Cases For Manifestations of Republicanism

CONSTI I DIGESTS 2010
Lim v. Executive Secretary

1

2002, De Leon, Jr. J

Two years after the VFA was approved in 1999, the terrorist attacks 9/11 prompted America to
declare an international terrorist campaign. Pres. GMA pledged the countrys support to the
endeavor.

On January 2002, members of the USAF (United States Armed Forces) arrived in Mindanao to,
along with the AFP, take part in the Balikatan 02-1 exercises. The next month, the Senate,
after conducting a hearing on the military exercise, approved the Draft Terms of Reference
upon presentation by then VP Guingona.

Petitioners Lim and Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They filed suit as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. Two
party-list intervenors, SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGAGAWA, aver that some of their
members are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu and thus are directly affected by operations
conducted in Mindanao.

They argue (a) that the Abu-Sayyaf bandits do not constitute an external armed force and thus,
the Philippines is not subject to armed external attack contemplated in the MDT (mutual
defense treaty) of 1951 to warrant US military assistance. They also claim that the VFA signed in
1999 does not authorize US soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory, not
even to fire back if fired upon.

Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have legal standing.

No. They cannot file suit as taxpayers because the military exercise does not involve Congress
taxing or spending powers. Being lawyers does not invest them with personality to initiate the
case and they have failed to demonstrate the requisite of suffering proximate injury. Issues
raised premature and based on a fear of future violations of the Terms of Reference.

(2) WON the Balikatan exercises violate the Constitution.

No. Petitioners claim that it violates the Renunciation Clause of the Constitution (The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy) but neither the MDT nor the VFA
allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The VFA permits the
USAF to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities. The word was used to give leeway in
negotiation by both parties. In this manner, the US may sojourn in the Philippines for purposes
other than military. Combat-related activities, as opposed to combat, are authorized by the
MDT and the VFA.

1
A lot of dissenting opinions. Too lazy. Will get back to them when I have time.

Although international laws are adhered to, as expressed by the Indoctrination Clause, it does
not imply primacy of international law over national law. The Constitution espouses a view that
has marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country. The Court, if it sees that
the treaty runs counter to Congress or goes against the fundamental law, can nullify such an
agreement. But in the case at bar, the question is WON American troops are engaged in combat
alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of alleged training and exercise. The Court cannot
answer this question because it lacks sufficient information. Newspapers or electronic reports
per se cannot be considered apt support for petitioners allegations. Facts must be established
according to the rules of evidence. WON Pres. GMA is engaged in doublespeak involves a
question of fact the question is thus not fit for a special civil action for certiorari.

Petition is thereby dismissed.


IBP v. Zamora
August 15, 2000, Kapunan, J.

Facts:
IBP alleged that Erap, in ordering the military deployed in Manila, committed grave abuse of
discretion because: (a) no emergency existed, and thus no military deployment was warranted;
and (b) through Letters of Instruction formulated by the head of the national police, the joint
exercise of Task Force Tulungan (as visibility patrols) conducted by the marines and the PNP
was a violation of civilian supremacy because the task of law enforcement was civilian in
nature.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the IBP has standing.

No. They failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.
Upholding the rule of law and the constitution is not sufficient to clothe it with standing. This
is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
(2) WON the Presidents decision is subject to judicial review.

Yes. When the President calls out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, the Court
cannot question the wisdom or substitute its own. However, it can still conduct an examination
on whether such a decision was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether or
not it was exercised constituting grave abuse of discretion.

In lieu of such a decision made by the President, it is incumbent for the petitioners to show that
the decision was without factual basis. No evidence of such nature was adduced.

(3) WON grave abuse of discretion was committed in calling out the military when no
emergency existed.

In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the
peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is
not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to
the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law,
in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative
want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the

armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law,
in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

(4) WON in deploying the marines, the President violated the civilian supremacy clause.

IBP contends that with the said agreement, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized
and is thus in violation of Sec. 3, Article II of the Constitution.

Court rules that there is no breach. The joint exercise merely constitutes a permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement; military participation in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI. Furthermore,
leadership is vested in the PNP, a civilian institution, and their assigned role specifically gives
them the responsibility of directing and managing the deployment of the marines.

There is no incursion of the military because the marines werent incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP - the marines, in effect, merely provided assistance in these visibility
patrols; hence, such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

As evidenced by the long history of military and civilian agencies working in tandem with each
other, the joint visibility patrols instead of showing the alleged derogation of civilian
supremacy, shows mutual support and cooperation in the deployment of the marines.

Puno, Separate:
He contends that the executive branchs decision to cloud its activities under the political
question doctrine will not suffice.

Mendoza, Dissenting, Concurring:
There being no actual controversy manifest yet, the case should not be heard, but he
concurs with the dismissal of the petition because of the lack of standing.


PT&T v. NLRC

Facts:
A womans (Grace de Guzman) employment was terminated by PT&T because of alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds. De Guzman argues that the real
reason she was fired was because she contracted the married during employment which is
against company policy. She admits, however, that when she applied to work she indicated she
was single when, in fact, she was already married. She was reminded by correspondence of the
companys policy of not accepting married women as employees. She subscribed to the defense
that she wasnt aware of such a policy and thus, had no intent to hide the fact that she was
already married. The labor arbiter decided that she was discriminated against because of
having contracted marriage while employed with the company. PT&T appealed to the NLRC but
the latter upheld the decision of the labor arbiter modifying the decision by saying the womans
dishonest nature warrants a 3-month suspension from work.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON PT&Ts policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts a marriage, is discriminatory and thus contrary to the Constitution?
Yes. Although PT&T asserts that it dismissed Grace because of her dishonesty; records, not to
mention the letter reminding her of her companys policy, say otherwise; proving that she was
terminated because of her civil status. Furthermore, it was the policy itself which was the cause
of Graces secretive conduct (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.)
PT&Ts allegations of misappropriation is insincere and self-serving.


Tanada v. Angara
May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.

Facts:
The Philippines, by ratification of the President and concurrence of the Senate became a member of the
WTO. Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in the
agreement, annexes and other parts of the treaty. These allegedly place foreign nationals on equal
footing as Filipinos in contravention of the Constitutions Filipino-first policy. Main provisions which are
supposedly violated by the WTO agreement are the following:

(1) Art II, Sec. 19 Self-reliant, independent economy.

(2) Art. XII Sec. 10 Capital owned by Filipinos; grants, privileges, concessions for national economy
gives preference to qualified Filipinos.

(3) Art. XII Sec. 12 Preferential use of Filipino labor, material and goods.

These provisions are allegedly desecrated in the areas of investment measures, trade selected aspects of
IPR, and in the General Agreement on Trade in Services.

The SolGen, on the other hand, argues (a) that the charter provisions are not self-executing and are
mere general policies; (b) that the provisions shouldnt be read in isolation but in conjunction with Art.
XII Sec. 1 and 13, which when read properly as a whole, ensures that the WTO agreement doesnt
violate the Constitution; and (c) that WTO contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries
like the Philippines from the harshness of trade liberalization.

By praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the petition presents a jusiticiable controversy?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld."

(2) WON the WTO agreement and its three annexes contravene the respective provisions in the
Constitution.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by
Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready

for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to attain Balanced
Development of
Economy

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows: (1) A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; (2) A
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and (3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.

With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them
competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos." In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities
of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"; and speaks of
industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,
this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the
rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them.


WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect
weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN
where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that
of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This
is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development."

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
"economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

"Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities."

The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination"
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply
to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," the
fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,"
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor
of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy
of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor
does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition.


Oposa v. Factoran

Facts:
Petitioners, minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it was a
taxpayers class suit representing themselves, the countless multitudes, and future generations
of those who are entitled to the benefits of the countrys virgin tropical forests.

The plaintiffs complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in the
Philippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else.

Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987,
satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Recent
surveys, in the meantime, show that only 2.8% of the countrys land area is composed of
tropical virgin rainforests.

Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation, the Philippine Islands will be
bereft of national resources after the end of the decade, if not earlier. Plaintiffs assert their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to
protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

The complaint was filed against Factoran, then head of the DENR; it would order the DENR to
cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country, and cease and desist from
accepting, processing, renewing, and approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed the complaint
and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done because it
would not allow due process. The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier right to a
sound environment, and added that (a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they were
considered protected by the non-impairment clause, the State may still revoke such
agreements when public interest demands it; and (b) in granting more TLAs to cover more
areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion, and is
therefore subject to judicial scrutiny.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.

The petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the

present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

(2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve a the petitioners cause of action?

Yes. Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution provides the right. A cause of action is therefore
present but as far as cancellation of TLAs is concerned, there is a need to implead the
guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties.

(3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the non-impairment clause?

No. Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the same cannot
be stigmatized as a violation of non-impairment clause because it is within the States exercise
of police power to protect its ecology.

Feliciano, Concurring:
Although the petitioners are in fact entitled to a balanced and healthful ecology as stressed
by the Constitutional right, one cannot classify such a right as specific without doing
excessive violence to the language. The implications of making the Sections in Article II self-
executory are not the subject of this case. Petitioners should seek a specific legal right. It is
his understanding that the Courts decision implies that within the collection of statutes,
there is a specific right which the petitioners can use.


Chavez v. Phil. Estates Authority
2

Facts:
PEA, as authorized by its charter created by Marcos, was mandated to reclaim land, develop, improve,
etc sell, and lease these reclaimed lands. During the time of Cory, more land was transferred to PEA
under its name. Transfer Certificate of Titles of the then reclaimed Freedom Islands were given to PEA
during this time. During Ramos tenure as President, PEA, entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA)
with AMARI, a private corporation without public bidding. The JVA intended to develop the reclaimed
Freedom Islands and reclaim an additional 250 hectares surrounding said islands. In 1996, Senate
President Maceda, in a privileged speech, called the JVA the grandmother of all scams. An
investigation ensued with the report concluding the following:

(1) The lands being sold to AMARI were lands of the public domain which the government has not yet
classified as alienable, and therefore the PEA has no authority to sell yet.

(2) Transfer Certificate of Titles of the Freedom Islands are then void; and the

(3) JVA entered into is illegal.
In 1997, a Legal Task Force was formed by the President to study the JVA; but contrary to the Senate
investigation that decried the JVA, the task force upheld its legality. This prompted Chavez, in 1998, to
file suit as a taxpayer, contending the following:

Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale
of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks
to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

The Amended JVA, however, pushed through after being signed by PEA and AMARI, with the approval of
then President Estrada. After such a maneuver, Chavez prayed that the renegotiated contract be
declared null and void based on constitutional and statutory grounds.

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the case is academic and moot after subsequent events.

Respondents Yes; satisfied petitioners prayer for disclosure of renegotiations; moot, because already
signed.
Petitioners - counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking
the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential
approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.

2
As youll gather from the last few deplorable digests (and this last one) Ive run out of juice. Feel free to fix/update/mock them at
your convenience. Mars.


Court - PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of
the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners principal basis
in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the
Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation,
and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,
covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 (CA No. 141 for brevity). In the instant
case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for
non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141.
Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase.
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title
requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of
the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed
lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latters seventy percent
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even
allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation
project.

(2) WON the petition should be dismissed because judicial hierarchy wasnt respected.

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court.
The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a
trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

(3) WON the petition should be dismissed because of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondent they didnt ask us for the information before proceeding to Court to issue a mandamus;
this is in violation of the rule of mandamus. Tanada v. Tuvera is different from the current situation
because there, the ExecDept had an affirmative statutory duty to publish the President Decrees and
thus, the mandamus was warranted. In the instant case, PEA has no affirmative duty to disclose such
information.


Court - The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands
to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure
even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure
because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was
even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The
principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We
rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

(4) Do petitioners have standing?

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer
any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right
of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale
of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to
comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,[28] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public, thus -

Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an
issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to
initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount public interest, and if they immediately affect
the social, economic and moral well being of the people.

Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of
this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.


Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved
under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila
International Container Terminal, public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important
role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the
financial consideration involved. We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official
records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the
two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed.

(5) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern in this manner:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II
of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of
expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens,
whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials at all times x x x accountable
to the people,[29] for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained
by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the

citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is
limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the right does not include access to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.

Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the
closing of the transaction.

AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.
Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the
quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their
real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions,
putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.

We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose
publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public.
Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the
disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare
all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA
fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the
bidding process.

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the
bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the
evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite
proposition on the part of the government. From this moment, the publics right to information
attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite
proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court ruled as follows:

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic
or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

Contrary to AMARIs contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood
that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of

the transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if
one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill
of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The right covers three categories of information which are matters of public concern, namely: (1)
official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3)
government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is
part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category refers
to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or
explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category
refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other
documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations
to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like
rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic
secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as
confidential. The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations
of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity
and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant
case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by

the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also
prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

(6) Whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares[111] of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under
Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose
object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null
and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last
issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual
matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO

FACTS:
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for
Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend,
publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused
Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson from November 1998
till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on
Justice for joint investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach
Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the
chorus as well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's
resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat
is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and
corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115
representatives to the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges with
SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-
PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4
2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more bombshells
were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr.
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued

- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the
President of the Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves Malacaang Palace
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was transmitted
to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution,
which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to
administer the oath of office to GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175
experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82
confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of the new gov't.
and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus
offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this case as per
Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on
one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD:
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the
manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA
II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas
EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of the government only and it was
done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u
want a better understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec
11 in this case so look at those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this,
see Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid
Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political
question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of
powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in
the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to
court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)

5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the
de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919

FACTS

Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the citys red
light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up and
kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week. On the
night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and
Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity to
consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and were
met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo,
etc.

During their voyage, the womens relatives and friends initiated an application for habeas
corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and others
deprived the women of their liberty. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and
ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with
none of the women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this time
calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents were
only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ.

ISSUES
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WON the petitioners had standing
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty
2. WON there was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court

HELD:
1a. Yes
Ratio: When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc, another person
may submit it in his/her behalf.

Reasoning: It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with
the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from society and then shipped.
It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.


1b. No
Ratio: The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable
to (whether before the SC or before a lower court).
Reasoning: The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case involves parties from different parts
of the country. Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint.

1c. Yes
Ratio: The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of
freedom of locomotion.

Reasoning: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from
such restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

2. 1st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the court on the day
named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail however, the court forebore drastic
action because it did not want the public to see a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

2nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. The
mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. However, the court decided that there was
substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to
Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident
finally closed.

3. Ratio: Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable, his methods
were unlawful. An officers failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of
habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.

Reasoning: He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of events and had
under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
but failed. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some
were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was
merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.

Disposition: No further action on the w of hc. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall pay
Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court.


ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957

FACTS:
- Injunction and Mandamus
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. It prohibits aliens
and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage
directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail business.
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and
partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime
Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila.
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
A. Police Power
- the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
B. Equal Protection Clause
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
1. presence of public interest and welfare
2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made
C. Due Process clause
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power
- Questions for test:
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified interference with
private interest?

ISSUES:
1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of law.
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is
to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

HELD:

1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there
is a question of public interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction used by the
legislature, in this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of
one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded.
Reasoning:
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the
people on whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country. Alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
b. Economic reason alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and
wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the countrys
economy and increase national wealth.
c. precedents
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle,
Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were found to be
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility,
and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued.

2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Reasoning:
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold
upon our economic life\
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XIV provides that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and
every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the
wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.

3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the use of
general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law.
Reasoning:

a. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have
always been included within the term regulation.

4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963

FACTS:
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement
committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association,
filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file
answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioners stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn
Administration and any other govt agency.
Respondents stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before coming to court.
- Petitioners action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was
authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such, Pres
must prepare for threats without waiting for any special authority.
- Also, they say its not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by
government agency and not the government itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for
the benefit of the people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase of rice with
Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the contracts
should prevail because it came later. These contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils.
has already paid.

ISSUE:
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction

HELD:
- RA 3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils.
Petitioner has sufficient interest.

- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the exemption from
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers all importations
of rice and corn into the Phils.

- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec. RA 2207 talks
about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452 also
indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs are only in
addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which says that in all purchases by govt, incl. those for
armed forces, preference is given to materials produced in the Phils.

- The benefit of the people argument cant be accepted because there is no local rice
shortage. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian
population.

- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. Even if they were, they
are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render this case
academic. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may have been
made but the actual importation has not yet taken place.

Disposition - For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED.

- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in question and he
exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions.


ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989

FACTS:
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," especially the, less privileged.
- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on
July 27, 1987) took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations,
including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,

1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless
gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitions are justiciable.
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. 6657
contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Sub issues:
a. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by
the President of the Philippines.
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in cash
but not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the petitioners
of their property rights as protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agrarian problems is
placed on the owners only of agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by
them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, they contend that
she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the period.
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not
in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time.
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems exclusively their
own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their right to equal
protection has been violated.
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the
exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he is
unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.3
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to
be expressed in its title.

HELD:

3
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation would be.

1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown
that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied but even
if they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.
2a. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the
said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec. 16f)
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain.4 This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land.
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.5
2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was
authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not
correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for,
like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because
of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to
have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and

4
The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. It is the power to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It is inherent
because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other
two are police power and taxation.
5
Frankly, I dont like the way this ponente argues. Hes like saying, now I dont want to explain why. If you cant see the reasoning its your fault. Anyway, were infallible remember? His next sentence: There is no
need to elaborate on this matter. Tsk

has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions.
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of
the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to
Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the
House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation
measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power
was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both
houses of Congress.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification
have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar
to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To
be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court
finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use
and (2) just compensation.6
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. 27.
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded to
each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other.

Decision
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against
all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.

6
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the Constitutions the just distribution of all agricultural lands clause. Then he
plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940

FACTS:
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with modification the
recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was
favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7
a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting Secretary
of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.

ISSUES:
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all the people.

HELD:
1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend.
Reasoning
adherence to precedent

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard it was held here that discretion
may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact.
textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads, is an administrative function which cannot
be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of govtl
regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations.

2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the
public. (police power of the State)
Reasoning
precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar)
Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation

3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest number


BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991

FACTS:
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise under PD 1067-B to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a potential source of
revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was
passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all games of chance,
giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of govt revenue, next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It
sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time employed 4,494 employees in
its 9 casinos.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869

ISSUES:
Procedural Issue
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the annulment of
PD 1869
Substantive Issue/s
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license
fees
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of
gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and crony economy

HELD:
Procedural Issue:
- Considering transcendental public interest and the Courts duty to check on limits of other
branches of govt, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the
petition.
Substantive Issues:
1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not mean that govt
cant regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to govt, but to society as well.

2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes, its power
to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can grant a
municipal corporation the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take back the
power. Also, Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. The
power is now vested exclusively on national government.
Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government, such
as PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.
The power of local govt to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress may
provide. It cant be violative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy.
Local autonomy doesnt make local govt sovereign w/in state; it simply means decentralization.
The local govt has been described as a political subdivision of state constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign
nation, it cant be an imperium in imperio.
3. Equal protection doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff.
treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that some gambling
activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are
prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional.
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. But as of now,
every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of Constitution.
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to govt policies, it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its
repeal or amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.

Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.


BONDOC V PINEDA
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991

FACTS:
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time,
Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of
Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice, SC
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).

- July 1989 Bondoc filed petition
- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the
Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the
finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots
resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices
and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

- March 4, 1991 Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for
Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a
flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No.
25.
- March 13, 1991 Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had
already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido
Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said
political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in
matters where party membership is a prerequisite.
- March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13,
1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter
from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this
"distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The
decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration
by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also said that:
> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide
instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House
or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and (3) of the party having
the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
> Suggestions:
+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-
judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
+ There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the
Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity. (like thats possible)
- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong
Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
- March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership in the
tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court even said that all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and
that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. The term of office of every member thereof should
be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated
except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including
political disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against
Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying
this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET

2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura from
assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as
a member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority
that nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member
whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal
who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision
mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision
to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-
Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial
review.
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he
has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to
implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that
withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the
petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order
of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of the HRET.
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its decision in
HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the
respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's membership in
the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take
Camasuras seat in the Tribunal.

ISSUE:
WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party

HELD:
- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation
of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all
the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second
largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal
was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.

- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent.

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to
the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.
The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.

+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to security of
tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the
records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it
violated his right to security of tenure.

- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor,
the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may not be
interfered with by the House

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of
the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of
the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of
the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of
the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the
interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of

copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
respondent.Marciano A. Pineda.

Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

ARANETA V DINGLASAN
TUASON; August 26, 1949

FACTS:

- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive
Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192,
which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ
of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the
required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which
appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic uf the Philippines
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner,
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party,
applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing
money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226,
which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to,
the holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it.
- Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a
State of Total Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the
President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have
any force and effect, thereby rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void.

ISSUE:
WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when Congress held its
regular session


HELD:
YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on
May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law.

- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published, the purpose
to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution.

- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy."

- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean
restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers,
"must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory
would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.

- The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with
the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation,
the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which
was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law; for Congress might
not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the
President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would
create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be, the law.

- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to
provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency
Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to make a provision for its
termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects, and incidents of the
delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations
promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the

President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already
annulled by the legislature.

- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when Congress is
in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative
bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually
nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be
suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly
would not be eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by
the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same
manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire good faith, and
inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the
subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on
export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the
inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action
or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted."

- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which
the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting,
which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think
that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what reason could there
be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports?
Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the form of rules,
regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one.

- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act
No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and
in the carrying out of the law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not
its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his
autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would
become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary
to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the
same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.


- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He
said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident
that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can
easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the
President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to
meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers
so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment
and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not
have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of
the normal processes of government. The period that best comports with the constitutional
requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to
be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the
inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body.

- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly is given effect. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or
only such subjects as the President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In
a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law.

- After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the
separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers
in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all
its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is
preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious.
Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been
copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under
our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act,
are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.

Decision Petitions GRANTED.


YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987

FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The thrust of his petition is that the
executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is
invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge
to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A
2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on constitutionality of statute
3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process
4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police power
5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of legislative power

HELD:
1. NO. While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the
measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.

2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers.

4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State in thus interposing
its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626-A. But while
the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a
lawful method. To strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not
on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao, regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.

5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos. There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily

taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA
BUENA; October 10, 2000

FACTS:
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
- March 14, 1947 The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.
- August 30, 1951 The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.)
- February 10, 1998 President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of
conferences and negotiations.
- October 5, 1998 President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA.
(Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers,
Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmea, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla,
Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmea III, Pimentel, Legarda-
Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under which
US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is an
agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also
defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the
members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when

Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by the US Military personnel.
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher.

4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in
ratifying/concurring with the VFA?
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition
against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds
raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus
standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount
importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the
Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.

2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The or is important to take note
as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an agreement
covering only troops not baseslike the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no
distinction whether the troops or facilities will be transient or permanent, so the VFA is
covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to
obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the
Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says duly concurred in by the Senate with no specified
number).

- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty.
the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the Congress, ratified by
a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23
Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP). Requirement of ratification in a
national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador
Hubbards letter states that the VFA is binding on the US govt and that in international legal
terms such agreement is a treaty.

- A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.
- In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers.

3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the xxx Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx (this doesnt really
answer the issue above, but the ponente didnt really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an
abdication of sovereignty.. oh well here goes)

- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound
by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to
be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. We cannot
readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations,
duties and responsibilities under international law.

- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations.
Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.

4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in
ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No.

- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic
manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or
International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of the members of
Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of
the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by
the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate
alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an
abuse of power.

Decision: Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.


SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V LANTION

FACTS:

Pres. Marcos issued PD 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons who have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.

June 18, 1999, the DOJ received from the DFA a request for extradition of private respondent MARK
JIMENEZ to the US charged there with violation of the ff provisions of the US Code:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, 2 counts
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts
3. Fraud by wire, radio or television. 2 counts
4. False statements or entries, 6 counts
5. Election contributions in the name of another, 33 counts

Petitioner designated and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.

The duty of the Sec of Foreign Affairs is to forward the request together with the related documents to
the Sec of DOJ. He also has the duty of ascertaining the sufficiency and completeness of the documents
to be considered as an extradition case.

The duty of the Sec of Justice is to designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case.

However, the Sec of DFA took its duty lightly and pass it on the Sec of Justice who himself evaluate the
documents which is not his duty.

Private respondent requested the ff:
1. Copies of extradition request from US Gov. as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith;
2. Ample time to comment on the request after he received the copies of the requested papers
3. Proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

DENIED the requests for the ff reasons:

1. It is premature to furnish the copies. The dept. merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting
Gov.
2. The US Gov requested the Phil Gov to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information.
3. The dept. is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request.

Private respondent filed the ff complaints:
1. Mandamus to compel the petitioner to furnish him the documents
2. Certiorari to set aside the petitioners letter
3. Prohibition to restrain the petitioner from considering the extradition request

ISSUE:

WON the private respondent was withheld the rights of notice and hearing.

HELD/RATIO:

YES. In a preliminary investigation, Sec 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents
basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits,
and other supporting documents. And the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents within 10 days from receipt thereof.

DECISION:

Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and supporting
documents, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.


PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE ASSOC of the PHIL V DUQUE III

FACTS:

EO NO 51 (MILK CODE) was issued by President Cory Aquino o Oct 28, 1986 through her legislative
powers

World Health Assembly adopted the idea that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.

In 1990, the Phil ratified the Intl Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

Petitioners Claim:
The RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement.
y Filed for a petition for certiorari and issuance temporary restraining order

ISSUES:

1. WON Administrative Order No 2006-0012 or the RIRR issued by DOH is unconstitutional
2. WON the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the
land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR
a. Whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements

HELD/RATIO:

1. YES.

Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed
by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the

member states; neither have they proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Respondents also failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

Under the 1987 constitution, international law can become part of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation method.
a. Transformation method through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
b. Incorporation method through declaration

2. NO. Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be
validly implemented by DOH through the subject RIRR.

YES. DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing the provisions.

Cases For Manifestations of Republicanism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cases For Manifestations of Republicanism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONSTI I DIGESTS 2010

Lim v. Executive Secretary

You might also like