November 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Political Law

Posted on December 15, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
Bill of Rights, due process, eminent domain, speedy trial
Here are selected November 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on political law:
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. The right to speedy trial is considered
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In this case, far from being vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, the delays entailed by the postponements of the hearings were,
to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Franciscos extraordinary
remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the lower court and the
assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case. Although the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate commencement of trial within
30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order, and the continuous conduct
thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119
provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Based
on the foregoing, the Court rejected petitioner Franciscos claim that the
postponements of the pre-trial conferences before the lower court violated
his right to a speedy trial. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et
al./Santos O. Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson
Nelson/Imperial, et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 160067/G.R. Mo.
170410/G.R. No. 171622, November 17, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. In determining whether the right of the
accused to a speedy trial was violated, any delay should be considered in
relation to the entirety of the proceedings. Here, there had been an undue
and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the
Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the
lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and did so only after
more than a year thereafter. However, while such reinvestigation delayed
the proceedings, the Court held that said process could not have been
dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of the rights of
petitioners and their co-accused. These rights should not be compromised
at the expense of expediency. Thus, even though the Court acknowledged
the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by
petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the Court held that
petitioners right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them
do not justify the dismissal of the criminal cases. The Court further held that
the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the
criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R.
No. 162206, November 17, 2010.
Constitutionality; Legal Standing. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Court held that he has no
legal standing. The issue of legal standing is derived from the following
requisites of a judicial inquiry: (1) There must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The Court said
that even if the petitioners claim that he is a proper party on the basis that
the creation and operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and
the issue he raised is of transcendental importance, his standing was still
imperiled by his appearance as counsel to then presidential candidate Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest filed by her opponent before
the PET. A constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. That appearance would have been the first opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the PETs constitution. Instead, petitioner
ubiquitously entered his appearance before the PET and acknowledged its
jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that
time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the PETs authority,
meant that he did not meet the third condition and therefore has no
standing to file the petition. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here
claimed that the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose. He contends that the provision, as worded, does not
authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while the above
provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it
preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its
constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving the
President or Vice-President, and its rule-making authority in connection
therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court may
promulgate its rules for the purpose), are not restricted but include all
necessary powers implicit in the exercise of such mandate and
authority. These powers are plenary and the authority of the Court to
decide presidential and vice-presidential election contests through the PET
are derived from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET
implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the constitutional
directive. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission clearly support
the foregoing conclusion. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial
Function. The Court here rejected petitioners claim that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that The Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. Consistent with the presidential system of government, the
function of dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable

is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the
1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Judicial power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute.
The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power. The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of
the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in
the Constitution. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Interest. If property is taken for public use before
compensation is paid or deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be
computed from the time the property was taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between
the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) that
he was in before the taking occurred. As in previous cases, the Supreme
Court affirmed the award of 12% interest on just compensation payable to
the landowner. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al.,
G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010.
Administrative Law
Due Process; Administrative Due Process. Petitioners here assailed the
credibility of a witnesss statement because it was not made under oath and
he was not presented as witness during the hearing. The Court rejected this
claim. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative
proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given
opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals
allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised.
Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752,
November 23, 2010.
Other Laws
Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit. Since Land Bank of the
Philippines is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform
proceedings, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit under Rule 142,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that No costs shall be
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by
law. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No.
182431, November 17, 2010.