Solvency

Chinas drilling now --- Maduro will continue anti-American policies.

Wallis 4-15-13 (Daniel, Senior Correspondent @ Reuters, Venezuela's PDVSA to keep funding
socialist programs under Maduro, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-venezuela-
election-oil-idUSBRE93E0B520130415)
(Reuters) - Nicolas Maduro's win in Venezuela's presidential election means state oil company PDVSA
will continue funding the government's socialist policies while increasingly relying on deals
with China and Russia. The late Hugo Chavez picked Maduro, a 50-year-old former bus driver, to continue
his self-declared revolution in the OPEC country where he nationalized most of the oil industry during his
polarizing 14-year rule. That put Venezuela's crude reserves, the world's biggest, at the service of Chavez's power base among
the poor majority. Maduro, who narrowly won the presidential election on Sunday with 50.7 percent of votes, now takes office
on a pledge to push forward his late boss's plan. His opposition rival, Henrique Capriles, refused to recognize the result and
demanded a recount, although the National Electoral Council said Maduro's victory was "irreversible". Maduro can be
expected to increase oil sales to political allies, especially China, at the expense of the
United States , the traditional top buyer of Venezuelan crude, while taking on more debt from those partners. Chavez
turned PDVSA into the financial motor of his self-styled revolution, funding everything from sports and cultural events to free
health clinics and home-building programs. Critics say that stopped the company from focusing on its main priorities, leading to
the neglect of older oil fields and new projects alike, and fomenting a culture in which technocrats were replaced by political
appointees. Chavez sharply increased fuel sales to China amid years of ideological tensions
with the United States, turning Beijing into his government's biggest single source of foreign
funding. Venezuela now sends China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude and products, up
from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment for loans totaling $36 billion. And the biggest
Chinese energy company, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's
ambitious efforts to tap its vast Orinoco extra heavy crude belt , one of the planet's largest
mostly-untapped hydrocarbon reserves.

Chavez kicked foreign oil companies out of Venezuela, and things wont change
under Maduro.
Chazan 3-6-13 (Guy, FT energy correspondent, Venezuela oil sector limited by obligations, Financial
Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcb7c4de-866f-11e2-ad73-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Yb9ipX1K)
But Hugo Chvezs ascent to the presidency in 1999 changed all that. He nationalised the oil industry, forcing
foreign oil companies to cede majority control of their projects to PDVSA , the state-owned oil
group. ExxonMobil had its assets expropriated after it refused to play ball. Many experienced
engineers fled into self-imposed exile after a crippling strike at PDVSA in 2002. PDVSA has been hollowed out. It bankrolls many
social programmes, leaving little cash to spare for investment in its core areas of exploration and production. It also has to subsidise
domestic petrol, which sells for 8 cents a gallon, and to supply oil at knock-down rates to Venezuelas allies, including Cuba.
Venezuelas oil output has stagnated as a result. The country produced 3.5m barrels a day in 1998, but that
dropped to about 2.5m b/d last year. Production could rise significantly if the country were able to harness the reserves of extra
heavy oil that lie just a few hundred metres underground in the Orinoco Belt. The government has a number of projects to develop
the resource, with partners such as Chinas CNPC and Gazprom of Russia, but these have been slow to get off the ground. Few
think the situation will change much under Nicolas Maduro, who is expected to win the upcoming election.
The cash demands on PDVSA will remain high, and there is little chance of a more investor-
friendly approach. But even if the opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski wins, the outlook for the oil sector is
unlikely to significantly improve in the near term, says the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy.

Turn
Failure to maintain the Chavismo movement creates a power vacuum and an
unprecedented political crisis
Moya-Ocampos 13 [March 8, 2013. Diego Moya-Ocampos is a senior political risk analyst for
Venezuela for IHS Global Insight and IHS Janes. He previously worked as a lawyer for a private firm in
Venezuela advising government agencies and private businesses on constitutional, regulatory and
environmental issues, and as Chief Secretary at the Venezuelan Attorney-Generals Office. Chvez Death
Leaves a Power Vacuum in Venezuela http://www.americasquarterly.org/chavez-death-leaves-
power-vacuum-venezuela]
Chvez' death is a game changer in Venezuelan politics and will shake up the political order. Chavism will now try to consolidate
under Maduro, who will run in the next presidential election as the PSUV candidate. Henrique Capriles, representing the coalition Mesa de la
Unidad Democratica (Coaltion of Democractic UnityMUD), likely will run in opposition. Maduro is expected to develop a
strong Chvez-like nationalist leftist discourse in the days to come, supporting new expropriations and promoting
anti-United States and anti-opposition rhetoric . According to a poll by private pollster Hinterlaces, released on February
17, Maduro boasted 50 percent of voter support compared to Capriles 36 percent. Maduro will probably win the election, although Chvez absence
could increase the opposition's prospects if shortages of food, medicine and other basic goods continue to intensify in Venezuela.Chvez'
absence creates a power vacuum that will be hard to fill and could generate an
unprecedented political crisis should Maduro fail to maintain the Chavismo movement . If
Maduro cannot coalesce the different Chavista civilian and military factions, the military might
intervene in the government, threatening Venezuela's political stability. The Chvez movement was closely
associated with his personality, but so far the different Chavista factions seem to be gathering behind Maduro. Yet, new political actors
from the Chavista opposition and military sectors could emerge to play a key role in the days to come.
Against the backdrop of political polarization, lack of judicial independence and a national assembly subordinate to the executive branch, the armed
forces could assume a behind-the-scenes role as constitutional police, seeking to guarantee the democratic process and prevent political instability.
Such direct or indirect military intervention could affect democratic governance in Venezuela
and alter the power balance among civilian political actors. Isolated unrest and clashes between pro-government
and opposition supporters could occur but they would not threaten political stability.

Venezuelan instability causes a litany of impacts.
Max G. Manwaring, 10-xx-2005, holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War
College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and
military positions, including the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author
and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin
American security affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of El Salvador at War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace
and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. Dr.
Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of
Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Venezuelas Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf
Chvez understands all this. He understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political
change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do
ones will. This caudillo will tailor his campaign to his adversaries political and economic vulnerabilities, and to their psychological
precepts. And this is the basis of Chvezs instruction to the Venezuelan armed forces (at the 1st Military Forum on Fourth
Generation War and Asymmetric War in 2004) to develop a doctrinal paradigm change from conventional to peoples war.61 The
Issue of State Failure. President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most
dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general
is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality,
insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian
disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve
criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as
Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as
murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of
coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation,
disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD , genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and
criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional
syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict. 62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive
activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of
South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be
taken to bring 23 about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in
addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic
efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to
govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on
selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of
corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the
business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of
political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government
are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take
advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed
organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed
states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states , or new peoples
democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian
populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer
dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and
their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

Oil
Global oil prices are at their highest price in years this evidence is predictive too.
-- Reasons: Chemical weapons incident in Syria, Iraq and Libya production, protests and
militancy in Libya, closure of pipelines in Nigeria and Iraq, Turkish oil import reduction
EIA 13 (US Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Global
crude oil supply disruptions and strong demand support high oil prices,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12891#, Keerthi, Acc 10/23/13)
While Brent crude oil spot prices have increased as much as $7 per barrel (6%) since the chemical
weapons incident in Syria on August 21, 2013, market fundamentals had been moving Brent prices higher
even earlier. From mid-April to August 20, Brent crude oil spot prices increased almost $15 per barrel
(15%) because of increasing global refinery demand coupled with record levels of unexpected
crude oil production outages, notably in Iraq and Libya. Global unplanned crude oil and liquid fuels disruptions averaged 2.7 million barrels
per day (bbl/d) in August, the highest level over the period January 2011 through August 2013. Oil supply
disruptions in key producing countries are up sharply: Libya . Protests at many seaport
facilities have blocked exports, and, as a result, crude oil supply disruptions averaged close to 1 million bbl/d in August, up from 0.13 million bbl/d in April.
Pipeline closures by militia groups at the end of August have worsened the situation, with disruptions rising to 1.35-1.4 million
bbl/d by the end of August. Nigeria . Disruptions in June on key pipelines helped curtail almost 450,000 bbl/d of production, up
100,000 bbl/d compared to May. Production recovered somewhat by August when 290,000 bbl/d were off-line. Iraq. Persistent attacks
on the pipeline from Kirkuk toCeyhan in Turkey helped push disruptions of Iraqi crude oil production to
250,000 bbl/d in August, up 100,000 bbl/d from April. In addition, September maintenance at the Iraqi port of Basra could further reduce exports by several hundred thousand barrels per day. Although the
Iraqi government has stated that exports will not be affected, a preliminary September loading schedule indicates a decline of several hundred thousand barrels per day. Source: U.S. Energy Information
Administration Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Syria is not a major crude oil producer, and significant volumes of crude oil do not move
through the country to reach global markets. Before the civil war began in 2011, Syria produced around 400,000 bbl/d of crude oil and exported about 150,000 bbl/d, mostly to Europe. However,
ongoing hostilities, which have significantly affected energy infrastructure, combined with
stringent international sanctions on petroleum exports from Syria, cut crude oil production
by about 85%. As a result, while the recent events in Syria have pushed Brent prices higher on concerns about wider geopolitical unrest in the Middle East, they have not reduced the physical
flow of crude oil into the global market.
Chinas investing in Venezuelan oil in the status quo- means they are moving
towards privatization.
Zhu 10 (Chen, CNPC, Venezuela Sign Oil Deal, Caixin Online, 4-19-10, http://english.caixin.com/2010-
04-19/100136697.html)
China's leading oil company China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) signed an agreement with
Venezuela state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela to develop an oil block in the Orinoco
Belt, Eastern Venezuela. Under the contract, the companies will set up a joint venture to develop
the Junin 4 block of the Orinoco Belt for 25 years. The project production capacity is
expected to reach 2.9 billion barrels. The Junin 4 block covers an area of 325 kilometers, with estimated reserve of
8.7 billion barrels. The project's annual production capacity may reach 20 million tons. Venezuelan Oil
Minister Rafael Ramirez said on April 16 that CNPC will have to pay the Venezuelan government as much as US$1 billion to access
the reserves. The signing ceremony was held in Venezuela's capital, Caracas, on April 17, with the attendance of President Hugo
Chvez. China and Venezuela also signed a long term financing agreement in which China
agreed to extend US$ 20 billion in loans to Venezuela with a term of 10 years . CNPC and
Petroleos de Venezuela signed oil supply contracts as the guarantee of the loan.
Heg
We agree, they increase heg. But by increasing heg, they are unilateral in
nature.

Hegemony makes great power wars more likely transition war and
stabilization theory are wrong and rationalizes aggression that causes structural
violence
Sjoberg 10 (Laura, Assoc. Prof of Poli Sci @ U of Florida, Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, p 85-90)
***[PTT = Power Transition Theory]
A feminist approach suggests several critiques of the PTT research agenda which question the accuracy
of its causal explanations, the normative value of its definitions, and the appropriateness of its empirical
predictions. Feminists argue that gender expectations and assumptions are a constitutive and causal
force in global politics. 35 PTTs failure to acknowledge gender in global politics is reflected in its definition of power, its
normative commitment to elitist assumptions about the relevant actors in global politics, and the variables used to explain empirical
phenomena. Power in power transition theory Power transition theorists see power as the ability to impose
one states will on another. 36 Feminists identify this interpretation as power-over 37 and critique its conceptual narrowness and
gendered content. 38 Power-over means that ideologies suit the changing interests of those in power, and not those whose lives are controlled by
them. 38 This is particularly evident in PTTs explanation of how a state obtains power(-over). PTT explains the acquisition of power as having three
dimensions: population, productivity, and political efficiency. 40 As Tammen et al. explain, population is the sine qua non for great power status
because it is the potential resource pool that a nation can begin to mobilize for its economic development and ultimately determines in the long run
which nations will remain major powers. 41 Power transition theorists seem unaware that womens rights vary inversely with population increases. 42
The same is true of labor productivity. States that increase labor productivity do so by augmenting the export sector. Women fill these new jobs, which
are underpaid and risky. Women who had previously been in the household are often still expected to fulfill their household functions. 43 PTTs
view of power also sets up future conflicts . Power-over means that the accumulation of power is
necessarily competitive and zero-sum, making conflict likely if not necessary. Viewing power as zero-sum also
presumes a stark distinction between self (state) and other(state) where the advantages of accumulated power can be confined to its accumulator.
Some states (even great states) are not primarily or even secondarily concerned with the competitive acquisition of power. 44 In a globalized world,
not all power acquisitions are zero-sum. Presuming the necessity of competition puts global politics on a
path towards conflict, and assuming that power acquisitions can be contained misrepresents the distribution of gains. Feminists argue
that people and states without power-over are not powerless. As Allen argues, To think about power solely in terms of domination neglects the power
that women do have ... empowerment. 45 In fact, the need to theorize power that women retain in spite of masculine domination has led feminists
to explore different sources and manifestations of power. Two important results are understandings of power which Al len categorizes as power-to
and power with. 46 Power-to is the capacity of an agent to act in spite of or in response to power wielded over her by others (i.e., rebellion or
revolt). 47 Power-with is the ability to act in concert with other weak actors to match the strength of the dominant power. 48 In this interpretation, by
emphasizing plurality and community ... [feminist theory] consciously seeks to distance power from
domination and understands power collaboratively. 49 PTT focuses on great states to explain the dynamics of
international security. Power transition theorists explain that PTT attacks the central issue of world politics great power stability. 54 Great power
stability matters because the dominant state defines the structure of the international system. Feminist perspectives question both the state-centrism
of PTT and its focus on big states. First, feminists interrogate the state-centrism of PTT. PTT assumes that the state is unitary with definable interests.
Feminists define security in broad terms. In these terms, a secure world would be one without physical, structural, 55 or ecological viol ence. 56
Security threats are also found in threats to individual lives at the margins of global politics, such as hunger, disease, sexual violence, and small arms. 57
Feminist research has shown how those at the political margins can become insecure even
while states are becoming more secure. Women s bodies have been considered the means to an end in debates over
the US security force in South Korea, the prevalence of and possible solutions to AIDS, and debates about refugee camp
composition, to name a few. 58 These threats are often more vicious than the threat of great power war.
59 Because many feminists see individual security as central, they critique the hierarchy that PTT values. Feminist theorizing, as a
commitment to under- standing the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated, recognizes that the least
fortunate are the people who are excluded from the consideration of decision-makers and grand
theorists. 60 Feminist theorists have been critical of hierarchy for the pressure that it puts on the bottom. PTT does not share this interest. In PTT,
the international system is viewed as a pyramid-shaped hierarchy where at the very top tier is the system s dominant power. The next tier contains
the great powers, followed by the medium and small powers. 61 PTTs policy prescriptions demonstrate that power transition theorists not only see
the model as accurate, they believe it is beneficial. Tammen et al. characterize small powers as irrelevant because they pose no threat to the dominant
nations leadership in the international system. 62 PTT suggests that a dominant nation should convince
challengers to live in a world stacked against their interest, because a dominant nation that
successfully co-opts potential challengers ensures that the international status quo will be preserved. 63 In
other words, PTT has a normative investment in a hierarchical international system. Rather than endorse domination, some feminist
theorists argue that empathy and care should be seen as alternatives to domination. Christine Sylvester explains
that empathy rests on the ability and willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully. It is to
hear ... and be transformed in part by our appreciation. 64 An empathetic approach enables respectful
negotiations with contentious others because we can recognize involuntary similarities across difference as
well as differences that mark independent identity. 65 As such, there is no arrogance of uniqueness and precious little
committed defensiveness. 66 Instead of an international structure which excludes most citizens of the world, some feminists suggest
connectedness as an alternative structure. 67 Explanatory variables in great power politics Gender dynamics also act on the
empirical phenomena PTT studies. Even taking the subject matter of PTT (great power competition) on its own merits, feminist analyses question the
causal mechanisms that PTT uses. PTT considers power parity and dissatisfaction. These variables cannot explain the events of interest to PTT for two
major reasons. First, while the power transition scenario envisions a possibility that a peaceful power transition takes place where the challenger is
satisfied, the internal logic of PTT makes that a contradiction in terms. Elsewhere, PTT explains that other states are dissatisfied with the status quo
international order because it was put in place by the hegemon for its own benefit. 68 Challengers are, by definition, dissatisfied. Second, parity of
material power- over can be very different depending on the influence of power-to and power-with. Additional forces may be acting on the propensity
of great powers to come into conflict. One such force is international system patriarchy. Patriarchy is the structural and ideological system that
perpetuates the privileging of masculinity. 69 Feminists have identified patriarchy as a principal cause for so
many of the world s processes *such as+ empire-building, globalization, modernization. 70 Enloe details: Patriarchal
systems are notable for marginalizing the feminine. That is, insofar as any society or group is patriarchal, it is there that it
is comfortable unquestioned to infantilize, ignore, trivialize, or even actively cast scorn upon what is thought to be feminized. 71 In an
international system of patriarchy, one would expect that dominance would be the ultimate place of honor, and states would strive to approximate
that position. Feminist work suggests that international system patriarchy could be a key explanatory component of
great power (and other) conflict in the international arena. 72 PTTs research question might be rephrased to ask why, at
the moment of equality, great powers are most likely to engage in conflict. Feminists might suggest that relatively equal great
powers come to blows because of state masculinity. States compete to prove their masculinity,
irrespective of power parity. For example, as Ann Tickner explains, The 1991 Persian Gulf War was frequently depicted as a
personal contest between Saddam Hussein and George H. W. Bush and described in appropriate locker-room or football language. 73 In states
competitions, the winner s masculinity is affirmed, while the loser s masculinity is subordinated. In the dominant narrative of the First Gulf War, the
US tough but tender ideal-typical masculinity saved Kuwait s helpless femininity from Iraq s hypermasculinity. 74 The masculinity of the US
was affirmed and valorized while Iraqs masculinity was called into doubt. 75 Feminist theorists have used the term hegemonic masculinity as an
analytical tool to understand this competition. According to Charlotte Hooper, Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to a range of
subordinated masculinities in opposition to femininity. 76 In describing a states hegemonic masculinity, feminists argue that the state organizational
practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena. 77 An ideal-typical masculinity establishes cultural hegemony through moral persuasion
and consent, entrenched ideological ascendency, and an ethos of coercion. 78 Hegemonic masculinity consists of the attributes that are most widely
subscribed to and least questioned in a given social formation: the common sense of gender as subscribed to by all men save those whose
masculinity is oppositional or deviant. 79 Each hegemonic masculinity is the set of standards to which men are expected to aspire. Hegemonic or
ideal-typical masculinities have been linked to states contextual understandings of heroism on the battle field. Feminists have argued that some men
fight wars while other men could fight wars; war-fighting is always tied to the image of masculinity. 80 Judith Gardam has explained that, often, the
social construct of what it is to be male ... is represented by the male warrior, the defender of the security of the state. 81 In these models,
masculinity, virility, and violence have been linked together. 82 Feminists have long argued that hegemonic masculinities and
subordinate masculinities play a role in ordering the international system. 83 For example, Steve Niva
describes the hegemonic tough but tender US masculinity during the First Gulf War as valuing bravery on the battle field and sympathy and care for
civilians. 84 A number of feminist scholars have noted that, some- times, a states hegemonic masculinity becomes
reactionary or hypermasculine in response to threat. 85 Feminists have identified elements of state hypermasculinity in
the US in the post-9/11 era, as well as in the Spanish-American War and the beginning of the Cold War. 86 Feminists argue that variations in the
characteristics and salience of a states hegemonic masculinity over time influence state behavior. Feminist research suggests that the question of
whether two powerful states come into conflict as they reach power parity might result from the characteristics of the ideal-typical masculinity in
that state at the time. In such a scenario, conflict becomes more likely when states hegemonic
understandings of masculinity involve conquest, war heroism, competition, aggressiveness, or fighting; or
some sense of racial or cultural superiority vis--vis a challenger. On the other hand, conflict would be less likely when states hegemonic
understandings of masculinity involved tenderness, stoicism, restraint, or responsibility.

U.S. heg provokes geopolitical backlash- triggers conflicts with world powers.
Layne 06- Christopher Layne is Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A & M University. (Fall 2006, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar
Moment, Vol. 31, No. 2) SA
U.S. hegemony cannot endure indefinitely. Even the strongest proponents of primacy harbor
an unspoken fear that U.S. hegemony will provoke the very kind of geopolitical backlash that
they say cannot happen (or at least cannot happen for a very long time).119 In fact, although a
new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states
have been engaging in balancing against the United Statesincluding hard balancing. U.S.
concerns about Chinas great power emergence reflect Washingtons fears about the military, as
well as economic, implications of Chinas rise. Other evidence suggestsat least by some
measuresthat the international system is closer to a multipolar distribution of power than
primacists realize. In its survey of likely international developments through 2020, the National
Intelligence Councils report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China
and India as new major global playerssimilar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and
the United States in the early 20th century will transform the geopolitical landscape, with
impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that
commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen
as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.120
In a similar vein, a recent study by the Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both
China (which Mapping the Global Future argues will then be by any measure a rst-rate military
power) and the European Union could each have nearly as much power as the United
States.121 Projecting current trends several decades into the future has its pitfalls (not least
because of the difficulty of converting economic power into effective military power). But if this
ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the
international system are likely to emerge in the next decade or two.
U.S heg triggers unnecessary wars risks overstretch
Layne 06- Christopher Layne is Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A & M University. (Fall 2006, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar
Moment, Vol. 31, No. 2) SA
Conclusion
The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the
fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by
adopting a multipolarand essentially unilateraloffshore balancing strategy that
accommodates the rise of new great powers.130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant
ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The
United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for
hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced
from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the
international system and geography.131 Thus, to reduce others concerns about its power, the
United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by
others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America that has the wisdom
and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world
to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore
balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably
will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous
strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially
given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting
to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to
balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially
overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than
risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize
on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore
balancing, indeed, is Americas next grand strategy.
US heg motivates terrorism fear of no support or aggression
Jervis, 2009 (Robert- Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, and has
been a member of the faculty since 1980, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v061/61.1.jervis.html, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009 , pp. 188-213)
Some classical balance thinking still applies, however. States have a variety of security concerns that require
influencing or acting independently from the superpower, and they have interests that extend beyond
security that may call for a form of counterbalancing. Even if others do not fear attack from
the unipole, they may believe that the latters behavior endangers them, a worry that parallels that of
traditional alliance entrapment.46 Thus today some states believe that the way the U.S. is pursuing its
war on terror increases the chance they will be the victim of terrorist attacks and
decreases stability in the Middle East, an area they depend on for oil. So there is reason for them to act in
concert to restrain the U.S.47 The point is not to block the U.S. from conquering them, as in traditional
balancing, but to increase their influence over it. Although such efforts will not be automatic and their occurrence
will depend on complex calculations of costs, benefits, and the possibilities of success, these
concerns provide an impetus for trying to make it harder for the unipole to act alone. Others
may also fear that the unipole will refuse to act when their security, but not its own security, is at stake.
As Waltz notes, absence of threat permits [the superpowers] policy to become capricious.48 It is
not surprising that American policy has changed more from one administration to the next after the cold war than it did
during it, and the fear of abandonment may be the main motive behind the Europeans pursuit of a rapid reaction force. With it
they would have the capability to act in the Balkans or East Europe if the U.S. chose not to, to intervene in small
humanitarian crises independently of the U.S., and perhaps to trigger American action by
starting something that only the U.S. could finish. This is not balancing against American
power , but, rather, is a hedge against the possibility that the U.S. would withhold it, perhaps
in response to European actions of which the U.S. disapproved. 49

Another major terrorist attack against the U.S. would cause it to
precipitate a nuclear conflict
Peterson 01 John L- President, Arlington Institute, The Next Sound You Hear, World
Future Society, http://www.wfs.org/mmpetersen.htm
But there seems to be a rather specific objective behind all of this. There is an end-game that these
terrorists seem to have in mind, and it is not just to kill a bunch of Americans. The analysis that I read points to
all of this being the Islamic radicals first assault in a war aimed at elevating Islam to being the major influential religion and
political system in the world. How might they do that with the relatively limited resources that they have? Again, the most
salient thinking that Ive found suggests that theyd like to turn America against
Islam, and vice-versa. A holy war between Islam and the West. How do you do that? Get the U.S. to
overreact. Focus the unhappiness of the vast numbers of desperately poor Muslims around more high-profile injustice visited
on them indiscriminately by American retaliation for the September 11 attacks. Mobilize them around a gross inequity . . . the
same way that Americans (and the West) have mobilized around a great inequity. The third principle is therefore:
Provoke Over-Reaction. Get the West to seemingly strike out against "Islam" again. Give
them the basis for moving their religious war into high-gear. If this is the framework for a second strike, then where should we
look? We should look for places where a relatively small, sophisticated effort can produce inordinate social pain and anger.
Produce an event that will cause Americans, in the fury of the aftermath, to look with
hate upon every Arabic-looking person they see and strike out in vengeance. (That, of
course, is the predictable way in which things work in many places on the planet.) The best of all worlds would be a
nuclear counter-strike that wiped out a bunch of innocent Muslims that would
start the war for sure. Where are our vulnerabilities in this kind of scenaric world? Obviously, there is the possibility
of a nuclear or biological attack, and that is where we will immediately put up our defenses.