Herrera vs COMELEC

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras promulgated resolution no. 68 to request the COMELEC to
have the province subdivided into two provincial districts.

Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the
provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all
political parties, and other interested parties.

A consensus was reached, where it was decided that the province will be thusly divided. The Provincial
Election Supervisor then issued a memorandum recommending the division of the province.

The Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance then issued a memorandum
circular which reclassified the Province of Guimaras from a 5th class to 4th class province.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras, where the 1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo) will be allotted 3 seats, while the 2nd
district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag) will be given 5.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against the COMELEC resolution on the following
grounds, to wit;
1. The districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2. The consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3. The allotment of the members of the provincial board of the two districts is not equitable.
4. There is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950

(1.) COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The municipalities belonging to each district are
compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its
face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or
adjacent.

(2.) There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As
required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.

(3.) The allotment of seats for the members of the board or Sanguniang Panlalawigan is in accordance
with law. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members.

Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.

(4.) Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered.


Salcedo II vs COMELEC

The petitioner Salcedo filed a petition seeking to annul the cancellation of the respondents certificate of
candidacy for Mayoralty in a municipality in Iloilo. The petitioner sought to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of his political rival, Ermelita Cacao Salcedo. He alleged that the latter made false
representation therein for stating that her surname is Salcedo. The petitioner alleged the following, to
wit;

1. Petitioner Salcedo married a certain Celiz, as evidenced by a marriage contract duly registered in the
LCR. The petitioner however contracted a second marriage with the respondent Cacao in a civil
ceremony, without having the 1
st
marriage judicially dissolved.

2. Cacao then subsequently contracted another marriage with a certain Aguirre, as shown by a
marriage certificate recorded with the LCR.

The Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not
legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

The respondent contended in her answer that she did not have any knowledge that the petitioner Salcedo
was in fact already married; that upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged the petitioner to
have his marriage with Celiz annulled; that the petitioner filed and was granted a petition for presumptive
death against Celiz for abandoning the family home; that Salcedo and Aguirre are one and the same
person.

The COMELEC decided in favor of the petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the respondents
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC held that since the petitioner and Celiz were still legally married
when the respondent contracted marriage with the petitioner, then their marriage is void; the use of the
surname Salcedo is a material misrepresentation which is a gorund for the cancellation thereof.

The Comelec however overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's certificate of
candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. The petitioner sought recourse with the SC.

WON use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material
misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

(1.) No, the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname
"Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.

A false representation under sec. 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention
to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.

The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not
within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo
were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent.

Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their
ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the
use of such name.


Frivaldo vs COMELEC

The petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon in 1988.
Subsequently, the league of Municipalities and its President filed a petition to annul the petitioners
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States.

In his answer, the petitioner admitted that he was naturalized in the US and became a citizen thereof, but
such was for the purpose of affording himself protection from the Marcos administration; that he was
forced to undertake such recourse as a means of survival against the persecution by the Marcos
administration.

He prayed for the dismissal of the petition, alleging that the action is in reality a petitioner for quo
warranto should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of
the Omhibus Election Code.

WON the petitioner was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon.

(1.) The petitioner Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines during the time of his election, hence he is
disqualified.

The petitioner described in his certificate of candidacy filed in 1987 that he is a natural born citizen,
without mentioning any subsequent loss of citizenship.

Evidence on record proves that he was naturalized under US laws in 1983, as evidenced by certifications
issued by the US court granting such naturalization, as duly authenticated by the consul general of the
Philippine Consulate in California.

(2.) The petitioner should have reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking advantage of CA 473 OR RA
9225 (Philippine Citizenship Reacquisition Act). Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them
subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary to abandon their nationality.

(3.) Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

The fact that the petitioner still owes allegiance with a foreign country while serving public office in the
Philippines cannot be permitted.

The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.






De La Torre vs COMELEC

The COMELEC, by petition, declared the petitioner De La Torre disqualified from running for public
office, particularly the position of Mayor of a municipality in Laguna. It was discovered that there existed
a criminal case filed against the petitioner for violation of the anti - fencing law, and was duly convicted
thereof.

The COMELEC resolved to disqualify the petitioner by virtue of Sec. 40 of the LGC which provides that
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification. The COMELEC held that
the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

The petitioner sought recourse with the SC, contending that sec. 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply to his
case on account that the court granted his application for probation and suspended the execution of
judgment of conviction, hence the grant of such application rendered sec. 40 inapplicable.

However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

WON the petitioner is disqualified to run for public office due to his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.

(1.) Yes, the petitioner is disqualified thereform. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Under PD 1612, one of the elements of the crime of fencing is that the accused must have known that the
item or article has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft or robbery.

In conjunction with the definition of moral turpitude, the knowledge of the accused that the item or object
which he purchased or under his possession is derived from the commission of robbery or theft
ILLUSTRATES A HIGH DEGREE OF MORAL DEPRAVITY AND PERVERSITY. It is the
intentional and malicious deprivation of ones property which taints the crime with moral turpitude.

(2.) In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is ordinarily guided by the
general principle that mala in se crimes involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita.

Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstance.










Mercado vs Manzano

The petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the1998 elections.

Respondent received the highest votes from the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent was not
a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.

It was alleged that the respondent was born in San Francisco, California and acquired US citizenship
through jus soli. However, he was born of Filipino parents, making him a Philippine citizen by jus
sanguine, thereby making him a dual citizen.

The COMELEC initially ruled in favor of Mamaril, and ordered the disqualification of the respondent
Manzano from running for the office of vice mayor for having dual citizenship which is proscribed
under sec. 40 of the LGC.

However, the COMELEC en banc reversed decision of its division and declared Manzano qualified to run
for vice-mayor. It held that the respondent Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Aggrieved, the petitioner Mercado, the 2
nd
highest ranking candidate sought recourse with the SC.

WON the respondent Manzano may run for public office despite his dual citizenship.

(1.) Yes, the respondent may run and be elected as public official. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is a phenomenon which is the result of the concurrent application of 2 or
more laws of different countries in relation to the acquisition of citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.

The phrase dual citizenship under the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, mere dual citizenship does not fall under this disqualification.

(2.) Candidates with dual citizenship may run for public office provided that upon the filing of their CoC,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as dual citizens.

(3.) Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens to possess dual citizenship:

(a) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(b) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fatherscountry such children are citizens of the latters country;
(c) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.


Nolasco vs COMELEC

The petitioner Alarilla filed a disqualification case against his political rival, herein petitioner Blanco who
is the mayor elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Prior to the filing of the petitioner for disqualification, the NBI conducted a raid on the residence of the
respondent Blanco upon verified information that the latter was maintaining a private army. As a result
thereof, several high caliber firearms were confiscated and several arrests were made.

The respondent alleged that the petitioner performed acts which are grounds for disqualification under the
Omnibus Election Code giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing election functions; committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; spending an
excessive amount for his candidacy, which is beyond the ceiling imposed by the COMELEC.

(VOTE BUYING)

After trial, the COMELEC ruled to disqualify the respondent.the respondent filed an MR with the
COMELEC en banc, while herein petitioner Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect filed an intervention, urging
that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.

The COMELEC ruled to deny the motion for reconsideration of Blanco, and the intervention of Nolasco,
hence the petitioner Nolasco filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, contending that he was denied of
due process when the COMELEC suspended his proclamation as the winning candidate, and that there is
no basis for such suspension.

WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws // COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor.

(1.) There was no denial of due process and equal protection of the laws to Blanco as he was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong.

Blancos contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.

(2.) Nolasco must be the one who must assume office of the Mayor, and not Alarilla. It is already a
settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number
of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified.

The second placer cannot assume the elective office on account that he did not have the majority votes of
the constituent. IF the 2
nd
placer be declared the winning candidate merely due to the disqualification of
the 1
st
placer, then such would be substituting the mind of the voter.

It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where
the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.






Ramas vs COMELEC

The petitioner Ramas et. al. and the respondents Famur et. al. were all candidates for public offices in a
municipality in Zamboanga Del Sur.

After canvasing, Ramas et. al. were declared winners for the office of mayor, vice mayor, and members of
the Sanguniang Bayan. As such, the respondents Famur et. al. filed an election protest against the
petitioners. The trial court, after trial, held in favor of the respondents and declared the party of Famur et.
al. as winners for the local elective positions mentioned.

The respondents immediately filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC, and cited several
reasons for the grant of such motion, such as the appeal undertaken by the petitioners is merely a dilatory
tactic, and that it is of public interest that the elective officials assume office immediately.

Upon receipt of the petitioners opposition to the motion, the trial court granted the motion for execution
pending appeal, holding that public interest will be served, considering that the remaining term of office
is for (2) years only, with the 1
st
year wasted due to the election protest.

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the COMELEC against the trial court
order granting the motion.

The COMELEC subsequently denied the petition and affirmed the grant of the motion for execution
pending appeal, holding that it presumed that the protestee is the presumptive winner of an election, until
such time that the protest is resolved, and that public interest will be best served if the respondents assume
office. It also avoids the (grab the proclamation, prolong the protest) scheme which unduly delays the
resolution of election related controversies.

The petitioner sought recourse with the SC.

WON the COMELEC erred in granting the motion for execution pending appeal.

(1.) The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in affirmed the grant of the motion
for execution pending appeal. Although there exist no provision under the present election laws regarding
executions pending appeal, the revised rules on civil procedure may have a suppletory application insofar
as election cases are concerned.

For resolutions involving executions pending appeal regarding election cases, what has to be considered
for the grant or denial of the same are the following factors, to wit;
a) public interest, (b) the near expiration of the term of office, and (c) the length of time of the pendency
of the election protest.

In the present case, it is undeniable that the election protest which has been going on for 1 year had
deprived the constituents representation and a stable local government.

In the instant case, the trial court relied on the following as good reasons for its grant of execution
pending appeal: (1) public interest, (2) near expiration of the term of office involved, and (3) pendency of
the election protest for one year.

The trial court cannot, therefore, be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion. All that was
required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.
Miranda vs Abaya

The respondent Abaya filed an a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of the Pempe
Miranda, the incumbent mayor who was supposed to run for another term. As such, the COMELEC
granted the petition and caused the disqualification of the latter.

However, the son of Pempe Miranda, Joel Miranda who is the petitioner herein, filed his certificate of
candidacy to substitute his father. Such filing was way beyond the period within which candidates must
file their certificates.

During the election, the petitioner garnered the highest votes. The respondent now filed a petition to annul
the substitution made by the petitioner. The respondent contended that the substitution was improper on
account that the person which the petitioner substituted was already disqualified, and that the petitioner
filed his COC beyond the prescribed period.

The COMELEC granted the petition and annulled the said substitution and proclaimed the respondent as
the winning candidate. The petitioner sought recourse with the SC, contending that the substitution is in
accordance with sec. 77 of the omnibus election code.

The petitioner also argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
proclamation of the respondent Abaya as the winning candidate

WON the substitution is invalid and inoperative.

(1.) Yes, the substitution is invalid. Under sec. 77 of the omnibus election code, it is provided therein that
substitution may only be made if the initial candidate is an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party. It is also stated therein that substitution may only be made if such candidate was
disqualified, had died, or had withdrawn from running.(ejusdem generis)

In the present case, it is readily apparent that Pempe Miranda is not a member of an accredited political
party, and that he was not merely disqualified, but his certificate of candidacy was CANCELLED.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be
validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

(2.) The COMELEC erred in proclaiming Abaya as the winning candidate. The second placer cannot
assume the elective office on account that he did not have the majority votes of the constituent. IF the 2
nd

placer be declared the winning candidate merely due to the disqualification of the 1
st
placer, then such
would be substituting the mind of the voter.

It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where
the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

The law on electoral succession must be followed.





Borja vs COMELEC

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992.

On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11,
1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995.

On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On
March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections.

Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on
the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government
Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made
no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the elections against
Borja.

Issue:Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term
limit.

Held:The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the official
concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served
the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected.


















Socrates vs COMELEC

COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto
Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his
COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification
of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor
of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant
recall election for the same post.

COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in
the recall election.

Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.

The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severancefrom office for any length of
timeinterrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.


Farinas vs Barba

Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24,
1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox
was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba.

The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code,
disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan
members are lodged in the Governor.

Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner
Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same
day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same
position.

On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition.

On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by
respondent Mayor Barba.


WHO can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?

(1.) The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where
the vacancy occurs.

The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward
Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo.

For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas.

On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was
the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.










Jainal vs COMELEC

Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for Mayor of
Indanan, Sulu. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winning candidate.

On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for the annulment of
election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his proclamation as the Mayor. Talib
claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and the
preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for these precincts did not bear
the signatures of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact
which indicates that said election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes
cast exceeded thenumber of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A.

Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talibs petition, contending that the latters allegations were the
proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court.

On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in part,
annulling the election returns from nine precincts. Theproclamation of Jainal was likewise annulled.
Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the resolution of its
2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of Barangay Adjid as valid.

Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor,
who, under the provisions of the Local GovernmentCode, will fill up the vacancy created by the
annulment of petitionersproclamation.

Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant to the
COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006.

Jainal likewise filed Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation before the COMELEC EN BANC praying
for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006
COMELEC resolutions.

On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of Jainal and
ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed him, as
Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

WON the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice Mayor to cease and
desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

No. Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the 22 March 2005 and 18
September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final
and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in
granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from
assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of
this Courts prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present
petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the Extreme
Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation.


With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu is
vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession.

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian
barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of
lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns,
or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.


Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioners proclamation is in the nature of a
permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his
office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the
recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC.

Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in
the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified.















Joson vs Executive Secretary

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently
into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was
endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in
default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension.

Petitioner later Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. DILG denied the motion declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of
suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.

Whether or not: (a) Preventive suspension is proper; (b) Procedural due process is violated; (c) The
resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is
the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;

RULING

(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men
constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two

(2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province
is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.

(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioners right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating
Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision
does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation
would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There is
nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23
that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of
position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit
their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.

(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What
is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently
includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Josons
claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is
said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency.

As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the
Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the
President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise
authority.




































Flores vs Sanguniang Panlalawigan ng Pampanga

o An administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against then Mayor Flores of
Minalin, Pampanga, was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the same province.
o The complainants were the municipal councilors of Minalin.
o The administrative complaint against petitioner alleged that on August 1, 2001, he executed
Purchase Request No. 1 for the acquisition of a communication equipment amounting to P293,000.00
without any Resolution or Ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalin.
o The winning bidder was one Kai Electronics.
o The communication equipment delivered by Kai Electronics was overpriced by more than 100%.
o Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an Order recommending to Governor Manuel
Lapid of Pampanga, that petitioner be preventively suspended from office for a period of sixty (60) days.
o Without seeking a reconsideration of the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
petitioner sent a letter to respondent Governor Lapid requesting him to veto the same.
o Also, without waiting for respondent Governor Lapids action on his letter, petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
o The CA denied and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
o In ruling against the petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that he failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before going to court.
o Moreover, respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the challenged Order considering that the allegation of overpricing is supported
by documentary evidence.
o Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA.
o Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

o Yes.
o Section 61 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the LGC of 1991) partly provides: A complaint against any
elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision
may be appealed to the Office of the President.
o After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawiganpreventively suspending him
from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the
opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part.
o Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
o Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that
respondentSangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but that there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o The SC have held that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution.
o The SC also added that petitioner, before filing with the CA his petition for certiorari, should
have waited for respondent Governor Lapids action on the recommendation of respondentSangguniang
Panlalawigan.
o It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available remedies within the
administrative machinery against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, the intervention
of the courts can be resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such remedies.
o The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.

Constantino vs Ombudsman

The municipality of Malungon, Saranggani Province, issued a resolution authorizing herein petitioner
mayor to enter into a contract of lease for heavy machineries. In the contract, there was no prescribed rate
of rental, period of lease, or purchase price.

Accordingly, the petitioner entered into such contract with Norvolian Corporation for the lease of heavy
machineries. Under the contract, the lessees will retain the machineries leased after the expiration of the
leasehold agreement. As such, the machineries were delivered to the municipality after its expiration.

The Sangunian, through a resolution, authorized the mayor to operate the newly acquired machineries for
the construction of public works. However, the payment for the machineries and the projects undertaken
halted when the Sangunian issued a resolution ordering such desistance.

The vice mayor of the municipality filed a complaint against the mayor for violation of RA 3019, alleging
that the contract entered into by the mayor was beyond the scope of the authority given to him under the
Sangunian resolutions.

Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed the necessary information against the petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan, and ordered his preventive suspension, and removal from office.

WON the resolution of the ombudsman is erroneous.

(1.) Yes, the finding of the Ombudsman is erroneous. In light of the foregoing facts, which appear to the
Court to be quite apparent on the record, it is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman
could have arrived at a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the transaction in
question.

It is difficult to see how the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation -- entered into
pursuant to Resolution No. 21 -- and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council through its
Resolution No. 38 -- could be deemed an infringement of the same Resolution No. 21. In truth, an
examination of the pertinent writings (the resolutions, the two (2) instruments constituting the negotiated
contract, and the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their integrity and congruity. It is, in fine,
difficult to see how those pertinent written instruments, could establish a prima facie case to warrant the
preventive suspension of Mayor Constantino.

A person with the most elementary grasp of the English language would, from merely scanning those
material documents, at once realize that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed wishes of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

(2.) The private respondents amazing turn-about is patent upon the record, and is branded by Mayor
Constantino as a cunning and treacherous political maneuver -- an attempted coup to oust him from his
position as Mayor otherwise than through the normal process of election.

Be this as it may, the Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made an instrument of politics, nor be
privy to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice.





Lapid vs CA

Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired
among themselves in demanding & collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control
fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without
a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for
such collection.

The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out the
penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued
that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the
assailed decision.

WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct & imposing
upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.

Held:
Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.

The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar provision. Section 7,
Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In
all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770.

The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable. The legal
maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that
all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said
section are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one
filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives
parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory.

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become
final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are
immediately executory.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately
final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award,
judgment,final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.finalorder or resolution unless the law
directs otherwise.

Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.

It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case,
that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Considering however, that
petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.

It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory.


































Bunye vs Escareal

The above-named accused, all public officers of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, were
charged of enacting Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 in order to allegedly take possession and take over its
operation and management of the New Public Market inAlabang, Muntinlupa starting August 19, 1988
despite the valid and subsisting lease contract for a term o0f 25 years between the Municipality of
Muntinlupa and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc.(Kilusang Magtitinda).

COA Chairman Domingo and MMC Governor Cruz also warned that appropriate legal steps be taken by
the MMC toward the rescission of the contractto protect the interests of the Government, and to
evaluate thoroughly and study further the case to preclude possible damages of financial liabilities which
the Court may adjudge against that municipality as an offshoot of the case.

The forcible take-over allegedly caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and gave
the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of their official functions.

On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending them pendent
lite from public office pursuant to Sec.13 of RA 3019.Petitioners Municipal Mayor, Vice
Mayor and Councilors question the resolution suspending them from office for 90 days pending their trial
for violation of Sec.3(3) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

WON the preventive suspension is unjustified or unnecessary and its implementation will sow havoc and
confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the shattering of the peace and order
thereat?

Sec.13 of RA No. 3019 as amended, provides that the accused public officials shall be suspended from
office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.

In Gonzaga vs Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, the SC ruled that such preventive suspension is
mandatory. Preventive suspension n is not a penalty. In fact, suspension under Sec.13 of RA 3019
is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People vs CA, 135 SCRA 372).

The Sandiganbayan clearly did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the preventive suspension of the
petitioners.

The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all
the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. The prosecution must be
given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non-
intervention and non-interference for 90 straight days from petitioners camp (p.13, Solicitor Generals
comment).

The petitioners fear that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for 90 days when
they are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain 8 councilors who can meet as
the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior Local Government,
will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions of Mayor,
Vice Mayor, and 6 councilors in accordance with the provisions of the LGC



Aguinaldo vs Santos

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup
dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him
to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A
sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for
acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the
rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government.
Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the
former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty
committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere
preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he
had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor
ofCagayan.

WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case
moot and academic

WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President

WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative
case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor.The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts
of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed
by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the
legislature the power and authority to enact a local governmentcode, which provides for the manner of
removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had
the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of
the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.


3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence.






































Pablico vs Villapando

Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan
filed an administrative complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, the mayor of San Vicente, Palawan for
abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement
with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections where Villapando was
elected.

They allege that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within
the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.

Villapando, on the other hand, argues that he did not hire Tiape, but appointed him and invoked Opinion
No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice which states that the appointment of a defeated candidate
as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the
Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and
dismissed him from service which was affirmed by the Office of the President. Meanwhile, Ramir
Pablico, the vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Villapando
filed for a temporary restraining order with the RTC of Palawan which was first granted, then denied.

Villapando now seeks to annul the Sangguniang Panlalawigans Decision as affirmed by the Office of the
President, and the RTCs denial of the TRO. He argues that under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160, an elective local
official may be removed by order of the proper court based on the grounds enumerated under said section.
Without such order of the court, he cannot be dismissed.

WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, may validly impose the
penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

(1.) No.The Supreme Court held that it is clear under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 that the penalty of dismissal
from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.
In Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., it was held that [t]he Office of the President is without any power
to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60. Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations

Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be
removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated
in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority referred to
pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective local
officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local
Government Code.

Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which
operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the
power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence,
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local
officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of
1991.

The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and
the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.

Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the
disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.