Juan Pablo Domínguez, 胡安

国际关系研究生 - 外交学院
北京， 中国
2007 年，6 月，26 日

Chinese participation in UNPKOs during the Cold War era

A study of Chinese voting behavior

1. Introduction
Chinese perception of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations –UNPKOs- has
changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War until present times. Its support, or
better yet, lack of support was reasonable considering its thorny past with the
organization. However, as new changes came into New China after the passing of
Chairman Mao and with the pragmatic approach of Deng, a review of its politics toward
foreign countries was demanded. As foreign relations grew along with Chinese economy,
the interests of its nationals in the overseas prompted Beijing’s new conception of
economic development regarding international stability.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the voting behavior of the Chinese delegation
to the United Nations Security Council –UNSC- in order to interpret Beijing’s policy
towards Peace Keeping Operations from 1971 to 1990. How China voted on
peacekeeping resolutions in the UNSC and how it explained these votes will indicate
changes in China’s attitude towards the UN peacekeeping regime over time. In particular,
its behavior will demonstrate to what extend Beijing defended the concept of traditional
peacekeeping against more intrusive ways of UNPKO. It is in this way that we have
divided this short paper into four main sections being this introduction the first one. The
second session consists in explaining why voting behavior can explain polity changes
through time. Following we present a brief recount of the historical background
supporting Chinese perception of UNPKOs and its voting behavior in the Cold War era.
Finally the last section is composed by a set of concluding remarks.

2. Cold War and Chinese voting

The development of a policy can be tracked through time by analyzing the voting
behavior of a member state in the UN. Even more, when the vote on a resolution is
finally cast after behind-the-door negotiations, all members can not only express their
views on the document presented before them by the show of hands but also in their
public explanation issued before or after the vote is taken. In the case of the United
Nations Security Council, the five permanent members (China, France, Great Britain,
Russia, and the United States) can thus qualify their support or abstention with a
dissociating or sympathetic comment rather than vetoing the adoption of the draft
resolution. In combination with its explanation of vote, China’s voting behavior on
UNPKOs can therefore indicate its support for the UN peacekeeping regime as a whole.

During the Cold War1, the first significant contact of the new China with the United
Nations forces was merely 9 months after its foundation and it was probably the worst
beginning it could ever have. Chinese Volunteers engaged the US led UN forces in North
Korea in what became the first military battle of the Cold War and aided its Communist
Comrades in an effort to respond to its security interests and as a way to oppose US
actions in preventing the liberation of Taiwan. As an obvious result, China’s attitude
towards the United Nations and its Peacekeeping Operations was significantly impacted.
Since then Beijing regarded all subsequent UN interventions as being manipulated by the
superpowers. Not only was China branded as an aggressor in a resolution of the UN
General Assembly –UNGA-, it also became the target of the first U.S.-led enforcement
mission authorized by the United Nations in 1951.

At the beginning of the bipolar world order of the Cold War, Beijing remained largely
isolated from multilateral diplomacy since the Western powers recognized the regime in
1
In this paper we concentrate in the period 1971-1990 because it marks the period where China regained its
seat in the UN and the end of the Cold War.
Taipei as the legitimate representative of China after 1949. Being a communist country,
opposed to super power hegemony, it was but expected to view UNPKOs through the
lens of anti-imperialist ideology and superpower manipulation. For instance, Beijing
expressed its viewpoint towards UN Emergency Force I –UNEF I- as a mechanism that
would allow US neo-colonialism to supersede British and French colonialism. Another
example of Chinese discourse of UN manipulation is the UN Operation in Congo –
ONUC- as a US imperialism where the UN flag operating under it (Choedon, 2005).

This hostile attitude towards UNPKO did not change when Beijing resumed China’s
seat in the UNSC in November 1971 (Kim, 1979). The Chinese representative in the
UNSC declared that he would not participate in the votes on UNPKO since “China has
always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called ‘peacekeeping forces’. […] Such a
practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control with the
superpowers as the behind-the-scenes bosses.” (Choedon, 2005)

Between 1971 and 1981, China did neither participate in any of the votes on UNPKO
in the UNSC, nor did it pay for the peacekeeping expenses (Staehle, 2006). The turning
point of China’s attitude to UNPKO came in December 1981 when Beijing voted in favor
of Resolution 495 on the extension of the ongoing UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and
agreed to pay its share of the UNPKO expenditure (Choedon, 2005). China began to
support every subsequent resolution on UNPKO between 1981 and 1990 (Tzou, 1998).
This fundamental shift was the result of China’s “independent foreign policy”, which was
formulated at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
September 1982, when China embarked on its policy of economic reform and opening
up. This new policy reflected Beijing’s interest in a stable and peaceful environment in
order to achieve its goal of economic development and modernization. To this end, China
was eager to engage in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy (Choedon,
2005).
 3. Conclusions
Although Beijing did not join the United Nations until 1971 and did not participate in
UNPKO-related votes in the UNSC until 1981, China’s attitude towards UNPKO during
the Cold War had three main characteristics which remained influential in the post-Cold
War era: First, China’s experience in the Korean War explained its fierce opposition to
any UN enforcement action and its cautious stance towards the use of force in UNPKO.
Second, Beijing became wary of interferences by foreign powers in the internal affairs of
weaker states. And third, China voted in favor of all UNPKO between 1981 and 1990,
which were all traditional peacekeeping and transition management missions.
 4. Reference

Choedon, Yeshi. “China’s Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing

Priorities of Foreign Policy.” China Report 41, no. 1 (February 2005): 39–57.
Kim, Samuel S. China, the United Nations, and World Order. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
Lynch, Colum (2006) “China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping”;
Washington Post Staff Writer, Washington.
Osman, Mohamed A. (2002) “The United Nations and Peace Enforcement”
London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
Staehle, Stefan (2006) “China’s Participation in The United Nations
Peacekeeping Regime” George Washington University, Washington.
Tzou, Byron N. “The PRC’s Policy toward UN Peacekeeping Operations.” Issues
& Studies 34, no. 5 (May 1998): 102–122.