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MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores,
Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen,
was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538
or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which
he and his co-accused were sentenced to a prison term
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
[1]

The case before us concerns only the petition for review
of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his
conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having
increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a
prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this
Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was
already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Sec. 13, Rule 124,
[2]
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the
Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124,
relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the
penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate
court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec.
14 of RA 6538,
[3]
which is not considered reclusion
perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.
[4]

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied
on People v. Omotoy
[5]
where the Regional Trial Court
found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The
case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote
16 of the decision, it was observed -
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the
reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum
period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court
of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty
imposed is reclusionperpetua or higher (Sec. 5[2](d), Article
VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special
offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay
the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed
on the accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to
any party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec.
13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is
applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty
imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year
period falls within that range, reclusion
perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which
cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-
year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised
Penal Code.
[6]

More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is
one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised
Penal Code.Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal
law imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with
terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those
terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal
Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws.
[7]
This
is because generally, special laws provide their own
specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which
penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The
Revised Penal Code.
[8]

The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the
medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such
technical term underThe Revised Penal Code is not similarly
used or applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the
penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond
to that in The Revised Penal Code.
[9]
But it is different when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death.
[10]

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the
penalty of x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
[11]
For these reasons the use of the
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its
decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the
trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years
and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty
for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on
a Footnote in Omotoy
[12]
to affirm the conviction of the
accused. The substance of the Footnote may not be
the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an
important part of the decision since it enunciates a
fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals.
That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no
consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the
instant case since the former involves an appeal from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the case
at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme
Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis
for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which
empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments of lower courts in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
[13]

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable
penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at
least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it
should impose such penalty, refrain from entering
judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire
records to this Court for review.
[14]
This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between this Court and the Court of
Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction
over the case from the very inception and can, without
bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the
case.
[15]

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes
a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case
may be had only by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45
[16]
where only errors or questions of law
may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of
whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-
Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find
hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani
parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at
No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila.
The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was
used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint
venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was
nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its
disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-
Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately
issued an Alarm Sheet.
[17]

On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino
Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a
common-law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that the
accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen
and Michael Cummins himself stole the Isuzu Trooper.
Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any
statement regarding the incident.
[18]

In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores
brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques,
Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining
witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques,
Bertumen and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle
and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and
Baguio.
[19]
They claimed however that it was with the
knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that
on the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani
to join them in their outing to Laguna. But when
Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they could
borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed
and even turned over the keys to them.
[20]

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during
that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 Miling Flores but
his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.
[21]

The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but
increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused
from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
[22]

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated
by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and
that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no
intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves,
according to petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle
outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.
[23]

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a
petition for review on certiorari where only questions of
law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue
before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the
evidence may not be entertained in this appeal. Besides,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court.
[24]
This rule may be disregarded only when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there is no
ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This
Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced
by the parties particularly where as in this case the
findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
completely coincide.
[25]

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its
imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538
imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The
evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a
quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it,
thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle;
nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the
imposition of the full penalty. With the application of The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may
be reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of
petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison
term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
twenty-two (22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 2000
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235 reversing the two (2) Orders
dated August 27, 1998
[2]
and December 4, 1998
[3]
of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 which denied respondent
Roque Villadoress motion for disqualification of Rico
and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and the motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the
amended informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744
and 94-138745 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto
Adriano and Rolando Advincula, for Falsification of
Public Document before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41.
It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against several parties, among them,
IBC 13. When the labor arbiter
[4]
ruled in favor of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
[5]
As an
appeal bond, IBC 13 filed Surety Bond No. G (16) 00136
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. (BF) with
the Confirmation Letter dated September 20, 1993
supposedly issued by BFs Vice-President. However,
both documents were subsequently found to be falsified.
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of public
document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutors
Office. The charges against respondent Villadores and
Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were dismissed by the City
Prosecutors Office which, however, found probable
cause against the other respondents. Nonetheless, on a
petition for review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the latter affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but
ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an
accused in the two (2) criminal cases. Accordingly, the
original informations were amended to include
respondent Villadores among those charged.
Following the arraignment of respondent Villadores, the
private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed anew a
Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging
damages sustained by private complainant, herein
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the crimes
committed by the accused. The incident was referred to
the City Prosecutors Office by the trial court. In
compliance, the fiscals office submitted a Motion to
Admit Amended Informations with the following
amendment: to the prejudice of Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr., and of public interest and in violation of
public faith and destruction of truth as therein
proclaimed.
The Motion was granted by the trial court and the
amended informations were admitted in an Order dated
October 10, 1997. Respondent Villadores subsequently
filed a Manifestation and/or Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied in an Order dated October 24,
1997.
Thus, respondent Villadores interposed on November
26, 1997 a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Said petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 46103, sought to annul the Order of the trial
court dated October 10, 1997 which admitted the second
amended informations, as well as the Order dated
October 24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.
[6]

In a Decision dated June 22, 1998, the appellate court,
acting thru its Eleventh Division, found that the trial
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the amended informations and dismissed the
petition of respondent Villadores.
[7]
The decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 became final and executory on July
18, 1998.
[8]

Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, respondent Villadores moved for the
disqualification of Rico and Associates as private
prosecutor for petitioner Villanueva, Jr.,
[9]
in line with the
following pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:
[10]

Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when it
argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the
offended party in these cases. It must be underscored
that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond
for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed.
We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained
damages as a result of the falsification of the surety
appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal
would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.
Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the ground
that the above-quoted pronouncement of the appellate
court is a mere obiter dictum.
[11]

In an Order
[12]
dated August 27, 1998 the trial court
denied the motion for disqualification ratiocinating, thus:
A reading of the aforecited decision of the Court of
Appeals clearly shows that the aforecited reason for the
motion is a mere obiter dictum. As held by the Supreme
Court, an obiter dictum lacks force of adjudication. It is
merely an expression of an opinion with no binding force
for purposes of res judicata (City of Manila vs. Entote,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509). What is controlling is
the dispositive portion of the subject decision of the
Court of Appeals which denied due course and ordered
dismissed the petition of the movant questioning the
Order of this Court granting the Motion to Admit
Informations and admitting the Amended Informations
that include the name of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as
the private offended party, which in effect upheld and/or
affirmed the questioned Order of this Court admitting
the amended informations.
Reconsideration
[13]
was sought by respondent Villadores
but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated December 4, 1998.
[14]

Thus, on January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 50235, seeking the annulment
of the trial courts Order dated August 27, 1998 denying
the Motion for Disqualification as well as its subsequent
Order dated December 4, 1998 denying
reconsideration.
[15]

On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its now
challenged decision which reversed and set aside the two
(2) Orders of the trial court dated August 27, 1998 and
December 4, 1998. The appellate court directed that the
name of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 be
stricken out from the records.
[16]

Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds:
[17]

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ENJOINING RICO & ASSOCIATES
FROM APPEARING AS PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
AND/OR AS COUNSEL FOR FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR., IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-
138744-45.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE
MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR. IS AN OFFENDED PARTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-138744-45 HAD BEEN
RESOLVED WITH FINALITY IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103 WHERE
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATIONS IN SAID
CASES TO STATE THAT THE CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA, THE SAME COULD NO LONGER BE
RELITIGATED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 50235.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
PRONOUNCEMENT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103
THAT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS NOT
AN OFFENDED PARTY, AS A MERE OBITER
DICTUM.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., WAS IN FACT
AN AGGRIEVED PARTY.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ORDERING THE NAME OF
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUVEVA, JR., APPEARING
AS THE OFFENDED PARTY BE STRICKEN FROM
THE RECORDS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN
CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103, IT UPHELD THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATIONS SO AS
TO STATE THAT THE CRIMES CHARGED WERE
COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR.
All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of whether
or not the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 to the effect that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed
by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, by the way, that is, incidentally
or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding
as precedent.
[18]

Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by
respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the
admission of the Amended Informations. Among the
issues upon which the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46103 was anchored, was whether Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party.
[19]
Argument on
whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the offended party
was, thus, clearly raised by respondent Villadores. The
body of the decision contains discussion on that point
and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within
the issues presented by the case cannot be considered
as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent
questions, although only incidentally involved, which are
presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and led up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which
the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on
some other ground, or even though, by reason of other
points in the case, the result reached might have been the
same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could
have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictummerely
because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the
case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded
as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more
points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the
ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every
point decided, and none of such points can be regarded
as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not
be denied authority merely because another point was
more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor
does a decision on one proposition make statements of
the court regarding other propositions dicta.
[20]

The decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
46103 allegedly show a conflict between the
pronouncements in the body of the decision and the
dispositive portion thereof. However, when that decision
is carefully and thoroughly read, such conflict is revealed
to be more illusory than real. In denying the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, the appellate
court had this to say:
At the centerfold of this controversy is Section 14 of
Rule 110, 1st paragraph, which is quoted hereunder:
SEC. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads, and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
Needless to state, amendment of a criminal charge sheet
depends much on the time when the change is requested.
If before arraignment it is a matter of right, no leave of
court is necessary and the prosecution is free to do so
even in matters of substance and in form. On the other
hand, the more complicated situation involves an
amendment sought after the accused had already been
arraigned. This time amendment can only be made by a
prior leave and at the discretion of the court, only as to
matters of form when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused [Draculan vs.
Donato; 140 SCRA 425 (1985); Teehankee vs. Madayag,
207 SCRA 134 (1992)].
Relative to the second instance, the primary
consideration is whether the intended amendment is only
as to matter of form and same could be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. Substantial
amendment as a consequence is proscribed. In essence,
substantial matters in the complaint or information is the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form [Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66
SCRA 38 (1975); Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
In other words, even if the amendment is only as to
matter of form, one other criteria must accompany it for
its admission, which is, that it should not be prejudicial to
the accused. Conformably, the test as to when the rights
of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is, when a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended
[People vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (1988);
Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
Given the above aphorisms, the inclusion of the name of
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the prejudiced
complainant in the cases appears to be not substantial. It
did not change, alter or modify the crime charged nor any
possible defense. Likewise, any evidence the accused
might have under his defense in the original informations
is still very much available to him and applicable to the
amended informations. In sum, accused petitioner is not
in any way prejudiced in his rights with such amendment
which, in Our considered opinion, is only a matter of
form under the standards laid down in the cases above-
cited.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the
crime charged in the two informations is falsification of
public document committed by a private individual
defined and penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the evil sought to
be punished and sanctioned by the offense of falsification
of public document is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the trust as therein solemnly
proclaimed [People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil 48, citing
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of December
23, 1886; People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324, Po Giok To, 96
Phil. 913; see Revised Penal Code, Luis B. Reyes, 13th
Division, p. 211 and Aquino, 1976 ed., Vol. 2, p. 984].
Apropos, the crime of falsification of public document
does not require for its essential elements damage or
intent to cause damage. In the final analysis. the inclusion
of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr. would then
be merely a superfluity in the information, a meaningless
surplusage therein. In fact. it is even highly doubted if
civil damages may be awarded in such transgression of
the law.
Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in
admitting the second amended informations albeit such
amendment is totally irrelevant and unnecessary to the
crime charged. The mere fact that the court decides the
question wrongly is utterly immaterial to the question of
jurisdiction [Estrada vs. Sto Domingo, 28 SCRA 891
(1969)]. And writs of certiorari are issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
It cannot be legally used for any other purpose [Silverio
vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527 (1986)].
Incidentally, We are in one with the petitioner when it
argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the
offended party in these cases. It must be underscored
that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond
for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed.
We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained
damages as a result of the falsification of the surety
appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could
have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal
would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it
purchased a fake surety bond.
[21]

Clearly then, while the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46103 admitted that the addition of petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. as an offended party is not necessary, it
held that the admission of the amended informations due
to the amendment to include petitioner Villanueva, Jr. did
not by itself amount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise
stated, there is an error of judgment but such did not
amount to an error of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari, which was availed of
respondent Villadores, is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. Thus, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctible through the original special civil action
of certiorari.
[22]
In effect, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46103 merely held that respondent Villadores chose
the wrong remedy.
It is significant to mention that the intervention of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as an
offended party is apparently predicated
[23]
on the
reduction by the NLRC, in IBCs appeal of the illegal
dismissal case, of the monetary award to which he is
entitled, despite finding the appeal as not perfected due
to the posting of the spurious appeal bond.
[24]
However,
such alleged error should have been brought by
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum,
[25]
and
not raised in criminal cases before the trial court as a
ground for his inclusion as a prejudiced party.
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition, being
devoid of merit, must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, G.R. No.
161629
Petitioner,
Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus -
Quisumbing,
Ynares-
Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as Ombudsman, HON.
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in
his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman,
and Ombudsmans Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau, represented
by Promulgated:
Director AGAPITO ROSALES,
Respondents. July 29,
2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- x

DECISION


YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision
[1]
dated August 28, 2003
and the resolution
[2]
dated January 15, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals
[3]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed
with modification public respondents (1) Joint
Resolution dated January 22, 1999, which ordered,
among other things, petitioners suspension for one (1)
year for conduct prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order
dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum
dated March 17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine
(9) months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified
the above issuances by further reducing petitioners
suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay.
[4]


Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the
Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an
investigation was requested on alleged anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB
investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV
extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed
before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint
against herein petitioner. Also charged administratively
were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang,
Board Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in
petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the
complaint was treated as both a criminal and an
administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214
(criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification
of public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
(administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents
and Gross Neglect of Duty.

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and
Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly
granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b)
using recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV
extension without the applicants affixing their signatures
anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein. Specifically,
petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of
Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the
applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose
papers were questionable.

In a Joint Resolution
[5]
dated January 22, 1999,
Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved
the administrative cases filed against petitioner,
Caronongan and Ang, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is
respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA
be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B.
CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same having
been rendered moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA
P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.

SO RESOLVED.
[6]


Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on
December 29, 1999.
[7]


In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent
Ombudsman approved a Resolution
[8]
dated June 22,
1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-
Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner
for insufficiency of evidence.
[9]


Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
[10]
in
the administrative case alleging that the BOC which
reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved
the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued that it
effectively declared the applications for extension regular
and in order and waived any infirmity thereon.

In an Order
[11]
dated February 8, 2000, Graft
Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration which was approved by respondent
Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the period
of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months
without pay.

On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, which included a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order to enjoin public respondents from
implementing the order of suspension. The Court of
Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court
of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced
the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay.
[12]


With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the
following grounds:

I.

IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION,
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING
RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE
JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER:

...

II.

THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF
THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY ADVISORY
ON THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (BI) IS
CONTRARY TO THE PERTINENT PROVISION
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.

III.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
OMBUDSMANS RESOLUTION FINDING
PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT
INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION
MATTERS.
[13]


The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which
approved the questioned applications for the extension
of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the
BOC into approving these applications and argues that
the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned
his conduct when it approved the subject
applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith
and the government did not suffer any damage as a result
of his alleged administrative lapse.

We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape
liability, petitioner undermines his position in the BID
and his role in the processing of the subject
applications. But by his own admission,
[14]
it appears that
the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV
extension and its supporting documents, but more
importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates
their papers before making a recommendation to the
BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it
finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum of
Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and
propriety of the applications.

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,
[15]
we stated that all heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct
of government business dictate that the gritty details be
sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final
approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not
unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and
recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be expected to
review every detail of each application transmitted for its
approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its
proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good
faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension
applications are so patently clear on its face. He is
principally accountable for certifying the regularity and
propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.

Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out
for prosecution. It is of record that administrative cases
were also filed against Caronongan and Ang, but
extraneous circumstances rendered the case against
Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was
dismissed because it was proven that she merely
implemented the approved decision of the BOC.

Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs
approval of the defective applications for TRV extension
cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved
petitioners administrative lapse. The instant
administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as
Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing
nine (9) defective applications, independent of and
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does
not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to
encroach upon the authority of the BID on immigration
matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine
whether petitioner committed any misconduct,
nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the
performance of his duties.

Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner
essentially puts in issue the import of the Ombudsmans
findings. Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals
pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman
may not be said to be merely recommendatory upon
the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to
uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the authority
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office
of the Ombudsman.
[16]
Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were
illegal constitutes an indirect interference by the
Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over
immigration matters.

We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.
[17]
The Ombudsman and his deputies, as
protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations.
[18]
Foremost among its powers is the
authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving
public officers and employees, thus:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.


Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and
functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and
his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but
also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal
liability of government officers and employees in every
case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
[19]


The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations as in the present case is
settled.
[20]
Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman
shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts
or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of
an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an
arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers
but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid
of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any
decision or order that emanates from the Office of the
Ombudsman after it has conducted its
investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its
literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is
only advisory in nature rather than one having any
binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,
[21]
thus:

... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority
to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service, more particularly from his position in the
BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.
[22]


For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Ombudsman argue that the word recommend must be
taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts
statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns
the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and
not its jurisdiction.

We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals
that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of the administrative case. The
statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to
varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial
examination.

The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents
theory. Section 15 is substantially the same as Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We
draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this Act:Provided, That the refusal
by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer; (Emphasis supplied)

We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in
the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of
any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is
a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the
head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged.
[23]
By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
recommends the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution
and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in
this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out
its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
[24]
It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of
impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary).
[25]
Also, it can preventively suspend any
officer under its authority pending an investigation when
the case so warrants.
[26]


The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the
wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission
[27]
reveal the following:

MR. MONSOD:

Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give
the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to
avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution
arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a
chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a
chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.

However, we do not want to foreclose the
possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it may see
fit, may have to give additional powers to the
Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure
Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of
our people too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.


MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
[28]


MR. MONSOD:

Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I
read the committee report which recommended the
approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the
office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the
explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the
implementing law the last one, P.D. No. 1630did not
follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan,
...

...

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Commissioner Blas Ople):

May we just state that perhaps the honorable
Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as a civil
advocate or a champion of the citizens against the
bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we
are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On
the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up
to the same level as the President.

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless
animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the
concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that
he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by
law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future
time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not
foreclosed.

So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it
is not an irreversible disability. (Emphasis supplied)
[29]


It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution
intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of
political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,
[30]
it was held:

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the
classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to
receive and process the peoples complaints against
corrupt and abusive government personnel. The
Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers
and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature has vested him
with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
actions. ...
[31]


In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service and reducing petitioners period of suspension
to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, taking into
account the education and length of service of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and
the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, G.R. No.
161629
Petitioner,
Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus -
Quisumbing,
Ynares-
Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as Ombudsman, HON.
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in
his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman,
and Ombudsmans Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau, represented
by Promulgated:
Director AGAPITO ROSALES,
Respondents. July 29,
2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- x

DECISION


YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision
[1]
dated August 28, 2003
and the resolution
[2]
dated January 15, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals
[3]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed
with modification public respondents (1) Joint
Resolution dated January 22, 1999, which ordered,
among other things, petitioners suspension for one (1)
year for conduct prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order
dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum
dated March 17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine
(9) months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified
the above issuances by further reducing petitioners
suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay.
[4]


Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the
Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an
investigation was requested on alleged anomalies
surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB
investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV
extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed
before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint
against herein petitioner. Also charged administratively
were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang,
Board Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in
petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the
complaint was treated as both a criminal and an
administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214
(criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification
of public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
(administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents
and Gross Neglect of Duty.

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and
Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly
granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b)
using recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV
extension without the applicants affixing their signatures
anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein. Specifically,
petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of
Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the
applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose
papers were questionable.

In a Joint Resolution
[5]
dated January 22, 1999,
Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved
the administrative cases filed against petitioner,
Caronongan and Ang, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is
respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA
be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B.
CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same having
been rendered moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA
P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.

SO RESOLVED.
[6]


Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was
approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on
December 29, 1999.
[7]


In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent
Ombudsman approved a Resolution
[8]
dated June 22,
1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-
Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner
for insufficiency of evidence.
[9]


Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
[10]
in
the administrative case alleging that the BOC which
reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved
the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued that it
effectively declared the applications for extension regular
and in order and waived any infirmity thereon.

In an Order
[11]
dated February 8, 2000, Graft
Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration which was approved by respondent
Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the period
of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months
without pay.

On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, which included a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order to enjoin public respondents from
implementing the order of suspension. The Court of
Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court
of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced
the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay.
[12]


With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the
following grounds:

I.

IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION,
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING
RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE
JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER:

...

II.

THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF
THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY ADVISORY
ON THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (BI) IS
CONTRARY TO THE PERTINENT PROVISION
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.

III.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
OMBUDSMANS RESOLUTION FINDING
PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT
INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION
MATTERS.
[13]


The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which
approved the questioned applications for the extension
of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the
BOC into approving these applications and argues that
the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned
his conduct when it approved the subject
applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith
and the government did not suffer any damage as a result
of his alleged administrative lapse.

We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape
liability, petitioner undermines his position in the BID
and his role in the processing of the subject
applications. But by his own admission,
[14]
it appears that
the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV
extension and its supporting documents, but more
importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates
their papers before making a recommendation to the
BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it
finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum of
Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and
propriety of the applications.

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,
[15]
we stated that all heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct
of government business dictate that the gritty details be
sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final
approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not
unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and
recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be expected to
review every detail of each application transmitted for its
approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its
proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good
faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension
applications are so patently clear on its face. He is
principally accountable for certifying the regularity and
propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.

Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out
for prosecution. It is of record that administrative cases
were also filed against Caronongan and Ang, but
extraneous circumstances rendered the case against
Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was
dismissed because it was proven that she merely
implemented the approved decision of the BOC.

Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs
approval of the defective applications for TRV extension
cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved
petitioners administrative lapse. The instant
administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as
Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing
nine (9) defective applications, independent of and
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does
not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to
encroach upon the authority of the BID on immigration
matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine
whether petitioner committed any misconduct,
nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the
performance of his duties.

Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner
essentially puts in issue the import of the Ombudsmans
findings. Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals
pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman
may not be said to be merely recommendatory upon
the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to
uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the authority
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office
of the Ombudsman.
[16]
Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were
illegal constitutes an indirect interference by the
Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over
immigration matters.

We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.
[17]
The Ombudsman and his deputies, as
protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations.
[18]
Foremost among its powers is the
authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving
public officers and employees, thus:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.


Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and
functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and
his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but
also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal
liability of government officers and employees in every
case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
[19]


The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations as in the present case is
settled.
[20]
Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman
shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts
or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of
an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an
arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers
but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid
of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any
decision or order that emanates from the Office of the
Ombudsman after it has conducted its
investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its
literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is
only advisory in nature rather than one having any
binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,
[21]
thus:

... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority
to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
service, more particularly from his position in the
BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.
[22]


For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Ombudsman argue that the word recommend must be
taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts
statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns
the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and
not its jurisdiction.

We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals
that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of the administrative case. The
statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to
varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial
examination.

The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents
theory. Section 15 is substantially the same as Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We
draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21 of this Act:Provided, That the refusal
by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer; (Emphasis supplied)

We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in
the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of
any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is
a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the
head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged.
[23]
By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
recommends the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution
and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in
this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers
intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out
its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
[24]
It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of
impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary).
[25]
Also, it can preventively suspend any
officer under its authority pending an investigation when
the case so warrants.
[26]


The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the
wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission
[27]
reveal the following:

MR. MONSOD:

Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give
the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to
avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution
arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a
chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a
chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.

However, we do not want to foreclose the
possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it may see
fit, may have to give additional powers to the
Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure
Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of
our people too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.


MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
[28]


MR. MONSOD:

Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I
read the committee report which recommended the
approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the
office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the
explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the
implementing law the last one, P.D. No. 1630did not
follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan,
...

...

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Commissioner Blas Ople):

May we just state that perhaps the honorable
Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as a civil
advocate or a champion of the citizens against the
bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we
are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On
the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up
to the same level as the President.

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless
animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the
concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that
he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by
law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future
time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not
foreclosed.

So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it
is not an irreversible disability. (Emphasis supplied)
[29]


It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution
intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of
political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did
when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,
[30]
it was held:

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the
classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to
receive and process the peoples complaints against
corrupt and abusive government personnel. The
Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers
and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature has vested him
with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
actions. ...
[31]


In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service and reducing petitioners period of suspension
to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, taking into
account the education and length of service of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and
the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork
for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein
to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines)
Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their
immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or
licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee
or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of
Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to
be made available upon request at each Caltex station
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At
the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant
whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters
dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded
the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next,
the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner
kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-
Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-
lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for
third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be
qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven
different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed
can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-
prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional
first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-
expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the
"National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-
prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,
respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven
regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash
prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000
for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four
participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983
of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent
provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No
matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether
sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into
the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in
or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered
to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau
of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising,
describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying
or purporting to convey any information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property
of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory
evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property
by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person
or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind
through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of
Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or
employee of the Bureau to return to the person,
depositing the same in the mails, with the word
"fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside
cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed
by or addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and
telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts may,
upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting
any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise,
forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any
postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person
or company or to the agent of any such person or
company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or
as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind,
and may provide by regulation for the return to the
remitters of the sums named in money orders or
telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or
company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the
Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which
the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview
of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the
requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7,
1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing
stand, stressing that there being involved no
consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a
lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years
before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster
General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a
"gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal
Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only
denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed
contest but as well threatened that if the contest was
conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it
(Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing
the present petition for declaratory relief against
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that
judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the
mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public".
After issues were joined and upon the respective
memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds
that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'
announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the
rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to
bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other
upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second,
whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old
Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for
the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is
available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration
of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised
Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court,
conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter,
laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have
a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination
(Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R.
No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576,
578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July
31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being
that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the
factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated
the present controversy, a number of significant points
stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a
business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has
the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and
stimulate increased patronage for its products. In
contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the
enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power
and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under
Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously
pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for
the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of
information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media,
it was found expedient to request the appellant for an
advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue
of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the
pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw
a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and
accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as
to the correct construction to be given to the applicable
statute was thus reached. Communications in which the
parties expounded on their respective theories were
exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee
insisted upon its position was matched only by the
obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground.
And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was
"conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it
and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the
remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of
its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest,
and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the
appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly
spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof
on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their
interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty
occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance
its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law
he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable
duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried
out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous
shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless
their differences are settled and stabilized by a
tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic
of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).
And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the
time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely
the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or
by the fears of others" which admittedly does not
confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has
ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case
at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right
which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward
vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac.
350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense
that there is here no question of construction because the
said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief.
The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds
from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be
divorced from the matter of their application to the
appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction,
verily, is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason
of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law
(Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the
case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the
appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to
nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing
down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action.
Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been
committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken
a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the
battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety
nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest
before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms
ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be
conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs.
Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d.,
152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory
relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has
been cast, would be to force it to choose between
undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and
definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed
contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it
launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes
thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order
with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the
appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the
contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits
the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we
weigh these considerations in one equation and in the
spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1,
Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant
case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law
we can see in the present case any imposition upon
our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and
binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if
he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying
function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to
subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound.
But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8,
Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to
abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no
misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate
the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the
conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399,
117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had
the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be
subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief
action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S.
2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15
N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for
declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology
in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra,
condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or
otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal
service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of
the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path.
As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil.,
278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of
the postal authorities under the abovementioned
provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been
attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is
that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous
cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States
[1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne
[1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915],
30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil.,
395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel
Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed scheme to be the subject of contention.
Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field
of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the
element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter,
our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the
same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive
yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law
does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property
by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or
indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does
condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are
struck by the clarity of the language in which the
invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels
or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply
estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump
with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense
from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee
be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but
to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand, and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed
from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand
it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern
injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and
pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to
prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291),
we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-
Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to
win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest.
Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any
Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a
pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant,
it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything
or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being
admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit
the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those
who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only
to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry
blanks". The required element of consideration does not
consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28
P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and
not whether those conducting the enterprise receive
something of value in return for the distribution of the
prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of
the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor.
The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby
to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the
way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing;
does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith
Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d.,
844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that
the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the
appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind",
which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the
issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be
avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its
tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and
preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action
was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,
Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in
effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in
which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest wanting in
consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited
gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift
enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there
appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and
standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to
a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is
given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur.,
654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine,
Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55;
Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth
vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State,
193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn.
507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already
noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser.
The contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's
products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the
appellee's contest can be encompassed within the
broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable
of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will
gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied
upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default
of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a
lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192,
178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129
Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great
Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114
Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally
impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift
enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it
exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142,
113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151
Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City
and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39
Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54
C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56
Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-
594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by
the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon
are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54
C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are
used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others,
the necessity for the element of consideration or chance
has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-
352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs.
Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson
that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term
in question is used in association with the word "lottery".
With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the
well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon
although only insofar as the element of chance is
concerned it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than
that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only
if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate
that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief
sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in
statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic,
are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium
for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of
public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to
lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification
lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency
to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super.
208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it
follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by
the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law
can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does
not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device
to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or
indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling
spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell
vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and
Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift
enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that,
under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which
we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if,
like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that
the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that
the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976
RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN
GONTANG, petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
E.V. Guevarra for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals (Second Division) in CA-G.R. No. 38363-R,
entitled "Leoncio Barrameda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Development
Bank of the Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga City), Rodolfo
General and Carmen Gontang, defendants-appellees,"
which reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 5697,
"dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff".
Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive
portion:
We therefore find that the appealed judgment should be
reversed and set aside and another one entered declaring
(1) null and void the sale executed on September 3, 1963,
by defendant Development Bank of the Philippines in
favor of its defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No. 5003 cancelled and (3) the
mortgaged property redeemed; and ordering the Clerk of
the lower court to deliver the amount of P7,271.22
deposited to defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang and the Register of Deeds to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff in
lieu of T.C.T. No. 5003 upon payment by him of
corresponding fees; with costs against the defendants in
both instances.
Undisputed facts are:
Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1418, containing an area
of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio Taban, Minalabac
Camarines Sur; to annul any and all contracts affecting
said property between the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) and Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang and to recover damages, attorney's fees and
costs.
The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the
DBP to secure a loan of P22,000.00. For failure of the
mortgagor to pay in full the installments as they fall due,
the mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially pursuant to the
provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial
sheriff conducted an auction sale in which the mortgagee,
as the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged property for
P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff executed a final
deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the
DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership
(Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the sale and affidavit on
September 2, 1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418 in the name
of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003 issued to
the DBP (Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September 3, 1963,
defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang
purchased the land from their codefendant. The sale in
their favor was annotated on TCT No. 5003 on November
26, 1963 only.
Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20,
1963, plaintiff offered to redeem the land. In view of the
refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff
commenced this suit. The original complaint was filed in
court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964,
plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the sum of
P7,271.22, representing the repurchase price of the land.
The trial court held that the one-year period of
redemption began to run on April 23, 1962, when the
sale at public auction was held, and ended on April 24,
1963; that the plaintiff's offer to redeem on November
20, 1963 and the deposit of the redemption price on
August 12, 1964 were made beyond the redemption
period; and that defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang 'are legitimate purchasers for value.
Two principal issues raised are:
(1) In the interpretation and application of Section 31,
Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that created the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development
Bank of the Philippines) which provides:
The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at public
auction, judicially or extra- judicially, for the full or partial
payment of an obligation to said bank shall, within one year
from the date of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem the
real property ... (Emphasis supplied),
shall the period of redemption start from the date of
auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in
the register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court
held?
(2) Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond
what appeared in the certificate of title of their vendor
the Development Bank of the Philippines and investigate
the validity of its title before they could be classified as
purchasers in good faith?
Petitioners' principal contentions are: that Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act No. 459 which created the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, predecessor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the
Development Bank of the Philippines, clearly provides
that the right to redeem the real property sold at public
auction judicially or extra-judicially may only be exercised
"within one year from the date of the auction sale"; that there is
no provision in Commonwealth Act No. 459 expressly
stating that the redemption period of one year shall start
from the registration of the certificate of sale in the
register of deeds; that Sec. 31 of C. A. 459 is a specific
provision of law which governs redemption of real
property foreclosed by the Agricultural and Industrial
Bank (now the Development Bank of the Philippines),
and prescribes the redemption period for both judicial
and extra-judicial foreclosures of mortgage; that insofar
as foreclosures of mortgage by banking and financial
institutions are concerned, the period of redemption
applicable must be the one prescribed in their respective
charters as, in the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459;
that the ruling in the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No.
L-17483, July 31, 1962, cited by respondent Appellate
Court as a basis for its decision, is not applicable to the
case at bar because this Court based its Agbulos ruling on
Section 26 (now Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, wherein it is not clear when the period of
redemption should start (date when execution sale was
conducted, or when the certificate of sale was executed
by sheriff, or when the certificate of sale was registered in
the registry of deeds), and this Court ruled that as the
land involved in that case is registered under the Torrens
system, the date of redemption should begin to run from
the date of registration, unlike in the case at bar where
Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and
clearly provides that the running of the redemption
period shall start from the date of the auction sale; and that the
ruling of this Court in Gonzales vs. P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824,
also invoked by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for
its decision, is likewise not applicable to the case at bar
because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B.
Charter, Act No. 2938, are different from that of
Commonwealth Act 459. Section 32 of Act 2938, which
is now Section 20 of R.A. No. 1300 (PNB Charter)
provides that the mortgagor shall have the right to
redeem within one year the sale of the real estate. This is
Identical to the provision appearing in Sec. 26, now Sec.
30, Rule 39, Rules of Court, while under Sec. 31 of
Commonwealth Act 459, the period of redemption should star,
on the date of the auction sale, and the latter provision is
applicable specifically and expressly to the case at bar.
It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in
Metropolitan Insurance Company, substituted by spouses
Loreto Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs. Pigtain 101
Phil. 1111, 1115-1116, wherein this Court, in construing
Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, categorically stated that the one
year redemption period shall start from the date of sale and
not from the report of the sale or the registration of the sale
certificate in the office of the Register of Deeds, is more
applicable to the present case. The pertinent portion of
the decision in the Marcaida case follows:
But again the appellants claim that in this particular case,
the statutory redemption period of one year should begin from
December 17, 1954, when the auction sale was actually recorded in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila and not from December
15, 1953, when the sale at public auction of the properties in
question took place. We find its contention to be also untenable in
view of the clear provision of the aforesaid Section 6 of Act No.
3135 to the effect that the right of redemption should be exercised
within one year from the date of the sale. It should not be overlooked
that the extrajudicial sale in question was for foreclosure of a
mortgage and was not by virtue of an ordinary writ of execution in
a civil case. ... And since the appeallants had failed to
redeem the land in question within the time allowed by
Section 6 of Act 3135, the appellee has perfect right to
require the cancellation of the attachment lien in
question. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by
petitioners, the crucial issue to determine is the choice of
what rule to apply in determining the start of the one year
redemption period, whether from the date of the auction
sale or from that of the registration of the sale with the
registry of deeds. In other words it is whether a literal
interpretation of the provision of Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act 459 that the period of redemption shall
start from the date of the auction sale shall govern, or
whether the words, "auction sale" shall be considered in
their ordinary meaning or in the same sense that site is
used in the texts of Section 26, now 30, of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act 2938, now Section
20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently,
should the word "sale" used in the above indicated
provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter,
under whichWe ruled that the redemption period shall
start from the registration of the sale in the registry of
deeds be applied to foreclosure sales for the DBP and
give to the words auction sale" in its charter the same
meaning of "sale" as used in connection with registered
land?
We are of the view that a correct solution to the
foregoing issue must entail not merely trying to
determine the meaning of the words auction sale" and
"sale" in different legislative enactments, but, more
importantly, a determination of the legislative intent
which is quite a task to achieve as it depends more on a
determination of the purpose and objective of the law in
giving mortgagors a period of redemptiom of their
foreclosed properties. Mortgagors whose properties are
foreclosed and are purchased by the mortgagee as highest
bidder at the auction sale are decidedly at a great
disadvatage because almost invariably mortgagors forfeit
their properties at a great loss as they are purchased at
nominal costs by the mortgagee himself who ordinarily
bids in no more than his credit or the balance threof at
the auction sale. That is the reason why the law gives
them a chance to redeem their properties within a fixed
period. It cannot be denied that in all foreclosures of
mortgages and sale of property pursuan to execution,
whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different
legislative enactments, a public auction sale is a
indispensable pre-requisite to the valid disposal of
properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that
whether the legislators in different laws used as collateral
for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in
different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of
no moment, since the presumption is that when they
used those words "sale" and "auction sale"
interchangeable in different laws they really referred to
only one act the sale at public auction indispensably
necessary in the disposition of mortgaged properties and
those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their owners.
In the case of Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor De Lis Meneses,
et al.,G.R. No.
L-15378, promulgated July 31, 1963, this Court stated:
The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by
appellants in their third assignment of error, which is to
this effect: that the lower court erred in not holding that the period
of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are concerned, started
only on May 26, 1956, registered. Should We rule to this
effect, it is clear that hen appellants attempted to exercise
their right to redeem, as judgment creditors of the
deceased mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and when they initiated the
present action on October 1, 1956, the period of
redemption had not yer expired.
We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case of
Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, promulgated on
July 31, 1962, We held:
The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the
law in this jurisdiction that when property brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act sold, the operative act is
the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not
take effect this a conveyance or bind the land it is registered.
(Section 50, Act 496; Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635;
Sikatuna vs. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester vs.
Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646) (Emphasis supplied)
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the
aforequoted ruling and not apply the same to the present
case. To Us petitioners' main contention that there is a
great deal of difference in legislative intent in the use of
the words 94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth
Act 459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act 2938, and
See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into
insignificance in the light of Our stand that those words
used interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the
public auction sale required by law in the disposition of
properties foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the
Salazar case and in those mentioned therein (Garcia vs.
Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959; Gonzales et
al. vs. Philippine National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is
firmly planted on the premise that registration of the
deed of conveyance for properties brought under the
Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the
property and registration is also the notice to the whole
world that a transaction involving the same had taken
place.
To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the
question of when the one year period of redemption
should start (from the time of registration of the sale)
would better serve the ends of justice and equity
especially in this case, since to rule otherwise would result
in preventing the respondent-mortgagor from redeeming
his 59.4687 hectares of land which was acquired by the
Development Bank of the Philippines as the highest
bidder at the auction sale for the low price of only
P7,271.22 which was simply the unpaid balance of the
mortgage debt of P22,000.00 after the respondent-
mortgagor had paid the sum of P14,728.78. As it is,
affirmance of the Appellate Court's decision would not
result in any loss to petitioners since the amount of
P7,271.22 they paid to the Bank will be returned to
'them. What further strengthen's Our stand is the fact
found by the respondent Appellate Court that
respondent Barrameda has always been in possession of
the disputed land.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, We find it
no longer necessary to determine whether the petitioners
are purchasers in good faith of the land involved, since
the respondent Barrameda redeemed the mortgaged
property within the legal period of redemption and,
consequently the sale of the property executed on
September 3, 1963, by the Development Bank of the
Philippine in favor of the petitioners is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent
Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin,
JJ., affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11988 February 1, 1918
JACINTO MOLINA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
Mariano Escueta for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal present for resolution the question of
whether or not fish are an agricultural product.
FACTS.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is the owner of
various fish ponds (pesquerias) in the municipality of
Bulacan, Province of Bulacan. Between January 1 and
September 30, 1915, plaintiff consigned to a commission
merchant in Manila quantities of fish which sold for
P5,264.89. The commission merchant paid the
merchant's percentage and fixed taxes due under the
Internal Revenue Law. Plaintiff, however, had not
previously paid the merchant's tax, although from August
1. 1904, the date when the first Internal Revenue Law
became effective, until October 26, 1915, plaintiff had
been engaged in this business, Plaintiff had been paid the
real estate tax on the land upon which the fishponds are
located. On the date last mentioned, on demand of a
representative of the Bureau of Internal revenue, plaintiff
paid under protest P71.81, the total internal-revenue tax
on the gross sum received for the first three-quarters of
the year 1915. The ground of the protest was that
plaintiff is an agriculturist and not a merchant and
therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the Internal
Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants. The
protest was denied by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
who held that the plaintiff was a merchant. Suit to
recover this amount of P71.81 was thereupon instituted
in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the defendant as collector of internal revenue. After trial
on an agreed statement of facts, the Honorable Jose
Abreu in a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant
to refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as internal-revenue
taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest
thereon from November 26, 1915, the date of such
payment under protest. Defendant appealed making four
assignments of error, all of which, however, with the
exception of the last, which need not be considered,
center around the question which we set out in the
beginning of this decision. Both appellee and appellant
have further favored the court with an exceptionally able
presentation of their respective contentions. We are given
to understand that this is in the nature of a test case,
concerning not alone the comparatively small amount
involved but affecting the taxes of numerous other
persons in an amount which will run up into thousands
of pesos.
In addition to the foregoing statement of the case, we
must note the nature of the fishponds and of the fish. As
to the first, before the lands are suitable for use as
fishponds, it is necessary for the land to be prepared by
the erection of dikes and cleaning out and deepening the
bottom. The presence of caretakers is necessary to see
that the fishponds do not become damaged and to
regulate the entrance and exit of water through the
floodgates. The fish are of the species known bagus.
These fish are obtained from small fishes (semillas), which
are placed in the fishponds. These small fishes are first
put in a comparatively small compartment, surrounded
by walls of earth, which is found within the fishery itself.
Afterwards when they get to be about the size of a
cigarette, they are let loose into the other compartments
of the same fishery. This compartment for semillas is
allowed to dry and is cleaned well before the semillas are
placed therein; it is even plowed to kill all the bugs that
may eat up the fish. In order to make marine plants grow,
a small amount of sea water is allowed to enter. When the
fish have become large an endeavor is made to fill the
fishery with water. From time to time the water
contained in the fishery is renewed to avoid the killing of
the fish. The walls of a fishery are constructed to
preserve and to retain the water and the fishes inside the
fishery. These walls are constructed on a swampy lands
and in some cases on rice fields bounded by a river or the
sea.
The food of the bagus includes marine plants. These
algae are of seven classes, their scientific names being
cladophora, chaetomorpha, oscillatoria, oedogonium,
lyngbya, enteromorpha, and najas. One of these plants is
rooted. Some of the others are very loosely attached to
the ground, but not rooted. Generally the algae float in
the water.
LAW.
The provisions of the law which it is necessary to
construe are not extensive. The different internal-revenue
laws have provided for a merchant's tax. "Merchant," as
used in the law, "means a person engaged in the sale,
barter, or exchange of personal property of whatever
character." (Act No. 2339, sec. 40; Administrative Code
[1917] sec. 1459.) The succeeding section (Act no. 2339,
sec. 41; Administrative Code [1917], sec. 1460) is entitled
"Sales not subject to merchant's tax." The section
provides:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the
following commodities shall be excluded: . . . .
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or
owner of the land where grown, whether in their original
state or not."
With the facts and the law before us, we return to the
question first suggested.
QUESTION.
Are fish an agricultural product within the meaning of
the exemption provisions of the Internal revenue Law?
OPINION.
Different methods of approach to this question are
possible. For example, all argument could disposed of
peremptorily with the bald statement that in accordance
with the rule of stare decisis, the decision of this court in
The United States vs. Laxa ([1917], 36 Phil. Rep., 670) is
decisive. Justice Araullo, in his opinion, held that fish are
not an agricultural product, that the owner of a fishpond
who sells the fish at the fishpond is a merchant, that such
a merchant is not entitled to the exemption provided by
the Internal Revenue Law, and that the said owner is
guilty of violation of the Internal Revenue Law. We
prefer not to take such a stand, although we are confident
that it could be defended, because of the vigorous
objection to a decision in a criminal prosecution
becoming a precedent in a civil action for the recovery of
taxes.
As opposed to the Laxa decision, counsel for plaintiff
invites special attention to the cases of Mapa vs. Insular
Government ([1908] 10 Phil., 175) and Mercado vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue ([1915] 32 Phil. Rep., 271). In the first
case, the Supreme Court said
The question before us is not what is agricultural land,
but what definition has been given to that phrase by the
Act of Congress.
The Philippine Bill, it was found, classified land as
agricultural public land in order to distinguish such land
from timber or mineral land. Neither Congress nor the
court gave any definition of agricultural land as such or
of the products of the land. Moreover, the court made
the observation that, "The land in question in this case,
which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind
of crops raised thereon." If the case can be considered as
an authority, it must be that the court recognizes that
agricultural land, as the term is used in the Act of
Congress, may be devoted to other than agricultural
purposes, and that using agricultural land for a fishpond
is a use other than agricultural. In the second case of
Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, following Mapa vs.
Insular Government (supra), the Court said
It is, then unquestionable that bakawan firewood is an
agricultural product, differing from other kinds of
firewood obtained from the forest trees because the
bakawan plant grows only on land subject to overflow,
which require clearing and care by workers skilled in
agricultural pursuits, in order that it may thrive. It is also
to be noted that up to the present time mangrove
swamps have been found suitable for no other useful
crop.
But it is plainly a far cry from holding that bakawan,
planted and grown through the culture of the soil, is an
agricultural product, to finding that fish are in similar
sense planted and grown as a result of the culture of the
soil. Whatever comfort can be derived from these
decisions are persuasive authority is more than nullified
by the later case of The United States vs. Laxa ([1917] 36
Phil. Rep., 670)."
Just, therefore, as the facts and the law are indisputable,
so do we prefer to forget these three cases for the time
being and to rest our decision on the plain and ordinary
meaning of the law disclosed by the elementary rules of
statutory construction.
And first, in order to dispose of the question, is the
owner of a fishpond, such as the plaintiff, who sells fish
taken from a fishpond, a "merchant" as defined in the
Internal revenue Law? Recalling this definition of a
"merchant," it would appear undeniable that the plaintiff
is properly included in such classification. To paraphrase
the law, he is a person engaged in the sale of fish. Under our
law, whatever may be the usual conception of a
merchant, buying and selling are not essential; to sell only
is sufficient. (See also In re Cameron Town Mut. Fire,
Lightning and Windstorm Ins. Co. [1899], 96 Fed., 756.)
If such a man is a merchant, does his sale of fish place
him under the exemption of the Internal Revenue Law?
We know the meaning of "fish." In the authoritative
work by Dr. C. L. G. Gunther on the Study of Fishes, we
find the following:
According to the views generally adopted at present, all
those vertebrate animals are referred to the class of
fishes, which, living in water, breathe air dissolved in
water by means of gills or branchiae; whose heart
consists of a single ventricle and single atrium; whose
limbs, if present, are modified into fins, supplemented by
unpaired median fins; and whose skin is either naked, or
covered with scales or osseous plates or bucklers . . . .
We then have left to define merely the words
"agricultural products."
"Agriculture" is defined by Webster as "the art or science
of cultivating the ground, including the preparation of the
soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of
crops, and the rearing, feeding, and management of live
stock." Let us test our facts by this definition. The
ground of the fishpond is cultivated. The soil is prepared.
We, however, greatly doubt that seeds (of fish) are
planted or that crops (of fish) are raised and harvested.
Certainly, the seeds of fish are not sown in the ground as
one would sow corn, while as distinguished from the
rearing, feeding, and management of live stock, which
consumes the products of the farm, the fish living in
water depending upon water for life, only receive
nourishment from marine plants most of which have
little or no connection with the land.
To proceed. The equivalent of "agriculture" in
"husbandry." And "husbandry" is defined by Webster as
"the business of a farmer, comprehending agriculture or
tillage of the ground, the raising, managing, and fattening
of cattle and other domestic animals, the management of
the dairy and whatever the land produces." Again, we are
far from confident that a farmer is generally understood
to be a fisherman, and that the land can be said to
produce fish. In a case in which these definitions were
considered, the supreme court of Tennessee said that
"agriculture" means "in its original sense, the cultivation
of the ground for the purpose of procuring vegetables
and fruits for the use of man and beast, or the act of
preparing the soil, sowing and planting seeds, dressing
the plants, and removing the crops. In this sense of the
word includes gardening or horticulture, and also the
raising and feeding of cattle or stock; but in a more
common and appropriate sense is used to signify that
specie of cultivation which is intended to raise grain and
other field crops for a man and beast." (Simons vs. Lovell
[1872], 54 Tenn. [7 Heisk.], 510; see also In re Drake
[1902], 114 Fed., 229.)
To proceed. "Agricultural products," the supreme court
of Georgia has held, "in ordinary usage," is confined to
the yield of the soil, as corn, wheat, rye, hay, etc. (Davis
and Co. vs. Mayor and Council of Macon [1879], 64 Ga.,
128.) The court had here to determine if beef cattle were
exempt from taxation as "an agricultural product." The
court asked
"And when it is thought of closely, would it not be rather
an unusual application of the phrase 'agricultural
products' to make it comprehend beef cattle? In ordinary
usage, is not the phrase confined to the yield of the soil,
as corn, wheat, rye. oats, hay, etc., in its primary form?
When there has been conversion of the fruits of the soil
into animal tissues are still to apply the phrase? And
suppose we are to disregard the change in its first stage,
and call a cow or a steer an agricultural product, must we
carry the name forward to the steak or roast which the
butcher sells us from the slaughter animal? If cattle fall
under the denomination, so do hogs; and if beef, so does
bacon." (See also State vs. Patterson [1887], 4 S. E., 47.)
Another case, coming from the supreme court of the
District of Columbia, gives a much broader meaning to
the phrase. (District of Columbia vs. Oyster [1885], 4 Am.
Rep., 275.) The court said
The common parlance of the country, and the common
practice of the county, have been to consider all those
things as farming products or agricultural products which
had the situs of their production upon the farm, and
which were brought into condition for the uses of society
by the labor of those engaged in agricultural pursuits, as
contra-distinguished from manufacturing or other
industrial pursuits. The product of the dairy or the
product of the poultry yard, while it does not come
directly out of the soil, is necessarily connected with the
soil and with those who are engaged in the culture of the
soil. It is, in every sense of the word, a part of the farm
product. It is depended upon and looked upon as one of
the results and one of the means of income of the farm,
and in a just sense, therefore, it may be considered
produce.
To indicate further the wide sweep of the term
"agricultural products," and to show how such
terminology influences those who disagree with us,
"agricultural products" has been held to include swine,
horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay,
poultry, vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, butter, and lard. (See
Mayor vs. Davis, 6 W. and S., 279.) But never by any court to
include fish.
Like everything else in the world, it must be that there is
a limit to the things which can be included in the term
"agricultural products." The District of Columbia case,
much relied upon by the plaintiff, gives the clue.
Agriculture is but one pursuit. Agriculture and what it
includes is contradistinguished from other occupations
and professions, as manufacturing and we believe,
fishing. Thus, of fisheries the Encyclopedia Britannica (p.
429) says
For the most part the operations of fishing have been
comparable with those of primitive hunting rather than
with agriculture.
Fisheries, while possibly in concomitance with the soil,
are even more certainly concerned with the water in
which the fish live and have their being, If fishing is
farming, then conversely farming must be fishing.
Waiving all the technical definitions, does the ordinary
man when he speaks of agriculture and farming think of a
farmer as a fisherman, and when he speaks of fisheries
does he think of a fisherman as a farmer?
One other word in the law, "grown" is necessarily
included and must be considered in finding the proper
meaning. The law provides that "agricultural products"
must be "grown." Again referring to Webster, "grown"
means "to cause to grow; to cultivate; to produce; as, to
grow a crop; to grow wheat, hops, or tobacco." The fish
taken from the fishponds and sold are certainly not the
natural products of such land. They are retained therein
by the construction of artificial dykes. They are animals
farae nature, They have none of the characteristics of the
natural products of the soil. Fish are not "grown" as
wheat, hops, or tobacco are grown."
The question as to whether or not a similar exemption in
favor of agriculturists contained in the Internal Revenue
Law of 1904 operated to exclude from the merchant's
tax, receipts from the sale of fish, arose shortly after the
passage of that Act. The Attorney-General in an opinion
rendered on March 14, 1906 (3 Op. Atty. gen., 65), held
in effect that the culture of the soil was determining
factor in considering what products are or are not
agricultural products. As to quarrymen and fishermen.
the Attorney-General observed
The occupation of the lumberman and the stockman, in
the historical development of these industries, as well as
in present day practice, has never been confused with
that of the agriculturist; while as to quarrymen and
fishermen it may be observed that tillers of the soil are not
wont to plow the fields in quest of rock or in anticipation of a crop
of fishes or of pearls.
This opinion of the Attorney-General was concurred in
by the then Governor-General and Acting Secretary of
Finance Justice, who had helped draft the law. The
Collector of the Internal Revenue thereupon published
the opinion in full in Bureau of Internal Revenue
Circular, No. 106. This official ruling of the executive
officials is now entitled to consideration by the courts.
Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statue by the executive
officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such
interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby. (In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630,
following Pennoyer vs. McConnaughy [1890], 140 U. S.,
363; Government of the Philippine Islands Ex Rel.
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan
[1916], 34 Phil. Rep., 518.)
We have thus far considered the etymology of the words.
We frankly admit to a slight doubt of exact interpretation
by this method. We, however, believe that viewed from
the standpoint of the most elementary of all rules of
statutory construction there is but one possible result. In
other words, our sole duty is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the lawmaking body. We can best
discover this intention through the medium of the action
taken by the Legislature in the enactment of other laws.
The first Internal revenue law (Act No. 1189) was
enacted by the Philippine Commission. It is plain that the
Commissioners must have had in mind agriculture as
known to them in the United States. The organization of
the American Government includes a "Department of
Agriculture," the "Bureau of Fisheries" is under the
Department of Commerce. Agriculture and fishing are
therefore separate and distinct. In Great Britain there is a
"Board of Agriculture and Fisheries." Moreover, the
same Philippine Legislature which provided an
exemption from taxation for agricultural products was
also interested in establishing a Bureau of Agriculture. In
enumerating the functions of this Bureau, not one word
is said of fish or fisheries. We rather doubt if the experts
in agronomy in the Bureau of Agriculture would consider
themselves competent to advise as to piscatology. On the
contrary, you find a section of fisheries established not in
the Bureau of Agriculture but in the Bureau of Science.
Instead, also, you find special laws unrelated to
agriculture dealing with the granting of fishery privileges.
The purpose of the Legislature in exempting agricultural
products from taxation under the Internal Revenue Law
was to encourage farming and not fishing. This court has
herefore held, and we reiterate, that "where language is
plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give
them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful." (Yangco vs. Court of
First Instance of Manila and Yangco [1915], 29 Phil.,
183.) Chief Justice Marshall in the historic case of
Gibbons vs. Ogden, ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) said:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment,
generally employ the words which most directly and aptly
express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened
patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people
who adopted it must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what
they have said.
The answer to our question are A person engaged in
the sale of fish is a merchant. Fish are not an agriculture
product. This merchant is not entitled to exemption
under the Internal Revenue Law.
The further objection is made that the particular tax
would constitute double taxation. It is sufficient to note
in this respect that this court in Gil Hermanos vs. Hord
([1908] 10 Phil., 218) said:
It is very apparent that tax under discussion is not a tax
upon property. It is rather a tax upon the occupation or
industry in which a person is engaged.
The internal-revenue tax is also uniform for all of a class.
In opposition to such a contention, it could be advanced
if necessary that the burden is on plaintiff to establish
that the surrender of the taxing power is manifested by
words too plain to be mistaken. "When exemption is
claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist."
(Farrington vs. Tennessee [1877], 95 U. S., 697, 686.)
"The presumption is always against any surrender of the
taxing power." (Tennessee vs. Whitworth [1885], 117 U.
S., 129, 136.)
We have permitted our discussion of the question raised
by this appeal to proceed much farther than is really
necessary for the decision of the case. If we have fallen
into the mire of proximity, it has been because we
approached the subject with a desire to accede, if
possible, to the request of the plaintiff. We are as much
interested in upholding legislation which will assist in the
commercial development of the Islands as any one. We
cannot, however, step outside the settled and ordinary
meaning of the law and by judicial legislation give to the
law a meaning not intended. If redress is proper, under
these circumstances, complainants must look to the
Legislature and not to the courts.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
defendant is absolved of the complaint, with the costs of
the first instance against the plaintiff, and without special
finding as to costs of this instance. So ordered.
Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
JONHSON, J., with whom concurs ARELLANO,
C.J., dissenting:
The only important question presented by this appeal is
whether or not the products of a "vivero de peces"
should be considered as an agricultural product and as
such relieved from the internal-revenue tax in accordance
with paragraph (c) of article 41 of Act No. 2339.
The Court of First Instance, in a very well-reasoned
opinion, held that said products were exempt from the
internal-revenue tax under said Act. This court, by a
majority opinion, held that said products were not
exempt from the payment of the internal-revenue tax and
reversed the judgment of the lower court.
We think the majority opinion misses both the spirit and
purposes of the law, and woks a great imjustice and a
severe hardship upon thousands of the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who are engaged in purely agricultural
pursuits. Said decision places a great burden upon those
who are least able to bear it. By reason of the very small
profits of the agriculturist, earned by the hardest of labor,
every intendment of the law should be, at least, liberally
construed in his favor.
Paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 provides that
the tax imposed under said law shall not be imposed
upon "agricultural products when sold by the producer or
owner of the land where grown, whether in their original state
or not." Under the interpretation given in the majority
opinion, the Collector of Internal Revenue may collect
taxes upon every grain of rice produced by the farmers of
the Philippine Islands, unless he sells the same "where
grown." Such an interpretation, in our opinion, was never
intended by the lawmaker.
The majority opinion has fallen into error, in our
opinion, in not distinguishing a "pesqueria" from a vivero
de peces." no contention is made that the products of a
"pesquera," as the terms is generally used, should be
relieved from the internal-revenue tax. Our contention is
simply that the products of a "vivero de peces" should be
relieved from the internal-revenue tax, upon the theory
that they are as much of an agricultural product as any
other product of the farm by reason of the method
employed in producing them. The majority opinion
admits [that] whether a particular product is or is not an
agricultural product depends upon the methods used in
producing it.
A "pesqueria," as distinguished from a "vivero de peces,"
may be defined as a specie of trap placed upon the farm in
which fish are caught from time to time. While a "vivero
de peces" may be defined as apart of the same as is done
in the production of corn, sugar cane, rice, bananas,
coconuts, ducks, chickens, eggs, milk, butter, lard, hay,
wood, cattle, horses, sheep, or any other great variety of
products produced by the farmers in the Philippine
Islands, the only difference being one of degree of the
care and labor necessary for production.
The error which the majority opinion has fallen into may
best illustrated by an example:
A is the owner of a farm. A portion of the same is dry
land capable of producing sugar cane, or corn, or other
varieties of farm products which can only be produced
upon dry land. A portion of said farm, by virtue of its
location with reference to water, sunlight, and air may be
used for the production of abaca, bananas, or some of
the various classes of fruits. Another portion of the farm
is low land, upon which rice or certain classes of
vegetables only can be produced profitably. Still another
portion of the farm is swamp land, covered by water and
incapable of being properly drained. Another portion of
the farm is mountainous so that it cannot be cultivated at
all. Upon the mountainous portion of said farm the
owner raises cattle, sheep, goats, horses, hogs, chickens,
turkeys, eggs, lard, butter, wool and hides. Another
portion of the farm can most profitably be devoted to the
production of bacauan which was held to be an
agricultural product. (Mercado vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 32 Phil. Rep., 271.) The swamp land of his farm
is of such a character that it can not profitably be devoted
to the production of rice or any of the cereals, and is too
swampy upon which to raise cattle, sheep, horses, goats,
etc. The farmer, therefore, utilizes that portion for the
production of geese, ducks, and other domestic fowls, as
well as for the production of eggs. There comes a time
when the swamp land ceases to be profitable for the
production of rice as well as for the production of said
fowls and eggs. All of said farm, including the various
classes of land as above described, is taxed as agricultural
land; and it is a matter of common knowledge that the
"vivero de peces" are taxed as agricultural land, and
equally as high, if not higher, than other lands devoted to
the production of rice, corn or sugar cane, etc.
A great demand may arise for fish in the country. The
farmer, in order to reap the advantage of said demand,
ceases to produce eggs, or ducks, or geese upon the
swamp lands of his farm and turn the same into a
"vevero de peces." He, thus, wisely utilizing the different
portions of the farm for the production of all of the
products which farmers generally produce, is greatly
increasing the wealth of the State.
The majority opinion admits that domestic fowls
chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys and eggs, butter, lard,
milk, vegetables, fruit, etc., are agricultural products, but
argues that nothing is, or may be considered, an
agricultural product which does not result from a
cultivation of the soil. To admit that eggs, butter, lard and
milk are agricultural products, and to argue that nothing
is an agricultural product which does not result from a
cultivation of the soil presents a consistency in argument
and conclusion which we are unable to understand. It is
admitted that the land for the "vevero de peces" is specially
prepared. A certain cultivation and preparation is necessary
for the creation of a "vivero de peces." It is difficult to
understand what special preparation of the soil is
necessary for the production of hen's eggs, butter, lard,
milk, or cattle, or sheep or horses or hogs, or goats which
makes those products agricultural products. It is a matter
of common knowledge that land may be specially
prepared for the production of rice this year and then
changed into a "vivero de peces" next year and vice versa.
Under what interpretation of the law and under what
definition of agricultural products may we conclude that
the year in which the same parcel of land produces rice
produces an agricultural product while in the year it is
producing fish is not also producing an agricultural
products? Of course, as we stated above, a "vivero de
peces" must not be confused with a "pesqueria" which is
used as a trap for the purpose of catching fish. No
contention is made that the products of the latter is in
any sense an agricultural product any more than the
product of a trap placed in the fields for the purpose of
catching wild animals, which from time to time pass
upon the land, is an agricultural product.
It is admitted in the majority opinion that the land for a
"vivero de peces" must be specially prepared by first
building dykes and cultivating the land preparatory to the
planting of the fish. the only difference, therefore,
between the preparation of a "vivero de peces" and the
preparation of a rice paddy is one in extent of labor
employed. In both cases the land is specially prepared for
the particular purpose to which the farmer desires to
devote it. Forgetting for a moment the stereotyped and
the lexicographer's definition of agricultural products,
and forgetting for a moment that there is no more
difference, so far as the method of production is
concerned, between the production of corn and the
production of ducks and eggs, we will find ourselves
driven to the conclusion that from the standpoint of
method of production there is no difference between the
production of fish in a "vivero de peces" and the
production of ducks upon land which is recognized as
agricultural lands. The majority opinion has fallen into
error by trying to make a 15th century definition apply to
20th century conditions. The judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed with costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO
JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P.
Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45,
representing the income tax collected on his salary as
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from
January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to
December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as
they do the same question of law, they were jointly
submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge
Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and
well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was
a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and
considering the proposition and the arguments pro and
cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra,
which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that
case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O
'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a
diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a
discussion and determination of the remaining question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly
section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf
of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision
in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received
favorably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
To bring home his point, the Solicitor General
reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in
the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9,
Article VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above
constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that
judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income
tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the
Government was a decrease or diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which
is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did
not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case,
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to
counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a
decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section
9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt
from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries,
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes
the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
says that "no salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial
officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income
tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can
the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature
lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary
of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found
and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we
shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and
enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the
execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws.
But the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority
to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a
law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the
pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function
and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the
power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy
vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority
vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty
of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths
of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall
said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental
law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to
the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to
the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the
courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon
the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial
tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional
government, among the most important functions in
trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of
Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the
determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature
are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal
and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic
Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is
a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office," found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of
a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
(11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates
a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an
attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am.
Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form
of government is assigned the task and the power to
make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic
law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of
the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare
what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in
actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion
and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of
the Constitution by the Legislative department. That
would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly
violative of the fundamental, principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those
governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case.
Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the
collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and
evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where
the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or
sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent
and clear. All that the official who had previously
received his full salary was called upon to do, was to
fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying
his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was
received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his
other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact
that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said
income tax. But under the present system of withholding
the income tax at the source, where the full amount of
the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed
in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding
to the number of pay-days during the year and actually
deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full,
because the income tax is deducted therefrom every
payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case
of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to
say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every
payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present
case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal
Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided
by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And
further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to
P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the
collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt
from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving
P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving
P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he
would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear
that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by
P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection
with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act
No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons
behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among
certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court
should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out
of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay
income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this
connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all
judicial officers including Justices of the Court of
Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption
also extends to other constitutional officers, like the
President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the
members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly
members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of
the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court
of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all
these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is
relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other
judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15
Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of
First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830
Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption
in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High
Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit
judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As
said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S.,
245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the
clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent
men to the bench and to promote that independence of
action and judgment which is essential to the
maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading
principles of the Constitution and to the administration
of justice without respect to person and with equal
concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but
as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other
words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and
the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in
the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when
the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of
them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering
further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax
law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for
each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be
derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption,
could not be large or substantial. But even if it were
otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the
purpose and the considerations that prompted the
establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the
same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme
Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution)
regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater
importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not
exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax
on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his
office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not
primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought
and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of
short duration. Because of the limited membership in this
High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of
experience, practice and training required, one generally
enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite
late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and
being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does
not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not
in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long.
It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption
can give more benefit. They are relatively more
numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive,
they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its
diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid
would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing
unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public
policy or public interest. While all other citizens are
subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a
crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their
attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all
other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark
or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical
person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead,
Senators and Congressmen in making such statements
during their sessions are extended immunity and
exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who
enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are
exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and
improvements thereon when used exclusively for
educational purposes, even if they derive income
therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the
income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4],
National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any
person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the
United States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act
No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of
the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of
the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such
services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945,
inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act
No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the
Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for
reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may
justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be
exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on
his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps
for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of
the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt
judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as
not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the
independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer
is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.
We further hold that the interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid
down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G.
R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as
former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I
concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides
that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be
considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an
invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary.
In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null
and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental
principle underlying the separation of powers.

PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the
majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it
be held valid although against a provision of the
Constitution.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO
YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral
Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as
member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as
admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO
SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados
contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente
una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente
resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no
se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8
of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8
of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula
for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest
in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent,
Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following
grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction
the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the
National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created
in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if
the National Assembly has not availed of its primary
power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7
of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1
and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared
and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly";
that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of
protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in
the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by
the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
essential to carry out the power and functions conferred
upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting
its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion
of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to
take cognizance of election protests filed within the time
that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not
an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and
filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,
setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing law fixing the period within which protests
against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9,
1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly
conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its
quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said
Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act
within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
its members, and that such confirmation does not
operate to limit the period within which protests should
be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be
article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be
subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a
writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States)
has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction
against the respondent Electoral Commission which
petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of
the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of
the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly
upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not
feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense
of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question
and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice
to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented
to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them
to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative
power that this assent is required in the enactment of
laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a
bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly.
The President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion
of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the governments
of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less
to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of
this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the
Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by
resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the
other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution
adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has
the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9,
1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission
has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the
exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution
of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as
it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand, and the
Electoral Commission on the other. From the very
nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission
may not be interfered with, when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if
it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
Discarding the English type and other European types of
constitutional government, the framers of our
constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions
have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the
courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what
otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically
their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland
of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no
power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are
silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South
Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of
the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional
system which may be in the long run prove destructive of
the entire framework? To ask these questions is to
answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle,
reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that
upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall
now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has
pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of
section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore,
that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of
its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and
significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States providing that "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of
its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August
29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the
sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the
particular case s therein specified. This court has had
occasion to characterize this grant of power to the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39
Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent
tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections
to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five
appointed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-
committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of
Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but
also against the election of executive officers for whose
election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well
as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified
executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of
three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six
members of the house of the legislature to which the
contest corresponds, three members to be designed by
the majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight
modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to
be designated one each from the two major parties in the
Senate and two representatives to be designated one each
from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the
proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members
of either house and all cases contesting the election of
any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three
members elected by the members of the party having the
largest number of votes therein, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was
probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee
on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction,
to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The
Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the
Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the
composition of the Electoral Commission and made
further changes in phraseology to suit the project of
adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature.
The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by
Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to
strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and
inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National
Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members",
the following illuminating remarks were made on the
floor of the Convention in its session of December 4,
1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as
to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the
gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not
contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of
the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why
the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If
there is no question about the election of a member,
there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral
Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that
the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election
of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is
just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a
legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What happens with
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does
anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this
case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is
the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first
clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman
from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place
of another who was declared elected. From example, in a
case when the residence of the man who has been elected
is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who
has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of
the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon
its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all
the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no
contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as
that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more
questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6
on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election
as separate from the first part of the sections which refers
to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the
cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the
elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested
elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman
yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so
desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz
believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly,
the assembly on its own motion does not have the right
to contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is
right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of
the assembly believe that a member has not the
qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him
for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only
be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member
of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of
its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall
decide whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be
informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly even though that question has
not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power,
because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft
reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated
by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining
the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
x x x x x x x x x
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste
solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft
que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la
Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la
eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y
para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien
razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo
que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election",
de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se
limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of
Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following
interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,
quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la
Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del
Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como
los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso
como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria
como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les
daria el triunfo.
x x x x x x x x x
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador,
Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly to
the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of
ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz
(C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme
Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority
party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote
of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining
the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to
read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed
of three members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted
revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on
February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the
Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests
relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words
"the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the
Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no
means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious"
canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition
of contests by the House of Commons in the following
passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his
printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their
right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770,
two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination
of controverted elections, and rights of membership.
One of the standing committees appointed at the
commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions
was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to
report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to
the house, from time to time. When an election petition
was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of
all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in
the form of resolutions, which were considered and
agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and
decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as
by a committee. The committee of privileges and
elections although a select committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee was
usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order
to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members
named was required to be present, but all the members of
the house were at liberty to attend the committee and
vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years
previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as
mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example,
in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon
his government, resigned his office in consequence of an
adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under
this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence
the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious
conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of
higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of
commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous
leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial
of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve
in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the
motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing
practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the
merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among
us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as
earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite
sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to
act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary
impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known,
that in every contested election, many members of this
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial
capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the
partial management of the very business, upon which
they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described,
that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the
approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent
on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law
since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which
Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works,
for the honor of the house of commons, and the security
of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister
or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the
evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led
many of the contemporaries of the measure to the
information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not
been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The
bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration
of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation
of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of
the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members
by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's
Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota
in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose.
Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879
[42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices
Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70;
Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.
22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787).
In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which
were originally heard by the Committee of the House of
Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in
the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which
were originally determined by each house, are since 1922
tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law
provides that all protests against the election of members
of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2,
art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17,
1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
decide contested elections to the Diet or National
Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of
deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art.
19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June
2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose
membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States.
In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute
as to the number of electoral votes received by each of
the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made
no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress
passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes
at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special
Electoral Commission composed of five members
elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House
of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme
Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission
was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses
voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral
lesson to be derived from the experience of America in
this regard, judging from the observations of Justice
Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the
Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the
United States and its Appellate Power under the
Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of
Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at
least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who
framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of
them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it
with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done
so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of
which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote
of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon
the approval of the constitutional the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom
and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention
it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality
all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need
of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for
this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this
end in view, a composite body in which both the majority
and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and execution of the limited and specific function
assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer
to the legislative department than to any other. The
location of the provision (section 4) creating the
Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
"Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature.
But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State
vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we
concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
but subject at all times to the regulative power of the
National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the
framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a
dual authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power
to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that
this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity
to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the
admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the
creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and
peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly.
But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake
has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction
in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the
possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the
people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they
have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve
specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working
within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and
honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they
were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of
these constitutional agencies might leave much to be
desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in
the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow
that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not
be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts
may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects
of the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the
appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy.
The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution,
except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National
Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and
the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December
3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on
December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show
when the Electoral Commission was formally organized
but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for
the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3,
1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually
been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division
of the National Assembly attached to the record of this
case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices
of the Supreme Court the six members of the National
Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935.
If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming
non-protested elections of members of the National
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for
the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases
had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself
and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed
in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time when the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed
as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly",
to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of
its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As
contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution
of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact,
certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers
is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
national Assembly and to render him eligible to any
office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House
of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a
member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper
election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office
(Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694,
695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is
in order only in cases of contested elections where the
decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In
England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter
the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions
for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32
Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed,
the order or decision of the particular house itself is
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law
and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was
still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature
fixed the time when protests against the election of any
of its members should be filed. This was expressly
authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, return and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec.
478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies.
As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules
for the filing of protests had already expired, each house
passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns
of such members against whose election no protests had
been filed within the prescribed time. This was
interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests
against the election of those members not theretofore
contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-
640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121,
1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of
the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the
reason that with the power to determine all contest
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional
provisions which authorized the National Assembly to
fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the
time for the filing of contests against the election of its
members. And what the National Assembly could not do
directly, it could not do by indirection through the
medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power
into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies,
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other
two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the
present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration,
which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the
sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contests against the
election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against
the election of any member of the National Assembly
should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority
under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably
expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however,
constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions
therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the
Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas vs.
Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the
other hand, the power to regulate the time in which
notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative
in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law.
ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed.,
572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government
established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of the separation of powers into legislative,
executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the
National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of
any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the
power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested
election may be given, must be deemed to be included in
the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a
provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section
4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section
5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that
each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has
assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice
of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201,
Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an election of
any Member of the House of Representatives of the
United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result
of such election shall have been determined by the officer
or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine
the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member whose
seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the
same, and, in such notice, shall specify particularly the
grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par.
105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the
Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect that
the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding
this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the
Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by
resolution respectively prescribe the time and manner of
filing contest in the election of members of said bodies,
the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the
costs and expenses of contest which may be paid from
their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the
Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would
be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests
from the category of political to that of justiciable
questions. The purpose was not to place the commission
beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the
determination of such contests with the due process of
law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section
2, of which provides that
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force
until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly,
and all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so
far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was
to insure the orderly processes of government, and to
prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus
provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall
remain operative even after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent
with the Constitution, and that all references in such laws
to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
government and corresponding officials under the
Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only
with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold
that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative
and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral
Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge
election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the
Senate or the House of Representative under the former
regime. It is important to observe in this connection that
said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to
regulate the time and manner in which notice of a
contested election may be given, not in the Philippine
Legislature but in the Senate and House of
Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the
elections of members of the Philippine Legislature was by
statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with
power to decide such contests. Construing section 478 of
the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as
required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the
election of members of the National Assembly is vested
in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body
clothed with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have
the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro
Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By the
same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by
law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which
fixed the time with in which written contests must be
filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions,
the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and
determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.

G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA,
MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR
TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO
ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO,
RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA,
ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF
PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR,
and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO
LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS
ACEBES, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES
AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY
FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga
del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local
elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate
petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC
XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in
Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71,
6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the
said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of
certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by
the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we
issued temporary restraining orders directing the
respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further
proceedings in the cases in question until further orders
from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to
the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to
answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are
hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint
with the respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named
respondents, conspiring and confabulating together,
allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel
and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that it
was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company
won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract
pursuant to the said simulated bidding were effected and
executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company; that,
in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated
and the papers on the same were falsified to favor
Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the private
secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly
confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was
given wholly unwarranted advantage and preference by
means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are
hereby also charged with interest for personal gain for
approving said award which was manifestly irregular and
grossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and
committed by means of falsification of official
documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran
Trucking Company, represented by respondent Cesar
Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his
trucking contract in the under his trucking contract in the
amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same
was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view
of the then subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking
Company; which was to expire on November 2, 1969;
that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was
made to appear that it was collected by Tecson Trucking
Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter
and the voucher was never indorsed or signed by the
operator of Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and
consummating the aforecited collection, respondent
officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to
the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced
Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal,
another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for
the construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol
Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the
Bidding Committee composed of respondents cited
hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously
manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage
and preference in favor of the, supposed winning bidder,
Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and managed
by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of
respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is
interested for personal gain because he is responsible for
the approval of the manifestly irregular and unlawful
award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore,
respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee,
also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by
making it appear in the very abstract of bids that another
interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when
in truth and in fact, it was not so.
2

xxx xxx xxx
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted
I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for
violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said
respondent testified falsely under oath in Cadastral Case
No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration
of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified
falsely under oath during the hearing and reception of
evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a
certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, when in
truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired
and is owned by the provincial Government of
Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial jail building is
now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful
statement of respondent in said Cadastral case were made
knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur in
violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
3

On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent
filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the
respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named
respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and the
rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as
follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication,
respondents conducted the so-called "bidding" for the
supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga
del Sur; that said respondents, without any valid or legal
ground, did not include or even open the bid of one
Jesus Teoson that was seasonably submitted, despite the
fact that he is a registered duly qualified operator of
"Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his
compliance with all the rules and requirements on public
bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondents illegally and
irregularly awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an
associate of respondent Governor Bienvenido Ebarle;
and
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really
simulated and papers were falsified or otherwise
"doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby
giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference and
benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that there is
a statutory presumption of interest for personal gain
because the transaction and award were manifestly
irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and
regulations.
4

xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid
preliminary investigations, but the same having been
denied, he went to the respondent Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and
mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same
time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further
proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary
injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-
Graft League filed a motion to have the restraining order
lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito,
handed down the first of the two challenged orders,
granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing
Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary
restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of
criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April
26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-
ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions
of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, and
appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree by consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration
of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,
seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the
appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-
MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of
the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although
he well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6

xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration
of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,
seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the
appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth
Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
well knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
7

xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent
brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City
Fiscal against the petitioner, still another proceeding for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son of
his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third
degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well knew that the latter is related with him
in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified
under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov.
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY
ABABONwho was then the incumbent Motor Pool
Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third
Civil degree, in violation of the Civil Service Law, this
knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality
against said complaining employee.
Third Count:
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment
as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know
that the latter is related with him within the third degree
of consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of
the Civil Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR.,
son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment
as Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he
well know that the latter is related with him in the third
degree of consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH
EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third degree,
an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
wen knew then that the latter was not qualified to such
appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service
Law, thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted
advantage and preference in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking
advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or
influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular and
felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting
an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the
Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who,
according to the records of the case, failed to establish
his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the
Land Registration law and the Public Land Act, it
appearing that the Provincial Government of Zamboanga
del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse possession of
Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon
still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration
of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,
seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the
appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH
EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he
wen knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil
Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate,
to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion,
seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the
appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-
MONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office of
the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although
he well knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the
Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws.
8

xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted
I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the
petitioner with further violations of Republic Act No.
3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother
Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity
within the second civil degree, an appointment as
LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City,
although he well knew that the latter is related to him in
the second degree by affinity and is not qualified under
the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent,
an appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's
Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Jesus
Ebarle is related to him within the third civil degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service
Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and
privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said
respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL
ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor,
Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina
Codinera is related to him in the second civil degree of
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service
Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please
set the case for immediate preliminary investigation
pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971
of the Secretary of Justice, and in the paramount interest
of good government.
9

xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special
Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a
restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League
moved to have the same lifted and the case itself
dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order,
dismissing the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No.
34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October
8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and
considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the
failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft
League to comply with the provisions of Executive
Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY
WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES
SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their
criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the
standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to
commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No.
33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal
(in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the
complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had
issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies as
well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are
politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as
we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce
the Order in toto:
MALACAANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be
duly informed or reminded of the procedure provided by
law and regulations by which complaints against public
officials and employees should be presented and
prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed
because of the failure to observe the form.91 requisites
therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and
particularity the charges or offenses being aired or
denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper
office or authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the
Administration believes that many complaints or
grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of law and regulations
on the matter are duly observed by the parties concerned;
and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct
should be eliminated and punished, it is equally
compelling that public officials and employees be given
opportunity afforded them by the constitution and law to
defend themselves in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall
be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the
complainants, describing in sufficient detail and
particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead of
generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be
filed with the Office of the President or the Department
Head having direct supervision or control over the
official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall
be lodged with the proper department or agency head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with
the Office of the President in case of provincial and city
officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary
in case of municipal officials, and with the municipal or
city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed
with the corresponding local board of investigators
headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the
case of those appointed by the President which should be
filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall
be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials
or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent
laws and regulations so that the erring officials or
employees can be soonest removed or otherwise
disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in
like manner, and to the end also that other remedies,
including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the
interested parties after administrative remedies shall have
been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in
the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has
exclusive application to administrative, not criminal
complaints. The Order itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say,
"crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the
Executive Order could have very well referred to the
more specific term had it intended to make itself
applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for
informing the public "of the procedure provided by law
and regulations by which complaints against public
officials and employees should be presented and
prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by
law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing
procedural rules with respect to the presentation of
administrative charges against erring government
officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but
restatements thereof. That presidential appointees are
subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President,
for instance, is a reecho of the long-standing doctrine
that the President exercises the power of control over his
appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding
subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33
of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act (of 1959)
then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the proper Head
of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to
investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary
action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against
elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the
Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges
against any elective provincial and city officials shall be
preferred before the President of the Philippines; against
any elective municipal official before the provincial
governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before
the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the
provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a
"Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and
decide complaints against members of the Philippine
police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative
apparatus in the matter of complaints against public
officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no
reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal)
recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary
measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a
condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court
resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s]
[being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties,
" 17 but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings
such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior
administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted
that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification,
"after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to
previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in
question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it
were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would
have employed such technical terms as "accused",
"convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in
construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional
implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted.
For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the
1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested
exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential
lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If
we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would
be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act
No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations then in
effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional
anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the
personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to
bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft
League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate
the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by
the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The
rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be
filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person.
20
The "complaint" referred to in the
Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the
fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the
aggrieved party himself.
21

For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by
complaint or information, both of which are filed in
court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the
offended party; with respect to an information, it is the
fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal
prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary
restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced
as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the
petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162
refer invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the
Revised Penal Code. That does not, however, make such
charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in
general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic
Act No. 3019; exerting influence upon the presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over
which the provincial government itself lays claims,
contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019; and making untruthful statements in the
certificates of appointment of certain employees in his
office. On the other hand, the complaints subject matter
of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of simulating bids for
the supply of gravel and sand for certain public works
projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;
manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the
capitol building; testifying falsely in connection with
Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in
which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a
piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of
the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids for the
supply of gravel and sand in connection with another
public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are
characterized by major differences. When, therefore, we
restrained further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and
4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not consequently
stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-
ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the
same proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the
complaints in question are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the
disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this
case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a
general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal
prosecutions.
22
The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit:
(1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4)
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and
(5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm
or otherwise void.
23
We cannot perceive any of the
exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a
manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of
complaints commenced by the private respondent below,
but whether or not they were filed for harassment
purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide.
The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's
complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he
wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON
BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO,
EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY,
FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO,
MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON,
ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA,
ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA,
REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,
ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y
ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y
FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and
PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office
of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal
of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et
al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-
46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First
Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17
Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8
Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with
Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them the details of which will be recounted
below an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it
failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient
in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the
central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all
other corollary matters not being indispensable for the
moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the
Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y
DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential
Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control one
(1) carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a
wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of
11- inches, which the said accused carried outside of
his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being
used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for
the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon
involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed
with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y
AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter
of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated
April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of
his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice
pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the same
not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn
his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded
except for the name of the accused, the date and place of
the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon
involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First
Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus
PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the
Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at
Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called
socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as
could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood,
which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. The Orders of dismissal
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts
concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential element
of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the
carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with
or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried
under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting,
or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in
Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this
specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information
is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to constitute the
offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases
under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult
to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court
upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in
trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten
times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is
back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are
inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the
heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of
this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-
42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the
charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing
premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons
outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by
said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection
or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that
also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons
if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the
aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends
in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made
unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof,
regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon
because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on
his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife
that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same
may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home,
such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty
as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person
cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a
livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in
preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9
were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the
prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President
in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some
unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the
act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable
by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof,
is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder.
(pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded
his order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence
and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a
state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of
wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness
and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of
the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in
the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives
and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall
under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from
five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the
said law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during
martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons
is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their
farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity
would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19,
rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given
before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the
Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at
the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases
where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their
immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed
by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are
charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL
ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY,
TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state
of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General
Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No.
7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in
older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and
decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is
unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or
their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in
death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against
persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim used in
violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may
direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board
of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private
firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or
knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades,
rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to,
"pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients
in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by
fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all
or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures
are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or
of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to
fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo,"
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and
while being used in connection therewith; and any person found
guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and
3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided
for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders
of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities;
that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized
for reasons of public policy.
1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in
statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is
immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the
carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the
crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in
general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-
martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.
2

E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be
sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the
statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the
specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the
charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification
of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the
order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly
weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly
weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by
a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by
Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in
turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or
imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the
discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his
person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any
kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any
public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law
violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between
the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on
the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime
and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute
and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3).
5
P. D.
9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal
by implication is not favored.
6
This principle holds true with
greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused.
7
In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or
non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting
fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential
decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an
accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an
easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action a fear understandably shared by
respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are
daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged
in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a
violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the
offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc.
not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or
punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without
that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance
or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and
all situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of
"statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial
task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the
measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a
presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is
the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within
the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if
strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions.
8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or
reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated
September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081
as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly
mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public
disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential
part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that
the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed
limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text
itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains
the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115,
rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of
the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects
which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in
Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of
interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16
N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et
al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must
be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and
not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a
word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an
apparently general provision may have a limited application if read
together with other provisions.
9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within
its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause,
the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in
order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and
decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are
those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer
to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which
refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation
1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted
hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms
against our duly constituted government and against our people, and
having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection
and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons,
destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which
activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public
order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state
of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and
destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the
forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's
Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated
forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and
depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid
lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will
not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have
fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing
political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present
duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on
the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-
quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent
of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American
Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis
supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to
its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060;
emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire
into the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter
of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended
by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.
9
-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the
President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or
an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on
another, and so on.
10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the
following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult
to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court
upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9,
that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in
trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten
times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73,
rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his
example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a
lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to
return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30
meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman.
The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places
him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3).
Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such
absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited."
11
The purpose is not
to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.
12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this
manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor
should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so
by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the
rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as
an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v.
Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged
in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a
sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is
determined solely by the facts alleged therein.
13
Where the facts are
incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing
of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when
the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is
charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information
that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal.
14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar
Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an
order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the
facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section
1, Republic Act 145.
15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.
If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another
information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such
order is not made or if having been made another information is not
filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further
time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if
in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on
some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of
the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have
filed an amended Information to include the second element of the
offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We
have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but
the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Information.
16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a
complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier,
or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the
dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a
motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information
is barred only when the criminal action or liability had been
extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was
granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be
filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities
and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office
they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith
in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a
fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of
P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and
justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the
severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A.
Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15,
1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he
stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so
that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those
whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may
not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D.
No. 9.
17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire
into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and
prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and
letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual
guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its
implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and
unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of
oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their
government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and
We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or
quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our
observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision
regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an
amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph
3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the
facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83736 January 15, 1992
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
TMX SALES, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
F.R. Quiogue for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a case involving corporate quarterly income tax, does
the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of
erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292
(now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue
Code commence to run from the date the quarterly
income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner, or
from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return
(final payment), as claimed by the private respondent?
Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal
Revenue Code provides:
Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any national internal revenue tax
hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or
not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest
or duress.
In any case no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the
expiration of two years from the date of payment of that tax or
penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic
corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return for the
first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31,
and consequently paying an income tax thereon of
P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent
quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so
that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income
Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it
declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total
deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of
P6,156,525.00 (CTA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 45-46).
Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its
external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the Appellate
Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for
refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing
overpaid income tax. (Rollo, p. 30)
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc.
filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax
Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
praying that the petitioner, as private respondent therein,
be ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of
P247,010.00, representing overpaid income tax for the
taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
In his answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
averred that "granting, without admitting, the amount in
question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is
already barred from claiming the same considering that
more than two (2) years had already elapsed between the
payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in
Court (March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax
Code of 1977, as amended)."
On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a
decision granting the petition of TMX Sales, Inc. and
ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
refund the amount claimed.
The Tax Court, in granting the petition, viewed the
quarterly income tax paid as a portion or installment of
the total annual income tax due. Said the Tax Court in its
assailed decision:
xxx xxx xxx
When a tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period
of two years provided in Section 306 (now Section 292)
of the Revenue Code should be counted from the date of
the final payment or last installment. . . . This rule
proceeds from the theory that in contemplation of tax
laws, there is no payment until the whole or entire tax
liability is completely paid. Thus, a payment of a part or
portion thereof, cannot operate to start the
commencement of the statute of limitations. In this
regard the word "tax" or words "the tax" in statutory
provisions comparable to section 306 of our Revenue
Code have been uniformly held to refer to the entire tax
and not a portion thereof (Clark v. U.S., 69 F. 2d 748;
A.S. Kriedner Co. v. U.S., 30 F Supp. 274; Hills v. U.S.,
50 F 2d 302, 55 F 2d 1001), and the vocable "payment of
tax" within statutes requiring refund claim, refer to the
date when all the tax was paid, not when a portion was
paid (Braun v. U.S., 8 F supp. 860, 863; Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Prieto, 2 SCRA 1007; Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Palanca, 18 SCRA 496).
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is now
before this Court seeking a reversal of the above
decision. Thru the Solicitor General, he contends that the
basis in computing the two-year period of prescription
provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax
Code, should be May 15, 1981, the date when the
quarterly income tax was paid and not April 15, 1982,
when the Final Adjustment Return for the year ended
December 31, 1981 was filed.
He cites the case of Pacific Procon Limited v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 68013, November 12, 1984)
involving a similar set of facts, wherein this Court in a
minute resolution affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision denying the claim for refund of the petitioner
therein for being barred by prescription.
A re-examination of the aforesaid minute resolution of
the Court in the Pacific Procon case is warranted under the
circumstances to lay down a categorical pronouncement
on the question as to when the two-year prescriptive
period in cases of quarterly corporate income tax
commences to run. A full-blown decision in this regard is
rendered more imperative in the light of the reversal by
the Court of Tax Appeals in the instant case of its
previous ruling in thePacific Procon case.
Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal
Revenue Code should be interpreted in relation to the
other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect
to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law
which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. In the
case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court
stated that statutes should receive a sensible construction,
such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS
SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR
INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general
legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order
to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a
particular provision thereof, should be considered.
(Manila Lodge No. 761, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
73 SCRA 162 [1976]) Every section, provision or clause
of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part
of the act is to be taken into view. (Chartered Bank v.
Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 [1921]; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino,
47 Phil. 249, cited in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v.
City of Cebu, 13 SCRA 449 [1965]).
Thus, in resolving the instant case, it is necessary that we
consider not only Section 292 (now Section 230) of the
National Internal Revenue Code but also the other
provisions of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 84, 85
(now both incorporated as Section 68), Section 86 (now
Section 70) and Section 87 (now Section 69) on Quarterly
Corporate Income Tax Payment and Section 321 (now
Section 232) on keeping of books of accounts. All these
provisions of the Tax Code should be harmonized with
each other.
Section 292 (now Section 230) provides a two-year
prescriptive period to file a suit for a refund of a tax
erroneously or illegally paid, counted from the tile the tax
was paid. But a literal application of this provision in the
case at bar which involves quarterly income tax payments
may lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
Section 85 (now Section 68) provides for the method of
computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on a
cumulative basis, to wit:
Sec. 85. Method of computing corporate quarterly income tax.
Every corporation shall file in duplicate a quarterly
summary declaration of its gross income and deductions on a
cumulative basis for the preceding quarter or quarters upon
which the income tax, as provided in Title II of this Code
shall be levied, collected and paid. The tax so computed shall
be decreased by the amount of tax previously paid or assessed during
the preceding quarters and shall be paid not later than sixty
(60) days from the close of each of the first three (3)
quarters of the taxable year, whether calendar or fiscal
year. (Emphasis supplied)
while Section 87 (now Section 69) requires the filing of
an adjustment returns and final payment of income tax,
thus:
Sec. 87. Filing of adjustment returns final payment of income tax.
On or before the fifteenth day of April or on or
before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following
the close of the fiscal year, every taxpayer covered by this
Chapter shall file an Adjustment Return covering the total net
taxable income of the preceding calendar or fiscal year and if the
sum of the quarterly tax payments made during that year is not
equal to the tax due on the entire net taxable income of that year
the corporation shall either (a) pay the excess tax still due or (b) be
refunded the excess amount paid as the case may be. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by
private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its
Adjustment Return required in Section 87 (now Section
69), is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter.
A literal application of Section 292 (now Section 230)
would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive
period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax
was paid can be easily determined. However, if the
quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be
ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292
(Section 230) would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
The following application of Section 85 (now Section 68)
clearly illustrates this point:
FIRST QUARTER:
Gross Income 100,000.00
Less: Deductions 50,000.00

Net Taxable Income 50,000.00
=========
Tax Due & Paid [Sec. 24 NIRC (25%)] 12,500.00
=========
SECOND QUARTER:
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00 150,000.00

Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00 125,000.00

Net Taxable Income 25,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 6,250.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00

Creditable Income Tax (6,250.00)

THIRD QUARTER:
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00
3rd Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00

Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00
3rd Quarter 25,000.00 150,000.00

100,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 25,000.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
2nd Quarter 12,500.00
=========
FOURTH QUARTER: (Adjustment Return required in
Sec. 87)
Gross Income 1st Quarter 100,000.00
2nd Quarter 50,000.00
3rd Quarter 100,000.00
4th Quarter 75,000.00 325,000.00

Less: Deductions 1st Quarter 50,000.00
2nd Quarter 75,000.00
3rd Quarter 25,000.00
4th Quarter 100,000.00 250,000.00

Net Taxable Income 75,000.00
=========
Tax Due Thereon 18,750.00
Less: Tax Paid 1st Quarter 12,500.00
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter 12,500.00 25,000.00

Creditable Income Tax (to be REFUNDED) (6,250.00)
=========
Based on the above hypothetical data appearing in the
Final Adjustment Return, the taxpayer is entitled under
Section 87 (now Section 69) of the Tax Code to a refund
of P6,250.00. If Section 292 (now Section 230) is literally
applied, what then is the reckoning date in computing the
two-year prescriptive period? Will it be the 1st quarter
when the taxpayer paid P12,500.00 or the 3rd quarter
when the taxpayer also paid P12,500.00? Obviously, the
most reasonable and logical application of the law would
be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the
time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if
the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he
is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.
Furthermore, Section 321 (now Section 232) of the
National Internal Revenue Code requires that the books
of accounts of companies or persons with gross quarterly
sales or earnings exceeding Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) be audited and examined yearly by an
independent Certified Public Accountant and their
income tax returns be accompanied by certified balance
sheets, profit and loss statements, schedules listing
income producing properties and the corresponding
incomes therefrom and other related statements.
It is generally recognized that before an accountant can
make a certification on the financial statements or render
an auditor's opinion, an audit of the books of accounts
has to be conducted in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards.
Since the audit, as required by Section 321 (now Section
232) of the Tax Code is to be conducted yearly, then it is
the Final Adjustment Return, where the figures of the
gross receipts and deductions have been audited and
adjusted, that is truly reflective of the results of the
operations of a business enterprise. Thus, it is only when
the Adjustment Return covering the whole year is filed
that the taxpayer would know whether a tax is still due or
a refund can be claimed based on the adjusted and
audited figures.
Therefore, the filing of quarterly income tax returns
required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and implemented
per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income
tax should only be considered mere installments of the
annual tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are
computed based on the cumulative figures of gross
receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable
income, should be treated as advances or portions of the
annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the
calendar or fiscal year. This is reinforced by Section 87
(now Section 69) which provides for the filing of
adjustment returns and final payment of income tax.
Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period provided
in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax Code should
be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment
Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment
of income tax.
In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Prieto (2
SCRA 1007 [1961]), this Court held that when a tax is
paid in installments, the prescriptive period of two years
provided in Section 306 (Section 292) of the National
internal Revenue Code should be counted from the date
of the final payment. This ruling is reiterated
in Commission of Internal Revenue v. Carlos Palanca (18 SCRA
496 [1966]), wherein this Court stated that where the tax
account was paid on installment, the computation of the
two-year prescriptive period under Section 306 (Section
292) of the Tax Code, should be from the date of the last
installment.
In the instant case, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a
refund on March 14, 1984. Since the two-year
prescriptive period should be counted from the filing of
the Adjustment Return on April 15, 1982, TMX Sales,
Inc. is not yet barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor
Ceferino Padua for plaintiff-appellee. Estanislao A. Fernandez for
defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo
Subido, denying defendant-appellant's motion for the
cancellation of his appeal bond and declaring him to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay
the fine and indemnity.
From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused
guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the
law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to
indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in
the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an appeal
to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said
judgment in the following tenor:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for
the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment
are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of
the case that the imposition of the corresponding penalty
should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this
reason, we impose upon accused-appellant a fine of
P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by
appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications above indicated,
the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
costs.
In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for
execution of the judgment.
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a
motion with the trial court praying that (1) the court
enter of record that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal
bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that
although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he
could not be required to serve the amount of fine and
indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment
because said judgment did not expressly and specifically
provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in
form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended
party the lower court issued a writ of execution of its
judgment. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied.
On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila,
armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever
rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant
Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building
situated at No. 2313 Suter, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. However, it turned out that the
property levied upon be the sheriff was registered in the
name of Agapito Subido who, upon learning of the levy,
immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriff's
office and instituted an action in the lower court (Civil
Case No. 41731) to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from
proceeding with the sale of his property. In the meantime
the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the sale of property levied upon by the sheriff.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its
opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation
of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require
accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the
indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order
denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared that
in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine
and indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accused-
appellant moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied on December 26, 1959.
Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of
December 19 and 26.
In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower
court erred
I
IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF
INSOLVENCY.
II
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL LIABILITY
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN
SATISFIED WITH THE ATTACHMENT SECURED
BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.
1

The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the
accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
"a libel committed by means of writing, printing,
litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any
similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200
to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party". It is
evident from the foregoing provision that the court is
given the discretion to impose the penalty of
imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It
will be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon
the accused: three months of arresto mayor; a fine of
P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the
sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3)
months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of
P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:
However, in the application of the penalty provided for
in the violation of the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment
are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of
the same, that the imposition of the corresponding
penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For
this reason we impose the accused a fine of P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by
appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated,
the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
cost.
To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided
in the concluding portion of its decision:
WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated,
the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's
costs
the alluded modifications could mean no less than the
elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the
reduction of the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the
rest of the punishment remains including the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court
wanted to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine
and the indemnity it would have so expressly provided.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals
that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency" is separated by a comma (,) from the
preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months
of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to
pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify
the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a
comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make "the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not
only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-
payment of the fine.
If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to
non-payment of indemnity only and not to the non-
payment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma
(,), after the phrase "to indemnify the offended party,
Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00
pesos," so that the decision of the lower court would
read:
From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused
guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of five hundred
(P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt
that the lower court would want to make accused-
appellant serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court
would want accused-appellant to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity
only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fine. Accordingly if according to the
lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to
pay the fine and the indemnity and the only
modifications made by the Court of Appeals are to
eliminate the three (3) months of arresto mayor and to
reduce the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by
force of logic and reason, the fine of P5000.00, the
reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency should stand.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the
retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an
accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay his civil liability.
2

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.
3
In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it
careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as
to safeguard the rights of the defendant.
4
Considering
that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be
made applicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code that:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving sentence.
Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be
required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in
form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability
has been satisfied with the attachment secured by the
offended party on the property of Agapito Subido,
wherein he is supposed to have an interest. He therefore
argues that until the final determinations of Civil Case
No. 71731 which Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the
Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with the sale of his
property, accused-appellant's liability for subsidiary
imprisonment cannot attach as the determination of
whether the accused is solvent or not is a prejudicial
question which must first be determined before
subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed.
We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a
satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the
accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies
when the offender is insolvent as shown in the present
case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary
imprisonment may attach, there must be prior
determination of the question of solvency of the accused.
The moment he cannot pay the fine, that means he is
insolvent and he must serve the same in form of
subsidiary imprisonment. So accused-appellant has to
choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the
modification that accused-appellant may no longer be
required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the
judgment below, the Orders of the lower court dated
December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendant-appellant's
motion for cancellation of appeal bond and sentencing
him to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the fine imposed by said judgment, are
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA
ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO,
MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO,
BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE
DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA
DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970
HILARIO AGUILA and ADELA
HIDALGO, petitioners,
vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO,
MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO,
BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE
DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA
DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, respondents.
Jose O. Lara for petitioners.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of
Agrarian Relations dismissing petitioners' actions
as sharetenants for the enforcerment of the right to
redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of section
12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. As the same
issue of law is involved and the original landowner and
vendees in both cases are the same, the two cases are
herein jointly decided.
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time
of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27,
1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-
named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-
square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels
of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, described in
the decisions under review.
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-
square meter parcel of land, together with two other
parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses
Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof,
alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly
worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective
areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of
three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a
deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by
respondents-vendees
1
in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-
square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-
spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants
thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a
deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by
respondents-vendees in their favor.
As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties
stipulated on the facts in both cases, petitioners-tenants
have for several years been working on the lands
as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the
lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption
prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8,
1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-
tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by
respondent-vendor were registered by respondents
register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in
the records of their respective offices notwithstanding
the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit
required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.
2
The
actions for redemption were timely filled on March 26,
1965 by petitioners-tenants within the two-year
prescriptive period from registration of the sale,
prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.
The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two
identical decisions dismissing the petitions for
redemption.
It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows:
"(T)he only issue in this case is whether or not plaintiffs,
asshare tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land
they are working from the purchasers thereof, where no
notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who
was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the
property and where the vendor did not execute the
affidavit required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844
before the registration of the deed of sale. In other
words, is the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of
Republic Act No. 3844 applicable to share tenants?"
But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and
premises, it arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the
right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land
Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not
toshare tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions: "(S)ec 12
of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter I
of said Act, under the heading
'Agricultural Leasehold System,' reads as follows:
'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have
the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two
or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said
right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this
Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any
other right of legal redemption.'
The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this
jurisdiction are share tenancy and leaseholdtenancy. (Sec. 4,
Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844).
A share tenant is altogether different from
a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and
obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22
to 41, inclusive, and Secs. 42 to 48, inclusive, of Republic
Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38, inclusive, of
Republic Act No. 3844).
It is our considered view that the right of redemption
granted by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is
applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not
to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly,
definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the
'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else. In enacting the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, Congress was fully
aware of the existence of sharetenancy and in fact
provided for the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy
system. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844.) If it were the
intention of Congress to grant the right of redemption
to sharetenants, it would have unmistakably and
unequivocally done so. We cannot extend said right
to sharetenants through judicial legislation, wherever our
sympathies may lie.
The agrarian court fell into several erroneous
assumptions and premises in holding that
agricultural share tenancy remains recognized in this
jurisdiction; that "a share tenant is altogether different
from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and
obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal"; and that
the right of redemption granted by section 12 of the
Land Reform Code" is applicable to leasehold tenants only,
but not to share tenants, because said provision of law
clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to
the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody else."
1. The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as
proclaimed in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly
outlaws agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public
policy" and decrees its abolition. 3 Section 2 of the Code
expressly declares it to be the policy of the State, inter alia,
"to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and,
as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development; to achieve a dignified existence
for thesmall farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices; ... and to make the small
farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of strength in our democratic
society."
4
It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to
state the premise after the Land Reform Code had
already been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural
tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the
premise is that based on the transitory provision in the
first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that
existingshare tenancy contracts are allowed to continue
temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their
express abolition, until whichever of the following events
occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when
the National Land Reform Council makes the
proclamation declaring the region or locality a land
reform area; or (b) the shorter period provided in
the sharetenancy contracts expires; or (c) the share tenant
sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.
In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy
contracts whether by contractual stipulation or the
tenant's exercise of his option to elect the leasehold system
instead or by virtue of their nullity occuring before the
proclamation of the locality as a land reform area, the
same section 4 has further declared in the third proviso
thereof that in such event, the tenant shall continue in
possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall be
presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the
provisions of this Code."
2. The foregoing exposes the error of the agrarian court's
corollary premise that "a share tenant is altogether
different from a leasehold tenant." The agrarian court's
dictum that "their respective rights and obligations are
not co-extensive or co-equal "refer to
their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect
to the contributions given, management, division or
payment of the produce.
5

But the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law,
between the landowner and the farmer be
a leaseholdtenant or temporarily a share tenant
a vinculum juris with certain vital juridical consequences,
such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's
right to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or
transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more
basically, the farmer's pre-emptiveright to buy the land he
cultivates under section 11 of the Code
6
as well as the
right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without
his knowledge, under section 12 of the Code.
This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the
Code to implement the state's policy of establishing
owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-
reliant existence for the small farmers that would make
them a pillar of strength of our Republic. Aside from
expropriation by the Land Authority of private
agricultural land for resale in economic family-size farm
units "to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified
farmers,"
7
the purchase by farmers of the lands
cultivated by them, when the owner decides to sell the
same through rights of pre-emption and redemption
are the only means prescribed by the Code to achieve
the declared policy of the State.
3. The agrarian court therefore facilely let itself fall into
the error of concluding that the right of redemption (as
well as necessarily the right of pre-emption) imposed by
the Code is available to leasehold tenants only and
excludesshare tenants for the literal reason that the Code
grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to
nobody else." For one, it immediately comes to mind that
the Code did not mention tenants,
whether leasehold or sharetenants, because it
outlaws share tenancy and envisions the
agricultural leasehold system as its replacement. Thus,
Chapter I of the Code, comprising sections 4 to 38,
extensively deals with the establishment of
"agriculturalleasehold relation," defines the parties thereto
and the rights and obligations of the "agricultural lessor"
and of the "agricultural lessee" (without the slightest
mention of leasehold tenants) and the statutory
consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the
lessee. There is a studied omission in the Code of the use
of the term tenant in deference to the "abolition of
tenancy" as proclaimed in the very title of the Code, and
the elevation of the tenant's status to that of lessee.
Then, the terms "agricultural lessor" and "agricultural
lessee" are consistently used throughout the Chapter and
carried over the particular sections (11 and 12) on pre-
emption and redemption. The agrarian court's literal
construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the
proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of
the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the
farmers, who invariably were all share tenants before the
enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now
uplift to the status of lessees.
A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in
section 11 providing that "In case the agricultural
lessor decides to sell the landholding the agricultural
lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same
under reasonable terms and conditions." It will be seen
that the term "agricultural lessor" is here used
interchangeably with the term "landowner"; which
conflicts with the Code's definition of "agricultural lessor"
to mean "a person natural or juridical, who, either as
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor,
lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of his
land for a price certains." 8 Obviously, the Code precisely
referred to the "agricultural lessor (who) decides to sell
the landholding," when it could have more precisely
referred to the "landowner," who alone as such, rather than
a civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor, could
sell the landholding, but it certainly cannot be logically
contended that the imprecision should defeat the clear
spirit and intent of the provision.
4. We have, here, then a case of where the true intent of
the law is clear that calls for the application of the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or
spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is
within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.
Section 11 of the Code providing for the "agricultural
lessee's" preferential right to buy the land he cultivates
provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered
for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the
landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees
object to such acquisition," presumably for being beyond
their capabilities. Taken together with the provisions of
Chapter III of the Code on the organization and
functions of the Land Authority and Chapter VII on the
Land Project Administration and the creation and
functions of the National Land Reform Council, (in
which chapters the legislature obviously was not laboring
under the inhibition of referring to the term tenants as it
was in Chapter I establishing the agricultural leasehold
system and decreeing the abolition of share tenancy, 9 the
Code's intent, policy and objective to give both
agricultural lessees and farmers who transitionally
continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the Code's
enactment, the same priority and preferential rights over
the lands under their cultivation, in the event of
acquisition of the lands, by expropriation or voluntary
sale, for distribution or resale that may be initiated by the
Land Authority or the National Land Reform Council,
are clearly and expressly stated.
Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the
responsibility of the Land Authority "(1) To initiate and
prosecute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition
of private agricultural lands as defined in Section one
hundred sixty-six of chapter XI of this Code for the
purpose of subdivision into economic family size farm
units and resale of said farm units to bona fide tenants,
occupants and qualified farmers ... and "(2) To help bona fide
farmers without lands of agricultural owner-cultivators of
uneconomic-size farms to acquire and own economic
family-size farm units ...."
Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in
enjoining the National Land Reform Council to
formulate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement the Code's provisions for selection of
agricultural land to be acquired and distributed and of the
beneficiaries of the family farms, ordains the giving of the
same priority "to the actual occupants personally
cultivating the land either as agricultural lessees or
otherwise with respect to the area under their
cultivation."
5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions
and injustice if a share tenant would be denied the rights
of pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to
exercise on his own resources, notwithstanding that the
National Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed
that all the government machineries and agencies in the
region or locality envisioned in the Code are operating
which machineries and agencies, particularly, the Land
Bank were precisely created "to finance the acquisition by
the Government of landed estates for division and resale
to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee from the
landowner."
10
The non-operation in the interval of the
Land Bank and the government machineries and agencies
in the region which are envisioned in the Code to assist
the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of tenancy and
afford him the financial assistance to exercise his option
of electing the leasehold system and his preferential right
of purchasing the land cultivated by him could not
possibly have been intended by Congress to prevent the
exercise of any of these vital rights by a share tenant who
is able to do so, e.g. to purchase the land, on his own and
without government assistance. It would be absurd and
unjust that while the government is unable to render such
assistance, the share tenant would be deemed deprived of
the very rights granted him by the Code which he is in a
position to exercise even without government assistance.
6. Herein lies the distinction between the present case
and Basbas vs. Entena
11
where the Court upheld the
agrarian court's dismissal of the therein tenant's action to
redeem the landholding sold to a third party by virtue of
the tenant's failure to tender payment or consign the
purchase price of the property. There, the tenant-
redemptioner was shown by the evidence to have no
funds and had merely applied for them to the Land
Authority which was not yet operating in the locality and
hence, the Court held that no part of the Code "indicates
or even hints that the 2-year redemption period will not
commence to run (indefinitely) until the tenant obtains
financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from
securing redemption funds from some other source."
12
In the
present case, the petitioners-tenants' possession of funds
and compliance with the requirements of redemption are
not questioned, the case having been submitted and
decided on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption
being available to them as share tenants. The clear and
logical implication of Basbas is where the tenant has his
own resources or secures redemption funds from sources
other than the Land Bank or government agencies under
the Code, the fact that the locality has not been
proclaimed a land reform area and that such government
machineries and agencies are not operating therein is of
no relevance and cannot prejudice the tenant's rights
under the Code to redeem the landholding.
7. Even from the landowner's practical and equitable
viewpoint, the landowner is not prejudiced in the least by
recognizing the share tenant's right of redemption. The
landowner, having decided to sell his land, has gotten his
price therefor from his vendees. (The same holds true in
case of the tenant's exercise of the pre-emptive right by
the tenant who is called upon to pay the landowner the
price, if reasonable, within ninety days from the
landowner's written notice.) As for the vendees, neither
are they prejudiced for they will get back from the tenant-
redemptioner the price that they paid the vendor, if
reasonable, since the Code grants the agricultural lessee
or tenant the top priority of redemption of the
landholding cultivated by him and expressly decrees that
the same "shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption." In the absence of any provision in the Code
as to manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a
suppletory character.
13
Hence, the vendees would be
entitled to receive from the redemptioners the amount of
their purchase besides "(1) the expenses of the contract,
and any other legitimate payments made by reason of the
sale; (and) (2) the necessary and useful expenses made on
the thing sold."
14

8. The historical background for the enactment of the
Code's provisions on pre-emption and redemption
further strengthens the Court's opinion. It is noted by
Dean Montemayor
15
that "(T)his is a new right which
has not been granted to tenants under the Agricultural
Tenancy Act. It further bolsters the security of tenure of
the agricultural lessee and further encourages agricultural
lessees to become owner-cultivators.
In the past, a landlord often ostensibly sold his land being
cultivated by his tenant to another tenant, who in turn
filed a petition for ejectment against the first tenant on
the ground of personal cultivation. While many of such
sales were simulated, there was a formal transfer of title
in every case, and the first tenant was invariably ordered
ejected.
There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale
by the landowner to another tenant,
16
in order to effect
the ejectment of petitioners-tenants. This is further
bolstered by the fact that the sales were executed by
respondent-vendor on September 27, 1963 and March 2,
1954 shortly after the enactment on August 8, 1963 of
the Land Reform Code which furnishes still another
reason for upholding ... petitioners-tenants' right of
redemption, for certainly a landowner cannot be
permitted to defeat the Code's clear intent by
precipitately disposing of his lands, even before the
tenant has been given the time to exercise his newly
granted option to elect the new agricultural leasehold
system established by the Code as a replacement for
the share tenancy outlawed by it.
9. Clearly then, the Code intended, as above discussed, to
afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be
share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably
would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's
proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the
enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier
converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to
acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of
their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition,
by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It
then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and
will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention
of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Taada vs.
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.)
A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or
intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of
the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to
'its intent.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
100 Phil. 850)."
17
The Court has consistently held in line
with authoritative principles of statutory construction
that, it will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such
as that given by the agrarian court, that would defeat and
frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law's
declared policy and intent.
18
Finally, under the
established jurisprudence of the Court, in the
interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, it will be
guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the
law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave
doubts in favor of the tenant and worker.
19

The agrarian court's dismissal of the cases at bar should
therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants' right to
redeem the landholdings recognized section 12 of the
Code.
In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by
respondent-vendor in favor of respondents-vendees for
the price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while
what is sought to be redeemed is only the first parcel of
land of 22,876 square meters, described in the deed.
Petitioners-tenants' allegation that the proportionate
worth of said parcel "taking into account the respective
areas, productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of
the three lots," is P1,500.00, was traversed by
respondents in their answer, with the claim that "the said
land is fairly worth P20,000.00.
20
While the vendor
would be bound by, and cannot claim more than, the
price stated in the deed, and the Code precisely provides
that the farmer shall have "the preferential right to buy
the (landholding) under reasonable terms and conditions" or
"redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration"
21
with
a view to affording the farmer the right to seek judicial
assistance and relief to fix such reasonable price and
terms when the landowner places in the notice to sell or
deed an excessive or exorbitant amount in collusion with
the vendee, we note that in this case the deed of sale
itself acknowledged that the selling price of P4,000.00
therein stated was not the fair price since an additional
consideration therein stated was that the vendees would
support the vendor during his lifetime and take care of
him, should he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of
his burial upon his death:
Ang halagang P4,000.00 ay hindi kaulat sa tunay na halaga
ng mga lupa subalit ang mga bumili ay may katungkulan
na sostentohin ako habang ako'y nabubuhay, ipaanyo at
ipagamot ako kung ako ay may sakit, saka ipalibing ako
kung ako ay mamatay sa kanilang gastos at ito ay isa sa
alang-alang o consideracion ng bilihang ito.
Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did
not rule upon conflicting claims of the parties as to what
was the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the
stated price of P4,000.00 whether P1,500.00 as
claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the
proportionate values of the two other parcels, but the
whole total is not to exceed the stated price of P4,000.00,
since the vendor is bound thereby and likewise, what
was the additional proportionate worth of the expenses
assumed by the vendees, assuming that petitioners are
not willing to assume the same obligation, the case
should be remanded to the agrarian court solely for the
purpose of determining the reasonable price and
consideration to be paid by petitioners for redeeming the
landholding, in accordance with these observations.
In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of
P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional
consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra,
assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are
entitled to redeem the landholding for the same stated
price.
ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are
hereby reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted.
In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the
agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price
to be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees
for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the
observations hereinabove made.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957
SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of
the Philippines,defendants-appellees.
Rogelio M. Jalandoni for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jose
P. Alejandro for appellee, Vicente Gella.
Nat. M. Balbao and F. E. Evangelista for appellee, Central
Bank of the Philippines.
BENGZON, J.:
The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may
be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by
Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9,
1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa
beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17
per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from
said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central
Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended
complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance,
wherein defendants submitted in due time a motion to
dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint stated no
cause of action because cocoa beans were not
"chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against the
Government without the latter's consent. .
The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the
motion, and dismissed the case by his order of
November 19, 1954. Hence this appeal.
The lower court, appellant contends, erred in dismissing
the case and in holding that the term "chocolate" does
not include sun dried cocoa beans.
SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax
collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of
costs transportation and/or other charges incident to
importation into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya
beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded
to any importer making application therefor, upon
satisfactory proof of actual importation . . ."
In support of its contention appellant quotes from
dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the
words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice
that the quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut"
"chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal
exemption refers to "chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut
nor the tree. We agree with the Solicitor General and the
other counsel of respondents that in common parlance
the law is presumed to refer to it
1
chocolate is a
manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa
beans, or "cacao" beans as they are locally known. We
may take notice of the fact that grocery stores sell
powdered cocoa beans as chocolate, labeled "cocoa
powder", or simply "cocoa". They are, however, really
chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The manufacture of
chocolate involves several processes, such as selecting
and drying the cocoa beans, then roasting, grinding,
sieving and blending.
2
Cocoa beans do not become
chocolate unless and until they have undergone the
manufacturing processes above described. The first is
raw material, the other finished product.
The courts regard "chocolate" as
"Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao beans
without the abstraction of the butter and always contains
sugar and added cacao butter. Rockwood & Co., vs.
American President Lines, D. C. N. J., 68 F. Supp. 224,
226.
Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled,
crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains no
sugar, and is in general use in families. Sweetened
chocolate is manufactured in the same way but the paste
is mixed wit sugar, and is used by confectioners in
making chocolate confections. In re Schiling, 53 F. 81,
82, 3 C. C. A. 440.
In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the
principle of strict construction of statutes exempting
from taxation,
3
we are of the opinion and so hold, that the
exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does
not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the
other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready
for human consumption; the former is not.
However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954
suit was brought in May 1954 Congress approved
Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting
"cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This shows, maintains the
appellant, the Legislature's intention to include cocoa
beans in the word "chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the
Committee Chairman who reported House Bill No. 2676
which became Republic Act 1197, declared before the
House.
Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, after the
word 'canned', strike out the words, 'fresh, frozen and'
and also the words 'other beef', on line 9 and on the same
line, line 9, after the word 'chocolate', insert the words
'(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ). I am proposing to
insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( )
after the word chocolate, Mr. Speaker, in order to clarify
any doubt and manifest the intention of the past
Congress that the word 'chocolate' should mean 'cocoa
beans.
In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman
could not have spoken of the Congressional intention in
approving Republic Act 601 because he was not a
member of the Congress that passed said Act. Naturally, all
he could state was his own interpretation of such piece of
legislation. Courts do not usually give decisive weight to
one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional
debates concerning the application of existing laws.
4
Yet
even among the legislators taking part in the
consideration of the amendatory statute (Republic Act
1197) the impression prevailed that, as the law then
stood
5
chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted,
but cocoa beans were not. Here are Senator Peralta's
statements during the discussion of the same House Bill
No. 2576:
SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference report
and I am really bound by it, but, Mr. President, a few
hours ago I received some information which maybe the
chairman would like to know, to the effect that we allow
chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come this country
except from the 17 per cent tax when we do not allow
cocoa beans, out of which our local manufacturers can
make chocolate candy, exempted. So why do we not take
off that exemption for chocolate and instead put 'cocoa
beans' so as to benefit our manufacturers of chocolate
candy?
xxx xxx xxx.
Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the chairman, only
I was just wondering if the chairman, might not consider
the fact that in view of the information, this seems to be
inconsistent we allow chocolate to come here exempt and
not exempt cocoa beans which is used by our
manufacturers in making chocolate candy.
And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying, in the same
connection:
MR. PRESIDENT, On the same page (page 1), line 9,
delete "cocoa beans". The text as it came to the
Senate was misleading. In the original law the exemption is
for chocolate and the version that we got from the Lower
House is "(cocoa beans)" giving the impression that chocolate
and cocoa beans are synonymous. Now I think this is a sort
of a rider, so your committee recommends the deletion of
those words. (Journal of the Senate, July 30, 1954, re H.
B. No. 2576, Emphasis ours.)
Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the
briefs would seem to show that in approving House Bill
No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa
beans" instead of chocolate with a view to favoring
localmanufacturers of chocolate products.
6
A change of
legislative policy, as appellees contend
7
not a
declaration or clarification of previous Congressional
purpose. In fact, as indicating, the Government's new
policy of exempting for the first time importations of
"cocoa beans," there is the President's proclamation No.
62 of September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption (of
cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3,
1954 not before. As a general rule, it may be added,
statutes operate prospectively.
Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported
during January-October 1953, i.e. before the exemption
decree.
After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to
express our approval of the lower court's opinion about
plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it
becomes unnecessary to consider the other contention of
defendants that this is a suit against the Government
without its consent.
The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col.
ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY
MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N.
LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES
ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO
GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo
C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey
Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital;
Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez,
Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental
Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp.
2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon
the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording
petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges
filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for
manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents'
Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners
filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130);
Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and
an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring
developments that transpired after the filing of the
petition and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to
REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the
meantime, theSTATUS QUO pending filing of
comments by said respondents on the original
supplemental manifestation" (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to
direct respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192,
Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1,
1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health
to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental
Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation.
Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the
lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them
(Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the "Omnibus
Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings
filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051
against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of
petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing
their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly
defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate,
maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order
of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of
the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp.
259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious
falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing
subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in
their pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo,
pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a
"Manifestation and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22
September 1992 Resolution'" (Manifestation attached
to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614
thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted
its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a)
"despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992
Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status
quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b)
the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension,
the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to
hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving
the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace
petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated
by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment attached
to Rollowithout paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present
controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the
filing of the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein
petitioners were then actually occupying their respective
positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be
allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they
may be lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or
any and all persons acting under their authority desist and
refrain from performing any act in violation of the
aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992 until
further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p.
615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General,
commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and
Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The
authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend
suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and
(b) "Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly
suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such
powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the
instant case" (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners
adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or
employees connected with his office. Petitioners also
refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners'
counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached
to Rollo without pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman
has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent
Motion to LiftStatus Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp.
10-11), invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if
in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of
the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive
suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the
petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the
departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office.
Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension
himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
haveinter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of
the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct
powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against public officials or employees at
fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension,
demotion fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel
compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren
call that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that
what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a
punitive but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the
power "to recommend the suspension" of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
"suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word "suspension" in said provision
referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal,
demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis,
the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as
the other words with which it is associated. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific
by considering the company of terms in which it is found
or with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez
Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with
the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him
to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and
efficient manner, he may need to suspend the
respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent;
the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman
should be given the discretion to decide when the
persons facing administrative charges should be
preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461;
Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in
determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is
imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public or
for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz
Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp.
496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal
cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted
liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution.
Such being the case, said statute, particularly its
provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such
interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and
objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that
will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be
avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it
was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d)
213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E.,
438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court,
holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty,
said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of
acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only
preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General
leans heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or
employee under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with
preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of
a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or
employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2266), which superseded Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or
employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government
officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No.
805), concurrently with the President, the Department
Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the
phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau"
was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his
authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only
mentions that the proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend "any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation . .
." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the
proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend
any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
"subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to
read "suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion
that can be deduced from the deletion of the word
"subordinate" before and the words "in his bureau" after
"officer or employee" is that the Congress intended to
empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all
officials and employees under investigation by his office,
irrespective of whether they are employed "in his office"
or in other offices of the government. The moment a
criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the
Ombudsman, the respondent therein is deemed to be "in
his authority" and he can proceed to determine whether
said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
suspension order without affording petitioners the
opportunity to confront the charges against them during
the preliminary conference and even after petitioners had
asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and
Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners,
the Solicitor General contends that assuming arguendo that
the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend
erring public officials and employees who are working in
other departments and offices, the questioned order
remains null and void for his failure to comply with the
requisites in Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law
(Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the
questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued
even without a full-blown hearing and the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra,
petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of
Health could not preventively suspend him before he
could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed
perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out
was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera,
there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer
pending his investigation and before tho charges against
him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia.,supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive
suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is
strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to
preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining
authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative
complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued
the order of preventive suspension only after: (a)
petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive
Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated the
charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3,
Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex 4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to
the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of
harassment by petitioners of the members of the private
respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative
case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their
list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo,
pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their
list of exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo,
pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that
Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in
recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can
it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their
recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing
their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive
suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261).
The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was
filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the
acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were
legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the
validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of
their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the
intemperate language used by counsel for private
respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel
(Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent"
"Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to
Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental
Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or
written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral
attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive
language by counsel against the opposing counsel
constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of
the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned
language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more
heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place
in the instant special civil action, which is confined to
questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the
purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of
judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar
separate and apart from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and
the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1954 March
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence Phil. Rep. Vol.
94
G.R. No. L-6835, People v. Yadao et al., 94 Phil. 726
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 30, 1954
G.R. No. L-6835
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
FAUSTO YADAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor
Augusto M. Luciano for appellant.
Jose T. Cajulis for appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
The sole question for decision is whether the information
filed against defendant-appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal sufficiently describes a violation of
section 1 of Republic Act No. 145, which reads as
follows:
Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation,
presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits
under the laws of the United States administered by the
United States Veterans Administration, who shall,
directly or indirectly, solicit, contract, for charge, or
receive, or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for,
charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding
twenty pesos in any one claim, or who shall collect his fee
before the claim is actually paid to a beneficiary or
claimant, shall be deemed guilty of an offense and upon
conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not
exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Said information alleges that defendants conspiring
together, willfully did "offer to assist one Floverto Jazmin
in the prosecution and expeditious approval of his
legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits under the laws of
the United States administered in the Philippines by the
United States Veterans Administration, and as
consideration for which, said accused directly solicited
and/or charged said Floverto Jazmin as fee or
compensation the sum of P800 which is in excess of the
lawful charge of P20 in any one claim." The Honorable
Julio Villamor, Judge, upheld a motion to quash, on the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a public
offense. Hence this appeal by the prosecution, raising the
juridical issue above stated. It is clear, in our opinion, that
section 1 of Republic Act 145 punishes:
(a) Any person assisting a claimant etc., . . . who shall
directly or indirectly solicit . . . a fee exceeding twenty
pesos;
(b) Any person assisting a claimant . . . who shall attempt
to solicit, . . . a fee exceeding twenty pesos; and
(c) Any person assisting a claimant . . . who shall collect
his fee before the claim is actually paid.
In all the three instances the person must be one
"assisting" the claimant.
[[
1
]]
The principle "assisting" and
the clause "assisting a claimant in the preparation etc."
qualify "any person" as antecedent of the pronoun "who"
in the phrases, "who shall solicit", "who shall attempt to
solicit" or "who shall collect".
Examining the information, we find it does not aver that
the defendants assisted or were assisting the claimant for
veterans benefits. It merely asserts they offered to assist,
and it is evident that violation is committed only when a
person receives or attempts to solicit etc. more than is
permitted by law. One who offers to assist, but does not
assist, is not included within the penal prohibition, which
by its nature must be restrictively interpreted, or strictly
construed against the government.
[[
2
]]
Of course there
was an attempt to commit the offense described
by Republic Act No. 145. But the said statute does not
expressly punish attempts to commit the offense, and the
provisions of the Penal Code about attempts (tentativas)
do not apply.
[[
3
]]

The prosecution relies upon Sanchez vs. U.S. 134 Fed.
(2nd) 279, 63 S. Ct. 1325, 319 U.S. 768 wherein this was
said:
A showing that an excessive fee was solicited, contracted
for, charged or received for assistance in preparation and
execution of necessary papers in any application to
Veterans' Administration will support a conviction of
violation of fee limitation for assistance in such
application regardless of whether such assistance was in
fact rendered.
But such adjudication is not conclusive, because the
statute therein construed differs materially from ours. It
punishes "any person who shall directly or indirectly
contract for, charge or receive, or who shall attempt to
solicit, contract for excessive compensation." The section
does not contain the phrase "assisting a claimant" after
the words "any person" and before the words "who shall
etc". That phrase conditions each and every violation of
section 1 of Republic Act No. 145. The appealed decision
quashing the indictment is, therefore, affirmed, without
costs.
G.R. No. 86738 November 13, 1991
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, respondents.
Nepomuceno, Hofilena & Guingona for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:p
Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock
of petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc. ("Nestle") was
increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares
with a par value of P100.00 per share, to P600 million
divided into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00
per share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures
involving Board and stockholders approvals and effected
the necessary filings to secure the approval of the
increase of authorized capital stock by respondent
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which
approval was in fact granted. Nestle also paid to the SEC
the amount of P50,000.00 as filing fee in accordance with
the Schedule of Fees and Charges being implemented by
the SEC under the Corporation Code. 1
Nestle has only two (2) principal stockholders: San
Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. The other
stockholders, who are individual natural persons, own
only one (1) share each, for qualifying purposes, i.e., to
qualify them as members of the Board of Directors being
elected thereto on the strength of the votes of one or the
other principal shareholder.
On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and
stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions authorizing
the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously
authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle,
exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A.
San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and completely
paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to
and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of stock.
On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter signed
by its Corporate Secretary, M.L. Antonio, with the SEC
seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of additional
shares to its existing principal shareholders, from the
registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised
Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in
Section 6(c) of the same Act. In that letter, Nestle
requested confirmation of the correctness of two (2)
propositions submitted by it:
1. That there is no need to file a petition for exemption
under Section 6(b) of the Revised Securities Act with
respect to the issuance of the said 344,600 additional
shares to our existing stockholders out of our unissued
capital stock; and
2. That the fee provided in Section 6(c) of [the Revised
Securities] Act is not applicable to the said issuance of
additional shares. 2
The principal, indeed the only, argument presented by
Nestlewas that Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities
Act which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Exempt transactions. a) The requirement of
registration under subsection (a) of Section four of this
Act shall not apply to the sale of any security in any of the
following transactions:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The distribution by a corporation, actively engaged in
the business authorized by its articles of incorporation, of
securities to its stockholders or other security holders as a
stock dividend or other distribution out of surplus; or the
issuance of securities to the security holder or other
creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide
reorganization of such corporation made in good faith
and not for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of this
Act, either in exchange for the securities of such security
holders or claims of such creditors or partly for cash and
partly in exchange for the securities or claims of such
security holders or creditors; or the issuance of additional
capital stock of a corporation sold or distributed by it among its
own stockholders exclusively, where no commission or other
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly in connection
with the sale or distribution of such increased capital
stock. (Emphasis supplied)
embraces "not only an increase in the authorized capital
stock but also the issuance of additional shares to existing
stockholders of the unissued portion of the unissued
capital stock". 3 Nestle urged that interpretation upon the
following argument.
The use of the term "increased capital stock" should be
interpreted to refer to additional capital stock or equity
participation of the existing stockholders as a consequence of
either an increase of the authorized capital stock or the issuance of
unissued capital stock. If the intention of the pertinent legal
provision [were] to limit the exemption to subscription to
proposed increases in the authorized capital stock of a
corporation, we see no reason why the law should not have been
more specific or accurate about it. It certainly should have
mentioned "increase in the authorized capital stock of the
corporation" rather than merely the expression "the issuance of
additional capital stock 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Nestle expressly represented in the same letter that all the
additional shares proposed to be issued would be issued
only to San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. and that
no commission or other form of remuneration had been
given, directly or indirectly, in connection with the
issuance or distribution of such additional shares of
stock.
In respect of its claimed exemption from the fee
provided for in Section 6(c) of the Revised Securities Act,
Nestle contended that since Section 6 (a) (4) of the
statute declares (in Nestle's view) the proposed issuance
of 344,500 previously authorized but unissued shares of
Nestle's capital stock to its existing shareholders as an
exempt transaction, the SEC could not collect fees for
"the same transaction" twice. Nestle adverted to its
payment back in 21 February 1983 of the amount of
P50,000.00 as filing fees to the SEC when it applied for
and eventually received approval of the increase of its
authorized capital stock effected by Board and
shareholder action last 16 December 1983.
In a letter dated 26 June 1986, the SEC through its then
Chairman Julio A. Sulit, Jr. responded adversely to
petitioner's requests and ruled that the proposed issuance
of shares did not fall under Section 6 (a) (4) of the
Revised Securities Act, since Section 6 (a) (4) is applicable
only where there is an increase in the authorized capital
stock of a corporation. Chairman Sulit held, however,
that the proposed transaction could be considered by the
Commission under the provisions of Section 6 (b) of the
Revised Securities Act which reads as follows:
(b) The Commission may, from time to time and subject
to such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, exempt
transactions other than those provided in the preceding
paragraph, if it finds that the enforcement of the
requirements of registration under this Act with respect
to such transactions is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of the investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering.
The Commission then advised petitioner to file the
appropriate request for exemption and to pay the fee
required under Section 6 (c) of the statute, which
provides:
(c) A fee equivalent to one-tenth of one per centum of
the maximum aggregate price or issued value of the
securities shall be collected by the Commission for
granting a general or particular exemption from the
registration requirements of this Act.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the SEC ruling,
without success.
On 3 July 1987, petitioner sought review of the SEC
ruling before this Court which, however, referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated 13 January 1989, the Court of
Appeals sustained the ruling of the SEC.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
Nestle is now before this Court on a Petition for Review,
raising the very same issues that it had raised before the
SEC and the Court of Appeals.
Examining the words actually used in Section 6 (a) (4) of
the Revised Securities Act, and bearing in mind common
corporate usage in this jurisdiction, it will be seen that the
statutory phrase "issuance of additional capital stock" is
indeed infected with a certain degree of ambiguity. This
phrase may refer either to: a) the issuance of capital stock
as part of and in the course of increasing the authorized
capital stock of a corporation; or (b) issuance of already
authorized but still unissued capital stock. By the same
token, the phrase "increased capital stock" found at the
end of Section 6 (a) (4), may refer either: 1) to newly or
contemporaneously authorized capital stock issued in the
course of increasing the authorized capital stock of a
corporation; or 2) to previously authorized but unissued
capital stock.
Under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, a corporation
engaged in increasing its authorized capital stock, with
the required vote of its Board of Directors and of its
stockholders, must file a sworn statement of the treasurer
of the corporation showing that at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of "such increased capital stock" has been
subscribed and that at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
the amount subscribed has been paid either in actual cash
or in property transferred to the corporation. In other
words, the corporation must issue at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the newly or contemporaneously
authorized capital stock in the course of complying with
the requirements of the Corporation Code for increasing
its authorized capital stock.
In contrast, after approval by the SEC of the increase of
its authorized capital stock, and from time to time
thereafter, the corporation, by a vote of its Board of
Directors, and without need of either stockholder or SEC
approval, may issue and sell shares of its already
authorized but still unissued capital stock to existing
shareholders or to members of the general public. 5
Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals resolved the
ambiguity by construing Section 6 (a) (4) as
referring only to the issuance of shares of stock as part of
and in the course of increasing the authorized capital
stock of Nestle. In the case at bar, since the 344,500
shares of Nestle capital stock are proposed to be issued
from already authorized but still unissued capital stock
and since the present authorized capital stock of
6,000,000 shares with a par value of P100.00 per share
is not proposed to be further increased, the SEC and the
Court of Appeals rejected Nestle's petition.
We believe and so hold that the construction thus given
by the SEC and the Court of Appeals to Section 6 (a) (4)
of the Revised Securities Act must be upheld.
In the first place, it is a principle too well established to
require extensive documentation that the construction
given to a statute by an administrative agency charged
with the interpretation and application of that statute is
entitled to great respect and should be accorded great
weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly
shown to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute
or the Constitution and other laws. As long ago as 1903,
this Court said inIn re Allen 6 that
[t]he principle that the contemporaneous construction of
a statute by the executive officers of the government,
whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect,
and should ordinarily control the construction of the
statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support
it. 7
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the
emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or
modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying
those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience
and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a
particular statute. 8 In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Customs 9 the Court stressed that executive
officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves
with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and
purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon.
The courts give much weight to contemporaneous
construction because of the respect due the government
agency or officials charged with the implementation of
the law, their competence, expertness, experience and
informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret. 10
In the second place, and more importantly, consideration
of the underlying statutory purpose of Section 6(a) (4)
compels us to sustain the view taken by the SEC and the
Court of Appeals. The reading by the SEC of the scope
of application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater
opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory
objective of protecting the investing public by requiring
proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of
the true financial conditions and prospects of the
corporation. By limiting the class of exempt transactions
contemplated by the last clause of Section 6(a) (4) to
issuances of stock done in the course of and as part of
the process of increasing the authorized capital stock of a
corporation, the SEC is enabled to examine issuances by
a corporation of previously authorized but theretofore
unissued capital stock, on a case-to-case basis, under
Section 6(b); and thereunder, to grant or withhold
exemption from the normal registration requirements
depending upon the perceived level of need for
protection by the investing public in particular cases.
When capital stock is issued in the course of and in
compliance with the requirements of increasing its
authorized capital stock under Section 38 of the
Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter of course
examines the financial condition of the corporation, and
hence there is no real need for exercise of SEC authority
under the Revised Securities Act. Thus, one of the
multiple documentation requirements under the current
regulations of the SEC in respect of filing a certificate of
increase of authorized capital stock, is submission of "a
financial statement duly certified by an independent Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) as of the latest date possible or as of the date of
the meeting when stockholders approved the increase/decrease in
capital stock or thereabouts. 11 When all or part of the
newly authorized capital stock is proposed to be issued as
stock dividends, the SEC requirements are even more
exacting; they require, in addition to the regular audited
financial statements, the submission by the corporation
of a "detailed or Long Form Report of the certifying
Auditor." Moreover, since approval of an increase in
authorized capital stock by the stockholders holding two-
thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock is required
by Section 38 of the Corporation Code, at a stockholders
meeting held for that purpose, the directors and officers
of the corporation may be expected to take pains to
inform the shareholders of the financial condition and
prospects of the corporation and of the proposed
utilization of the fresh capital sought to be raised.
Upon the other hand, as already noted, issuance of
previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital
stock by the corporation requires only Board of Directors
approval. Neither notice to nor approval by the
shareholders or the SEC is required for such issuance.
There would, accordingly, under the view taken by
petitioner Nestle, no opportunity for the SEC to see to it
that shareholders (especially the small stockholders) have
a reasonable opportunity to inform themselves about the
very fact of such issuance and about the condition of the
corporation and the potential value of the shares of stock
being offered.
Under the reading urged by petitioner Nestle of the reach
and scope of the third clause of Section 6(a) (4), the
issuance of previously authorized but unissued capital
stock would automatically constitute an exempt
transaction,without regard to the length of time which may
have intervened between the last increase in authorized
capital stock and the proposed issuance during which
time the condition of the corporation may have
substantially changed, andwithout regard to whether the
existing stockholders to whom the shares are proposed to
be issued are only two giant corporations as in the instant
case, or are individuals numbering in the hundreds or
thousands.
In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an
issuance of previously authorized but still unissued capital
stock may, in a particular instance, be held to be an
exempt transaction by the SEC under Section 6(b) so
long as the SEC finds that the requirements of
registration under the Revised Securities Act are "not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of
the investors" by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of
stock that is proposed to be issued or because the
potential buyers are very limited in number and are in a
position to protect themselves. In fine, petitioner Nestle's
proposed construction of Section 6(a) (4) would establish
an inflexible rule of automatic exemption of issuances of
additional, previously authorized but unissued, capital
stock. We must reject an interpretation which may
disable the SEC from rendering protection to investors,
in the public interest, precisely when such protection may
be most needed.
Petitioner Nestle's second claim for exemption is from
payment of the fee provided for in Section 6 (c) of the
Revised Securities Act, a claim based upon petitioner's
contention that Section 6 (a) (4) covers both issuance of
stock in the course of complying with the statutory
requirements of increase of authorized capital stock and
issuance of previously authorized and unissued capital
stock. Petitioner claims that to require it now to pay one-
tenth of one percent (1%) of the issued value of the
344,500 shares of stock proposed to be issued, is to
require it to pay a second time for the same service on
the part of the SEC. Since we have above rejected
petitioner's reading of Section 6 (a) (4), last clause,
petitioner's claim about the additional fee of one-tenth of
one percent (1%) of the issue value of the proposed
issuance of stock (amounting to P34,450 plus P344.50 for
other fees or a total of P37,794.50) need not detain us for
long. We think it clear that the fee collected in 21
February 1983 by the SEC was assessed in connection
with the examination and approval of the certificate of
increase of authorized capital stock then submitted by
petitioner. The fee, upon the other hand, provided for in
Section 6 (c) which petitioner will be required to pay if it
does file an application for exemption under Section 6
(b), is quite different; this is a fee specifically authorized
by the Revised Securities Act, (not the Corporation
Code) in connection with the grant of an exemption
from normal registration requirements imposed by that
Act. We do not find such fee either unreasonable or
exorbitant.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13
January 1989 in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-13522, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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