Carlo Casini

faithful participation to NATO

From a Turkish point of view, however, the European Parliaments several resolutions
concerning Turkey are causing frustration because Turkey is being treated as a backward
nation.
A necessary step for Turkeys eventual accession to the EU is finding a peaceful solution
to the Cyprus issue. This article does not intend to provide an historical overview of the
Cyprus problem or to analyze its complicated parameters. It should be stressed, however,
that Cyprus is already a member of the EU and there must be sincere friendship based on
sympathy between two member states. Similarly, Turkey should fully respect the rights of
its ethnic and religious minorities. Finally, the only way in order to successfully address
violent acts by terrorist organizations
which are outrageous and need to be fought firmly is the further strengthening of the rule
of law and human rights.
Turkey strongly tied to Europe and leaning out together with Greece, Italy and Spain
towards the Mediterranean, a positive solution of the Middle East conflicts which will
significantly affect world peace could be found.
Turkey should play a more constructive role and coordinate its efforts with the EU in
order to address the flux of illegal immigrants trying to enter the EU through Turkish soil.

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The systemic changes at the end of World War II began to change the Turkish position in
the European order as well. The post war restructuring and emerging dynamics of the Cold
War gave Turkey a specific role to play in the European order as the southeast bastion of its
defense against Soviet expansionism. As a result, Turkey was an integral part of the European
institutions that were created. Turkey first demonstrated its will to become a member of the
EEC (i.e. now the EU) through a signing of an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1959.
Since this day, "Turkey's status as a potential member has continuously evoked heated debate
within the EU and remained at best ambiguous.v'" Drawing from the above discussion about
Turkey's being Europe's other, "an important asymmetry seems to be evident concerning its
[i.e. Europe] approach to and treatment of insiders and outsiders."63 If one considers the
recent enlargement of the CEECs, this reality comes to the surface and becomes much more
visible. "It would not be possible to explain the differential treatment of the CEECs and
Turkey, countries broadly at the same level of economic and political development, without
reference to this factor."64 The EU did not display the same eagerness and goodwill towards
Turkey as it did towards the CEECs.
"The discourses that emphasize the exclusive aspect of European identity based on
geography and culture construct Turkey as inherently different. On the other hand, the
discourses that emphasize the inclusive aspects of European identity construct Turkey as
different from Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics."65
"[s]ince a European identity is not based on a common historical memory, it is difficult to
argue that Turkey should be excluded on these grounds. As long as Turkey can fulfill the
institutional, economic and legal requirements for membership, all of which are necessary to
meet other conditions such as human rights, Turkey is not principally excluded from a
European identity which has been shaped so decisively by the institutions and the law of the
EU."66

Bade Darbaz

Turkey, with its deterrent power supplied by strong defense, is the only country in the
region which has not been at war since 1922 and has achieved in developing its economy in
the peace place. However, the country has been living in peace and stability is not only the
result of the deterrent power of the defense but also the result of being a NATO member
and fallowing foreign policy of being a peacemaker.
In its history, Turkey has had a hard political past, even though it has been in the process of
westernization for so long. There were two military interventions during the 1970s and the
1980s because of the political regime of the time. It is hoped by many Turks that the EU
accession will bring advanced levels of democracy, culture and civilization to Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey is aware of some costs that the EU accession will possibly bring.
One of them is related with Turkeys problem with her Greek neighbor. It is about territorial
right in the Aegean Sea and accusation that Turkey is guilty of abusing human rights.
Moustakis noted that Dealing firstly with the Cyprus conflict, the official Turkish view
maintains that the Cyprus problem should not interfere or put in jeopardy future Turkish
accession to the EU (Moustakis 1998: 128+) whereas EU concerns that this issue must be
solved before Turkeys EU accession.
The other political cost is related with the Kurdish minorities. European Parliament stated
that if the south east part of Turkey wants autonomy, then Turkey should allow Kurdish
people to produce an autonomous Kurdish entity. This problem has been causing a fight
between PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) (which is accepted as a terrorist group) and Turkish
army. Although the Turkish government has made some concessions about giving some
rights to Kurdish minority such as the national recognition of the Kurdish language and
separate national identity, these efforts have not had any effect on the activities of the
radical PKK (Moustakis 1998: 128+)

The process of modernization in Turkey is growing day by day, particularly since
the day Turkey applied to the EU membership; it has been changing itself according to EU
norms and laws and developing itself both politically, culturally and economically.
Moustakis stated that it is hoped by the Turks that their Europeanization vocation
will be rewarded if and when Turkey becomes an EU member which will play an important
part in helping to speed up the modernization of their political, social economic and cultural
environment. (Moustakis 1998: 128+)
Due to the problems between Turkey and Greece, Greece has the power to use the
veto within the European Council in order to hinder legislations which may be beneficial for
Turkey. For example: Greece blocked the horizontal financing component of the EU
Mediterranean policy because Turkey was one of the beneficiaries which also delayed the
implementation of certain trade concessions.(Moustakis 1998: 128+)
Another benefit for Turkey will be about the Islamic fundamentalism issue. It is
believed that if Turkey enters the EU, it will reduce the opportunities of Islamic
Fundamentalism; it will hinder the spread and growth of it. Turkey is a secular democratic
country and because of that there is a balance between secular and religious activities in
Turkey. It is also assumed that if the EU turns its back on Turkeys membership application,
it may increase the religious activities in Turkey.


Brief Turkeys Quest

However, with the collapse of communism in the East, Turkeys membership application
again went to the end of the queue.
The 1997 Luxembourg European Council summit brought another defeat for Turkish
ambitions. The Luxembourg summit set up a two-tier accession process in which Turkey
was not accepted as a candidate. In fact, additional conditions were placed on Turkeys
candidature, including the resolution of differences with Greece over Cyprus and the
Aegean.
The Luxembourg summit provoked a wave of outrage in Turkey and prompted it to
freeze its political dialogue with the EU.

Other issues that still need considerable attention are the fight against corruption,
judicial reform, trade union rights and womens and childrens rights. Also, Turkey needs
to create conditions in the south-east part of the country for the Kurdish population to
enjoy full rights and freedom.

Catherine
Thus, according to this vision, regardless of its religion and culture or even of its
potential benefit to the EU, Turkey should be offered membership on condition that it
fulfills the political criteria. Such arguments, together with pragmatic ones, have often
been used by other actors who (conditionally) support Turkish accession, as well as by
Turkey itself. In this context, a strong argument in favour of Turkish accession has been
that EU membership will lead to greater democracy and human rights protection and
strengthen the rule of law in Turkey.(16)

Killian Strauss

The decision on launching official membership talks was made on 16 December 2004
and accession negotiations with Turkey were launched on 3 October 2005. There was
however a last minute obstacle: Germany and Austria sought to leave open the
possibility of Turkey not becoming a full member but rather obtain a so-called
privileged partnership. Yet the other EU states did not agree and so accession
negotiations were ultimately launched with the "shared objective" of full membership.
Strong opposition to Turkish EU membership has come among others from German
conservative parties that have beenparticularly outspoken in their criticism, citing
financial and political motives
2
; Frances conservative UMP has been similarly critical,
reflecting a more general French position, with some two thirds of French voters said
to be hostile to Turkish membership
There have been a number of major reform packages over the past decade, including a
ban on the death penalty, steps on reducing the influence of the military, the fight
against torture, improving the rights of the Kurdish minority etc. These measures have
been clearly geared to address the Copenhagen criteria
5
required for EU entry and have
been backed by a coalition of forces in favour of Turkeys EU entry, which include the
military, the business community and the Kurdish minority. Yet there still remains
concern about the implementation of these measures, which is why the EU must insist
not only on the adoption of reforms, but also on their implementation.
Although Turkish membership may still be as far as ten or fifteen years away,
negotiations have been halted on a number of chapters since 2006, mostly at the
initiative of Cyprus, an EU member since 2004, which is steadfastly opposed to
Turkish EU membership as long as the island is divided, its north occupied by Turkish
troops and its ships barred from access to Turkish ports. Incidentally, it was Cypriot
Greeks that voted against a UN referendum on unifying the island in 2004. But France
and Austria have also been less than helpful in the way Turkey has been treated by the
EU. Both countries have announced that they would hold a referendum on Turkey's
accession. At present, eight of the 35 accession chapters are still frozen, effectively
halting Turkeys membership negotiations. It is not surprising that this has also led to a
drop in pro-EU enthusiasm in Turkey, as many Turks no longer perceive the accession
process as fair and open-ended.
Officially at least, negotiations are said to continue. If Turkey were eventually admitted
to the EU, its membership would beyond any doubt be epochal and would have a
considerable impact on the way the EU works, especially on its finances, but also
potentially on the future of the continent and in particular on future admissions.

The question which inevitably arises in this context is what impact a potential EU
member Turkey would have on a future European Union. The main issue for many of
Turkeys critics resides in the countrys size Turkey is a big country (with currently 75m
inhabitants, with over 80m forecast by 2020),
Instead of paralysing the Union, Turkish membership could actually serve as a catalyst
for a discussion on where a Europe of 30 members should be heading

The main criticism about Turkey, however, is the countrys dismal human rights record
and lack of democracy.
continuing violations of human rights, including minority rights with regard to the
countrys Kurdish minority, honour killings as well as the thorny issue of Cyprus.
Yet implementation of the new rules is still patchy, especially in rural areas and at lower
levels of the countrys administration.

This has resulted in a reduced commitment in Turkey to implement important reforms
leading to more doubts in Europe. It is a vicious circle.
This is why the EU should encourage implementation of reform measures before
accession, not only their adoption, as frequently happened in the new member states
from Central Europe.
At the same time, however, a big question mark hangs over the social and political
acceptance of these reforms, leading to the question whether Turkish society is actually
ready for Europe. Yet over the past fifty years, Turkey has gradually moved closer to
Europe,

It will change the way the Union will look at itself and will help it define its future shape.
Integrating a secular Muslim country into the EU would constitute an important sign that
Europe is open to other cultures and religions. More importantly, Turkish membership in
the EU would make an important contribution to reforming and modernising the country
itself, and would contribute to stability in the entire region between the EU, the
Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East by providing an example how a
Muslim country can succeed both in remaining secular and in adopting democratic
practices.

As far as Turkey itself is concerned, the country has made big efforts, yet the closer it
gets to EU membership, the more resistance it seems to face from within the Union.
Yet leaving Turkey outside the gates of Europe would have negative consequences
that are all but impossible to gauge at present. Even postponing or suspending
accession negotiations could, according to Heather Grabbe undermine the usefulness of
accession as a foreign policy tool

Nugent final

At political elite levels, the main concerns and opposition stem primarily from
centre right parties (especially those in the Christian Democratic tradition), strongly pro-
integration parties, and far right parties. The concerns of each of these groups are clear
enough. For the Christian Democrats, it is as described above with the CDU/CSU:
weakening Europes Christian inheritance and identity. For pro-integrationists (who
overlap with the Christian Democrats), it is the perceived potential harmful implications
for such things as the smooth functioning of EU decision-making processes, the further
development of the EU policy agenda, and the nature of European consciousness and
identity. And for the far right, it is a melange of matters related mainly to resistance to
the integration process as a whole, sovereignty concerns, and ethnicity considerations.

It was significant that when the EP held a vote in December 2004 on whether or
not to open accession negotiations with Turkey, the vote was held by secret ballot at the
insistence of the centre right European Peoples Party (the largest party in the
Parliament). In the vote, 407 voted for, 262 against, and there were 29 abstentions.
There was little doubt from where most of the opposition votes against came.

At the same time as being located next to politically unstable areas,
Turkey is a member of virtually all of the major western and European
organizations, with the exception of the EU: the Council of Europe, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and most importantly of
all - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As such Turkey already is,
and as an EU member would have even greater potential to be, an
important bridge between the West and countries currently on the margins of
Western influence.


Turkeys strategic political and security position. Turkey occupies a key geo-
political position. It is physically located close to, and has considerable influence
in, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and several states of
the former Soviet Union. A stable Turkey within the EU could have a stabilizing
influence within this conflict-prone neighborhood.

Political pressures

EU decision-makers have long been pressurized from various quarters to accept
the
Turkish application. The most obvious of these quarters has, of course, been Turkey itself
which, despite the clear reservations, doubts, and even opposition on the EU side, has
just refused to give up on its ambitions for membership. As long as the Turkish reaction
to rebuffs was confined to disappointment, EU governments did not become overly
concerned. This situation changed, however, after the EU decided in 1997 to offer a
foreseeable membership perspective to all applicants except Turkey. It changed because
Turkish leaders reacted to the decision with anger and with statements and comments
to the effect that Turkey might have to start looking more seriously to its east and south
for allies. This resulted in many EU leaders coming to view the 1997 decision as having
been over-dismissive, and indeed as being potentially dangerous if Turkey started to
edge away from the EU.

This possibility of Turkey edging away also played a part in stiffening the pressures being
exerted on EU decision-makers from other political actors. Turkey has never benefited
from having a strong patron or sponsor of its case amongst existing EU members, in
the way in which during the lead-up to the May 2004 enlargement some problem
countries did so benefit: Germanys strong support for Poland, for example, or
Greeces support for Cyprus. But Turkey has, nonetheless, had friends in EU circles,
which have played an important role in supporting its case. Within the EU itself, the
most important of these friends have been the UK on the one hand and in recent times
- Greece on the other. UK support has been important because of the UKs position as
one of the EUs large states, whilst Greek support has had considerable symbolic
significance because of the traditional enmity between Greece and Turkey. Outside the
EU, the US which for geo-strategic reasons has long been close to Turkey in western
power circles has acted virtually as a sponsor of the Turkish case. Indeed, on the
eve of the crucial December
2002 Copenhagen summit, President Bush even telephoned the summits chair, Danish
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to stress the strategic importance of Turkey
(European Voice, 12-18 December 2002), and after an EU-US Summit in June 2004 he
told a press conference As Turkey meets the EU standards of membership, the
European Union should begin talks that will lead to full membership for the republic of
Turkey) EUobserver, 27 June 2004)..


Second, there is differentiated, or enhanced, cooperation. This is where policy
initiatives and actions proceed without all EU member states being fully involved, or
indeed being involved at all. The most notable examples to date of differentiated
integration are Schengen, EMU, and the fledgling European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP). It seems likely that this list will expand in the future. There are two firm reasons
for this, and one possible reason:
Differentiation is most likely in policy areas that display certain characteristics,
and these characteristics have been, and continue to be, increasingly present as
the EUs policy portfolio grows. The policy areas include: those that are not
directly related to the internal market; those that are strategically important
for some states; those that are of concern only to some states; and those where
member states favor different regulatory styles (Junge, 2002).

The Amsterdam Treaty made specific provision for enhanced cooperation and
the Nice Treaty has made it easier to operationalize. Whereas under the
Amsterdam provisions at least a majority of member states must be involved for
enhanced cooperation to be able to proceed, under the Nice provisions only a
minimum of eight must be so.

If the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified by any member state or states it is
likely that more pro-integrationist states will proceed with policy developments in
specific areas and leave the non ratifiers outside. The notion advanced in some
Eurosceptic quarters that non ratifications will mean the end of the Treaty is
probably illusory. Of course, much will depend on which member states do not
ratify non ratification by France, for example, will be more damaging for the
Treaty than non ratification by the Czech Republic. Certainly in the case of the state
that is seen as being the most likely to not ratify, the UK, it is highly
probable that non ratification will encourage some member states probably led
by France and Germany to press ahead by themselves with ever closer union in
some areas. (On the possible consequences of a UK No, see Grant, 2005)

The more differentiation does develop in the years prior to Turkeys accession,
then clearly the greater is the potential for Turkey to become an EU member without
necessarily involving itself, or at least involving itself fully, in unsuitable or difficult
policy areas.


Turkey Accession to EU

The Turkish Armed Forces is the second largest standing armed force in NATO, after the
U.S. Armed Forces. - Turkey is a crucial ally for the West
- It will create an opportunity to extend the stability and prosperity enjoyed by the EU
citizens into Turkey. It will help the EU to solve the issue of immigration.

However, Turkey's EU negotiations have been overshadowed by concerns about freedom of
speech and democracy in Turkey, treatment of religious minorities, women's and children's
rights, civilian control of the military and the Cyprus tensions.


The Cyprus conflict is a long standing conflict. It is the oldest conflict in the continent of
Europe. Cyprus constitutes the main obstacle to Turkeys accession, and since 2006 the EU
council has frozen eight of the 35 policy chapters (which all candidates for EU membership
must successfully negotiate) because of Turkey's refusal to implement its commitment to
open its ports and airspace to Greek Cypriot shipping and aircraft. Four more chapters have
been blocked by France, and Cyprus has blocked six, including the energy chapter. Cyprus
has been the main official reason for the freeze. The whole island is a member of the EU.
However, EU laws do not apply in the north of the island, which is governed by Turkey and
is known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey.
Because Cyprus is an EU member, Brussels requires Turkey to open its ports and airports to
Greek Cypriots. But Ankara says it will do that only when the EU, as promised, lifts the
Turkish part of Cyprus from economic isolation by allowing it to trade directly with EU
member states.
Ankara says the EU has not kept its word due to opposition from Greek Cypriots, who say
this would amount to EU recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.


In contrast, some politicians worry that such a large, mainly Muslim country would change
the whole character of the EU. Analysts say the major unspoken reason is that Turkey is a
strong, Muslim nation. Because of its size, Turkey would have significant decision-making
power in the EU, something observers say makes many Europeans uneasy amid growing
Islamophobia on the continent.