Ship hulls used to be 'riveted together
In all probability, cracks in steel hull
plates of ships was common place.
Except that due to the riveted
const ruction techniques of the era,
a crack in a single plate was not
catastrophic and would be
attributed to an occasional single
bad steel plate from the steel mill
or faulty fit-up in man ufacture.
Abrittle fracture, woul d only run to the next riveted joint, typically not
mor e than 20 feet in length, wi th notice able but not catastrophic
leakage which could be contained until the next reasonable scheduled
repair.
FRACTURES IN SHIPS
The 'Li berty' cargo ships were welded structures, built in the USA
during Worl d War 2 to bring 'liberty to Europe'
-
Out of 2700 li berty ships built to supply UK, 400 sustained fractures,
90 of which were considered serious and 10 broke completely in two.
1000 suffered significant failures between 1942-1946because of low
temperatures, while 200 suffered serious fractures between 1942-
1952
The US Government knew something was
wrong, because the failure rate of the
welded liberty ships were very high in the
North Atlantic, while literally
NON-EXISTENT in the warm waters
of the South Pacific.
17
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
SdlenectiJdy, 1943
New ship
F.,iled in h<trbour.
Air temp. was ~ -3e
Water temp. .. 4C
Light winds.
Many of the fractures
on the Liberty ships
init iated at poo r
welds, not associated
with design details
The quickest a Liberty ship was buill 5 days after the keel was laid!
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
The Libert y ships are an exampl e of where the Charpy speci men has
been calibrated agai nst structural behaviour .
The Liberty Ships were the first ships to have an all welded hull. A ..
larg e number of the ships failed in a brittl e manner. The ship plates
were tested using the Charpy specimen to determine:
the plates whe re br ittle fracture initiated "1.III11!1
the plates where brittle fracture propagated I ~ ~ I I I '
?
?
the plates where britt le fracture arrested
?
THE LIBERTY SHIPS
The resu lts were:
initiat ion (source) plates had an
average Charpy energy of 7 ft
Ibf
propagation plates had an
average Charpy energy of 10 fI
Ibf
arrest plates had an average
Charpy energy of 16 ft Ibf
Therefore , to arrest a fracture, a
plate would need to have a Charpy
energy greater than 16ft Ibf .
Also, design changes were made
10remove local stress
concentrations (they removed
square hatch covers).
CI_2OOI_.
7 It Ib
10 It Ib
... = ~ .._ 16 It Ib
L
<
"
LINKING CHARPY TESTS TO FULL SCALE PIPELINE
BEHAVIOUR: A Fracture Propagation Test
reservoir
CI_2OOI_'
inlermedial u
toughness p;p.e
;nt ermedillt.
toughness pipe
test section
reservoir
(not to scala)
19
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION TESTS
1995
DOth. "
_ JI SI
!IJMann
. Foo ll1ills
U DEPRG
CSM
J
- SMI. Athe n.
aesu
l[l eG
~ S
'990 1985 1980
FUll .cal. bu",! lut. carried out in the last 25 ~ ....
1975
'"
Y..,
PREVENTING DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION
Temperature
Charpy Energy
Absorbed
(toughness)
The Charpy impact energy is related to
the ductile toughness of a pipel ine.
Minimum levels can be specified that
ensure thai ther e is insuffici ent energy
available in the system for ductile
propagation to occur
The arrest toughness is a function of
the pipeline geometry,
stress level, the pressu re, and
the decompression characteristics of
the fluid that is conveyed in the pipeline.
A number of empirical and semi-empirical criteria exist to estimate the
minimum required arrest toughness (e.g. Battelle, AISI, British Gas) .
The formul a due to Battelle is probably the most com mon ly used.
2
CONTROLLING DUCTILE FRACTURE
PROPAGATION (METHANE)
Battelle C.. = 15
x
23 82
x
l O-
5
a;( Rt) lIJ 50% confidence
Alsr CO' = 15x 2.377 x 10-4 G'.li2(D)112 95% confidence
where
C,
=
a, =
D
=
R
=
I
=
full size Charpy V-Notch Energy, J
hoop stress, Nmm-
2
pipe diameter, mm"
pipe radius, mm
pipe wall thickness, mm
'Note that the presence d ott-
gaMS (ethane. pentane, elC.) in
nalUflll gas, gives a 'rictl' gas..
These formulae are nol
appropnate lor Ihese rid'! gases or
when the gas ellhibb a ~
phase'dunng dec:ompres$iOn.
See ASME 83 1.8
These are known as ' short' formulae'
-
Spreadsheet?
"AS_'_ -.-...... _ d ~ _ "' __OO<lCIO"' ...
___$""" F ........ ""' ...&_.__DI<JOO"' ...
_ .. _ ... 5 ........ -'.
EXAMPLES OF CHARPY REQUIREMENTS FOR
'DUCTILE' FRACTURE PROPAGATION CONTROL
Examples of Charpy formulae in ASME 8 31.810 arrest a duct ile fracture in a
gas line are:
Ballelle formula: CVN 2: O.0108cr2I
1IJ
R 1/3
American Iron and Steellnstilute : CVN 2: O.0345n31
2R
' 12
R,t in inches, (J in ksi, CVN is 'full size' and in ft lb.
The Canadi an Standard, eSA Z662 gi ves:
CVN = O.00036cr3'2R1/2
R,t in mm, CJ in MPa , CVN is 'full size' in J
. Small di ameter, thin wall, or low stress pipe does not require Charpy
toughness requirement. GSA Z662 considers:
. <114.3mm outside diameter; <6mm nominal wall; or design operati ng
stress<50MPa
. pipe as not requiring Charpy testing
o_aooe_,
"
21
BATTELLE 'SHORT FORMULA'
' oo
// 1.3.B<itlel!e
0
000
/ .
'.
PROPAGATE

,

0
0
,
0 0
,
0
"
"
00 _ . / o
'"
rJ '00 ".11' .
., ,,,, '"
f
<8
0 . " <> .

. ,
"
" /
J
'00
" .
0
" 0
0
/
0
. 01:0
o' /
0 0
%
,
!
gq,c8
0
0
, /
/
/ 0
f

00 . /
" 0
0

oJ
ARREST
!
.,'
0
"
ChO'PYV.nolch J
I
,
.._--- _.__....
-.
z:
"',G.. "'''ONE,V.. """ ,G.. oaooro.m,G, ... JONES OG., EP1<G .. e-. "-' , _ .. ""'" _ ,... ",..
_ .31< --.. """'-....., ... """'-- ,"""""',.."
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION - More
Complex Model - Theory
THEORY - Ducti le crack propagation is
explained as follows'
if their exists a stress level at which
the fracture velocity and the
corresponding pressure wave
velocity are the same, then the
pressure at the crack lip will remain
constant and the crack will
propagated indefinitely.
Consequently, the pr opagation of a
ductile fracture can be described by
the balance between the drivi ng
force for fractu re propagation and the
force resisti ng it.
dnlfingforce
,
e Ponoren 2006 "",,611
DUCTILE FRACTURE PROPAGATION - More
Complex Model
MODEL - The Battelle two-curve model (TeM) is a semi-empirical
model that considers the balance between the driving force for fracture
propagation and the force resisting it.
It can be used to predict the minimum toughness (Charpy V-notch
impact energy) required to arrest a propagating ducti le fracture.
The reMconsiders the driving force to be directly related to the gas
press ure in the plane of the crack tip.
The r eMcan be applied to rich gases.
The r eMis expressed in terms of the fracture velocity and the gas
decompression velocity, as a function of hoop stress (press ure).
Crack d<;v;ng force
Toughne ss resisting
O P_2006ROII6Il
FRACTURE AND GAS DECOMPRESSION VELOCITY
Stress
(pressure}
Initial
pressure
{stress
arrest
stresslevel
l---
fracture velocity
-- --- - - ---
gas decompression
velocity
1. Steady state fractu re propagati(H'l occurs
hen ~ t'M>CUNeo interw<; l .
2. The limiti ng conditi(H'l is hen the two CUNeS
become langentiol , in",e.se the t(MJghn""s
and the fract ure will arr""t.
Veloc ity
23
FRACTURE AND GAS DECOMPRESSION VELOCITY
Sire>,
(pressure)
Arrest ......
lead state fract ure
ro atk! \
ropaga/e
fracture velocity
gas decompression
velocity
Veloci ty
GAS DECOMPRESSION VELOCITY
Each decompression wave travels at a
particular velocit y.
The decompression characteristi cs of
the product are, primari ly, dependent
on:
int ernal pressure
temperature
gas composition
The lower the is the percentage
methane (compared to the higher
hydrocarb ons), the higher the initial
pressure, or the lower the temperature,
the 'slower' is the overall
decompress ion wave.
DECOMPRESSION:
Pressure
Temperature
Gas composition
2
VELOCITY:
Pressure
Toughness
Flow stress
Diameter
Wall thickness
Backfill
FRACTURE VELOCITY
The fracl ure velocity is dependent on:
internal pressure
toughness
material flow stress
diameter
wall thi ckness
backfi ll
The larger the diameter, or the t hinner
the wall thickness, the higher the stress .
and hence the the crack wi ll propagate
faster for the same toughness,
Backfi ll is important. the fract ure velocity is
highe r (compared to soil ) if there is no backfi ll
and slower if there is frozen backfil l.
The fracture velocity is obta ined from an empirical equation (containing the
above parameters) limited to the full scale test s it was based on .
0_ 2005 _'
OTHER PARAMETERS THAT EFFECT DUCTILE
PROPAGATION
"
25
THE EFFECT OF BACKFILL
Battelle 2 Cu rves Approach
'"
'20
"0
-c
e 80
e
,
60
ao
20
0

""/1/ '-"'"
>
:---
// .r..>:
I
Soil back fill
.
_ No backfi ll
_ Sea bac kfill
.
_ Decompres s ure gas curve
- . I I
o 250 300 350 400
Po"spa n 2006 Rov6il
Decompression spe ed (m/s)
THE EFFECT OF RICH' GAS
Gases ' rich' in higher hydrocarbons (ethane , etc.}
are called ' ri ch' gases
Fracture control for pipelines carrying rich gas
mi xtures often requires significant ly higher
toughness pipe compared to gas pipelines
carrying nearly pure methan e
this trend has been confirmed by several full scale
burst test s.
Why?
The decompression behaviour of natural gas
can be approximated by ideal gas behaviour.
However, the decompression characteristics
of rich gas are more compl icated.
Rich gases cannol be descr ibed by ideal gas
assumptions.
A$ME 83 1.8 requires additional toughness
considerations for rich gases
Methane+Ethane+etc
Rich Gas
x
--'. __R A _ ........ ..... ..,.. __
..... .. ...-,-
.....-.. ' .. '" """
26
THE EFFECT OF RICH GAS
Rich gas can:
1. decompress more slowly initially (compared to natural gas)
2. additionally, a liqu id phase (a two phase region) can occur at high
pressures. leading to even slower decompression rates.
Two phase behaviour causes a discontinuity in the decompression
curve
The effect of these slower decompression speeds is more driving force at
the crack lip
Therefore a higher toughness requirement
The Battelle Two Curve Model can be used to estimate the arrest I
propagation conditions for a pipeline conveying rich gas.
Ar1 -ad hoc" decompression curve for the gas mixture of interest i s required .
calculated using a dedicated gas decompression model
The model needs to be validated for the relevant gas cc mposmon.
temperature and pressure.

THE EFFECT OF RICH GAS
500 <00
Pur.
_ Ricra 9'1$ ",i"U'.
_ Resis tance cu ,,", ,
_ ResIs tance cu""' 2
300
b ---- - - +----1

2" ''0
p ,pe d, am .... ' 36 "
mm
TU 'P' n ' ur.120 ba '
9,.de U O
Us a ge locto" 12""
'"
' 10
' 00
-
to
80
e
,
60
ac
=
10
0 -
0
Decompress ion , pee d (mls)
e_ 2OOf _ '
27
THE EFFECT ON OFFSHORE PIPELINES
'00
Battel le 2 C u ~ u Approach
'"
0
F : ~
0 .
"Ie."",,[" CV' ''J
~
0
7 /
V
/ /
---
So; , " " ""
~
r-- _ ~ 0. ",,,
Full scale tests by Battelle and CSM have shown that water acts in a
similar way to backfill; the deeper the water, the more beneficial effect.
Hence, would expect offshore lines to have lower toughness
requir ements for ensuring arrest.
The Battelle Two Curve Model
accommodates backfi ll effects,
including water, ,.
through empirical 12
corrections (but note 10
that thickness of
offshore pipelines
may lie outside range
of applicability of
the TCM) ,
FRACTURE LENGTH
28
FRACTURE LENGTH
Britt le fractu res result in (large) pipe fragments being thrown some distance
from the crater; these are a hazard
Ducti le fractures norma lly run along the top of the pipe, and the pipe remains in
the crater.
If the minimum ductile toughness requirement is satisfied by all pipe in a
pipeline, then the fracture length should be between two and three pipe lengths,
If the minimum ductile toughness requirement is not satisfied by all pipe in a
pipeline. then:
If most of the pipe is 'arrest' pipe. then there is a high likeli hood of a fracture
length of a few pipe lengths.
If most of the pipe is not 'arrest 'pipe, then there is a high likelihood of a
fracture length of many pipe lengths.
The likely length of a fracture can be estimated using simple stat istical methods
if it is assumed that the 'arrest' pipe (acceptable toughness) is randomly
distributed, and the proportion of 'arrest' and 'propagate' pipes is known (or
estimated),
CRACK ARRESTORS FOR DUCTILE FRACTURES
'" Po, ,,,,," 2006 Rov61 '
29
Britt le fractures are very fast and show littl e pipe wall deformation.
crack arrestors of littl e value
we must prevent a brittle fracture propagation!
Ductile fractures are slow, typically 100 to 300 rns-' . and are
characterised by:
the fract ured pipe behind the running crack to bulging outwar ds, creating
high longitudinal stress at the crack tip, and
ovansauon ahead of the crack tip and an elevated hoop stres s.
The basic arrestor concepts are (for a ducti le fract ure):
t . Restri ct flap opening (e.9 wrap the pipe with wire).
2. Reduce the hoop stress ahead of the crack (e9 by inserting hea vier wi. :1
pipe),
3. Chang e the direction of the crack (e.q . by inserti ng a brittle girth weld).
4. Add mass to the pipe wall .
In most applications, arrestors based on eit her 1 or 2 are used.
Note that the new higher grade steels may require stronger/longer crack
arrestors than lower grade steels
D ........... :IOOII.._1
-co.-""".. .....,.................
'p ~ _ ... J ........ _'*"'\Ie-.....-...""._e-.... ...,....-T..... _._.....
.. "'<:>00> .. ,_"....-e- e-..._.e.--- __ ........ 2 > - ~ """" '"'co>.,,.,.,,
00
30
When choosing an arrester, consider:
Type of arrester;
l engt h, thickness and material of arrestor;
Strength and stiffness;
Corrosion control of any steel
attachments;
Spacing and location of arrest ors,
Ther e are a number of examples of crack
arrest ors fitted to pipelines in the USA lines,
These include :
Loose steel sleeves filled with epoxy to
prevent moisture entry;
Steel sleeve crack and buckle arresters:
Clock spring composi te fibre wraps.
at
CODE GUIDELINES FOR CRACK ARREST
"
31
FAILURE BEHAVIOUR OF PIPELINE DEFECTS
s. .. "'"'"'".. Part -Wall Defect
d. ".. THROUGe _wALlDE' EC' ''''"''' ' Lea/
,ft "" ,.."" ,,8""" ,,",,"" f .....
' '''a N '" , ... . . Toug""""
, "., .. ""' "" Pr opagates
. tt... "",,,,",0 to '" "'.. ,,"" p,"" a l <-''''ll''_'
o. " "" _, ""., ... . ""' a '><.oI vaI" , then , ....
" " " ''' "'' ',,"" """"""" ''''' PART. W",- , ">ftCI ,. "
. "" ,,", Through-Wall Defect
"
c. n - ROLGH-," ALLDEFECT
, THJlOlX3>i.w",-, D...CT,ae"" R uptUrl>
" ' oloa toLong. '" ,, " '" ","",",,, ".,n "" ,...",'"
L"" """"""",,,
!!!!!!!!!IIII!'1lIlI
, ''''' THR<JC'OH.W",", "".OCT"OM"'. "'" Arrests
" p,""... . """', """"""'"'.
'" It orod'" to. ,,,,, ",
ASME B31.8 REQUIREMENTS FOR FRACTURE
PROPAGATION CONTROL: Brittle Fracture
ASME 831.8 refers to API 5L, supplementary
requirements SR5 or SR6.
For own specimens, ASME 831.8 and SR6
require that at least 80% of the pipeline batches
(tieats') shall exhibit a fracture appearance with
a shear area of 40% or more.
This specification is based upon two samples
taken from one pipe in each heat
II is based on non-published data collected by
API, and corresponds to an average of all of the
heats of appro ximately 75% shear area
If the test temperature corresponds to the
minimum operating temperature, t hen this
specifi cation wi ll assure t hat appro ximately half
of the line pipe supplied will fai l in a ductile
manner (i.e. approximately half of the pipe will
have a FPn above the minimum operating
temperat ure) .
API 5L requires
a DWTT shear
area of 2::40%
32
API 5L requires a Charpy
shear area of '2:80% + a
toughness calculated from
models
ASME 831.8 REQUIREMENTS FOR FRACTURE
PROPAGATION CONTROL: Ductile Fracture
ASME 831.8 refers to the
supplementary requirements of API 5L.
For example, the (average) line pipe
shear area of the Charpy specimen
must be
The all-heat average Charpy
toughness should exceed a value
calculated using one of four quoted
predictive models:
Battelle, the American Iron and
Steel Institute (AISI ), British Gas ,
and British Steel. E.g.:
Battelle. . Full size C,= O.0108"h2R'l3t1l3
AIS!. . Full size c, = O.0345crh3/2D1I2
THE EPRG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRACK
ARREST TOUGHNESS
The EPRG recommendations give toughness requirements for a range
of line pipe steel grades and diameters.
The recommendations refer to full size Charpy specimens, and the
specified values are based on an average of three values.
The recommendations assume ductile behaviour, i.e. at the minimum
design temperature the requirement for an 85% shear fracture area
determined in a own test (to API RP 5L3) will be satisfied.
The recommendations do not apply to rich gases, or to pipelines with no
backfill or frozen backfill
The recommendations are based on buried pipelines in the Western
world , operating at ambient (e.g. 5 C) temperature.
RE G , PISTONo,V , VOGT,G., , and ;0"5,0 G.. EPRG fl<,rom"",nd. '"" I", C'ad<Am'" r""!l N", ,,
fu l"Ogosr,..,,,," C"'" Pope S,,,,,I,.J R "rem. t'",,. ,.v'" 34 J"'Il"'g. _ ,.,,, ,pp. 6Or-<;, 1
33
ARREST TOUGHNESS
The EPRG recommendations do not clearly indicate the appropriate test
temperature.
The DWTT shear area requirement at the min imum des ign temperatu re
ensures that the steel is on the upper shelf.
The FPTT determined usi ng DWTT specimens will be higher than that
determined using Charpy test spe cimens (the own specimens are full
thi ckness specimens).
Therefore the temperature of the Charpy test can usually be at room
temperature, because the steel is on the upper shelf and the upper shelf
impact energy is not temperature dependent ;-<':
unless the steel shows an increase in the <,
upper shelf with temperature . ,
(a 'rising shelf steel). rising shelf
However. it is good practice to conduct
Charpy tests over a range of temperatures, including the minimum design
temperature.
C_2006_'
ARREST TOUGHNESS
c harcv v-octcf (full-size) for gas l ransmission pipel ines operating aI 62.5% SMYS
Pi e outside diametor 00 mm
'>1:2:20 Gr",I"
_+; 920

-6 10 crzo $820 <920 <' 020
L240 xas
'"
ec
'"
p,OO X52
"

T '" "
" " L480 X7QL.

"
..
" "

se sa
L550 XSOl . e S5
"
00 rz
"
"
se
Charpy V-f1otdl (full -size) for gas transmIssion pipel ines oper ating at 12% SMYS
"
(lUIIoidot diame1er 00 mm
G._
>610 >720
.,,,,
-sec
2'0
-S,O ' -610
."" .""
"'"
S102'O <, 12'0
,,,
".

.,
L290 X. 2
.,
.,
"

L.'SlXOO
.,
"
.. .. ..
" L5 X65
., .,
"
"
.. ..
" " " L480 :00 .. so ss ..
"
ss
"
" " L550 X80
" " " "
so se
'"

"
34
BASIS OF EPRG RECOMMENDATIONS
Grade
X80
X70 and X75
Below X7Q
Basi s of EPRG Tou gh ness Recommendati ons
1.0 x Battelle
0.90 xAISI
0.75 xAISI (minimum full size Charpy of 40J)
BASIS OF EPRG RECOMMENDATIONS
The EPRG recommendations do not give the lower bound toughness
required to arrest a ductile propagating fracture in all of the pipe
purchased 10their specification.
The recommended minimum toughness of 0.75 x AISI prediction for
arrest takes into account the statistical distribution of Charpy toughness
within a pipe supply. This requirement ensures that half of the Jinepipe
supplied will meet the predicted arrest requirements (i.e. the AISI
predicted toughness), based on a statistical analysis of the measured
Charpyenergy.
The recommendations are based on statistical analysis of actual
Charpy energies, showing that approximately half of the supplied pipes
will have a Charpy energy in excess of 1.3 times the minimum specified
value.
35
DNV OFFSHORE STANDARD OS-F101 REQUIREMENTS FOR
FRACTURE PROPAGATION CONTROL
o
Wall <-30mm
Thickness
Out side diameter (mm)
-Fracture arrest properties for
<=610 1<=820 1<=1120
larger wall thicknesses and
diameters shall be subject 10
SMYS Ch arpy Toughnes s (J) agreement .
245 40 40 40
' Charpy V rl()(ch (full scale)
' Joules: Transverse values:
290 40 43 52
Average value of three
360 50 61 75
specimens)
Minimum Individual results t
415 64 77 95 exceeo 75% of these values.
450 73 89 109
485 82 100 124
555 103 126 155
Cak:ula1loll:i to otllaI n Cv lISe EPRG G<JioeIlne$. but elll end ee walodltyto 80'% SMYS
FRACTURE CONTROL PLANS
C_2OOI_' n
36
FITTINGS
FITTINGS
.Pipeline fittings include forged bends, tees , and flanges.
_They are usually short and thick, and occur at relatively
infrequent intervals along the pipeline length.
_ It can be assumed that a fracture in a fitting propagates
only as far as the tough pipe to which it is welded:
GAS
_ Therefore , fracture propagation is not conside red a
problem and the fracture arrest philosophy that is appl ied to
line pipe is not appropriate.
_Consequently, fittings are designed to protect against the
less severe case of fracture 'initiation'.
37
FRACTURE CONTROL PLANS
_ We usually include our ar rest toughness requiremen ts for our gas pi peline in a
'fract ure control plan'
_ Fracture control is concerned wi th controlling fracture initiat ion and
propagat ion
e aecause higher toughness levels are required to arrest propagati ng
fractur es than are required to avoid initiation of fracture, the specification of
sufficient toughness 10control fast fracture will ensure the line pi pe is
sufficiently tough 10give ductile initiation that is controlled by yield (flow)
stress rather than toughness' .
a conseqoenuy the fracture ptan 1$ usually focussed on limIting fracture
propag ation
a r neretore it will specify two toughness measures 10 limil brittle fractures and
ductile (sometimes called tearing) fractures in the line pipe body
. Propagating Mille or ductile fractures in longitudinal welds" (SAW and ERW )
have not been recorded in operati ng pipelines.
Conse quently, the fracture control plan does not have to incl ude longi tudinal
welds or heal affected zones.
C'''''''- 2000l Ro>t\o"
'AS 28M' "(""'9""""""_'''' ......r._," ..,........ ''''''''' '''' .... "...... '-"... ....., ...""'l __
PROPAGATING BUCKLE
38
PIPELINE BUCKLING IN BENDING
When we bend a pipe we can increase its curvature. The bending eventually
becomes unstable and we cause wrinkles on the compression side, then a
buckle forms .
The curvature i s no longer uniform and it localise s at the buckle. to give a
' kink'
Wrinkles (magni fied)
"
t:
J
)
y
C_2006_' -n
PIPELINE BUCKLING
"'" .
-_..., .,/
.'
---
.-""'.
---- .....
.: .- .....
I ...
A large external pressure can also cause a
pipeline to ovali se and collapse. but the bucklo is
no longer a local wrinkle on the compression
side, but it spre ads out and can move along the
pipel ine in a dumbbell ('dog bone') shape.
Collapse occurs when exte rnal hydrostat ic
pressure causes a pipe to become unstable
and buckle locall y.
Collapse resu lts in gross plastic deformation
of the pipe cross-section.
It is a Iorm of local buckling.
Tensi le axial loads, or bending loads, reduce
the col lapse pressure' .
_ .......awyof .... pope .... causea Ie t><.dIfI a111:M<1r Tho$
's""'Y _ _ lot p,pe sutllecte<lle ..:demaI pr-...s
Af5o. ". preserce of a9"1r' -'dcanatIed bucI<lng ...., .-.... tluCI<le
D"IVOSFlO' _ ......... ""ed Ie tlOI_lOon-setof
... SOoJll
c P",,-, 2OOlI ....
39
PIPELINE BUCKLING: Example Equations'
_External pressure on a pipelin e can lead to yielding or collapse of a
pipeline
. Suckling of a long (leng th >1. 110(0/1)0.5) pipeline, buc kling primarily
depends on its 011 ratio (outer diameter/wall thickness), in the same way
as a col umn in pure compression depends on its slenderness rati o.
_For large Ol t ratios, buckling occurs whi le the mat erial is still elastic
(elastic buckling). The external pressure (Pe. psi) to cause this buckle is:
. Pe::: (2E1(1-u
2
)).(VD)3, which gives a hoop strain> [1/(1-2u)).(tl D)l
. wt1ere E is Young"smodulus (psi), aro u is Poissooratio
. for a Poisson rat io of 0.3 (steel), P, " 2.2E{VD)3, .....t lich gives a hoop strain"
1.1(U0 )2
_For short lengths of pipe, the stress in the pipe wan may reach the elastic
limit before buckling occur s:
. Plast ic limit to- short pipes, Pp '" 20
jUO
_where OJ is material yield st rength (psi)
. For intermedi ate lengths of pipe. see reference at bollom of page for
buckling pressure

PIPELINE BUCKLING: Example Equations'
_At small Olt rati os, buckli ng results from yielding of the cross section.
This yielding occurs at an external pressure (P):
oP, = 2.(tld).cr
y
_where 0 , is minimum yield strength (psi ) in hoop directi on
_At intermediate values of 011. the collapse pressure. Pc. is:
. p = (P P " (P 2 -+ P 2)0.'
c ! ' el'r e
_ASME II and ASME V lIl give charts for the design of piping subjected
to external pressures
0 _ ........ _'
40
PROPAGATING BUCKLE SUBSEA
_A pipeline under external pressure, or high bendi ng loads can also
support a 'propagating buckle'.
_This is a buckl e that con tinues to propagate along a pipeline, and
may occur in offshore pipelines under hi gh layi ng loads.
C_2QllO;_.
PROPAGATING BUCKLE: Cause
"
e'Two things must exist for a propagating
buckl e:
_A buckl e must exist before the
propagation occurs.
e'Ihe external pressurell oad must be above
a ' propagati on pressure' , PPI'
_The buckle will conti nue to propagate
until the external pressure dec reases to
below the p..... or it meets a physical
obstacle, 89 a buckle arrestor.
_The Ppi will be lower than the pressure
to buckle the pipeline
A 'wet" buckle is one that fails the pipe. and allows water ingress .
A 'dry' buckle is when the pipe is not broken
ez
41
PROPAGATING BUCKLE: Calculation
. Offshore design codes (e.g. DNV OS F101) give guidance:
. Propagation pressure =Ppr=3S(lyIl(tl D)2-5
_1=wa1l thlCkress, 0 " pope diamet er. Oyi$ the YIeld s1fength. a is a factor rangIng from 085 1010.
ar'lddepends on type 01line pipe used.
_SeeONV ooeume nl!of lull detai ls and umts.
PROPAGATING BUCKLE: Buckle Arrestors
Pipe wall coll apse du e 10external pressure
Buckle will propagate
---- ---- ----._,-
42
THE TITANIC
,
... . .
I a.u."'
f
'-"-" .... 10
,,-1' .
Did the Titanic sink because
of poor toughness?
The Roya l f-1ail Ship Titanic:
Did J "'!f:1al1U'1'ic.a1 Failun
Cauve eo Rernember t
I

43
THE TITANIC
-

~ -
~ -
/'--- -
_.-
-
- ~ -
/
r(
i
,
/ - -
,
I
j
,
;1''''-
j - -...........
r
~ / ---
i
j ~ -
I -:..._-
,

) / -0-"'-

- ~
.

-

arnese are Charpy tests from the actual Titanic hull.
_ Compare the Titanic hull steel with a modem (A36) steel.
_Clearty. the steel used for the hull was not suited for service at low temperatures.
_ The seawater temperat ure at the lime of the col lision was -2"G.
0 __2'D_"
THE TITANIC
_ The steel used in RMS Titanic was probably
the best steel availa ble in the period of 1909 10
1911,
_but it would not be acceptable at the present
l ime for any construction purposes and
particularly not for ship cons truction ,
_ Would a ship constructed of modem steel
suffered as much damage as the Titanic in a
similar accident?
_ If the Titanic had not collided with the iceberg,
it could have had a long career
_ Its sister ship - the Olympic - had a career of
over 20 years
_ II was bui lt of similar sleel , in Ihe same
shipyard, and from the same design
_ The only di fference was a big ceberq.. ..
44
Utility Pig and Intelligent
(Smart) Pig Inspection
Penspen Integrity
Lecture note - intelligent pigging technology is always changi ng
and i mproving. Therefore. some 01the guidelines, tolerances ,
accuracies, etc.quoted i n this lect ure may be 'out of dale'.
Check with pig for latest information
n .....'
......."c_ .. P" ... _"' """""
s...... ...." ,wI>O_ ....
_ uno _ ....
Chno yo "' .. o"o
.... Co.Ao "'W"9_c....... P....
" 01"'"1>9 _ _ ' ''' -..-..."'f.......__'_"".........
Gaa ,_, .. J _ .. ... _c...
_ '...__..... """""""""-_c...
1
PIPELINE INTEGRITY?
a
.Pipel ine integrity is ensuring a
pipel ine is safe and secure. It
involves all aspects of a
pipeline's design, inspecti on,
management and maintenance.
e 'Ffus presents an operator
with a complex
_ 'j igsaw'
to solve if they are to
maintain high integrity
. Pipeline integrity management
is the management of all the
elements of this complex jigsaw
_The management brings all
these pieces of the jigsaw
together.
Audit
,.,
IIasellne
Assessment
INSPECTION OF PIPELINES
The industry is now moving to 4 cat egories of inspecting
(' assessing') our pipelines:
In line inspection, using intelligent (smart ) pigs
Hydrotesting
'Direct Assessment'
This is can be a mixt ure of methods.
For exampl e, we can do above ground surveys of onshore buried
lines that can detect problems with the corros ion protecti on and
pipeline coatings. l.e inspecting for external corro sion.
These are 'indi rect' measurements.
We can excavate the pipeline and measure wall thickness loss,
This is a 'direct' measurement.
Combin e indirect and direct , and you have direct assessment.
'Other' technologies - this allows new & future
technologies

PIGS: WHAT ARE 'PIGS'?
'Pigs' are devices that are inserted into pipelines and travel along the
pipeline with the product flow.
They can travel up to 1000km, but typi cally travel 50km (a typi cal
pipeline 'section' )
Assorted plastic cups or discs on board the pig
allow sealing, guiding, spacing, scaping, etc..
-.,._... .....
3
2
Usually propelled by pipel ine fluid
'INTELLIGENT' PIGS:
These are tools that collect
information on the condition of our
i eline
PIGS: WHAT ARE PIGS?
'UTILITY PIGS:
These are tool s that help clean ,
seal, and maintain our pipeline
5
PIGS: USES
INSPECTION
REPNIt
1!'HIlITORS. PRE-

CI-E<XFORPHYSICAL

DETECT CORROSlON. AH;l
OTHERDEfECTS,
""'COO'<
- '"
lINECOVER J,K) SJ'AANNG
RENOYAT1ClloI-Ntl
........""..'------i"""".-."'Oii:- ---i
GaPlOO....
__'\'1NG'" srru
"""""""'"""'"
""""..
a.AN-.GroR PRCO..CT
"'""""'"
r
Pigs hel p operation and effiCiency by:
removing subs tances and debris that may hinder
process systems or form corrosion cells
-help detect defects
' providing an alternative 10 the hydrolesl
s
3
PIGS: The History... Cleaning pigs....
1870: the flow in a Pennsylvanian crude
oil line decreased , due to paraffin deposits,
and the pressure had to be increased.
To remove the deposits, a bundle of rags
tied in a ball was pumped through the line.
____ t
This first pig was upgraded to a bundle of leather
Leather swells when wet &creates a good seal for the
bundle
o"*"",,,, 2tU_',
...--. "- ,_ ...... SoN'<:eo

,
PIGS: The History... 'Condition' pigs....
1904: 4" line in Montana was covered by a rock slide during
construction.
A rubber ball was pumped through the line to detect
damage.
... "
. If the ball exited, undamaged, the line was not
damaged.
Rubber balls have been used
ever since for this purpose.
4
The origin of the name 'pig' is debatable.
Early pigs were made of pipe or mandrel
bodies, with flanges welded onto each end
and rubber or leather cups
Early pipeliners used to comment about
"hearing that pig squeal" as it passed by' ,
WHY DO WE CALL THESE TOOLS 'PIG'?
_ _ _ _ .a
co p""""" 2006 Rev6l1
- F,,,", ' co'"Gw of PI",",,,,, Doh","""""'nc r... 0,,,,,,, P,. " P""I,," Cw".,
9
'UTILITY' PIGS
~ )
, ",A
e Pe'speo 2006 Rw'l1'
5
UTILITY PIGS: Cleaning and Maintenance
-----....
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Foam Pigs
_ Foam pigs are ' bullet' shaped, and are the most basic of our utility pigs.
They are cheap cleaning devices.
_They are lightweight and easy to work with and able to negotiate a
variety of pipe (differing diameters) and bend configurations (tight radius,
mi tre bends)
. They have a variety of densities of foam (very soft to very har d)
. They can be ' bare' (e.g. for drying a line) or contain metal or plastic
bri stles (for cleaning/sweeping a line)
. They are used for dryi ng, cleaning, batching. product removal
operations, etc..
_They are regularly used for air
removal prior to a hydrostatic test,
and dryi ng after the test.
Cp.....,...20011 ....... .
__G-.",""""""",,_
tt
6
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Spherical Pigs
Spherical pigs are usually polyurethane
globes. filled or infl ated with liquid
(usually glycol or lightweight oi l).
Sometimes we have solid spheres
They can negotiate very tight radius
bends, and ar e used for :
heavy-duty service in the removal of
liquid hydrocarbons and water from
pipelines;
bat ching;
hydrostati c testing;
Etc..
r--=:::::- -is Pheres
Sphere pigs should
never be run ,n
~ s tha I do not
have s.pe<:ial now
tees ,nstalled
ta
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Mandrel Pigs
. 'Mandrel' pigs have a central body lube,
cr ' mandrel' , and various component s
can be assembled onto the mandrel.
a This allows mandrel pigs to be used for
a specific duty, such as:
a batching;
a gauging:
. sealing; cleaning/brushing;
a etc.
a The sealing discs. cups, bristles. etc.,
can be replaceable
C"-2OOlI _ '
Mandrel Pigs
7
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Mandrel Pigs
_ Mandrel pi gs can use either a 'cup' or a 'disc' as the sealing element.
_ These elements are designed to allow the pressure of the line to seat the
outer seal ing surface of the cup or di sc against the internal pipe surface. to
ensure positive seal.
ec uos and discs are flexible, that all ow them to adapt to out- of -roundness
or varying internal pipe diameters.
Cups
Discs
C_2OOli_'
--".,,--,,--,--
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Solid Cast Pigs
_ Solid_cast pigs are moulded in one piece, usually from
polyurethane, and are a general purpose pig for
batching, displacement and routine pigging operations.
_ They are easy 10handle and have excellent sealing
capabilities.
_With the addition of brushes. they can also be used for
cleaning appli cat ions .
e v anous configurations are avai lable. includi ng:
. spherical ;
. cup.-type; and
e orsc-tvpe .
Solid Cast Pigs
te
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Bi-directional Pigs
a'Cup' pigs are unidirectional :
Cup pigs for
uni directi on al
operation.
Disc pi gs f or
bi -direct ional
ope rat ion.
_Bi-directional pigs have discs placed at opposite ends of the pig,
allowing them to be moved in either direction.
They can be used in the same way as 'cup' pigs; in particular, during
hydrostatic testing (for air or water remova l), or can be filted with:
_Brushes, for cleaning;
ealumtnlum or steel gauge plates, for gauging;
atracker devices, for tracking;
_etc..
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Gel Pig
_A 'gel' pig is a semi-solid chemical substance injected or placed inside a
pipeline usually to clean the inner walls of powder-like debris such as iron
sulphides and rust.
_These highly viscous pigs are sometimes called 'qelly' pigs,
_The gels can be water-based, or use a range of chemicals, solvents,
and even acids.
_Gel pigs are also used extensively to: remove water from pipelines;
debris pick-up; batching; inhibitor/bioci de laydown; condensate removal
from gas lines; removal of stuck pigs; line filling/hydrotesting; etc..
Gel 'pigtrain'
Drive
Fluid
Separator
Ge'
Debris
Ge'
linefill
I
Debris Debris Separator
Gel Gel Gel
9
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Batching Pigs
_ Satching pigs are used for batching or displacement processes, and
also for light cleaning.
_More cups or discs can be added to the pig where interfaces or
contamination are critical.
56" batching
p;g
ts
EXAMPLE OF BATCHING PIGS
C:"'""",,"2OOlI_'
10
EXAMPLE OF BRUSH CLEANING PIG
zt
EXAMPLES OF CLEANING PIGS/RUNS
__200II_'
za
II
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Cleanliness is
important!
_I n the earl y days (40 years ago) the major reason for cleaning was
increased flow throughput.
_ Even small irregul arities inside the pipe can cause turbulence in the
product fl ow. Turbulence increases fr icti on loss. reduces capacity and puts
an unnecessary load on the pumps and compressors.
THE USES OF UTILITY PIGS: Cleanliness is
important!
_ Now, pipelines are cleaned to: improve throughput; reduce operating
cost s; control corrosi on; remove obstructions; prepar e a line for internal
inspection, etc..
e lnternat cl eaning can remove liquids and sol ids that can promote
corrosion;
_ ror example. bacteria can thri ve under scale and sludge.
_ Many pipelines are injected with chemicals to preventsnfubit corrosion,
particularly when there is bacterial corrosion present
a aut. if the chemicals cannot modify the environment supporting the corrosion
(e.q. if the bacteria is under a srudge) they will not be effective, as most
chemicals have to contact what they are trying to control, so cleaning
becomes essential
_ The same cleaning requirement holds for a filming inhibitor that has to
be depos ited on a surface of the pipe to form a barr ier between the pi pe
st eel and the environment.
12
WHEN IS A PIPELINE CLEAN?'
_ Methods for determining if a pipeline is ' clean' include:
_ The cleanliness of the cleaning pig
_ The amount of debris collected in the fill er or strainer s foll owing a pig
run
_ The reduct ion of operating pressure
_ The increase in flow rate
ef moroveo product quality
_ A reduct ion in the consumption of compressor
or pump fuel
_ A successful corrosion inspection
_ The reduction in corrosion rat es of corrosion coupons
25
BENEFITS OF 'CLEAN"
_ A major gas pipeline operator has stated his company spent $800,000
cleaning a single 3D-inch pipeline.
_The flow efficiency was increased from 58 to 96 percent.
_Th is company saved $1.2 million in compressor fuels for the next
seven mont hs.
In anot her example, the project costs totalled S640,000. Of thi s,
5100,000 in capital was spent on pig launchers and receiver s, and
5540 ,000 spent for the cleaning operation.
_ A total of 344,000 Ibs. (156,364 kg.) of solids were
removed in 12 batch runs.
_ The pipeline efficiency was increased from
71 to 80 percent.
_ The savings were 5377,000 in compressor fuels
duri ng the first eight months.
l DW .......... _f-.....,, 2OOJ
26
13
PIGS: Putting Then Into Pipelines
PIGS: Putting Then Into Pipelines
Pig Trap - Receiver
.. ,.......... ..
Pig Trap - Launcher
"-'r. ' -aw-_ Il ""
t."v09"l_

C-.oe. 2Ol6 1l_ ' 28
14
PIGS - Putting Then Into Pipelines
Pigs are
inserted into
a pipeline
using 'pig
traps', that
are fitted with
doors
('closures').
They enter
in a
'launcher',
Theyleave
in a
'receiver' ,
ft+(
I I
Launcher
I I R . Ihll.1>t. m I
ccervcr
29
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS
15
FROM UTILITY PIGS TO INTELLIGENT PIGS
Early, pigs were all util ity pigs, and had
steel bodies and rubber, leather or
urethane cups or discs.
They were designed to 'plough', so they ______
were equipped with wire brushes. scrapers,
etc..
In the late 1960s, the intelligent pigs
were developed.
Intelligent pigs are designed 10trave l up to 600
mi les ( 1,000 km) in a single pass . but average
pipel ine sections are around 30 mi les (50 km)
long.
C_ 2006 _ ,
"
FROM UTILITY PIGS TO INTELLIGENT PIGS
We can have:
'free flowing' pigs
these are propell ed by the fluid, and are
tot ally self contained (on board
power, dat a col lection, etc.).
They do not interfere with flow
Sel f contai ned pigs thai are pumped
through a pipeline _____
These pigs require fl ow 10be regulated, ____
or a different fluid to be used
tet hered (or cabl e) pigs . that are
connected to a powe r supply or data
acquisition box via a cable.
These pigs can either be driven by
motors. or pumped thro ' lines. and are
used for unpi ggabl e' lines such as
loading lines.
16
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS - Many Types
MOST COMMON TYPES OF PIG
ARE GEOMETRYAND METAL
LOSS
GEOMETRY MEASUREMENT
LEAK DETECTION
TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE
RECORDI NG
BEND MEASUREMENT
PRODUCT SAMPl iNG
WAX DEPOSIT MEASUREMENT
METAl LOSS DETECTION
PIPELI NE PROFILE
MAPf' ING
CURVATURE MONITORING
PHOTOGRAPHIC INSPECTION
CRACK DETECTION
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG - Position Along the
Pipeline
e'ooometer' wheels measure
where the pig is in the pipeline.
_An 'odometer' is any device for
measuring distance
17
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS - Detecting
'Features'
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG - Specifications
T
s
35
I,,,,, ,...- - -:=':.<"="'
''''' '....
I., ...... .. ... "'
.
. .
' .'
.... .
--
- -_.
-- ...
........- -
........ ..,'..... ,--
.,.. .. .... ...
'-....., ..."".. "." ,....

-
... --- ._--_.__.._--
....""... _"''''-
,."1,,.,
....I"" ,

"". _ ",,c'p '''' v'
,-""' ''"'''',.. ..
1
0 \ . ,
...
I,:""".
I
""
, -on
'00< _ "',-
,
\ '''l ""
r I",,"'"
""" ..,."
......"' .....
\ 8
WHAT MAKES A PIPELINE UNPIGGABLE'?
Our older pipelines were built before intelligent
pigs were developed
Before intelligent pigs, internal access to/through a
gas pipeline was not a requirement, although liquid
lines needed some access - e.g. for cleaning.
So, many pipelines are not piggable. Reasons:
No pig traps
Bend radius <1.50
Mitre Joints > 10
Unbarred branch connectors
Reduced -bore valves
Diameter changes> 2" Main problem in USA is
Low pressures or flows unpiggable valves and
Mani folds unpiggable bends
Etc.
ALWAYS CHECK WITH THE PIG SUPPLIER
C_2006_,
THE IDEAL PIPELINE FOR A SMART PIG.?
Perfectly straight, from end to end.
Constant internal diameter, and no weld penetration.
Perfectly round.
Polished or epoxy coat ed inside surface,
No off -takes.
No valves or other devices.
Pumping light , unrefined oi l at a speed
of about 1 mJsec.
Q
- ---,------- - - - - - - - - --=
Therefore, unfortunately, not every
pipeline can be inspected with a smart
pig.
Always check with the pig provider,
to see if your pipeline can be pigged.
19
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS REQUIRE A VERY
CLEAN PIPELINE
If you are going to intell igent (smart) pig a pipeline it
MUST be very clean.
'Standard' cleaning pigs may not be suffici ent to clean a
pipeline pr ior to intelli gent (smart) piggi ng.
Thi s is because smart pigs such as MFL pigs have
powerful brushes/mag nets that remove residual wax ,
etc., left behind by the cleaning tools. These residue
can foul or destroy sensors.
Pigs using ultrasonic technology have problems as
residual substances such as wax can attenuate
their signals.
Theref ore, pre- pigging cleaning is often a special
progr amme (e.g it may require a magnetic
cl eaning pig 10remove fer rous debris) normally
carried out by the smart pigging company itsel f.
39
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS REQUIRE A VERY
CLEAN PIPELINE
20
CLEANED FROM THE PIPELINE
CLEANED FROM THE PIPELINE
Sa nd ,e""'_ad from pipeline
O_2JIj R...6i l
"
21
I
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG - Tolerances (Guide
Only)
Internal Diameter - Standard pipeli ne toler ances, but variable diameter pigs
are being developed.
Most larger diameter pigs can deal with di ame ter changes of 2-4"
Variable diameter toots are bei ng developed (e g 24/36", and 28/42" )
Bends - Most pigs can negoti ate 1.50 under certain conditions.
Mitre bends - atout tzv in angle (but check) Lf .G$.....
Forged Bends - it's best to have the additional materi al on the "\\\.."
outer diameter. :: ---:: ,
Bend Ovahty - 2% or less ....
Low pressures - below about 10bar (145psi) it is not possible to drive a
conventional pig without dangerous speed excursions
Off-takes- Intell igent pigs can negot iate 60%. Utility pigs can safel y traverse
70% (of nominal size) out lets. It's good practice to install guide bars for
greater than 50%.
Valves - Full bore, but some pigs can negotiate some reduced valv es.
But always check with the pig supplier.
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG - Operational
Restraints: 'Rules of Thumb'
Most intellig ent (smart) pigs have speeds within 1 to 10 mph (1 to 5mfsec) :
1-2m/sec for UT tools.
3-5m/sec for MFL
New pigs have speed control (this can reduce operational costs),
Uti lity pigs are 2 - 10 mph in liqu id lines, and 5 - 15 mph in gas lines.
Inertial mapping. with GPS wi ll eli mi nate above ground markers
Temperature:
Intelligenl pigs are limited by their electronics:
upper limit will be about 80 C and increasing
every year.
Utllity pigs are limited by the polyurethane
or elastomer seals: upper limit eccot 60 C.
Pressure:
Intelligent pigs have instrumentation sealed in pressure
tight containers which means pressure
restrictions: limit is 1000 psi, but many will be > 2000 psi ,
Utility pigs usually have no pressure limits.
But always check with th e pig supplier.
22
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS
Geometry
45
TYPES OF PIGS Gauging
_ GAUGING - We wi ll often use
simple, cheap 'gauging' pigs to
check the bore and profile of a
pipeline.
_These gauging pigs have
special plates mount ed on
board thai deform if they collide
with a rest riction.
arhese gauging pigs will tell us
of problems in the pipe bo re by
emerging with the plates denied
or damaged.
_H owever, t hey will not tell us
wher e the damage is, the
number, or its dimensions
23
TYPES OF PIGS Gauging
TYPES OF PIGS - Geometry the principle
_A 'geometry' pig is a 1001thai (usually) has arms (calipers) on board that
deflect when they pass through, or in, a restriction
Cup sl ee ve_
a- Odometer whul
Reeor ding unit
<,
Sensing whe<ll
"
TYPES OF PIGS - Geometry... 'Caliper'
_ Early geometry pigs were cali per
tools.
_ They used mechanical sensor s
('fingers'), and were aimed at
finding ' restrictions' in new
pipelines.
_The early caliper pigs could detect 3
to 4 inch deep dents or buckles".
_These tools would not provide o'clock
position
_ Most of these defects were in the
lower half of the pipeline due 10poor
ditch padding or failure to remove
skids.
C_ 2OOII _.
In the 19605. Ill e
hmlted number of
<:ahP&f arms.
meant only large
dents could be
detected.
Small or shallow
dents could be
missed
One of the first cali per tools
was TOW's 'Kauper' pi g
"' . __"'- c-..- _ , _ , _ .....
TYPES OF PIGS - Geometry 'Caliper'
_ API 1160 states that 'Caliper' (as opposed to 'deformation' tool s - see
next) tools measure deviations in the geometry of a pipeli ne's diameter.
_Changes in the pipe diameter geometry can be due to pipe bends, dents,
buckles, gate or check valves, or changes in wall thickness.
_Today, Caliper tool can use mechani cal arms or electromagnet ic meth ods
10sense the ovalil y of Ihe pipe.
ac euoer tools are used to veri fy that pipel ines are capable of passing othe r
tools such as corrosion lool s and 10inspect
for buckle s or dents in the pipe.
_Buckles and dents can be the result of pipe settlement during or after
construction.
_ See API 1160 for more informati on
50
25
TYPES OF PIGS - Geometry/Deformation current
tools
_ We now have many 'geometry/deformation' tools on the market "
_ The old cal iper tools have been replaced by tools that can locate
(distance, o'clock) and report dents of Q,25inch deep, and have a
threshold of O.125inch.
_ The old tools had their sensors (calipers) inside the cups of the pig. The
new toots have sensors out side the cup - in contact with the pipel ine.
' .. __OEP,
C_2006_' "' ........ _c.ro.- _"_ '-_,_
tools
_ The names of these tools has changed.
_ We now ref er to 'deformation' tool s that can measure very small
changes in geometry, down to a.Ol inch.
_ They are now high resolut ion with arms at - 1 inch spacing aro und
the pig, compared 108 or
16 arms in total on the
older pigs.
We now consider a 'cali per"
tool as a tool used to
meas ure the internal
diameter of a pipeline
A 'geometry' or 'deformation'
tool is a tool that measures
deformations in the pipe.
See API 1163
__Cli,'"
"_2008_'
26
tools
_These tools can pass through
large defor mations (e.q. 25% pipe
diameter)
_They can operate at high
pressures (2000 psi) and
negotiate tight bends (1.50)
DU"' gemn" lry
TYPES OF PIGS - Geometry/Deformation accuracy'
16" pipeline. Inspected 2000-2003
2 3 4
Predicted Dent Depth, % Diameter
3
c,
c
" 2
c
-c
1
,
"
o
.. .
."'
I
I
.-
I
I
Vendor' s minimum
detection threshold
Conservative
5
'" PO"""," 201)6R",,"" 54
' '''''" tho 0' '' s.., Boo E_ ... of '''''''''' .......'m.""'" "",",,,.,,' \'WM<r"" C"",,., c-""''''''' ""''''' S,,'" _ ""'''''' ""',
27
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS Mapping
_ Mapping tools are based on inertial
navigation, using built- in gyroscopes and
accelerometers, and they can establish the
geographical coordinates of the pipeline.
_ The information includes the coordinates of
girt h welds and is useful for creating pipeline
alignment maps, populating GIS information
syst ems, and determi ning pipeline ground
movement.
_ See API 1160 for further information
y
x
Z
Inertial navigation systems (INS)
TYPES OF PIGS Mapping
ss
_ Mapping pigs are based on inert ial
navigation usi ng gyroscopes and
accelerometers
. Geopig, developed by BJ Pipeline
Inspecti on Services , was the first on the
market.
_ II is a pipeline internal inspection tool that
provides complete pipeline geometry data,
including
_information on dents. buckles, wrinkles.
ovality, bending strain and pipe centreline.
_ It has an inertial measurement unit similar
10the type used in fighter jets to monitor pig
position and altitude, X, Y and Z co-
ordinates (tpitch, yaw & roll'), etc..
_ Many piggi ng companies now offer this
type of pig.
Geo::II>g in_geometry 1001. ~ _ caIopet
"'...... T.... lormolltlfl Geopig ,eplaC8<lm...,...., Iype
-.\>IDYOd10 be !eM eccu,altt <lOA10 popwr'"
de"" hnes.I....es """" as ..."" buoldup
28
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS-
Measuring Metal Loss or Wall Thickness
O_2OClli_1Io1
TYPES OF PIGS: Metal LosslWall Thickness Smart
Pig
_ Smart pigs came on the market in the
19605 to detect & size metal loss
(corrosion)
a'ruboscope & vetco.
Full circumferential 'MFL' in 1966
_ 1978 - 'high' resolut ion pigs
developed by BG in UK
_1 9805 - number of MFL vendors
increased
_ 1986 - pigs using ultrasonics arrives,
10measure wall thickness
_ 19905 - improved technology and
new products come on market
\- .;.;
~ t "
~ i "
Wl __~ c ..... _ , _ .. ."","_... ,_ "J_" __'__ ""_ '""' , __e-
29
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): 'MFL'
0 _ 2OOIl _"
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): 'MFL'
Magn eti c Flux Leakaqe . The pipe wall
is magnetised (saturised) by permanent
magnets. and any metal toss will cause
magnetic fields to distort . A detector
senses this distortion.
These pigs can run in either liquid or gas
li nes, and can measure losses even in thin
walled pipe.
Gives a rel ative (i.e. percent wall
thickness) measure of defect depth
The more sensors, the higher the
'resolution, giving better sizing of narrow
defects
30
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): Basic MFL layout
All pigs have differ ing layout s, but they all require:
A dri ve module
A module 10carry the magnets and sensors
A module to carry recording/pr ocessing equipment
A module to carry power (batteries)
A module to carry odometers
These modules can be combined, particularly on larger diameter pigs
Drive Magnets
Processing Batteries Odometer
module + sensors
c ........... """"_.
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS):
MFL Illustration
T... ..-.. ...... __.. _
......... 01< ....- _
_ <6 ...--- oas"'"""V"'"
at
Tl\anks 10Dave Latto @ BJ sevees.
62
31
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS):
Resolution of MFL Pigs
Standard resolution
Old type of MFL pig
Few (analog) sensors: every 40-150mm
No 10/0 0 discrimin ation
Detection/sizing threshold: - 20 300f0wt
High resolution
More recent tecnooioqv
More (digi tal) sens ors: every 1().17mm
10100 discrimination
Detection/sizing threshold: - 10% wt
Very high resol ution
Newest technology
More (digital) sensors: every 4-8mm
10/0 0 discrimination
Det ection threshold: - 10% wt
Sizing can be +/-5%wt
U
IW
Ire
>30% ? r
I ? I
[;10%

>10%
+/-5%
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Sensor ~ ~
Technology
In til e 1990s. Ihe sensors on MFL pigs started to change
Originally, MFL pigs used 'induction coil' sensors' , These sensors
measured the change in mag netic fields
Now, ' Hall-e ffect' sensor s are used that can measure the actual (absolute)
strength of the mag netic fiel ds.
These sensors coll ect flux data in the axial, radi al and circu mferential
directi ons
Hall sensors can check to see if there is adequate magnetic field saturation
(thi s is important: poo r magneti sation affects data quality)
The use of Hall sensors allows more sensors 10 be fitt ed to the pig, and
hence better resolut ion
- ~ _ _ ~ __,,,,,,,-,-_,,,,u ... _
32
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Fields'
( )
Uf#f
(J ,n 1: )
(Jt:;{)
Magnetic fi eld
Magnetic field disturbed by
defects with width, in this
orientation. Flux leakage -
decreases with decreasing
defect depth and width
Magnetic field not disturbed_
by defects with no width, in
thisorientation
Therefore, axial or narrow defects verydifficult to size/find
,_...... _-.. -_.. ""... ,
65
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Signals
:Si t . I, . fIJI
v- ... _ .... __........- ...
.. ...!,I.!eJ
I...... .... ' ""
r
---
'_b_.. ::-
--- .. ' _ ......
_ _..
.. ::- _ -
._------ __e-
1
33
Width (note- Estimat ing defect width
/
is not straightforward. This is because
the signal spreads in the
circumferential direction, and the
amount of spread depends on the
defect length. depth, and width .
-- .
Length
" " .
I . ' .. . ..... , .... ,,
T. ken ffom
V's,tttU$"'" for." eXC_l MFl ' Wlori3I
(courtesy GEPII)
Spiral weld
Corrosion
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): Accuracy &
Reliability
_The accuracy and reliability of
a pig is very important to us
_Remember.. . we rarely
assess a defect... we usually
assess a defect report.
_If the defect report, e.g. from a
pig, is unreliable, your defect
assessment is unreliable! ~
Reliability
69
~ ~
~
70
35
Reliability
"
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Accuracy-
'+/10% t, 80% of the time... 7'
% Conf idence (%Dat a Number of Standard
within t he st andar d Deviations fr om
deviati on s) Mean
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
50 0. 67
..
..
...
Da t a
ee.a 1
..
...1, n
" "
80 1.28

.. dev lilt ,on
90 1.65
!
'"
, n
95 1.96
.-
.
" " 95,4 2
\ I e
"
..
" . : n l H i
.
98 2.33
.l..- __
"
., ., . ,
, ., .,
99 2.58
STM"DARO DEVI ATI ONS
99.7 3
c:p........, 200II _'
36
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Accuracy -
'+/.10
%
t, 80% of the time?'
%
)
Low Resolution (LR) Tool (example) If this lR1001 reports a
Standard Deviation Sizing Tolerance %
50% wall thickness
(%wall thickness, t) (%wall thickness, t)
Confidence
defect, it wi ll be in the
depth range 3.2% (50
15.6 +/-20 80
x (3 st . dey. x 15 6mm)
15.6 +1-10 48
to 96.8% (50% x (3 st.
15.6 +/-5 25
dev. X 15.6), 997 time
in 1000 '
f this HR tool reports a
50% wall thickness
defect. it will be in the
depth range 26 .6% and
73.4%,997 times in
1000
High Resolution (HR) Tool (example) I
Standard Dev iation Sizing Tolerance, %
(%1) ("lot) Confidence
7.8 +1-20 99
7.8 +1-10 80
7.8 +1-5 48
"_ _ s ... _ ....-.. .__ ... _ "OI _
_ .... _ __
------..-
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Accuracy
3 0 2 0
,
1.0

25% +
previous detec tion levels :tl0%
10% I_I
XHR detedlOfl levels :t5%
",+ -
_ Data from 19905 four pig
vendors on 9 pipelines:
a venoo-A..
systematically oversized
depths by 1G-20%wt
_Vendor B... accurate on
2 pipelines (to +1.15%wt),
but systematically
undersized on another line
(20-30%wt)
everd or C.. . were
accurate to +1 15%wt in 4
pipelines
percent of wall
r::::-,---,------:-=::-,---_,---_'"i thickness
_ >tJ " _ . .. .. F_. _ '""I>W"II
__ .........-- _ _ ..-_..s-....
--
Defect lengthtWal Thickness
OoI<IIot'_"" ..... __oI_... l .... _
.....
_ """\I _ O*",,".
. ..
xI ....... ,' _ ...."........""
37
Raported depth ("tot]
"'"
//
""""""
' ''''''''
ec "

./
' ''''''''
60
Skll shaped
/
,,-
X
"
c
0
X
20 , 0
00 X
_ Data from 19905 :
_MFL pigs do not detect "narrow'
defects, due 10limited number of
sensors,
e,g, a wet gas pipeline failed from
smooth internal corrosion ( 1.5m in
length, 40mm 'Hide. 80%wt in
depth, by C0 2 cor rosion
_ The pipel ine had been
inspected 3 mont hs before the
failur e with an MFL pig. with
no detecti on of these detects.
a n eta analysis of defects in the vicinity
of girth welds is complicated due to the
magnet ic nux leakage signals of the weld
interact ing with the defect signals.
_ Data opposite shows a pig
oversizing defects in the vicinity of
girth welds
20 4(1 60 80
Adual depth (%11 "'"
s.. H J, M. Ja..-.. M \I F_ . I\"I8laIIoA _ <;rado.

TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Accuracy'
100 80
Staled eccu racy
. /-10%l 8O'lr. of the lime
60
Corrosion detects 00 e>ctemal wall

40
True accuracy
20 o
100 ,------------7-7--:"

80
60
-e
[
40
"
.g 20
j
Actual defect depth from fiel d excavation (%wall i hic kness, tl
It has been not ed that MFL pigs over-estimate deeper def ects, and
under -est imat e shall ower defects _._-.a. .....
38
(cont.)
100 80
-
-
Stated accuracy
+1-10%1, 80% of the lime
60
eorros.on defects on inlemal ....all
40
True accuracy
20 o
60
20
40 1:1
80 +/.18%1,95% oI lt1e time
100 ,--------------:7--:;>-'"
:to
-e
s
u
'0
I
Actual defect depth fr om fiel d excavation (%wall thi ckness, t]
C_2OOII"*"6-' T1
__ . ....o>-..._ O<....
TYPES OF PIGS (METAL LOSS): MFL Accuracy'
"
;. so
-e
! so
u
a. 30
a
"
o
.! 10
C
True il(curacy:
WT 95". of tIme
..
Actual ee reer depth '.om in fIeld inspect ion. '!lo WT
Me ' e l ro.... uused by COHO.'O" .
C"- 2006_'
00fW_"'__."....,'9 ... CM"o.J " _ .... J.l (;or' ........... E F_-.-
te
39
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS: 'UT'
0_1001I_',
TYPES OF PIGS: 'UT' FOR WALL MEASUREMENT
Ultrasonics - A transducer transmits
Transducers
signals perpendicular to the surface and
s=r=::::::::
receives signals from both internal and
external surfaces
These pigs can generally only run in liquid
~ . I
lines, but can measure losses in much
thicker walled pipes.
Gives an absolute measure of def ect depth.
-:=r=r=r;:::
I
r '.., J
~ _ I O O I l _
60
40
TYPES OF PIGS (WALL MEASUREMENT): 'UT
example
.J -J - - J
1- - -- -
~ ~
at
Di.1>D
I, Sw><!.(,fh.pal
t = = = = = = = ~
TYPES OF PIGS (WALL MEASUREMENT): 'UT
Sensors
Typical perf ormance:
Depth accuracy = +/- 0.020 "
95%confidence
Width accuracy= +/- 0.3"
l ength accuracy = +1- 0. 13"
Requires liquid couplant
10 /00 discrimination
Standard UT pigs will not find cracks
82
4 1
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS -
Combination ('Combi') Tools
C 2OJli_'
Combination ('Cambi') Pigs
_We can combine technologies on a pig.
_ For example, we can combine an MFL pig with a geometry pig:
Drive MFl Deformation
Odometer
module Tool Tool
83
42
Combination Pigs
--.-_.. ._<....... _-
. Metal Loss & 'Crack' Detection... 'TFI ' MFL
85
86
43
Metal Loss & ' Cra c k ' Detection TFI MFL
_We can have cracks in pipelines
. stress corrosion cracking. lack of
fusion in seam welds, 'railroad'
cracks, etc ..
_ Our MFL pigs could not detect axial
cracks or narrow axial defects because
of the orientation of the magnetic fiel d
_ However, at girth welds , high res. MFL
pig can detect narrow defects, as these
defects wi ll disturb the magneti c flux
_ If we turn the magneti c field around
90
0
, axial defects will distrub the
magnetic field

Transverse magnetic field
er
Metal Loss & 'Crack' Detection TFI MFL
TFI: Transverse Field Inspection
Uses MFl , but magnets are rotated 90
0
Hence. MFL is applied in circumferential direction
Data analysis can focus on seam weld
Gives full body inspection
Can also detect corrosion, but not as good as MFl
88
4
- Metal Loss & ' Cr ac k' Detection TFI MFL
_Therefore, axial or narrow defects can be
sized/found by TFI
. Bul lhe defect must have a width to allow
leakage of field
e 'rhererore it will not perf orm well on fat igue
cr acks and sec.
Magneti c field slightly -
disturbed by defects with
no widt h, in this orientati on
Magnetic field
-"- /
If
T
"
"
-'>-
Magneti c field disturbed by _
defects wi th length, in this
orientation.
89
- TFI Accuracy
---,
Pig run in
2001 and 2002
-
"
-_.-
("'" _ Length
!'"1-- - - --- - - ---1
2 5
- Depth
/'
.1_ /'
_ c__
./
./
./
-
-/
../
....
m
_w .. .
O_'I\lOlI_ 90
'1IoIIE_ -O-V-"''''''''r''_'"'_-w_ C__ __2003
4
TYPES OF INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS - Crack
Detection UT
O P. "".- 2006 R&<>6I'
UT CRACK DETECTION ('CD') PIGS: Principle
_ UT smart pigs designed to
measure wall thickness cannot
detect axial cracks, as they 'fi re' their
sound into the pipewall at 90 UT SENSOR
_Bul if we 'angle' the ultrasonic ,.;..""-----...,
sensors ' we can detect cracks
92
4
UT CRACK DETECTION ('CD') PIGS: Types
_We have two types of UT crack
tool :
auftrascntcs (1) - Requires liquid
couplanl , detects all types of cracks
(limits = depth 1mm, length 25-
SOmm). Available in di amet ers 28" .
a ut t rascntcs (2) - UT sensor is
mounted in couplant-fllled wheel* -
hence can work in oi l and gas lines.
Available i n =>30" diameter.
C Pon__
UT SENSOR
WHEEL
CONTAINING
LIQUID

93
UT CRACK DETECTION PIGS - Sensor Technology
_Ultrasonic tools operate by introducing an ultrasonic pulse into the pipe
wall at an angle such that it generates a shear wave travelling
circumferent ially throu gh the pipe wall as it is reflected off the pipe's inside
and outside diameters.
_ If the pulse encounters a crack, it is reflected back along the same path
and is received at the transducer.
By rotating the transducers by 90
0
, the tools can be modified to detect
circumferential cracks and crack like features.
_ See API 1160 for more information
Pholog, ap/1 of Michel Beller
94
4
UT CRACK DETECTION PIGS Examples
"""-
-
Schemati c of Pipelronix
(now GE-PII) crack tool
-_.. ~
Detection 'EMATS'
C_2006_.
96
4
Detection. .. 'EMATS'
Electromagnet ic acoustic technology (EMATl all ows ultrasound to be generated
in a steel pipewall.
-The EMATs do not have to be in physical contact with the wall.
el-lence, thi s technology does not require liquid coupl ant to transfer the ul trasound
into the steel.
_This makes it much easier to use in gas pipelines.
e'Ihe EMATs generate a compression wave of ultrasound:
. it travels through the plpewall and reflects from surfaces.
ethe returning echo produces a signal pulse in the transducer.
eas in tradi tional ultrasonic inspection. the time between firing pulses and the
echoes determines the remaining pipewallthickness
_EMATS can also detect coating disbonding
e_2OOI_
...........Iion 13""" '""" GE.f'lI_
Detection... 'EMATS' .".
_EMATS:.. Generation of Sound
. Apermanent magnet establishes a magnetic field in the pipewall
and a coil generate ultrasonic waves into pipe wall.
. The coil carries AC current at a 90
0
angle to the magneti c field
e'Mirrcr ' eddy currents start to flow in the pipewall
. Aforce normal to the pipewall is exerted on the eddy current s
. This force generates ultrasound travelling through the pipewall
97
The orignal EtJAT
$8Il$Ol' rf;OQUirOO a high
battery lo drive it.
mak.ing it impractieal tor
pipeline inspection.
Recenl advances in
transducer design have
redUODd power
consumption
requirements.
98
4
Detection 'EMATS'
99
Detection Eddy Current
Conductive material
O eail
_Eddy current - low frequency magnetic field
induced in pipe wall, inducing eddy currents.
Sensors time arri val of eddy current at back
wall. 36" gas tine model expected 2003.
When an AC current flows in a coil in
close proximity to a conducting surface the
magnetic field of the coil will induce
circulati ng (eddy) currents in that surface.
_When the eddy currents in the specimen
are distorted by the presence of flaws or
material variations. the impedance in the Eddy current
coi l is also altered.
_This change is measured and di splayed in
a manner that indicates the type of flaw or
material condition
100
5
MECHANICAL DAMAGE DETECTION PIGS?
",
MECHANICAL DAMAGE DETECTION PIGS?
-
.... _--
.__~ .. _...... __... J_ .' __T_.. _
......... __._. _--,- - .,.,..
-.. -. -------'---"-,.."
REUO\IEO
@@g
"2
_ Mechanical damage defects are denis, gouges, or
a dents with a gouge.
_ Dents can be detected and measured using cal iper
pigs.
_ New tools are coming onto the market to detect
gouges.
_ These mechanical damages can have associated
cold work and plastic strains.
Applied & residual stresses affect the magnetization
curve. which then affect flux leakage.
_ Similarly. plastic strains affect leakage
_Consequently, MFL signals from mechanical
damage defects are fundamentally different, when
compared with purely a meta! loss defect".
_ Note' " that the largesl componenl of MFL signa l
from a dent is due to sensor ' tift-off" as they ride over
the damage.
5
MECHANICAL DAMAGE: MFL Signals
_Met al l os s defects cause high leakage of flux:
_this MFL signal is of the order of 100s of gauss
_A gouge can consist of both cold worked material & rretauoss:
_Cokl work. alters the magnetic properties of the line pipe steel
_ It increases magnetic penneabil ity in the area 01the cerect .
causing a
decrease in magnetic fl ux
_ Metal loss increases fl ux leakage
_ Effed? The MFl signal from a gouge is of the order of 105 of gauss
_A dent contains residual strains
_ The residual strains win increase magnetic permeability
MFl
(gauss)
_ But a dent causes very low magnetic flux leakage
Metal loss 100s
_ Effect ? The MFl Signal from a dent is of the order of
Gouge 10s
105 of gauss
Dent 10s
_Noi se: The low MFL signals from dents and from gouges
Noise 2
are a problem, as the MFL noise level is about 2 gauss
-
O_.2OOlI_
._---
"3 ._--,_.. _---.. ._.,--,--
.. __________-=-
MECHANICAL DAMAGE: MFL Signals
_The flux leakage signals from gouges and dents tend to have small peaks at
the beginning and end of a damaged region,
_ but the signal s from removed metal have small valleys":
REJdO\lf'D
tlF TAI DENT GOUGE

_ Most mechanical damage defects are a
combination of gouges, dents, and metal loss.
_The amoun t of removed metal, a cri tical
parameter in assessing damage, can be
obscu red by the residual stresses and
geometry changes associated with dent ing
and gouging .
--"'.-
"s. _ _ """'_. ..........
",.
5
TETHERED/CABLE/PROPELLED PIGS
TETHERED/CABLE PIGS/etc
105
_ Some pipeli nes cannot be pigged using
the free flowi ng pigs, e.g:
_ Some loading lines
_ Some tie-ins
a t jnes with no traps
_These lines are considered 'unpiggable'
106
TETHERED/CABLE PIGS/etc
_ Remember, 'unpiggable' pipelines may also be uncl eanable
_Cleanliness may be a problem
....----
'"
TETHERED/CABLE/PIGS/etc
---.
_We can use pigs that are prope lled along behind an
electric meter, or are pumped thro' a line.
_They can travel many km, and come in most pipeline
sizes.
_These pigs will usually be attached to a power supply or
data acquisiti on box via a cable.
".
5
WHAT CAN SMART PIGS DETECT AND WHAT
THEY CANNOT DETECT - Summary
DEFECTS AND SMART PIGS (from API 1160)
(0 = DETECT, S = SIZE)
DEFECT
.
METAL lOSS CRACK GEOMETRY MAPPING
TOOLS TOOLS (caliper) TOOLS
TOOLS

"' FL SR MFLHR ur ur

CORROSION 0&8
1
D&S D&S D&S D&S NO NO
CRACKS - axial NO NO NO D&S D&S NO NO
CRACKS eire NO d
3
&s' NO 0&5
2
NO NO NO
GOUGE Detections but no discrimi nation as gouges NO
DENTS d
d&, d&, d&, d&,
D&S 0&,
LAMINATIONS d d D&S D&S NO NO NO
MILL DEFECTS d d 0 0 d NO NO
OVALITY NO NO NO NO NO D&S 0&5
5
'0'
I_No'DIOO""""m,,, ''' '''
J _ Lowoo" C3>o 0 Moo" Um,,""O, Un, ..;. " . 00'_
5 _ WTool " Eq",r-' W'n Ov..,tyM......."lI Ge.v
C p""""," 2OC6Rov6l.
2 _ "'o,M""""" ..-"" ..- """';"1190 Dog)
- L<>wo< c... $ ..-.. Lim,,,", 0.- So"""
6 lomiOldb'\' too""""'I"" mOW _ , ."" ,,,,, ,,"" "Yth. "" ""no,,,

5
'BEST PRACTICE"
'BEST PRACTICE" - USA
a Liquid pipeline operator s in the USA
inspect more than the required ' high
consequence areas'
a Metal loss defects are identified usi ng
high resolution MFL tools, accompanied by
a geometry tool
aHydrotesting** was also used:
a 13% of operators used hydrotesting
_ 69% used high resolution pigs
a During inspection of 163,000 miles.
approximately 1 defect every 10 miles
required remediation
MFL Geometry
IIFf +
69%% 13%
1 defect repair/10 miles
.. ... ... _
..-_""""*""__ .. "'C ...... __... . . ..

--".......-_-
5
'BEST PRACTICE-' - Western Europe
_Li quid pipe line ope rators in Western Euro pe
submit inspection data to ' CONCAWE' . In
2004,
_ 11% of the (now) 36000 km system is
inspected every year by metal loss pi gs.
_8% every year by geometry pig
_ 3% by crack detection pig
_ In 2003, 26% of the metalloss/crack
inspections were used in conjunction wit h
geometry pigs
_ There were no inspecti ons using crack
detection tool s only
_ Up to 2003, 21% of the 36000 km system has
never been inspected using pigs
11 % MFL 8% Geometry
1iIfIIIIt + 1iIfIIIIt
79%% 21%
113
(M'
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG STANDARDS
'"
5
American
Petroleum
Institute
ONACE'
_ 1111 ;., , '
ft< E CO RROSIOi'l SOCIETY
. "Standard Recommended
Practice, In-Line Inspection of
Pipelines", 2002
ASNT ILI-PQ-2005
. In-Line Inspection Personnel
Qualification and Certification",
ANSI.ASNT ILI-PQ-2005
. "In-Line Inspection Systems
Qualification Standard'. August
2005. Ed. 1.
. NACE RP0102-2002
NEW INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG STANDARDS
. AP11163
115
NEW PIG STANDARDS: API 1163
.API 1163: this document covers the qualification of in line
inspectionsystems. It assures:
_ Inspection providers make clear and uniform statements
describing their pigs' performance
. Pipeline operators selects suitable pigs for his/her
conditions
. These pigs perform correctly under conditions specified
_I nspection procedures are followed before, during and
after inspection
. 'Anomalies are described using common nomenclature
.The reported data and inspection results provide the
expected accuracy, quality, etc.
116
5
III Tool Operator and Data Analys t
Experi ence Train ing Educat i on
(mont hs) (hours)
Level 1 6 80 High school graduate
or equivalent
Level 2 16 160 As above
level 3 30 (Oper ator) 320 (Operator) >2 years at
36 (Ana lyst) SOO (Anatyst)
university/college
NEW PIG STANDARDS: ASNT I LI PQ 200S
_A5NT ILI-PQ-2005
_ Gives mi nimum requirements for the qual ification and certi fication of
in-l ine inspection personnel. Per sonnel are:
_Tool operators (field reviews of inspection data for excavations or
identifying lie in sites for multiple inspection passes
_ Data analysts (uses in-line inspection data for the detection of feat ures
and the positioning of those feat ures in the pipe line for report ing)
_The standard gives three levels of qualification:
_l evel 1 (b'a,neeJ
_ l evel 2
a t.evet 3
C_2OOI_'
NEW PIG STANDARDS: NACE RP01012002
_NACE RP0102-2002
_ Outl ines a process to plan, organise, and execute an il1-
line inspection project. It includes guidance on:
_Tool selection
_Logistical guidel ines
_I nspection scheduling
_Data analysis and management
cl_l'OOf>_'
'"
59
SHOULD I CONDUCT A PIG INSPECTION ON A
NEW PIPELINE?
BENEFITS OF A 'FINGERPRINT'fBASELINE'
INSPECTION
A final check on integri ty and quali ty
Claims under the pipeline's warranty
It also allows an operator to log
defects reported during the
inspection. On subsequent
in-service inspections these defects
can be ignored
A pig can detect a variety of different defects in diff erent orientations.
We could use the data from the baseline inspection, to help determine
corrosi on rates from later runs
There can be a long delay between testing and commissioning. This
increases the risk of corrosion being present in the pipeline at the start
of operation.
'"
''0
60
PROBLEMS WITH A FINGERPRINT/BASELINE
SURVEY
A pig can miss defects, or incorrectly
size them.
Can you 'compare' the results of a
baseline survey with a later in-service
inspection?
A pig can detect a variety of different
defects in different orientations.
However, the probabi lity of these defects. and
resulting failures, occurring are diffICUlt 10
quantify. and hence any benefit is difficult to Quantify.
The onl y pract ical way (and the only impartial way) that
the value of a basel ine inspection can be quantified is to
assess its effect on the integrity of the pipeli ne.
There will be occasions where a baseline will be useful. others when it
will not be useful
O_2OOIiRo.l>1
BASELINE SURVEYS - SOME GUIDANCE
New pipelines will contain some defects
API pipe spec allows some defects,
ASME 831 allows defect up to 10%
below nominal wall thickness from
transportation, etc..
These defects may have escaped
detection al tha pipe mi ll, or may have
been introduced during transportation
storage or construction.
However, someof thesedefectscan nowbe
detected by the new generation smart pigs
These pigs can detect defects below 10%
wallthtckness.
In a thi n wal led pipe line this means
that <1mm defects will be detected.
61
BASELINE SURVEYS - SOME GUIDANCE (c ont .)
In the extreme, a long pipe line that has been
superficially corroded during - say - storage.
and contai ns many thousands of small internal
corrosion pi ts. all below 1mm, will be
condemned by a fingerprint run
the smart pig will report 10,000s of
corrosion defects in the pipeline'
however, thi s pipeline will have passed
the pre-service hydrotest, contain defects
that are insignificant. and the defects
detected may be 'custom and practice'
storage/construc tion defects allowed by
ASME.
we only know about them because of the
new smart pigs , but they have always
been in our constructions.
BASELINE SURVEYS - SOME GUIDANCE (c ant .)
Old pigs would detect defects greater than 30% wt or later 20% wt .
Now, they detect <10%'u'Il.
Ther efore a pipeline that was fingerp rinted using old technology, ana
passed as 'defect free' (i.e. no defect above 20% wt ), may - on a new
run today - have 10,000s defects reported, all under 20% wt.
The defects are reportable usi ng new technology
Some may be categorised as severe if simple defect sizi ng and
assessment methods are used .
p ,peWa/I
Clustered profile
length
'"
62
BASELINE SURVEYS - SOME GUIDANCE (cont.)
There is a need to quantify the 'workmanship' level of defects on a
finger print run, otherwise perfectly acceptable new const ructions
containing 'custom and practice' defects, wi ll be the subject of lengthy
arguments between operator and constructor.
NACERP 0102-2002 stales:
'True baseline III surveys , Le. those conducted prior to or very shortly after the
start of service, offer a number of benefits that may sign ificantly reduce the
workload required following future surveys, but are not required:
PIG AND HYDROTEST COSTS
,,,
'"
63
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIG COSTS
_ The cost of a smart pig run will depend on the pig, the defects you want to detect ,
the length of the line, access, condi tion of line, et c__ No rules for esti mating.
_ The demand for smart pigs is great - suppliers may dictate cost
An estimate in 2004
from a pigging company
was :
' S1600/mi!e for high res
-$BOO/mile for low res
(ignoring mobilisation
I demobili sation costs)
CRACK WT
Pig type
GEOMETRY
D ~ = =
1
2.5
D.5
2U ~ ~ ~
1 .5
$1000/mile
3
OP-,,-,2005 ,..,G."
TO PIG OR TO HYOROTEST? - Can we pig?
INGAA data for USA gas lines:
Pigged 20-25%
~
Piggable with minor 25-35%
modifications
Piggable with extensive 2030%
~ I J V il.
modifications
' y
Not piggable 1520%
128
64
TO PIG OR TO HYDROTEST? - Costs?
In most large pipel ine systems (e.g. USA (oil and gas) and UK
(gas)) >20% of the pipel ines will be unpiggable
Cost ' US$/mi le
20000
15000
10000
5000
o
HITest
D Direct Assess
o Pigging
_The USA Office of Pipeline
Safety have estimat ed" (2001
prices) that:
_ahydrates! costs
$S,274fmi le (not including
repai rs).
_ Smart pigging costs
$3,210/mi le (not including
costs of modifications to
allow pigging)
_ (see next slide)
. , _ '_ . _ ... . ", " __ ... " J1<","", """"'"
.......... c. "'" __""" __
-' _. """"" ""9' """''''_...... 0... 'SP' 00-_. 'JS 00' """
129
TO PIG OR TO HYDROTEST? - Modifying for pigs
INGAA and AGA have quoted (2003) pipel ine modification
costs"
INGAA AGA
Si mple mod if ication (adding $11,7S0/mile'
launch & recei ve trap)
,
Major modificati on (traps, $76,SOO/mile'
pipe replacement, etc. ) "
Pipeline in urban area <$SO,OOO/mi le
(' LDC')
.. 40 mile Ime
, 10 mile line
II:> Po, ."., 200li R..6Jl 130
65
TO PIG OR TO HYDROTEST?
INGAA and AGA have quoted (2003) hydrotesting and pigging
costs"
INGAA AGA
Pigging/mile $3,669 $9,660
(not incl uding modifi cations) (long di stance (in urban areas?")
lines")
Hydrotesting/mile $29,700 $40,000
(nol including repairs) (long distan ce
(in urban areas)
lines)
Direct AssessmenVmile**** $15,000 $7-8,000
....
ExcavatIOns, e.g kr " e<1ficallOn. can typoeally 00$1 be!'oW!en 529.000 and S40.ooo
" ' Typocal l DC: shorter estaoce
Long dIstance line5 wiI typically be pigged between compressor stations. 50 miles
..... ......-. -.' 50!. ... <II" "'T 1200<1

_...... _-
e _2OOI_' 131
___ " ..... 0:..--. ....... _ ... ... ,.,.
TO PIG OR TO HYDROTEST? - Technical Illustration
DESIGN PRESSURE (72 pe,cent SMYSI
HYDROTEST PRESSURE ( 100 pe'cent SMYSj j
"
..
"
..

"
.. .. ..
2c1(Rt )" O. 5 (normali sed detect lengt h)
0_2001_'
'"
66
I NTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGGING - Using the Data
O_JOOS_'
SMART PIGGING - Some Defect Assessment
Considerations 1
Pigs cannot discriminate between all defects - there will be confusion
with some defect s. This may require excavation/uncovering for visual
inspection of defecti ve areas .
Work with the pigging company when interpreting data - they know
the data the best. Ensure you understand all reported feat ures. and
ask for further interpretation if there are problems .
When pigging companies are confused over a defect - it is your
responsibility to determine the most likely defect.
For example, if a report says 'manufacturing or mechanical
defect' you should be clea r which one it is.
Has the pipe a history of manufacturing defects (e.g. has the
pig reported many of these defects)?
_ Is the reported defect in an area where mechani cal damage
is likely to occur, e.g. heavily populated area, shared
corridor, pipeline crossing, etc.
When in doubt - investigate!
0_2001_"
'"
67
Considerations a 2
Pigs are not perfect ...
Always check with the pigging company reoreliabil ity. tolerances
(depth , length), etc.
Add tolerances onto the report ed defect sizes .. . if a defect is
reported at 20% wailihi ckness and the pig depth measuri ng
tolerance is 10% wall thi ckness, use a defect depth of 30% in
your preliminary calculati ons.
Pig companies may give you a defect assessment (an 'ERF') to help
you rank the defects' severity.
Check that the pig company has taken into account all stresses
(e.g. axial stresses), material properti es (e.q. your pipeline may be
low toughness) and defect interactions .
When in doubt - invest igate!
Considerations 3
Use ALL pipeline/inspection/operali onallhi storical data when
considering a smart pig defect report .
Compare your pig report with your pipeline map, and superimpose ~
defect locations.
Do defects co-i ncide with heavily populated areas (this would mean
high consequence of failures, and possi ble third party interference
defects) , at low points (could be corrosion due to water settling),
etc..
Are reported featur es near recent excavations (could be gouges), at
top of pipe (could be denting due to impacts), in field bends (COUld be
wrinkles), along long. seam weld (could be SCC)?
Use aU known inspecti on data when revi ewing pig reports -
previ ous inspections by other pigs may help current interpretations.
When in doubt - investigate!
C "-2001\1lft6',
136
68
Considerations 4
Location accuracies of pigs vary - check the pig company's
specification.
A pig run one year may report a defect at a one location . but in later years
another pig may report the same defect at another location - but irs the
same defect.
location accuracies are typica lly 12% from a fixed reference point
This means that if you have a pipeline feature that the pig can
easi ly identify (e.q. a valve or a 900bend) . it will be within +/- 1-2%
from this point.
E.g. if my defect is 200 metres from a valve reference point . the pig
should be able to locate my defect 10 +/-4m (for 2% accuracy).
However, if my only reference point is a Tee that is 2km from my
defect report , my accuracy is +/-40m.
Excavalelvisually inspect features that are potentially serious - e.g. if
you have a report of a part wall defect at the top of the pipe. and a
previous caliper run has found denting in that vicinity. you may have a
combined dent and gouge.
When in doubt - investi gate!
SOME CASE STUDIES ON PIGGING
O_2OOIl_l
''''
69
CASE STUDY 1 - Use all Data
_40 diameter, 0.344" wan-ttnckness. gasolene line

constructed in 1978.
_ Operating pressure at lime of accident =384psi
e c onetructeo at a depth of 4 feel , through an act ive
landfill site.
Operator's construction specifications did not
incl ude special requirements for pipeline
cons truction through landfi lls.
_Landfill material consisting of trash and other materials
ext ended to more than 10 ft deep at places unde r the
pipe line
_The section of the landfill where the pipeline was
located remained in use unt il about 1980, and was
officially closed in 1987.
_ Up 10 1980 additional debris was placed over the
pipeline.
_ At the l ime of the accident, about 8-10 tt of debri s
and earth covered the pipeli ne at the point of failure.
",
CASE STUDY 1 - Use all Data (cont)
_2 weeks before the accident, a recycle plant
near the pipeline began using an area over the
pipeline to generate and stockpile 'mulch' ,
_At the time of the accide nt. the mulch
pile height was 17 feet
_The centre of the mulch pile was over the
pipeline, and - 60 ft from the point of fai lure.
_ Aheavy vehicl e occasionally traversed
the pipeli ne right-ot-way while moving
equipment around the site.
_ Crossing the pipeline right -of-way
with heavy equipment and storing
materials on or near the right-of-way
were against an agreement between
the operator and the recycle plant.
'"
70
CASE STUDY 1 - Use all Data (cant)
_INSPECTION Oper at or ran a pipeline internal inspection t ool
("smart pig" ) throug h t he pipeline i n 1993 and found no
signifi cant anomalies.
_ SURVElLANCE - The aeria l pipeline patrol pilot noted the mulch
stockpile on the right-of-way dur ing pat rols, but did not beli eve this to
be of concern
_ He further believed that the appropriate operator's employees
were aware of the mulch pile on the right-of-way.
_VISUAL - 6 months prior 10 the pipeline failure, a 'concerned
citizen' living in the community wrote 10 her cong ressman and
expressed concerns about the safety and vulnerabi lity of the pipeline
in the landfill. Congressman wrote to the regional regulator (OPS)
asking that to address t hese concerns ,
_An inspector interviewed oper ator personnel and visited the
landfill sne.
_ No code violations were noted by the engineer .
_The visit by the engineer was made prior to the activities of
recyde plant and the mulch being placed on the line.
'"
CASE STUDY 1 - Use all Data (cant)
.Pipeline fail ed in 1998
evlsual examination of the pipe
segment revealed circumferential
buckl e def ormation on the upper
side of the pipe.
_No damage such as dents,
gouges. or corrosion was noted
on the outside surface of the
pipe in the area of these cracks.
_Cracking in the pipe was
consistent with stress damage
due to soil settlement underneath
the pipe.
71
aprobebrc cause of the pipeline
rupture was:
_Selllement of soil and
compacted trash underneath
the pipeline .
_ Contributing to the pipeline
fai lure wer e:
_ Act ivities of the Recycling
Centre, which subjected the
pipe line 10 additional stresses
at and near the site of the
rupture, and
_The fai lure of the aerial
pat rols 10report 10the
operator that recycling
activi ties were ongoing on the
pipe line right- of-way
CASE STUDY 1 - Use all Data (cont)
_ N.c,""'" 1....-..""" s......._.., 1I1'H
v,.. . _'"""'_
'"
CASE STUDY 2 - Use your Defect Assessment
Knowledge
,,,
_24",0.25", crude oil line, constructed in
1975. Pressure = 606 psi
1997, a MFL standard inspection tool
was run through the ent ire pipeline.
_Excavations were made allocations where
the tool indicated significant anomalies.
_ At the site where the pipeline ruptured. the
1997 inspection data showed an anomaly that
the contractor had interpreted as a "dent.
_The pipeline had not been excavated at this
location because the dent did not appear to
meet the repair criteria bei ng used at the time.
_ Repair criteria was .. repair if dent was :>2%
of the outside diameter of the pipe.
Failed in 2000. $7million costs
72
CASE STUDY 2 - Use your Defect Assessment
Knowledge (cant)
_The rupturewason thebOttom01the Pipe.
Transgranolar cracks thai had the appearance typical of fCi t igue progression were present.
The combined depth of the progressive cracks in the areas of ma ximum penetration was about
90 1095 percent of the pipe wali l hickness
. Pri mary and secondary orig in areas of fatigue cracking 'Here found at the edges of a dent in the pipe
wall.
_ The dent was consist ent wit h contact wi th a hard object although no hard object likely to have
caused it (such as a rock) was found during the investigation.
_ Numerous secondary cracks were in the vicinit y of the twoorigin areas.
_NTSB Concl usion: pipe
failed due to fatigue
cracking
_This was due to a dent
in the pipe that. in
combination with
fluctuating pressures
within the pipe. producing
high local stresses in the
pipe wall
'"
CASE STUDY 3 - Pigs will not detect certain
defects
_197 0 Gasolene pipeline. 28".
705psi operating pressure at location of
fai lure.
_An in-line inspection tool ("smart pig") was
run through this section of line in 1997.
_Anomalies meeting the operator's
criteria were excavated. evaluated. and
repaired.
- Noanomali es meeting their criteria
were reported in the area of the 2000
failure. so the pipe was not visually
examined at this location.
_Failed in 2000. S1 8mitlion clean
up/damage bill
P_oO'

'"
73
CASE STUDY 3 - Pigs will not detect certain
defects (cont.)
_The NTSB concluded the probable cause of the pipel ine
failure was:
_ Corrosion_low cycle fat igue cracking thai initiated at the edge of the
longit udi nal seam weld at a likely pre-exist ing weld defect.
a Contributing to the failure was the loss of pipe coaling integrity.
.....,. __....... -<1)
---.....,.-
CASE STUDY 4 - Pigs will not detect everything
a12.75", 0.2" fuel oil line. Built in 1972- 3
a1995: Inspected by a geometry tool & MFL 1001.
aThe data from the MFL inspection did not
corr elate well with field measurements for
either wall loss dala or odometer readings.
aThe oper ator deci ded to do an additional
inspection in 1997 using an ultrasonic
inspection (UT) tool
a 1997: Inspection using UT tool + pigger used a
cal iper tool to confirm that there were no
obstruct ions 10prevent passage of the UT tool.
_ After excavat ions , operator det ermined that
the pig inspection data correlated relatively
welt with field measurements
However, some locations had larger
corros ion than indicated by the UT
_Failed in 2000. $71million clean-up bill.
'"
74
CASE STUDY 4 - Pigs will not detect everything
(c ont)
_The pipeline ruptured at a wrinkle in a section of pipe that had been field-
bent during initial construction of the pipeline in 1971 and 1972.
_The deformation, or wrinkle, that failed was a single outward deflection of the
pipe wal l, commonly described as a buckle.
P82OC1_"""'"

CASE STUDY 4 - Pigs will not detect
everything(cont)
'"
acause of failure:
_During service, forces imposed on
the defor med area of the bend,
including the normal operating
pressure and therma l cycles in the
pipeline, caused repealed straini ng
and eventual cracking unti l the pipe
at the deformed area failed.
econtrtbutlnq to the magnitude
of the fuel oil release were
inadequate operating procedures
to ensure timely l eak detection.
_Suckle was undiscovered because
the data from the in-line inspection
tool were interpreted inaccurately as
represent ing e r-otece.
Pressure/Temp
",",,' PAR""" " , PB2OO'-o,,,,,,,
v;.;,..-,""' \'
75
DEVELOPMENT OF PIGS - THE HISTORY

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76
DEVELOPMENT OF PIGS - THE HISTORY*
Tubosupe
Formancn urGent" 'a l
Ilc \caling Cu . 1'1.:
Inld li::l.'nll'i g Ile\l:l"pmcnt
[Tubucopc - Lia nlug \\11.10), Mrs
"PH I W.S I %U
Development of
SHWr U : lt
machine Til"
1'J."1l
Development
" n pipdint., ..crappe r
lIfi()
I>cHl upmcnt nf
foa m pi g " Pul l pilt
nor IIp,, n,, III lin usc r
Cloc k Springs
.v ppr ova l of I S "alural
G'l" Pipeline S,.f<:ty . \ (1
Dn cl npmCllt of sec I Ll
1. wl, 91)' .. \
1';'IS
19sn
1989
Brilhh Ga..1 BMflle a\\C"m,'lll or
manrri al prepcrue.. & f3i1U rl', 711' ..
0(' , etopmcnt (If I 'h nl \ onk
----, (101(j'IIn-Ernn i, ), SO',
First in..tallarion (If
Clur k Spri ng "
Ih-nlopnll'nlof l' el roSleen ' 1I
repair- techniques
\C1I Safdy Hill
appruved hy I S Se nate
Penspen 2006 Rev6/ 1
' Mo Mohitpour et at. T rends in Pipeline Integr ity Inspection And Rehabilitation Techniques', Proceedings of
4th Internat ional Pipeline Conference September 29-0 ctober 3, 2002, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, Paper
IPC2002-27035
PIGGING TO MAINTAIN EFFICIENCY
Consider a 12
R
waterl ine:
If inside diameter is reduced by
5% ( 15mm), the loss of
throughput is 10%.
To bring the throughput to the
original level would require an
increase in pressure of 30%.
If deposit was uneven, resulting
in turbulent flow, effective
reduction is 15%.
Throughput would be reduced by 35%.
Increase in press ure to overcome losses would be 140%.
On the BP Amoco Forties pipeline. fricti on increased by 4.2% per day if
the pipeline was not pigged.
C_ 2005 _ '
" 3
MFL PIGS - 'SATURATION' and 'LEAKAGE'
Steel can carry up to a 1000 times as much magnetic flux as air or liquid
:/
-.
I -.
/ /
~
Magnets on pig When there is a reduction in t he Hence, the flux leaks
saturate the nominal p'pewan, the flux density would
out to the air, and
pipewatl. have 10 increase in the reduc ed sensors on the pig
The nominal wall can prpewall - but it cannot as it is
detect this leakage.
carry no more flux saturated .
co .......... 200II ~ w ,,..
77
OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS - MFL PIGS
WAll THICKNESS
The MFL pig creates magnetic flux through the ouewsn
the pipe steel mu5l: be saturated ""til magneli(: nux to allow inspection.
the Ii&Id level woll reduce as !he wall thitkness onctea1l6s.
l'M:!noe l here is a max imum walllh'clcness that can be satisfactorily ;nspeded ThICker ....all ,..;11 not be
seneaied
Magnetic nux pigs are limited by walilhickness.
Typically up to 18 mm wali l hicknes s up 10 16 in. diameter, arid 30 mm for greater than 16in.
SPEED
When the pig is stationary. we have the ma ximum mag netic flux level in the pipe wall .
As the pig's speed increases, t he flux level reduces due to t he effect of secondary magnet ic
fields arisi ng from eddy cu rrenls induced by t he mot ion
HISTORY
The first run by an MFL pig can give different mag netic field levels compared wit h later runs
because of magnetic ' hysteresis'.
In general, the Ii rst pass induces higher field levels than later runs,
For very thick wall (I'.ith low field levels), an inverse history effect has bean observed more
passes may be needed to achieve an optimum,
SIZE
There are MFl pigs on the market that can inspecl 6-56in diameter lines
Most can detect general corrosion, pittmg, girth weld cracking. and dents
Can detect metal loss down to 10% wall thickness, Of smaller
C_ 2II06_,
PIG TRAPS Details
_ Pigs are launched and received in 'traps'
_ ThoS(! are usually made out of pipe 2" diameter above the pipeline size.
_ Smart pigs are longer Ihan utility pigs and need longer traps
_ Traps shoold be able to pig with about 05 metr e clearance at pig door, and 05 metre
ceereoce at valve.
_Launch trap mu st be able to take full length of smart pig, therefore the 'barre!' length is cnncal.
eneceoe trap must be able to accommodate the pog berweentne last valve and the end of the
'reducer', The plg should flOItr avel up the barrel. as it loses propulsion in larger dlameter Hence
the length of the reducer plus distance to valve weld is cotcai.
_Valves around pig trap must be and seated' If they are paSS1f"1Q gas/oil . the p'9ll,ng
cannot commence Check all valves'
_ Traps reee 10be purged ....\h nltrogen. Have a (say two boItle) supply lor each pig run avaIlable.
_Assistance wiI be needed \of pig compan....s at pog trap Sll e 80lh in terms of cranegatworl<shop lor
lofunwmaonta"'ng the PIlls. and operabOnal s.uppon 'MIll aod tacilil.teS,
_ Pogs need to be cleaned. Steam dearw-og or hogh pressure water needed
_ Beware of pig trap debns - it can be tolOC and inflammable, or radooactrve, or etc...
is
78
POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES
CPorsor 2006_ '
'"
POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES
.- ,
)
'"
.-
_ Gas pipelines will contain 'dust' from construction, etc..
_We do not want dust in our gas stream - it will block filters and can
damage compressors.
_ It can also block the passage of pigs. or foul pig sensors
--'
_Some 'dust' is caused by corrosion and/or the ~ /..
presen ce of sulphur in the gas: ~ $ ' .. I.
II,
. 'Black' dust (see next slides) .
'Yell ow' (elemental sulphur ) dust
_ This is not well understood
e venow dust is deposition of elemental sulphur due to desublimatioo of
sulphur vapour in the gas stream. Pressure reductions can cause the
powder to form. This sulphur can be in very small (etppm] quennuea in
the gas .
_ The Australian organisation - APIA - is conducti ng research into this
type of dust
79
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES
_ Some 'dust' is gas lines caused by corrosion or the
presence of sulphur in the gas
_ Slack powders (usually iron sulfid es and oxides)
are known to be created inside natural gas and other
similar wells and pipelines.
_Hydrogen sulphde and sulphr are the major cause
of bl ack dust
_The components and conditions necessary to create this dust can be
found at some point in many pipeline s. Some form of iron sulfide is known
to be created by either of two mechani sms:
a ch emt ce! react io n of constituents present in the pipeline, usually hydrogen
sulfide. and
eml crcbt et assimilati on of chemical constituents in the pipe and the
production of both iron sulfides and pipe wall pitting,
_ The iron oxides are created from subsequent oxidation of the sulphides.
or by direct oxidation of the iron in piping.
'"
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES'
_ Slack Powder is a generic name for small particles of ferrous corrosion
by-products.
_ The material may be wet and have a tar-like appearance, or it can occur
as a dry, very fine powder that is almost like smoke.
_ Slack Powder can be any of seve ral forms of iron sulphide or iron oxide.
_ It may be mechanically mixed or chemically combined wit h any
number of contaminants such as water, liquid hydrocarbons, salts.
chlorides , sand and dirt .
'Black powder"is often used as a generic term for debris consistingof a mixture of
iron oxides, sulphidesand/or carbonates. The industry normally associates this
black powder as debris is gas lines. but its main constituents are present in other
lines. The typical causes of black powder are:
-Direct chemical reaction of transported fluid componentswith pipe alloy.
-fnerrecuve removal of mill scale from newpipe during pre-commissioning.
-rmproper dewatering, drying and/or lay-up of pipe during pre-commissioningor
remedial works.
_ $ --. _ .. o.on.R_R_E.......... ...._ .... O"_._2OOI pTT
C""'""""" 2001 R_' 160
....... __,....."... " ........ "" ... <;MR<; ........ GUC_ 0.:- ' '''"
80
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES
a s ome pipelines have black powder

problems and others do not.
_ It appears that those lines that do
not have the black powder problem
belong 10smaller companies who
do not cover a large area and whose
opera tions are cl oser to the distribut ion
end than 10 the gat heri ng end of the pipeline , Black dust on16- cleaning pig
_ Slack powder is claimed to have occurr ed in both "dry" and "wet" lines
_ Even in parallel lines, one can have the problem and. the other not .
_A report by the Gas Machinery Research Council (R M BaldwinBlack
Powder" In The Gas lnoustry - Sources, Characteristics And Treatment',
GMRC Report No. TA 97-4. 1998) stated
. 'We have not identified any pipeline to date which has been able to
eliminate tne black powder problem once started.'
_ It is not well understood.
te
HOW IS BLACK POWDER FORMED'?
_ Black powder is formed from a chemi cal reaction between the ferrous
pipe alloy and constituents of the product
_ Microbial action can aid the chemical reaction
_ Hydrogen sulphide, carbon dioxide and water can contribut e the
formation of iron oxides, sulphi des and carbonates
- H
2
S is common in gas gathering lines. but is reduced in transmission
lines after processing the gas
_ The presence of oxygen can increase corrosion and create oxides
_ The presence of wate r is important to aid the prdiuct ion the the powder.
_ Sulphate reducing bacteria and acid producing bacteria can cause black
powder
Int ernal coat i ngs on a new line can prevent black dust in
service
11_2006_""
'"
RI
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES: Cause
_ Black powder is very common in gas pipelines all over the world. and
can cause wides pread problems in equi pment fouling and flow reduction"
_ It is caused by":
_ Sour gas service: high revers of H
2
S cause formation of iron
sulphides
_ Moisture: water in wet gas, or left over from the hydratest leads to
the formation of iron hydroxides and iron oxides
_Mill scale deterioration : in older and uncoated pipelines mill scale
may be poor quality and it can disband during manufacture of the
pipe. Often in combination with moi sture, this can accumulate in
cracks and pores in the steel, and lead to black parti cles.
Black powder presence may also increase corrosion rate in a line by offering a
suitable environment for SRBs to thrive in, or by preventing corrosioninhibitors thai
are dosedinto the gas streamfromreachingthe surfaceof the metal surface in
order to protect it".
. ........... .......... ,_<--.,__c-.
e-_'..... _w_.. _
.... ""'" ":>s.'"
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES: Effect "
_Slack powder can:
_ Reduce the efficiency of the pipeline
. Ieads to flow losses in long pipelines
. clogs instrumentationand valves;
_ Reduce gas qual ity;
_ Fouling/damaging/wearing of equipment (turbi ne blades), filters,
etc.:
ereduces erncrency of compressors
_ Fill defects and as they are made up of ferrous materials they can
mask the true extent of defects detected by MFL pigs.
_ Fouls intelligent pig sensors and builds up in front of the pig
The weight of smart pigs such as ' MFL' pigs, combined with the small
clearances and strong magnetic fields make these tools particularl y
prone to becomi ng 'clogged up' with Black Powder "
' OJ
C-'-2OOli 1l_,
.... _ _ ._..... _ .. ... ._.e- _ ".,. . ,.. "
-.. e- __,__e-'....". T ~ __~ e
'"""- ""-"'-----
'"
H2
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES: Removal "
_ Black powder problems can be solved by:
_Mechanical pigging
_ Gel cleaning
.Filtering
esurtactanr- cleaning
C _ 2006 -.tol
.... _ ._F..,..,.... .._ .. & O" __ ~ ~ 1
REMOVING BLACK POWDER"
_It is benefi cial to use a combinati on of several cleaning pigs in a long
train, separated by a fluid (e.g. a gel ) to suspend and transport the debris
that the pigs leave behind
_Another very effect ive method of removing the powder is cleaning with
inhibited acids
_ But this method produces toxic H
2S
and dispo sal of the acids may
be difficult. and
_ Is not practical for long lines with extensive debri s.
Brush or scraper pigs can remove the black powder by loosening it, and
pushing (bull doze) it along the pipeline.
However, due to t he specific gravity of the powder, and if it is in high
volumes, the pigs may ride over a lot of the dust, leaving much behind.
"ll Do,,,,,,,, A-.....tlaro... "'l8lo<._.wO->OP_.... OcIo"",:IOO5 ,J'
'"
"6
83
BLACK POWDER (DUST) IN PIPELINES: Control
_It is usually controlled/reduced by
filtering the gas
_Some pigs claim to remove black
dust
_New method of controlling the
powder is by injecting a chemical to
eliminate the dust
'"
Dust on 12"
HOW MUCH BLACK POWDER CAN BE IN A GAS
LINE'?
_Slack powder can be in a variety of forms; dust, flakes, molasses,grease
or wax.
_Slack powder can be extensive, and theamount removed can be
measured in tonnes rather than kg. A case study' quoted 127 kgJkm (450
Ib/mile) of debris removed from a pipeline
_Two case studies" quote the removal of 20,000 and 60,000 kg 44,000
and 136,000 Ibs) of debris
_Another source quotes up to 226,796kg (500,OOOlb) of black powder
rmeoved from a pipeline using 'physical' methods'?" . This suggests that
purely 'chemical' methods to remove Black Powder may be impractical
Gas specifications for H
2S
, CO
2
and water can be quite 'lenient'
Just 1ppm of H
2S
in 10MMCFD gas can produce 363kg of black powder in a year"
. ..... """"" ,,'""' _ t><._= oJ'
..' _''''''''''."'"" ChoTI .. ,,'""' __ """''''''' . "
. '00<<< " ,," Goo _ .,"" '"""' _"'- ,_. -"""""
CJor..., """"' ""c..... _ .,,,,,. ,.. ..
84
BLACK POWDER: Summary
_ In many cases, black powder problems are considered a way of life that
has no solution and therefore is accepted as one of the problems and
expense s of doing business.
- Once you have a black powder problem, it may not be possible to
solve it..;
_ The formation of the powder can be mitigated by':
elntemal coatings on the pipeline;
. Reducing the concentrations of H
2
S and CO
2
in the transported gas;
_ Swabbing the pipe interiors with btocldes and/ or cor rosion inhibitors.
_ The powder can be removed by a combination of mechanical pigs and
debris-suspending fluids"
This pig/fl uid combination involves a train of several pigs and fluids
MANAGING AN INTELLIGENT PIG RUN
Technologies:
choose from MFL, ultrasonics, etc..
choose resolution
Track Record and Cost:
assess thi s using past users, or seek speci alist advice
Pre-surv ey Meet ing:
establish need and notify pig suppl iers
line Proving and Cleani ng:
pigs to chec k gauge (to prevent pig jammi ng or being damaged)
cleaning pigs (e.q . a magnetic-cleaning pig to remove ferrous debris prior to a
MFl run, or wax cleaning) - BEWARE THE STUCK PIGI
Time:
the results of a geometry survey may only take several hours but the results of an
intelligent pig run may take several weeks.
Some smart pigging companies can give you the 'top' defects within 48 hours
"0
FINDING PiGS
Pig SIGNALING: a method that indicates when a pig has
reached a certain point
e.g. a lever
You will need a pig signaller at the launch and receive locations
. 8 9 an intrusive level thai the pig lifts.
Pigs can cont ain a magnet or radi oactive source that can be
detected externally (non-intrusive)
Pig LOCATION: a method to determine where a pig is
e.g a transmitter in the pig, that can be located using a receiver
Pig TRACKING: a method that follows a pig along a line
e.g a series of transmitter s. or acoustics
IN-LINE INSPECTION - KEY DECISIONS
AND FOLLOW-UP SERVICES
How ofle n
10inspect?
>-
o
w

f-
(j) When to inspect?
Wh ich line 10
inspect first?
,
,
Whi ch pig
to use (Qualiry, reliability,
accuracy, cost;?
Wha t do)'OU
want to detect?
Safety Assessment (of
Current Operal/Ol1
or Uprating. Revalidation)
(fJ
W
o
ii:
w
(fJ
C_2006_,
Fitness-for -purpose
Assessment of Defects Detected
and Future Inspection NeedS
\
Whallo do WIth
Defecls not detected
86
PIG MARKET AND SUPPLY
In the utility pigging and service portion of the industry, there are probably
less than 50 compani es worldwide.
In the in-line "smart pig" port ion, there are only 5 or 6 major companies
providing the most advanced pigging technology and services.
The world market for both utility and smart pigging is estimated 10be >$550
million with the smart pig portion being an esti mated $450 million.
J C Cakl ",el l, 'PIggIng world '
Pipe LIM Are na, Marcl1 1009 Vo1. 82 No 3
The Inter state Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) esti mates that
25% of the USA natural gas system has been intelligently pigged since these
pigs became generally available in the 19805
Half the Class 3 and 4 gas pipelines in the USA are not piggable without
extensive retrofits,
.. lnle9"'YManaQ"""",1 ,n HoQh ConHQYeOCeAJeas'. Dod<el RSPA.40- 1666. us DOT. June 2001
PIG MARKET AND GROWTH
Metal loss pigs.
31000km Western European oil system
www.concawe.be
5000
Km surveyed/year
6000 .,,-- - - - - - - - - - - - 19% of system
inspected in this year
<,
4000 .jj--- - - - - - - - - - ffl l-- - --j
3000 -JI-- - - - - -----jUL-
o
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
2000
'"
87
I
OPERATIONAL PROBLEM STUCK PIG
Pigging companies wi ll ask ope rators to be responsible for t e l f

pigs , once they have laun ched them into the pipeline.
_ However, pigs can st op in a pi pel ine and cause problems - this
can lead to liabil ity arguments.
_ Soth the operator and pigging company ~ I
can be at fault, dependi ng on reasons ~ ~ ~ ~ > t
for the pig
being stuck.
20"cleaning pig st uck in line
e'There is a difference between a 'stopped pig' and a 'stuck pig'.
_ A 'st opped' pig may be due to a pressure drop, or slight reduction in bore in the
pipel ine
_ The stop ped pig can be made to move by relatively mi nor changes to pipe line
or pig parameters (e.q . increasing t he pressure)
_ A pig ca n be 'st uck' as a res ult of :
. pipeline bore reduction - gauge/profi le/dummy pigs are run to prove the
pipeli ne bore, to pr event this. Examples of liability:
_ if this ' provi ng' is done by the pigging contractor, the stuc k pig is thei r
prob lem,
_ if the pig is stuck in a half opened valve (opened during pigging by the
ope rator), it is the operator's problem,
_ gas flow con ditions - the recommended flow rate s should be maintai ned with
adequate diffe rent ial press ure before/behind the pig,
_ a pig fault - pigs operate in a host i le environment and can be damaged - main
items that cause prob lems are typi cally cups and suspension
whee ls/assemblies .
Pigging compan ies wil l produce many excu ses to minimise their liabil ity in
this case
'"
88
_ This problem is avoided by runninq".. .
_cleaning pigs through the pipeli ne first, followed by
8 ...
_gauging pig fitted with a deformabl e metal disk of the
same diameter as the inspection pig. The gauging pig
can also be followed by...
_a profiling pig, which is again a deformable simulation
of the expensive inspection pig.
_If these pigs pass through the line without
damage, the inspection pig wi ll also.
C_2tll6_,
r-see GE-PII webSltlfs 'faqs'l
_If a pig does get stuck it can sometimes be
dislodged by
-I ncreasing the pressure across it, either by raising the
pressure behi nd it or reducing the pressure in front of it.
- Sometimes it can be freed by sending another 'rescue
pig' behind it to push it out, assuming the problem is
damage to driving seals on the original pig.
_The final resort is to decommission the line and cut
the pig out
m
'"
89
-r
DO MFL PIGS DAMAGE INTERNAL PIPE
~
COATINGS?

_Magnetic inspection pigs are heavy and fitted
with steel brushes
- These brushes may look like they would
scrape internal coat ings off a pipewall, they do
not.
_The pig weight is spread over thousands of
individual bristles, and as a result the 'point
loadings' are small.
coPon"""n 2000 R",I1
H9
see the GE-PII website for more QuestIons 8. answers
DO MFL PIGS PERMANENTLY MAGNETISE T ~
PIPELINE? ~
_After inspection with a magnetic inspection pig,
the pipeline is usually left in a state of low level
magnetization.
_This can affect welding, if a section has to be
cut out and replaced.
_ In this case, de-magnetising procedures are
available to overcome the problem.
'80
90
SMART PIGS REPORTING & I MMEDIATE ACTIONS
- API 1160
_ REPORTING - API 1160 suggests "final'pig report should be with operator WITHI N 6 MONTHS
_ IMMEDIATE REPORTING - However, some defects should be reported as ' immediate concern'
in a ' preliminary' report WITHIN 30 DAYS if they are:
eoerecte of depth >80% of nominal wall , regardl ess of length
_ACTION These defects will require further monitoring. leak clamps , pressure
reductions, etc..
_The failure pressure of reported defect is less than Maximum Operating Pressure of
pipeli ne
_ ACTION Pressure reduct ion may be needed (with similar reduction in pressure relief
devices, etc.), etc..
_Top of the line dents (between 4 and 8 o'clock) with any indicated metal loss
_ACTION Pressure reduction may be needed (with similar reduct ion in pressure relief
devices. etc.), etc..
_Any other 'sign ificant" defect by a criteria of the operator
_ IMMEDIATEACTIONS - These actions are based on the in-line i nspection report. and NOT
excavation
_ We cannot wait for excavation to confirm or otherwise these serious defects
_ These temporary actions must be in place WI THIN 5 DAYS of receipt of the preliminary pig
report. They remain in place until excavation and assessment is completed.
_ The actions remain in pl ace until permanent measures are put in pl ace WITHI N 30 DAYS
of receiving the prelimi nary report
'"
SMART PIGS REPORTING & NONIMMEDIATE
ACTIONS - API 1160
_ REPORTING API 1160 suggests 'final' pig report should be with operator WI THIN 6
MONTHS
_ IMMEDIATE REPORTING Some defects should be reported as 'immediate concern' in a
'prelimin ary ' report WITHIN 30 DAYS (see previous slide)
_Other defects must be evaluated, repaired. etc.. within 6 months of receipt of the final pig
report if they are:
e beu s with metal loss or containing welds
_ Top of the line dents (between 4 and 8 o'clock) with depth in excess of 2% pipe diameter
(=>12" diameter pipe) or 0.25" 12" diameter pipe)
_ Dents with depth >6% pipe diameter
- Gouges Of grooves of depth> 12.5% nominal wall thickness
_ The safe operating pressure of reported defect is less than Maximum Operaling
Pressure of pipeline as calculated using a safe procedure, e.g. ASME 831G.
_ Metal loss of depth> 50% oominal wt a f()(eign line crossing
_ Metal loss of depth> 50% nominal wt Withsignificant circumferential extent (I.e. liable to
failure under axial loading)
_ Weld defects of depth> 50% nominal wt a foreign line cros sing
_Possible cracks, that on excavation are cracks
_ Selective seam weld corrosion
'"
91
r:
DEFINITIONS
C ~ O O I _
DEFINITIONS: 'FEATURES', 'ANOMALIES', etc..
_ ANSIIASNT ILI-PQ-2DD5, NACE RPD192-2002 and AP I 1163 give
guidance on terminol ogies in pig report s:
_A 'feature' is any object detected by an III tool during the performance
of an inspection run. A feature may be an anomaly (see next bullet ),
valve, nearby metallic objects, etc..
_An 'anomaly' is a possible deviation from sound pipe material or weld.
"Mel al loss' is any number of types of anomal ies in pipe in which metal
has been removed from the pipe surface. usuall y due to corrosion or
gouging.
"3
184
92
DEFINITIONS: 'DEFECTS' . 'IMPERFECTIONS'
_ANSIIASNT 11I-PQ-2005, NACE RP0192 -2002 and API 1163 give
guidance on termi nologies in pig reports:
_ An 'imperfection' is an anomaly in the pipe that will not result in pipe
failure at pressures below those that produce nominal hoop stress equal
to specif ied minimum yield strength of the pipe material. That means an
anomaly with characteristics thai do not exceed accept able limits
_ A'defect' is an anomaly for which an analysis indi cates that the pipe is
approaching failure as the nomi nal hoop stress approaches the specified
minimum yield strength of the pipe material. This means an anomaly with
dimensions or characteristics that exceed acceptable limits.
0_200&_,
'"
SETTING A SAFETY MARGIN HYDROTEST AND
OPERATION
A-40%WT
OEFECT
COULD
SURVNE
A-20% WT
DEF!=CT
COULD
SUR IVE
Margin
ct si ze
'X
Margin
Safety Margin
Safety
tres s
On defe
IX
Safety
0",
OPERATION
AT 72%
SMYS
HYOROTEST
TO 100%
SMYS
So, we'll only accept defects in our 72% SMYS line mat will survive 100% SMYS (hydrotest)
C_2006-.n
'"
93
METAL LOSS INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS -
Performance and Data Interpretation
METAL LOSS INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS - MFL
& UT
MFL:
Diameters up to 56"
Velocity best u.s-anvsec
Pipe/wall thickness>15
Max wall thickness
<=10" diamete r. OS"
>10" diameter __1 to 1.5"
Range:
Up to 150km for =<10"
diameter
Between 140 and 800km for
>10 " (seamless is less, and
large diameters are lowest)
Location-
Axial is +/- 200mm from ref
we ld
Circumferent ial is +/- 5 deg
UT:
Diameters up to 56"
Veloc ities up to anvsec
Walllhickness>7mm
Max wall thickness
No practical li mi t
Range :
90-900km
Location'
Axial is +/- 200mrn f rom ref
weld
Circumferent ial is 0.3-0.5"
{sensor spaci ng}
'8'
94
INTELLIGENT (SMART) PIGS - Data Interpretation
. Pigs record data - they do not interpret
_e.g. MFL pigs measure flux leakage NOT def ect depth and length
_ The data is processed by software and viewed by anal yst s (human beings)
. They will attempt to discriminate between corrosion . metal loss and
manufacturing defects, by looking at the signal characteristics (shape.
amplitude, length, etc.) .
_ It is not always easy!
_Therefore, some companies are movi ng to the use of more sensors on thei r
pigs to discri minate
_This is being partl y driven by the need to identify 3rt! Part y Damage
clearly.
_ If you have doubts over a pigreport. or do not understand the report :
_ Clari fy with the pig supplier
a u se all your own data (maps, maintenance reports. etc.) 10 help clarify
_ If in doubt, investi gate
e __~
'"
95
Pipeline Repair and Rehabilitation
Penspen Integrity
,, "......'
IMPORTANCE OF REPAIR AND REHABILITATION
In many cases oil and gas field infrastructure is at the end of its
design l ife, but they still have 25 or even 50 years of world
production left.
Russia: 7% of its system is <10 years old. 34%>30 years .
Pravda, 2003: They require $US130million/annum to be kept in wor king
order.
Over 50% of the 1,000,000 km of USA oil and gas pipeline system
is over 40 years old.
1
2
IMPORTANCE OF REPAIR AND REHABILITATION
_ Our pipelines operate in a hostile
envi ronment ... damage and corrosion.
_Our pipeli nes ar e ageing... corrosion.
_Our pipeli nes are being asked to
operate longer ... for economi c reasons
_ Our pipelin es ar e being asked to
operate longer . . . we have extensive oil
and gas reserve .
3
REPAIR AND REHABILITATION - Safety Fi rst!
Safety is always our f irst
consideration.
Pressur e reductions ,
excavation safety, trench
safety, welding safety, pipe
movement safety, fire
prevention, emergency
procedures. etc. are our
primary concerns.
Use recogn ised, proven
procedures, and quali fied
personnel, and make use
of relevant standards
e.g. API RP 2200
-
,
,
-'" :?-
,
2
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERING DEFECTS
1. Reduce Pressure
reduce pressure to safe level and plan pressure reduct ions for
repair/rehabilitation.
2. Critical Information
Establish critical informati on for engi neering assessment.
3. Defect Assessment ~
'Fitness for Purpose'
Carry out engi neering defect assessment, or structura l assessment if
defect/damage is structural, e.g. loss of support, buckles,
etc.
4. Location Assess ment
Assessment of damage location to define access requirements and
available repair and rehabilitation methods.
5. Repair/Rehabilitation Method
Select most effect ive repair or rehabililalion method .
Reduce Pressure (P,l to safe level befo re repair , plan
pressure red uct i ons fo r repair:
p
-,
"'_r.-.._
,--- ...,.. -,__......_- _.-... -_.. ..-., _----_.-._-,--
_ ~ - - - - - - < - - - - - . . . . - _ . _ _--.. -
. . .. -.. _ ..... _ ......_.- _ ...... _'"__0.-._.0-
_.. _-
. .._ _ ..~ _ ~ ...._ _ .. _-.. __r ...... __.. ___......... <__
-_.."--
'''--U ,.,..... .... . _ _ ~ ... _ ,_.. _
._.""_._.. _...... _--,_ _-
....-..... _--_._..-. - ., '-.a.. _ ..... ~ . ~ - . o . - ~ ...._
._,... _ - - - _ . ~ - - - - - _ .._...._...... _... ...._- . ..... . .. _ ~ .. __..._<-....-_ _ 0- _
6
3
1. Reduce Pressure to safe level before repair, ptan pressure redu ctions f or
repair:
LEAKING PRODUCT: If pipe is severed or the defect is leaking, make pipe and
surrounding safe .
REPAIR; Plan future pressure reductions dependi ng on type of
repai r/rehabilitation.
Some composite repairs require pressure reductio ns of 50%,
Recaating may requi re removal of pipe from trench, and pressure may be
required to be reduced to zer o.
Some regulat ions require pressure reductions is a pipeline is to be move d:
e.q. regulat ions in USA require pressu re 10 be reduced to 50% of the MOP in
a liquid pipeline, jf il is to be moved.
C_2006--.
7
Reduce Pres sure to safe level before i n s pec ti on an d repair:
_We need to reduce pressure in a damaged pipe because:
. Pipeline damage can fail when held at constant pressure (' time dependent
effects )
. Pipeline pressure constant, increase above the MOP, e.q.
due 10 overpressures 'operational effects'
ALL DAMAGE SEVERE DAMAGE
If !he deled is very severe (e,g, very loog (wolh II " sk
of rupture). or very deep (>8O%w1), or II crack)
' 80%' - For pipe wall def ects, lower ' 30% SMYS' - The pipel ine pressure
operating pressure to 80% of that at
shou ld be reduced to the lower of
which defect was discoveredanf hcted.
80% of the pres sure at which the
until defect has been assessed. For
defect was inflicted/discovered. or a
structural defects (e.g. buckling)
hoop stress level of 30% SMYS
structural assessments will be needed.
Pr essure should be controlled. Overpressures not allowed.
These stress levels can be waived if a risk analysis shows it 10 be safe to do so
C_ 2O:I6 _ '
a
4
r:
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERING DEFECTS - ' 80%'
Pressure
The ' 80%' pressu re reduction is based Oil

'80%'
full scale tests on defects (inc luding dents )
held at constant pressure.
Defects fail in line pipe due to plastic

p ----- flow. Thi s is time dependent
80%

The part wall defects fai l ed at higher
- - - - -
' hold' pressures than the dents.
p
You do not know the defect until you

have inspected it.
Therefore, it is reasonable and safe 10

assume you have a severe defect (dent
and gouge) . and hence you should
reduce pressure to 80% whi le you
inspect and meas ure it.
Plus, you need some allowance for

overpressures
Time
I ASME B31 8 requif9s00% 'oou ctlonfor ',""oha ni"" l dama ge
<: p",,_ " 2000 Ro,"" 9
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERING DEFECTS - '30%
SMYS'
Stress
'30% SMYS'
The ' 30% SMYS' reduction is based on the
leak/rupture behaviour of defects.
,
1<1(1\1)'0.1
~ ..__._ .
, , ,
cr
30%
SMYS
You have a low chance of a defect rupturing at stress
levels of 30% SMYS or lower,
L -J This 30% SMYS limit applies to long detects You can
relate a specific defect length to the failure (rupture)
stress. This gives you your 'saf e' operating stress.
This 'safe' hoop stress must not be more that 80% of
thai at which defect was c.scovcrocnnmcteo
" P",,,,,," 2006 _,"" 10
5
2. Est abli sh Critical Inf ormat i on for
eng ineeri ng assessment:
defect information: based on visual
..\ assessment, measurements and NOT.
.".,- DefecUfai lure history of the pipeline.
pipe and weld material : pi pe material
grade . diameter, wall thickness, type of
weld and pipe specification propert ies.
design and operati ng character istics:
design specifica tion, design, current
operati on, cycl ic and hydrates!
pressur es, operating temperat ure,
fluids, leakage rat e, etc.
pipeline configuration: oerectrccauons.
loca tion of adjacent welds , bends and
fi ttings. curvature in pipe, ovalily of
pipe.
conseguences of failure: it oetect has
not failed.
u
Remember...
We rarely assess a 'defect'
We usually assess a 'defect report '
Consequently, our defect assessment
is dependent on the accuracy of the
data in a defect report.
Rubbish data... rubbi sh assessment!
-_.. _,_....-
tz
6
Excavation will be necessary for onshore pipelines.
EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR REPAIR OF OFFSHORE
PIPELINE: Example
Remote ly operated vehicle (ROV)
for inspection
Pipeline repai r method
(from www.ocea neering.com)
Concrete remova l mach ine
7----- - ----- - _ .
Remember thai measurements in the field can have large errors
3. Carry out Defect Assessment:
Urgency of the repair and analysis depends upon:
defect severity: location, depth, length, orientation, and
fi nancial/strategic value of pipeline
threat to environment and PR
regulatory/legal/insurance considerations
fai lure/furthe r failures consequences
Not all 'defects' are pipe wall defects. Some will be structural anoma lies
(e.q. buckles or unsupported spans) that will require design/structural
analysis.
Use engineering assessment - 'fitness for purpose' - for repai r/no-repair
decision .
" P" spa o 2[)(}1; Ro, 6i'
15
8
ENGINEERING CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS (ECAs)
Establ ish any accepted defect assessment methods with client and
regulatory authority.
Establ ish ' level' of assessment:
Simple workmanship
Conservative 'code' calcul ation
Detailed 'fitness for purpose' assessment
Probabi listic assessment ('limit slate' calculation)
Risk Assessment
Other - e.9 full scale testing.
Ensure defect assessment is cond ucted by experts, and a quality
assured report is produced, with uncertai nties and conservattsms
highlighted , and consequences of failure recognised.
Always obtain three prices!
PROBLEMS WITH 'DEFECT ASSESSMENTS'
Usually very limited data to work on thi s is the major consideration.
Often highly priced and naive (simplistic appr oach for complex
problem).
Staf cond ucting them are usually speciali sts wi thout any engineering
support, or knowledge of the specifi c pipeline, l.e . they wi ll assess the
defect, rather than the pipeline.
Usually ' distant' report , delivered to client with no ' ownership'.
Usuall y the report does not address the client's main problem - how can
I continue to operate my pipeline safely and cost effectively for the
whole design life?
Solution?
Give a very clear and focused Scope of Work. and do not ask solely for a
'defect assessment", and do not give any wider work scope 10 speci alists
without assurances.
Ensure that consu ltant works closely with you, and appreciates your
pipelines, design s and operational problems.
D_2tU_,
te
9
.,
/
4. Location Assessment to define access requirements and available
repair/rehabilitation methods:
Platfo rm Topsides
Offshore Riser
Deeper Water Depth Zone ( > 50 m )
Inlermediale Waler Depth Zone ( 20 - 50 m )
Shallow water Depth Zone ( < 20 m )
Inter-tidal zone
Inshore zone
Onshore .-
Valve Stat ions/Pigging ',\ """"" 1
lacilitiesITerminals -.<
Road/River y-
y",,,,;., -
1:>- <,
.- ...
.' - '--,-".1.' .._-
SELECTING A REPAIR/REHABILITATION METHOD
Repair Method'
Goat ing Repair
Grinding
Weld Metal Oecosncn-
Full Circumferentia l Sleeves
Composite Reinforcement Sleeves
Patch/Part Sleeve Repairs++
Mechani cal Clamps+++
Pipe Section or Pipeline Replacement
External Coatings/Internal Liners
TM " """ "" -;>Udd.. .....,"ll,.... ,""' .. "",,"""' ''''"''" Iool '''.,'_''.....-...
""""''"'' ,'_ ... AP111 60, 10<>0 " "'. "' ,.,. _ __,. ".. , ,, .. _.
- ""',.,,,. , """' '00' ...,...'_
There ere Ol her methods of ropaifingJrehabiM3tlng, e g Upgrlldlng Cathodic
Protection. but onl y 'mechanical ' (ItId 'barner 'methods are covered in this lecture,
10
COATING REPAIR'
Pipeline reooating usually falls
into one of two categori es:
repair coaling or
rehabilitation coaling.
Surface preparation is considered
the most important stage of a
recaating
Coating material should meet
NACE Standard RP0169 There are
many diff erent types of coat ing
repair , and many product suppliers
Some ar eas of a pipeli ne may
require special consideration , e.g.
ri ser splash zones"
..... _ ... ... _- _ .. ....__.. _-_.. --...,...... !:'- _...
__><C , _ _ _ ~ _ ... __
- __0 __* .... _......., __Cooood_
... . - ~ ... ~
COATING REPAIR (cont.)
A popul ar method is tape, whi ch has a bit uminous rubber adhesi ve
layer with either a PE or PVC backing.
This type of tape has a particular
advantage in thai it will bond at the
overlaps wi thout primer activation.
Because of this feature it is supplied with
a dispo sable paper inter1eaf layer to stop
it completely sticking toge ther on the roll.
These tapes are made up to 1.65mm thick.
They woul d be very suitable for d aylwet
conditi ons and are made in temperat e and
tropical grades.
If the repaired areas could be prepared
by abrasive blasting then it would be
possible to use an epoxy repai r coali ng
which would also be suitable for clay/wei conditions.
"
I I
GRINDING
Repair by hand filing or power grinding may be used if:
stress concent ration at defect or imperfection is removed, all damaged
or excessively hard material is removed, and the pressure carrying
capacity of the pipe is not reduced.
API 5L allows grinding to shallow depths.
GRINDING (cont.)
Criteria:
ope rat ing pressu re level is reduced to 80% of recentl y demonstr ated highest
operating pressu re.
limits of metal removal for non- indented defects can be sel by engineering
cri tical assessmen t (ECA), e.q A$ME B31G li mi ts.
grinding of indented defects is complex and not gener ally recommended
without significant pipeline depressurisalion.
Use low powered tools {e.q . <460 walls), or hand lools.
23

C"",k"
12
WELD METAL DEPOSITION
Advantages:
Simple and direct application of additional
wall thick ness, but al ways use approved
procedur e that is applicable to your
line/producVdefect.
Gas Research Institute (USA) - Weld
deposition repairs are feasible to 900 psi for
minimum 0.125" wall thickness pipe . API
1160 limits this to >0.181" (4.5mm) .
Can be useful where sleev es are not
possible - at fittings and bends - or where
access is diffi cult.
Fatigue and fracture tests at Edi son
Weldi ng Institute
(USA) has shown good properties
WELD METAL DEPOSITION (Cont.)
25
Concerns:
Reduce pressure (80% of di scovery level)
before welding
EGA can usually show it is not needed.
Possi ble blow-out or penetrat ion of pipe
(burn-through):
pene tration depends on wall thickness,
weld heat input and removal of heat by
now of fluid inside pipe.
Possible loss of integrity of pipe following
repair:
stanc strength and fatigue strength must
be restored.
significant discontinuities must not be
introduced. including hydrogen cracking
in the HAl (heat affected zone).
can be diffICUlt to QA.
Can show as small pits in an MFl pig run,
due to material change, and may lead to
excava tion.
26
13
WELDED SLEEVE REPAIR (see API RP 1107 & API
STD1104)
Sleeve
Circumferential weld
(Type B Sleeve only)
Pipeline
ytlis ,s a very poPlltar,epa" methOd,
' Research @ AGA showed Ihese $Ieeves (Type B) can
strenglhen pipe 10 100% SMYS.
Sleeve must reinforce defedlve area, and restrain de/eel
Type A not recommended for old ERW w!ld repairs
, When used to repair dents, hardenable mat erial must be
used to stop dent moving under Shell
Seam weld
(detail below)
,
,
Back Ing Slnp
and reloef
,-
PREFERRED
We will no1 <:orISodoel ' p<Jl'>pO.in'
these were used to reinJO<Ce old
comp<essoon COIJphngs
Becau se they wore very big, they hav e been
YSM 10 rep.ir buokles , leaki ng cla"l'S, etc
Tiley are cons 'oc r"';

I '"
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDED SLEEVES
TYPES OF WELDED SLEEVE

Type A - two hal f shells welded together to give 'close fit'
No pre ssure containment ,
Type B - As Type A, but also welded to pipe
(can be when line is in service)
Pressure containment
Stand-off Shell (when

pipe is distorted or not
-
straight)
Pressure
containment (but not yet
T_ '.. ' SRJg-Flnlnv 51..._ WooI_I OI"Il*inol
proven for leaking defects)
Epoxy Foiled Sleeve I

Used on Type A, can use
-
on Type B- see later
Pre-stressed Sleeve - see
later T,.".. ' B' Snug.Fming $I .. p,pehnej
0_2OO!i """" za
14
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL TYPE A SLEEVE
Type A - two half shells welded togethe r
to give 'close fit', but no welding to
pipeline. Works by restraint.
These sleeves can increase failure
stresses >30%* of defective pipe.
Reinforcement only
wi ll not conta in pressure so no good for
leaks or future leaks .
MUST be close fit to restrain defect
Pressure reduction whi le installation will
help .
Grind off weld reinforcements at DSAW
welds and girth welds, bridge girth welds.
and use fi ller material at t ransit ion
curvature of seam welds
' SeoW. ldlng Joc m. I. J u"" 1977
.. _Coo..... NOl.. & Row"'''' "''''''' P' oe""" ' ",P;DOI,,,,,R ep;>.C, J F Ca, M. ,ZOO2
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL TYPE A SLEEVE
Wi ll not carry much stress if defect is short
(length S (2001)5)" .
Sl eeve str ength and welds should be equa l to
carrie r pipe if defect is long (length 2:(200t)05)... .....
Should extend at least 2" either side of defect"
Mitered sleeves not recommended
Note, welding ends is good practice to prevent
cor rosion, or put heavy coating on, or sea ls in
annulus).
Usually for external cor rosion only (dft 0.8).
Not to be used for circumferential defects.
Best to fill defect or dented region with filler
material to help good fit
Hardenable materials are epox ies. polyesters.
S-W"' "'"\lJoL",o' , J,o. ' 977
s.. Coo'" Not.. &'R"""",,,,,,",,,,P",,,,,,.. ' o< P,,,," "0R.o"c J FK,.<,"" '''''2'002, C.oo". 2002
JO
15
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL TYPE B WELDED
SLEEVES
Type B - welded to pipe
Can restore damaged area so that failure
stress is SMYS' of pipeli ne
Pressu re conta inment. Annulus can
be pressurised by dri lling using a hoi
la p.
Good to- leaking defects, or defects mat
may event ually leak.
Must have same pressure carryi ng
capacity as carrier pipe.
Most operators ensure sleeve is same
strength and thickness as damaged
pipe
Shoul d ext end at least 2" either side of
defect
Grind off wel d reinforcements at DSAW
welds and girth we lds .
SLEEVES
Do not terminate the sleeve within 2" of a
girth weld
Do not place two type B sleeve s closer
together than one-half the carrier pipe
diameter.
Can be used to repair most defects,
including ci rcumferential defects.
Easily detected by MFL smart pigs
Burnthrough is avoided by ensuring good
welding practi ces, low H
2
electrodes, and a
min. wall of 6.4mm (0.25").
Ci rcumferent ial fillet welds can have
delayed cracking if non-low H
2
electrodes
are used
Full penetration wel ds are used for the side
seam.
a __...,.;o;_.
32
16
WHY DO WELDED SLEEVE REPAIR 'WORK'?
_ STRESS SHARI NG - If my welded sleeve
fil s around the pipeline perfectly, I can
achieve 'stress sharing' - my stress in my
carrier pipe is reduced .
_If I tightl y fit my sleeve with a thickne ss
simi lar to my car rier pipe, at a pressure of
Pr and increase the pipeline pressure of Po.
my sleeve shares the increases in stress
from Poto P,
_ Thicker sleeves take higher stresses. Any
carelessness in fining will resul t in poor
stress sharing
_ RESTRAINT OF BULGING - Type A and
non-pressurised Type B sleeves stop a
defect from 'bulging' in ductile hne pipe.
Defects in pressurised pipe must bulge
outwards pri or to failure
33
SLEEVES - SAFETY & PRESSURE REDUCTION
SAFETY
PRESSURE REDUCTION is always good practice, as we have
repair crews around the pipeline. and the status of the defect for
repair may be unknown.
Repair pressure to operating pressure ratio of 0.67 has
been recommended"
Some reports of hydrogen build up below sleeves, causing pipe
collapse and safety concerns
t 7
SLEEVES - SAFETY & DRILLING
DRILLING
Sleeves have been drilled in the past , due to the fear of a brittle fracture
initialing under the sleeve and propagating outside the sleeve"
Note that if Type 8 sleeve is to be drilled (to remove hoop stress from
damaged area) , the lop half of the repair sleeve needs to be fitt ed with a
connection thaI can lake a standard drilling machine and plugging
device.
Drill ing pipe should only be considered if defect being repaired is likely 10
rupt ure in future.
I.e will defect grow after repair (e.q. fatigue), or will pipe pressure be
raised (e.g pipeline to be uprated)
Current pract ice is moving away from drilling the pipe' "
Drilling can be difficult
Attachme nts 10pipe sleeve can be dama ged
There is no evidence of a fracture ever extending from under a
sleeve
0_2006_
.... J_OOId .. "' _ d_ e--a ... ...-BJ'I'"' __.... ~ d _ O - _ ,
__.... ~ O<i:l<lO:l c,-. _"'C:>0C2-21,n
35
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDED SLEEVES -
Stand-Off Shell
O P., ,,,,,,, = _ 6i l
36
18
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDED SLEEVES -
Stand-Off Shell
. Stand off shell:
. Used where snug-fitting sleeves
cannot be used because of
pipeline distortion or where the
pipeline is not straight.
_This form of repair is far more
complex in the installation
process , as each repai r is made
up in stages and can require
many pieces.
37
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL EPOXY SLEEVES
(EPOXY FILLED SLEEVE)
Well-proven technique, but uncertainti es over long term
integrity with leaking defects .
No direct welding onto pipeline.
Experience of use onshore, with non-leaking, defects .
Sleeve fit up are problems minimised, as the gaps are
filled by epoxy
A large gap (' fit up') is tolerable (40mm)
Cost savi ng compared to standard welded sleeves.
Can be used where welded sleeve is impractical:
Bends
l eaks at fittings
Weakened girth welds (good bond streng th)
Different systems available for use onshore and
subsea:
longitudinal welded sleeve (as type A)
sleeve with bolted flange
38
19
(EPOXY FILLED SLEEVE) - schematic'
oe..- p _ _ ~ , _ _ ~ - , , , F "
_....... ~ - , , . , - - -
(EPOXY FI LLED SLEEVE)
39
20
WHY DO EPOXYFILLED SLEEVES WORK?
DEFECT
PIPELINE
2. DEFECT IS RESTRAINED
1. LOAD IS
TRANSFERRED
REPAIR
SHELL
EPOXY
FILLING
"
FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL EPOXY SLEEVES -
Effectiveness*
Full scale stat ic and cyclic** tests on sect ions of pipe
containing defects:
Dents (5-9% pipe diameter deep) combined with Defects (slots) (12-
17%wt deep)
Defects (slots) (up to 85% wt deep and up to 457mm long)
Corrosion (60% wt , 457mm long)
Showed the epoxy filled sleeve repair to have very high
fai lure stresses
None of the 11 static tests on repaired defects failed. All
survived >140% SMYS
Only one of the 10 fat igue tests failed (defect depth =
60%wl , defect length = 457mm) - after 135,000 cycles at
124 N/mm
2
eu-, p >< 00'<'"'. '-'" R..... " P',..;no Drioct . ' PO"" ,... S<-. , CSymDO>O"'OO
l ..... po, "",om"'" ,.."_ _ u SA
, "'... ,....,.. u"'" Oil , "', 12. Nimm ' '" 10 ,.. .. """""" bel "," I' ''' to,O();)- ' <O, """"Y_ '
,,"""""",." .. ' ''''''''"'''''' _ ,.,""'''' 104M .... , "._""d"'",
42
2]
Effectiveness
o Unrepaired
1
1.5
0.5
" ing' 0,JAE!==
tests
0.29 0.49 0.61 0.77
Defect (machined slot) depth/wall thickness
.,e..-. P_.,..._"' ........ ...""""". ....."._' __R......, N:;A"
:t>r-...onc._._'__us.o.
Failure stress!
Yield
2
"'--- - -----, = = = =;""]
PRESTRESSED SLEEVES REINFORCEMENT
(COMPRESSION) SLEEVE
This repair is two half shells fillet welded together, with an epoxy filler
Calculation s are conducted to determin e required 'stress reducti on ' for the
defective pipe, t.e. the she lls are going 10 be heated up , then shrink to
compress the defective pipe, and prevent defect pr opagation ..7 ---,
Pipe is sandblasted
Epoxy is app lied around pipe - acts as lubricant
and subsequent load transferer
Sleeves are assembled
Sleeves are heat ed to specified temperat ure
and held in place by jac ks or clamps
Fillet we lds applied, no weld ing onto pipe,
Sleeves cool. Sleeve 'comoresses'tbe pipeline.
Coat and backfill
'" B....-yoro.. " , T ~ lookl u.. "' 0><1 """""0'_ "-' 0',0> & (in _mOO, J" .... " , 001, P ""'"'
Installed (grit-
C_ 2006 R_1 blasted)compression sleeve 44
22
PRE-STRESSED SLEEVES - REINFORCEMENT
(COMPRESSION) SLEEVE
Popular and used in Canada since 1994
Takes aboul1 hour to install (according to Petroline)
Maximum sleeving achieved has been 24ft in 10 hour work day
Up to a pipe length has been repaired with end -to-end sleeves (ends of
individual sleeves don' t need to be butt welded together)
Petroline says it has been used to repair sec, arc burns. denting , cracks
in ERW seam welds. corros ion. mill defects
Canadian code GSA Z662 accepts the repair for corrosion
COMPOSITE REI NFORCEMENT SLEEVES
Fibreglass re-infor ced composi te material
wrapped ar ound the pipe can restore
pipe line stre ngt h in hoop dire ction.
No 'hot' work on line
Usually defect is first filled with high
compressive strength filler material
r:
-- .- ._-
23
COMPOSITE REINFORCEMENT SLEEVES
Care should be exercised :
Not specifically designed to resist
bendi ng or axial stresse s
Some wraps do not alter MFL
indi cations. so cannot be detected
by pigs
Techni cians need to be
trained to apply the
repairs
composite strength
and stiffness can
diminish with li me

__der.v -. GE....
COMPOSITE REINFORCEMENT SLEEVES
O_Z0CJ6lWv61,
"
24
WHY DO COMPOSITE REINFORCEMENT REPAIRS
WORK?
DEFECT 2. DEFECT IS RESTRAINED
COMPOSITE ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~
WRAP
1.LOADIS
TRANSFERRED
PIPELINE
0_""","_'
COMPOSITE REINFORCEMENT SLEEVES -
'Clock Spring'
Polyester resin wrap reinfor ced by glass filament.
Tightly wound and bonded to pipe . Wid th - 300mm
(t z-incnes).
Typical thickness 12.7 mm comprising 8
concentric layers. Two hours to complete repair.
Individual layers bonded using fast-curing material
with high compressive strength.
Pipeline diameters: 4
ft_
56
ft
Only B" clearance
is needed around
pipeline.
Ensure repair
extends 2- beyond
defect
Coil (layer)
50
25
COMPOSITE REINFORCEMENT SLEEVES-
'StrongBack'
. ' Str ongBack' - This product is a resin-
impregnated . Kevtar reinforced, tape wrap,
applied directly 10 the damaged pipeline.
_ The wrap is water activated by
immersion or external application -
hence it can be used underwat er.
This met hod is usuall y used to
reinforce small areas of corrosion and/or
mechanical damage
Remember: composote
repairs must be inslalled
by qualJfied stall
'Armor Plate'
.'Armour Plate' Another pipe
wrap repair method very similar
to ' StrongSack' but the
hardening agent uses a
chemical rather than water.
Each wrap is 12.5" wide
. This method is usually
used to reinforce small
areas of corrosion and/or
mechanical damage
IRemember: some composite ~ t may not be I
detected by pigs
26
' PermaWrap'
Remember: pressure reduct ions may
be reQuired for composite repairs.
.PermaWrap (Wrapmaster)
_4 36- diameter
_ Widths of 6" up to 18"
_ 2 man, 45 minute installation
_ All contain met al strip for
detection by pig
COMPOSITE WRAP REPAIRS -
Mechanical damage
a c omcosue wraps have been evaluated for repairi ng mechanical damage'
e'Ihere is some debate about the usefulness of wrap repair s for mechanical
damage or cracks in pipelines ' "
e uqoto lines can be heavily pressure cycled (fatigue).
Durinq pressure cycling, the wrap material can allow movement of e.g.
denied regions , and this lack of const raint may lead to fatigue failures in
lines that are pressure cycled.
a c onsequenuv jf the damage is not ground out under a wrap repair.
ther e may be a failure risk
r:
."O_.J"'_ <-,, _ ~ _ _ ~ _ . __. __
__-.....:w.".""- ._
"' J_ _ .. r _ ~ _ . ... _ ... _",_. __ ,_
_ """""."-"> -""' .... ",,,
27
PATCH REPAIR'
A simple quick
repair. but only
gives limi ted
support 10
defective area
But requires
live welding
Usually circular
pat ch made from
same material
as pipeline .
Axi ally
orientated fill et
welds may be
prone 10fatigue
damage.
Fille\ Weid
We call also have a ' hatl sole' repair; l his is where we weld a
half shell to the and fillet weld it to the line pipe.
55
WELDED PATCH/PART SLEEVE
Pat ch repairs are now
only used on:
low stressed pipelines
low SMYS line pipe

non-teakinq defects,
or corrosion that is
leaking
'''''''DOT _'<12111
2X
HOT TAP REPAIR OF DEFECTS - Direct removal of
defects
Defects such as mechanical damage, can be removed
by hot tapping the defecti ve area, and cutting out the
defect , or cutting out the section of pipe
All the defecti ve area
must be removed
BVPASS
1-:-\ - - - - - - -3-
DEFECTIVE
'IESECTION
PURGE r '"'
ree
=:1
BYPASS
'"

'"
PERMANENT REPAIR METHODS API 1160
GUIDELINES
Weld
Repair"
External Detect - (S80%wt)Y
Internal Def ect- (S80%wt) N
External Detect- (>80%wt) Y'
Internal Defects(>80%wt) N
Leaks N
Cracks N
Girth Weld Defects N
Denis N
Denis with detects" N
Type A Type B
steeve! Sleeve
y y
N Y
N Y
N Y
N Y
N Y
N Y
Y' Y
y4,3 y 3
ccrnpcelte!
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N'
N
Hot tap
Y'
Y'
Y'
Y'
N
N"
N
Y'
Y'
WALLTOWE cDONTO_ Cl<ECKWITH EXPERT API "60 " "' ITS >.PPtICA-lO" TO
'N " 0 ''' -, """ I e 'S 1"1 '" y , '''' '' ... ' HODTO <,"""w' DEFECT DEP'HS
'NDCS""' Y PRAe- ICE " AMERICA IS TOLIMIT riPE A SLEEVES CO"POS reRWA'.' fO "' ''';' $NOT
EXCEED,"O"",,,WT
A"V lJA>MC' " 1" ' ",," "uST HA'J< "'!oN REMO""O, ' .G. BYGR,'<O,"" eo.. ,,.,, w "," """",,'"
o""'."p"""....
Se EEVE" "S- " ' FILLEDW TH' CO" PRESSl8 cE""TERIAl
" r''IOTO,AWEcD
CRACKSTeATARE ..aT l",,"'NC CA, BE HOTT"""" DTO REMOVEC.....C"
SOMECOMPGSITEREPAIRS CJ.N .. u SED ON ST.....,CHTP PE W THO,"TS. IF T1<E'r' AAE FiLED WI'H
.... A'O """,.,,, "' TESTS TOSE PERMA" ENT
" OE"T C"foJ"" Rf MOV. OOWp , ' T" v
29
MECHANICAL CLAMPS
MECHANICAL CLAMPS
Pressure containing clamp, with seals at
each end
Eiastomenc seal will contai n leak - but the Seals
ends are sometimes also welded as back up for
the seal
Thick and heavy, due to large bolts needs to
ensure adequate clamping forces
Simple to install , but heavy 10handle.
Designed to contain a leak. If defect may result
in a rupture, leak clamps are not
recommended.
If pipe is leaking, an offt ake will be fitted to the
lop half of the clamp to route product away, and
remove build up of pressure in clamp during
repair.
sa
30
MECHANICAL CLAMPS
Mechanical clamps are usually considered as 'temporary'
repairs.
However specialised subsea clamps are often not replaced
and become a perman ent repair subject to regular
inspection.
Several types of clamp:
Pudco. PII Tecnomarine, HydroTech,
Furmanite. etc
r,-- " eals
'Plidco' clamp
MECHANICAL CLAMPS
2001 - Ala!.ka _ Jet Fuel Leak - Corrosion pols
O_2OOlI R..6i l
61
31
MECHANICAL CLAMPS - Underwater
Underwater
clamps are
similar to
onshore pi peli ne
clamps,
63
_._.-"'..--..-..--_-._-
MECHANICAL CLAMPS - Underwater
Underwater
clamps are
simi lar to
onshore pipeline
clamps. but they
wi ll needdiver
or ROV support.
and vessel
support
32
MECHANICAL CLAMPS - leak repair offshore
aThe repair of a pin-hole leak is relatively elementary as compared to a spool
piece replacement.
_ In simple terms , for the pin-hole repair.
soil/overburden must be cleared and the
concrete/corrosion coating removed for
a length of 40" to 60".
_A repair clamp can then be lowered
into position over the pipe and
set (activat ed).
aThese operations can be done by divers
a ln deepwater (>1000ft?) - these operations
are all performed by ROVs.
a Oiverless repair clamps have been
manufactured and tested in sizes to 18"
. They are owned by pipeline operators
and remain in inventory as an emergency, stand-by repair capabi lity.
MECHANICAL CLAMPS - leaking fittings
'Enclosure' type
repair
components are
capabl e of
repairing/sealing
damaged
flanges and 0
bends/elbows in
both on and
offshore lines.
"T ,._ _ G_,... ... __....... -..... Of._ ..C.......OO.
R ...".,..,.'I3I ..... . _........,._OOh>o ..... ~ ~ o . . .
66
33
PIPE SECTION REPLACEMENT
PIPE SECTION REPLACEMENT
)
) < ",x.
Cui out def ective pipe and replace by pre-tested section, by:
Isolation of flow and pressure, depressu rtsation and purging of section
10be replaced ,
Hot-tap, Stopple and Bypass to bypass flow and keep pipeline
operating, perhaps at a reduced pressure.
j Remove
Replacement section may be installed by:
Welding - pref erred
Mechanical Connectors - popular offshore
0_200II_"
68
34
Isolate
ISOLATION METHODS
Isol ate a section of pipeline for replacement by:
Valves - Existing valves within the system
Conventional Pipe Plugs - St opper s set by Hand
Isolation Pigs/Spheres - High fricti on. driven to location
Remote Setting Plugs/Spheres - Set by umbili cal or remotely
Pipe Freezing Plug - Freezing of a plug of wat er or gel
Hot Tap & St opple - Allowi ng flow to continue in bypass
Mechanical Tees
Welded Tees
Plug/valve/pig
Remove
ISOLATION METHODS
PIPELINE STOPPERS AND ISOLATION PIGS
Pipeline Stoppers - set manuall y and generally used as secondary
barrier (low differenti al pressure - up to 20 barg):
Pronal Plugs
available wil h pressure control. purge and vent facilities
Hyperbaric welding bl adders
Isolati on Pig s/Sph eres - driven into position (lOWdifferential pressure -
up to 5 barg)
Sealing Pigs
BalchingPigs
Spheres
Gel Pigs
70
35
ISOLATION METHODS
PIPE FREEZING PLUG
Freeze
exchanger
and pump
.>
dry air 10
coolant pumps
Air compressor
with dryer
__ ; 'c.- .
Freeze J acket . ,
Instrument
recording panel
Liquid Nitrogen
"
HOT TAP, STOPPLE AND BYPASS
1. WELDI NG - The four fittings permanently
Bypass fitting
,...stoPPle mli ng
<,
secured (wel ded) 10 the line.
- '
G:!J
,
2. Temporary Sandwi ch Valves are installed on the
fill ings , and taps are made through all the valves, L Tapping
The tappi ng machines have cutters that remove machine
coupon of the pipewall and remove the coupon from '\ _
the li ne Sandwich
3. Two stopple plugging machines are installed. valves
Product is diverted through the temporary bypass. _ Stopple
The isola ted section is purged. Modificati ons are

made 10 the isolated pipe section. The new section is
....."
_ machine
purged and equalized, and t he plugging heads are
retract ed
4. The temporary bypass is removed. Plugs are
install ed in the stopple fittings with a l apping
machine. All equipment is then removed and blind
flanges are installed on the fitti ngs to complete the
Tal<"" from lt>ol TO W___te
job.
n-os_a double
e _1OOlI ....0Y.
n
36
HOT TAP, STOPPLE AND BYPASS
BYPASS
HOT TAP: cutting into a live pipeline using a special tee,
welded or clamped to the pipel ine.
STOPPLE*: insertion of a temporary plug into the line, through a hot-
tap tee, to isolate a secti on of the pipel ine.
BYPASS: attachment of bypass If
pipe to a pair of hoi-tap tees to ]il STOPPI.E
provide a flow bypass ill ""',,
around
VAlVE PURGE feo,
' T ]T TEE
Et:L "]- =--==j
STOPPLE
ree
'Stopple' means stopping-off " nOer press ure
HOT TAP, STOPPLE AND BYPASS: Onshore
37
MECHANICAL CONNECTORS
Subsea Pipeline Repair
replacement spoolplece
replace sect ion of line at a riser or
mid-line
Connectors used in conj unction with
Misali gnment ball flanges ( MAF )
' Pup' piece for axial adjustment
Standard RTJ (ring-type-joint) flanges
Swivel Ring Flanges
VENDORS: Ceani c Corporation ( Big Inch ), Cooper Cameron , HydoTech
Systems (Oil States ), PII Tecnomarine, Hydra-Tighl , Oil Stales Industries
( Mer1i n connector)
REPAIR COST COMPARISON (late 19905)
REPAI R METHOD
COST (US$)
COST
INDEX
Clockspring
4650
1
Epoxy Sleeve
5800
1.3
Hot tap & stopple
>100,000
>20
Plidco clamp
16200
3.5
Snug Sleeve
7200
1.6
Stand off sleeve
8950
1.9
24" hne ' n UK. not iocIud,ng C/VIls works and eXC3yabon costs . Repalr oI SOmm brig corrosIon
T. .... _ .. ~ ""'...... _ ........ _ 001 ..... ..., _ ~ ~ - - p , ....... """'T<YCo-'-.._Y '-"- ' ..
D ....._ :/OOOI _ '
38
REPAIR - GENERAL GUIDELINES
REPAIR EXAMPLE OF DECISION TREE
Conclusion from
defect assessment:
Repair methods:
~
Grind defec t
Surface defect/stress raiser
Type ' A' welded sleeve
Epoxy sleeve
Reinforcement required
- Composite sleeve
Leak to be sealed

Type ' B" welded sleeve
Mechanical sleeve
Sland-offShcll
~ X ~ I e damage to be replaced
Replace pipe section

39
REPAIR GUIDELINES (e.g. AGA Catalog No
L51716)
..~
~
~
I. h
",1?
Rli

.,
,
!.
~ g
0
0
~ ~
,

h
"
Q '"
d l
~
.. s e
,.

l .ak (t hrou gh .. , II dol.... 1)

- -

-
,
-
Lea k unde, pr. nur.
- -
bl.rnll Corroalon
- - - - - - - - -
Deep IXI.,n, 1corrOllon >0.81

-

-
Int ernal Corr oal on

- - - -

-
O.nt

-

-
Dent. goulle

-

- -
<
Sh. llow Crack" 0.4 t
,
,
<

< < <

Deep C..ck > 0.4 \

< <

-

Sum Weld Defect

< <
<

'CO
-
-

< <
,
Wri nkle or IoClII buck le
-
<

Girth weld delect
-
<
<
(See also . ASME B31.8S-2oo1and API 1160 for more up to dale guidelines)
(Note - These guidelInes do not always agree ....ih each other)
.. ................ _.
RESPONSE TI MES FOR DEFECTS IN API 1160-
Liquid Lines
REPORT' IN 30 DAYS & REPORT AND MITIGATE IN 6
REPAIR IN 30 DAYS' MONTHS
DEFECTS >80% wt - DEFECTS >50% wt wit h widespread
ctrc extent, or at f oreign line crossings
GOUGE/GROOVE >12.5% wt
DEFECT HAS FAILURE PRESSURE < DEFECT HAS FAILURE PRESSURE <
MOP safe operating pressu re (as
determined by (e.g.) ASME B31G
TOP OF THE LINE (48 o' cl ock) DENTS DENTS >6%od
WITH DEFECTS
DENTS ON WELDS OR WITH
DEFECTS
OTHERS CONSIDERED SERIOUS BY IDENTI FIED CRACKS
OPERATOR
WELD DEFECTS >50% WT
PREFERENTIAL WELD CORROSION
0 """""", 2006 _ '"
1 - Temp. mitigation is required within 5 days of receipt of report
2 - e.g. from pig vendor
80
40
RESPONSE TIMES FOR DEFECTS IN ASME 831.85
- Gas Lines (Defects detected by pigs)
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE SCHEDULED RESPONSE MONITORED
(defect on point of (defect is significant but (def ect will not fail
failure) not on point of failure before next
inspection)
'Promptly' review after defect is
Review within 6 months Revi ew within 6 months
discovered or reported
- Any metatrcss t hat wo uld leak Corrosion wit h failure
to near -term l eak or rup ture pressu re>1. 1MAQP
- Corrosion wi th fail ure
- Dents on weld s wi t h
pressure<1.1MAOP
deplh>2'!. OO"
-Metal loss in/around DCor I F
Mechanical damage"
ERWIFW seams
Dent wit h depth >6%00 "
Examine within 5 days of review
- Dent wit h cr ack'
Repair/remedialion 'promptly'
Dent on non-duct ile we ld'
o See al so ASME B3 1.8 (851.4)
sec , Dent wit h gouge
Examine and evaluate within 5
days
' For lines ~ 3 0 S M Y S
" Using ASME 831G or equivalent
at
RESPONSE TIMES FOR DEFECTS IN FINAL RULE
195.452 Feb 2002) - Liquid Lines
IMMEDI ATE EVALUATE & REPAIR
REPAIR
Within 60 days Within 180 days of discovery
',""",,,vo<} ",",,,"
"'" " vo ....'00"",
of discovery
,nt""".Iion"
....... """',,"'"
-Defect has predicted -Ali dents on top -Defect has predict ed (e.g, by RSTRENG) 'operating'
BURST pressure of pipel ine with pressure <curr ent established MOP
<estab lished MOP deplh >3% pi pe -Dent s > 2% pipe diameter (or 0,25" for NPS less
(e.g. ASME B31G) diameter (or Iha n 12") cont aining a weld
-Mel al loss >80% wt >0,25" for NPS of -Dents > 2% pi pe diameter (or 025" forNPS less
-Dents on top of line < 12") than 12") at lop (4"8 o'c lock)of pipe
(e-e o'ciockj with -Dent in bottom of "Dents at bott om of pipe of depl h > 6% pipe diameter
depth >6% nom. pipe pipe with any -Corroson > 50% nomi nal wt ,
diameter stress raiser, -c orrosion of , or along. a longitudinal seam weld
-Dents on top of line crac k or metal Met al loss > 50% @ pipel ine crossings, with
(4-8 o'cloc k) loss widespread circumferential extent, or at girth weld
cont aini ng any defect "Possible Crack, lhal is confirmed by excavations
-Any other defect "Gouges/groove > 12.5% nominal wt
cons idered serious
~ P""","" 2006 Rov,,! ' 82
41
RESPONSE TIMES FOR DEFECTS IN FINAL RULE -
192.933. Dec 2003) - Gas Lines
REPAIR
IMMEDIATE WITHIN ONE NO LIMIT (but must record and monitor)
YEAR
-Delec t has predi cted -Dents wit h a -Dents on bottom of line (4-8 o'clock) 'Mlh depth >6%
BURST pressure depth grea ter nom. pipe diameter'
=<1 .1xMAOP (e g . than 2% pipe - Dents on top of line 4 ~ 8 o'clock) wit h depth >6%
using ASME 6310 or diameter" nom . pipe di ameter ' shown by analys is to have low
R$ TRENG} affecting a girth or strains
- A dent wi th any meta r longitudi nal seam -neets wit h a depth gre ater than 2% pi pe di ameter"
loss , crack or stress weld affectinga girth or longitudinal seamweld shown by
raiser. -Dents on top of analysis \0 have low strains, plus consideration of
-Any other defect line (4-8 o' clock) weld quality
consideredserious wit h depth >6%
nom, pipe
diameter"
0 __-.
_ ....., 05_ .... _P i>' ''S) .. _ .....,'T
~ .... O:/"i ... _Poo (JtP'$) .. ... .... ' T 83
CONCLUSIONS
Gather all data relating to defects &
pipeline
Conduct defect assessment s.
If repair/r ehabi litation needed.. .
Conduct cost appraisal.
Select most suit able repair or
rehabil itation solution.
All repair methods available has a role
Choose the repair method that best
suits the defect and the pipeline.
And finally... fully document & record the
repair.
42
'APPROVED' REPAIR METHODS
Note that some suppliers of repair methods may
'claim' that their repair has been 'approved' by the
USA Department of Transportation
The DOT does not approve repair
equipmenUmethods
Repairs either meet or do not meet standards.
e.g. You can say that line pipe meets API 5L standards.
but you cannot say that API 5L line pipe is approved by
DOT
Some concern over non-American products in USA.
For example, ISO or European standards and
specifications will not automatically be accepted in USA
85
85
43
THE FOUR STAGES OF REPAIR AND
REHABI LITATION
STAGE 1
lnspectoooJOe1ectlon
<fI

0 _200&__,
PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
STAGE 3
Assessment 01Defects
STAGE 4
Repa"IRehab< litil te
"
REPAIR AND REHABILITATION
DRIVERS AND APPROACH
DRI VERS Many repair o r rehabil it ati on projects are not dri ven by the choice of
repair or rehab il it ation met hod. They are driven by economics, urg ency or
engineering considerat ions .
COST For example, the cost of the repair clamp for a damaged offsho re pipeline is
negli gible compared to the cost of the vessel that has to be hired to install the repair.
Further example: it may be cost benefici al to replac e, rather than rehabilita te, a pipel ine -
a new, larger. more efficient pipeline can give lower whole life costs than an ageing, small ,
inefficient line, albeit rehabilitated.
URGENCY - A catastrophic failure (people or environmental ) has such a devastating
effect on PRo etc" that the least 01a compan y's worries is the type of repai r/rehabilitation.
Cost to public image, lost revenue and dean up costs are key considerations.
ENGINEERING The 'engineering' associated with any wOO on a pipeline may be the
crucial considerat ion. For example. an offshore line that has lost its coat ing. and is floati ng,
an onshore line that is to be lifted out of a trench and recoated 'live' (while pressuri sed).
APPROACH Pi peli ne rehabilitat ion is similar to pipeline construction
u.e.retri eval /trenchi ng, section rehabi l it ati on, backfill , inspection, etc.] , and
requi res the same engineeri ng approach,
88
44
COST MODEL
Repai r or rehabilitation is usually driven by cost or urgency
Failure Probability, (Pr)
target probab ility
Ti me
Cost
f
[Optlmum P,
,
,
j
p,
89
COST COMPARED TO REPLACEMENT
pipe size
6-14 inch
16 - 24 inch
28 - 48 inch
percent of new
construction
70 -130%
50 - 90%
25 - 50%
a r hese costs are for landlines.
a s meuer diameter pipe is cheap to buy, hence mater ial costs of a new pipeline are low_
_ Rehabi litation becomes more cost-effective as the diameter increases,
_Note : sometimes the people and disrupt ion problems associated with new
const ructions (e.g. re-Iaying a pipeline in an environmentally sensitive area, with
associated problems with public image and lengthy negotiations) may mean an
operator chooses reeaaling/lining, even when the capita l cost for new const ruction is
lower.
C Po"",,,," 2006 Ro'6I1 90
45
COST BENEFIT
80
70
" 60
ro
g;.. 50
40
o
g 30
20
10
160 km long, 914 mm dia meter l and pi pel ine

New Line Coating repair Hydro & Repair III & Repair
Il>P",,,,,,,, 2000 Rov6i ' 91
OVERALL STRATEGY
DEf iNE REPAIR/REHABILITATION AND
MONITORiNG STRATEGY
Build up data base
of pipeline technical
data and
repair /rehab. data
I
I
and hazard response
Define environmental I
I
wnte I
response plan I
h
I
Ensure access to I
pipel in e along rout e
Set up respon se teem and
repair/rehab. co-ordinat ion
team
Def ine def ect
assessment
approach and
cri t eri a lor each
pipeline
Define conditi on
monitorin g strategy
Write
repair/re hab.
manual and
procedures
......,
Wr ite
repair/rehab .
specifications
..1
I
Assess li kely
repair/rehab. methods
f or each locat ion
Pr e-invest in
to ols for
repair /r ehab.
Set up standby repai r/
rehab. tool storage
facili ty
Pr e-qual i fy co nt ract ors to repa ir or
rehab subsea and onshore
pipe lines
Appoint
inspect ion
contractor
46
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The project management principles used on new pipelines should be applied to
pipeline rehabilitation:
Project Concept (Goal Statement)
Project Study and Definit ion (Plan of Execution)
Pre-Construct ion (Award Contract)
Construction
Ongoi ng operat ions (Inspect ion and maintenance)
Project management will co-o rdinate many different services, including
inspections, protection survey, coatin gs select ion, etc .. Problems may include:
scope of project difficult to define as many uncertainties exist (e.q. location of
cor rosion)
deali ng with older pipeline, whose design, drawings, etc" may be difficult to
locate/prove
proj ect s are often 'fast- tracked ' due to operational pressures
Project is often on a pressurised pipel ine with additional safety risks
lake up and removal of existing coating may be disposal problem
etc.!
ACTIONS
93
I DAMAGEIDETERIORATION REPORTED
I Reduce pressure? I
I Collect data I
Defect Assessment , I I
defi ne repair or ~
r ehab. requirements
Assess location of
damage, define access
requi rements
Mobilize co-ordination
and planning team
Decide action to
limit
environmental
damage &
hazards
Recommended
repair/rehab.
methods
..oj.
f _
Select
repairlre hab.
method
Organize
access and
consents
e f o a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a b . ..1
sta ndby
Carry out
repair/rehab.,
i nspection and
rein st atement
Mobilizetask
force for
repair/rehab &
damage limitation
47
REPAIR AND REHABILITATION - ACTIVITIES
PRELIMINARY STRATEGIC POSITI ON
1 Damage location , excavation and marking
2 Preliminary damage survey
3 Exposure and stabilization of damage site
4 Coating removal/pipe cleaning
5 Detailed inspection of damage
6 Damage assessment & reporting
FINAL STRATEGI C DECISIONS/COST MODELLI NG
7 Repair/rehabilitation method decision
8 Equipment fabrication and procurement
9 Repair/rehabilitation procedure pre-qualification tests
10 Repai r/rehabilitation damage
11 Inspection and documentation
12 Site reinstatemenUprotection
THE COST OF REPAIR AND REHABILITATION
About 25% of a pipeline company's maintenance budget is
taken up with repair, replacement and rehabi litation;
.50% of this is spent on inspection and monitoring, 30%
on compressors, control equipment, etc ..
This will be equivalent to about $400/km.
'Repair' - small scale remediation (e.g. repair defect)
'Rehabi litation' - large scale remediation (e.g. recoat)
96
48
WELDED SLEEVES - SOME WELDING GUIDANCE
AVOIDING BURNTHROUGH
_ Early work showed that burnthrough is unlikely, if you use low hydrogen electrodes and the
temperature beneath the welding arc is <1800F(982C).
_ WALL THICKNESS - This temperature is unlikely in wailihicknesses >;; 0.25"
using normal wel ding procedures
_ Welding onto thinner wall is possi ble with special, controlled procedures (e.g. low
heat input)
_Note thai internal press ure (hoop stress) and level of product flow are perceived as important
(some companies reduce pressure and ensu re a flow rate), but work at Battelle and EWI show
them to have low importance.
PRESSURE (st ress level) has litt le effect, as the size of heated area is smal l, and the
hoop stress can easily redistribute itself around the small area (as it does around a pit).
Actually. high stress may be beneficial: provi ded we have a flow rate, at high pressu re the
risk of burn through is lower, as the thermal cond uctivi ty of gas is hi gher at high pressu res'
_ Note that a pressu re reduct ion may be necessary to reduce risk of any defect
fai lure during inspection and repair
_ FLOW RATES - Maintaining flow does keep temperatures lower, but the thermal mass
of pipe and contents are more important, and they are usua lly below 982C even at low/no
flow rate'
_ There are programs avai lable for calculati ng heat flow and the risk of burnthrough - contact
Batt elle, USA, or EWI , USA
_ WE"""", Ho, ." o!lose" ,"" ""'" ' g' f'po-"o""''''W ''!J
""""' e<J"'Y Conl""""'" """' '''" . Fob 200 1
FlOW""e, mOl "" <"tlco' '''''' "' '" wal'od 6 ' ''' ''' II',," " ,.
98
49
AVOIDING HYDOGEN CRACKING
_As we are wel ding onto a pipeline with flow. the welds may cool very quickly.
_ This accelerated cooling can lead to hydrogen cracking, as the flowing product
removes heal from the pipewall
_ Hydrogen cracking requires three conditions:
Hydrogen in the weld
_ Susceptible weld microstructure
a 'Iensile stress acting on the weld
_To avoid hydrogen cracking, we must prevent one of these three conditions
_ We will inevitably have some residual stresses in a weld. therefore the primary
method of preventing hydrogen cracking. is to use low hydrogen electrodes or low
hydorgen processes.
_ If we cannot use low hydrogen electrodes/processes, we can:
_ Specify mi nimum required heat jnputlevet
_ Specify a temper bead deposition sequence
_ Specify a minimum required preheat temperature
_A combination of the above three
s... W 8"""" "' _ ' of " .......,"" ..".." .. .... .... . p,,,.,,.... ..... P9O""ll
.od '_ ', eo,.,l.........,. ,_ .."". F ;/001
UNDERWATER REPAIRS
C_ :ll;<lI R....'
100
50
HOT TAP - hyperbaric' welding underwater
_ Subsea hyperbaric welding is widely used for joining offshore oil and
gas pipelines and for underwater repairs to producti on platforms.
_ The welding is done by Divers or equipment installed by Divers in a dry
"habitat" whi ch is sealed onto the pipeline and filled with a breathable
mixture of helium and oxygen, at or slightly above the ambient pressure
at wh ich the welding is to take place.
_ The divers often prepare the equipment
and the actual welding can be controlled
from the surface by the mother ship.
_The area under the floor of the
Habitat is open to water.
_Thus the welding is done in the dry
but at the hydrostatic pressure of
the sea water surroundi ng the Habitat.
~ __GIIILO... _--.
PIPE SECTION REPLACEMENT - deepwater
offshore
_ SpOOl piece replacement is a more complex
repair requiring a much larger scope of details
in deepwater . There are two basic scenarios
for a replacement , which are as fol lows:
_Retri eve Pipeline Ends: One scenario is to
cut the damaged section from the pipeline,
retrieve both ends to the surface, weld repair
fittings onto the ends , lower the ends to the
sea floor, and install a spool piece, using Hydrotech Grip& Seal
a remote connector system.
_Repair on Bottom: Using this repair scenari o, the pipeline would also be cut on the
sea floor, the damaged section removed from the immedi ate location, and the
pipeli ne ends prepared (coali ng removal, etc.).
a r nenmechanical connectors, incl uding connectors for mating with the
replacement spool piece, would be slipped over the pipeline ends.
Based on measur ements made subsea by ROV. a spool piece would be
fabricated on the surface and lowered to the sea floor .
An ROV would activate the spool pi ece connectors and make the final lie-in.
'"
'"
51
PIPE SECTION REPLACEMENT - deepwater
offshore
[11'-_'-"H'-'''
'_ To US _ ....--s.-.__
_ 10" '_113
1
2111. __
---
.... ~ ......
_ """,'-"10...,...,. ..,.,..,..,ceI __f. _
".....,,1- - .).. ..
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",..><C ,_' .. _ ~ )
go, "''''''''''"'...~
_.
INTERNAL LINING
CP....- 2OOlI_'
''''
""
52
INTERNAL LINING
Pipeline is fitted with an internal liner to prevent furt her internal
corrosion; however the system has limitations:
pipeline has to be l aken out of service and cleaned
liner can onry be installed in short lengths (typically 800m)
ends of the l iner have to be seareoqoined to next section
concerns over use on sour service pipelines
There are many possible systems at present , e.q.:
Cur ed in- place - a thin reinfor ced text i le liner, fixed by adhesive
Modified slip lining - polyethylene liner compressed and expanded
u -Procese- pol yethyl en e deformed to U shape. roll ed in and expanded
High Density Polyethyl ene - installation method not established
HDPE LINING "SWAGELINING"
WWW_$wagelin'llQ.COlTl
105
53
INTERNAL PAINTING
Pipeline is painted internally to prevent future
corrosion.
Approximately 30 km can be done in one go.
Rigorous cleaning (mechanical and chemical)
required.
Batch of paint pushed through by pigs
Paint applied by robot
Cost - 30% of new pipeline construction.
OP...._ 2005_'
INTERNAL PAINTING
www.crc-evens.ccm
'08
54
EXTERNAL COATINGS FOR ONSHORE PIPELINES
' Field' coatings will not be as good as 'factory' app lied coatings:
Faclory coatings:
coat tar enamel (long and successful
record, and can operate up to BOC,
but now some health hazards identi fi ed).
asphalt enamel (considerable track record,
applied in si milar manner to coal tar, but
no iden tified health hazards) .
Coa llar & asphalt are soft mat erials and require careful handling
and usually sand padding/graded backfill , and care when field
bending (high strains - up to 4%.).
fusion bonded epo xy (can withst and higher temps (70- 100C). Resist s
di rect impacts, and is good for field bendi ng).
multi layer polyolefin (polyethylene (PEl doesn't bond to stee l, so multi
layer needed (e.q. fusion bonded pnmer/co-polymer adhesiveJPE
outer layer.
Resistant to damage. and the need for sand padd ing decreases).
_ '.!lEc-.,' """
109
,,,
55
(cant.)
' Field' coatings will not be as good as 'factory' appl ied coatings:
Field applied coatings will be lower quality than fact ory coatings:
Surface preparation - is the most important aspect of coali ng.
blast cleaning (manuall1ine travel ) by steel shot or sand .
Coaling removal - mechani cal bealing, mechanised scrap ing, high
pressure water jets.
Water jetti ng is extensively used , and can remove coaling (out
of ditch) on a 24 in. pipeline at a rate of - 3 m/min.
In situ rates are lower because of
ext ra care required with handling of
the pipeline.
Coati ng - Line travel machines can be
used. but they can only apply liquid
based coat ings
Cold appl ied bituminous wrap may
be used. but it is eas ily damaged by stones, etc.
..._------
REFURBISHING ONSHORE LINES
_ RECOATING - American Gas Association St udy gave the fol lowing
rehabilitation pref erences (compared to new const ructions)
SMALL DIAMETER, "10 LARGE DIAMETER, "10
REHAB ILITATION (NEW) REHABILITATION (NEW)
FBE o 46 0 63)
COAL TAR 18 13 17 19)
TAPE 46 18 33 7
PRECOATED 18 0 25 0
ASPHALT ENAMEL o 4 o 7
EXTRUDED PE o 29 o 4
COAL TAR EPOXY 18 0 17 0
e 'raoe is the most popular, if not favoured ,
coating for rehabilitation.
_ Mechanical wheel blasting and urethane
coating will give you a rate of -10 m/min on a
30- line.
56
PERMANENTITEMPORARY REPAIRS?
PERMANENTITEMPORARY REPAIRS?
Pipeline repairs are termed 'permanent' or 'temporary' .
For all pipe repairs, the operator needs to perform a structured risk
assessment that includes the consideration of all of the potential future
damage or deterioration mechanisms over the life-cycle of the repaired
pipe system. E.g.:
will internal metal loss of the pipe underneath the clamp cont inue?
will degradation of the elastomenc seal material occur?
These considerations will dictate the need for periodic inspection and/or
testing to the repair component.
The repair component itself may well be regarded as being a permanent
repair (a repair component that is intended to remain in place for the
remaining life of the piping system), but may require periodic exami nation.
A general repair philosophy would be:
replace like-for-like;
temporary repair until replacement can be carried out;
permanent repair only where replacement is not practical.
T""""""''''.''''' ''''. ....... Ppo """,,' _ OuiOOI r... UKHee" h "a S.,,,", E.occl ' 0, OHSI-K}f{o
TECHNOLOGYREPORT z001lO3!l 2001 Her "'.,"",y', S", on..". Off,,,,,.UK. ISBN0 71/ 6 :10097
11<
57
PERMANENTITEMPORARY REPAIRS'?
USA OPS: ... 'As to the permanency of repair, we are not
suggesting that the repair should last indefinitely. It need last
only as long as the pipe is expected to fast under normal
operating and maintenance conditions. '...
. . . '8 qualified repair method must have undergone ' 'reliable
engineering tests and analyses" to confirm that the method
meets the performance standard. '. . .
O _ :lOOll "-\lo '
-...sOOT tlo<>ooO ... RSP......rn _.,. , '"
.-
58
Risk (Integrity) Management
Penspen Integrity
1
PIPELI NE MANAGEMENT, PAPERWORK,
SYSTEMS, QUALITY ASSURANCE, TRAINING....
THEN YOU NEED
EVERyTHING
UNTIL SOMETHING HAPPENS...
_ In pipeline engineering, you don't need anything at all ...!
. You don't need qualified engineers,
. You don't need quality systems,
. You don't need to train anybody,
. You don', need risk management,
. You don', need management systems,
.Yes - you don', need anything!
2
WHY DO WE NEED RISK MANAGEMENT?
0_2OOIl_,
WE ALL TAKE RISKS
. We all take 'risks' :
_Fi nancial risks
.Health risks
_Travel risks
_Security risks
. Etc
.00 we calculate these risks?
In the UK. the annual chance of death from:
Cancer =3 )( 10-
3
Injury or poisoning = 3 x 1()-"
All types of accidents =2 )( UP
All types of road accident =6)( 10
5
All types of accidents wi th gas " 7 .. 10-
1
Lightning" 6 Jl 10 '
2
We NEED TO MANAGE THESE RISKS
_We all face ' hazards' or 'threats' (anything with the potential to cause
harm)
_ e.g. driving, crime, illness, etc..
_ We need to minimise (reduce the probability) our exposure to these
hazards, and also the 'consequences' or being affected by these hazards
e c onsequences such as inj ury, loss of earnings, etc.
a u er ce. we ' manage' both threats and consequences

~ Management of these risks is an important aspect of
--- all our lives.
We are all exposed to risk dail y, at work and in our
private lives, and often manage it subconsciouslv. ._
But in our business we need to ensure that .;. A "
we think about it actively! ' '""\.}{_.
&,<!I .I
WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?
5
_ Risk management is a system for dealing with the
likelihood that a future event will cause some kind of harm
to, e.g., peopl e, the environment, your business, etc..
_ Risk management provides strategie s, processes , and
tools to monitor, recognise, and deal wit h a risk event
5
3
WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?
_Risk management should be about practical steps to protect people from
real harm and suffering
_ It provides an overall benefit by balancing benefits and risks, with a
focus on reducing real risks. EJ

_ It is not concerned with creating a totally risk-free society
(impossible), or scaring people by exaggerating or publicising trivial
risks
_We attempt to reduce risk to 'ALARP' : As Low As Reasonably
Practicable
_In the pipeline business we are concerned with protecting people. the
environment, the pipeline owners, etc..
CP. ' sw' 2000R",,"" 7
'S " lIe's in italics based on !>llemenl by Bill Callaghan, Chair or and Safety Corrwnission, UK, Augu,t 2006
RI SK MANAGEMENT IS NOT A PANACEA '
_ Society increasingly asks for 'zero risk' .
_Zero risk is a myth.
_We are now applying risk management in most
industries, but we still experience oil spills,
explosions, terrorism, etc..
_ Our risk management processes will not be
perfect.
_We are dealing with complex problems, changing
conditions, and - always - we have the 'human'
factor.
_ Failures will continue...
4
RECENT 'INCIDENT'
9
Petro-chern site
Blast heard 200 miles away.
Europe's biggest peacetime fire.
Major accidents happen; for
example:
. Buncefield, UK. November 2005.
WHY DO ' I NCI DENTS' OCCUR?
10
5
'I NCI DENTS': Why?
_An 'incident' usually occurs when a ' system' breaks down,
as most systems have multiple ' barriers' that prevent failure.
_For example, we will be injured in a automobi le acci dent if: we are involved
in an incident; t he automobil e does not protect us; etc .
_For for a to fail Threat
from corrosion, the coaling must '"
be faulty, CP insuffici ent, " Barriers
inspections fail to del ecl, etc .
Incident
_All these 'bar riers' will have faults (nothing is perfect ), but t he incident will
only occur if all these faults 'line up' .
'I NCIDENTS': Why?
-So, our risk analysis must look at all threats, all barriers, and all
consequences, and understand how all these threats and barriers interact.
Threat
Faults
In barriers
No Incident
Threat

_ It's a bit like 'Swiss cheese' ..
6
'I NCI DENTS': ' Sw i ss Cheese' Model
_The ' Swiss Cheese' model was put forward by James Reason"
_ The basic model's hypothesis is thai 'accidents' can be traced to one or
more levels of failure.
_ These are typically quoted as:
eorqanisationa! influences;
. unsafe supervision;
a orecondmons for unsafe acts; and
_the unsafe acts themselves.
'INCIDENTS': 'Swiss Cheese' Model's Barriers
a ln the Swiss Cheese model , an organisation's defences against failure
are modell ed as a series of barriers, represented as slices of Swiss
cheese.
_ The holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in
individual parts of the system, and are conti nually varying in size and
position in all slices.
-
Potential
Threats
-
-
-
Barriers that reduce potent ial exposure
--.
"
7
'INCIDENTS': 'Swiss Cheese' Model Failure
PTClecti""
' Barn"",'
We. Im"""",,
. ~ Or 'Hole.
_The system as a whole ~
produces failures when all of the
holes In each of the slices momentarily
ahgn, perrnittinq (In Reason's words) "a
trajectory of accident opportunity" , so that a hazard Accident
passes through all of the holes in all of the
defences, leading to a failure
en- ese holes may be continua lly opening , shutting ,
and shifting their location!
Q P.n,,,,,,,soosR . ~ . 1 15
PROBABILITY, RISK, GAIN AND UNCERTAINTY
16
1M)
8
RISK: Some quick definitions
In engineering...
Probabili ty is 'chance' - the
chance of an uncertain event
(hazard) occurring;
Reli ability.. . is a probabil ity:
the probability that a system will
perf orm its intended function
during a specified period of time
under slaled conditions;
Consequence are the effects of
the event (hazard) occurring
Risk... is the combination of the
probability of an event occurring,
with its consequence;
Safety.. . is the absence of risk.
or the reciprocal of risk.
17
,"'
'RISK': What i s it?
_Ri sk is calculated by combining the

likelihood of a hazardous event, with its consequences . L
_ Risk is easy to visualise ....... ....
_ The lik elihood (or 'probability') of my trousers
d .

. high if I do not wear a belt or braces .....J
_average if I wear a bell , and .,.......
_low if I also wear braces.
e 'r ne cons equences of my trousers falli ng down is embarrassment.
_ If I'm weari ng underclothes I have
Jowembarrassment.
_ If I'm wearing no under clothes , I have
high embarrassment
OI'''-:/OOlI_'
ts
9
RISK: What is it?
_Ri sk is calculated by combining the l ikelihood of an event, with its
consequences
_ Likelihood ='how often' , and
ac onsequence > 'how good or bad' .
_Ri sk =a functi on of (Probabi l ity of the event occurri ng, Co nsequence
of the event)
Probability Consequences
__ill
I a ~
Risk I e:::::::) But what about ' gain... ?
0_ 2OOOl "*"" ,
The probability of winning the UK Lottery with a single t icket. and
getting the jackpot (match 6 of 6 main numbers) is ... 1 in 14,000.000.
ts
PIPELINE RISK: What is it?
.Risk ; Probability of failure, ~
Consequence of failure " ~
.Failure probability and consequences I .",
vary with the pipeline type. product, ., -
environment , etc.. C"'"'-"':::>
_ Failure pro babil ities will be a prediction of the
likelihood. over time, of all the likely failure
modes in the pipeline.
_ Failure consequence analysis will depend on -
release rate through orifices . toxicity of product .
generation and dispersion of vapour clouds and
flame jets. thermal radiation hazards, vapour
cloud explosions, etc..
..... no ... project is risk free . Ri sk can be managed, minimised. shared,
transferred or accepted. It cannot be i gnored". Q _ _ .. ....... ~
20
10
Gain
.,.
.......
.'
....
.'
.'
..
.'
......
Risk
_ I will not take a risk without a
gain
_Illustration:
_If I have 51000, and I
place it in a deposit
account in a bank .. . low
risk (of losing the money),
but low gain (poor interest
rate).
_If I place the $1000 in the
stock market. .. medium
risk , medium gain.
_If I place the $1000 on a
horse... high risk, high
gain, and also good fun!
'GAIN'
-----------------1

21
BALANCING RISK AND GAIN
_I now have to balance this Risk with any
Gai n.
This is controversial:
_If I show by risk analysis/management that I
can reduce maintenance costs with only a
slight increase in risk, who gains?
_The operator gains by decreased
maintenance budgets, but it is the public who
must car ry the increased risk. The public are
the losers.
_If I increase my maintenance and reduce
failu res, the reverse is true.
Never cut costs on operation/maintenance without a risk enalyeistttt
11
UNCERTAINTY & IGNORANCE>
_We cannot know everything: 'uncertainty' is
a state of knowl edge in which, although the
factors influenci ng the issue are identified , the
likelihood of any adverse effects or the effects
themselves cannot be precisely described.
_ This means we have 'imperfect
knowledge'.
e u ncertemty is unavoidable, and has many
manifestations (e.g. in knowledge or
modelling) and will affect the risk approach.
_ A risk analysis will help understand
uncertainties
23
UNCERTAINTY & IGNORANCE>
_We must disti nguish between uncertainty and
' ignorance': the latter refers to a lack of
awareness of factors influencing the issue .
_This is a well- recogn ised weakness in risk
assessment, that the identification of hazards
may be incomplete.
_The measures needed to counteract this
ignorance are a wide use of different
disciplines and skilled people
12
IGNORANCE AND MANAGERS'
.Management must be careful. ..
_Incidents, and the resulting crises, are
sometimes attributed to a combination of:
_An accumulation of flaws in an
organisation that provide the process for an
incident (e.g. the ' Swiss cheese' model);
_The development of managerial ignorance
or unawareness that leaves managers blind
to this accumulation.
'Ignorance' has been defined as a manager 's
(unintentional ) inabil ity to notice , and take into
consideration, this cumulati ng effect of an
organisations imperfections.
BP Chairman Peter Sutherland. 2007, in statement to shareholders: "Let me say at the ouuet
that BPis a great company It has a great oontonc of assets and exceseot peopl e '
C P"" gpeo 2006 Rev&'1 2 5
' C Rou._Wort. A ,...;00 "" ,,,,poo'Ioct_ , , ~ '" ,,1.1. "'''"_'''....., A""'"," , ,, "",_ont ",,",,"9 H.....; .....' z005 ZOOM". """ om"",," """
DOWNSIZING AND RE ORGANI SATION
_ Be aware that major change can affect
safety..
_ From the Texas City Refinery Report' :
_ The balance point between
minimum compliance and [safety]
optimisa tion is dictated by corporate
culture and upper management
standards.
_Downsizing and reorganisation
can result in a shift more toward the
minimum compliance approach .
_ This shift can result in a decrease
in internal [safety] monitoring,
auditing, and continued
improvement activity. ,
INVESTI GATION REPORr
R, ,,.,.v E , < > s , ~ AND F,
,,,...... ,,'-....
26
13
'RISK', 'RISK ANALYSIS', RISK ASSESSMENT',
'RISK MANAGEMENT'
0_2005_'
RISK: 'Voluntary' & 'Involuntary'
_ We tend 10ignore everyd ay risks like riding a bi ke,
alt hough fatalities from bike accidents are very frequent
_ Risks imposed upon us are less acceptable: a fatali ty
caused by a gas pipeline failure will create a huge public
react ion and outcry, although such fata lities are infrequent.
a c cotrast this with smoking cigarettes: tobacco is by far
the largest source of preventable deaths in the United
Slates. Diel and insufficient exercise also cause 1000s of
premature deaths
. Yet , there is little regulatory effort on reducing
smoking. etc ..
_ This is because peopl e judg e that smoking is a
volunta ry activity, and hence . the resulting deaths are
less troublesome than are other sorts of deaths.
_ Hence, the public will accept risks from voluntary
hazards (e.q. driving a car) that are many limes greater
than from involunt ary hazards (such as a nuclear
disaster).
~ ~
We are {oath to let
others do unto us
what we happily do
unto ourselves '
Chauncey Starr
za
14
RISK: 'Voluntary' & 'Involuntary'
Smoking.. . Voluntary Pi j:2el ines.. . Involunta
C""'=r 200li -. 29
'RISK ANALYSIS': What is it?
_Ri sk Analysis wilt calculate
a risk.
_ It usually compr ises of five
tasks:
_ System definition.
_Hazard identification.
_Probability assessment.
ec onsecuence analysis.
_Risk results .
' Ri sk' refer10 to events """"ere ceeoce
of occurrence 1$ kroowro If1 advance
' Uncertai nty' refer10 to events where
the ceances are I'l(lI known in
advance
From API 581
30
15
'RISK ANALYSIS': Estimating Risk
_We can estimate the level of risk:
Consequenc e
Il il: h

Lo w

rJ
.-<::

lM/
..
Very
Lo w
Probability
'RISK ANALYSIS': What is it?
_Risk analysis - the estimation of risk from the basic activity"
System definition

Perform risk calculations
Risk Analysis
'".,. 'M", "" ,,, . "'.... lJK_ th ' M S"fety E"., ut ,. Cfu..... ' T. ,,,,,,,",,,,, R""""
200 11""3. HS" BOO<S ""'" IS BNa71' . """ ,
16
'RISK ASSESSMENT': What is i t ?
_ Risk assessment - a review as to acceptability of risk based on
comparison with risk standards or criteria, and the trial of various risk
reduction measu res.'
System d finiti n
l!denl ify hazardS:1
l'P'ini ormrisk
I Compare with 'acceptable' risk levels
Risk Analysis I I
I
Risk Assessment
's.. ......,.... " " ......... nt', uK and Sol.". E,ow!".. 0 /"""" T""''''''''O\' R_
om","" H"" OOOKS. """ IsaN0"'. 2231 , 33
'RISK MANAGEMENT': What i s it?
_Ri sk management - the process of selecting appropriate risk reduction
measures and implementing them in the on-going management of the
activity'
Systemdefinitfonl
Ilpentifl\haZa'dsi
"erformrisk calculations
Compare with
'acceptable' risk
RiskAnalysis
levels
, ,
Perform cost benefits 1
I
Decisions, Actions,
Risk Assessment
Mitigation
Risk Management
r:
17
RISK ANALYSIS/MANAGEMENT: Summary
Hazard s:
Pr obability
Consequences
Risk Analysis
Risk
Assessment
Management
0_2006...,..-'
What could cause the pipeline to fail or not function correctly or
effi ciently? Corrosion, damage by third parties, etc..
Which is the higher probability of occurrence? lightening stri kes
are unlike ly, but corrosion is highly likel y on most pipelines.
What are the consequences of this threat occurring? Casualties?
Environmental damage?
We can then consider both probabilities and consequences, and
assess the overall risk associated with each hazard. Hazards
wit h low probabi lity of occurrence + low consequences would be
considered low risk. High probabi lity hazards + high
consequences would be cons idered high risk .
From the risk analysis, we obtain a risk value.
'Assessment' is comparing our calculated risk with an
'acceptable' risk
We need to put policies & procedures in place to both control &
mitigate all these hazards and their consequences.
35
SUMMARY: Risk Management and Risk
Assessment
Ri sk Manag ement i s an over all programme
II includes risk assessme nt
But it also incl udes mitigation methods, measuring the
performance of the mitigation methods, organisation of
my risk control s, etc ..
Ri sk As sessment i s an anal ytical p ro ces s
Jt identi fies all potential hazards to my pipeline and
consequences of any adverse effect caused by these
hazards
It compares this risk with a 'target' or 'acceptable' risk
Jt helps in our deci sion making,
But , NEVER rely only on your risk analysi s to assess
the overall integrity and safet y of your pipeline
Use risk management !
36
,.
18
CONTROLLING RISK
37
CONTROLLING RISK OF FAILURE: Location
Classes in ASME B31.8
Design Factor
(hoop st ress/SMYS)
""........orJ/nl". ".",*"g
...... _.
AREA CLASSIFICATION
..--'''' -'- -==----

.. _-
Class t (Div 1) 0.80
Class 1 (Div 2) 0- 10 buildings (rural ) 0.72
cress 2 11-45 buildings (areas around towns) 0.80
Class 3 46+ dwellings (e.g. suburban) 0.50
Class 4 Multi-st orey-type buildings OAO
J8
19
CLASS LOCATION AND INCIDENT FREQUENCY
_Areview of ' incidents' (reportable damage in pipelines) in USA pipelines
concluded that incidents/year decrease with Class location
_ i.e. incidents in Class 1 and 2 locations (high stress) are less
frequent than Class 3 and 4 areas:
_Class 3 and 4 -0.0045 incidents/year/mile
ac tass 1 and 2 -<0.0017 incidents/year/mi le
_ This can be explained simplisticall y:
emere are more activities thaI could damage a piperine in a
suburban area compared to a rural area ,
_ but it is more complex with many parameter s affecting these
incident rates.
_ . , ~ . l '-__~ ""'"
_ ~ , ~ _ . ... . _-.oo _ _ ,_"",
CONTROLLING RISKS
39
We can control and reduce pipeline fai lures and consequ ences:
Pipeline type, design, age, construction quality, product , environment,
Company operating practi ces, maintenance and inspection pract ices, local
social, economic and political environment , etc.. all affect failure probabilities
and consequences.
Controlling Pr obabilit ies . Examples:
Damage Prevention:
One Call System
Une Maril.ing or pipeline tape
Increased depth of cover or wall thickness
Improved third party information & Incr eased patrol s
Corrosion Control
CP checks
Rehabilitation or coatings
Pipeline cleaning
Cont rolling Consequences . Examples:
Leak detection
Improved emergency planning and response
e"."..,..,2000l R_'
..,
20
r
CONTROLLING RISKS: Effect of Time/Age"
Corrosion failure frequency/1000 km year
0.25
0.15
0.05
<1954 1954-
1963
1964-
1973
1974-
1983
1984-
1993
1994-
2001
Year of pipeline construction
CONTROLLING RISKS ('THREATS' ): Example from
USA Operator
Threats Main Assessment I Mitigation
External Corrosion Smart pig (MFL)
Internal Corrosion Smart pig (MFL)
Stress Corrosi on Cracking Hydrostatic ' Spike' Test
Manufacturing Hydrostatic Strength Test
Construction Hydrostatic Strength 'rest
Equipment Surveillance
3rd Party Damage
Surveillance I Damage Prevention
Program
Weather Related & Outside Forces Surveillance f Case Specific
Incorrect Operations Training
42
21
HOW TO CONDUCT A RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
_We have a variety of risk assessment techniques. Here is a simple summary of
techniques tha t can be used singu larly or in combination" :
Hazard Identification This is usua lly a list of all possible hazards thai might a-ise.
(HAZID)
Hazard and HAZOP closely examines the plant processes and
Operability Study identifies expected and unexpected hazards . The
(HAZOP) con sequences of these hazards will be considered, and
methods of mitigating or avoid ing them will be planned.
Risk Assessment We can use qua litative, quantitative methods to esta blish
the relative import ance of any risk
probability Modelling Fault tree analysis, Event trees, Block diagrams , Cause-
cons equence diagrams, etc
e&fi$equence This can be used to asses s the outcome of a hazard and
AnalySis check that mitigation methods are in place .
Fai lure Data Published or fi eld data on failures, etc., can be used in the
Collection and above techn iques, and they can give 'acceptable' ris k
Analysis l evels.
.. "-.
22
RISK ASSESSMENTS KEY ELEMENTS
Determine
if and why you
want a Risk Assessment
Estimate
Failure
PROBABILITY
Estimate
Failure
CONSEQUENCES
Who ""';11be involved In the
Assessment , and wi ll it
be Acceptable to
R ural Authorities?
IDENTIFYall Hazards
Calculate
RISK
Identify person/group
who cando the Assessment
Establish Database
of Pipel ine, Route and Plant
Est abli sh and Agree
ACCEPTABLE RISK
LEVELS
Implement, Control
Review and Audit
,
----- ----------'
Document all Analysis
sess If Company will
r---lAcce pt RIsk (compared
to Gain
RISK ASSESSMENTS: Simple - Qualitative
Approach
Qual itative risk assessment matrix
w
Ow
Zo::
W::J
::J ....l
@tt
(flLL
6
0
o
High
Pipeline Pipeline
B E
Medi um
Pipeline Pipeline
A D
Low
Pipeline
C
Low Medium High
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
Thi s analysis gi ves us a RELATIVE risk , or a RANKING,
II does nol give us a risk value. only a COMPARISON.
C _ 2OOli 1l_ l
23
-
RISK ASSESSMENTS: Complex - Quantitative
Approach
_ We can conduct a QUANTITATIVE risk
assessment (ORA)
_These assessments calculate
ABSOLUTE ri sk level s on both individuals
and groups
_We calcu late a ' probability' of becoming
casually.
_ E.g. 1 in a million chance of
injury/annum
_We compare this calculated probability
with a 'target' or ' acceptable' probability
_This targeUacceptable probability may be
obta ined from our Regulatory Body
_QUANTITATIVE ri sk assessment will involve
det ailed calculations, using software.
_ Some commercial software is available
-I .r
J
.. j,'
- ' . "'-
Risk =P
t x
C
t
Risk < Acceptable
QUANTATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS: Example 'QRA'
Algorithm for Pipeline
"
,..)
Make
Decision !
Identify
,
Hazards Determine
I
Failure
FreQuency'
,
Assess
Hca'Cu,atel
Failure
Modes
Risk
t
,
,
LJ Determi ne
IThermal

,
Outflow Probabilit Radiation Effects ,
,
,
,
I AssessJ
1- ________________ -IMitigation?

?
.
24
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT: Example for
Gasoline*
Probability
of Event
X Consequence of Event Compare
Probability Consequence I1IIJII(> with
of ignition Probability 'acceptable
' 00
Immediate Delayed
' risk
. .
Ignition
Ignition
V.,
Pool Fire
0.031
0.031
Pipeline
V., Pool Fire
Release
0.030
0.30 to 0.57/1000
0.03 1
km years"
No
I "likel y
0.969
consequence of
gasoline release
No
Unignited..c:
(94%) Is un-Ignited
Pool of gasoline
0.969
0.939
For a rup' u", ,., a o r., ..., I", ,,, R,,", 1,,,,,, Ga,oI "", Plpol,,,,,, '0 UOI1.o Kingdom HSE Coo,,,,,, ,
l(l()6 Ro, 6i ' R .-,ct1 R. ".,., e RR l 06i l 899, Hea lth & Soafety 1999
""'\I" dor->' on w ' '';d<,-''''' ,"""oo,",e
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS: Difficult t o apply
Popular for pipelines in Europe and Canada, but not popular in USA
and Latin America
!
1. 1,06 00
!
' .06 ,07
.
,
1.0,,-00
I- - J-_-J
,
"
("I )
25
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS: Linking
Risks to Public Concerns
evartous studies have established that hazards give rise to
concerns which can be put into two broad categories:
_1 . Individual concerns, or how individuals see the risk
from a part icular hazard affecting them and things they
val ue personally, i.e. how does the risk affect them, their
family and things they value.
People may be prepared to engage voluntarily in
activities that often involve high risks, but usuall y they
are far less tolerant of risks imposed on them and over
which they have little control. unless they consider the
risks as negligi ble.
Moreover, though they may be willing to live with a ~
risk that they do not regard as negligible. if it secures ~ ~ < ;
them or society certain benefits, they would want such
risks to be kept low and clearly controlled.
2. Soci et al concerns (see next)
avartous studies have established that hazards give rise to concerns
which can be put into two broad categories:
_1. Indi vidual conc erns (see pr evious)
_2. Societal co ncern s: these are the risks or threats from hazards
which impact on society and which, if realised, could have adver se
repercussions for the institutions responsible for putting in place the
provisions and arrangements for protecting people. e.g. the
Govemment of the day.
_This type of concern is often associated with hazards that give rise to
risks which , were they to materialise, could provoke a socio-pol itical
response, e.g. risk of events causing widespread or large scale
detri ment or the occur rence of multiple fatalities in a single event.
_Typical examples relate to nuclear power generation or railway travel.
_ Societal concerns due to the occurrence of multiple fatalities in a si ngle
event is known as societal ri sk .
52
26
Risks to Public Concerns'"

....
..
n'w""
lJroa,jJ,- an-",,' "hi ..
,...
'Roow'g """ . """act",\) """'"" HSE .' doc",,,,,",","',," HSE Boo'" KI P;>, 2001
53
Risk
lannum
0.000
0,00000
0.000000
1
0 s eing InjlJred
0
Having a
Automobile
0
Death by heart attack
accident
ecctoent 0
0
Death by
cancer
1
0
Ki lled by car
0
Death in
I
Accidental
whi le walking
drowning
o airplane
1
crash
o Killed by
I 1
light ning
Unacceptable
Tolerable
Acceptable
Low Degree of personal cont rol High
Being killed/injured by a pipeline failure is 'involuntary' risk
27
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS: Types Of
Risk
_ Risks from hazardous install ations are of interest to both the
individual who might be inj ured, and 10society in general.
_This means we must consider two types of risk:
. 'Indivi dual' risk is a measure of the risk to an individual who .-
might be located at any point in the effect zones of incidents. A
more formal definition is... -yo \
. 7 he frequency at which an individual may be
expected to sustai n a given level of 'harm from the
realisation of specified hazards'.
_An example of indi vidual risk is the risk of being killed in a
road accident in the UK about 100 in a million per year, on
average.
_ It should be noted thai individual risk is the same whether
there is actually one person at risk or many persons at the
same risk .
' Soc ietal'
RISK ASSESSMENTS: 'Complex' Approach Types
Of Risk
. Risks from hazardous installations are of interest to both the individual
who might be injur ed, and to society in general.
. This means we must consider two types of risk :
. 'Indi vidual ',
. ' Soci etal' risk is a measure of risk to a group of people in the effect
zones of incidents. A more formal definition is...
' he relationship between fr equency and the number of
people suffering from a specified level of harm in
a given population fr om the realisation 'I:
of specified hazards'.
An example of societal risk is air travel ,
where there is a 1 in 10 chance of a major
disaster in the U.K. per year.
It is the reaction of society which distinguishes soci etal risks .
(e.g. an oil rig disaster), from the more famili ar risks (e.g.
motoring), even thoug h the latter may result in more deaths/year
28
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETAL RISKS AROUND A
PIPELINE
To reduce risk: relocate line.
reduce pressure, etc..
Thi s is expensive.
0_ 2005 _'

, .,.> S.
Individual within a certain
distance from the pipeline
(' proXimity') , or above a
specified populati on density,
At risk 'X'
!- ..

Individuals within proximity, or
above a specified population
densi ty.
All are at risk 'X', but because
we have a 'group' we must
consider 'societal' ris k
57
OUTLINE OF A QUANTITATIVE INDIVIDUAL RISK
ANALYSIS
_ Individ ual Casualty Risk =Failure Frequency x Failure
Consequ ences
Failure Frequency =Incident Frequency (PI) x Failure Probability (? ,)
_Failure consequences depend on four main factors :
. Probability of ignition, P9 ....-
- Exposure probability, p. ..
. Probability of Being a Casualty, Pc
. Probability of interaction of failure with property, P,
_ Therefore:
Indivi dual Casualty Risk - Pi X PI X P
r
X P9 x P, X p.
Remember:
Risk Analysis will tell us HOWOFTENsomethi ng will
happen, bul it will nol tell us WHENil will happen.
se
29
OUTLINE OF A QUANTITATIVE INDIVIDUAL RISK
ANALYSIS
Individual Casualty Ri sk = P I x P
f
x P, X P\I X PcX p.
_ Some quoted values are:
Pi X PI = 4.5 x 1 ~ per km year for a rupture
Pc = 1
P, = 154 per km for a 914mm pipel ine
Pg =0.5
P, = 0.63
_ Giving: Ind ividual Risk = 0.2 x 10-6 per year
' ACCEPTABLE' FAILURE PROBABILITIES
(EXAMPLES ONLY)
OFFSHORE ACCEPTABLE FAILURE PROBABILITIES (per year)
Limi t States SAFETY ZONE OPEN WATER
Ultimate
10.
5
_ 10-6 10"3_10..4
Serviceabi lity
10.
1
_ 10.2
10.
1
_10-
2
ONSHORE
TARGET FAILURE PROBABILInES (per km)
MORE
LESS SERIOUS
Limit States SERIOUS SERVICEABILITY
(Urban)
(Remote)
Ultimate
10.
7
10
Serviceability
10"3
o _ ~ _
59
30
'ACCEPTABLE'INDIVIDUAL RISKS (FROM THE
UK)
INTOlERABLE
1 IN10.000 years
A$ LOWA$ IS
REASONABLY
PRACTICABLE
1 IN1,000,000 years
REASONABLY
ACCEPTABLE
3 lN 10,000 ,000 years
ACCEPTABLE
Lower probab ilities approach ' zero', i .e. 'never'.
A value of 'never' in the pipeline business has been quoted as 1 x 10-
12
_ _pipelinensk_a>m
'ACCEPTABLE' INDIVIDUAL RISKS (FROM THE
UK)
_These levels were obtained by the UK's Health and Safety Executive
from consideration of accident stati stics in various industries (ignoring
high risk occupations such as helicopter pilot)
_ A risk of death of about 1 in 1,000 per annum was considered 'jus t'
tolerable to society for a 'normal' working population.
_ The HSE then considered the death of a membe r of the public from a large
scale, hazardous industries. HSE proposed a tolerabl e figure of no less than
10 times lower: 1 in 10,000 per annum
In the UK, the annual chance of death
from:
Cancer = 3 x 10-
3
Injury or poisoning = 3 x 10'"
All types of accidents = 2 x 10'"
All types of road accident = 6 x 10$
Lightning =6 x 1
In UK industry, the annual chance of
death:
All employees = 8 x 1
Mining and Quarrying =1 x 10'"
Construction =6 x 10'$
Agriculture, forestry = 6 x 10$
Service industries =3 x 10.{i
3 1
'ACCEPTABLE' INDIVIDUAL RISKS (FROM THE
UK): The 'ALARP' Principle
_ The ALARP principle is establ ished in law in Britain by the 1949 case of
Edwards vs. the National Coal Board
_ Here it is stal ed that.. .
the case establi shed that a comput ation must be made in which the
quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice, whether in
money. time or trouble, involved in the measures necessary to avert the
risk, is placed on the other; and that, if it be shown that there is a gross
disproportion between them, the risk being insignificant in relation to the
sacrifice, the person upon whom the duty is laid discharges the burden of
proving that compl iance was not reasonably practicable.
63
' ACCEPTABLE' SOCIETAL RISKS (FROM THE UK
ROYAL SOCIETY)
10000 1000 100
No. of Death s, N
10
'F-N curves' are a graphical repr esentati on of the relati onship between the
annual probabil ity of an event causing N or mo re fatalities, and the number
of fatal ities; this being a common way of expressing societal risk issues.
E 0. 1
,
c
c
e
0.01

CI 0.001

z 0.0001
32
r:
BEING 'REASONABLY PRACTICABLE"
_ What if the cost of reducing the risk
to 'ALARP' is very high, or the
reduction impractical?
_ Risk management aims to be
' reasonably pract icable': this mean s
that we have to take action to control
the safety, environmental , financial ,
eic. . risks, except where lhe cost (in
terms of time and effort, as well as
money) of doing so is "grossly
disproportionate" 10the reduction in
the risk.
_We can calculate this (see previous.
and later ). or we can simply apply
accepted 'good practice' .
Cost Risks
BEING 'REASONABLY PRACTICABLE': Good
practice*
'Good practice' refers to practices that have been
acknowledged by HSE or local aut horities as
representing standards of comp liance with the law.
_II doesn 't mean "custom and practice"
necessa rily - that can be poor practice
e ano 'good pract ice' would be considered a
'minimum requi rement'
. Examples of ' good practice' are:
.guidance produced by other government
departments;
a stanoaros produced by Standards-making
organisations (eg. ISO, BS, CEN);
. guidance agreed by a body (e.g. trade federation,
professional institut ion, sports governing body)
representing an industrial/occupational sector;
. et c..
66
33
BEING 'REASONABLY PRACTICABLE': Cost of Life
(From the UK) in 'Tolerable' Region
_The question now is... 'How much would we be prepared to pay to
reduce the risk of dying in an accident?'
Transnort
Cost ($millinn)
Benchmark 1.5
1.3
R"il
?f1
Air 29
BEING 'REASONABLY PRACTICABLE': Cost of Life
Fr om the USA
Office of Pipel ine Safety' (2004)
For use in Cost/Benefit analysis
Injury Cost ($million)
Fatality 3
Serious injury 0.5
*Docket RSPA 00-7666 356
68
34
r:
COST OF FAILURES (FROM THE USA)
Office of Pipeline Safety' (2004)
Repair (non- leaking) to gas $20,000 to $40,000
pipeline
(depends"" wtlet her supply isinterrupted)
Repair (leaking) to gas pipeline -$200,000 to $400,000
Major failure to gas line -$5,000,000
*Docket RSPA00-7666 356
r-
MANAGEMENT OF RISK... using 'systems'
O P.,.,.., 2006 R",,6i'
35
MANAGERS & RISK MANAGEMENT
_ Risk 'management' requi res managers!
_ This management element should not be underestimated.
_ Management must impl ement the full risk management
process, and this can be difficult.
. Managers need to put in place systems that allow a full risk
assessment to be conducted, its recommendations
implemented, and the performance of the system reviewed
and audited.
_ This mi ght not be easy...
_ a manager may not be able to anticipate major incidents.
as he/she wi ll have basic assumptions about him/herself,
j heir position. their company. the world, etc.. and ...
collect ively, managers may have shared-beliefs about
possible incidents
_ How can we put a system in place?
O_2DlIri _ '
", _ _ . A_ "' -'_ _ _ _
MANAGING A PIPELINE SYSTEM
. We control risks. by managing them
_A pipeline system has many types of plant. buill using differing codes, and
under differing regulations:
Y
ASSETS
PROCESS PRESSt)RE PIPELI NES:
PLANT S STEk1S TRANSMISSION
HAZARDOUS
PRESSURE PIPELINE
REGULATIONS
RI8UT10N
PLANT
ESSElS SAFETY
CODES
ASMEVm,
ETC
DIFFERING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS NEEDED
e.g.ASME 831.8S
36
MANAGING A PIPELINE SYSTEM: Management
Syst e m
_ A Management System is a management plan
_ It is a document, that explains to company starr, customers,
regulatory authorities, etc., how the company and its assets
are managed, by stating:
. who is responsible for each aspect of the asset and its
management.
. what policies and processes are in place to achieve targets
and goals,
_how they are implemented
_ how performance is measured, and final ly,
e how the wtlole system is regularly reviewed and audited
_The document is agr eed al board level
.Many companies operate such a system in a piecemeal , or
unstructured manner
_ II is the production of a single. detailed document that
encompasses all the above aspects thai creates the 'system'
MANAGEMENT SYSTEML Key Elements
Policy
Policy
development
Organising
Organisationa l
I
deve lopment
Planning &
I
;j---.
Implementati on
\:
Deve loping

techniques of
Performance
planning,
measuring and
reviewing
Reviewing
Performance
Feedback loop to
Improve
performance
37
PIPELINE INTEGRITY/RISK MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
...... _- ..... ... --..
........
,,., . ,,,,,,,. ,.,, "-... _..
f
Integrity

Manag"ment
!
Organising
I
Planning &
I
Auditing
I-
Implementation
Measuring
Performance
Reviewing

2OCJ6R",,6I'
B
IUlh
DATA MANAGEMENT

v- i'-
c> Poe","", :1006Rov,,1
76
38
PIPELINE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM -
Implementation
1. Pi peline Integrity Management System
Philosophy, responsibilities, performance measures, review and
audit proced ures, and the overall integrify program
L..-,'"nt", egri!y' Management Plan & Schedule Risk Assessment
2. Pipeli ne Int egrity Implemen tation Pl an
(Inspection and mitigation methods and procedures)
!:-:__ when and how. .,,--:_"::--:,-'
Assess & collate results anal is tools} & Rep.airs Feedback
3. Database Management & Applications
Collate and update all data
... e.9,/ . G
0_2005_,
-n
DATA MANAGEMENT
piIDatabase

fiIIiII1iiI Database
Application sJSJi'
Database
Data Application Domain
e_2ODI_
Application B
Application c....
Data Warehouse Domain
39
DATA FORMATS
-
100
"
O Dlg lt a l
=
o Paper
80
%
60
40

20
JI
...
0
1995 2005
Documents produced!information available
79
Recent Changes in 'Integrity'
Regulations & Standards in the USA
Penspen Integrity
.tUS Regulations on Integrity Management Liquid & Gas Lines
./ API 1160 Integrity Management of Liquid lines
./ASME 831 Integrity Management of Gas lines
80
40
RECENT PIPELINE SAFETY IN USA
There have been a number of very high profil e,
tragi c pi pel ine accidents in the past coup le of
years in the USA, The most emotive was a 1999
failure of an onshore pasolene line (see right) - il
leaked into a river, and a subsequent ignition ki lled
three young people who wer e playinglfishing in the
river.
Unfortunately, it doesn't stop there - another big
failure of an onshore gas line in New Mexico in
2000 killed 12 campers (see right), and we are
now faced with a very unpopular pipe line
industry in the USA and a regu lator unde r siege.
81
US Department of Transportation
82
41
DOT, USA 'FINAL RULE': Liquid Lines 49 CFR
195.452 (Bac k 9round)
_ In 2000 , the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
proposed regulations that require pipeline integrity val idation +-
through inspection, testing, & anal ysis of pipelines that run
through/near high consequence areas (HeAs).
_HCAs are high population areas (e.g. 10.000peoorezsq
mile), 'busy' commercial navigable waterways, enviro nmental
sensitive area (as defined in 49 CFR 195.6),
_ OPS is issuing integrity management program
requirements in several steps .
_Natural gas and hazardous liqui ds have different physical
properties, pose differ ent risks, and the configuration of the
systems differ,
_ OPS has begu n a series of rul es by issuing requirements'
pertaining 10 hazardous liquid operators ,
C."<IHO SH T n
OE PA,RTMENT
0'
O m A T ~ :
" vu
1ll vm
TV IX_
v X
,
83
... .-...-_....... ,-- -..-_-----_._--_.. -
FINAL RULE: Liquid Lines. Requirement General
_The rule requir es operators to develop and
implement a written integrity management plan. This
plan must:
_ Identification of all pipeline segments that
mi ght affect a high consequence area, should
there be a fail ure, (to be completed by end of
2001)
_Aplan to perform a baseline assessment of
pipeline system by specified dates, e.g. smart
pigs. hydrotesti ng, etc.. (to be completed by
March 2002)
_ Integrity assessments conducted after
1995 may be considered acceptable.
provided they comply with the provisions of
the rule
..
42
FINAL RULE: Liquid Lines. Requirement - Integrity
Management Plan
_ The Plan must contain:
_ A process for identifying which pipel ine segments could affect a HCA
_ A baseline assessment plan (see next slide)
_ An analysis that integrates all avai lable information about the integri ty of
the entire pipeline and the consequences of a fai lure
e c rnerta for repair act ions to address integrity issues raised by the
assessment methods and informat ion analysis
_ A continual process of ass essment and evaluation to maint ain the
integri ty of a pipel ine
_ Identification of prevent ive and mitigative measures to protect the high
consequence area
_ Methods to measu re the effectiveness of the program
_ A process for review of integrity assessment results and information
analysis by a qualified person
0_2006_-' 85

FINAL RULE: Liquid Lines. Requirement - Baseline
Assessment
_ Baseline assessment must include identificat ion of
all pipeline segments, methods to assess integrity,
sche dule for integrity assessments, and explanation
of all risk factors.
_ Following the base line assessment, a ri sk analysis
is required on any segment impacting HCAs
_ Note that smart pigs ar e not considered suitable
for ERW or lap welded pipe with a failure history
_The baseline assessment must be 50% complete
by Sept 2004 , and complete by March 2008 .
r:
0 _ 20061le61'
43
FINAL RULE: Liquid Lines. Baseline Assessment
(a pipeline's first integrity assessment)
_THEASSESSMENT
. ', ..all of the actions that must be performed to determine the condition of
the pipe and to repair it if condi tions wanant. This includes
conducting internal inspections or hydrostatic tests f' r FI
or implementing other technology that provides an -
equi valent understanding of the condition of the line.. . I .J I . - l "'-
and the resulting evaluation, excavation, and repair. ' _.
_ IT MUST INCLUDE
. ',.. a written plan for performing the baseline assessments necessary /0
assure pipeline integrity for each pipeline segment that could impact an HCA
It must include : , I I
- Identification of all the pipeline segments that can affect an HCA E ,
- The integrity assessment method, or methods, planned for
use on each identified pipeline segment i
- A schedule for assessment of each identified segment
- An explanation of the technical basis for the integrity assessment methOd(s)
selected and the risk factors used in scheduling the assessments.'
0_""""_'
FINAL RULE: Liquid Lines. Progress in 2004
_ There are miles of onshore and offshore liquid pipelines in the USA.
_The number of pipeline segment miles that coul d affect HCAs is -70,000 miles.
e r rese HCA segments constit ute approximate ly 43 percent of the total liquid oicetm-s
in the Integrity Management (1M) program,
_In 2004. the Total Pipeline Miles Inspected due to the liquid integrit y management
requirements was -95,000 Miles.
_ This mileage includes both the miles Inspected In pipeline segments that could affect
HCAs as well as the miles inspected coocoenr WIth the HCA inspectlons required by
the LIQuid 1M Rule.
_ The number of pipeline segment mi les Inspected thai could affect HCAs was
mi les.
_ There were .700 ccoetcos repaired Of mit igated in pipeline segments that could
affect HCAs that were classifi ed as needing 'Immedlate "attention, and -3.800 other
ccontcoe were repai red Of mitigated on a 'sceeourer basis as reqered by the LIQuid
1M Rule.
_ In 2004, there were more than an additional 11,000 anomalies repaired Of mltigated -
both WIthIn pipeline segments that could affect HCAs and In pipe segments that could
not -tnat were not reqoeed by the l iQuid 1M Rule
88
44
r>
FINAL RULE: Gas Pipelines 49 CFR Part 192 11!'t9Cil
(Background)
_USA DOT has issued a final rule for* transmission -.
gas lines (methane, hydrogen. ..) on Pipeline
.,
s
Integrity Management in December 2003
r'
_ Rel ies (quotes) heavily on A$ME 631.8S --- ........-
> .
eo oerators must ident ify ' high consequence areas'
r _-'-'- "'___
_ Must have an integrity management program
_ Identify all threats to the pipeline in these 'HCAs' usi ng
risk assessment - ASME 631 .8$ 'HCAs'
_HCAs: 8
_ Class 3 and 4 locations g
_ There are exceptions based on building densit y within ...n... -.n.
an area around the pipeline I n [J
[] [] J;I gl
An area of a circle of threshold radius 1000 feet or larger =0 0
that has a cluster of 20 or more buildings Intended for human --" -
occupancy.
e Peo"",o 2006 "".611
89
" "'" "'" Opell, . , "' _ .(0 ' 114) I" ..
FINAL RULE: Gas Pipel ines . 49 CFR Part 192. _ Q il
I nte9rity Management Flowchart
1. Ident ify 'high conseq uence areas' :
Use cl ass locati on or 'impact circles'
2. (a) Identi fy Threats and (b) Perfor m Risk

Assessment

3. Produce Baseline Plan
I

4. Remediation I
<,
"'S.) \ dditional Preventative &
Mitigation Measures

6. Continual Evaluation &
J Reassessment
cPO' ''''''" 2006 R..,..,6I1
90
'"
45
FINAL RULE: Gas Pipelines. 49 CFR Part 192. ' i , ~
Progress in 2005'
a There are -295,000 Total Gas Transmission Miles of onshore and offshore
pipeline in the USA
a There are -20,000 Total HCA Miles (-7%of the Total Gas Transmission Miles )
a Duri ng 2005, the Pipe line Miles Inspected due to the gas integrity
management requirements was -20,000Miles (- 7% Tota l Gas Transmission
Mil es .
_ This mileage includes both the pipel ine miles outside of HCAs (inspected dUrIrIg the
HCA inspections) and the pipeli ne miles of HCA.
_ The HCA miles Inspected was nearly 2,800
. Pipeline operat ors completed nearly 240 Repairs clas sified as needing 'i mmediate'
attention and roughly 400 Repairs class ified as ' scheduled' in HCAs.
_ There wer e 10 "incidents' (involving damages 01$50 ,000. inj uries, or fatahlles) Wlth
Third Party Damage
_ There were 104 'l eaks' in HCAs with equipment and external corrosion being the
leading causes or the leaks.
_ There were 20failures (deemed unsuitable lor ccouooeooperation but no release
of gas occurred) 'Mth external corrosion being the leading cause ol l ailures .
O_2o:lI_'
STANDARDS/CODES FOR PIPELINE INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT
_There are two published document s that give guidance on Pipeline
Integr ity Management:
_Liquid lines: API 1160
_Gas Iines:Supplement S of A SME 831.8
_They both require a detailed integrity management ' program' , that
includes an integrity management 'plan'
PIPELINE INTEGITY MANAGEMENT
I I
API 1160 ASME B31.8S
rogra
sr
.,
46
American Petroleum Institute: API1160
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMES &
API1160
93
_The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) requires operators
of HCA pipelines to have an integrity management
program that continually assesses and evaluates the
integrity of He pipelines.
_API has produced a standard on pipel ine integrity
management based on industry experience and
practices
_This st andard int ends to provide a basi s for a
company's approach to complying wit h the new
Regul ati ons (CFR 195.452) of the USA DOT.
_This standard-development initiative is titled
"Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid
Lines", 1st Ed. , API Standard 1160-2001.
_ It was published in November 2001
(hltp: /lwww,ap i.orgicaU)
47
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMES &
API1160 - High Consequence Areas
aAPI1160 defines ' high consequence areas' as:
. high population area - urbani zed area, containing 50,000 or more
people and has a population density of at least 1,000 people per
square mile .
aother populated area - concentrated population, such as an
incorporated or unincorporated city, town, village, or other designated
residential or commercial area.
commercially navigabl e waterway - a substantial likelihood of
commercial navigation exists.
earea of the environment that has been designated as unusually
sensitive to oil spills - an unusually sensitive area ('USA' )
95
I NTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS &
API1160
aAn Integri ty Management Programme:
etoennnes & analyses all events that could lead to failure
_Examines likelihood and consequences of potent ial pipeline incidents
_Examines and compares all risks
_ProIJi des a framework to select and implement risk mi tigation measures
_Established and Tracks performance, with the goat of improvement
_The programme starts with a good pipeline design & construction, and
satisfying all other legal and code requirements
_ It is flexible
_ It is built on trained people, using defined processes
_ Integration of all informat ion is a key requirement
_ It should be tai lored to an operator's needs
_ It should be continually evaluated and reviewed internally
_An integral part is a risk assessment, and this is a continuous process
_It must take act ion when significant damage , etc" is detected or expected
_It should use new technology as appropriate
_It should be internally and externally audited
_There is no 'best approach' ,
48
r:
FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRITY MANAGEMENTI!l!l!l!iI: b
PROGRAMS: API1160
Identify Potential
Pipeline Impact to
HCAs
Revise
Inspection/Mitigation
Initial data gathering
and review
Initial Risk
Assessment
Develop Basel ine
Plan
Reassess risk
Update Data
1
Manage Change
BASELINE ASSESSMENT PLAN IN API1160
r>
_ The Baseline Plan is developed after gathering all necessary data , and having
conducted the ri sk assessment
e w r en developi ng the Plan, an oper ator shou ld consider:
. Pipeline anomalies thai may lead to failure
_T he inspection techniqu es available
. Methodologies for eval uation of in line inspection data
. Pipeli ne repair methodo logies and other mitigation activities
_The Plan consi sts of:
_An initial inspection plan
_ The most appropriate i nspecti on method for each seg ment must be ident ified
_ E.g. hydrotesting or smart pigs
_ The inspections should be prioritised
_ Possibly some mitigati on measures, including a schedule
_ E.g, mitigating spills
98
49
RISK ASSESSMENT IN API1160 l'I.\i!l.'!'
Errors US>n!J IfIMI8quaIe da ta 8ITI much
Jess /Jl,Jtl usiIg nodatB 8 f air.
Charles Babbage (1192-1811)
_ The goal of a risk assessment is to identify and prioriuse all pipeline threats
_ Risk assessments are continuous processes, and should be part of the company's
daily processes. They wi ll need data
_Absence of data wi ll lead to uncertainty
_ Don't panic! Flag up data gaps, and go oul
and generate that data
. You can perform your initial assessment using limited data
_ A learn approach is best for risk assessment , so adequate resources are needed.
_ Steps are :
_ Form expert team' Agree structured approach
. Identify risks using past/present data. but focus on possible future mishaps
_Quantify and rank risks
. Mitigate high risks
_ Review and audit
_ Ensure a feedback loop as new data is continuously generated
_Start again!
" II StaII_
... _ . _1_WIIurft*",_
99
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: API1 160
_ We need t o evaluate how effective our integrity managemen t program is'
_Did you do what you said you were going to do?
_Was what you said you were going to do effecti ve in addressing the issues of
integrity in your pipeline
_ API 116 0 requires at least 10 performance measu res.
_ TM y shal l include:
_A goal to reduce the number of unintended releases, WIth a goal of 0 rel eases.
_ A goal to reduce the volumes of rel eases, WIt h a goal of 0 releases.
_ Ameasure of integri ty management activities completed in a year.
_ Effectiveness of a company's community 'outreach' activi ties.
_ Anarrative of the system, and a record of its improvements.
_ They should indude:
eoer coseeucothat high risk areas have been reduced
_ Intemell audit showing improvement
_ Extemal audit showing improvement
eoenonsneucothat operational events (e.g. SCADA outages ) are imprOVIng
e oemonsueuoo that the risk associated WIth Iachnes and terminals are decreasing with
' m,
C_ 2OO$ _ '
' 00
50
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(A5ME) - A5ME B31.85-2001
'2i- -
.
111.....'
.. TlU .'1"
.' \l ..
I'll..... "
c ..<...pu ."n
A5ME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT:
A5ME B31 .85-2001
'"
. In 2002 The American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) has produced an integrity management appendix for
its ASME 831 code.
' Managing System Integrity of Gas Pip elines' ,
ASME 631 .8S-2001
. Applicable to onshore pipel in e systems
constructed with ferrous material s that tr ansport
9
0s
. It is similar to API 1160, but is speci fically related to
gas (ASME 831.8) pipelines.
Under this ASME initiative. there are other documents
being produced by organisations such as the National
Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) that wi ll
contribute to integrity management.
. Students are directed to the websnes of ASME, NACE and
also the US Office of Pipeline Safety for further, up to date,
information.
III
'"
51
ASME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT:
ASME 831 .8S-2001
. 'Ma nagi ng System Int egri ty of Gas Pipelines' ,
ASME 8 31.85-2001
'A comprehensive, systematic and integrated
integrity management program provides the means
to improve the safety of pipel ine systems. Such an
integrity management program provides the
information for an operator to effectively allocate
resources for appropriate prevention. detection and
mitigation activit ies that will resul t in improved safet y
and a reduction in the number of incident s. '
_ II is similar to API 1160, but is specifically related
to gas (ASME B31.8) pi pelines,
ASME 831.8S-2001
SAFETY
'03
ASME1-13 1.1)$-2001
!nlcgny

_ This standard describes a process that an operator of a pipeline system can use to
assess and mitigate risks in order to reduce both the likelihood and consequences of
incidents
. The standard covers both a prescript i ve and a performance based integrity
management program.
Integrity Management Program
Elements in A8 ME 831 .88 2001.
1

M.nogomcnt
Plan
seeti ,,"
l'",fQm,,,,,.<
' M
S<>.:t'0lI9
""""""coti.
'M
S/leli"" lO

Coolrol
".

'"
52
A5ME B31.85 & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT-
Identify 'High Consequence Areas'
'"
"-' - 1
--
~ ~
~ - ~ - i )
~
: ; . ..-
----
--
c ee-,
0 - _
w-
0 -
0 - -
_The USA regulations require
integrity management in all 'high
consequence areas '.
_ These areas can be identified
either by Crass Location of
' potent ial impact circles" (see next)
'--_...--.. -=--
A5ME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT - ' I mpac t
Areas' i n A5ME B31.85 .'""""' .. ,Ii "' ff( T)
_ We need to know the size of the area around our pipeline thai woul d be
affected if the pipeline was to fail.
_We will call thi s the 'refined radius of impact'
_ASME 831.85 gives us guidelines on calculating this radius.
_ It is based on work at the Gas Research Institute
_ The affected area extends from the centre of the first affected circle to
the cent re of the last affect ed circle
_The number buildings in the
affected area can then be used
to determine a relative
consequence of a rupture for this
pipeline segment
""
53
A5ME 831.85 & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT-
Identify 'High Consequence Areas'
... _-
" s"st..m
IncludCI T" "i. ....... "' '''--_--'
u..... .. O lfledln ....
48 CfP. 192.3'
1. Identify HCAs
'-"T"'""'"j
\/101;<1"';""
____ legend .__
0
_ - ,
.......,ssmll!'Nl
o Commu n;<-':ion
o 0".,.,,,,, POll1t
.The USA regulations require
integrity management in all 'high
consequence areas'.
.These areas can be identified
either by Class Location of
'potential impact circles* (see next)
Ch'''lll or 2 10, ooIlon
with I'tR >661n. OO
n Of more Buil dings
Int .. nd.. d lor Hums"

PICCool "lnloll
2. or More
BUHdfngsllllended
lor IIum."
Oecupsncy'"
Penspen 2006 Rev6/ 1
"f>rorMod 8<j,O'll e.:.....t
Aj'o..-:lllr'tli D<tc.ll.2OOG
_ ' a:! .'3Ol
"Image fromhttp://ptimis.phmsa.dOl.govlgasimplflow2.htm
IN)
A5ME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT - 'Impact _=-,..,
Areas' in A5ME 831.85 .,,'1#1( ~
" OO ft
660 ft .
rooo ft.
Pipel ine
_The refined radius of impact
for natural gas is calculated usi ng
the formula:
.r = .69 ~ d ,,<I'p
where r is the radius of the impact
circle in feet,
e o is the pipeline segment's maximum
allowable operating pressure (MAOP)
in psig, ~ , . 1'<;, , . , . . ~ , ~ .. . . . . . , ~ <h. "'"", f,., HJ"' '''' " j"' .. MA' " of I .t<" ,".
_ d is the out side diameter of the pipeline in inches.
_F or example, a 3D-inch diameter pipe with a maximu m allowable operating
pressure of 1000 psig, has a potential impact radius of approximately 660-ft:
r = .69 * d 'i'p =.69 (30 in) (1000 Ib/i n
2
) 112 = 654.6 ft '" 660 ft .
GRI-DQI01B9_ A Model f()/ Siting High Consequence Areas Associated wilh Nal u,al Gas Pi pelines
Note that the 0.69 factor IS10.- natural gas _ other gases will ha ve other fact ors
'"
A5ME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: 'Impact
Areas' for Consequence Analysis e t I ~ ,
_The operator counts the number of houses & individual units in buildings
within the pot ential impact area. The potential impact area extends from
the center of the first affected circle to the center of the last affected circre
_This housing unit count can then be used to help determine the relative
consequences of a rupture of the pipel ine segment.
_M INIMUM CONSEQUENCES TO BE CONS IDERED:
e r ocuteuoodensity
. Proximity of the population to the pipeline (including considerat ion of manmade or
natural barriers that may provide some level of protection)
. Proximity of populations with limited or impaired mobi lity [e.q.. hospitals. schools,
chi ld-care centers, retirement communities, prisons. recreation areas) particularly in
unprotected outside areas
. Property damage
. Environmental damage
_Effects of unignited gas releases
_Security of gas supply (e.g.. impacts resulting from interruption of service)
_Public convenience and necessity
_Potential for secondary failures
'08
54
A5ME 831.85 & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: ~ . =
Integrity Management Plan Process Flow Diagram
Identify Potential
Gathering, Reviewing
Pipeline Impact
& Integrating Data
By Threat
I
I Risk Assessment I
I
In line
Evaluate All Threats t
Inspect,
Ilo'egeityALe"meo,-J
Hyorotest .
Direct
Assessment .
I
Or 'Other'
Response to Integrity
Assessment & Mit igation
O_2OOlI_'
'"
A5ME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: Ri sk
Assessments
tIM,
_ Objectives:
. Prioritization of pipelines/segment s for scheduling integrity assessments
and mitigating act ion.
Assessment of the benefits derived from mitigating action.
e b eterrnmauon of the most effective mitigation measures for the identified
threat s.
Assessment of the integri ty impact from modified inspection intervals.
Assessment of the use of or need for alternative inspection
methodologies.
'Ifa man will begin With certamtleS, he wiN
_ More effective resource allocation.
endin doubts: but d he will be content to
. RISK =f(THREATS. CONSEQUENCES)
begin with doubts, he will endm
certainties '.
Francis Bacon (1561 1626),
Advancement of Leami ng
0 ","- 2OOlI_'
'"
55
ASME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT - Risk
Assessments (Threats' to Pipeli ne)
_Time Dependent : External Corrosion . Internal Corrosion. Stress
Corrosion Cracking
_Stabl e : Manufacturing Related Defects (Defective pipe seam, Defective
pipe): Welding/Fabrication Related (Defective pipe girth weld, Defective
fabrication weld, Wrinkle bend or buckle . Stripped threadslbroken
pipe/coupling failure); Equipment (Gasket O-ring failure . Control /Relief
equipment malfunction, Seal/pump packing failure . Miscellaneous)
_Time Independent : Third Partyl Mechanical Damage (Damage inflicted
by first , second . or third parties (instantaneousfimmediale failure),
Previously damaged pipe (delayed failure mode), Vandalism): Incorrect
Operations( Incorrect operational procedure; Weather Related and
Outside Force (Cold weather, Lightning, Heavy rains or floods, Earth
Movements)
. (The interactive nature of threats (more than one threat occurring at a
section of pipeline at the same time) needs to be considered).
__ _.__"' . _._________ 111
""- __.. _ __.. __ oo.._ ..... _ .. __, _ . _, __ _ ,
Assessments Gfi( )
. Following, and using, the priorities determined by the risk assess ment,
the operator shall conduct integrity assessments using:
_ in_line inspection, f..M,,":
_ pressure testing, _ "t
_dIrect assessment .......
eorrect assessment is an integrity assessment method utilizing a
structured process through which the operator is able to integrate
knowledg e of the physical characteristics and operating history of
a pipeline system or segment with the results of inspection,
examination and evaluation in order to determine the integrity.
_ External corrosion, e.q. indirect assessment using coat ing
survey, followed by excavation and direct measurement
. Intemal corrosion, e.g. examinations of low points
a other methodologies
uz
56
ASME & INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT: Prescriptive
Integrity Assessment lntarvats for Corrosion
IIm@
Prescr ipt ive Inte grity Management Plan for >=50% SMYS lines
Ins pection Technique Int erval years ) Criteria
5
Test Pressure to at ieaett.zs limes MAQP
Hydrostatic Test ing
10
Test Pressure to at least 1.39 times MAOP
20
Not allowed
In-line Inspection
5
I
Predic ted Fai lure Pressure above 1.zsumes MAQP
10 Predicted Fai lure Pressure above 1.39 li mes MAOP
20
Not allowed
Direct Assessment
5
I
Maxi mum interval w'hen indi cations are examined on sampling basis
10 Maximum interval with all indications examined
20 Not allowed
_Lines operating at <50% SMYS have different interval s (see ASME 831.85-2001)
_ Failure pressure is calculated using ASME B31G or slmil" ,
_JF Kielner at Prceunetaro Piggmg e o ~ f e r e n e Houston. January 2002 said above is not really applicable 10
mechanical damage in plpel,nes; It is aimed at corrosion, Also, It is not for fat igue cycled lines - this table is aimed at
gas lines that - unlike liquid lines - are not usually pressure cycled. Also, it is nol intended for use with sec.
_ It is guidance, and guidance does not cover everything. If your pipeline ;s not covered by the guidance, it is YOUR
responsiba.ty to produce a safe altemat ive.
<W on""", 2006 " ",, 611
na
SUMMARY
11'
57
SUMMARY: Integrity/Risk Management in USA
New regulations in USA requi re ' integrity management' of liquid and gas
pipelines
A major element of this integri ty management is 'ri sk analysi s' and 'ri sk
management'
An integrity or risk management system can be constructed using:
..--
._,
..,,,...
.. .. ~ . , , .
'"
. ""-,,".,,,,,.
" ",..."
" ,.. .....", ,,
I I
.=
'"
o
--_..
...._--
I 0 11 - I
INTEGRITY/RISK MANAGEMENT
I I I ""'" I I I
API 1160 1l;;.", ASME B31S
L-__-' _ I!Ii(, I ;!1 ~ ~ I
III
@,!tl( ,
The pipeline indust ry now has methods thai can allow it to design and
operate their pipel ines in a safer and more cost -beneficial manner using
' risk management' .
'"
SUMMARY: Pipeline Integrity Management
Aud lll"ll
Gathering, R..lewlng
& Integrati ng Oala
s.....n ~
"',.,_t.
Di...a
As ..u ........
~ -
Pi peline Integrity Management
Syst em/Program
Pi peli ne Integrity Management
Pr ogram/ Plan
'"
'"'
58
SUMMARY; Key Elements of ASME B31.8S & API
1160
IThreat (Hazard) Assessment I
IRisk Assessment I
I'Inspections' I
IData Management I dell
=
0_2OIl6-. 117
SUMMARY: Risk Management Systems
NOTE I!! - It should be emphasised that risk
management will not reduce risk to zero - this is
an impossibl e dream.
Pipe lines will al ways pose some level of risk - our
challenge i s to control this risk to a reasonable
level. Fai lures will occur, even under the most strict
and thorough risk management programme.
For example the Carlsbad failure is thought to have
been caused by internal corrosi on. The failure was
in a nat ural gas line (where you would not expect
internal corrosi on to be the main fai lure problem),
and the casualli eslfatal ities occurred in a 'Class t '
area (remote. rural).
A risk assessment of this line and l ocation
would probably have shown this to be a highly
unlikely event and outcome.
0 _2006_'1
'"
59
CLASS TUTORIAL: 'Prioritisation'
CLASS TUTORIAL: 'Prioritisation'
'"
4
Pipeli ne
Form expert learn -I will now form these
teams.. at random.
Agree structured approach - I will give you a
structured approach
Identify risks using pest/present data, but focus
on possi ble future mishaps - you will do this.
Quant ify and rank risks - you will do this
After this. we could: M<tigate high risks: Review and audit;
Ensure a feedback loop as new data is continuously
generated: Start again!
We will now perform a 'risk assessment' of 3 RiS;k,-- c-__---,
pipelines.
We are going to use a ' Prioritisation Scheme'
Pipelines can be 'ortortttseo' to allow us to
determine an opti mum inspection and maintenance
schedule, identify high risk pi pelines, etc..
For these types of qual itati ve risk assessments. we need
to:
60
1. THE ELEMENTS OF A PRIORITISATION SCHEME
Identify all potential modes of
failure.
Est imate the probabil ity of
failure for each mode.
Identify and determine the
consequences of failure for...-.lil..
each mode. -...
Combi ne the probability and
consequences of failure to
estimate the risk.
Rank pipelines within a group
in order of risk.
2. PIPELINE PRIORITISATION
P,
c,
'"
Pipel ine
Internal Corrosion
Information
External Corrosion
Loss of Human life
Fatigue
Damage to Property
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Lossof Service
Third Party Damage
Cost of Fai lure
loss of Ground SupPOrt
Envi ronmental Effects
Third Party Intervention
Susceptibility II
Severity
I ,- ,-
0
RelativeRisk
""'"
nces OfFal ure
I
PRIORITY RATING
I
tza
61
3. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS:
Prioritisat ion (Susceptibility and Severity)
.Probability of failure depends on
'susceptibility' & 'severity'
. For example, a pipeline passing
throu gh heavily popul ated area, is
susceptible to third party damage. If
it is thin walled, it will resul t in severe
dama ge.
_ For example, a pipeline with many
seam weld defects (e.q. a pipeline
that has failed a number of times on
hydrotest), is susceptible to fatigue,
but if the pipeline is not pressure
cycl ed it will not be severe.
Suscepti ble
() )

Severity
4. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS -
PRIORITISATlON: Calculation
_Relative risk =Probability of failure x
Consequence of failure:
Probability of failure = Sum of all (7)
failure probabi lities, PI
_Individual probabilities =
Suscepti bility Factor (S, ) x
Severity Factor (S,) = P,
_Consequences of failure = Sum of
all (5) consequences = C,
I> Po, ,,,,," 2006 ><",,6; ,
62
5. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS
' RANKI NG' PARAMETERS: Quantifying Factors
_Rank probability of external corrosion
on a scale of 0 to 100
_Take into account parameters such as
coating type (bare pipe, modern factory
coated, etc.). age & quality, CP avai labil ity
& effi ciency & type, soi l type.
_Rank probability of mechanical
damage:
_ Remote (desert?) pipe to a short length
offshore pipe. in busy shipping and fishing
channel
_ Etc
o ~ ~ _
6. SI MPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS
'RANKING' PARAMETERS: Algorithms
tzs
I
Probability of
External Corrosion
I
AI Coaling I
I y ~ I IQuali l)' I I Age II [(flO'''"') I IA.......I.y I I Type I
Ia Ib Ie I I I
10-,11 0- 111 0-'110-'11
0
-'11 0-11
I I I I I I
1 ,11 " ll cII D I I 'II F I
CI So;, I
I
I Ty", I
I
I 0 - I I
I
I G I
Probability = A(Coating) + B(CP) +C(Soil) ~ 100 max
Coating score = a(lypc) +b(quality) + ctagc)
0 __2DDII_0I1
63
7. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTSL:
Worked Example
Score each parameter up to 100
PROBABI LITY

=-

=
-

101.....

.=

Susceptibility
10 50 10 0 60 25 0
Severity
10 55 10 0 30 25 0
Tot al
100 2750 100 0 1800 625 0 5375
CONSEQUENCES LOSS Of' DAMAGE COOTOf' ENVIRO'lMENTAl. TOTAL
HUMAN ro ,,>Me< FAILURE EFFECTS
LIFE PROPERTY
10 50 80 40 5 185
Relative Risk ; 5375 x 185 ; 994,375
C"-2(U_'
'"
8. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS -CLASS
TUTORIAL
. You are operating three pipelines:
. Pipel ine 1 is 20", 0.375", operating at 50%
SMYS, offshore
_35 years old, history of leaks from internal
corrosion. It passes through
environmentally-sensitive areas.
Pipeline 2 is gas.
_ Failed at seam welds 5 times on the pre-
service hydrot est.
a passes through highly populated areas
and operates at 30% SMYS
. Heavily pressure cycled.
Pipeline 3 is gas, OS
a tape wrapped, operati ng at 72% SMYS.
Failed once by cracking near a seam weld,
but remote from compressor stations.
Perform a relati ve risk analysis
O __
Crude oil -
... 35 years ol d
128
64
9. SIMPLE QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS -CLASS
TUTORIAL: More Information
PIPFU'iE I PIrl'LI SE 1 P1PFl. INE)
PIPE lO, O.37S-, wc kled ",om IllSA j6", O.7S". wc ld<d ",om 11lSAW .lh ", O.I-. wckkJ ", .m (llSAIli)
15 " oar<old off,bore 1 ,,:or old 0",00'" 10 "".r< 01.1. on,oof<
srRESS JI)';;,,"'Y'
72'" ""Y"
" "fee ,,"
PRODUCT Crud<
" Co.,
S. c...
COATIMi &CP e""jtar . "' .. ,. Hi E_I'''' Y' P,prop)'kno: Tape ..nppcd
('I' rrodc m and OK
CI' <t, kl rh.. "'M. OK
,.,
ct.x\.l and .. Uli.
F""VIRO' '>tE" y
-".
1"""",,_1>Icd """.... "", lmbI. to 1"Io>odq
H1.- RITVOf SL1'I'lY ......,-.kJ,o..............
E_oaI ...""".
fac1I.y :!O daY"
....
SFl'UIITV

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-
CLASS TUTORIAL: More Information
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0_200111......'
no
65
CLASS TUTORIAL USE PRO FORMA TO DO ASSESSMENT
PROBABIUTY

. " rlGlJE sec ,-
T""o...... 'y rOrAL
- -
'AAn ,.... E.RVE.... IQN

Susceptibility
r -
40 00
10 0
-/(./.
c:J.->
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'Iv
:J..\'\ i"J 0 '0
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l).G \ 'l--(J
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CONSEQUENCES l OSS OF LOSSOF COSTOF ENVIRONMENTAL TOTAL
HUMA-. W SERVICE FAILURE EFFECTS
li FE PROPERTY
\0
1't0
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).0
(0
Relative risk =
y:. \Ik-:;. t: (glX
C:._1OOlI_'
tat
CLASS TUTORIAL
This is a project - appoint a project rnanaqer . he/she must deliver 10 lirne!
Appoint a point scorer . not the P Manager.
_Rank your pipelines, and state the highest risk
pipeli ne
r: '"
66
12. PROFORMAS
-
ro eo eo to u o 0
.iaY caJ S60(J reo 9tf! n
o
I,,,...."""..,,.
I 18 U 11'
) 6 0
'2''I {, 000"
~
Relative risk = ~
~ ~
-",,-, -10 D 'Z J - _
-
'-
I"''''''''''NO''
I
C Po'"",' 2006 Re,6I1
I
"" '"
I I
Relative risk =
L
t-I
67
PROBABILITY
Probabil ity has its origin in the study of gambling
and insurance in the 17th century
Probability is ' chance' - the chance of an
uncertain event occurring
'Odds' are the ratios of two probabilities
For example , consider the probability and
odds of one of these rectangles being
coloured in:
The probabi lity of me colouring in one of these
squares in 'I.. or 25%
The 'odds' of one square being coloured in, is
1:3 or 33%
The probability
of an impossible
event is O.
The probabi lity
that an event is
certain to occur
is 1.
135
,"
PROBABILITY can be useful!
Probability can be useful. Here is an example:

Population of
Your company asks you to l ake a drug lest

employees
let's assume that, typically, 2 in 100 staff are drug

users .
Let's assume the drug test is 99% accurate
You ar e nOI a drug user ,.. but you test 'positive'.
Your employment ends: the company stat e they

Drug Non-drug
are 99% confident you are a drug user
User:
User:
Is this reasonable?
P
d
= 0,02 Po" 0.98
No! They are confident that the drug test is

99% accurate , and that is all. Test
Actually, one third of staff identified as drug users

are NOT drug users!
Right (+)
Right (+}:
This means they are only 67%confident of you

P
e
" 0.9
J
P
c
= 0.99
-\1 g c
0
being a user.
0;
See the 'deci sion tree' for an explanation:
o '" e
"
Staff identified as drug users = 0.98% + 1.98%"

\
2.96% Correcl ; Incorrect

Correct:
But 33% (0.98/2,96) are not drug users! Drug user Drug u."r Non-Drug user Non_Drug user
."p"",,,,,,, 2IlO6 Ro, 6-'1 P
o
=O,02% P._O.9B% Prn-97%
''''
68
e Poo,"", o 2006 Re,6I 1
RISK: Probability and Frequency
.Frequency: e.g., "out of 160 coin
tosses, 80 land on heads"
.Probabilities: e.g., "50% of the
coin tosses land on heads"
_These can be misleading.. .
RISK: Probability versus Frequency* perception
versus reality?
aconsroer these probability statements:
_The probability that a woman has breast cancer is 0.8%.
_If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 90% that she will
have a positive mammogram.
_If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 7% that
she will still have a posit ive mammogram.
_ What is the probability of woman who has a positive mammogram
actua lly having breast cancer?
?
_24 Physi cians were asked this question. Only two doctors gave the
correct probabi lity. .? Gig...n,,", G" ' Ecologica l i t e l ~ "" "".p'a'Oon fOff,oquenc.,, ' 10 0 Cumm;"Il' &C
Allen lEd' ), rho E,."M"" oI M"'<1. N"", Y"", 0.1"," Un",...;' . P,..., 9-29 . 1996.
.'" C;C;,7'0""" '" AE"""'"",'S;m". l 00" IN Und ."."",,') " ,"'" "om N" m. ,oey '0 1O"1l!'t'. (NJ38
. , .
69
r:
RISK: Probability versus Frequency. frequency is
easier!
_Now consider the same statements (with figures rounded up) as
frequencies:
_8 out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer.
_ Of these 8 women with breast cancer, 7 will have a positive mammogram.
_ Of the remaining 992 women without breast cancer, 70 will still have a
positive mammogram.
_I magine a sample of women who have positive mammograms during breast
cancer screen ing. How many of these women do actually have breast
cancer?
out of ?
?
_ 1000 women screened: 7 with cancer have positive mammograms, 70

without cancer will have positive mammograms. Hence 7 in 77 women with
posit ive mammograms will actually have cancer (one in 11 or 9%)
. r nr!Rct answer is 9 out of 100
cp"",,,,,, iiicilrrr "" r
RISK THE LAW AND SAFETY AND HEALTH
1<0
70
RISK MANAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL - UK DISASTERS
CAUSE
Flood
Mine
Dam bur st
Railway
Fire
Oi l pl atform
Landslide
Explosion
Aircr aft
Underground
Road
Snow avalanche
Earthquake
0_200&_'
LOCATION
severn Estuary
Universal Colliery, Mid Glamorgan
Brafield Reservoir ,
Quinli ns Hill ,
Theatre Royal , Exeter
Piper Alpha
Aberfan, Mid-Glamor gan
Chilwell, Notti nghamshire
SEA Trident, Staines, Surrey
Kings Cross , London
Gillingham, Kent
lewes, East Sussex
Rowhedge
DATE
1606
1913
1864
1915
1887
1988
1966
1918
1972
1987
1951
1836
1884
FATALITIES
-2000
439
250
227
188
167
144
134
118
34
24
8
1
'"
RISK MANAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL - --.-
WORLD DISASTERS
-
,
CAUSE LOCATI ON YEAR DEATHS
Flood Hwang-ho river, China 1931 3,700,000
Earthquake Shensi Province, China 1956 830,000
l a nds lide Kansu Province, China 1920 200 ,000
Snow avalanche Huaras, Peru 1941 -5,000
Toxic release Bhopal, India 1984 2500
1
100,000,,,,_"..)
Mine Uranium, East Germany 1949 2300 - 3700
Dam burst South Fork Dam, Pennsylvania, 1889 2209
Explosion Halifax, Canada, 1917 1963
[ The Theatre, Canton, China 1845 1670
Aircraft KLM and PanAm 747's Tenerife, 1977 579
Terrorism World Trade Centre, USA 2001 >3000
Railway Modane, France 1917 543
Gas pipeline Urals, Russia 1989 >500
LPG Storage Mexico City 1984 500 1...OOO ......ed)
Nuclear _ Slalion Chernobyl 1985 >30
200 ...... __
_
O ...... ....,.., :IOOl; R_1
'"
71
.There is international concern over the health and safety of
workers and the general publi c, and most countries have laws
covering health and safety. e.q.:
e o ccupanoner Health and Safety Act (OSHA), 1970 in the USA
_Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 in the UK
_I n law we have two fundamental principles:
a -t . The concept of general ' dul y of care' for all persons , i.e. workers,
operators, customers, users, etc.'
a 2. Goods and services must be 'fit for purpose' and not result in any
danger to health and safety when used for the purpose intended.
'"
(cont.)
a1 . In the European Union, we can satisfy 'reasonable care' when we can
demonstrate that the following action s have been carried out:
aRisk assessmenl - to identify hazards and risks to healt h and safety
_Reducing the risk to 'as low as reasonably practicable',
_Maintenance to ensure safety in operation and the provision of
information,
_Action to measure, monitor and control.
_2. 'Fit ness for Service' is a cont ractua l issue. and subject to civil
proceedings. However, if the goods or services effect the health and
safety. criminal law may apply.
_For example. a compresso r that breaks down and causes injury may
be subject '0 both crimina' and civil proceedings
'"
72
EXAMPLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATIONS
UK PIPELINES SAFETY REGULATIONS
/
_ The Pipel ines Safety Regulations
1996 came into force in Apr il 1996.
_They replace earlier prescriptive
legi slation with a more integrat ed.
goal setting. risk-based approach
that covers bot h onshore and
offshore pipelines.
_The defi nition of ' pipeline' used in
the Regulations means that apparatus and works associat ed with the
pipeline (such as compressors, valves, etc.) also come under the
Regulations.
_ The Regulations cont ain a two tier approach:
_G eneral duties that are applicable to all pipelines, covering design,
construction and installation. operation, maint enance and
abandonment .
_Addit i onal duties applicable to pipeline carryi ng 'dangerous fl uids',
C_200S_'
145
EXAMPLE REGS UK PIPELINES SAFETY
REGULATIONS THE 'MAPD'
..........
...\
hazards /

....-
...._-_._...... .
..... MAPD 's a
/!IIl t/he <>peratrxMs ...
MAPD
'r-- - f how llIe oper8lrx haseslabl,

sJ< from majrx accidllfl(s and has i ; sallSfeclory managemfNJl
lII'I/lPPropnaill mlll'lllgSmfNJl/ \. to ca>lro/ lIN mlJjrxaccui_ s
emfocontn:Jlhe. "sIts ....- .pl t IN 1!'peI,.,. Dr pipel,.,.
..... ' .
....---_.............
I I I I
PRODUCE
ARRANGE FOR
IDENTIFY Al l EVALUATE
SAFETY
AUDITING AND
HAZARDS ALL RISKS MANAGEMENT
REPORT ING
SYSTEM
HAZARDS RISKS SMS AUDITING
''''
73
SUMMARY - CHANGING LEGISLATION
Old Style Legislation New Style Legislation
Prescriptive
..
Risk based
Detail ed rul es and Framework rules with
regulati ons
IL
,
guidelines
What must be done

How it must be managed
Do it anyway Identify hazards and ri sk s
first, then rank them and
prioritise actions
accordingly
Risk Management (insurance)
Penspen
Integrity
148
74
RISK MANAGEMENT Past
The tool used by organisations to ensure business and shareholder value is 'ri sk
manaqemenr.'
'the process enabling the systematic identification, analysis and management
of cri tical business risks '
Many energy organisations focus on the "hazard' risks only
This is achieved by transferring the risk of physical asset loss or damage 10 a
nat ional or international insurer.
Insurers have traditionally welcomed this type of business. Why?
Oil and gas assets have been good quality over past 20 years
Were many insurers in the market looking for business in this type of risk.
This has changed...
Age ing infrastructure is failing
$500,000,000 of insured physi cal losses in Middl e East in 200 1 and 2002
mainly due 10 ageing assets.
International reinsurance market has reduced from $4billion capaci ty to
S1billion to absorb global energ y risk
C_:IOO!_,
I ...... ~ _ _ . __
RISK MANAGEMENT Future
Recent catastrophi c energy inciden ts have resulted in global insured energy claims
exceed ing globa l premiums by 100%
Severa l incidents have been attributed to ageing infrastructure
Insurers will now only accept 'high qual ity' ri sks
Energy companies now need to use independent risk engineering report s or
asset valuations to manage this process
However . do we need to insure against every risk?
Energy companies now need to assess all risks, and provide an optimum balance
between risk retention (they carry this risk and cost) and risk transfer (to the
insurance mark et). Don't 'over-insure'.
This requi res an assessment of ALL business risks:
BUSINESS Operational , strategic and financi al
HAZARDS Hazards such as fire , explosions and natural peri ls
We do this by using consistent risk processes in a company
Identify Risks; Analyse/Measure Risks; Design Against Risks; Implement Plans
to ReoucezeummateRisks; Measure Succe ss and Improvement s.
O_:IOO!_1
'-..-------
,,,
150
75
AN OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT
RISK ASSESSMENTS WHY?
Risk Assessments are needed for :
Compliance with regulators,
legislation and code (move
from prescript ive to goal-based
design).
Control of the hazards
associated with pipelines (cost of a failure is made up of
direct costs (e.g. repairs) , and indirect costs (loss of
business and goodwill, compensation claims, etc .)).
Indi rect costs can be the largest.
Control of Insurance Cost.
Improvements to pipeline efficiency, safety and security.
'"
' 52
76
I_F a t ali ties 0 Injuries I
RISK MANAGEMENT WHY?
30 ,,-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -.';
25 j!-- --l l---------- - -
20 h ,--- - II---- - - -j 1-- --
15
10
5
o
86878881'909192939495969798990 1 2
C.......-1<Q_'
,.. _--_.._... _ . ~ .. _--
... _-_........ _-
._...--.....-".__._----_... _--_.-..',-
"3
RISK MANAGEMENT (defi nition f rom US OPS)
.Safety
e'the protec tion of the public,
the environment and propert y'.
Risk
. 'any threat to achieving those goals' .
Risk management
e'a ... management decision support process. implemented
as a program, integrated through defined roles and
responsibilities into the day-to-day operations,
maintenance. engineering management , and regulatory
decisions of the operator '.
'"
77
RISK MANAGEMENT (definition from US OPS)
It encompasses both risk analysis and control. I" L,-::,::O I
It can improve safety by:
Analys ing the precursor events and causes of potential pipeline
incidents.
Examining both the likelihood and severity of potential pipeline
incidents.
Provide comp rehensive & integrated means for examining and
comparing all risks, and prevention and mitigation measures.
Provide a structured, easily communicated means of identifyi ng and
prioritising pipeline risks and risk reduction measures.
Establishing and tracking performance measures to ensure safety
improvement.
THE MOVE TOWARDS RISK MANAGEMENT
USA
The USA Regulations requ ire risk
assessment , and codes (API and
ASME) give guidance
UK Pi pelines Safety Reg ulations.
Goal-selting, not prescriptive (the
State sets the standards to be
achieve d, then industry presents
the solutions)
Startingpoint for a 'good' pipeline
designand operation is a recognised
design code, and good, proven operational practices.
But operators are not limited to these.
Canada has non-mandatory 'Gui deli nes for Risk Analysis of Pi pelines
in its pipeline code.
Aust rali a (AS 2885 .1) requires a risk analysis
The European Commi ssion is revi ewing ' maj or acci dent" pipelines , and
are likely to requ ire operators to have a 'major accident prevention pol icy'
and a ' pipel ine management system' that ensures the policy is applied.
/
GENERIC RISK MANAGEMENT THE
I NGREDI ENTS..
RISK MANAGEMENT
RISK RISK EMERGENCY
I--
EMERGENCY
ASSESSMENT CONTROL PLANNING PROCEDURES
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCES
OF FAILURE OF FAILURE
I
DEFECTI DEFECTf
FAILURE
CONSEQUENCES
DAMAGE DAMAGE OF
DATA FREQUENCY
eQUATIONS
FAILURES
C,,",-2OOlI_'
A RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
' .'.'1'0<1""" 0<>:
..., """.
- ,. Oc rlplIQn 01 ond l..; ol ond 5101",,,'1' Oul<..,
......__00- _'K.... ..... __ ..."", """"..""" 0 ...""'""'....,-.. ..-ot ,....
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., p. ..."nn... _ ,
...._...-.-'
-

5.S.... ohol d-.s:
............ _.__....-
--.... _....---_._---.......... .
. ...
- . Oo<u.......I1Ulon...., Communicalion $yt._,
, ,
,.
"'olen ,-

- -
.R.... ""..,..,-. E._ ...., e-oI fot __ur.oflhe
-,---_._----------
-----------
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._.. _.. _-----------------
-
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_-..._.. -----

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,-
- 1$. _ "' ''''' a.m- ...d p.....,.s...
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-
'5'
79
ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DOT, USA 'FINAL RULE'
FOR LIQUID LINES
C_2006_'
'FINAL RULE' - 49 CFR 195.452 Background ' I ~
159
_A final rule applying to hazardous
liquid operators with 500 or more
miles of pipeline was issued
November 3, 2000, (65 FR 75378).
Extended to shorter lines in January
2002.
_An amendment to 49 CFR 195.452
in May 200 1 established new
requirements onintegri ty
management of liquid pipel ines in
'high consequence areas' (HCAs)
"_2006_110,
~
160
80
'FI NAL RULE' - Objectives of OPS
_Accelerating the integrity assessment of pipelines in
High Consequence Areas
_Improving operator integrity management systems
_Improving government's role in reviewing the adequacy of
integrity programs and plans , and
.Providing increased punl lc assurance in pipeline safety.
C_2006_
PERFORMANCE OF L1QUIO PIPELINE OPERATORS
_ Liquid pipeline operators are inspected/audited against the Final Rule.
_Audit is lengthy - a number of inspectors over a 2 week period
_ Early reports say 80-85% of operators did not comply, with many
receiving NOAs and NOPVs (Notice of Amendment and Notice of
Possible Violation)
_Visit www. promis. rspa.dot.gov
<>_2C06_'
'"
'"
81
ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DOT, USA 'FINAL RULE'
FOR GAS LINES
THE COST OF THE NEW INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
RULES'
_Northwest Natural Gas Company has agreed with the Publ ic Utility
Commission of Oregon to increase its rates by $5million.
_These costs will be reflected in customer rates
_This $5million will cover NW Natural 's increased costs in 2004 from the
enhanced integrity program.
_These costs will range from $5mil1ion to $15million/annum over the next
9 years
Pipe"';",.April13 2004
82
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT IN TEXAS
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT IN TEXAS
RISKBASED OR PRESCRIPTIVE
_ The Railroad Commission of Texas is responsible for the many 1000 kms of
pipel ines in Texas.
_ II has proposed new regulati ons relati ng to pipeline integr ity assessment and
management plans for intrastate natural gas and hazardous liquids pipelines .
_ RISK_BASED - The Commissi on proposed a performance-based option
within the rule under which pipe line operators can develop an integrity
assessmen t and testing program thai would identify the risks associated with
parti cular pipel ine facil ities .
- Eadl operator's plan would be recoreo to assess the integrity of specific
segments of a pipelin e's system. considering all appli cabl e risk factors. e.g.
locatiOn. age . croooct, and leak history.
- Operators 'NOUId have - 12 months to de-velop thei r assessment pl ans and then
another five years 10 do the IfIltlal assessments. after wh ich !he operators 'AOU1d
develop an ongoing intf!9nty management pl an for managing the identified nsxs.
- The Commission 'AOUkI have to review and accept all pl ans for Inlegnty
assessment and management.
PRESCRIPTIVE - If an operator chooses not to develop an assessment
program, then the operator would be required to use the pressure testing or
in-line testing opti ons with 5 and 10 year retest interval s.
O_2OOli", .r,i'
165
83
TEXAS - RISKBASED APPROACH
_The risk-based plan must contain at least:
_ IDENTI FICATION of the pipelines & segments covered by the plan
_ A PRIORITY RANKING of the pipeline/segments of each system
based on an analysi s of ri sks (see next slide)
_ ASSESSMENT OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY using at least one of the
foll owing methods appropriate for each segment:
_ in-line inspe ction ,
e pressurs test
. 'direct assessment' (e.q. coat ing inspection), or
. other newtechnology.
_ MANAGEMENT methods for the pipeline segments whi ch may includ e
remediation or increased inspect ions as necessary; and
. PERIODIC REVIEW of the pipeli ne integ rity assessment and
management plan every 36 months, or more frequently if necessary.
C_ 2OOi_'
TEXAS - RISK-BASED APPROACH
PRIORITY RANKING
'"
_The priority ranking of the pipel ine/ segments of each system mu st take into
account:
a oooureuon density,
. the identifi cati on of significant threats to the environment & publi c
health/saf ety,
a pipeline configuration,
. prior in-line inspect ion data or report s,
. pri or pressure test data or reports.
Ieak and incident dat a or report s,
. operating characteri stics such as MAOP). cathodic protection surveys. etc .,
a const ructron recor ds, including 0 the age of the pipe and the operating
history,
. pipeline specifications: and
. any ot her data that may assist in the assessment of the integrity of pipel ine
segments.
",
X4
TEXAS - PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
LIQUID LINES
Hazard ou s Liquid s requi re a
press ure t est or an i n-li ne
inspection, and remedial acti on i n
accordance wit h t he f ollowing
schedul e;
Pipeline Schedule
Rural 5 - 10 years'
"Depends on liquid carried
Non-Rural 5 years
Crossing of Navigable 5 years
Waterways
Offshore Intervals prescribed by operator
0_ 2005 _',
TEXAS - PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH
GAS LINES
Gas transmission and gathering lines require a pressure
test or an i n-li ne inspection, and remedial action in
accordance with the following schedule:
Pipeline Schedule
Onshore 5 - 10 years'
Offshore Intervals prescribed
by operator
"Depends on locat ion classification, diamet er, st ress and pressure.
Cl ass 1 li nes are 10 years , Clas s 2, 3, 4 at >20% SMYS are 5 years .
0_ 2006 _11,
' 69
' '0
85
RISK ASSESSMENTS IN AUSTRALIA (AS 2885.1)
RISK ASSESSMENTS - SIMPLE APPROACH -
Australia (AS 2885.1) - Probability Analysis

' Frequency' of Description
occurrence of a
Hazardous Event
Frequent Expected to occur typicall y once per year or more.
Occas ional Expected to occur several times in the life of the
pipeline .
Unli kely Not likely to occur within the life of the pipeline. but
possible.
Remote Very unlikely to occur within the life of the pipeline.
Improbabl e Examples of this type of event have historically
occurred, but not anticipated for the pipeline in this
location.
Hypotheti cal Theoreti cally possible, but has never occurred on a
similar pipeline.
OP__ ....,
'"
86
I!ir;Aust ra l i a (AS 2885.1) - Consequence Analysis
' Severi ty' Cl ass Description
Catastrop hi c Appli cabl e only in location classes 'T1 and T2'
where the number of humans within the range of
influence of the pipeline would result in many
fatalities.
Maj or Event causes few fatalities or loss of continuity of
supply or maj or environmental damage.
Severe Event causes hospitallsing injuries or rest riction of
supply, or minor environmental damage.
Minor Event causes no injuries and no loss of or
restriction of supply.
Suburban, resident ial, commercial, ' high rise' areas
0_2006_',
'"
Australia (AS 2885.1) - Risk Matrix/Analysis
Frequency of Risk Class
occurrence
Severity Class
Catastrophic Major Severe Minor
Frequent High H H Intermediate
Occasional H H I Low
Unlikely H H L L
Remote H I L L
Improbable H I L Negligible
Hypot het ical I L N N
R7
(AS 2885.1) - Risk Management
Risk Class Risk Management Actions
Action Required
High
Modify the hazardous event, the frequency or the cons equence to ens ure
the risk class is reduced to intermediate or lower.
Intermediate
Repeal risk identification & evaluation processes to verify and , where
possible to quantify, t he risk estimation. Determine the accuracy and
uncertainty of the estimat ion.
Where the risk cl ass is confirmed to be intermediate, modify the hazardous
event the frequency or the consequence to ensure the risk class is reduced
to 'Low' or 'Negligible' .
Where the risk class cannot be reduced to achieve 'Low' or 'Neg ligible',
act ion shall be taken to remove hazardous events, or reduce frequencies or
reduce severity or consequences, so as to reduce the risk to ALARP
Low
Determine the management plan for the hazardous event to prevent
occurrence and to monitor changes which could affect the classification.
Negligible
Review at the next Review Interval
Q P....""" 2006 "",,6/1 H5
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES & PLANNING
88
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
.
Example
PI(OO:I>URl:S mil
WITHTHF c'ovsrcrevcrs
Of A \ 1\ J OR ACClOt:' T.
'ESTABLISH. RI::CORn . REI -'!,E. rrsr-
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W1l0OO5 suout.n Ill'
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fOR LSEEAIlU,
llillAl WI IfN. t' Pf() D.\ !E
SITLSSII }{Y I<.g RE\1EI\'ED ANO f OR Wil li ANY
AC Cl UESlS
!lOW EH
ClI/l"(;EOF MOll !t"I!':Il IF fl SS( )(' llIl ED
OPfMT10:>i) S F:(:I' SSARY INSTAU A TlO" S
OPERATOR A!'lD LOCAL AUTIIORITIES
ML'ST LIAISE TO t.NSUll t. T1lt.OPERATOWS
B IERGEl"CYPROCWCKES 'rover AIL'
....ITH TI lE AUTHORlTltS
,
O_1CI06_.
m
EMERGENCY PLANNING Example
IHe ll \lOR O n R"' Tl l lt
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lOCAL MJTHORI TY SIIOl;l[) PRLPARE A
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ort ...""' ..........."" .... 'a
lOCAL AlJT1I1JRITY __..._ ",,,,,,,,.n,,'"''.'''
"""UQI .-."""......... WITH RI,(;l; L' '-IUR _,\ ' D
... .,... a"''''''....'''' ..............
..,..., ...... ' <'l<A...... "".... ' ... . ANY OTHfR AI'I' ROI'Rt"n
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C _ 2005 _'1
r:
RISK MANAGEMENT: Concluding Comments
"9
SUMMARY THE WAY AHEAD?
The preferable way is to produce a 'paper-based' risk management system,
but the general approach would be:
HIGH LEVEL ' SIGN -ON' - Obtain corporate agreement , and executive 'sign on' 10 'ntrcduce
risk/i ntegrity management systems into your company.
The focus is safety, and all risks and gains of all stakeho lders in the process should be considered and
documented
RISK TEAM - Form an expert panel, or hire in expert ise, to produce and manage your risk
management system. Agree on performance measures, accountability, etc ..
RISK/IN TEGRITY MANAGEMENT PLAN - Follow the requirements of the Regulations &
guidelines in this presentation, or the API ( 1160) or ASME (831.8) integrity management
documents.
MANAGE AND CONTROL AND UPDATE All DATA - Al l data you have on your pipeline is
of value in your risk management, and it forms a key 'plat form' in bui lding up your risk profi les
RISK ANALYSIS - Remember that we can never reduce risk to 'zero'; therefore, we are using
risk analysis as a tool to identify high risks that need our attention. The risk analysis can use
software tools (usua lly called ' applicati ons' ) t hat will use our database, but this analysis is only
one part of our risk management.
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM - The above plan is incorporated into a management system to
allow a systemat ic and performance measured way .
KEEP DOING THINGS BETIER! - Cont inuous ly improve your performance and system , and
recognise that risk management is a commitment to all stakeholders in your pipeline, for the
life 0 the pipel ine
90
SUMMARY - ' TOP TO BOTTOM'
_Risk is a partnership in a company:
ec orpor ete management enables things 10be done, as it controls finance and
sets objectives and assigns responsibilities
_Designers conceive ideas and turn them into detailed drawings and
specifications
_Engineers turn det ail ed drawings and specifications inlo plant and equipment
eo peratc re and users put plant and equipment to useful purpose
_Therefore, risk management starts with corporate management
_However risk can only managed if they are recognised as a threat and there is
a fear of thei r consequences
_However, many boards and senior managemenllack the imagination of
experience to recognise risk
_Engineers and operators are closer 10 the risks, and they must learn to
educate management in these risks
S-W_ OWd....... _._E U... l _ .UO; ~
_ _ 1 .....
SUMMARY THE FUTURE?
'"
'"
91
Responsibilities, Morals and Ethics
' " " " for Engineers
Penspen Integrity
OUTLINE
Responsibi lities
'Professional'
Loya lty
Confli cts of i nterest
Ethics
Ethi csfResponsi biliti es of Engineers
Standard of Care
Accident
Reasonable Care
Competence
Negligence
Fitness for purpose
Socio-Eco- Human Rights Responsibilities
The legal System
Personal and Pipeline Security
1
2
RESPONSiBILITIES
list the top three organisations/people you are
responsi bl e for?
.,_2IIlIll-'
RESPONSIBILITIES
3
. We have many responsibilit ies in OUf lives.
They can be:
. amily (e.q. care for your children);
social (e.g. care for your neighbour);
professional (e.g. care for your clients);
. spiritual (e.g. satisfying our conscience);
and
. political (e.g. care for developing
countries ).
-.Ale will focus on our professional
responsibilities in this lecture
...
.1
0
!t'
Ii - .oi l
1:w . r=J
,
?
RESPONSIBILITIES: Professional
.Responsibility usually means we are expected to
achieve or maintain a result, as we have the
required knowledge
.It does not require 'perfection'
.-This is because we may not always achieve the
result:
-.A responsible physician may see a patient die;
-.A responsible engineer may witness his
design failing in an unforeseen accident
RESPONSIBILITIES: Staff/Job
5
~ have responsibilities to all 'stakeholders' who are affected by our
work/decisions
.The company we work for
.The cl ient we are making the decision for
~ y person/environment affected by our
decision
lIThe above leads to five areas (all linked) we
need to address reo our ethics/responsibilities and duties:
.Professional behaviour
.Ioyalty - to your profession and company,
.conflicts of interest - between you and your company or cl ient
.ethics - in dealing with matters of conscience and morality.
duty of care - to all stakeholders in your decision making,
e """",,,n ' 006 Rev6l1 6
PROFESSIONAUPROFESSIONS
C_2006_
PROFESSIONAL/PROFESSIONS'
. 100s of years ago, you could be anything: doctor, dentist, carpent er ...
without qualifications
. 1DOs of years ago, your local barber , was also your dentist, surgeon,
et c., because he had scissors and knives!
7
a
PROFESSIONAL: What is i t ?
~ t is a 'professional'?
. Most people view a 'professional' as
someone who receives pay for a job.
In a recent survey of young people ,
'movi e stars' were included in a list of
'professionals' .
~ window cleaner was recently
described as a 'fenestration hygiene
executive'!
. Let us look at the history of
'professional' to help us understand its
meaning
C_l'OOIl_
PROFESSIONAL: What is it?
9
.The notion of 'prof essional' is derived from the idea that
people professed - promised - to meet high moral standards
. Traditionally, ministry, medicine and law were the professions. as
they requi red extensive trai ning, and their practice was exclusive to
their group: for example. you could not practice medicine without
belonging to their group
C_2OOI_
PROFESSIONAL: What is i t ?
. So, now we consider a professional as
someone who receives payment for a
service, but also...
is U a member of an organised professional
body with a... recognised standard of
conduct. ..
w
..... has some speci al skill or ability or some
special qualifications derived from training or
experience..:
PROFESSIONAL: Responsibilities
. Our 'Responsibilities':
. professional - the responsibility
that arises from a special knowledge;
. company- these are our 'offici al' or
specified duties in our job;
. Iegal - those required by society.
We are 'Accountable' to:
. the company we work for;
. the client we are making the
decision for;
. any person or environment that
may be affected by this decision.
0 __2OOll1l_'
PROFESSIONAL, Staff Responsibilities
these responsibilities and
accountabi lities lead tothree areas we
need to address:
.Ioyalty - to your profession and
company
.ethics - in dealing with matters of
conscience and morality
.competence ('duty of care') - to
all stakeholders in your decision-
making
r:
Responsibilities are delivered through loyalty
And reflected through ethical practice
LOYALTY
7
LOYALTY
.Loyalty is 'friendship or duty towards something or
somebody'
.Loyalty is a confusing concept.
-.Ne can see people being 'loyal' to a football team,
but to a company?
.-To a profession?
.-To a customer?
LOYALTY
. Loyalty in a company
.Most staff are employed by an organisation.
He/she will have an employment contract and
'Terms & Conditions' will require some 'loyalty', e.g. a
long notice period, and a company's rewards
package (e.g. large pension) may be seen as
warranting some loyalty in return.
Ensuring loyal ty by good pensions, company cars,
etc., is a simple buying method .
This is similar to supermarkets' 'loyalty' cards -
because they pay you back for your custom.
~ g i n a simple financial deal.
LOYALTY
. Loyall y differs
rl'Ne have loyalty to family
rJIoNe have loyalty to colleagues
. Etc
. Consider the different loyalty offered by a cat and a dog ...
':
.'.'0J
e __ O O I ~
LOYALTY vs COMMITMENT
. Loyalty should not be confused with
commitment.
. Commitment is 'dedi cation to a cause or
principle'
. Football fans are both loyal (t hey woul d
never support a rival team), and
committed (they will turn up to every
match 10walch thei r team even if the
weather is bad and the offering worse),
but...
lithe players in thei r team are only
committed. as their loyalty is a function of
their financial payments and contractual
detail. and can change any day. +..
H
Q
LOYALTY Company
LOYALTY Company
.what do companies look for in staff in terms of loyalty?
~ new employee who has had 10 jobs in 10 years
. may appear disloyal
/ ' I
8A existing employee who has been with the same : ~
compan y for 25 years. ..\_
" .
may be seen as lacking ambition ~ "": l!.
~ review by a USA company report ed career advisers as listing 'loyalty'
as 10th out of 11 as what they thought employers were looking for in new
recruits.
.rap of the list was team player . intelligence and professional
demeanour.
. LOYALTY IS CERTAINLY A CAREER ISSUE, BUT IS IT A
PROFESSIONAL ISSUE?
20
10
LOYALTY Staff
-.Ne have a legal definition of loyalty
. '... an implied duty that an employee is to act solely for the benefit of
his or her employers in all matter s within the scope of employment.'
aA. member of staff must make his or her own decisions on loyalty to a
company in terms of his or her car eer progression.
However, in our professional work, we do not owe unqualified loyatty to a
company, as this would be a sacrifice of an employee's aut onomy,
. For example, a mai ntenance manager who tells a maintenance
engi neer to 'watch costs' , is behaving in a reasonable, legitimat e
manner,
_ but if this manager asks the engineer to cut costs
by neglecting certai n agreed procedures, the
engi neer is placed in a difficult position.
ENGINEERS AND LOYALTY
The above legal definition of loyalty helps an engi neer in these
circumstances; if an illegal or dangerous act is being proposed. it is not to
the benefit of the company.
PROFESSIONAL CODE OF ETHI CS - Remember. in certai n
circu msta nces, a prof essi onal code of ethics may con tai n an expression
of public policy, and a professional may be expect ed to abi de by this
professional code as well as federal and stat e laws.
"-hat duty may oblige them to decline certain acts requested by an
employer.
_ E MUST NEVER LET OUR COMPANY OR PERSONAL LOYALTIES
BREAK LEGAL OR ETHICAL BARRI ERS
zt
11
LOYALTY AND 'COLLEAGUES'
You will form 'friendships' at work .
This may lead you into conflicts: for example if a colleague who has
become a 'friend ', asks you to ' cover' up something for him/her
.The same appl ies to customers: 'friendships' can be formed, that
may lead to conflicts.
There is nothing wrong wi th these friendships, but you must divorce your
professional life from your social life, whenever a professional/business
decision is being made.
~ remember...
DA colleague helps you move house.
DA friend helps you move the body....
C Po"_, 2006 R""""
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
23
24
1?
CONFLICTS OF I NTEREST
.-The previous definitions of loyalty tell us
not to act against our company's interest ,
but do they prevent conflicts of interest?
.-Typical conflicts of interest that arise in
companies incl ude:
. having a financial interest such as a significant amount of stock in a
supplier that could benefit from one's professional decisions (see
below);
. having family members or business associ ates who could benefit
from favouritism;
. having a position of authority on a public or governmental body that
might allow one selectively to benefi t business associates. one's
employer, family members, or one's own financial interests; and
......orking for a competitor or for competi ng clients at the same time.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - GUIDANCE FOR
STAFF
. Most conflicts of interest are obvious & easi ly avoided, but we have
formal guidance
. For example many professional soc ieti es have codes of ethics,
which includes conflicts of interest.
. Codes of cond uct issued by companies employi ng engineer s may
contain simi lar words.
Refer to these if you are unsure about a conflict of interest, or
refer to our line management.
25
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - GUIDANCE FOR
STAFF
. Measures recom mended for dealing with a conflict of interest are:
_ avoidance if possi ble (for example, refusing gifts from vendors),
_ divestment (for example, selling one' s stock in a supplier),
. resignation (for example, leaving a public board that often considers
contracts involving your company) ,
.Non-parti cipation (for example, removing onese lf from the
evaluation of potential subcontractors if a relat ive is one of the
candidates), and
_ disclosure of the facts of one's situatio
concerned.
ETHICS
c """, poo 2006 Rov6I1
27
28
'"
ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERS
lIThe UK's Roya l Academy of Engineering has defined 'eng ineering' and
what an engineer does:
.'Engineering is the knowledge required, and the process applied, to
conceive, design, make , build, operate, sustain, recycle or reti re,
something of significant technical con tent for a specific purpose; -8
concept, a model, a product, a device, a process, a system. a
technology,
.Engineers are individuals who apply this creative process.'
~ }
r
/l, ..( 11
u
e ,," 0''''' 0 2000 RwSi '
29
ETHICS: Overview
"Ethics" has at least three senses in Engl ish: it can be
.1. Another word for ordinary morality, .........
"Moral ity", refers to those standards of conduct everyone (every
rat ional person at his rational best) wants every ot her 10 follow even if
everyone el se's following them would mean havi ng to follow them too.
Moral ity (in this sense) is the same (common') for everyone,
engineers included.
2. The name for a field of philosophy, or
.3. The name for a set of special (morally permissible) standards (for
example, engineering ethics).
' Ethi cs' is the conventional term in the U.S. for ' professional
standards' .
Hence, many professional eng ineeri ng bod ies have detailed
ethical codes (e.g. ASME).
<:l Pon. p"" 2000 "",",' 1
30
..
,. . - !
" -', " ; " ':
I ' J' .
. . _ .. .. ,- ;1
-- - . ..".' .'\.

ETHICS: Engineering
. Engineering is an important and learned profession.
-.As members of this profession, engineers are expected to exhibi t the
highest standards of honesty and integrity.
-.Additionall y, engineers must perform under a standard of
professional behaviour that requires adherence to the highest
principl es of ethical conduct.
C_2OOl'_
ENGINEER'S RESPONSIBILITIES/ETHICS
-.Ne can describe professional standard s as those "morally permissible
standards of conduct each member of some particular occupati onal group
want s every other member of the group to follow. even if everyone else's
following them woul d mean havi ng to follow them too."
A profession 's ethical standards must be compatible wit h our common
morality, but they go beyond our common morality.
1IY0u could say that they interpret our common morality for the
specific details of work of a particul ar occupational group.
For example. al most all the engineering code s of ethics in the U.S.
include as a provision. "Engineers shall act in professional matters for
each employer or c lient as faithful aqents. "
C_2OCIllOlod"
1(;
ENGINEER'S RESPONSIBILITIES/ETHICS (from
ASME)
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
. Engineers uphold and advance the
integrity, honour, and dignity of the
Engineering profession by:
. Using their knowledge and skill for the
enhancemen t of human welfare;
. Being honest & impartial , & serving
with fidelity the public, their employers
and cl ients;
. Striving to increase the competence
and prestige of the engineering
profession.
,
I
II \
"
-
33
ENGINEER'S RESPONSIBILITIES/ETHICS: from
RAE
. THE UK's Royal Academy of Engineering has four fundamental ethical
principles:
~ u r y and Veracity;
.Honesty and Integrity;
. Respect for Life, Law and the Public Good;
. Responsible Leadershi p; Listening and Informing.
0Pw<-..-.2OOII_"
17
. Professional Engineer' is the term for registered or licensed engineer in
some cou ntries including the USA and Canada
.-The earmark that distinguishes a professional engineer is the aut hority to
sign off" or "stamp" on a design or a structure, thus taking legal
responsibility for it.
.-The term 'Professional Engineer 'is a legall y protected titre; the practice
of engineering is protected in both Canada and the United Stales,
. In some countries, engineers are prohibited by the Code of Ethics from
practi cing beyond their training and experience.
Breaches of the Code may be sufficient grounds for suspension or
loss of license, as well as financial penalties
. In some countries it could also result in jail time, should
' negligence' be shown to have played a part in any incident in
which there is lose of human life.
J I n(; ,
e_2OOlI_
I J5
ASME)
THE FUNDAMENTAL CANONS ('RULES' )
1 Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welf are of t he
publi c...
2. Engineers shall perfor m services on ly in areas of the ir competence.
3 Engineers shall continue their professional development throughout their careers
and... provide opportunities for the... development of those engineers under their
supervision.
4. Engineers shall act in professional matters for each employer or client ... and
shall avoid conflicts of interest.
5. Engineers shall build their professional reputation on the merit of their services
and shalt not compete unfairly with others.
6. Engineers shall associate only with reputab le persons or organisat ions.
7. Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and
truthful manner.
8. Engineers shall consider environmental impact In..
J < 'ri:: .
their professional duties.

C_2006_
J5
ASME)
THE FUNDAMENTAL CANONS ('RULES' )
1. Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare
of the public...
6. Engineers shall associate only with reput able persons or
organisations.
8. Engineers shall consider environmental impact in .. their
professional duties.
Environment
.Currently, prof essional engineering societ ies in the US. are beginn ing to
respond 10widespread concern about the envi ronment.
.Some engineering societ ies have considered whether existing codes already
encompass protection of the environment, by way of Canon 1" "Engineers shall
hold paramount the safety, health , and welfare of the public in the performance of
their professiona l duties"
.However, two societ ies have added provisions regarding the environment to
thei r codes .
In view of changes such as
these, we can speak about an
evolving morality in the
profession, or an evolving
ethics (ethics being the
conventional term in the U.S.
for professional standards).
co Pen,""" 1006 Rev&' 38
1Q
~ are asked to route a gas pipeline through a village in Africa, and the route
violates the ASME 831.8 location classification
_ If you route through the village the operator saves $1,000,000
_ If the pipeline is routed through the village, .. the Village chief wi ll be paid $15000
plus an annual rent for the ROW, plus an annual payment for clearing the ROW
. The $15000 wi ll pay for a new school, medica! centre, & permanent water
supply
. The annual rent will pay for
annual costs and staffing for
the school and medical centre
.-The annual payment will double
the size of their goat herd
.-The village cannot relocate
_ If you re-route around the Village,
the village will receive nothing
_ Your deci sion?
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
on
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
. ' Corporate Social Responsibil ity' (CSR) refers to the responsi bility that
modern business organisations have to creating a healthy and prosperous
society.
Businesses no longer can work in isolation; e.g.:
. he products and services that they
provide are consumed by large
numbers of consumers, their
employees are part of wider
communities, in which they
have responsibilities to families
and other social groupings.
busin ess activity impacts on the lives of people in many ways,
ranging from the creation of a safe and clean environment, through
clean and careful production. to the creatio n of jobs, and opportunities
for all members of the community.
CSR: The Change..
Gone are the days when the mandates of the oil
and gas majors were restricted to commercial
act ivities
. Gone are the days when, provided they worked
within the laws of the land, they were solely
accountable to their shareholders, with issues such
as human right s beyond their remit"
. Now, corporat ions must consi der other
stakeholders such as local communities.
Responsible businesses are responsibl e citizens.
.-This responsibili ty is reflected through ethical
practice .
Ethical practice involves doing the right thing
rather than the wrong one - and is based on
operating in a 'moral way' .
." """'''''" >006 _ , 42
Oil and Gas Journal, 1999, J Bray, ' Petroleum and Human Rights: The New Frontiers of Debate'
? 1
CSR: What does it involve?
. Corporate social responsibility involves
making sure that:
. your goods and services meet customer
requirements. and are provided in a fair way.
lIyour employees are given responsibility
and opportunities to work. with the
organisation in supporting community
projects.
he organisation is involved in relevant
sponsorship and 'corporate giving' activities
that are relevant and helpful to the
community.
lithe organisation is involved in activities and
programmes that support the development of
the whole community.
e_,..,._
I
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE
0_2(10(1_
Remember :
Awareness
Adherence ,
and Vigilance!
CORPORATE STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE
. Pipeline companies and engineers are not aut omatically
liable for an accident/event.
IIThey must be shown to be 'at fault'
. l awyers look at each case and ascert ain if ' due care' was
exerci sed.
Four yardsticks apply:
Feder al Regulations (note: these are minimum
requirements that must be met ):
. State Regulations (note: States can impose higher
standards than Federal);
IlAdvisory standards [e.q. ASME or API. but rete that
demoostrating that you have met minimum standards is not
an impregnable defence);
. Private knowledge & conduct (companies are expected to
adopt best practices . learning from previous accidents. etc..)
O _ ~ _
.'-;)
~
IlAn engineer's service need not be perfect; he/ she is

using judgement gained from learning and experience,
and will usually be working in an area where there is a
certain amount of unknown/uncontrollable factors.
_ Error comes from variability and uncertainty, e go in
dealing with human beings
Error is a fact of life ('to err is human').
- So when one hires an engineer, one accepts the risks
of that professi onal making similar mistakes to other
normally competent engineers.
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE:

Def init ions
.-Two definitions of 'Standard of Care':
. That level or quali ty of service ordi narily provided
by other normally competent practitioners of good
standi ng in that field, contemporaneously provi di ng
similar services in the same locality and under the ~ ~ 5 ~
same circumstances.
.... that which is commonly possessed by
members of that professio n or trade on good
standi ng. It is not that of the most highly skilled. nor
is it that of the aver age member of the profession or
trade, since those who have less than med ian or
average ski ll may still be competent and qualified.. .'
"_2006_
Liability
IlAn engi neer is not liable for damages for every error
...
I I
. however, if the error is wor se than a cert ain level, he/she
is liable.
I I
I I
. The line between negligent and non-negligent is the
:'
I I
'standard of care' .
~
I
I I
ae
Failure
~ judge or jury will decide on this standard of care after
hearing expert testimony.
The expert witness assessesagainst a normally competent
engineer, not expert. Failing a standard of care would be by:
. not havi ng learning and skill ordinarily possessed by
other engineers.
nol using the same level of skill,
. not using reasonable diligence and best judgement
. failing to accomp lish the purpose for which the
engineer was employed
. In the USA ' reasonable care' is"...
'the amount of care that a reasonabl y prudent person
would use in simi lar ci rcumstances' ,
If an engineer does not exercise 'reasonable care' they
may face prosecution.
C: __2OOIi_
r:
.. ~ .......... ........,... __,--.. .........' '''_,",, ' '''''''' =l
ENGINEER'S STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE
Defence
. Conversely, a company/engineer can show they were taking
'due care' before any incident by* ;
. adherence to federal and state regulations;
. conforming with advisory standards;
. private knowledge and conduct.
50
7<
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE:
Variations
lIThe standard of care varies with time, locale and
circumstances,
. Calculations are not in themselves engi neeri ng... but
they do convey the thought process and desi gn intent. The
quality, etc. of calculations indicates the level of care and
diligence; calculations substantiate, but do not substi tute
for j udgement.
.-The use of canned calculations and design approaches
wit hout understanding their application & limitations, is
beneath a standard of care,
. 'Low bidders and "can-do" type of guys kill people'
. Engineers have a duty to warn all parties of any immi nent
danger, even if the client feels it is not appropriat e
. Engineers must report safety issues, even if it is not in
thei r specific remit.
___~ E . . .._ _ ~ _ .. , . _ ... _ ...
1ri
I
"
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE: In t he
past
Engineers have always been responsible for their
work, and their failures ..
For example, 3000 years ago, Hammur abi the
great est ruler (1795- 1750) of Babylon, produced a
remarkable li st of codes and laws for his people.
It is the earliest compl ete legal code known
.-They were engraved in 2.4m high blocks of granite
. One of these laws was ... 'If a builder builds a
house for some one, and does not construct it
properly, and the house which he built fall s in and
kills i ts owner, then that builder shall be put to
death '.
_., .... ..... ",..,..... _.. .....
52
?{;
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE: USA
IlAny maj or incident involvi ng critical private infrastructure will
be the subject of close law enforcement scrut iny.
For pipel ines these agencies are:
. FBI, US Environmental Protection Agency, DOT,
US Coast Guard
aThese agenci es will consider any inci dents causing
environmental damage or injuriesas criminal cases
IIAn incident would be considered a crime if this 'harm'
was linked 10 'culpabl e conduct' .
.-The following evidence would show 'cul pable conduct":
. HistOl'Y 01repea t violation s
.:>eliberate behaviour
IlEfforts to conceal
.-Tampering with monitoring devices
a.\ctivities such as false statements. obstruction , etc.
0_2001_-
. ~ _ ""_...._c...... ............-_.. "" __,,... ,, "'"
53
ENGINEERS' STANDARD ('DUTY') OF CARE: USA
(cont.)
~ . - .... _ ~ - ~ - ..... _._-"'-""' ,.... ,., -
In the USA a corporation can be
charged wilh wrong doings - and
the executives can be liabl e
This is because
corporations act through the
actions of individuals.
Therefore, indi viduals can
be liable 10prosecution"",""""
. Companies would face charges after the , ..~
prosecu tors have considered : f1i\
. Was the offence serious (e.q. great harm)?
. Were wrong doings common in the
company and corporate?
.was management was aware of this?
_ Is there is a history of offences?
_ Did the company quickly identify and
report the incident and respond to it
effectively?
_ Has the company a 'compliance prog ram'
in place , and is it being applied diligent ly
(e.q. were wrong doers quickly disciplined)?
.would innocent shareholders or
employees suffer di sproportionately?
c _
? ?
ACCIDENT, COMPETENCE, NEGLIGENCE,
FITNESS FOR PURPOSE
ENGINEERS AND FAILURES'
. Prior to 1907, engi neers in Nort h America discounted the possibi lity of
being blamed for any acci dent through negligen ce, as engineers, by
definition, could not be negligent . The Quebec Bridge collapse in 1907
(where the chief engineer was eventually blamed) ended this argument.
IlAlso, prior to 1950, courts routinely denied liability of engineers and
architects 10 anyone injured at a construct ion site by arguing that the
engineers had a contract with owners, not construction crews nor users
of the structures.
But in the USA in the 1950s there were cases against builders by
'third parties' who successfully proved liability.
Engineers are now liable for thei r mist akes ... .
56
r
I
ACCIDENTS HAPPEN: Are engineers to blame?
.Engineers are often blamed for accidents .
The term ' accident' implies that even where an engineer is at fault,
there is no maliciousness on the part of the engineer.
.It is not easy to prevent failures .. .
The Twin Towers in New York collapsed after they were hit by
aircraft in 2001. There was some criticism of their design.
John Seabrook in his New York Times article following the
September 11 2001 attacks said 'Engineers can't be asked to make
every building safe from every possible event , yet that is just what
the people expect, and the engineers try to meet these impossibfe
expectations. '
ACCIDENTS HAPPEN: Type-?
.Fteddermann* describes 3 types of accident :
.Engineered: where a design fault has caused a failure; for
example the DC-10 crashes in the 1970s and 80s. Clearly, an
engineer's responsibil ity;
.Procedural: resulting from misuse of a product; for example pilot
error causing a crash;
.Systematic: resulting from a combination of errors, where a single
one of these errors would not alone cause the accident. Engineer's
would have a responsibility for this type of accident as he/she
should consider the interaction of errors, and their consequences.
E"'; ",' UOP'" Soddlo R;, or, Nol . P' .otco HaH. m
S b,/O,ng ' r<J<'"I, ,,"", To/O)' ''"' ..... E""", "' Eog,""",;ng Ed""",;",,' . IEEE TecMolOgyand Soc ely V"" .z"e S,"' ''' or 2002. p 6
58
)0
ACCIDENTS HAPPEN?
In the Olympic pipeline failure case in

the USA, the judge acknowledged
that the manager of the pipeline did
not intend the failure to occur, and
had good intentions.
However, the j udge sent the
manager to prison. 'to pul closure
to the matter in whi ch three
people died' ,
-.Accidents happen... .
Many 'accidents' should not be
described as 'acci dents'
If an 'accident' has preventable
causes, it may beco me a criminal
case!
the fact that the engineers
involved in the 'accident' did not
inlen d an accident to occur , is not a
defense!
. Was it an 'accident waiting to
happen'?
. 11is a question of 'reasonable
- did the engineers exercise
'reasonable care'?
C_2005_
_ ,.., _ .__0_.. _ ........ _ .... "'..... ::..00"",."'"
59
'COMPETENCE'
. We often hear that an engineer needs to be 'competent '
. Adefinition from a pipeline organisation* is:
. 'A Competent Person should have pract ical and theoretical
knowledge as well as sufficient experience of the particular
machinery, plant or procedure involved to enable them to identify
defects or weaknesses. and to assess their importance in relation to
strengths and functions of the machinery'
60
'NEGLIGENCE'
. 'Negligence' is":
.-when an engineer's conduct is below the standard established by the
laws of a land. for the protection of others against 'unreasonable' risks
of harm, and is also
h hen we have fully considered the possible consequences of our
actions, but then failed to act ' reasonably' to avoid the risk of harm to
others.
at
... "'- - ,...... ,.. _.__.... ""' - ---,.",.
'NEGLIGENCE'
. You may be accused of 'negligence' in any profession
. You can be called 'negligent' if:
duty of car e existed between parties
. The defendant breached the dul y
a resul t of that breach the Claimant sustained damage
_ To avoid being negligent an engineer must show thai he/ she has made all the
'preparations' thai a reasonable man/woman in this position would recognise to
prevent unreasonable ri sk. This 'dul y of care' can be demonstrated before any
incident by: 49
lladherence to federal and state regulatioos;
with advisory standards:
. private knO'N1edge and conduct .
In all civil cases the claimant is requi red to prove his or her case on the 'balance
of probabi lities'
. Thls simply means a Judge has 10 be persuaded tnat the claimants version of events
is ffiOfe likely to be INe than the defenda nts
0_2001_'
"
'FITNESS FOR PURPOSE' - Legal implications
. Engineers will often use the term 'fitness for purpose'.
_ This has several mea nings , and - unfortunately - it has legal signifICance also!
. 1. Consultant s working on a structure that - for exampl e - may have a
defect in will define fitness for purpose as 'when a particular structure is
considered to be adequate for its purpose, provided the conditions to reach
failure are not reached (BS 7910)' .
In this meaning we are adopti ng a techni cal defini tion, but 'fi tness for pur pose'
may have a lega l and contractual meaning in your country.
For example. in the UK, a consultant engineer is expected to exercise
'reasonable skill and care' in his/her work;
. 2. A contractor carrying out a construct ion has a fundamentally different
obligati on
. he/she is obliged by law to warrant (guarantee) that the completed works will
be fit for their intended purpose.
This will be implied in his/her contract - it does not have 10 be staled explicitly
'FITNESS FOR PURPOSE' - Legal implications
. Ther efor e, a design engi neer wou ld be expected to exercise reasonable
care and lake due account of both:
. his/her Client's requirements and
. the purposes of which the installation (e.g. a pipeline) that he/she is
designing is to be used.
_ BUT the design is not expected to be perfect in law, as there may be some
circumstances, unforeseen by the engineer, Ihal causes failure
. However, if you give a warranty of ' fitness for purpose' , it is equival ent to
saying the design is perfect
~ f n s that would ordinarily be available to the consulting engineer are
removed.
",_2001I-'
6J
r:
'FITNESS FOR PURPOSE'
.-Therefore, jf a consultant gives a warranty for fitness for purpose (on the
completed works) and they are not , he/she wi ll be liable even if he/she
has used all reasonable skill and care.
lIThe damages thaI can flow from a breach of warranty are different from
those of negligence:
h arranty - costs of making the wor ks lit for purpose,
. negligence - you pay for anythi ng that coul d have reasonably been
foreseeable.
Engineers should check with their professional indemnity insurance -
what is covered as a company/professional? Usually,
professionals/consultants are not covered for warranties.
C_2006-.
BE PREPARED"
. You can prepare (including training) for an incident:
_ Understand possible key litigation issues (for example, know all
government department who you must notify in the event of an
incident);
. Have a medi a strategy (e.g. have staff trained in dealing with media
attention, and not making sweeping, insensitive, flippant or damagi ng
statements immediately after an incident) ;
. Have procedures to preserve physical evidence at the scene of an
incident (after making the incident scene safe, protect and record all
possible evidence);
. Have procedures to deal with government investigators (e.q . identify
a single point of contact in your company);
. Develop a policy and procedure for damage claims ( (for example.
pay for local hospital bills )
. Gel the facts before they' re lost (i nterview staff quickly, etc.)
",_:;>001I_'
L ~ _ ..'b "'_...._ 00 __................ ' """ 0 .......
65
SOCIOECOHUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES
OUR WORK-
Socio-Eco-Human Rights Responsibilities
.Our work can take us all over the world. Sometimes we have
to balance social, economic, ecological and busi ness
issues/needs:
.-Ne might work forlin count ries that have a history of socialistic
econom ic support but need our skills/in vestment
IIThese countries then are uncomfortable when faced with the high
profits required to undert ake the investment risk
68
14
r:
THE OIL AND GAS MAJORS-
Rights Responsibilities
. Governments can accuse oil and gas majors of 'stealing'
natural resources
. Governments officials gain political credibility by claiminq foreigners
are 'stealing' the resources. but are ignorant of investment risk
-ail and gas majors can also be faced
with respected pressur e groups whose sole
concern may be in e.g. a single feature
of the local eco-system, based on
mistrust of a multi-national. rather
than a balanced overview
. However, all our companies are bound by laws, moralities,
etc., and many have developed Ethical Codes (see, e.g. Shell
website)
C_:lOO6_
THE OIL AND GAS MAJORS -
Socio-Eco-Human Rights Responsibilities
. Ois proportionate Power :
_ The largest oil compa ny in the world - Exxon-
had (1996) annua l profits four times the budget
of Came roon and 40 times the budget of Chad.
Ethics of the Majors
. 1982 to 1992 Shell' s subsidiary in Nigeria
spilled - 1.6 million gallons of oil in Niger Del ta,
most from leaking pipelines, causing water
pollution and death of fish, mangroves & tropical
forests
. In 1997 the Wall Street Journal reported
Exxon' s chairman as advising to developing
countri es to avoid environmental controls
otherwise they would lose foreign investment.
C_OlOO5_
-,-", ... _-
69
PIPELINES -
Rights Responsibilities
8 Social & Envi ronmental Concerns:
. Pipelines can run thro' important ecological "_I
areas
. Industrial deve lopments in previously rural
environments can lead to work, tradition, social
and health changes
. Poli t i cal lnstabili ty and Human Rights
Violat ions:
. Pipelines can be laid in politically unsta ble or
corr upt areas . Wealth created can lead to
sustained instability, etc., and increased chance
of sabotage , environmental disasters, etc .
8 Revenue generated by governments from
pipelines are not gua ranteed 10be used 10
al leviate poverty , etc__They may be used for
military purposes
'" Po",,"" 2000 R.,"", '
""" f.""
POVERTY
mIndta
mt ndo
o Boli via
o Russia
Mexi co
Kazak
III Nigeria
o China
III S Africa . Malay
. Iraq Ir an
4000 J,+--
8000 ,-,-- - - - - - - - - - - - - ::=
' H N
'NN
---------- ..0 ...
'NN
"N
2000 U-- -
6000 U-- -
..
"
e
country
_'oeo 2006 Rev6;1
POVERTY & ENERGY
oMillions of peopl e wi t h no electricit y
O Mill ions of people rel ying on biomass
HOW TO BALANCE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
. In all projects we must balance:
. Business issues, with,
. Social responsibilities.
So, staff on a project must carefully
consider: ~ _ ; ; ; :
. Political,
. Environment,
. Social, as well as
lITechnological.
This means we have to
consider interests beyond those
of the investors or equipment suppliers .
Then staff deci de on participating.. ..
Conclusions... Company Checklist
c Are you working for a company that gives good, fair value?
I Do they try and squeeze the biggest profit, and look for gullible
customers?
I Do they have an ethics policy, and work to it?
r Does the company apply its ethics policy globally, or selectively?
[ Does the company address all ethical issues, including controversial
issues that may reflect badly on its own image?
I Does the company appreciate the wide responsibilities it has to all its
stakeholders, and allow open debate about these responsibilities?
I Does the company recognise the consequences of the use of its
products , and address any damaging effects?
r Does the company actively pursue solutions to ethical problems; for
example, does an oil and gas major contribute to reducing climate
change, and ensure profits are spread to all stakeholders, however
distant?
Conclusions.. . Personal Checkl ist
r l is 'safety' a prime focus for the company, and a clear business goal?
L Ooes the company recognise its responsib ilities to the environment?
r pces the company's 'human welfare' consideration extend beyond its
staff , to all other stakeholders?
Does the company deal with reputable organisations and
governments?
I Does your line management act in a professional manner, and consider
and challenge company policies if they are unfair, short-sighted, or
unethical?
I Does management recognise mistakes , both at management level and
corporate level?
r Do you admire your bosses and colleagues for human values such as
honesty , mentoring, intellect , hard work, wisdom, friendliness, fairness,
etc., or is the only admiration in their position and salary?
r:
PRESSURE GROUPS Example
.-The National Pipeline Reform coeuuon is
a USA network of environ mental and safety
organizations, local governments, and labour
unions formed to protect the environment.
& public from releases from pipelines
IITheir report found thai 'many, if
nor most, of the more than 400 deaths and
nearly 4,000 injuries incurred in tens of
thousands of accidents involving interstat e
pipelines since 1984 could have been
prevented if : Pi""'''' ' raved'" __,... ".s
IIag;og and corroding pipes had been inspected and replaced regu larly, and:
~ the federal government's pipeline regulatory agency, the Office of Pipeline
Safety, had not been indi fferent to its responsibilities of implementing and
enforcing pipeline safety requirements '.
~ might agree or disagree with Ihese Groups, but we must listen 10 them.
-.. - _.'
- --
IT
Personal and Pipeline Security
Phil Hopkins
Penspen Integrity
78
1q
Terrorism
a 'rerrortsm is now a real threat to
the oil and gas business
_ We should never be complacent
e remember that terrorist s
attacked the World Trade
Centre in 1993, and
. Algerian Armed Islamic
Group terrorists attempted to
fly a jet into the Eiffel Tower in
1994
INTERNATI ONAL ATTACKS BY REGION - 199 8-2 00 3
- ""
- ""

_ = 7
= "",
Terrorists
a 'Tnere are 3 types of terrorist s 'mioosets':
_ RATIONAL terro rists who perform a type
of cost benefi t on their attacks to determine
maxi mum i mpact versus mini mum
personal risk
. PSYCHOLOGICAL terrorists who are
motivated by personal dissat isfaction &
cannot diffe rentia te between right & wrong,
do not recognise any views other than their
own, & wi l l show no mercy or remo rse
_ CULTURE MOTIVATED terrorists who
are dedicated to a religion, race or
nationality and are aggressive to any
perceived threat to their culture; their
attacks may incl ude self-annihi lation in
pursuit of an unquesti oning adhe rence to
dogma or propaganda
CASUA l- TIES BY
1996-2003
--

--
","" ""
--
i
".
80
dn
Travel to High Risk Areas
_ If you ar e trave lling abroad, remember that terrorists
can be motivated by many things:
_religion or patriotic fervour, envi ronment ,
concern, or animals, elc.
_Therefore. understand the country you ar e visiti ng,
and obtai n the latest security information
(e.g. v' ).
_ And remember - as secu rity is increased at
officia l/governmenUobvious locations, the
terrorist will st rike at 'softer' tar gets.
Plus... kidnapping is a $1bil1ion/year business, and increasi ng - don't
get caught ....
Travel to High Risk Areas
_ ALWAYS conduct a risk asse ssment of any
trave l to high risk areas
_ Most secu rity problems ar e failures of
management, therefore ensure secu rity is in
place TO YOUR SATISFACTION before
venturing to high risk areas.
IYour life - your responsibil ity I
r:
82
4'
Travel to High Risk Areas - quick tips
ec oncuct thorough risk assessment of area to be visi ted

_ Have trave l and health insurance
a t eave a copy of your itinerary with colleagues/family
_ Make 2 copies of your passport identification page, airline
COO
tickets, driver' s license and credit cards
...
a t eave one phot ocopy of this data with colleagues/fami ly at
home
. Pack the other in a place separate from where you carry

your valuabl es
. Travel light - less to lose, and less to put down when
z4
waiting
_Travel on one-stop flights (most accidents are on take
offll anding)
_ Minimise your time is public areas of airports - move
quickly to behind security
c_"""_
83
_.._-...-
---
..
- Do not hire ' flashy' cars (obvious target)
. Keep car locked at all l imes
_ Don't drive at night
_If somebody wants your attention, flags you down
- ignore himrher!
_If somebody 'suspidous' is near your car - do not
get out!
_Dress conservatively - don't look l ike a tourist -
don't look like a business person - no flash
jewellery!
_Store passports, credit cards in hotel safe - if you
need to carry then conceal them, DON'T put in
'easy grad' handbags, out side pockets, etc.
I
....--.... _-
SECURITY FOLLOWING SEPT EMBER 11 2001
_ Stay is good hotels (for security) and stay
in on floors 2-5 (difficult to enter il legally,
easily reached by fire services)
_Read the fire safety instructions in your
hotel room. Memorise the fire escape route
a use busy streets/roads. Trust no stranger.
Do not walk alone at night
_I f confronted - don't fight - give all your
valuables - they can be replaced!
85
r:
Pipelines - General Security
_ Mosl pipeline companies in USA partici pate in several alert systems,
and co-ordinate through government bodi es to learn of any potentia l
terrorist activity.
a c omoantes rehearse, review and refi ne thei r security measures on an
on-going basis. Safely and reli ability always have been at the heart of
everything pipeline companies do.
coPeo, pe, 2006 Rov6/'
Pipelines - General Security
_A pipeline is monitored all day, every day. A pipeline's flow and
pressure are monitored and regulated around the clock.
ec ompanes can deploy extra measures.
_This may involve call ing up additional manpower or sophisticated
technology.
_The tools used to prepare and respond will vary from company to
company .
_Emergency response plans
will be in place, as they will be
required by local laws/regulations.
_ Ensure your crisis management
plans in not just for a shelf - it
must be a real istic living document
--..... ...,
Pipelines. Specific
_Actions:
efdentify process for assessing pipeline system and faci lity vulnerabilities
- Devetop uniform definitions of security cond itions
. Develop graduated set of countermeasures for each security condition level
_ Quick Measure s:
_limited access to pipeline mapslinformation
_ Identify key facilities and secure
_Background checks for selected state and pipeline personnel
_Security exercise program
_Plan rapid restoration of pipeline service foll owing an attack/sabotage .
_ Some USA pipeline companies are :
_Controlling access, Using intrusion detection, Revie'Ning electronic systems
against cyoer-terronsm. Preplanning with FBI/military, Hiring armed guards
_Future:
. Govemment/lndustry partnership to address security needs . Already started.
44
Pipeline Engineers: Ethics,
Responsibilities, and Competency
Phil Hopkins
Penspen Ltd., UK
Penspen 2007 1
PIPELINE ENGINEERS: ETHICS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COMPETENCY
Hopkins, pl
ABSTRACT
In recent years the pipeline busi ness has been closely scrutinising pipeline 'integrity': we expect
our pipelines to be safe, and consequently requi re them to have high levels of integrity.
'Integrity' has various definitions, ranging from 'moral soundness' to 'the state of being entire or
complete' . The latter definition is appropriate to pipelines, but the former is appropriate to
pipeline engineers. This leads to the question. .. how do we ensure that our engineer has high
levels of integrity?
All professions have responsibilities, and the engineeri ng profession is no different: it has
responsibilities, and is bound by codes of ethics .
This paper discusses the ethics and moralities of the engineering profession. These are
important issues to engineers; their work will take them to regions of the world where there is
social injustice, the profits from the oil and gas may not find their way to the people, and where
protecting peoples' cultures and their environment is the major consideration. Also, engineers
will need to come to terms with the high profits made by the oil and gas businesses, and the fact
that much of these profits come from the developing world, and an energy-type that is creating
global warming.
The paper is intended as a simple ethical guide to all engineers working in the oil and gas
business.
1 Technical Director, Penspen Integrity, Hawthorn Suite, Units 78, St Peter's Wharf, St Peter's Basin,
Newcastle upon Tyne NE6 H Z, UK. Tel. 44 (0) 191 2382202. email p.hopki ns@penspen.com. This
paper is an update of the paper presented at WT1A International Pipeline Integrity Conference
Wollongong, Aust ralia. Welding Technology Institute of Australia. 7-9 March 2005. It is also based on the
author 's Keynote Address to the International Pipeline Conference 2006, Calgary, Canada .
Penspen 2007 2
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the pipeline business has been closel y scrutinising pipeline 'integrity': we expect
our pipelines to be safe, and consequently requi re them to have high levels of integrity. Some
definitions of 'integrity' are: 'soundness'; 'the state of being unimpaired'; 'the quality or condition
of being whole or undivided'; 'completeness', These are all highly appropriate defini tions of
integrity for pipelines. and we ensure a pipeline has this integrity by using engineering codes of
practice, and recognised procedures to both design and operate the pipeline.
Another defi nition of 'integrity' is more personal : 'steadfast adherence to a strict moral or ethical
code' , This leads to the question... how do we ensure that our pipeline engineer has integri ty?
This paper addresses the ethics and responsibilities of an engineer that shoul d ensure that he
or she has the same high level of 'integrity' as a pipeline!
1.1 Work.. ..
We all have to work for money. Some of us are lucky: we also do a job we enjoy. The luckiest
people are those that both enjoy their jobs, and know their jobs contribute to social welfare.
The oil and gas business is a big, international business: Exxon Mobil, the worl d's largest
publicly quoted oil and gas firm, made $US25billion profit in 2004. These earnings are
approximately equal to the gross domestic product (GOP) of Luxembourg or Guatemala, and
higher than the individual GOPs of Syria, Bulgaria and Kenya. In 2004, Shell recorded the
biggest profits ever by a British company. The $US18biliion earned in 2004 from oil and gas -
$2million an hour - is equal to nearly 1% of Britain's GOP! 2005 has seen even bigger profits:
Company Revenue (S1000m) Profits (S1000m)
ExxonMobil 370 36
Shell 307 23
BP 253 19
ChevronTexaco 153 14
Total 152 14
Conoco Phillips 198 14
Tabl e 1. Revenues and Profits of the Oil and Gas Majors
It is if interest to consider the true cost of oi l and gas. If we were to consi der the (cli mate)
damaging aspects of fossil fuels we would need to 'tax' these oil and gas majors' profits. We can
do thi s: in Europe, industries (e.g. fossil fuel -burning power stations) are charged a 'carbon tax',
related to the amount of carbon dioxi de the industry is responsible for. If we were to apply this
tax to the above profits, they would turn into defici ts! For example, the +$19 billion profits of BP
would drop to -$31 billion ;Iosses!
People working in this business may be exposed to ethical and professional situations where
they have to make decisions, not based on the good of the company, but on their personal
beliefs and social responsibilities.
2 This paper is the final paper in a series of four papers (see also References 1,2,21) that has addressed
change and ethical issues in the pipeline business.
Penspen 2007 3
This paper covers our responsibilities in engineering, and hopefully will show that money isn't
everything, and an engineer cannot be bought!
We are going to talk about ethics, and this is highly relevant to pipeline engineers. For example,
we may work for companies with interests in Nigeria, or, like the author of this paper, have
worked on projects in Nigeria. Nigeria is an 'oil-rich' country but its people are very poor: its
population of 130,000,000 have an average salary of $lIday. Its government is striving to
eliminate corruption which affects the redistribution of the oil revenues of over $25 billion/year.
Should we work for companies with interests in Nigeria?
A perspective on the problem was given by the Nigerian Finance Minister when she was
interviewed on SBC Radio 4 on 14th January 2005. She said that if all the oil revenue was given
to the people, they would only receive an extra $O.5/week.
This can be viewed in two ways:
a $0.5/day increase in salary is negligible by world standards, and would not remove
poverty from Nigeria;
a $0.5/day increase in salary is a 50% increase for that person, and would significantly
increase their quality of life.
Is corruption the problem causing poverty in Nigeria? Is the oil business contributing to Nigeria's
problems or alleviating them? Is the oil business, and the profit s going to the government and
the oil majors, the problem?
Also, we will be working in countries, or worki ng on oil from countries that may not be
democratic, or may not have good human rights records. For example, the fifteen countries
which have oil reserves in excess of 10 billion barrels are:
Engineers faced with projects in such countries need to carefully consider all morality, safety and
environmental aspects before agreeing to participate.
1.2 What is ' Engineering'?
There is little point in talking about ethics in engineering without first understanding what
'engineering'is!
Engineering means 'skilled' or 'creative'. Engineers have to research, design, build and operate
machines, structures, etc., that will function safely and efficiently. Engineering is a powerful and
prestigious profession. Engineers can save companies millions of pounds in the developed
world by clever designs, and can save thousands of lives in the developing world by working on
energy projects to provide power to their industries, or working on infrastructure projects such as
water pipelines to give people clean water. Engineers can make a big 'difference' in the world.
An engineer will use scientific laws to solve practical problems. It is difficult to differentiate
between scientists and engineers, but one way is to view a scientist as asking why?- and then
he/she researches the answer to the question. By contrast, engineers want to know "now" to
solve a problem, and how to implement that solution.
'You see things and you say "Why?" But / dream things that never were; and I say "Why not?"
George Bernard Shaw.
Penspen 2007 4
Country Reserves
(billions of barrel s)
USA 22
Mexico 12
Venezuela 78
Norway 10
Russia 60
Canada 180
Libya 30
Nigeri a 24
Iraq 113
Iran 89
Kuwait 97
UAE 98
Saudi Arabia 261
China 18
Qatar 15
Table 2. Countries wit h the Major Oil Reserve s
1.3 Legal Duties
We all must obey national and international laws. Engineers will be faced with many laws (for
example, contract law), and hence we need to consider our legal duties.
This paper is not an in-depth analysis of our legal duties; these will vary from country to country.
However, we will cover certain legal responsibilities: this is important as engi neers can be held
responsible for their actions and face penalties. Remember.. . we live in a very litigious society;
be aware of all your duties and responsibilities, and always put safety first.
1.4 Responsibilities
A detachable burden easily shifted to the shoulders of God, Fate, Fortune, Luck
or one's neighbour. In the days of astrology it was customary to unload it upon a star. " Ambrose
Bierce. The Devil's Dictionary, 1911.
We have many responsibilities in our lives. They can be family (e.g. care for your children),
social (e.g. care for your neighbour), professional (e.g. care for your clients), spiritual (e.g.
satisfyi ng our conscience) and political (e.g. care for developing countries).
First of all... what is 'responsibility' ? Responsibility usually means we are expected to achieve or
maintain a result, as we have the required knowledge. It does not require ' perfection'. because
we may not always achieve the result:
a responsibl e physician may see a patient die;
a responsible engineer may witness his design failing in an unforeseen accident.
Penspen 2007 5
Engineers have many responsibilities. We always think of three of the more obvious:
professional - the responsibility that arises from a special knowledge;
company- these are our 'official' or specified duties in our job;
legal- those required by society.
We would expect to behave in a professional manner at all times, as we are called professional
engineers. Also, we would always expect to behave in a right and proper manner to our
company, within the law of the land, to satisfy both our own morals, and the employment
contract.
Therefore, we are familiar with our professional and work obligations, but engineers now have
many responsibilities beyond these simplistic professional ones. When we design a component,
conduct a calculation, give a view, etc. we are making a decision, and hence we have
responsibilities to all 'stakeholders' in those decisions. These stakeholders include the engineer
and others; for example:
the company we work for;
the client we are making the decision for;
any person or environment that may be affected by this decisi on.
We can illustrate this by considering designing a hotel elevator: the stakeholders are our client
who ordered the elevator, the owner of the hotel, and aUpersons who travel in the elevator.
Consequently, we are answerable to many stakeholders and liable for our decisions, and our
'professionalism' goes beyond ourselves and our company.
Additionally, we are now in a 'global' economy, and engineers will increasingly be asked to work
on projects in countries that have poor human rights, or poor environmental records. This means
we may be faced with questions of morality and conscience, Again. an engineer must now
consider these aspects in his or her work.
All the above can be grouped into three areas:
loyalty: to your profession and company;
ethics: in dealing with matters of conscience and morality;
duty of care: to all stakeholders in your decision-making.
Obviously, all the above are linked together, but to give this paper some structure we will start by
talking about 'loyalty' and 'ethics', then move on to 'duly of care' ,
Penspen 2007 6
2. LOYALTY [1,2]
2.1 What is ' Loyalt y' ?
You can find various dictionary defini tions of loyalty. Here is one:
'Loyafty - friendship or duty towards something or somebody'.
Loyalty is a confusing concept. We can see people being 'loyal' to family members, even a
football team. but to a company? To a profession? To a customer?
A good example of loyalty is a pet. Dogs and cats can fetch a stick, or purr on your knee, and
only requ ire a meal per day in return. A dog is fanatically loyal : a dog will exhibi t lifelong loyal ty
to everyt hing, ranging from you, to an old slip per .
Even if you do not feed a dog , it will remain by your side. A cat is different: hi s or her loyal ty is
mer ely a business deal: feed me, and you have my loyalt y and affections, stop feed ing me, and
I'm gone.
Also, a dog's loyalty is unquestionable: shout 'sit' into a room full of cats and dogs, and all the
dogs will sit , but the cats will look long and hard at you, and think - "are you winding me up?". A
cat can show real and ferocious loyalty: try and steal a kitten from its mother; but it cannot
understand why dogs' loyalty can extend to giving up thei r lives in the protection of a deflated
football.
We will now look at loyalty issues that an engineer will face in his or her profession.
2.2 loyalty to a Company - an Older View
Our forefathers viewed loyalty to a company as a mark of distinction. Loyalty was usually
identified by long service. Today, this can be the 'kiss of death' to your career. Prospective
employers may be suspicious of an applicant who has been with one company for a long time.
Where is the ambition? Where is the varied experience? Where are the new skills?
Obviously, any new employer will be suspicious of an applicant who changes their j ob every six
months, so there is a balance needed when considering how long to stay with a company in
terms of your career prospects.
2,3 Loyalty - the Modern View
Loyalty is a quality that is becoming increasingly difficult to find, whether it is employee loyalty to
a company, or consumer loyalty to a product.
In the past, employees believed when they were hired by a company, it would last until they
retired. Start ing in the 1980s, as companies sought to increase profits, workers' perceptions of
lifetime employment were shattered by corporate downsizing, company relocations to ot her
states or countries, and static wages.
This is why older workers are more likely to express corporate loyalty, but they are also more
likely to feel betrayed by corporate actions.
A report on corporate hiring priorities gives us an insight into how the 'new' world views loyalty:
the survey was conducted by Vaul t Reports. a New York City-based employment research firm.
Vault Reports asked college career-centre professionals what they thought employers are
looking for in new hires. The top items were phrases such as "team player," "intelligence" and
"professional demeanour." Finishing next to last, No. 10 on a list of 11 items, was "loyalty.
Penspen 2007 7
The above shows us that there is a modern (lower importance) view of loyalty. However , in this
section we are looking more at loyalty to a company in terms of decisions made 'on the job'
rather than to further your career.
2.4 Corporate loyalty
Most professional engineers are employed by an organisation. An engineer will have an
employment contract and 'Terms and Conditions' will require some 'loyalty', e.g. a long notice
period, and a company's rewards package (e.g. large pension) may be seen as warranting some
loyalty in return. Ensuring loyalty by good pensions, company cars, etc. , is a simple buying
method.
Beware of companies and managers who use words such as 'pride. commitment, teamwork' as
a reason to work harder or longer: these are words that managers use to get staff to work for
free. Instead, companies need to offer tangible benefits as incentives for loyal staff. Hence,
policies and procedures must be in place that give staff confidence that any loyalty they show
will be rewarded. For example, longer notice periods, company equity schemes, and other
rewards for competence and commitment.
This is similar to supermarkets' 'loyalty' cards - because they pay you back (1% refund of
everything you spend) for your custom. Again, a simple financial deal.
2.5 loyalty: A l egal Definition
'l oyalty' is a very abstract word, but a definition [3] from a court in Maryland, USA gives some
important guidance:
'... an implied duty that an employee is to act sol ely for the benefit of his or her employers in all
matt ers within the scope of employment. '
2.6 loyalty and the Engineer
An engineer must make his or her own decisions on loyalty to a company in terms of his or her
career progression; however, in our professional work, we do not owe unqualified loyalty to a
company, as this would be a sacrifice of an employee's autonomy. For example, a maintenance
manager who tells a maintenance engineer to 'watch costs', is behaving in a reasonable,
legitimate manner, but if this manager asks the engineer to cut costs by neglecting certain
agreed procedures, then the engineer is placed in a difficult position.
The above legal definition of loyalty helps an engineer in these circumstances; if an illegal or
dangerous act is being proposed, it is not to the benefit of the company.
And remember, in certain circumstances, a professional code of ethics may contain an
expression of public policy, and a professional may be expected to abide by this professional
code as well as federal and state laws. That duty may oblige them to decline certain acts
requested by an employer. Note that almost all the engineering codes of ethics in the USA.
include as a provision, "Engineers shaff act in professional matters for each employer or client as
faithful agents."
We will discuss this further under 'ethics' , as we must never let our company or personal
loyalties break ethical barriers. The major point for an engineer to remember is that their main
loyalty and responsibility is to the general public, whom they serve. And this leads to a simple
priority for any engineer: safety!
Penspen 2007 8
Pens pen 2007 9
3. ENGINEERS' ETHICS
'What is moral ;s what you feel good after, and what is immoral is what you feel bad after'.
Ernest Hemingway.
Engineering is an important and learned profession. As members of this profession, engineers
are expected to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Additionally, engineers
must perform under a standard of professional behavi our that requires adherence to the highest
principles of ethical conduct.
"Et hics" has at least three meanings in English: it can be [4]:
1. a synonym for ordi nary morality, "Morality", refers to those standards of conduct
everyone (every rational person at his rational best) wants every other to follow even if
everyone else's following them would mean having to follow them too. Morality (in this
sense) is the same for everyone, engineers included.
2. the name for a field of phil osophy, or
3. the name for a set of special (morally permissible) standards (for example, engineering
ethics, see Section 3.2. 1)).
Thi s section considers ethics and engineering, but other aspects of life cut across engineering.
For example. the British Government recentl y (December 2001 ) was faced with an ethical
problem when asked to grant an export licence. Tanzania, one of the world's poorest countries
(half the populati on do not have access to clean water. over half live below the poverty line, with
a per capita income of $250 a year ) and in the top 10 list of most corrupt countri es in the world.
placed a S40mi11i on order with a British Company for a mi litary air traffic control system.
International 'arms' dealing has been recognised as corrupt for decades. The order, if accepted ,
protected 250 engineering j obs in the UK. How should the government react. and how can the
250 engineers ethicall y j ustify producing the equipment?
3.1 Moral St andards
In 'Prospects for International Standards' by Vivian Weil she reflects on common moral
standards; we refer to them as our 'common morality' . Her colleague, Michael Davis has usefull y
characterized our common morali ty: "Don't kill," "Don't decei ve, " and "Don't cheat" are among
the stand ards of our common morality.
Our common morality, provides a fundamental framework of standards to appeal to in reasoning
about cases. We have an addi tional framework: the codes of ethics promoted by the professions
through thei r professional associations. These ethica l standards are special sets of standards
adopted by occupational groups and binding upon the members of the group, because they are
members of the group.
Penspen 2007 10
3.2 Professional Standards/Ethics)
Using the above description of common moral ity, allows professional standards to be defined as
those "morally permissible standards of conduct each member of some particular occupational
group wants every other member of the group to follow, even if everyone else 's following them
would mean having to follow them too. H
A profession's ethical standards must be compatible with OUf common morality, but they go
beyond : they interpret our common morality for the specifi c details of work of a part icular
occupati onal group. For example, almost all the engineering codes of ethics in the U.S. include
as a provision. "Engineers shall act in profession al matters for each employer or client as fai thful
agents.
8
Avoiding injury to the employer or client is a requirement for engineers, specific to their
conditions of practice.
3.2.1 Engineers' Responsibilities and Ethics
The Amer ican Soci ety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) considers that engineers should uphold
and advance the integrity. honour, and dignity of the engineering profession by:
Using their knowledge and skill for the enhancement of human wel fare;
Being honest and impartial. and serving with fidelity the public. their employers and
cl ients;
Striving to increase the competence and prestige of the engi neering profession.
These fundamental responsibilities lead onto a set of fundamental rules ('canons'):
1. Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public...
2. Engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence.
3. Engineers shall conti nue their professional development throughout their careers and...
provide opportunit ies for the .. . development of those engineers under their supervision.
4. Engineers shall act in professional matters for each employer or client. .. and shall avoid
conflicts of interest.
5. Engineers shall build their professional reputation on the merit of their services and shall
not compete unfairly with others .
6. Engineers shall associate only with reputable persons or organisations.
7. Engineers shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
8. Engineers shall consider environmental impact in... their professional dut ies.Other
professional engineering organ isations have simi lar rules; for example, the Engineering Council
in the UK under its ' Roles and Responsibilities of Chartered Engineers' (17) states that an
engineer has '... a responsibility to society with regard to safety, to their legal and contractual
obligations, and for the ethicaf and environmental impact of their work'. 3.2.2 'Canon t '
Professional codes, then, reflect our common moral ity and the circumstances of practice in a
part icular society. Circumstances change and codes undergo revision, as professional societies
respond to pressures from outside and from within the world of practice. Currently, professional
engineering societies in the USA are beginning to respond to widespread concern about the
environment. Some engineering societ ies have considered whether existing codes already
encompass protection of the environment, by way of Canon 1 (see Secti on 3.2.1): "Engineers
shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of their
3 ' Ethics' is the conventionalterm in the USA for 'professional standards'.
Penspen 2007 11
professional duties." Two societies have added provisions regarding the environment to their
codes.
Around 1970, all the major professions came under closer scrutiny than before, and they had to
respond to demands for accountability to the public. Canon 1 of the engineers' codes serves as
a touchstone for engineers and engineering students who are trying to resolve problems. It does
not imply specific solutions, but it reminds engineers of their weightiest obligation as
professionals.
Ethical codes, like technical codes, respond to problems that engineers commonly encounter. At
each stage in their development, codes represent the consensus of a particular community of
engineering professionals, and they, in turn, help to define a community of engineeri ng
professionals. Both ethical and technical standards are part of and expressions of the experti se
of engineers.
3.2.3 Do we have to take note of Engineering Institution's Ethics Policies?
If we are a member of an engineering institution that has an ethics policy, society will expect us
to adhere to it.
Many engineers are not members of engineeri ng societies: membership, and obeying their rules,
are not legal requirements, Do societies ethics codes, etc., apply to these engineers? An
engineer 's obligations do not rest on an 'oath' or membership of a society; however, if you call
yourself an 'engineer' or have an 'engineer' job title, society (and the law) will expect you to
behave as a responsible engineer.
The law would consider engineering societies rules, and if they are rational , they will expect any
engineer to follow them. You may not be a member of ASME, etc., but a lawyer and society may
consider you have a 'contract implied by law' with this type of society.3.2.4 Engineering
Standards and Codes"
Safety is a leading ethical concern in engineering: this concern underlies technical standards
and becomes explicit in codes of ethics. Engineering knowledge and guidance is translated into
codes and standards that are used by industries, but all codes and standards leave scope for
individual j udgment, and this is where ethical codes help engineers.
Standards give engineers guidance and advice in a straightforward manner; however, the
process by which codes shape practice is not straightforward. As a British scholar recently said,
"Why should the use of standards be more straightforward than their development?",
Engineering societies voluntarily produce not only standards but also documented discussions
and accounts of debates that occur in the process of deliberating about standards. These are
published in their journals, websites, etc..
3.2.5 Linking Engineering Standards and Laws
It is not usually legally mandatory to conform to engineering standards, but fol lowing them
satisfies legal safety regulations, which are mandatory.
4 What is the difference between a 'code' and a ' standard' ? ASME considers a 'standard' as ... ' a set of
technical definit ions and guidelines - "how to" instructions for designers and manufacturers. Standards,
which can run from a few paragraphs to hundreds of pages, are written by experts'. Standar ds are
considered voluntary because they serve as guidelines, not having the force of law.
A 'code' is.. . 'a standard that has been adopted by one or more governmental bodies and has the force of
law, or when it has been incorporated into a business contract' ,
Penspen 2007 12
The failure to meet appropriate engineering standards, even when there is no violat ion of
government regulations, can leave a company vulnerable in a product liabili ty lawsuit. There is,
then, in the face of legal standards, a basis for continuing to emphasize good engineering
standards, ethical as well as technical , and to advance those standards by incorporating new
knowledge.
Don't Forget Training!
There is nothing training cannot do. Nothing is above its reach. It can turn bad morals to good; it
can destroy bad principles and recreate good ones; it can lift men to angelship'. Mark Twain .
All engineers are required to continue their professional development (See Section 3.2.1). We
must keep up to date, and be aware of new technologies and methods. If we do not - we are
failing in our duties.
In some countries it is a legal requirement to have a formal training programme for pipeline
engineers. For example, in the USA, the Federal Register Part 49 CFR 192.763 (pipeline
integrity management in high consequence areas) requires:
'An operator's integrity management program must provide that each supervisor. .. has
appropriate training or experience in the area for which the person is responsible {and] must
provide criteria for the qualification of persons who review or analyze results from integrity
assessments and evaluations.... '
We will mention training again in Section 5.4.2.
Penspen 2007 13
4. THE ENGINEER AND CLIMATE CHANGE [5-7]
We cannot ta'k about the ethics of engineers in the oil and gas business without talki ng about its
impact on the environment .
Oil and gas brings many benefits to society, and is an essential part of modernday living: we
cannot survive withou t it. In recent years, many scientists have highlighted the impact on our
environment of burning fossil fuels: this impact can be highly damaging, part icularly on our
climate. and have long term consequences to our planet.
Over the last two decades, scientists have observed a slight increase in temperature on the
surface of the earths. Some attribute this to an increased concentrati on of 'greenhouse gases' in
the atmosphere. The most important greenhouse gases are: carbon dioxide (C0
2
) , methane,
nitrous oxide , hydrofluorocarbons, perfl uorocarbons, and sulphur hexafl uoride.
The main greenhouse gas of concern to policy makers is carbon dioxide. It traps some of the
radiation that would otherwise be lost to space, and causes the Earth's atmosphere to be
warmer than it would otherwise be.
We all contribute to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere : driving a car , using electri city
obtained from fossil fuels, et c. Similarl y, when farmers in Brazil, or the United Stat es or China,
clear or burn forests to create new farm or grazing lands, emissions are also increased. That
explains why actions by man are central to the climate change debate.
4.1 Is Climate Change Really a Problem [8]?
Thousands of climate scientists, ecologists, technologists and economists from round the world
formed an Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988, under the auspices of the
United Nat ions. The panel's pioneering assessments amount to a scientific consensus on
climate chang e, its likel y impacts, and what we can do about it. Its early reports persuaded
governments of the seriousness of the problem and informed the negotiations of the Kyoto
Prot ocol (see next sect ion).
One of the central conclusions of the panel's work to date is that, whatever we do now,
signifi cant climate change is now unavoidable. It will take decades to bring emiss ions of
greenhouse gases under sufficient control that the concentrations of the gases in the air stop
rising.
The International Energy Authority's (lEA) World Energy Out look 2002 stated that global energy-
relat ed emissions of carbon dioxide are proj ected to increase by 1.8% per year from 2000 to
2030, reaching 38 billion tonnes in 2030. This is 16 bill ion tonnes, or 70% more than today
(2002). Two-thirds of the increase wi ll come in developing countries. China alone will contri bute
a quarter of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions, or 3.6 billion tonnes, bringing its total
emissions to 6.7 billion tonnes per year in 2030. Even then, however, Chinese emissions remain
well below those of the United States.
4.2 Kyoto Protocol
5 CO
2
levels have risen from an average of 280 ppm (parts per million) over the last millennium to a
current level of 370 ppm and continue to rise by 1.5 ppm per annum. Indeed. levels are at their highest for
400.000 years. Most scientists believe that human activity is causing that increase. Concurrently. an
average global temperature rise of 0.6
e
Chas beenobserved since 1860 [9].
Penspen 2007 14
In 1979, the first United Nations' World Climate Conference explored how climate change might
affect human activities, and issued a declaration calling on the world's governments "to foresee
and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well -being of
humanity". The United Nations subsequently helped to develop the 'Kyoto Protocol' : this protocol
requires participating nations - almost all from the developed world - to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions to five percent below 1990 levels during the five years from 2008 to 2012.
4.3 Is Saving th e Planet a Prioriy?
Is cutting the use of fossil fuels, and money spent on controlling global warmi ng, a good thing? It
is estimated that the implementation of the Kyoto agreement is $150 billion/year, and its effect
would not be seen for centuries; but, for half that sum, we could provide clean water, health care
and basic education to all of the world's population.
If we were to ask the father of an uneducated, starving, ailing family in the developing world how
we should spend $150 billion this year, he will not say 'save the planet' , he will ask 'save my
family'.
4.4 Climate Change and the Pipeline Engineer
Pipeline engineers work in a business that is known to create global warming; consequently,
they need to be confident that their profession and companies understand this impact and are
contributing to its mitigation. For example, many oil and gas majors are working on 'greener'
fuels, but this is a slow process: a review by the UK's Royal Academy of Engineering of the cost
of generating electricity in the UK from different energy sources concluded that natural gas was
the best option, and renewable energy sources were more expensive [10], Table 3.
An engineer has to accept the damaging aspects of burning fossil fuels, and be convinced that -
on balance - it contributes to the welfare of the people it serves, and that also his/her company
is aware of their duties in reducing these damaging aspects.
Cost Increases If back-up power generation ISneeded. The costs Ignore environment Impact.
Table 3 Alternative Energy for Electricity Generat ion
Method of Generating Electricity Cost (pence I kWhour)
Gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 2.2
Nuclear fission plant 2.3
Coal -fired pulverised-fuel (PF) steam plant 2.5
Coal-fired circulating fluidized bed (CFB) steam plant 2.6
Coal-fired integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 3.2
Onshore wind farm 3.7-5.4'
Offshore wind farm 5.5-7.2'
Wave and marine technologies 6.6
,
6 These costs assume no penally is being paid by the fossil fuels for crealing CO
2
, If taxes/penalties are
levied, then nuclear and the renewabl e sources become more competitive.
7 1 pence =0.01.
8 Coal is one of til e 'dirtiest' fuels and produces the most CO
2
: hence, it is causing most damage in terms
of global warming .
Penspen 2007 15
5. STANDARD (DUTY) OF CARE
Before we start this section, we need to note the single word that sums up an engineer's
responsibili ties, ethics, standard of care, etc.: SAFETY!
Engineers have always been responsible for their work, and their failures; for example, 3000
years ago. Hammurabi the greatest ruler (1795bc-1750bc) of Babyion", produced a remarkable
list of codes and laws for his people. It is the earliest complete legal code known. They were
engraved in 2.4m high blocks of granite.
One of these laws was... 'If a builder builds a house for some one, and does not construct it
properly, and the house which he built falls in and kills its owner, then that builder shaff be put to
death '.
5.1 Engineer' s Duty
Engineers have a duty to provide their services in a manner consistent with the "standard of
care" of their professions. Two good working definition of the standard of care (both taken from
the USA legal system) of a professional are:
that level or quality of service ordinarily provided by other normally competent
practitioners of good standing in that field. contemporaneously providing similar services
in the same locality and under the same circumstances '; or
that which is commonly possessed by members of that profession or trade on good
standing. It is not that of the most highly skilled, nor is it that of the average member of
the profession or trade. since those who have less than median or average skiff may still
be competent and qualified' [1 1].An engineer's service need not be perfect: since the
engineer, when providing professional services, is using judgment gained from experience and
learning, and is usually providing those services in situations where a certain amount of
unknown or uncontrollable factors are common, some level of error in those services is allowed.
When you hire an engineer you "purchase service, not insurance." so you are not justified in
expecting perfection or infallibility, only "reasonable care and competence". The fact that an
engineer makes a mistake that causes injury or damage, is not sufficient to lead to professional
liability on the part of the engineer. In order for there to be professional liability, it must be proven
the services were professionally negligent, that is, they fell beneath the standard of care of the
profession. When one hires an engineer, one accepts the risk, and the liability, of that
professional making a mistake similar to mistakes other normally competent engineers make,
using reasonable diligence and their best judgment.
The standard of care is not what an engineer should have done in a particular instance, it is not
what others sayan engineer would do, or what others say they themselves would have done, it
is j ust what competent engineers actually did in similar circumstances.
5.2 ' Error'
Error is fact of life: "To err is human. "
9 Babylon is Iraq and the northern parts of Syria.
Penspen 2007 16
Some error comes from variability and uncertainty in what the engineer is dealing with: real
materials, natural and man-made loads, and humans and their organizations. Error can lead to
fai lure, which can cause injury, and result in damages.
An engineer is not liable, or responsible, for damages from every error . Society has decided,
through case law, that when you hire an engineer, you buy the engineer's normal errors.
However, if the error is shown to have been worse than a certain level of error, the engineer is
liable. That level, the line between non-negligent and negligent error, is the "standard of care."
We will now deal with both negligence and standard of care.
5.3 Determining 'Standard of Care'
5.3.1 GeneralA trier of fact (a judge or jury), has to determine what the 'standard of care' is and
whether an engineer has failed to achieve that level of performance. They do so by hearing
expert testimony. People who are qualified as experts express opinions as to the standard of
care and as to the defendant engineer's performance relative to that standard. The trier of fact
weighs the testimony from all sides and decides in each case what the standard of care was and
whether the defendant met it.
Jury instructions have been standardised. A Bench Approved Jury Instruction in the USA reads:
"In performing professional services for a client, a (structural engineer) has the duty to
have that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable (structural
engineers), practicing in the same or similar locality and under simifar circumstances.
"It is (the structural engineer's) further duty to use the care and skiff ordinarily used in like
cases by reputable members of the (structural engineering) profession practicing in the
same or similar locality under similar circumstances, and to use reasonable diligence and
(the structural engineer's) best judgment in the exercise of professional skiff and in the
application of learning, in an effort to accomplish the purpose for which (the structural
engineer) was employed.
"A failure to fulfil any such duty is negligence".
Four key items in this instruction are worth repeating:
...have learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable engineers practicing in the
same or similar locality and under similar circumstances.
...use care and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable engineers practicing in the same
or similar locality and under similar circumstances.
use reasonable diligence and best judgment.
to accomplish the purpose for which the engineer was employed .
If anyone of these conditions is not met, the engineer has failed to meet the standard of care,
and is professionally negligent. Finally, it is worth repeating that the standard of care varies with
time, locale and circumstances.
5.4. 'Negligence' and 'Competence'
5.4.1 'Negligence'
You may be accused of 'negligence' in any profession. Section 5.2 noted that the line between a
non-negligent and negligent error, is the "standard of care", and negligence is a failure in your
standard of care. Obviously, you will not face litigation solely for not meeting this standard of
care; in law, you can be called 'negligent' if [14] :
Penspen 2007 17
a duty of care existed between parties;
the defendant breached the duty;
as a result of that breach the claimant sustained damage.
To avoid being negligent an engineer must show that he/she has made all the 'preparations' that
a reasonable man/woman (see next section) in this position would recognise to prevent
unreasonable risk. In all civil cases the claimant is required to prove his or her case on the
'balance of probabilities'. This simply means a Judge has to be persuaded that the claimant's
version of events is more likely to be true than the defendants.
5.4.2 'Competence'
We often hear that an engineer needs to be 'competent' . A definition from a pipeline
organisation [1 3] is:
'A Competent Person should have practical and theoretical knowl edge as well as sufficient
experience of the particular machinery, plant or procedure involved to enable them to identify
defects or weaknesses, and to assess their importance in relation to strengths and functions of
the machinery'.
All engineers need to have the required basic qualifications, then ensure they are up-to-date
with both 'practical and theoretical' knowledge. This means continual professional development;
for example, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in the UK requires its Chartered Engineers
to be ... competent throughout their working life. by virtue of their education, training and
experience. . .',
How does this relate to a pipeline engineer? Until recently, there have been no academic
engineering courses specially for pipeline engineers. This is now changing: there is a dedicated
pipeline engineering masters program at University of Newcastle, UK, and the Catholic
University in Rio, and University of Calgary, are offering, or will offer, extensive pipeline
engineering education at both under-graduate and post-graduate levels. Additionally, the
American Society of Engineers now has a division devoted to pipeline systems.
A basic education needs to be followed by both experience and continuous trainmq.. Note that
training alone is not sufficient: 'Just because you're trained for something, doesn' t mean you're
prepared for it '. Anonymous.
It is of interest to list the modules on the University of Newcastle's masters proqram in pipeline
engineering, to show how wide a pipeline engineer's knowledge needs to be. The modules are:
Fundamentals of Pipeline Engineering;
Design and Construction;
Asset Management;
Economics for Pipeline Engineers;
Hydrocarbon Processing and Production;
Corrosion and Corrosion Control;
Materials and Fabrication
Dynamics of Offshore Installations;
Pipeline Structural Integrity;
Civil and Geo-technical Engineering;
Penspen 2007 18
Safety and Environmental Engineering.
Obviously, it is a pipeline engineer's responsibility to ensure that any design or integrity
assessment is correct. He/she should use the best possible practices available, check
calculations, inputs and assumptions, and use all available data. These will include historical,
current and circumstantial data (inspection data, operations records, maps, etc.).
An appreciation of the wider practical issues, and an understanding of all engineering aspects of
the problem are required. This will require excellent data management support and internal
communications.
'Reasonable Person' and 'Reasonable Care'
Section 5.3 discussed 'standard of care'. The legal profession also uses the phrases:
'reasonable care' and 'reasonable person'.
5.5.1 ' Reasonable Care' and 'Accidents'
Accidents happen... but many 'accidents' should not be described as 'accidents' . If an 'accident'
has preventable causes, it may become a criminal case!
And the fact that the engineers involved in the 'accident' did not intend an accident to occur, is
not a defence. Was it an 'accident waiting to happen? It is a question of 'reasonable care' : did
the engineer(s) exercise 'reasonable care'?
In the USA 'reasonable care' [12] is.. . 'the amount of care that a reasonably prudent person
would use in similar circumstances' and we can easily relate this requirement back to our
standard of care. If an engineer does not exercise this 'reasonable care' he/she may face
prosecution.
5.5.2 The 'Reasonable' Person
The standard of conduct that the law imposes can perhaps best be understood in terms of the
hypothetical "reasonable person" [14]. The law presumes that there is a standard of behaviour
that a person of 'ordinary prudence , skill and care' would follow in all situations, so as to avoid
creating unreasonable risks of harm to others.
When dealing with professionals, or persons of superior learning or skill (such as engineers) , the
law imposes an even higher standard of care and diligence. In effect, it hypothesises a
"reasonable engineer," whose conduct is guided by his or her special knowledge and expertise.
In all instances, however, it is a jury of lay people who must decide whether challenged
behaviour was, or was not, reasonable.
The Engineer and the Law
The previous sections have covered both 'standard of care' and 'reasonable person' . These are
society's expectations and requirements for engineers, and these are the legal tests.
5.6.1 The Guilty Verdict...
Legal systems , laws and responsibilities vary around the world , but Section 5.4.1 summarised
how an engineer may face litigation if he/she has been negligent.
Senior staff or directors of engineering companies may be liable to prosecution if they can be
shown to have committed an offence:
with their consent or connivance; or
it was attributable to any neglect on the part of the officer/manager.
Penspen 2007 19
The test will be subjective: has the officer/manager deliberately turned a blind eye to something,
or deliberately ran a safety risk? To prove guilt, the defendant must be proven:
personally guilty of manslaughter; and
be identified as the company's directing mind and will, on the subject: this ' identifi cation
principle' is the problem area.5.6.2 Pipelines in the USA
Any major incident involving critical private infrastructure will be the subject of close law
enforcement scrutiny. In the USA, for pipelines, these law enforcement agencies are: FBI, US
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard.
These agencies will consider any incident causing environmental damage or injuries as criminal
cases. An incident would be considered a crime if this 'harm'
was linked to 'culpable conduct' [12}. The following evidence would show 'culpable conduct':
history of repeat violations;
deliberate behaviour;
efforts to conceal;
tampering with monitoring devices;
activities such as false statements, obstruction, etc.
Companies10 would face charges after the prosecutors have considered:
was the offence serious (e.g. great harm)?
were wrong-doings common in the company and corporate?
was management aware of this?
is there is a history of offences?
did the company quickly identify and report the incident and respond to it effectively?
has the company a 'compliance program' in place, and is it being applied diligently (e.g.
were wronq-doers quickly disciplined)?
would innocent shareholders or employees suffer disproport ionately?5.6.3 This is a Real
Issue!
Pipeline engineers need to be very careful [15] ... in 2003, a new level of personal liability was
reached in the USA when a federal judge sentenced two pipeline engineers to jai l time, following
an explosion of a gasoline pipeline in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. It was the first time ever
that pipeline employees had received jail time in connection with a pipeline accident.
A former company official was sentenced to six months in jail , while a control room manager
received 30 days in prison and 30 days of home detention. A third employee, whose job involved
monitoring the section of pipeline that ruptured, received a one-year probation and 150 hours of
community service. It was alleged that the accident resulted from inadequate pipeline
inspections following excavation work done five years earlier.
10 In the USA a corporation can be charged with wrong doings - and the executives can be liable. This is
because corporations act through the actions of individuals. Therefore, individuals can be liable to
prosecution.
Penspen 2007 20
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Globalisation
We are experiencing 'globalisation' that allows the economic integration of all world trading
regions (21), and the oil and gas business is a key part of this change: we can work in Houston
today and Chad tomorrow.
This means that the pipeline business and pipeline engineers have to adapt to this change and
come to terms with the ethical issues it raises .
In a world where oil and gas is, and will be, extracted from poor and sometimes corrup t
countries, and where oil and gas majors cont inue to make record profits , engineers have to work
to the highest ethical standards .
Engineers have to take a balanced view of their business and their own values, but certainly
engineers should not be against mult i-national companies making a profi t, the expansion of their
business, or to globalisation: as Kof Annan, the UN secretary-general said, 'The poor are not
poor because of too much gfobafisation, but because of toot little. '.
Kofi Annan speaks with authority, but we must be carefu l with our globalisation: the new weal th
it can create can have both immediate and long term negat ive effects: for example, if we create
highly paid j obs in the oil and gas business we may reduce the attractiveness of becoming
doctors or teachers in that country. Similarly, a short term focus on oil and gas riches may lead
to long term harm in other industries.
6.2 Growth in the Developi ng World
Pipelines will be a key growth area as we expand our energy inf rast ructures around the world ;
consequently, pipeline engineers have key roles in our energy future.
The world already consumes over 28,000,000,000 barrels (1 barrel =159litres) of oil per year . A
barrel of oil is currently (2005) about $US50: so, the oil business is worth $1.4 x 10
11
per year!
And we are expandi ng the oil and gas business: we are planning pipelines in new regions , and
pipelines will be needed in many countries in the future, as these countri es either have unused
energy reserves, or energy needs. These are the regions pipeline engineering companies and
engineers will be working in the future.
Surpris ingly, it is the developing world that is going to account for the growth in energy demand.
Consider the huge increase in the price of a barrel of oi l in 2004: this major increase was not
due to demand in the developed world: it was due to demand in the developing world [16]:
Regi on Increase in demand for oil, 1973 2003
USA +16%
European Union (EU) ~
Developing Countries +203%
Table 4. Increase in Demand for Oil in the Developed and Devel oping World.
The developing countries are now (2003) consuming over 25 million barrels of oil per day,
compared to about 20 million barrels per day in the USA, and about 14 mill ion barrels in the EU.
This increase will continue; for example, Afghanistan is a very poor country, but it has 120 billion
r cubic metres of gas reserves, and 125 million tons of coal reserves. However, currently, 85% of
Penspen 2007 21
the energy needs of Afghanistan are met by 'biomass! " energy, i.e, fuel wood,animal dung and
agriculture waste. Fuel wood accounts for about 75% of the energy needs (cooking and heating)
in rural areas, where most of the Afghanistan population lives. Soon, pipeline engineers will be
working in Afghanistan, developing these reserves, but will the Afghan people benefit, or the oil
and gas majors? Do the Afghan people have a say in these developments? Will protection of
historical cultures, safety, and the environment, be the prime development considerations?
We need to show corporat e responsibility in these developing countries. Indeed our oil and gas
majors are now addressing such issues; for example, BP has agreed with the government of
Azerbaij an that both sides will ensure greater transparency over tax and royalty payments from
BP's huge Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. BP is also investing in agricul tural programmes to help
local communities, and helping local companies to bid for contracts on the pipeline (22).
National Grid Transco, a major distributor of electricity and gas in the UK, is using Aborigine
workers on its project that is laying undersea cable from Melbourne to Tasmania (22). Engineers
can be encouraged by such shows of corporate social responsibility.
6.3 Balanced View
All engineers have responsibilities, but their prime responsibility is to 'safety'. They are bound by
the legal system in their country of residence or operation , but also have to satisfy the following
criteria in all aspects of their work:
professional (institutional requirements);
legal ('standard of care'); and
ethical (moral).
So... what can an engineer do to ensure he or she is behaving in an ethical manner, and for an
ethical company?
The first thing to do is to understand your company's values. Are you working for a company that
gives good, fair val ue? Or do they try and squeeze the biggest profit, and look for gullible
customers? 0 0 they have an ethics policy, and work to it? Does the company appreciate the
wide responsibilities it has to all its stakeholders? Do you admire your bosses and colleagues for
human values such as honesty, mentoring , intellect , hard work, wisdom, friendliness, fairness,
etc., or is the only admiration in their position and salary?
Some companies are actively addressing staff concerns over ethical issues; for example,
National Grid Transco, a major gas and electricity business in the UK, has consulted its 14,000
workforce and is working to a ' Framework for Responsible Business Practice' that provides
details of its corporate responsibili ties (22).
The next thing an engineer needs to do is check his/her own values in the workplace: integrity,
honesty, charity, etc..
Consequently, an engineer has to balance all ethical issues and decide on participation on a
career, job or project. This may not be easy; an engineer working for a company that makes
missiles could view the missiles as a weapon that ensures equity and peace in the world,
11 'Biomass' is organic material which has stored sunlight in the form of chemical energy. Biomass fuels
include wood, wood waste, straw, manure, sugar cane, and many other by-products from a variety of
agricultural processes.
Penspen 2007 22
r:
whereas commu nities destroyed by the weapon can only see it as it is - a weapon of mass
destruction.
It is the same in the oil and gas business. The service sector in the pipeline business is often
faced with 'difficult' decisions in pricing jobs, and winning contracts in some countries and some
companies. This problem has been around for many years and gives some elements of the
service sector a really chequered history. And do not think the oil and gas majors are without a
chequered history. Anyone working for an oil and gas major who has never heard of the
infamous 'Seven Sisters' shoul d quickly type that phrase into thei r search engi ne now....
6.4 Beware the Money Trap. ..
We can be driven to unethical acts, or 'confl icts of interest' by greed: we want more money. On
January 2, 2000, the New York Times reported, "Most partners {at] the world's largest
accounting firm violated rules prohibiting conflicts of interest by possessing investments in
companies for which they performed 'independent audits'." An estimated 86.5 percent of the
2,698 partners had at least one such violation, for a total of 8,064 cases.
Does money bring happiness? There is mounting, clear evidence that it does not (18, 19, 20)1
First consider what you 'want' and what you 'need'. There is a big difference: when we see a
sports car , or an expensive handbag, 'desire' takes over and the distinct ion is lost. We want the
brief pleasurable moment of acquisit ion. In many ways, we now have an excess of everything,
except happiness!
Most research supports the conclusion that money and material things are only weakly
associated with leading a good life. As income rises, the sense of happiness (now usually called
'wellbeing') rises. But only to a point. . . once a ' middle class' level is reached, money is not linked
to happiness. Conclusion? Needs can be satisfied , but 'wants' never can!
We NEED food, clothes, medical care, transport , etc.. Once you have att ained these needs, you
are satisfied. Unfortunately, the more you WANT, the more likely you are to feel disgruntled. We
can ident ify with this: I 'want' Pamela Anderson, but I 'need' my wife!
The more you acquire, the more likely you are to feel controlled by your possessions; for
exampl e, if you buy an expensive car , you need money to run it, and this spend ing may affect
your ' needs'. Plus, you will be obsessed with any scratch on it!
Actually, these conclusions are not new; the Greek philosopher Epicurus believed that to be
happy a person requires: food, water, shelter , warmth , friendship, and freedom of thought. He
advocated a simple life. He believed we all have the capacity for a happy life, but we 'poison' our
lives with needless anxieties and fears .
So... money , it turns out, is not the answer: once we have enough to pay for life's basics, such
as food and a roof over our heads: more money adds little to our happiness. Therefore, do not
sell your ethics!
6,5 What Turns an Ethical Person into an Unet hical Person?We will end by asking a
question... 'how can good, honest, ethical, people become unethical and dishonest in their
work? We are often surprised when we hear about individ uals, who in their normal day-to-day
lives are good and honest, but they have been shown to be the opposite in thei r professional
lives.
Penspen 2007 23
There are many reasons why people act unethically at work: it could be based on greed
(financial incentives), ambition, or envy. These people have a problem - they are inherently
unethical. or easily corrupted and require help. Ethical people wake up in the morning, and they
are ethical throughout their day, regardless of what they do during that day. These people have
no problems with ethics: they are inherently ethical.
However, even the saints amongst us can behave unethically. Why? One reason is that people
may fall under the 'spell' of a large corporation, and believe that actions that benefit the
corporation, are ethical. Consider this extract from an article in the Economist in May 2004:
u the corporation is a psychopath. Like all psychopaths, the firm is singularly seft-interested: its
purpose is to create wealth for its shareholders... like all psychopaths, the firm is itrespoositite,
because it puts others at risk to satisfy its profit-maximising goal. harming employees and
customers. and damaging the environment.
The corporation manipulates everything. It is grandiose, always insisting that it is the best, or
number one. It has no empathy, refuses to accept responsibility for its actions and feels no
remorse. It relates to others only superficially. via make-believe versions of itseft manufactured
by public-relations consultants and marketing men. In short ... the corporation is clinically
insane.... "
Penspen 2007 24
7. CONCLUSION
In a world where oil and gas is, and will be, extracted from poor and someti mes corrupt
countries, where the fuels pipelines transport lead to climate change, where the oil and gas
majors continue to make record profits, and where litigation is increasi ng, pipeline engineers
must practice to the highest ethical standards.
Our responsibilities and ethics will require constant attention: this paper has provided a simple
guide.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Penspen Ltd. , UK, for permission to publish this paper. The paper
is based on the author's lectures on Engineering Ethics at the University of Newcastle, UK. It is
the final paper in a series of four papers (see also 1, 2, 21) that have covered management,
change and ethical issues in engineering. For more details , or if you require a course on ethics
in engineering, contact the author (p.hopkins@penspen.com).
REFERENCES
1. P. Hopkins 'The Challenge of Change in Engineering', Journal of Pipeline Integrity, Vol.
1, No 2, 2002.
2. P. Hopkins, 'Surviving Change in the Pipeline Business', WTIA International Pipeline
Integri ty and Repairs Conference. Sydney, Australia. Welding Technology Institute of
Australia. 9
th
March 2004.
3. l. l. Lowery, 'Loyalty and Professional Rights' , Texas A&M University.
WoNW.lowery.tamu.edu.
4. onlineethics.org.
5. www.api.orq.
6. WoNW.defra.gov.uk/environmentl climatechange/O1.htm
7. http://www. metoffice.com/research/hadleycentre
8. http://WoNw.environment-agency.gov.uk.
9. http://www.t otal.com/csr2002/en/developpementi download/fs04_GHG.pdf.
10. Anon. , 'The Cost of Generating Electricity'. Royal Academy of Engineering. UK. 2004.
11 . Anon.. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Pages 74-75, 1979.
12. S P Solow, 'US Pipelines Face Increased Criminal Threat from Heightened
Environmental Scrutiny' , Oil and Gas J. Dec 22, 2003.
13. Taken from Brazier v. Skipton Company (1962) His Lordship Winn, J. UK.
www.ukopa.co.uk.
14. Anon., 'ASME Training Module C - Legal', Section C3, 'Torts'. American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
15. a J Dykes, 'Entrepreneurial Contentiousness Marks Recent Trends In Pipeline
Litigation ', Pipeline and Gas Journal. January, 2004. p.22.
16. D Wood. Materials World, January 2005. Pages 8-9.
Penspen 2007 25
17. Anon., ' Roles and Responsibilities of Chartered Engineers', Engineering Council,
Document Ref: 2.1.1. Issue No: 2. SARTOR 3rd Edition Part 2 Document. 23 June 1998.
18. G Easterbrook. 'What Money Can't BUY'. Sunday Times. December 28, 2003. p.5.3.
19. G Easterbrook. 'The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets Better While People Feel Worse'.
Published by Random House. USA.
20. P Martin, 'Making Happy People' , Published by the Fourth Estate. 2005.
21. P Hopkins, 'Time to Change?', Pipes and Pipelines Journal, September-October 2000.
22. Anon., 'Companies that Count', Sunday Times, UK. April 3rd 2005.
Penspen 2007 26
Penspen Integrity A member of Penspen Group
Tutorials in Pipeline Defect Assessment
By Phil Hopkins & Andrew Cosham
Penspen Group, UK
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 1 of Error! Bookmar k not defined.
Penspen Integrity
TUTORIAL l'
A member of Penspen Group
LEAK/RUPTURE WILL A PART WALL DEFECT FAIL AS A LEAK OR AS
A RUPTURE?
1. PROBLEM
A 305mm (12") outs ide diameter pipeline with a nominal wall thickness of9.5 mm (0.374"), and grade
X52
2
, conveying natural gas, contains a defect of length 135 mm (5.31") . The local wall thickness,
adjacent to the defec t, is 9.4 mm (0.370"). The current operating pressure is 104 bar (150Spsi) , the
design pressure is l SI bar (2625psi).
The problem is to determine whether or not this defect will fail as a leak or a rupture.
2. FITNESS FOR PURPOSE EQUATIONS
Predicting whether or not a part wall defect tails as a leak or a rupture is equivalent to calculating
whether a through wall defect of an identicallength will fail. The standard equation for predicting the
fai lure stress of a through wall defect is:
a j !(j =Ar
1
M ~ O { ~ J
if ~ 1.l 5SMYS
I
P <o -
j j R
where:
P, failure pressure
(Jr hoop stress at failure
M bulging factor
a flow strength
d maximum depth of part wall defect
1 Note that some of these tutorials/worked examples use either actual or simplified pipe geometries. to ease the
calculations. For example, linepipe is not usually supplied with an OD of 12" (it IS usually supplied as 12.75") .
2 Pipeline grades relate to the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) of the linepipe steel. The grade X52
means an SMYS of 52000 lbf/in
2
To convert from Ibflin
2
10l\inun
2
, multiply by 0.006895. Other conversions:
TOUGHNESS: lJ=0.738ftlb .
PRESSURE CO;\VERs ro,,' U1\ITS: I bar = 14.5psi = 105MPa = lU
5
::--J/m
2
= 0. I::--limm
2
STRESS CONVERSIO:-J U::--J ITS' I hi = IUOU psi = 1000Ibfiin
2
= 6.R9 MPa =6.R9 MN/m
2
= fi.R9l\imm
2
Rev 2003/1 Page 1 of 15
Penspen Integrity
2e defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
R outside radius of pipe
SMYS specified minimum yield stress
If the hoop stress is greater than the predicted failure stress of the through wall defect. then the part
wall defect is predicted to fail as a rupture (i.c. the length of the defect extends on failure). If the hoop
stress is less than the predicted failure stress, then the part wall defect is predicted to tail as a leak.
Notes:
I. A variety of different definitions of the Folies factor exist. A li gure in the handout for the solution
indicates how these different Folies factors effect the results ofthe calculatio ns.
2. A variety of definitions of flow stress arc available. but in this case it is assumed that the flow
stress is approximately 1.15 x S\1 YS.
Rev 2003/1 Page 2 of 15
Penspen Integrity
1. PROBLEM
TUTORIAL 2
WILL MY PART WALL DEFECT FAIL?
A 305mm ( 12") outside diameter pipeline with a nominal wall thickness of9.5 nun (0.374"), and grade
X52, conveyi ng natural gas, contains a ' flat bottomed' corrosion defect of depth 3.X mm (0. 15") and
length 135 mm (5.3 1"). The local wall thickness, adjacent to the defec t, is 9.4 mm (0.37"). The
current maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) is !CM bar (1508psi).
The pipeline is des igned to operate at 72 percent SMYS.
The pre-commissioning hydrotesr pressure corresponded to a hoop stress equal to 100 percent SMYS
(based on the nominal wall thickness).
The problem is to determine whether or not the defect should be repaired.
2. FITNESS FOR PURPOSE EQUATIONS
The standard equation for predicting the failure stress of a part wall is:

(
d) _,
1- t,lf
cH=
(j l.l SSMYS
where:
P, failure pressure
a f hoop stress at failure
bulging factor
a flow strength
2e defect axiallength
pipe wall thickness
R outside radius of pipc
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 3 of 15
Penspen Integrity
SMYS speci fied minimum yield stress
Note:
I. The ratio of defect dept h to wall thickness [d't ) in the above equation can be replaced by the cross
sectional area of the defect (A) di vided by the area of the pipe wall occupied by the defect. i.e.
(A/(2e.t . However. for a flat bottomed defect this reduces to (d.2c)/(t.2c), or d /t.
2. A varicry of diffe rent definitions of the Folia.. factor cxist..
3. A variety of defin itions of flow stress arc avai lable, but in this ease it is assu med that the flow
stress is approximately 1.15 x SMYS.
Rev 2003/1 Page 4 of 15
Penspen Integrit y A member of Penspen Group
WORKED EXAMPLE 3
ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF AN INTELLIGENT PIG RUN
1, PROBLEM
A 305mm (12"') outside diameter pipeline with a nominal wall thickness of9.5 mm (0.374"), and grade
X52, conveying natural gas, has recently been inspected using an intelligent pig. The current
maximum allowable operating pressure (t\IAOP) is 104 bar (1508psi). The pipeline is designed to
operate at 72 percent SMYS. The precommissioning hydrotcst pressure corresponded to a hoop stress
equal to 100 percent SMYS (based on the nominal wall thickness).
A number of corrosion defects have been detected in the pipeline, a summary of the corrosion defects,
and any associated comments, is given below:
Depth, mm Lengt h, mm Local wall Comments
(in) (i n) thickness, 111m (in)
3. H(0. 15" ) 135 (5.3") 9.4 (0.37") Flat bottomed defect.
4 (0. 16") 304( 12") 8.6 (0.34") Vel)' irregular shape.
3.2 (0,13'") 305 (12") 9,2 (0.36") May be associated with a scam weld.
5.2(0.2") 268 (10.6") 9 (0.35") Two smaller sized defects are close by.
6 (0.24") 213 (8.4") 9.2 (0.36") May be associated with a dent.
5 (0.2") 197 (7.8" ) 9.2 (0.36") None
3. 1 (0. 12") 348 ( 13.7") 10. 1 (0.4") This is in an offtake section of the line
that is heavily pressure cycled.
2.5 (0. 1") 441 (17.4") 10.310.41" ) NOll e
4.3 (0.17") 292 ( 11.5") 10.3 (0.41") In section of pipeline liable to
earthquakes.
The operator has reduced the operating pressure to 47 bar (682psi), because of the inspection results.
The problem:
1. Consider the comments. What do they mean. and how would they affect the assess ment?
2. Closer inspection of the defects show them all to be tlat-bottomed defects, not associated \vith
welds. dents. other defects. or in pressure cycled lines or earthquake regions. Calculate the failure
pressure of the corrosion defects, and comment on whether or not they should he repaired.
3. Which of the defects arc acceptable? What would be the implications of the operator seeking to
raise the operat ing pressure to the design pressure?
Rev 200311 Page 5 of 15
Pens pen Integrity A member of Penspen Group
4. 1I0w should the defects be repaired, if thought to be significam"
5. Ilow would the length of time that the defects would take to fail be estimated? How would
inspection intervals be set for these defects, if they were to be lcf in the pipeli ne?
6. \Vas the operator right in reducing the pressure to 47 bar (6S2psi)?
A plot of the defect depth (expressed as a fraction of the nominal wall thickness) and the defect length
is given below.
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
DEFECT DEPTH I WALL TIIICK. "IESS (nom)
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
a
a 100 200 300 400 500
DEFECT LENGTII. mm
Rev 2003/1 Page 6 of 15
Penspen Integrity
1. PROBLEM
WORKED EXAMPLE 4
CORROSION
A corroded area of length 100 mm (3.94") and maximum depth 6.4 mm (0.25") has been found in a
pipeline The pipeline geometry is 610 mm (24") outside diameter, 14.3 mm (0.562") wall thickness,
grade X52. The design factor of the pipel ine is 0.72.
Calculate the failure stress using the original B31.G criterion, and the modified R31.G criterion.
Determine whether or not the corrosion damage is acceptable.
2. BASIC EQUATION
I
ANSIIASl\lE B31.G
l
2 d 1
1- - -
- 31
ar =a
3 1 At

Jb!ln1. )1U2- JatWge )f
[;i!a(P,? lub1tl cl (tuM es /M(Pp)CV 1(/
where:
(j 1.1 x SMYS
....
si)..OJO
rTr hoop stress at failure, Nmm"
a flow stress
D pipe diameter, mm
d defect depth, mm
I axial length of defect, mm
l\lodificd B31.G
Rev 2003/1
1VJe
r QU.
ClfJ,.Ch.,
0
0i r U-
no .{,tdtV
)1
,
jatlC1
{ctSD
(ui!Yar
I D
Page 7 of 15
Penspen Integrity
1
1
-
0
.85
d
] "11' ' 2
_
_ --;- 1,-- _" _'oJ ' , w,,"
a
f
< a d I -
1- 0.85- -
1 M
j I )' j I )' 13
10
( I )'
.11 = 1+ 0.627"\JDi - 0.00337,\ .;DI , 1. for Ft5i 550.0
.r>
if = SMYS + I Oksi
where:
OJ" hoop stress at failure, Nmm?
a flow stress
D pipe diamet er. rnm
pipe wall thickness. mm
d defect depth. rnm
f axi allength of defect. rnrn
Rev 2003/1
for ~ > 50 0
Page 8 of 15
Penspen Int egrity
1. PROBLEM
TUTORIAL 5
CORROSION
An area of corros ion of length 190 mm (7.5") and maximum depth 5.0 mm (0.2") has been found in a
pipeline. The pipeline geometry is 762 mm (30") outside diameter. 11 .9 mm (0.469") wall thickness.
grade X52. The design factor of the pipeline is 0.72. The current maximum operati ng pressure is 70
bar ( 10 15psi).
Determine whether or not the corrosion damage is acceptable, and if it is not acceptable then det er mine
the maximum safe operating pressure.
2. BASIC EQUATION
H31.C
1
' - 0.85
7
]
IT/ = a d I
1- OB5- -
1M
AI =
1 I ) ' J I ) '
1+0.627'\ ,jOI - 0.00337\ ,jDI
M =0.032( +3.3
a =SAIl'S + IUksi
where:
at hoop stress at failure , Nmm" (IblYin
2
)
a flow stress . Nmm
2
(lbf/in
2
)
D pipe diameter(2R). mm (in)
pipe wall thickness. mm (in)
d defect depth . mm (in)
I axi al length of defect, 111m (in)
Rev 200311
for $ 50.0
for > 50.0
Page 9 of 15
------ - - - - - - -
Penspen Int egrity A member of Penspen Group
WORKED EXAMPLE 6
ASSESSING A PLAIN DENT IN A PIPELINE
1. PROBLEM
A 457mm ( IS") outside diameter pipel ine, 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) wall thickness, X52 has been dented by a
mechanical excavator. A detailed inspection of the sire of damage has revea led that the dent has a
smooth profile and that there is no associated metal loss defects or cracking. The de nt is not adjacent
to a weld. The dent depth is 3.5% of the pipeline diameter. measured at pressure.
The pipeline is pressu re cycled from 52 bar to 86 bar (750 psi to 1250 psi) once a day. The pipeline is
10 years old and has a des ign life of 50 yea rs.
Is the dent acceptable under static internal pressure loading and cycl ic internal pressure loading? [Use
the Fowler (SES) model for assessi ng the fat igue life of a plain dent]
2. BASIC EQUATION
Fatigue life of a plain dent:
where:
N fatigue life, cycles
[
t>. a] ' stress intensification factor' (sec Table 1)
t>.p
tJ.p cyclic pressure, psi
Spri ng back correction:
D" Dr
2R =1.43
2R
- 0.0023
2R nomi nal diameter of the pipe
Do dent depth meas ured at zero pressure
Dr dent depth meas ured at pressure
Rev 2003/1 Page 10 0115
[
6a] ,
Table J - Values of dP foran averageoperating pressure of 1000 psi".
D/l 18 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
DoI2R (%)
1 13.94 13.25 15 00 20.93 29.80 38.68 47.55 56.43
2 19.64 21.18 25.20 32.53 39.87 47.20 5453 61.87
3 25.35 29.11 38.34 44.14 49.93 55.72 61.51 67.31
4 31.05 37.04 51.49 55.74 59.99 64.24 68.50 72.75
5 36.76 4497 64.63 67.34 70.05 72.77 75.48 78.19
6 42. 46 52.89 77.78 78.95 80.12 8129 82.46 83.63
7 48.17 6082 90.92
8 53.87 68.75 104.1
9 59.58 76.68 117.2
10 65.28 84.61 130.4
11 70.99 92.53 143.5
3 Taken from: FO\VLERJ .R.; Criteri a for Dent Acceptability In Offshon' Pipelines, UTe 73 11, 25
th
Offshore
Technology Conference. Houston. Texas. 3
td.
6
1h
May 1993. pp 481-493.
Rev 2003/1 Pa ge 11 0115
r:
Penspen Integrity
1. PROBLEM
WORKED EXAMPLE 7
ASSESSING DENTS WITH DEFECTS
A 9l4mm (36") outside diameter pipeline, 9.9 nun (0.4 in. ) wall thickness, and grade X52 has been
dented and gouged duri ng constructi on. The dent is 70 mm (2.75") deep., and the gouge is 19.0
percent of the wall thickness.
The pipeli ne is to be operated at 72.0 percent SMYS. Determine whether or not it is necessary to
repair the damage.
The Youngs modul us is 30,000,000 1bain
2
The Charpy toughne ss (2/3 size) IS 56 ftlbf
The area of the fracture surface of a 2/3 Charpy specimen is 0.083 in"
2. BASIC EQUATION
D I'
r:
/
l.5 JrE [Y(i_1.8D,, )+Y(1002RD")J-' cx
p
[iI1
C
C
J
- K, J}]
a Jr e :Ad I 2R " t 2R K
2
where:
(
d) (d) 2 (d )' (d)'
Y, = 1.1 2 - 0.23 --; + 10.6 --; - 21.7 --; + 30.4 --;
Rev 2003/1 Page 12 of 15
Penspen Integrity
Y, =Ll2 - + -
13
tr+ 14tr
K , = 1.9
K, =057
(K
1
and K
2
are non-linear regression parameters)
Clf hoop stress at failure (lbf/in
2
)
(T plastic collapse stress of infinitely long gouge (lbOin!)
A fracture Area of Charpy (0.083 in
2
for a 2/3 Charpy specimen)
E Young's Modulus (30,000,000 Ibflin
2
)
C. 2/3 Charpy toughness (ftlbt)
d maximum or average depth of part wall defect (in.)
Do dent depth measured at zero pressure (in.)
pipe wall thickness [in.]
R outside radius of pipe (in.)
Rev 200311 Page 13 of 15
WORKED EXAMPLE 8
ASSESSMENT OF DEFECTS IN A GIRTH WELD
1. PROBLEM
A radiograph of a girth weld has revealed lack of sidewal l fusion in three locat ions. There arc no other
defec ts in the weld. The pipe line is 6 lOmm (24") outside diameter, 11.7 mm (0.460 in.) wall thic kness
and grade X52. The operating pressure of the pipeli ne i.. 70 bar ( 1015 psi).
The defect data is as follows:
Lack of Sidewall Fusion I
Lack of Sidewall Fusion 2
Lack of Sidewall Fusion 3
Start
02: 15
03:45
09:00
End
03:15
01:30
09: 15
Use the EPRG Guideli nes on the Assessme nt of Defects in Transmission Pipel ine Gi rth Welds.
Ass ume that all of the requi rement for the use of Tiers I, 2 and 3 are met.
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 14 of 15
Penspen Integrity
Defect No.3
12:00 (Top of Pipe)
Defect No.1
9:00- --+- - ---- ---+----- ----1--
6:00 (Bottom of Pipe)
Figure 1- Sketch of l.ocarion of Girth Weld Defect s
3:00
Rev 2003/1 Page 15 of 15
WORKED EXAMPLE 9
SETTING EXPERT LEVEL CORROSION ACCEPTANCE CHARTS
1. PROBLEM
An olTshore pipe line operator is thinking about using an intelligent pig on two of his pipelines . This is
because a new pipeline is being laid, and one of the older pipel ines has not been internally inspected
for 8 years. The operator is thinking of having an inspection of the older pipel ine, and at the same lime
would like to know if a ' basclinc-l' (or fingerprint) survey of the new pipeline is worthwhile. The
operator will be applying all the standard corrosi on prote ction and monitoring proce dures to the new
pipeli ne.
The existing pipel ine is 30 years old. A new, para llcl pipeline carrying the same product (natural gas)
is required beca use of increased demand. The new pipeline will be identical to the existing line, in
both geometry and in the product it carries.
The problems can be summarised as follows:
I. The operator want s to know what the required hydrotcst press ure is, if the code requires him to test
to 90% S ~ l Y S (based on the nomi nal wall thickness and the mea n diameter)?
2. Docs the operator need to run a pig in ei ther of these pipelines?
3. Docs the operator need a baseli ne survey?
-t. What is the size of corrosion that can accept in these pipel ines?
5. Can an overal l corrosion inspection strategy he produced'?
The pipeline geometry, material properties and operational parameter s arc as follows:
Outside diameter , 0
Nominal wal l thickness, t
Corrosion allowance
Minimum wall thickness. tmin
Material grade
Spec ified Minimum Yield Strength
Pipeline operating pres sure, Pop
Pipeline type
Hydrot cst stress level
500.2 mm (
12 mm
1 nun
I I mm
X65
448 ~ a
134 barg
Seamless
90010 SMYS
4 A baseli ne survey is one carried out shortly atler a new pipeline is brought Into service. It can reveal
construct ion and fabrication defects.
Rev 200311 Page 1 of 12
JI =
The intelligent pig provider states that their pig can detect defects of depth 40% wall thickness. if the
length of the defect is less than 3 times the wall thickness. If the defect is longer than this, then defects
over 20% wall thickness in depth can be detected. The intelligent pig provider does not guarantee the
detection of defects less than 7 mm in length.
2. METHOD
1. Calculate the hydrotest pressure:
The bydrotcs t pressure resulting in a hoop stress of 90% of Sl\.1YS is given by the follow... ing equation
(using the mean diameter and the nominal wall thickness):
p = 207
D - I
where:
P hydrotcst pressure
a hoop stress (equal to 90% SMYS)
nominal pipe wall thickness
D pipe outside diameter
2. Catcutate corrosion acceptance charts:
i. Stresses to be used:
For the purposes of this assessment. and to simplify the calculations. use the minimum wall thickness
of 11 mrn when calculating the stresses at both the design pressure and the hydrorcst pressure.
ii . Failure model to be used:
The Battelle failure criterion for a part wall defect should be used for the determination of the
maximum tolerable depth of corrosion. [The ASr>.1E R31.G Appendix, or other methods, could be
used, but the following method will give similar answers]
I - ~
I +0 26( ~ J'
ii = 1.I5S,IIYS
where:
P
f
failure pressure
Rev 2003/1 Page 2 of 12
Penspen Integri ty
Of hoop stress at failure
M bulging factor
o flow strength
21..' defect axial length
pipe wall thickness
R outside radius of pipe
SMYS specified minimum yield stress
Note:
I. The ratio of defect depth to wall thickness (dJt) in the above equation can be replaced by the cross
sectional area of the defect (A) divided by the area of the pipe wall occupied by the defect , i.c.
(A/(2e.t . However, for a flat bottomed defect this reduces to (d.2c)/(t.2c), or tI/1.
2. A variety of different definitions of the Folias factor cxist..
3. A variety of definitions of flow stress arc avai lable, but in this case it is assumed that the flow
stress is approximately 1.15 x SMYS.
The following calculations need to be performed:
I. Calculate the corrosion acceptance levels at the design pressure of 134 barg (using 11 mm wal l
thickness). Note that these levels will be fai lure levels, if simply using this pressure and the
Battelle failure criterion.
2. Therefore, an appropriate safety factor must be added to the calculations.
3. The easiest way to do this, is to work out the corrosion acceptance levels that would be used on the
pipeline if it was working at the hydrotest pressure. This gives a safety factor (the levels give the
size of defect that would fail at the hydrotcsr pressure).
4. The defect depth limits (i.c. the depth at which failure occurs) should be calculated over a range of
defect lengths at the operating pressure (134 barg) and the hydrotest pressure. The results should be
plaited in a graph or in a table.
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 3 of 12
Penspen Integrity
1. PROBLEM
WORKED EXAMPLE 10
A new natural gas pipeli ne is to be constructed. The pipeline geometry is 36 in. diameter, 12.7 mm
(0.5 in.) wall thickness. grade X60. The design pressure of the pipeline is 70 bar.
What full size Charpy impact energy should be specified 10 ensure that the pipeline has adequate
toughness to arrest a propagating ductile fracture? [Usc the Battelle equation]
2. BASIC EQUATION
-, ' ( )'"
C. =1.5 x 2.382 x IO cr , Rt -
where;
C. full size Cha rpy V-Notch Energy, J
R pipe radi us. mm
D pipe diameter . mm
t pipe wall thickness. mm
(71, hoop stress. Nnun-
1
Rev 2003/1 Page 4 of 12
Penspen Integrity
1. PROBLEM
TUTORIAL 11
Consider an existi ng natural gas pipeline. The pipeline geometry is 6lOmm (24") outside diameter,
9.52 mm (0.375 in.) wall thickness, grade X65. The minimum all heat average full size Charpy impact
energy of the pipe (from the mill certificates) is 25 J (18ft lb). The operating pressure is 80 bar
(1160p,i).
Will the pipeline arrest a propagating ductile fracture? If not, to what level should the pressure be
reduced? [Usc the Battelle equation]
2. BASIC EQUATION
, '( )'"
C
v
= 1.5 x 2.382 x 10 - rrII Rt
where:
C, full size Charpy V-Notch Energy, J
R pipe radius, mm
[) pipe diameter, rnm
all hoop stress, Nmm-
2
Rev 2003/1 Page 5 of 12
WORKED EXAMPLE 12
HOW TO USE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FITNESS-FORPURPOSE, IN
SETTING MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION PRIORITIES.
You have worked on sett ing inspection level s for corrosion, and this wi ll bc of usc to you. However,
how can you help with an overall inspection and maintenance plan'? How can you asses the benefits of
an intelli gent pig run with, say, a CP upgrade?
A method for determining which inspection and maintenance method to usc, and 0 11 which pipeline, is
a 'Prioriusation Scheme' , These type of schemes arc increasingly being used to guide opera tors on the
optimum usc of maint enance and inspection method s. For example, if a pipeline's major cause of
damage is third party interference, incre ased surveillance or the introduction of a One-Call Syst em may
be appropriate preventative maintenance methods. However. if a pipeline is failing due to internal
corrosion, then an internal inspec tion using an intell igent pig would be appropri ate.
PIPELINE PRIORITISATlON
Overview
PIPEU:\ E I
I .'...OR\I ATI Ox
Int. corrosi on
Ell.t Corrosion
Risk 10 life
Fatigue
Damage to property
Stress corrosion cracking
Loss of service
Mechanical damage
Cost of failure
Loss of ground support
Environmental effects
Thir d part)' intervention
I SeH' r it),
Fac tor Factor
Probability
Relative risk
Conscqucnce
o f fail un:
of fa ilure
I
PRIORITY RATI:\G
I
A Prioritisat ion Scheme considers the proba bility and consequences of failure within a group of
pipel ines (or sections or a single pipeline) by systematically assessing the pipel ines' design, operation
and failure history.
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 6 of 12
Points arc allocated for design. operation and failure history. High points indicate high risks. For
example. the probabi lity of failure due to external corrosion is evaluated by considering the quality of
the pipe coat ing. cr system. etc.. and the consequences of failure are considered by estimating the
density of surroundi ng population. security of supply, etc.
Our factors arc qualitatively assessed:
PRIORITISAnON
Calculation
-I Relative risk = Probability of failure x Consequence of failure
-I Probabi lity of failure = Sum of all (7) failure probabi lities. Ps
-I Individual probabilities = Susceptibility Factor (Su) x Severity Factor (Sv)
-I Consequences of failure = Sum of all (5) consequences
-I Relative risk 0; ( 117)( Su.Sv) x (1/5)(CO
PRIORITI SAnON
Susceptibility & Sever it y'
..J Pro bab ility of fa ilure depends on susccptibi lit y & seve rity
..J For example. a pipeline passing throu gh heavily po pul ated area.
is susceptih]e to thi rd party damage. If it is thin walled . it wi ll
result in severe dama ge
..J For example, a pipel ine with many scam weld defect s (e.g . a
pipe line that has failed a number of ti mes 0 11 hydrotcst ), is
suscept ible to fat igue . bu t if the pipeline is no t pre ssure cyc led
it will not be sev ere
In this part icular Scheme we arc using 'severity' and 'suscep tibility' to givc us further information on
the pot ential problems we may have 111 our line:
The calculations are straightforward, but will rely hea..... ily on knowledge and experience:
Rev 2003/1 Page 7 of 12
PRIORITISAnON
Factors....
J Rank external corrosion a scale of 0 to 100
.j Take into account parameters such as coating type (bare
pipe. modem factory cooled, erc.), age & quality, CP
availabi lity & efficiency & type, soil type.
J Rank past failure history 10 probability of failure in future
J No failure to several/annumand increasing
J Rank risk of mechanical damage
J Remote (desert") pipe to a short length offshore pipe. in
busy shipping and fishing channel
The great advantage of this Prior itisation scheme is that it can:
I. rank all the pipeli nes within a group (or sections of a pipel ine) in terms of probabi lity of failure.
and consequences of failure.
It. determine which pipeli ne (or sect ion of a pipeline) is most in need of some type of maintenance
measure, and
11 1. determine which mainten ance measure to lise.
There is now no need for a pipeline ope rator 10 'guess' which part of his system needs maintenance. and
he now docs not to have wait for a section of his system to show signs of deterioration. The Priorit y
Scheme is a proactive method of setting mai ntenance and inspection schedule.
Rev 2003/1 Page 8 of 12
Penspen Integrity
We'll now do a Worked Example.
r:
PRIORITISATlON
Calculation
Score each parameter up to 100
PROIlABI \. r n Int Exl Fatigue sec Loss of Third party Tol al
Corro,i\>n Corro, ion Damag e ground

Susceptlbtllty 10 50 10 0 60 25 0
SC\'c r il) 10 SS 10 0 ) 0 25 0
Tot al 100 27S0 100 0 1gOO 625 0 5375.'7
76'
ro077')
Ri,k to life
'0
Lo" of Cos t 01 Envi ronmental T01<1 1
failure effect s
CO:-;Sf:QlIf: i\n;S 10 50 so
"
5 18515 37
(O.37)
Relative risk = 0.077 x 0.37 = 0.028
1, We'll consider 7 possible failure modes, and calculate their susceptibility and severity for a
pipeline. Your tutor will describe the pipeli ne.
11. We' ll then multiply our susceptibility and severity ratings to give a total probability tor each
failure mode.
111. Having calculated each ofthcse totals, we then add them up to givc a total Probability
rv. \Ve now consider 5 possible consequences of failure. Again, we add these up to obtain our total
consequence rating for the pipeline
v, If the numbers arc very big (c.g. >10( 0) you can divide then by a common number, to make the
numbers ' manageable' . Remember that the actual number doesn't matter - it's how that number
wil l compare against other pipeli ne rankings
VI. Finally, we multiply our Probability and Consequence together 10obtain our ' relative risk' ranking
for the pipeline.
V11 . The above procedure is repeated for other pipelines, and therefor e all these pipelines can bc
compared on the same qualitative risk bas is.
viii. You can then sec how changing inspect ion and mainte nance procedures can effect the risk ranking
of pipelines, and how it changes their position relative to other pipelines.
Wc'Ilnow do a Tutorial:
Rev 2003/ 1 Page 9 of 12
Penspen Integrity
PRIORITlSATIOI\
Tlltorial
..J You are operating three pipelines:
.J Pipeline I is 20". 0.375", crude oi l, operating at 50010 smys, offshore.
35 years old. with a history ofleaks from internal corrosion. It
passes through environmentally-sensitive areas.
.J Pipeline 2 is gas, 1 year old. 30", 0.75", but has failed at seam welds
5 times on the pre-service hydrotest. It passes through highly
populated areas and operates at 30% S\ 1YS, and is heavi ly pressure
cycled.
.J Pipeline 3 is gas. 36".0.5". 10 years old. tape wrapped. operating at
72% smys and has failed once by crackin g near a scam weld. but remote
from compre ssor stations.
..J Perform a relati ve risk analysis
Here are some expanded deta ils:
PRIORITl SATIOl\'
Tutorial Data
r IrE U:\ E I PIPELINE 2 r IPEUI' E3
PIPI Jt,',
w.os-
"
. roold. olf;hor, I "".. 10 ...r< old.
S'I 30' .. ", 110" , ", ..
""' '''"'' " ,W
P" OIll ' M C",J< n.. N r...,
COATI!';, ; & n C",I 'or.,. ,,," P 1""1')01<0' T'f'<' ",np""d
cp .. ()t;
{'P .. UK (", .. OK
l .. \ l RO' ''., -..... 1k."J. popola'l
SH'UU n ot Sl I'Pl Y ....IId_..... -.- ho<odaI ..._
-... 10<;,1.., .1IMo, ]0 ..,.. ......
-
Sf('l 'RITl :-;0,.-
Lo<.ol __""".

["",nOlO.. ... 'R R\
-.
--

'*-
-

,
-
'>t,-'J' II-'-,,'CI' IHSTORY ....... ... 1"..,...- ,.._4 .. _ 10 \1...,,,_ s"'1"""
."
1.011 ' (.,10= d"" 00' 0'- <"''''' "'' ,' d,,,, s<.ml
f,, 'o""
-
;=.>t"",. f"I"". '" Kl'
,,, ,,' <otro,;on OIln><, h,.d<" t."
n ;n:RI
0)'1<"'''' to " '" " " ,,".m.1
\\' ;11 b< p"'"",,, 'l' k<l !>e'",,, , l ..,m"m """ ",II b< ",,",.'ao.e<! ,
J<,;!<" ., ,,, .. of 7l % .m,.. on<!JO' . <>.,'). ... hut..-.m, d igh' 1"' '' .'' {)<Io.,
'''''"'''(>l<S
rdro.-lIollO .......
There are no differences In any other parameter
Rev 2003/1 Page 10 of 12
Penspen Integrity A member of Pens pen Group
You should now be able to compare these pipe lines, and determine the pipeline that you most need to
spend time and money on.
Therefore. Rank your pipel ines in the order 1,2,3.
PRIORIT SATIO N
Tutorial- pipeline 1

T o t a l
In I r, I
C orr o,io n C o ,,,,, ioo
Fali gu" s r, M ccha nioa I
D am a g "
1. 0"
g roun d
,u n o "
o f T h ir d p o ny To to l
i n t ,' ,,' on l i o n
R .. k 10 l ifo V.mago to Lo"
pr o po"Y ,,- i,"
o f CO"
fail u r e
of Lnv iro "mO"l a l
" ff e ""
r ota1

Rela t i v e ri s k
PRIOR I TS AT IOl\
T ut o r i a/ - pipelin e 2
PR tlR ,tRII. IT Y
t o) 1.1
rot ""
c ,,,",," O (" """,,n
"" ,'" ". ,
n "" q'
1. " "
PO " n J
'" PP" "
of Th " d r ut ,. To .. ,
" " ' von,,,,"
c" "'Qr.'(:.'
". m. " '" L o "
",oP_") ,. n ",
of Co><
f. ilo "
of " " " , o" moo'"
< ffn"
l' 0 " l
Rev 2003/ 1
Rv e La f i v e risk
Page 11 0112
P R 10 R I T S A T 10 :'i
T il t o r i u l - p ip e/in e J
PRIJ U ,\ DI LIT Y
,,,
T," s c c M <eo n " . 1 l , o"
"
T h i"r

T o t . I
(' ," ' '',",n (" "" ", ;u"
l) ,m Ag . , ,," n d
Ln', " .M''''''
. "
Suoup'ibill t y
S ., .. lt l
T. .. I
R" to Itr.
I) . ... ".
'.
Lo ..
.,
c."
.,
t.ft ' '''' ... u .. l ToUI
,u"'<e h.lu '. .Hh
c o v vr c rr vc r s
R e la
t i ,. e
r i s k =
Rev 200311 Page 12 of 12

Defect Assessment in Pipelines Course

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Defect Assessment in Pipelines Course

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IRGANIZED BY

Reason for Training: Safety

o The effe ct of age

Pipeline desi gn includes:

conduct engineering economic

determi ne throughput & I

dete rmine pipe thickness and

In the USA. the Offi ce

... " .. .......

API 5L specifies the required yield strength of a pipel ine.

It is trad itionally measured in units of Ibfli n<

We normally know line pipe by its 'grade'

Some lower 'grade' steels are known by letters (Grade B or A)

Sut ..."'gM an; wt lding

_ A popular welding process we

PIPELINE DESIGN STANDARDS: ' Radi a l' Stress

A pipel ine - particularly onshor e

Historically. pipelines, pressure

Pr essure need s to be 'hel d' for a

Pressure, historically, is held for

Many pipeline codes do not now

The concept of a 'high level' test Stress

welded pipe to be tested to a

Product Size (inches) Pressure

Pipelines are made from line pipe steel of various grades

Inold pipelines we often do not

There is some data on old

TYPE GROUP AGE GROUP WALL & 0 0 GROUP

'>,u i. .......,;. w.r- r.,.1 .....

Highways (1992) 42500

Accidental poisoning 4100

TRANSMISSION PIPELINE SAFETY: W. Europe

PIPELINES FAIL: Third Party Interference

7million lor damages

DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION

DUCTILE TO BRITTLE TRANSITION

......... ....... t, .".. ['9"""''' ''''' . ~ t .

The Inglis solution for elastic stresses at a crack t ip

He called this a ' K field'

K is a function of applied stress, and the size and position of crack

Thi s was the start of applied fractur e ,

It is related to the di rection of the stresses

in the x.y andZ directions

It contai ns an edge crack, and we can

What is the maximum crack size (a

Local Net Gross

These documents attempt to describe a failure by both fracture and

in the transition region of my duct ile brittl e

This is done by my failure

I can describe all my

INTRODUCTION - Why would pipelines 'fatigue'?

The world's first large iron

'High cycle fatigue' is for greater than 1000 cycles.

The endu rance limit of ferrous

_ The crack is small (3

FATIGUE FRACTURE MECHANICS - Calculation

In (fatigue) fract ure mechanics we wi ll model an

II will grow 10 a size that will cause failure.

An S-N Curve for a weld does the same thing.

Therefore, a weld S- N curve is merely an

SoN CURVES AND FRACTURE MECHANICS -

bought to a good modem standard,

strain CUNe for line

Th., "' ''' um.. . """ .".." ot