Lorenzo Tanada vs. Hon Juan C.

Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS:
Lorenzo Tanada demands the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2 covers the publication of presidential decrees in the Official Gazette.

HELD:
Yes. Covered by Article 2 are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or directly conferred by the Constitution. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
its purpose is to inform













In re Ines Basa de Mercado
Joaquina Basa vs. Atilano Mercado
G.R. No. L-42226 July 25, 1935

FACTS:
CFI Judge Reyes probated Ines last will and testament and declared Atilano as the only heir.
Joaquina challenged CFIs jurisdiction because of failure to comply with Sec. 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides that when a will is delivered, the court shall publish a notice in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province 3 weeks consecutively. Joaquina contends that the newspaper Ing
Katipunan where the Court publishes is not a newspaper of general circulation since it has less subscribers
than Manila Daily.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of Joaquina is valid.
HELD:
No. The law does not require that publication of the notice referred to in the Code of Civil
Procedure should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers of subscribers is necessary to
contribute a newspaper of general circulation. Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
because it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information. It is published at
regular intervals and has a bona fide list of paying subscribers.










Jose Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. L-47616 September 16, 1947

FACTS:
Jose is born of a Chinese father and Filipino mother. They went to China in 1925. Upon his return
in 1940 to the Philippines as a Filipino citizen, he was denied admission because he is said to be Chinese.
Jose filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpuz and was granted by the Supreme Court. The Court said
that Tan Chong was a Filipino citizen and should not be deported. The case of Lee Swee Sang vs.
Commonwealth was decided on the same date as the case bar dismissing Lees petition for naturalization
since he was recognized as a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
set aside both decisions because they are not citizens pursuant to the laws in force at the time of their
birth. The Solicitor General cited the case of Chua vs. Secretary of Labor where a person of Chinese
parentage in the Philippines is not a Filipino because she followed the citizenship of her parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principe of stare decisis shall apply.

HELD:
No. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict between
the precedent and law. The duty of the Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in
violation of the law in force.









Corazon Catalan vs. Jose Basa et al
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

FACTS:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service due to
schizophrenia. In 1951, he donated half of his real property to Mercedes Catalan, his sister. In 1953, the
Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed as Felicianos guardian after the latter was declared
incompetent. In 1978, he and his wife Corazon donated their property to Delia and Jesus Basa. BPI
alleged that the donation was void ab initio because Feliciano was not of sound mind and therefore
incapable of giving consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation made by Feliciano is void.

HELD:
No. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. The burden of incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it. A
person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property.











Willem Beumer vs. Avelina Amores
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

FACTS:
Willem and Avelina, a Dutch and Filipina respectively, married on March 29. 1980. After several
years, the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of Willems
psychological incapacity. Beumer filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal partnership. In defense,
Avelina averred the exception of their two houses because she used her own personal property to
purchase the lots. Willem claimed that the said properties were acquired with the money he received from
the Dutch government as his disability benefit since Avelina had no sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject lots may be claimed by Beumer.

HELD:
No. An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause do not apply in this case
because the action is proscribed by the Constitution. Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by
law to acquire any private land in the Philippines except through inheritance.











WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES,
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
FACTS OF THE CASE:
WILLEM BEUMER, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29,
1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage. Consequently,
WILLEM BEUMER filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for the
distribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
During trial, WILLEM BEUMER testified that while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of land, were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received
from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient
income. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted was contrary to Article 89 of the
Family Code, hence, invalid. The RTC ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the
acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and Z, WILLEM BEUMER could not have acquired any right
whatsoever over these properties as WILLEM BEUMER still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
private lands. This was made evident by the sworn statements WILLEM BEUMER executed
purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his
wife, the herein respondent.
WILLEM BEUMERs plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase
The foregoing properties on the basis of equity were likewise denied for not having come to court
with clean hands. CA affirmed. WILLEM BEUMER appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not WILLEM BEUMER may reimburse his investment in the purchase of Filipino
land
HELD: RTC RULING - Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private
land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
CA RULING - A promulgated a Decision affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC.
SUPREME COURT RULING - The Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA.
The Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It
held that the foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, WILLEM BEUMER openly admitted that he "is
well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the
latters name.

Clearly, WILLEM BEUMERs actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the
constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why
it should not apply the Muller ruling. The time-honored principle is that he who has done
inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is
null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant WILLEM BEUMERsclaim for reimbursement on the basis
of unjust enrichment. It does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.




















Elena Muller vs. Helmut Muller
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

FACTS:
Elena and Helmut were married in Germany in 1989. In 1992, they permanently resided in the
Philippines and by this time, Helmut inherited his parents house in Germany which he sold and used the
proceeds to purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. They were legally separated due to Helmuts
womanizing, drinking and maltreatment. The trial court terminated their property regime. Helmut seeks to
recover his money used to acquire the Antipolo property and considered ownership over the property in
trust for Elena.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Helmut may recover the funds and the said property.

HELD:
No. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, an aliens disqualification
from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. The
distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on an
aliens spouses part, to allow reimbursement would in effect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.











ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER VS. HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615
August 29, 2006

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by Helmut Mullers
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
Helmut Muller had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the
construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00.

The Antipolo property was registered in the name of Elena Buenaventura Muller under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to
incompatibilities and Helmut Mullers alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, Helmut Muller filed a petition for
separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On August 12, 1996, the
trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between the Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the Helmut
Muller. However, it ruled that Helmut Muller cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Under Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by Helmut Muller in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of
the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the
personal properties purchased there by belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of
that inheritance used by the Elena Buenaventura Muller for acquiring the house and lot in this
country cannot be recovered by the Elena Buenaventura Muller, its acquisition being a violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties
of the said real property.

Helmut Muller appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying
the trial courts Decision. It held that Helmut Muller merely prayed for reimbursement for the
purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered Elena Buenaventura Mullers ownership over the property in trust for the Helmut
Muller. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution
which prohibits Helmut Muller from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property?

HELD
NO. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmuts disqualification
from owning lands inthe Philippines is absolute.Where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favorof the party who
is guilty of the fraud.Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.



















Teofisto Verceles vs. Maria Clarissa Posada
G.R No. 159785 April 27, 2007

FACTS:
Clarissa was hired by Virac, Catanduanes Mayor Teofisto Verceles as a casual employee.
Verceles made amorous advances on her and said that he was unhappy with his wife and would divorce
her anytime. Sometime in 1987, Clarissa got pregnant. She and her parents filed a complaint for
damages coupled with support pendent lite. The trial court and CA both ordered Teofisto to pay monthly
support for Clarissas child and pay damages to Clarissa parents. Verceles questioned the payment of
damages to Clarissas parents because Clarissa was already an adult.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Clarissas parents Constantino and Francisca are entitled to damages.

HELD:
No. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of
seduction is inapplicable because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with Teofisto.
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love
child to damages.











Eloisa Goitia vs. Jose Campos Rueda
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

FACTS:
Eloisa and Jose married in 1915 and immediately resided in Manila. A month after the marriage,
Jose demanded Eloisa that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs but the latter
refused. On other successive dates, Jose made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife. Eloisa
filed an action for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eloisas action will prosper.

HELD:
Yes. The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her
part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in
his own home the one having the right to the same.











Leonora Perido vs. Maria Perido
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975

FACTS:
Lucio Perido was married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong with
whom he begot three children. After Benita died, Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat with whom he had
five children. Lucio died in 1942 and his second wife died in 1943. On August 15, 1960, the children and
grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio executed a Declaration of Heirship and
Extrajudicial Partition of Lucios lots in Negros Occidental. The children belonging to Lucios first
marriage had second thoughts about the partition and in 1962, they filed a complaint to annul the said
Declaration. They alleged that the lots partitioned belong to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio
and Benita and that the children of Lucio with Marcelina were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucios second marriage is valid.

HELD:
Yes. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The statement of the civil
status of a person in a certificate of title issued to him is not conclusive to show that he is not actually
married to another. It is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together as
husband and wife are married to each other.









Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee
GR No.18081
March 3, 1922


FACTS OF THE CASE

Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left
property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng
Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriag contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan
Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to
Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased
namely Payang and Rosalia.

The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that
Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter
testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee
had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the
estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the
trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a
lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children.

The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Islands
laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid.
2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that:
(1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a
natural child while
(2) It found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the
widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to
them under the law.

Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted outside the islands, which
would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A
Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned
and discredited, after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save
upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of
such impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a
so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.








































Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062
January 24, 1992
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.
On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice
of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to
a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.
The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto
who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and
(his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
SERMONIA, vs. CA
G.R. No. 109454
June 14, 1994
FACTS:
On 26 May 1992, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151,
for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage
to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Jose C. Sermonia moved to quash the
information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial. Jose C. Sermonia
challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.
In this recourse, Jose C. Sermonia contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
obliterated by prescription. Jose C. Sermonia avers that since the second marriage contract was
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a
matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975;
hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this
reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and
not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by Jose C. Sermonia which was in July
1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
HELD:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not
contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that
he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to
be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.

























DOMALAGAN VS BOLIFER
Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he and the defendant entered into a contract by
virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son
Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer; that later, in the month of
August, 1910, he completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant the said sum
of P500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage," that,
notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in
lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi; that immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia Bolifer he
demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that
the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was
obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a great
sacrifice. The court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum
of P516 together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910, and costs.
Issue:
Whether the verbal contract is valid?
Held:
We have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to
any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show the existence of
the alleged contract. Section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet,
by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall
not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum. Said section
simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare
that said contracts are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in
paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be
proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the
contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties
to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to
support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a
writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. Therefore the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.





CABAGUE VS AUXILLO
Facts:
Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages
resulting from the latters refusal to carry out a previously agreed-upon marriage between Socorro and
Geronimo. The complaint alleged that the Auxilios promised such marriage to Geronimo, provided the
latter would improve their house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride; that
relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700; and that without cause
defendants refused to honor their pledged word. Auxilio moved to dismiss the case, on the ground that the
contract was oral and hence unenforceable. The court granted the MTD.
Issue:
Whether the oral contract is valid.
Held:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really involves two
kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in consideration of
the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the two lovers, as a mutual
promise to marry. For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages.
This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible. However, Felipe Cabagues
action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to
Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory of mutual promise
to marry. Neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro on a mutual promise to
marry.











HERMOSISIMA VS CA
Facts:
Soledad Cagigas was a high school teacher in Cebu. Cagigas was dating Francisco Hermosisima, who
was almost 10 years younger than her. Subsequently, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter. Eventually, intimacy developed between her and Hermosisima. When Cagigas advised
Hermosisima that she was pregnant, he promised to marry her. However, when the child was born,
Hermosisima married Romanita Perez. Thereafter, Cagigas filed a complaint for damages against
Hermosisima on ground of breach of promise to marry. The lower court ruled in favor of Cagigas.
Issue:
Whether moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry.
Held:
Under Art. 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is liable for
seduction. However, apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, strongly indicates that
the seduction therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337
and338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves
unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened
as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found
that, complainant surrendered herself to petitioner because, overwhelmed by her love for him, she
wanted to bind by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.











MARY JANE ABANAG VS NICOLAS B. MABUTE
FACTS:
The complainant alleged that Nicolas Mabute courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying
on respondents promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but
after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her
to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually
abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she suffered. Respondent vehemently denied the complainants allegations
and claimed that the charges against him were baseless and were intended to harass him and destroy his
reputation .He believes that the complainants letter -complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was
prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog. The complainant filed a Reply,
insisting that she herself wrote the letter-complaint. She belied the respondents claim that she was being
used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him. It defined what immoral conduct is as conduct that
is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an act unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of respondent is considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct.
HELD:
The court held that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral
conduct. Mere sexual relations between two consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative
sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, It is
not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that
will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or
should not marry. However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect
in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court
personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official
duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve
and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.




TANJANCO VS CA
Facts:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being of adult age. They had frequent dates and
subsequently became close and intimate to one another. Thereafter, Tanjanco expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for Santos who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings.
Inconsideration of Tanjancos promise of marriage Santos consented and acceded to his pleas for carnal
knowledge. Eventually, Santos conceived a child. Due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment
and social humiliation, she had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; Santos filed a complaint for damages against Tanjanco on the ground that due
to the latters refusal to marry her, as promised, she suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos also wanted Tanjanco to recognize the
unborn child. Tanjanco filed a Motion to Dismiss which the CFI granted. Santos appealed to the CA
which held that Santos complaint did state a cause of action for damages premised on Art. 21 of the Civil
Code. Tanjanco in turn appealed to the Supreme Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to
marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the action for breach of promise to marry can prosper?
Held:
In actions for breach of promise to marry, for a recovery of damages to be warranted, the essential feature
is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case that - to
constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer.
In this case, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellate, a
woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would
have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint


WASSMER VS VELEZ
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating:
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he
heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Subsequently, judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay Wassmer P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;P2,500.00 as attorneys fees; and the costs.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages predicated on the breach of mutual promise to marry is valid?
Held:
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21. Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the
New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.











BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ
FACTS
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But two days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Francisco Velez sent a letter to Beatriz Wassmer advising her that
he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day
before the wedding, he sent another message to Beatriz advising her that nothing has changed and that he
will be returning soon. However, he never heard of again.This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case
against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The
court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events.
He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer
because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD:
Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by the respondent is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It
is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. Because of such promise, Beatriz Wassmer made preparations
for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is
also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer,
acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages
against him.




MELECIO MADRIDEJO VS. GONZALO DE LEON, ET.AL
GR No. L-32473
October 6, 1930

This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as follows:

Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby
orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the
property described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without
cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the
trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent marriage
of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and
appellants.

Facts:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows
that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child
of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the
parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son
by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband,
Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage
of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitimate by that marriage. Appellant
(Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and
that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

Issues
Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

Ruling:
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who
married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said
marriage did not legitimate him.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with
costs against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or compel his
acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.































THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ELIAS BORROMEO
GR No. L-61873
October 31, 1984

Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu-
Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-
Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs.

Facts:
At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada
(mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform
her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas hut.
There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still
with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and
validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there
was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he
admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.

Issue:
Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Ruling:
In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married
unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a
marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity
and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the
celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant
violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.




REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047
September 2, 1994

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Edwin F. Cardenas.

As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever
issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.

Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did
not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was
brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her
lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage
proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage?

Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by
any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.Under
the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.








JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer.

On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision dated
January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December
2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005. This denial gave
rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to
the celebration of the marriages in question?

Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.Finally, the rule is settled that
every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on
the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. Therefore, the instant petition is denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.








































FILIPINA SY vs COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000

For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando
Sy.

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at
the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses
lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987,
Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later
amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries
and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC
and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari,
petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of
issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for
lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?

b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of
evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day
of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the
marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent
ever resided in Carmona.From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one
year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there
being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the
psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time
of celebration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21,
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144
are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap
and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.































RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746
August 28, 2007

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his
petition for annulment of marriage.

Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They
met a person fixer, who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a minister of
the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel.
However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil
registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license
number 7054133 is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage
contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of
Mandaluyong for concubinage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code, the
applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same Code.
The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that
a license was issued to the parties herein.Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient
basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively
liable. The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal civil
registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the
marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number7054033. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. The authority of
the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of
any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the said officer needs
to know is that the license has been duly and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect
attended the civil wedding. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


























SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria.

Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991,and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified
that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
He further testified that he didnot go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had
never resided in that area.In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
to check on theirmarriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriagelicense number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage on January
9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the
RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.Syed then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC granting
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria
who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. The petition is therefore granted.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


















Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
143 scra 499, 19 August 1986
[Lilia Oliva Wiegel vs. Honorable Alicia V. Sempio-Diy (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and Karl Heinz Wiegel]

Facts:
On June 1972, Lilia married Eduardo A. Maxion.
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel(KHW) was married to petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel(Lilia) on July 1978.
Hence, an action for the declaration of Nullity of marriage with herein petitioner was filed by Respondent
KHW before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City.
Lilia claimed that said prior subsisting marriage was null and void because she and the first husband(E.
Maxion) were forced to enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that the first husband was, at the
time of their marriage in 1972, already married to someone else.
Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence in her favor but respondent judge ruled
against it.
Lilia filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether KHWs marriage with Lilia is void

Held:
Petition is devoid of merit.
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because it will not be
void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married KHW, she was still validly married to her
first husband. Consequently, her marriage to KHW is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman.
Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded VOID under the law.
Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.
Terre vs. Terre
221 scra 6, 3 July 1992

Facts:
[Administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice]
Complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977. While that
marriage was still subsisting, respondent contracted a second marriage on 3 May 1981 with Helina
Malicdem. Complainant charged respondent Jordan, a member of the Philippine Bar, with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of abandonment of minor and bigamy.
Respondent contended that he married Helina Malicdem believing in good faith that his first marriage is
void ab initio.
Complainant Dorothy Terre testified that she was then married to her first husband Merlito Bercenillo, her
first cousin. With this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced complainant that her marriage was
void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he
wrote single as her status. After getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and
subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem.

Issue:
Whether a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage

Held:
In rejecting the respondents argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first
one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. The said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. The second
marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was bigamous and
criminal in character.
The conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second
marriage with him, in abandoning complainant after she had cared for him and supported him through law
school, leaving her without means for safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage
with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted grossly immoral conduct under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording
more than sufficient basis for disbarment.
Respondent disbarred
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
226 SCRA 572, 17 September 1993
[Roberto Domingo vs. Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera]
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a Petition entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The Petition, which
was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following: (1)They were married on 29 November 1976;
(2)Unknown to her(Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; (3)She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina sued them for bigamy; (4)Since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only
able to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by
her employer; (5)Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; (6)Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto,
who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent; (7)While on her vacation,
she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is void ab
initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should have filed an
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by their union. RTC
and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit.
Petition for review of the decision of CA

Issue:
Whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of
properties of erstwhile spouses
Held:
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouses who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy. The clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only
for purpose of remarriage. The declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the
other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them.
SC denied the instant petition. CA's decision is affirmed.

























Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis
336 scra 747, 31 July 2000

Facts:
On 21 October 1985, Respondent Isagani D. Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani contracted a second
marriage with Petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on 25 January 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy before the Quezon RTC.
Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. A Motion to suspend the
proceedings in criminal case for bigamy was then filed by Isagani invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. RTC granted Motion.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration denied.
Hence, petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes
a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

Held:
As ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. Thus, the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question.
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As
respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, he
cannot be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution
and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.



Mercado vs. Tan
337 scra 122, 1 August 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado married Thelma G. Oliva on 10 April 1976 in Cebu City. While
that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage on 27 June 1991, this time with
Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
On 13 November 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors
Office, accused petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Thelma G. Oliva,
and in a Decision dated 6 May 1993 said marriage was declared null and void.
Petitioner contends that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. He argues that a void marriage is deemed never to
have taken place at all.
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy. RTC of Bacolod City Ruling, CA Affirmed
Petition for Review on Certiorari

Issue:
Whether the judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage negates the guilt of the petitioner

Held:
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
before contracting the second marriage (Article 40, Family Code).
Petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
The crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The Court
cannot allow that.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
G.R. No. 193902
Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos, petitioner,
vs.
People of the Philippines and Samson R. Pacasum, Sr., respondents.
June 1, 2011

Nachur, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Zamoranos wed Jesus De Guzman in Islamic rites. The two wed again in civil rites. After a
year, petitioner and De Guzman obtained a divorce in talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was
confirmed by the Sharia Court. Thereafter, petitioner wed private respondent Pacasum under Islamic rites
and renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony. The union between the two was blessed by three
children. The two separated and private respondent filed a case against petitioner, a Petition for
Declaration of of a Void Marriage alleging that petitioner, at the time of her marriage to private
respondent, was previously married to De Guzman, petitioner first marriage solemnized before RTC
subsisted at the time of the celebration of their marriage and that petitioner and private respondent's
marriage was bigamous and void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Zamoranos committed bigamy.

Held:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that Muslim Code is complied with. In addition, the
marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code, in a so called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second is merely a ceremonial one. In
this case, both parties are Muslims so the Muslim Code will apply. One of the effects of irrevocable talaq
refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry. It stands to reason that petitioner
Zamoranos' divorce fro De Guzman was valid and thus entitled her to remarry private respondent
Pacasum.


G.R. No. 112019
Leouel Santos, petitioner
vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, respondents.
January 4, 1995

Vitug, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos was a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army who married private respondent
Julia Bedia-Santos. However, during the subsistence of their marriage, the couple would start a quarrel
over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently. Julia left the
country to work as a nurse in United States despite Leouel's pleas to dissuade her. She promised to return
home after the expiration of the contract but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States he desperately tried to locate Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Thereafter, Leouel filed
before the RTC, a complaint for Voiding of Marriage under article 36 of the Family Code. Julia opposed
the complaint alleging that it was the petitioner who had been irresponsible and incompetent. Leouel
agues that the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than five years clearly
show that she was psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

Issue:
Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
Under Art. 36, a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. The intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

G.R. No. 119190
Chi Ming Tsoi, petitioner,
vs.
Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi, respondents.
January 16, 1997

Torres, Jr., J.:

Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. As newly weds they were supposed to enjoy making love with
each other but there was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth night. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, but during those period there was no sexual intercourse
between them. Gina Lao Tsoi filed a decree of annulment of marriage against Tsi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

Issue:
Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi's refusal of having a sexual intercourse with his wife is a ground for
psychological incapacity.

Held:
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non fulfillment of this obligation will destroy the wholeness of the marriage. In this case, the
senseless and constant refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity which is a strong indication of a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter inability to give meaning and significance of marriage
according to Article 36 of the Family Code.





G.R. No. 108763
Republic of the Philippines,
vs.
Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondents.
February 13, 1997

Panganiban, J.:

Facts:
Private respondent Roridel Molina filed a declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina on
the grounds that the latter showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since
he preferred to spend more time with his friends on whom he squandered his money. He depended on his
parents for aid of assistance and was never honest to his wife when it comes to finances. Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child and had since then abandoned them. Reynaldo had shown that he was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill essential marital obligations.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity

Held:
Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In the present case, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and
remains valid. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their resposibilities and
duties as married persons. There had been no showing of the gravity of problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.




G.R. No. 126010
Lucita Estrella Hernandez, petitioner,
vs.
Court of Appeals and Mario C. Hernandez, respondents.
December 8, 1999

Mendoza, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage to private
respondent Mario Hernandez on the ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that from the time of
their marriage up to the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support
their family, devoting most of his time in drinking sprees with friends. She also claimed that her husband
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women and because of that, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with sexual
transmitted disease.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of
private respondent's psychological incapacity.

Held:
Private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion do not constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make a
private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. The root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming.

Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
GR NO. 155800
March 10, 2006

Tinga, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Antonio and respondent Reyes got married on December 6, 1990 in Manila. In April
1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage with respondent declared null and void on the basis
of Article 36 of the Family Code, asserting that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. Antonio claimed that Reyes persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. The RTC
gave credence to the petitioners evidence that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and while the case was pending, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the catholic marriage of the parties because of lack of due discretion on
the part of the parties. Although Antonio alerted the CA about the ruling of the Catholic tribunal, the
appellate court still reversed the decision of the trial court. The totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether or not the facts presented by the petitioner is sufficient to declare the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held: The present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity under
Article 36. The Court held that the case satisfies the guidelines set in the Molina case. Petitioner had
sufficiently overcome the burden of proof in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. The root
cause of the respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified by experts
as explained in the trial courts decision. The gravity of the respondents psychological incapacity
disabled her to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Respondents inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of mistruths were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Even the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. The
Court concluded that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code.


Eto yung mga lies ni Reyes. HAHAHA. :D

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,1[10] and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the
boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.2[11]
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred.3[12]
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some
of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.4[13]
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the
group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in
her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect5[14] but petitioner discovered per certification
by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.6[15]
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the number one moneymaker in
the commercial industry worth P2 million.7[16] Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.8[17] He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.9[18]










(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she
acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.10[19] She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.11[20]
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her
for good in November 1991.12[21]





















Bernardino Zamora vs. Court of Appeals and Norma Zamora
GR No. 141917 February 7, 2007

Azcuna, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Bernardino and respondent Norma was married in Cebu City in June 1970. Their union
however did not produce any child. In 1972, Norma left for the United States to work as a nurse and made
only periodic visits in Cebu when she became a US citizen. Bernardino the filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage and alleged Normas psychological incapacity. Bernardino claimed that
Norma was horrified by a mere thought of having children. Norma however denied the allegation and
claimed that petitioner had been unfaithful to her. The RTC denied the complaint having no evidence
presented by Bernardino to support his claim. It further ruled that the infidelity of the petitioner was one
of the contributing factors which led their marriage to be estranged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts decision, with reasoning that psychological incapacity is not shown or proven.

Issue: Whether or not there can be a declaration of nullity of marriage between Bernardino and Norma on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

Held: The Court found that evidence to prove psychological incapacity was lacking and insufficient. The
rule is clear that facts alleged in the petition and evidence presented considered in totality, should be
sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Bernardino failed
to substantiate his allegation that Norma is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her
refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed. Furthermore, that acts and
behaviour of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof
that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.







Republic of the Philippines vs. Laila Tanyag-San Jose and Manolito San Jose
GR No. 168328 February 28, 2007

Carpio-Morales, J.:

Facts: Respondents Laila and Manolito got married in June 1988. However, after 9 years of marriage,
Manolito was still jobless and hooked into drugs while Laila was the working all the time. Laila
eventually filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Laila called upon Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who
declared Manolito psychologically incapacitated to perform duties of a husband. The conclusion was
based solely on Lailas statement relayed to him. The RTC denied Lailas petition with the reasoning that
petioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible was not enough. The findings of Dr. Tayag
were also ruled to be inadequate. Laila appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed the trial courts decision and declared the marriage
between him and Laila void ab initio. The Republic of the Philippines then filed a motion for
reconsideration regarding the CAs decision.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between respondents can be declared null and void on the basis of
psychological incapacity.

Held: The case does not present sufficient guidelines to declare respondents marriage to be null and void.
The Court cited the Ferraris case, where the root cause of psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained by experts. The Court ruled Dr. Tayags findings and conclusions were
hearsay. It is unreliable and unscientific because it is based on the information supplied by Laila which
she found to be factual. The report by Dr. Tayag does not even show that the disorder was already
present at the inception of the marriage or that is incurable. The Court further held that emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, as well as failure or refusal to meet duties and responsibilities of a
married man constitute a ground fro declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.






Manuel Almelor vs. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254 and Leonida Almelor
GR No. 179620 August 26, 2008

Reyes, R.T., J.:

Facts: Petitioner Manuel and respondent Leonida, both medical practitioners, married on January 1989 in
Manila. After 11 years of marriage, Loenida filed a petition to annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations. Leonida claimed that she would
have frequent fights with Manuel She added Manuels deep attachment to his mother was
incomprehensible to her. She added that Manuel was a homosexual. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated, and it is marked by antecedence and incurability. Manuel
refuted the claims of Leonide saying that there is a professional rivalry between them. The RTC declared
their marriage to be null and void from the beginning not on the basis of Article 36 but on Article 45,
pertaining to concealment of homosexuality. Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals, where his petition
was dismissed. The CA ruled that the wrong remedy was filed by filing the extraordinary remedy of
petition for annulment of judgement.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in annulling the marriage of Manuel and Leonida on the
basis of Article 45 and not on Article 36.

Held: The Court ruled that the decision of the trial court nullifying Manuel and Leonidas marriage was
erroneous. If the lower court found that there was no basis on Article 36, the court should have dismissed
outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines in the Molina case. Instead, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. Even
assuming that Manuel is homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate is as a ground to annul his
marriage with Loenida. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. The trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion not only taking into account petitioners homosexuality per se
and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.






Lester Benjamin Halili vs. Chona Santos Halili
GR No. 165424 June 9, 2009

Corona, J.:

Facts: The case is about a motion for reconsideration regarding the Courts earlier decision affirming the
Court of Appeals decision, which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court annulling the
marriage of Lester and Chona on the basis of psychological incapacity. Lester filed a petition to declare
his marriage with Chona on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He alleged that he wed respondent
on civil rights thinking that it was a joke. Eventually the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a
mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating. Dr. Dayan diagnosed petitioners
disorder was serious and incurable and affected his capacity to comply with marital obligations. The RTC
declared their marriage void. The CA however reversed the decision ruling that the totality of evidence
failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the
CA, upholding the validity of the marriage. Petitioner now contends that evidence presented was
sufficient to sustain his claim of psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether or not there were sufficient evidence to annul the marriage of Lester and Chona on the
basis of psychological incapacity.

Held: The Court ruled there was sufficient evidence to declare the annulment of marriage. The Court cited
the case of Te vs. Te, where interpretation on psychological incapacity is on a case-to-case basis, which
can be guided by experience and findings of experts on psychological disciplines. In the present case, Dr.
Dayan, a clinical psychologist, sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that
was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. It has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and
void.






G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS,
.JR., Respondents.
Facts:
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor
of Lingayen, Pangasinan and was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her
second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage, citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal
house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. Eduardo testified that
Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that
she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with
neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she
abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. Eduardo presented the
results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on
the tests she administered on Catalina,

Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline
Personality Disorder which was characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to meet her marital obligations and was no longer treatable.
Issue
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas
marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
Held
No, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas supposed
psychological incapacity. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of
borderline personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation
on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not
specify which of Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform
her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her
childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond
maturity." There was no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder
and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating
nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.
Given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, the Court
cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.


G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
Facts
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New
Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in
college and they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter
whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites
solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support. Dominic started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in
Bel-Air, Makati in 1994. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to
sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.

Dominic was fired from his
employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged
with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. On
October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode. Dr. Samson declared that respondents
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere
extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondents childhood
experiences of separation and emotional deprivations.
Issue
Whether or not the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation was not sufficient for declaration of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
Held
The expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation was not sufficient for declaration of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of
evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean
that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos. Accordingly, the
RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.







G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
Facts
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.

To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while
still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in
1991,

Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar
and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity. Lolita denied that
she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business.
She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on
Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found
that Lolita was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide
the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship.
Issue
Whether or not the case has sufficient basis to nullify their marriage and declare Lolita psychological
incapacited under Article 36 of the Family Code
Held
No, there is no sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity. In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.

To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging
the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.














G.R. No. L-23433 February 10, 1968
GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.
Facts
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action
for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged
in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles
had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy
against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also
demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that
during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the
premature birth of their first child, who died three days later. Defendant also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation,
to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man; and that said
threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and
live apart from the plaintiff.
Issue
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of nullity of their marriage
because at the time of their marriage, the defendant had a previous and subsisting valid marriage
Held
No, the court ruling that before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to defendant. There is necessity for proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff,
defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary requirement to establish
these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to
have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the
court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said
marriage. Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And, when
both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of
the action.












G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, respondents.
Facts
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private
respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately
after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he
had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and
wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts
remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco,
Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959.
Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to
declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence. On July 3, 1962, thru
counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Issue
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of annulment of their marriage
Held
No, even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that
actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in
the complaint are proved. The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the
fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of
the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by
fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than
a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law
enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the
integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds. Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without
merit.










G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.
On March 14, 1935, the intestate proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escao started and her widower
Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate, Angelita Jones, her daughter by
her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were declared her only
heirs. On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion
alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never was a
valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was
null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct
of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate
proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix
Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which
impaired her rights.
In December, 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter
nothing was ever heard of him. In October 25, 1919, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones
an absentee from the Philippine Islands. On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were
married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage but
were not able to register it. Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to
have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter
date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in
accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix
Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void.
Issue
Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escao was invalid because it was not in
accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders No 68
Held
No, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escanos marriage was valid. For the purposes of the civil marriage
law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration
of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the
time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in
intestate succession, as in the present case.



G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent
Facts
Nolasco was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England
during one of his ship's port calls. Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose. After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to
his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent contends that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were
married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Issue
Whether or not the declaration of Janets presumptive death is affirmed
Held
No, the respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1
of the Family Code emphasizes that Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. Respondent failed to
establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that
would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.








G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C.
CAMACHO, respondents.
Facts
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962,
without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage
was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. In 1967 Aurelio
met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido and courted her and apparently won her heart. Petitioner's daughter,
Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying
from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale issued in his
name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the
property in favor of petitioner Nenita. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Respondent Luisita was then in the
United States with respondent Chito. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio, she and her son Chito came
home on May 30, 1988. Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on
Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
Issue
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is valid thus making her the heir and owner of
the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street
Held
No, petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married Luisita, Aurelio's previous
marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting and, therefore, his second marriage was bigamous. The
general rule, since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of
the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first
place. Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with
petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could
have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known
that Aurelio was married to Luisita.







G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT P. NARCEDA, Respondent.
Facts
Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract

he presented will
reveal that at the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old. According to
respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since.

There was never any
communication between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she
left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that the last time
she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a
Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC and CA
granted respondents declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda. Petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner,
respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough
to give rise to a "well-founded" belief that she was dead.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead
Held
No, Art. 41 of the Family Code provides a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. It follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.



G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
Facts
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was
a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July
1994, died. Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,000
12
by the
SSS. Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits
13
which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned
before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who
shouldered the burial expenses of Clementeclaimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime,
the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still
alive. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente
obtained the declaration of Alices presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parents place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her
parents place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS
then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since
she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs decision in declaring
Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social
Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
Issue
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically
terminates the subsequent marriage
Held
No, there is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes death. Likewise there is
no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clementes death. SSS is correct in
ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar
through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made
by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed
empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a
deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a
court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarques marriage to
Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally.
Alice reappeared only after Clementes death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in
this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised the marriage herein is
considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally it is however impossible for a direct
attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon
Clementes
. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. On 30 May
2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to
him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was
not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Respondent, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned
that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and
by nature, incurable.

Issue: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code

Held: In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36
15
of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code.
16
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x
x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.

[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
On October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)
[7]
a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one
of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the
estate.
[8]

On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is
better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have
been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that
Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.
[9]

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss
the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the
Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives
of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the
late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as
a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabels
parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of
her paternal grandmother the decedent.
[10]
On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.
[11]
When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court in an order dated January 9, 1998,
[12]
petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Issue: WON Isabel is a legitimate child
Held: Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to
the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article
89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and
born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren,
including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their
grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased
their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether
Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional
rights of the personalities involved over the decedents estate.



G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at
the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong
Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
6
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991,
who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.
8

Issue: WON the marriage is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
Held: All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having
been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in
love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage.
Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.

















G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff

Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an
action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. that
judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding
the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that
"the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that
definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced
... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the
marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD'. She prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

Held: Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment. While a woman may detest such
non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested.


















GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.. dilute MANGONON OF BUCCAT, defendant-
respondent.

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon deBuccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September,
and got married in Nov 26, 1938 in a Catholic Cathedral in Baguio.On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting
married)Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. Godofredo left Luida and on March 23,
1939, hefiled for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida,
she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida

Issue: WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the annulment of marriage
(fraud)

Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
pregnancy constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely thatGodofredo, a first- year law student,
did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy when they got married























G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

The complaint was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, that
defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner
Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by
another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child.
In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the
plaintiff.
During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion.
Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between
the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as
would annul a marriage.

Held:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial.
Without costs.













JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
GR NO. L-12790

Facts:
In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, the plaintiff
Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted
on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the
office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for
copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married.
On June 14, 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file
an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On December
17, 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days
from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On March 14, 1957 the defendant was
granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of December 17, 1956 with warning
that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her
husband would be rendered.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled with only the testimony of the husband who
claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.

Ruling:
The annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband
who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."

The lone testimony
of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the
ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.






















GR. No. 126010
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

Facts
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at
the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981. Three children were born to
them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982, Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the
suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends.
She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with
whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible
disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be
awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land
located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage,
as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12,
1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Ruling:
Psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must
exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's character was
on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and
there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to
constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
























G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October
2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for
failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
Issue:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?


Ruling:
No, the marriage is valid.
The CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same
Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.

Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

































G.R. No. L-32682 February 29, 1972
FORTUNATO TUASON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT of APPEALS, JUDGE FERNANDO A. CRUZ, LEONOR LIMAS and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF RIZAL (now Caloocan City), respondents-appellees.
Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio
R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June 3,
1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner
inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical
injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a
womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of
whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave
minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling
private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise
became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their
assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions,
without private respondent's consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because
of petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent
prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Issue:

Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is
declared null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant
under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro
Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby
awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment
as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.





BOARD VS. DELA ROSA (1991)

BIDIN, J.

FACTS:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana
Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together
with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued
by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of
foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice
to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such
included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner
issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation
[*]
issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon
posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On
September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless,
respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to
dismiss.

The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction
being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process
determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that
the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners,
thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha v. Vivo and Vivo v. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July
6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the Court of Appeals not RTC which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
2.Whether or not William is to be declared a Filipino Citizen, and if not, whether the order of his
deportation be barred for such issuance 28 years thereafter.
RULING:
1.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions."
Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted
by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in
view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of
this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.

2.
Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should be
instituted within five (5) years. In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was
rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent
William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. The power
to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one
who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be
considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract
foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US $50,000.00 in the
country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is
unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is
diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec.
1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
"Section 1.
The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings for lack of jurisdiction over
respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen.




























Republic vs Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son
that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.










Arca vs Javier (1954)
G.R. No. L-6768 July 31, 1954

FACTS: Alfredo Javier (Alfredo) was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married
Salud R. Arca (Salud), another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo
Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938
sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife and
child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the complaint,
Salud filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of Mobile County,
but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was
abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then
enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting
appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941. After securing a divorce Alfredo married Thelma Francis,
an American citizen. The latter, however, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the
evidence. Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines armed with two decrees of divorce one against his
first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis. When returned to
the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite. At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an
information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo
Javier.

Lower Court Ruling: Alfredo was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy predicated on the proposition that
the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with the Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the
honest belief.

ISSUES:
1. Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction? NO
2. Whether Alfredo is guilty of bigamy YES

RATIO: This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar nature in a number of cases
and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the
essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State
in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in
view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing
her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that
his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion
imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the
purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on the
matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.
855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.

In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of
the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of
Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)

It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)

But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the
appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new
domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not
having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer
jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)

At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and
the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a
divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State
to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs.
Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of
Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or
domicile at Mobile County because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely
rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never
intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941,
he moved to New York and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy,
he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It
may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently
residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining
divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.





















Tenchavez vs. Escano (1965)
15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple
and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker
and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carloscollege
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/
marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to
Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu
while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for
the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage
to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.



ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.



HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for
the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

























Van Dorn vs. Romillo (1985)
Facts:

After a divorce was granted by a United States court between petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipina
and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here in the Philippines alleging that
the her business was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that
the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid

YES.

There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada divorce in any of the States of the US. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to
sue as husband of the petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before his own country's court from asserting that right to exercise control over their conjugal assets.













Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera (1989)

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic
of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an
action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23,
1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they
are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit






Quita vs Court of Appeals
December 22, 1998
Fact of the Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines
on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another
person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the
intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the
petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner
was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad
are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner
herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that
Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino
citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas ordered in
favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for
reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children,
with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the
other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared
voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her
children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse of Arturo.

Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time
of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time
she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo.
She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo





Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000


FACTS ( table siya ) :

Alicia( 2
nd
wife) Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1
ST
wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)

Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927
to September 30, 1957
February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home
November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization
1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines,
He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
fathers name was left blank
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by
Paulas father and stepmother to the effect that
1. all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other
obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
life; and
4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego
December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband
and wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children
December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed
Special Administratrix of his estate
January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate
June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzos estate contending
that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate proceedings filed by
Alicia, gave due course to Paulas petition
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and conjugal estate
illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
RTC denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus,
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December
4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.













Garcia vs Recio ( 2001)


FACTS:

The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree
of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In
1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived
separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of
the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told
petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his
first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on
the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.


RULING:
The Philippine laws does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can
recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued
by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on
evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of
petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of
divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage.
In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained by the
respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the
foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be
declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties
marriage based on two existing marriage certificates





















Diego vs. Castillo (2004)


FACTS:
January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both Filipinos,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City
February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas
June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P. Diego before the
Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave credence to the
defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for believing in good faiththat her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

ISSUE: WON Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code

HELD:

NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
The law requires that
o (a) the offender is a judge;
o (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
o (c) the judgment is unjust;
o (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be administratively charged
lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law
of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action






FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of
Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of
the respondents on the ground of bigamy?

RULING:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioners personality
to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition
if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict
remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged
in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial
divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

























BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS
570 SCRA 472

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa
and they had a child name Alix, born in California. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic. Rebecca file a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix. In addition, Vicente and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other wherein Vicente file adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. On the other hand, Rebecca charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce. RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed and set
aside RTC's incidental orders. According to the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to
dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not divorce decree obtained by Rebecca is valid.

HELD:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid. Rebecca at that time she applied and
obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one an American territory which follows
the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there.

She had consistently professed shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when
she secured divorce in Dominican Republic. Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of
the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by
the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.



MAXEY VS COURT OF APPEALS
129 SCRA 187

FACTS:
Melboune Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claimed that
their parents were united in a marriage performed in the military fashion. In this case, Trial court and
Appellate Court rejected this claim. The couple had several children; all of them were born before the
disputed properties were acquired. The father was a member of the 1899 American occupation forces who
afterwards held high positions in the provincial government and in the Philippines public schools system.
The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1010 church marriage. Regina
Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after church wedding. The husband remarried his second wife
Julia. Using a power of attorney they sold properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato
Macayra.

ISSUE:

Whether or not properties in question is exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey.

HELD:

This cannot be said of the exclusive right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties in question
when the present Civil Code became effective for standing against it was the concurrent right of Regina
Morales or her heirs to a share thereof.
The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect.
Neither can this be said of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the
questioned properties are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate
claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in
common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
The petitioners should return one-half of the Php.1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the
private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
consideration lead use to rule out rentals on one hand and return of Php.650.000 on the other.














EUGENIO, SR. VS VELEZ
185 SCRA 45

FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she
was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
The Court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas
body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings.
Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence.
Two orders were issued by the court directing delivery of the deceaseds body to a funeral parlor in
Cagayan De Oro City for autopsy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child
and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled
in common law jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Thus, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.


VALDES VS REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 102, QUEZON CITY
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. Uder this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.










MALLILIN VS CASTILLO
333 SCRA 628

FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children
but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist.
They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was
the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real
and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable
conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject
properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still
legally married at the time of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under
the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living
together.

HELD:
The trial court erred to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry
each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living togther, they could not have owned
properties in comon. The Family Code, provides that co-ownership exists between a man and a woman
who live together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, likewise provide that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-onwership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry
each other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process
and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is
unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties
registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. The case was
remanded to lower court for further proceedings.








Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

FACTS: Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband when she met
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided
to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. In 1996, the couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with
the RTC of Boac, Marinduque.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jacinto Saguid can be declared coowner of Gina Rey under Article 148 of
the Family Code

HELD: Yes. Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is
before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Article
148 applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of a concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. The Court declared Jacinto Saguid as Gina Reys coowner in the controverted house and
personal properties. Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.









Elna Mercado-Fehr vs. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

FACTS: In March 1983, after two years of long distance relationship, petitioner left Cebu City and
moved in with respondent in the latters residence in Metro Manila. On December 3, 1983, their son
Michael Bruno Fehr was born. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they
purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was
issued in the name of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties acquired by the petitioner and respondent should be
partitioned in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD: Yes. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation. The Court gives more credence to petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties cohabitation. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and
respondent. The property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership.











Lupo Atienza vs. Yolanda De Castro
G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006

FACTS: Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of
Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent
Yolanda De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. Despite Lupo being a married man, his
relationship with Yolanda became intimate, and the two eventually lived together in consortium
beginning later part of 1983. They had two children but, after the birth of the second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways. On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City
a complaint against Yolanda for judicial partition between them, alleging that a parcel of land with
improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City was acquired during his union with Yolanda
as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner and respondents property regime is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code

HELD: Yes. Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is
before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Article
148 applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of a concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. In the instant case, the respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established
that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings. She had the financial capacity
to purchase price of the subject property. Thus, the subject property is declared to be exclusively owned
by Yolanda De Castro.








Yolanda Signey vs. Social Security System
G.R. No. 173582 January 28, 2008

FACTS: Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of SSS, died on May 21, 2001, and in his members
records, he had designated Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as
secondary beneficiaries. On July 6, 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS. She
revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, with whom he had
two minor children namely, Ginalyn Servano and Rodelyn Signey. Petitioners declaration was confirmed
when Gina filed a claim for the same death benefits on July 13, 2001 in which she declared that both she
and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased. On October 2001, Editha Espinosa filed an
application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against
the illegitimate minor children of the deceased

HELD: No. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no
legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled
to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a
dependent, the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married not
gainfully employed. In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13
April 1996 and 20 April 2000. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and
Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.










Heirs of Maramag vs. De Guzman - Maramag
G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009

FACTS: The petition filed in the RTC alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife
and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family; (2) Eva
de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she
is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company,
Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife); (3) the illegitimate children of
LoretoOdessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angeliewere entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and
Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their
legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In answer, Insular admitted that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie,
as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessas share as she was of age, but
withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters
of guardianship. No settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the
heirs. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of
Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

ISSUE: Whether members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for
the concubine
HELD: It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts
shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states

SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise
specified in the policy.


Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the
insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the
policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third
persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case,
third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation
to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy
and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal
proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares
of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations
under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance
contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion
of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds
shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.




















Walter Villanueva and Aurora Villanueva vs. Florentino Chiong and Elisera Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008

FACTS: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but
have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at
Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half
western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino
allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house
thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners
demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to
sign a deed of sale.
ISSUE: Whether the sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent was valid.
HELD: No. Respondents separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced Eliseras interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. The sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda.
de Ramones v. Agbayani, we held that without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not
void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code

provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership
before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a
conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when
Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13,
1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Eliseras instance, during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article
173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991,
perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.

























Rodolfo Espinosa and Maximo Glindo vs Atty. Julieta Omaa
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omaas legal
advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on July 23,
1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Marantal and Espinosa,
fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms
and conditions but, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of
the property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,
complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not
valid. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested
for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract.
ISSUE: Whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization
of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
HELD: Yes. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-
CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a
notary public.
The Court adopted the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Court has ruled that
the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has
also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is
exactly what Omaa did in this case. A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in
his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his
secretaries or any member of his staff. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.







Eloisa Goitia vs. Jose Campos Rueda
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

FACTS: Eloisa and Jose married in 1915 and immediately resided in Manila. A month after the
marriage, Jose demanded Eloisa that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs but
the latter refused. On other successive dates, Jose made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife.
Eloisa filed an action for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eloisas action will prosper.

HELD: Yes. The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on
her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other
remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged
to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining
in his own home the one having the right to the same.














Macario Lapuz vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio
No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
FACTS: On August 18, 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on
September 30, 1934 and that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. In his
second amended answer to the petition, respondent Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, on or about March 1949.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before
the trial could be completed petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action.
HELD: Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The
Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death
of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.








Valerio Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973
and got married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children but shortly after the birth of their
youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in March 1983. In
May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home her four children with Tyrone who later started living with Jocelyn, who
bore him three more children. On July 6, 1994, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that Malyn, because her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone
and their children during their co-habitation, was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage shall be declared null on the ground that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations

The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that
the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD. Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. The Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.





Manuel Almelor vs. The Hon. Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 and Leonida Almelor
G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) got
married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral and had three children. After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground
that Manuel, being a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous and easily angered, was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Further adding to her woes was his
concealment to her of his homosexuality. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonida's claim and concluded, after conducting interview with Leonida, Manuel and
their eldest child, that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. Manuel belied her allegation that he was a
cruel father to their children and denied maltreating them. The overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove
Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with
his wife but, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. Manuel expressed his
intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no
psychiatrist was presented.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage shall be annulled on the ground of Manuels concealment of
homosexuality

HELD: No. Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but
one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove. What was
proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida.
Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their
marriage.








AIDA CAMPOS, ALISTAIR CAMPOS, and CHARMAINE CAMPOS
vs. JUDGE ELISEO CAMPOS

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 February 8, 2012


Facts:

Petitioner Aida Campos and respondent Eliseo Campos were married on 9 September 1981. They
had two children, petitioners Alistair and Charmaine. On 16 July 2008, respondent filed a petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Respondent alleged that he and Aida were both psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part, respondent alleged that he is a
homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with another man.
Respondent alleged that as a result of his homosexuality, his wife had affairs with other men which he did
not bother to stop or question.

Aida denied the allegations and alleged that Eliseo wanted their marriage annulled so that he
could marry another woman with whom he was having a relationship. Aida opposed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and filed instead a petition for legal separation.

Aida further alleged that soon after filing the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage,
respondent executed an affidavit of loss claiming that the title covering Lot No. 4747-A, Csd-13-002130-
D, a parcel of registered land evidenced by OCT No. P-28258 under the name of Alistair, was lost in his
possession. Aida alleged that at the time of respondents execution of the affidavit of loss, the title was in
Alistairs possession. Aida alleged that respondent wanted the property back in the event his petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage would be granted by the court. Aida alleged that respondent claimed
before the Register of Deeds that he was the real owner of the property and it was only wrongly registered
in the name of Alistair.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct


Ruling:

Petitioners failed to present any proof of respondents alleged relationship with another woman,
so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no evidence that respondent engaged in scandalous
conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him.

Respondent was not guilty of dishonesty as regards the declaration of loss of title covered by
OCT No. P-28258. As found by the investigating judge, the title was kept by respondent in his drawer.
When respondent could not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the advice of the
Register of Deeds who told him to execute the affidavit of loss. In addition, while the property was
registered in Alistairs name, he did not controvert his fathers claim that he was the real owner of the
land and that his father kept the title in his possession. Thus, respondent did not appear to have acted in
bad faith or committed dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title to the property.

The respondent is guilty of simple misconduct.






































FROILAN GANDIONCO
vs. HON. SENEN PEARANDA and TERESITA GANDIONCO

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987


Facts:

On 29 May 1986, respondent Teresita Gandionco, wife of petitioner Froilan Gandionco, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge Senen Pearanda, a
complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support
and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita also filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
General Santos City a complaint against Froilan for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October
1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita in the
civil case for legal separation. On 10 December 1986, Judge Pearanda ordered the payment of
support pendente lite.


Issue:

Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal
case for concubinage


Ruling:

The contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because
said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain
the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent
spouse, among others.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as there is
no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge in ordering the same.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he
can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
LUIS MA. ARANETA
vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION and EMMA BENITEZ ARANETA

G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956


Facts:

Petitioner Luis Araneta filed for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife,
respondent Emma Araneta. Emma then filed an omnibus petition: (1) to secure custody of their children, a
monthly support for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, (2) to enjoin Luis from
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and (3) to have Luis pay for the fees of her
attorney in the action. Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging
that Emma had abandoned the children; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and
contesting her right to attorneys fees. Luis prayed that as the petition for custody and support cannot be
determined without evidence, the parties be required to submit their respective evidence.

Respondent Judge Hermogenes Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody
of the children to Emma and a monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for
a house and P2,000 as attorneys fees. The main reason given by the judge for refusing petitioners
request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues is the prohibition contained in Article 103
of the Civil Code, which states that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.

Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, petitioner filed for certiorari against said order
and for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before
deciding the omnibus petition.


Issue:

Whether or not evidence not affecting the cause of legal separation should be allowed


Ruling:

Yes. Evidence not affecting the cause of separation, like the actual custody of the children, the
means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, should be allowed so
that the court may determine which is best for their custody. The rule is that all the provisions of the law
even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if
necessary.




JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No L-13553 February 23, 1960


Facts:

Petitioner Jose De Ocampo and respondent Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. In March
1951, De Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was maintaining illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. Having found out, he sent his wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she
stayed there for one year. Again, petitioner discovered that his wife was going out with several other men
other than Arcalas. In 1952, when respondent finished her studies, she left petitioner and since then they
had lived separately. In June 1955, petitioner caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which respondent
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, De
Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.


Issue:

Whether the confession made by respondent constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by
the Family Code


Ruling:

Respondents admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article
48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or
through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on
the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery,
which has not yet prescribed.









LUIS YANGCO vs. JUDGE WILLIAM ROHDE

G.R. No. L-996 October 13, 1902


Facts:

Petitioner Luis Yangco filed a writ of prohibition, alleging that a complaint had been filed by
Victorina Obin against him praying that she be declared his lawful wife, and that she be granted a divorce,
an allowance for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit. The said complaint was
filed before respondent Judge William Rohde, who then overruled the demurrer filed by the petitioner,
stating he is of the opinion that petitioners marriage with Victorina is valid. Petitioner denies this.

Respondent judge then ordered petitioner to pay Victorina. Petitioner claims that he would be
unable to earn back the sum hes being compelled to imburse, and that hes been deprived of right of
appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He prays to reverse respondents judgment, and to
prohibit respondent from compelling him to pay Victorina the said sum. Respondent judge files a demurer
on the following ground: (1) That this court is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action;
(2) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.


Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge was right to act on the assumption that their marriage was valid
2. Whether or not respondent judge was right to compel petitioner to pay the sum
3. Whether or not Victorina Obin has the right to obtain an allowance for alimony
Ruling:

1. No. Respondent judge said himself that the status of validity of the marriage was not clear or
free from doubt.

2. No. Article 143 of the Civil Code states that the right to support is granted to: (1) spouses;
(2) legitimate descendants and ascendants; (3) parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged
natural children; (4) other illegitimate children, and (5) brothers and sisters. Present in all these
cases is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support. In the case
at bar, the civil status that should be the basis of the action for support is marriage, which must be
duly proven in the manner provided for by Article 53: Marriages celebrated before the operation
of the Code, must be proven by the canonical certificate.

3. No. Under Article 1591 of the old Code, any person believing himself entitled to provisional
alimony or support was required to file with the complaint documents proving conclusively the
title by virtue of which the same was sued for. The judge, under Article 1592, could not admit the
complaint unless the documents referred to in the preceding article were submitted. Thus, as the
evidence is lacking, a suit of alimony could not have prospered based on respondent judges
opinion alone.









































G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Facts: On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging they married civilly on 21 September 1934 and a canonically on 30 September 1934
during their marriage they acquired properties, on 1943 her husband abandoned her and that she
discovered that her husband is cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street,
Manila. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.The respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with
several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. Petitioner
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified
the court of her death.
Issue: Whether the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Decision: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree
can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.













G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

Facts: Eloisa Goitia De La Camara and Jose campos Rueda were legally married in the city of Manila
on January 7, 1915they resided at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month,
when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act
other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat
her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that,
as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of
her parents. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and
valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and
stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.

Issues: Is Jose Campos Rueda obliged to support his wife who is outside their conjugal home?

Decision: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husbands, who is obliged to support the wife, may fullfill the
obligation either by paying her a fived pension or by maintaining her in his home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligations and to support his wife if the wife is drive away from conjuagal home because of hios
wrongful acts. In this case the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the physical assault
of the husband, she can therefore claim support form the husband for separate maintenance eve outside
the conjugal home.











G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee
Facts: Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo married on 1910, they have lived together
as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common
home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by
the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant
answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent;
but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of
(1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel
fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor
of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400
per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his
services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual
formalities by appeal to this court. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him,
reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-
treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
Issue: Can this court compel one of the spouse to cohabit with each other?
Decision: NO, upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of
the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other, and render
conjugal rights to the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
rights of consortium.









G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
Zamboanga City,respondent.
Facts: Hatima C. Rasin was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in
accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga
City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic
Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif
Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 198 that, thereafter the former husband Hadji
Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman. Invoking the provisions of Article 143, par.
1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due
notice and hearing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to
resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul. On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an
order which reads as follows: It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of
petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the
petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use
of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground that the
petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of
Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption
of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
Issue: Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and
comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court?
Decision: Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not
seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of
divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply
and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her
husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her
such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the
case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need
not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her
husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial
authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church
[4]
in Manila; that
a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to
the couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage is void?

Decision: In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this court ruled that psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
]
Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. On the other hand, in the
present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological not physical illness.



Arcaba vs. Vda. De Batocael - November 22, 2001

1. On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A.
2. After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Franciscos mother executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of
one-fourth (
1
/
4
) of the property to Francisco.
3. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked
Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a
widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store inside.
4. Cirilla worked as caregiver of Francisco Comille but never asked for ages.
5. On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A,
consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in
the same instrument. Cirila had a common law relationship with Francisco Comille.
6. On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children.

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was
valid.

Held

The donation inter vivos in favor of Crilla Arcaba is void is void under Article 87 of the Family Code,
which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic
massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated
that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law spouse.







Mateo vs. Lagua - October 30, 1969
1. Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan,
Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, Lot No. 6541 and Lot No. 5106.
2. Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their
son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia Mateo.
3. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the
properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor's name.
4. When Alejandro died, Bonifacia and her daughter lived with father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua who
in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots.
5. He refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action
and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
6. Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent
Gervacio.

Issue:
Whether or not the donation by Lagua and his wife is inofficious.
Held:
No, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting a payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in
order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the
donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the
properties of the donor.
4
In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before
the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to
order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.







Quiao v. Quiao | July 4, 2012
1. The court rendered a decision declaring the legal separation of Rita C. Quiao and Brigido Quiao.
2. The personal and real properties were divided equally.
3. Bigido Quiaos net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children.
4. Brigido Quiao clarified before the RTC the net profit earned. The phrase NET PROFIT
EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. The Order further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to
Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community
Held:
No, the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. When a couple enters into a regime of
absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to
each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits.











Buado vs. CA | April 24, 2009
1. Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol. The trial court ordered
Erlinda to pay for damages, total of 40,000php.
2. The civili liability of Erlinda arises from criminal offense of slander.
3. The personal properties were insufficient to pay for the damages. The sheriff auctioned the
property of Erlinda.
4. The Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado won the auction and bought the property for only 51,685
with a current market value of 500,000.
5. The sold property was included in the conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
Held:
No, unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.











Dar vs. Alonzo Legasto | August 30, 2000
1. The CA dismissed the petition for review on certiorari and mandamus for failure to comply with
the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping after finding that the petition "was signed only
by Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino, and Liberty Cruz, without authority attached
thereto to sign for and in behalf of their co-petitioners.
2. Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the same.
3. Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners, Dar, Angeles,
Constantino and Cruz.
4. They were sued as Mr. and Mrs. in the said case.
5. What is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the
system of absolute community of property.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary that the husband and wife must both sign the petition.
Held:
No, what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the system
of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition. The fact that the petitioners
were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property in which they have a common interest. Such
being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on
certification of non-forum shopping.












FRENZEL VS CATITO (188)
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent, met respondent
Ederlina Catito, a Filipina in in Sydney, Australia. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany
and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at Kings Cross,
return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He purchased the properties
that Ederlina can use in her business and which was registered under her name.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. In
the course of their relationship, Alfred purchased a house and lot and agreed that only Ederlinas name
would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same. He
sold his properties and businesses abroad. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in Alfreds account
with the HSBC, Kowloon Branch and then transferred his deposits in Savings account with HSBC,
Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina.
Alfred discovered that Ederlina is married to Klaus. But Ederlina assured Alfred that she would
divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the
outcome of Ederlinas petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase several properties and again agreed to have the deed
of sale made out in the name of Ederlina.
Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a
divorce from Klaus. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off
all contacts with her.
Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties acquired by him with his personal funds.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in applying the rule of pari delicto in the case

Held:
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in
good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. The petitioner is charged with
knowledge of the constitutional prohibition. As can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court, the
petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law
even before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the
petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondents name as the sole vendee thereof.
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition
of real properties in the Philippines by aliens.
BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR (189)
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

Facts:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar (respondent), a
separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and
respondent fell in love and decided to live together their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
Cabancalan,Mandaue City. The Transfer Certificate of Titles of the properties were issued in
respondents name alone since Jambrich was an alien and not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons. However, the idyll lasted only until
April 1991.
Jambrich met Camilo F. Borromeo (petitioner) sometime in 1986. Jambrich purchased an engine
and some accessories for his boat from petitioner. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. When
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether the sale or assignment made by Jambrich to Borromeo is valid considering that the
former as alien is disqualified to own real properties in the Philippines

Held:
The fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Furthermore, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who
is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties
to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,

the
Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
While the acquisition and the purchase of Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw
in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.


DEWARA VS LAMELA (190)
G.R. No. 179010 April 11, 2011

Facts:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara were married before the enactment of
the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were
separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo
stayed in Bacolod City.

On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence

against Eduardo. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment and to pay civil indemnity.

Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667
of the Bacolod Cadastre in the name of Elenita Dewara to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of
Eduardo because he had no property in his name.

Thus, Elenita, represented filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent
spouses and ex-officio sheriff before the RTC of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy on
execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive
property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner declaring that said property is paraphernal in nature.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.


Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo

Held:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was in
the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property
and the monetary consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this Court of
the paraphernal character of the property. Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently
proven that the prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to reach a
conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation rather than a sale.
The subject property is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS DAVID, SR. (191)
G.R. NO. 169548 MARCH 15, 2010

Facts:

Manuel A. David, Sr. (respondent) and Martha S. David were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the
spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was registered in the name of
Martha S. David, In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation (petitioner) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against
Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was
without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the
property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
Titan in its Answer, claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA)

signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the
spouses. Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a forgery;
hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the property is part of the spouses conjugal partnership and in the absence of Manuels
consent the deed of sale is void

Held:
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In the case, Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive property because Manuel failed to
present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to
contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the
original purchase of the property. In consonance with the ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not
required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the
presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent
of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law.
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
The Petition is denied.

DIMAYUGA- LAURENA VS COURT OF APPEALS (192)
G.R. NO. 159220- September 22, 2008

Facts:

Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent) were married
on December 19, 1983. They have two children, Mark Jordan who was born on 2 July 1985 and Michael
Joseph who was born on 11 November 1987.
On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner further alleged that during their
marriage, she and respondent acquired properties which were all part of their conjugal partnership of
gains. Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, for custody of their
children, and for monthly support of P25,000.
The trial court denied the nullity of their marriage, declaring the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner and respondent Dissolved with all the effects provided by law; and further affirming
the petitioners claim that all the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties.
The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with regard to the denial of the
petition for annulment of marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The
adjudication respecting the properties which comprise the conjugal partnership is modified to exclude the
properties belonging to the parents of respondent.

Issue:
Whether the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner and respondent

Held:
The totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of
the solemnization of their marriage.

The Court sustains in part the Court of Appeals Decision.

The transfer was merely an accommodation so that petitioner, who was then working at
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate using the properties
as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as additional capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station. As found
by the Court of Appeals, the loan was still being paid from the income from the
Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as
attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was the business of respondents
parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.
As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute Sale the Court finds no
sufficient proof to sustain this allegation. Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City should
be included in the conjugal partnership of gains.

The petition is partly granted.
MUOZ JR. VS RAMIREZ (193)
G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010

Facts:

On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427,
with Erlindas consent, to the GSIS to secure a housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through
monthly salary deductions. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story
residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of
Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of
the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the
documents transferring the title to the petitioners name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be
secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427 but it was cancelled since Erlinda returned Eliseos
affidavit, unsigned; the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage,
and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not return
the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title.
The petitioner alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their
offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the
incidental charges. Also the petitioner introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlindas name; the residential lot was part of a large parcel of land
owned by Erlindas parents.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal

Held:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas
exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the house was built thereon
through conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-
Canullas.

Under the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally belonged to
one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of improvements thereon at the expense of the
partnership. We applied this provision in Calimlim-Canullas, where we held that when the conjugal house
is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the
husband is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Petition is denied.
CARIO VS CARIO (194)
G. R. NO. 132529 FEBRUARY 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (petitioner) and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (respondent).
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan
Nicdao praying, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. She submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
The lower court ruled in favor of respondent and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Susan Yee is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies
despite the nullity of their marriage

Held:

Both marriages contracted by SPO4 Santiago S. Cario were declared void ab initio.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
The marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner
and the deceased) the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By
intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And,
respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license.
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

Petition is granted.






























DIO VS DIO (195)
G.R. No. 178044 - January 19, 2011

Facts:
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again.
On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code.

Held:
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36

of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relation of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.
The Court affirmed the Decision of the trial court with the modification that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.









JUANIZA VS JOSE (196)
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

Facts:

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November
23, 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the
time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with
defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and
wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, decision was
rendered, ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay the victims
and the respective heirs of the deceased.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered
insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant. The lower court
denied her motion and based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals stating that the lower court erred
in holding her liable on the erroneous theory that Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo, having lived together
as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, are co- owners of said jeepney.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a
common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry

Held:
It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of
the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of,
and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages
caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein.
Rosalia Arroyo is declared free from any liability for damages.





BIENVENIDO VS COURT OF APPEALS (197)
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido and lived with her until Aurelio's death on
May 28, 1988. On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which the
deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued
in his name, Aurelio was described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner
Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado
Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to
settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Aurelio Luis brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed
in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
The trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing
the complaint of Luisita. On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property forms part of the Conjugal property of Aurelio and Luisita
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in applying Art. 739 of the Civil Code and declaring
invalid the Deed of Sale between Aurelio and Nenita

Held:
Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous. Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the
property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there
was no such partnership in the first place.
The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to Nenita is void on the principle
embodied in Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares donations made between persons who are guilty
of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void. In the first place, an action for
declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this
case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself void.
In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale

executed with all the solemnity
of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her
name.

Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's
title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.
The decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING the
complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.





































AGAPAY VS PALANG (198)
G. R. NO. 116668 JULY 28, 1997

Facts:
Miguel Palang is married to Carlina Vallesterol and had a daughter named Herminia Palang.
Miguel left to work in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with his wife and
child, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. The trial court found evidence that he
attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
On 1973, the then sixty-three year old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year
old Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land in Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan said property was
issued with Erlindas name.
Miguel and Carlina Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristoffer Palang. Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years, later on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
Carlina and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, (respondents) instituted the case at bar, an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The lower court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay

Held:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation
when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. The Court find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently,
the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property
of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought, the testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. Petition is
DENIED.

PEDRO GAYON vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON
FACTS:
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses
Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses
executed a deed copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex A whereby they sold to
Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the
barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon,
subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption
had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors,
despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by
virtue of a deed of sale copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex B dated March
21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had,
since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes
on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree
for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly,
praying that an order be issued in plaintiffs favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the
aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex A to the complaint is fictitious, for
the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband
had ever executed any document of whatever nature in plaintiffs favor; that the complaint is malicious
and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to employ the services of
counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00; and that being a brother of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case before
filing his complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the Mr. Gayon that an earnest effort toward a compromise
before the filing of the suit is tenable.
HELD:
As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art.
222 of our Civil Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
provision applies to suits filed or maintained between members of the same family. This phrase,
members of the same family, should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 which should be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as
party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and
plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
The order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the
inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre
Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of
the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the
costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon.
















EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA
FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their
union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana ("Khriza").
Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four
(4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana
("Rosalina"). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family
Code. On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that there
were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the
Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998. On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied
Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to
bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to
comply with the condition precedent under article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not
dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that
the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the
petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a
condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition
precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section
1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional
defect. Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party fails to
raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. Such defect is curable by
amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance
with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a
petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the failure to state
compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of the complaint.
Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present
the real controversies between the parties.
























JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R.
ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM vs. DANILO PANGILINAN,
RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents back wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &service incentive leave
pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos
name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt
from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of
execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that
the Pandacan address is actually the business address.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid
HELD:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment
debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family
home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must
have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,229-231 and 233
of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154actually reside
therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or
if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must
not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.155 for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption
must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3,
1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos
family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the
Pandacan property valid.


JOSE MODEQUILLO vs HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER
ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITOCULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA
FACTS:
As liability for a vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 which killed Audie Salinas and which
injured Renato Culan, Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay indemnity for damages
to spouses Salinas and to Juanito. Consequently on July 7, 1988, a writ of execution and levy were issued
against a parcel of residential lot and an agricultural land, the titles of which were under the name of
Modequillo. Modequillo then filed a motion to quash, alleging that the residential lot was their family
home that had been constituted since 1969, prior to the case and hence exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in
Article 155 and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not
one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. The trial court denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
HELD:
The liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred in 1976 and the money judgment
was rendered on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; &
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code.
It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. Under Article
162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152and 153 of
said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that
all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

























Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli Corazon Angeles MAGLAYA
FACTS:
Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4
parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the
sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as Franciscos second wife and
surviving spouse that she should be made administrator of Franciscos estate. She claims that respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her
claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage
contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She
also said that she and Francisco adopted a child.
Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to
December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938
Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little
consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of
adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also
offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate?. Pictures taken during
respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her
scholastic and government service records, were also offered as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado.
HELD:
No. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy
under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence
of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Franciscos marriage to Genoveva, thus she
cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending
physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,
RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child,
said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondents legitimate filiation
to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment
by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the
form of the latter. Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased.



































MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER,
JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO GILLERA
G.R. No. 189998
August 29, 2012

FACTS:

Christian Harper, 30 YO, came to Manila in November 1999 on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the
early morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified
malefactors. His death was discovered when his credit card company informed his family members about
a suspicious attempt to use his card who later on tried to inform him. When the family was not able to
contact him, they called the manager of Shangri-la Hotel who, together with the security personnel on
duty, found his lifeless body in his hotel room.
On August 30, 2002, the widow and her sons (respondents) filed a case in the RTC to recover
various damages from petitioner, pertinently alleging that the murderer succeeded to trespass into the area
of the hotels private rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotels gross
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or
omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased. The RTC held
the petitioner liable for the death of Christian Harper and ordered to pay for the damages. Shangri-la
escalated the petition to CA which affirms the decision of the RTC with some modification on the
respective payment for the damages.
Petitioners challenge against respondents documentary evidence on marriage and heirship is not
well-taken. Petitioner also argued that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harpers own
negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that
hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests.

ISSUE/S:
(a) WON the respondents are the legal heirs of Christian Harper
(b) WON the petitioner has a liability in the murder of Christian Harper


HELD:
In this case, the respondents have presented several documents, like the birth certificates of
Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and
the probate court certificate, all of which were presumably regarded as public documents under the laws
of Norway. Such documentary evidence was sufficed to competently establish the relationship and
filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court.

According to Article 2176, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Liability on the part of the
defendant is based upon the fact that he was in a better situation than the injured person to foresee and
prevent the happening of the injurious occurrence. The hotel business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also
security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business.
The Supreme Court thereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.






































ELAINE A. MOORE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18407
June 26, 1963


FACTS:
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for her child to be
permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore brought about by a former
marriage. After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held during which the parties
submitted a stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the petition, whereupon
petitioner interposed the present appeal.
Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American
citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by a name William Michael Velarde was born. This child, now 14
years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued
by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree became final,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time.
He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true
father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioners desire that the minor be able to use the name
Moore after his family name Velarde.

ISSUE/S:
( a ) WON under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second
husband of his mother
( b ) WON justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name
( c ) WON petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a
change

HELD:
Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father.
Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of their father. Also made on Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of
annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment shall principally use the
surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it is concluded that
the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of
the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
The court found the observation of the governments counsel acceptable. Indeed, if a child born
out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the
first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real
paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling
of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore family, the court is
deterred by a legal barrier which cannot be overlooked.
Another factor to be considered is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the
present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to a mature age. If that time comes, he
may then decide the matter for himself and take such action as the law may permit. For the present the
court deemed the action taken by petitioner premature.
The court affirms the decision of the lower court.








































ZOSIMA NALDOZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-55538
March 15, 1982

FACTS:
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They begot two
children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23, 1970 and July 22, 1973,
respectively. Her husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another
woman and never returned to the conjugal abode. Because Dionesio allegedly swindled the money of a
congressman and other persons, the classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto would teased them
about it. As a solution Zosima filed a petition for the surname of her two children be changed from
Divinagracia to Naldoza following her surname.
After due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. The trial court did not
consider as sufficient grounds for change of surname the circumstances that the children's father was a
swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage to Zosima was a second marriage which,
however, had not been annulled nor declared bigamous. Zosima Naldoza then appealed to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court erred in denying the petition of Zosima Naldoza

HELD:
The reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the
petition. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court stating "the child should, and in the course of
time must, know of his parentage", if, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of
selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's
surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
















REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO
G.R. No. 88202.
December 14, 1998

FACTS:
This is an appeal interjected by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios
petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu.
Respondent stated that she was born on January 19, 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon
City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On 10 January 1972,
Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode and never reappeared nor sent support to them and it was Ernesto
Yu who had come to the aid of her mother and her siblings. Her mother was able to change her last name
to her maiden name and was also granted by the court the declaration of Pablo Castro Vicencio as
absentee. On 15 April 1986, her mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a ceremony
solemnized by Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
It was also established that even since her childhood, Cyntha Vicenio had not known mush less
remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu; that
despite of which she had been using the family name "Vicencio" in her school and other related activities
therein.
Disregarding the OSG's contention, the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying
the petition and granted her the petition for change of name. The decision of the trial court was affirmed
by the appellate court, which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname be changed.
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private
respondent's change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal
complications due to the fact that private respondent's step-father has two children with her mother. In the
event of her step-father's death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as
a "legitimate" daughter.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner should be granted the request to change her name

HELD:
Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father's
legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place.
Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all
her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead the court to reject
private respondent's desire to use her stepfather's surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result
would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very
change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. Although the
respondent was already 18 years old, she was still considered a minor as per Republic Act 6809.
The appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED.

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343
October 18, 2004


Facts:
This case seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court f Appeals which provides,
Loreta P. Miguel shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10) years
of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent
he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner,
Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may
take the child out upon the written consent of the mother..
Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, the grandparents f the child to whom he mother left the child for
custody, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The respondent Loreta P.
Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. She responded that her
stay in Japan is temporary and that the reason of the marriage is for her to continue to work in Japan to
support her child.

Issue:
WON Joey Briones should be allowed to have custody of the child

Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be
a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers
to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
The Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to live with
is DELETED for lack of legal basis.






G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.

FACTS
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On August 22,1969 the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on
September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the
petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with
an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory. The respondent's
complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. The
application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24,1969. The petitioner
filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed against the respondent. On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with
respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul
the aforementioned orders. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a
writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. The respondent court, in
its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to
present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for
support pendente lite. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of
October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the respondents application for
support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his
defense against the said application?


HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15,1970, all are set aside
and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending
action for legal separation between the parties. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from
the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the
filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a
ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article303 of the same Code the obligation
to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which
gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when
the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a
situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.





















G.R. No. 150644

EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner vs. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON
and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN
LACSON, Respondents.

FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. After the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented
an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. They have been doing it for a period of
eighteen (18) years. However, as things turned out Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite
Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the
schooling of Maowee and Maonaa. Lea then, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against
Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33. The trial court granted the
sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite. Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied by the appellate court

ISSUE:
WON the respondents are entitled for support from the petitioner?

HELD:
The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner is obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is
his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears. He invokes the
following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has
a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand.

As the appellate court ruled, it could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture
of trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did not
make a formal demand therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from
his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such
obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Hence, the Supreme Court finds no adequate reason to
disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand
Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement
from the petitioner. The provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently
needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.


Contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-
contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents
with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a
neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is
thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less
petitioners daughters.

The instant petition is denied and the appealed CA decision and resolution are affirmed.






NOEL B. BAGTAS, Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. RUTH C. SANTOS, Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo
City, and ANTONIO and ROSITA
GALLARDO, Respondents.





FACTS:

Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo (Maricel).
Maricel ran away to live with her boyfriend, became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo
(Maryl Joy). Maricels boyfriend left her. In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the
same day, Maricel ran away again and lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson).
Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In April 2002,
the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and Sioson. Bagtas and
Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a petition for habeas
corpus. The RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus. Bagtas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
WON the issuance of habeas corpus grant the production of and custody over Maryl Joy?

HELD:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even
if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful custody
over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for habeas corpus and
awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient basis.
These cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the courts view of the best interests of those
whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to
deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the consideration of the
facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the childs welfare is
the supreme consideration.
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the case would
mean further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands that proper proceedings be conducted to determine
the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of her.
The Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, for
the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the Spouses Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo
to have custody of Maryl Joy Gallardo.

















FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in
Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the
Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner,
wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint
against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
Perez advised him he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge
receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was
instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name
petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No.
142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty.

ISSUE:
WON he violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No 6085 as he never used any alis name; neither is
Oscar Perez his alias.

HELD:
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for
tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or
printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his
business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where
his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in
the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or
common interest with him in such contract agreement, business transaction, or business
CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by
proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. The use of a fictitious
name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication
that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not
fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence
showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.