Prepared by ALFIE OMEGA SOCIAL LEGISLATION ECC Cases St.

Thomas More School of Law

1. SARMIENTO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power
Corporation)
Facts: late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her
death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April
1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated
squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals
On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.
Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for
death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
The GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland
(salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and employment conditions.
Respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision
It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by reason
of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.
Late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on
August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as
a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated
squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals
The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, the law on employees' compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that
provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also
permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act
which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment.
Held: Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees'
Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's
employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by
her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.
The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements.
According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in
her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external
auditory canal
We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known.
Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation
Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's
employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by
her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.
The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements.
According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in
her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external
auditory canal
We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known.
2. ROSALINDA PA-AC vs. ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts: the deceased, Marcelo Pa-ac worked for the respondent company from 1951 to 1968 or a period of 17 years. He started as a laborer, shovelling
sand and gravel in connection with the construction work of the respondent. After two years, Pa-ac was Promoted as a shifter in the mill department as a
precipitation man. His primary duty as such was to conduct precipitation color test-The process
which lasted for about 15 minutes at a time was repeated every hour, and involved the mixing of chemical solutions. On January 1, 1960, Pa-ac was
assigned as sand fin operator and charged with the duty of maintaining the specific gravity of the fed while he makes a record of the readings. He also
saw to it that the pump was functioning smoothly. On January 1, 1961, the deceased was assigned as ball mill operator whose duty it was to regulate
the ball mill fed by opening and controlling a 48-square inch (8" x 6") fed gate by pushing the fed lips. It was also his work to charge the steel balls by
means of an electric machine which starts by pressing a button and to see to it that the machine was running smoothly while he balanced the fed. Three
years thereafter, or on June 17, 1964, Pa-ac was reassigned to the precipitation section. On September 1, 1967, he was promoted as mill general
capataz whose duty it was to supervise the men working in the mill. As such, he worked seven days a week and received a daily wage of P8.15. He
worked in shifts rotated every 15 days. The morning shift was from 7:00 o'clock a.m. to 3:00 o'clock p. m. the afternoon shift was from 3:00 o'clock p. m.
to 11:00 o'clock p.m., and the night shift was from 11:00 o'clock p.m. to 7:00 o'clock a.m.
1968, Pa-ac was a guest in a wedding party. Before luncheon consisting of fatty foods was served, Pa-ac joined the other male guests in drinking San
Miguel gin and Tanduay rhum. It seems that he had one drink too many because he became talkative and when it was time to leave, he could not walk
straight. He had to be supported by Mr. Alexander Olivar, the respondent's safety engineer, to the service pick-up which brought them to the bus
terminal. Sensing that Pa-ac was in no condition to work, Olivar advised Pa-ac who was supposed to report for work with the afternoon shift, not to
report for duty anymore. From the bus terminal, where the two parted ways, Pa-ac headed home on foot to the Mountaineers's Store, some 500 meters
away. At quarter past 2:00 o'clock p.m., that day, two laborers, Basilio Sabado, a crane helper and Camilo Valloyas, a hoistman while on their way to
work, came upon Pa-ac sitting alone by the roadside. He was in a state of dizziness and his hands were shaking. Summoning the service pick-up, the
two laborers rushed Pa-ac to the respondent's hospital in Sangilo.
When admitted in the hospital, Pa-ac was weak and semi conscious.
Pa-ac died within two hours from admission.
The record also shows that the deceased was twice married. On 1945, he married Natividad Saloy according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church.
1960, after living together as husband and wife for 15 years, Pa-ac and Natividad were. divorced according to the tribal customs of the Mountain Provin
In September of the same year, Pa-ac married Rosalinda Palki following the customs of their tribe. The claim was filed by Rosalinda with the knowledge
and tacit consent of Natividad who had chosen to nurse her frustration and disappointment in her hometown of Bauko, Mountain Province.
1970, the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, Baguio City Sub-Regional Office, decided in favor of the petitioner. He found the claim to be
within the purview of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act. No. 3428), as amended, which states that:
Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. The right to
compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the
negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the negligent party.
On appeal by the respondent to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the aforementioned decision was reversed.
Held: We sustain the Commission's decision.
In the case of Vda. de Cardiente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (134 SCRA 66, 70), this Court, in construing Section 2 of Act 3428, held that:
"... compensable illnesses or diseases are those which are. (1) directly caused by such employment; or (2) either aggravated by the employment, or (3)
the result of the nature of such employment."
The records disclose that the deceased died of myocardial infarction. Medical authorities reveal the nature of such illness as follows:
myocardial infact. A region of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the result of an obstruction to the
blood circulation, usually by a clot.
The duties of the deceased as stated in his job description are light and do not involve strenuous physical exertion. As capataz he merely acted as
overseer of the mill. It is not' unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that such duties could not have directly caused the deceased's ailment.
The records also belie the theory of aggravation. They show that the illness was not pre-existing. Prior to his death, the deceased never complained of
any symptoms of the disease. He was never admitted and treated in the hospital for the said ailment. The attack was the first time he suffered the
ailment and that one time proved fatal.
The petitioner emphasizes the presumption of compensability provided by the law in these cases.1avvphi1 We note, however, that this presumption is
rebuttable. The presumption stands unless the employer clearly establishes that the death or ailment was not caused or aggravated by such
employment or work. In this case, there is substantial evidence which shows that the deceased's ailment was not traceable to his employment. The
respondent presented medical authority and opinions which state that myocardial infarction occurs without relation to ef forts or other discernible clinical
event. (Records, p. 123). It also showed that the deceased, prior to his death, had been drinking and eating fatty food.


Injuries
1. ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO
Facts: At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way
home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The
slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was
himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like
Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four
"carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose
out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",
1
phrase --are
said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;
3
however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is
unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of
the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.
4
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the
accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.
Issue: WON the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Held: We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that
"the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the
reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question,
there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make
it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the
premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the
ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road.
the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the
compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The
private road leads directly to its main gate.
24
Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its
right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the
road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road
was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point
where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is
immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and
was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place
where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within
the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in
the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is
unexplained.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,
25
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to
be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with
the express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent,
express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the
course of employment.
In IDECO, a mechanic of the company, while walking on his way home at about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 19, 1969, was shot to
death about 20 meters away from the gate of IDECO, in a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The motive for the crime was
unknown. The claim for death benefits of the heirs of the deceased mechanic was granted by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
IDECO appealed claiming that the death of the employee did not arise out of and was not in the course of employment and that it was error
for the Commission to apply the so-called "proximity rule". After an exhaustive dissertation by then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, on American and Philippine Jurisprudence on the scope of the words "work-connected", "arising out of "in the course of" and "going
and coming rule"' the Court affirmed the compensation award notwithstanding the unexplained motive of the assault because the portion
where the employee was killed was in very dose proximity to the employer's premises; it was an "access area" 6 "so clearly related to the
employee's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises," and IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for
its employees, that is, safe against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, and one of these dangers being assault by third
persons, and not having taken the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by
its employee resulting in his death. (cited in Bellarmino case (also cited Luzon stevedoring)).
2. ENCARNACION BELARMINO vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, PACIFIC METALS CORPORATION and DOMINADOR L. CRISTOBAL,
Facts: Cirilo Belarmino was employed in 1969 as a capataz in the rolling department of the Pacific Metals Corporation.
On October 9, 1969 the close of working hours, more particularly, between 5:00 to 5:20 in the afternoon, Belarmino was shot to death by one of the men
working under him by the name of Ponciano Angeles at a place about 75 feet away from the compound of the Pacific Metals Corporation in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City.
As a result of the death of her husband, Encarnacion Belarmino filed on May 26, 1970, her claim with the Regional Office No. IV of the Department of
Labor against Pacific Metals Corporation Copy of this claim was received by the corporation on June 16, 1970, and on June 26 it filed a controversion
alleging that it was not the employer of the deceased, but that it was Dominador L. Cristobal who was the contractor of the services of the corporation.
The claim was accordingly amended to include Cristobal as party respondent.
A hearing was held during which the claimants adduced evidence to show that Cirilo Belarmino was shot by Ponciano Angeles because of a grudge or
conflict resulting from the work of the latter in the factory. The widow of Belarmino testified that her husband had occasion to confide in her that "it was
difficult to handle persons" and as a result "he had a misunderstanding with Ponciano Angeles, one of the workers under him in the rolling department."
2

The Workmen's Compensation Commission dismissed the claim for death benefits because the accident which resulted in the death of the employee
was not work-connected inasmuch as Cirilo Belarmino had already left his work at 4:00 in the afternoon when he was shot outside the premises of
employer-corporation.
In the case now before us, respondent Commission, mainly premised the denial of the claim on the fact that the death occurred after working hours
outside the premises of the corporation, and the alleged absence of any showing that the assault was connected with the work of the deceased.
ISSUE: WON the death of an employee caused by an assault of a co-employee after working hours at some distance from the premises of the employer
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act?
YES. Not only are the "proximity rule" adopted in IDECO, supra, and the "going-to-and-coming-from" rule enunciated in the very recent case of Bael v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 1977, 75 SCRA 181, applicable to the instant situation, but more controlling is the principle laid down in Luzon
Stevedoring that where the cause of the assault is work-connected, the death of an employee is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
(cited IDECO and Luzon, Alano)
3. CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,
vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines),
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army.
He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his
Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company
to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat."
1
Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao
and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place "
2
that is, it had peace and order problems due to
the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao.
., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles
of beer.
The soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin
and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacionof Aritao, Dft.
Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was
on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting
in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried
that he had been hit and fell to the ground.
The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his
sustaining a gunshot wound.
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son
was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied
6
by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor
performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.
Denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
Sole issue: whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations?
Held: YES>
Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be
noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on
Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the
Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if
such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from
any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on
the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied
with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness.
The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if
he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his
company is stationed.
We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were noton vacation leave. Moreover, they
were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them
while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3)
soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA
bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.
Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already
been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty
status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7
days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of
Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft.
Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a
pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless
in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he
is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation
leave.
8
Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.
More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the
Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of
the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk
of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.
We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the
circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and hence compensable.
4. GENEROSO ALANO vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan.
While she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-
bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.
GSIS denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the
conditions prescribed by law.
The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2)
The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official
functions."
According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at
about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually
waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school.
The case, therefore, was dismissed.
Issue: WON the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident?
Held: In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background,
this Court held:
The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is
going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at
the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.
5. SALVADOR LAZO vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES)
Facts: The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular
tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to
5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his
sack of rice.
On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery
road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, was denied by the GSIS. From the
foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred.


Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while
he was attending to a personal matter.
Held: In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just
like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of
residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...."
7
Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in
the course of employment.
We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his
place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the
accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact
standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been
notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &
Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the
actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his
work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a
part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not
arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner
deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.


If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day,
there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the
Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
6. CHUA YENG vs. MICHAELA ROMA
Facts: Santos Romeo was working for petitioner as cargador in loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu City.
In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the
warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said
house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying "tse", but as
the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy.
Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner
Issue:
Held: As has been said
. . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably doa workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his
pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos vs.Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)
By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating
some fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there
were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the
back of the warehouse; that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's
house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to,
the place of work.
Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof
should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Baens
del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959).
Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
7. LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC.vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Facts: Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge of the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. His duty was to look after the safety of the barge and its
cargo especially in the absence of the patron.
On September 11, 1956, Cordero, having been requested by the patron to take over, was left alone in charge of the barge. Two days later his lifeless
body was found floating in the Pasig river by Det. Labao of the Manila Police Department. A post-mortem examination revealed that he died of asphyxia
as a result of submersion in water.
Ramon Relente president of the union to which the deceased belonged, reported the matter to the officer in charge of the marine department of the
company and asked for financial aid to the family of the deceased, and this request having been denied, he made arrangement for a loan of P250.00
from the company. The company filed a report with the Workmen's Compensation Commission manifesting its desire to controvert the claim if one is
filed later.
On March 5, 1957, the deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which was referred to a hearing officer who, after hearing, rendered
decision ordering the company to pay to claimant death benefits in the amount of P2,912.00, to reimburse the claimant the amount of P200.00 as burial
expenses, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P218.40, and the sum of P35.00 as fees of the Workmen's Compensation Commission Office.
The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on three grounds: (a) there was no causal connection between Cordero's death and his
employment as a sailor; (b) Cordero's death was due to his own negligence; and (c) claimant's right, if will, is already barred by Section 24 of Act 3428,
as amended.1wph1
The Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed the decision in toto; hence the present petition for review.
1. It is contended that the claim filed by the deceased's widow is already barred by law because it was filed beyond the 3-month period within which the
law requires that it be filed from the death of the deceased.
Thus, Antonio Cordero died on September 11, 1956, and under the law the heirs of the deceased had until December 11 of the same year within which
to file the claim for death benefits, but the widow filed her claim only on January 31, 1958, which is after a period of more than three months. But
Workmen's Compensation Commission did not consider this objection material it appearing that the president of the union to which the deceased
belonged had taken immediate steps to inform the management of the incident while he asked that financial aid be extended to the bereaved family
even to the extent of making arrangement for loan to cover the burial and other expenses of the family.
2. The second point raised by petitioner is that Cordero died not in the course of employment, or that his death did not arise out of it, because at the time
of his death he was swimming with some companions in the Pasig river and as a consequence he was drowned and his lifeless body was found floating
on the surface of the river. Hence, petitioner claims, his heirs are not entitled to the compensation prescribed by law.
Held: As to the nature of the employment of Cordero, the Workmen's Compensation Commission made the following finding:
The nature of the employment of the deceased was like that of the barge of which he was in charge moored at the Pasig river and tied
to the seawall. His duty required him to be nailed to his post 24 hours of a day followed by other days. But he was a moving human
being and not like a machinery which can be kept sleeping in a little corner of the barge, during the long and monotonous hours of the
days and nights of his employment. He had to move and perform the ordinary, functions of a human being like for example, answering
the calls of nature, bathing, eating and sleeping. When he took a bath in the water, he performed a daily routine needed by the human
body, incidental to, and habitual and usual in the life of a sailor, and any accident occurring to him and due to ordinary and necessary
incidents of his employment is well within the sphere of such unusual employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation to
the family.
While in the strict sense death caught up with Cordero when he was not in the barge where he is supposed to be for 24 hours watching and taking care
of it but swimming with some companions somewhere in the Pasig river near where the barge was moored, it may be said that he died in line of duty for
he was then undertaking something that is necessary to his personal need and comfort since the taking of bath is not only habitual in a sailor but
necessary to the human body. He went swimming not for pleasure, not for fun, but in answer to the daily need nature, in the same manner as a human
being needs to answer other calls, such as eating, sleeping and the like. When these needs are satisfied in the course of employment and something
takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in
the course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way. The situation would be different if the mishap occurs in
a manner that it may clearly show that the laborer has acted beyond his duty or course of employment. Not so in this case.
Neither can it be contended that in going out with some companions to swim the deceased is guilty of notorious negligence for the reason that if his
purpose was to take a bath he could have done it with the aid of a water tank on board the barge. If the deceased were one who does not know how to
swim or is not a sailor accustomed to the perils of the water, the argument may have some value but not so in the case of the deceased who
undisputable was a swimmer. He must have preferred to take a bath while swimming than by pouring water over his body on board the barge because
of his awareness that he was swimmer and for him to swim in a river was merely routine. And if he died in the course thereof it must be due to an event
that he has not foreseen. At any rate there is no clear evidence that his death was due to his notorious negligence and not to a cause which he could not
have reasonably avoided.