Torts Reviewer

NOTES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atitiw, Angeles, Banasen, Nagpala, Pablito

TORTS

A tort is a wrong independent of contract, or a
breach of duty which the law, as distinguished from a
mere contract, has imposed. It is a violation of a
private legal right other than a mere breach of
contract, express or implied for which a civil action
may be maintained.

Classification of Torts

1. Intentional Torts

Include conduct where the actor desires to cause
the consequences of his act or believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from
it.

2. Negligent Torts

Involve voluntary acts or omissions which result in
injury to others without intending to cause the
same or because the actor fails to exercise due
care in performing such acts or omissions

3. Strict Liability

When the person is made liable independent of
fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain
facts specified by law

TORTFEASOR

A. DIRECT TORFEASOR

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.

Elements of Quasi Delict or Culpa Aquiliana:

a. There must be an act or omission
b. Such act or omission causes damage to
another
c. Such act or omission is caused by fault or
negligence
d. There is no pre- existing contractual relations
between the parties

Burden of Proof

The burden of proof is on the person claiming
damages to establish by satisfactory evidence that the
legal cause of his damage or injury is the fault or
negligence of the defendant.

Quasi- delict arising from Breach of Contract

The existence of a contract does not preclude the
commission of a quasi delict by one against another
and the consequent recovery of damages against the
former.

Illustrative Cases

Air France vs Carrascoso
G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966

Facts:
Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class
passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a
pilgrimage. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in
first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France
forced him to vacate his seat in favor of a white man
who had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso filed
for moral damages, averring in his complaint the
contract of carriage between Air France and himself.

Issue:
Whether or not the was breach of contract

Held:
A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the
part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier.
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a
case of quasi-delict. Thus, damages are proper.

Regino vs PCST
G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology (PCST). During the second
semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in
logic and statistics subjects under Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively,
as teachers. In 2002, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance
Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the
construction of the school's tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two
tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was
allegedly implemented by recompensing students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the
opportunity to take the final examinations. Regino
refused to pay the tickets because of financial
difficulties and prohibition by her religion from
attending dance parties and celebrations. On the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and
statistics, her teachers Ms. Gamurot and Ms. Baladad
disallowed her from taking the tests. Gamurot made
her sit out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad
allegedly ejected her from the classroom. Petitioner's
pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.

Issue:
Whether or not PCST is liable for damages

Held:
Generally, liability for tort arises only between
parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for
tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may
also be a tort. In the case, PCST is liable for damages
because it acts qualifies under Article 21 of the Civil
Code which states that any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Distinguished from Culpa Contractual and
Culpa Criminal

Culpa
Contractual
Culpa Aquiliana Culpa
Criminal
There is a pre-
existing
obligation
There is no pre-
existing
obligation
There is no pre-
existing
obligation
Preponderance
of evidence is
required
Preponderance of
evidence is
needed
There crime
must be proven
beyond
reasonable
doubt
Defense of a
good father of a
family in the
selection and the
supervision of
employees is not
Defense of a
good father of a
family in the
selection and
supervision of
the employees is
This defense
cannot be
interposed. If
the employee is
insolvent or
incapable to
a proper and
complete
defense but can
mitigate liability
for damages
a proper defense
of the employer
pay the civil
aspect or
liability, the
employer is
subsidiarily
liable
The existence of
a contract must
be proven. If it
is proven that
the contract was
not complied
with, it is
presumed that
the debtor is at
fault
The fault or
negligence of the
defendant must
be proven
The innocence
of the accused
is presumed
until the
contrary is
proven
Negligence is
only incidental to
the performance
of an existing
obligation based
on a contract
Negligence is
direct,
substantive and
independent
Negligence is
direct,
substantive and
independent

Illustrative Example

Victory Liner Bus No 1123
Route: Baguio to Pasay Time of
Departure: 12:00 midnight
Driver X was intoxicated but was cleared by
supervisor
Passenger A; Pedestrian B
Bus Collided with another Truck (no negligence
on his part)

Passenger A
Culpa Criminal
- Criminal Case of Reckless
Imprudence against X
- Criminal case cannot be filed
against the company
Culpa Contractual
- A vs. Victory Liner for breach of
contract
Culpa Aquiliana
- A vs. X and Victory Liner or
- A vs. Victory Liner

Pedestrian B:
Culpa Criminal
- Criminal Case of Reckless
Imprudence against X
Culpa Aquiliana
- B vs. X; or
- B vs. X and Victory Liner; or
- B vs. Victory Liner

Illustrative Cases on Culpa Aquiliana

Delsan vs C and A Construction
G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003

Facts:
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by
petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at
the Navotas Fish. At around 12:00 midnight of October
20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express received a report from his radio head operator
in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in
about eight (8) hours. At approximately 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the
area because it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m.,
Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of
Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power
barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8
to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full
ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship
towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision,
Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He
succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the
engine was re-started and the ship was manoeuvred
full astern; it hit the deflector wall constructed by C
and A consortium.

Issue:
Whether or not there was negligence on the part of
Delsan

Held:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was
correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in
deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report
from his radio head operator in Japan19 that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours. This,
notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek
shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was
already congested.

PNR vs Brunty
G.R. No. 169891. November 2, 2006

Facts:
Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were
approaching a railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal,
Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately
70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the
railroad track up ahead and that they were about to
collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly
killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train;
the two other passengers suffered serious physical
injuries. Rhonda Brunty was immediately rushed to
Central Luzon Doctors Hospital where she was
pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Thus,
Ethel Brunty, Rhondas father sent a letter to PNR
demanding for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not there was negligence on the part of
PNR

Held:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order
to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or
some person for whose acts he must respond was
guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and damage. 53 Applying the
foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the
following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees
(respondents herein) sustained damage or injury as a
result of the collision. That there was negligence on the
part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal
accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the
PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but
does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in
transportation.

Safeguard Security vs Tangco
G.R. No. 165732. December 14, 2006

Facts:
Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time
deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would
sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed
firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard
Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and
pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the
same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death. Pajarilllo was
subsequently charged for Homicide with which he was
convicted. Respondents reserved their right to file a
separate civil action in the said criminal case.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents
filed with RTC a complaint for damages against
Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not Safeguard is solidarily liable with
Pajarillo

Held:
Yes. An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.
The civil action filed by respondents was not
derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the
criminal case but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from crime. The source of
the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is
a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by
law. Hence, its liability is solidary and not subsidiary.

Illustrative Cases on Culpa Contractual

Victory Liner vs Gammad
G.R. No. 15963. November 25, 2004

Facts:
Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad was on board an
air-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for
Tuguegarao, Cagayan from Manila. At about 3:00
a.m., the bus, while running at a high, speed fell on a
ravine which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and
physical injuries to other passengers. On May 14,
1996, respondent heirs of the deceased filed a
complaint for damages arising from culpa contractual
against petitioner. In its answer, the petitioner claimed
that the incident was purely accidental and that it has
always exercised extraordinary diligence in its 50 years
of operation.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a breach of contract

Held:
Petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of
contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard to all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed
that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent
when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the
presumption is rebutted, the court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
exercised extraordinary diligence.
In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the
statutory presumption that the proximate cause of
Marie Graces death was the negligence of petitioner.
Hence, the courts below correctly ruled that petitioner
was guilty of breach of contract of carriage.

LRTA vs. Navidad
G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

Facts:
While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached him. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad later
fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that
Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by
the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

Issue:
Whether or not LRTA is liable for breach of contract

Held:
The law requires common carriers to carry
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they
ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
Hence, the foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier.

UE vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000

Facts:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of
Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his
last year, he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student and on February
1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega
which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. He took the examination
on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor
Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade
of five (5).
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members
of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among
the fourth year students should be allowed to
graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Thereafter, the plaintiff attended the investiture
ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the
stage when his name was called, escorted by her
mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing
the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right,
and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law
Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination. He took a leave of absence without pay
from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30,
1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he
dropped his review class and was not able to take the
bar examination.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a breach of contract

Held:
When a student is enrolled in any educational or
learning institution, a contract of education is entered
into between said institution and the student. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely inform
and furnish sufficient notice and information to each
and every student as to whether he or she had already
complied with all the requirements for the conferment
of a degree or whether they would be included among
those who will graduate. For its failure to timely notify
the respondent about his academic deficiencies, the
school is liable for breach of contract.

Illustrative Case on Culpa Criminal

People vs de los Santos
G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001.

Facts:
Herein accused Glenn Delos Santos was charged
and initially convicted with the crimes of multiple
murder, multiple frustrated murder, and multiple
attempted murder in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan De Oro City when the Isuzu Elf Truck he was
driving suddenly rammed towards several members of
the Philippine National Police who were undergoing an
"endurance run" in the early morning of October 5,
1995 as part of their Special Counter Insurgency
Operation Unit Training. 12 PNP members died on the
spot, 1 died shortly thereafter, 11 were seriously
wounded, and 10 were slightly injured.
Delos Santos, in his defense, surmised that while
his elf truck was doing a left curve in the vicinity of the
incident, he was distracted by a very bright and glaring
light from an on-coming vehicle; that it was only when
the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters
from each other that the other cars headlights were
switched from bright to dim; and that immediately
after passing the oncoming vehicle did Glenn suddenly
hear and feel bumping thuds, so he tried to put his
right foot on the brake pedal, but was not able to do
so. Emano.

Issue:
Whether or not Delos Santos is guilty of the crime of
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder

Held:
Glenn showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
(1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Considering that the incident was not a product of
a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act
of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and
less serious physical injuries.

B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY/ PERSONS MADE
RESPONSIBLE FOR OTHERS

Doctrine of Vicarious Liability

A person is made liable not only for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible subject to certain conditions.

1. Parents:

For damage caused by:
a. Minors
b. Living in their company

Degree of Diligence needed to overcome
presumption of negligence of parents

What is required is diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage. This implies a consideration
of the attendant circumstances in every individual
case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of
such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

Illustrative Case:

Cuadra vs Monfort
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

Facts:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa
Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six. On July 9,
1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three
other classmates, to weed the grass in the school
premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten
the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face her
friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from
the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it
with some powder. The next day, the eye became
swollen and it was then that the girl related the
incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a
doctor for treatment. Due to the said incident, she
underwent surgical operation twice. Despite the
medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.

Issue:
Whether or not the parents can be held liable for the
act of their minor child which caused damage to
another.

Held:
No. In the present case there is nothing from
which it may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was
at school, where it was his duty to send her and where
she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against.
Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
could be attributed to her parents.

Parents liability extends to intentional crimes
committed by minor children

The parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages

Illustrative Case:

Fuellas vs Cadano
G.R. No. L-14409. October 31, 1961

Facts:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on
September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St.
Mary's High School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon of
September 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his
lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one
Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside
the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same,
an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito
and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher,
separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home.
Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito
had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by
Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate,
told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand
to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake
hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg,
placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the
ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm
under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side.
While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried
out "My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went
away. For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito
Cadano, son of plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two
separate actions were instituted for damages against
Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas.

Issue:
Whether or not Agapito can be held civilly liable for the
intentional felony committed by Rico

Held:
Yes. The particular law that governs this case is
Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides:
"The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." To hold that
this provision does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal
Code is subserved by this particular provision of our
Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent
decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical
cases.

Liability now without Alternative Application
Under Article 2180, the enforcement of such
liability shall be effected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. However, under
the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offenders. For civil liability arising from quasi
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall
apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the
Civil Code as modified (Libi vs IAC, 214 SCRA 16)

Correlated with PD 603

Liabilities of Parents
Article 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the Civil
Code.
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. -
The civil liability for acts committed by a youthful
offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or
in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender.

Correlated with the Revised Penal Code
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of
felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases. The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article
12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12,
the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was
no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane,
imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article
11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably
determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of
the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.

Correlated with RA 9344

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

2. Guardians

For damages caused by:
a. Minors or incapacitated persons
b. Under their authority and
c. Live in their company

Who are Guardians

The appointment of guardians and the procedure
to be followed are provided for in Rule 92 and 93 of
the Rules of Court.

Guardian De Facto

Refer to cases where an orphaned or abandoned
child is taken care of a relative or neighbour, not
legally-appointed as a guardian.
Such person in custody or guardian de facto would
not be responsible, since there is absence of
responsibility or duty. HOWEVER, if the injury caused
is the result of bad education or training by the child
de facto, the latter should be held liable. It is the moral
responsibility of the guardian

3. Owners and Managers of Establishment or
Enterprise

For damages caused by:
a. Their employees
b. In the services of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasions of their
functions

Illustrative Cases


YHT Realty vs CA
GR. No. 126780. February 17, 2005

Facts:
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from
Australia and registered with Tropicana Hotel. He
rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to
rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at
Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin
was aware of the procedure observed by Tropicana
relative to its safety deposit boxes. When a registered
guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone
could personally request the management who then
would assign one of its employees to accompany the
guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box
with the two keys. Before leaving for a brief trip to
Hong Kong, McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box
with his key and with the key of the management and
took there from the envelope containing his deposited
money. When he arrived in Hong Kong, he opened the
envelope and discovered upon counting that it was
$2,000.00 short. After returning to Tropicana, he
discovered that the envelope in his safety deposit box
was $5,000.00 short and the jewelry stored was
missing. When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he
immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who
admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with
the key assigned to him.

Issue:
Whether or not YHT is liable for the negligence of its
employees

Held:
Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code
provides that the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has
ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is
presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting
and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to
prove the negligence of such employer. Thus, given
the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money was
consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas
employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit
box without the guests consent, both the assisting
employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as owner
and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily
liable

Mercury Drug vs Spouses Huang
GR. No. 172122. June 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of
a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck. It has in its
employ petitioner Rolando Del Rosario as driver.
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the
red 1991 Toyota Corolla. These two vehicles figured in
a road accident. At the time of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt. A
drivers license had been confiscated because he had
been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries
to his spinal cord, head, face and lung. He is paralyzed
for life from his chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment. Respondents
fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its driver. The trial court found
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally
liable to pay respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not Mercury Drug is liable for the negligent
act of its employee

Held:
Art. 2180 provides that: the obligation imposed
by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. As further provided in
paragraph 4 of the said article: the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug
should show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, both in the selection of the
employee and in the supervision of the performance of
his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to the supervision of its
employees, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements,
employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence. Unfortunately, it failed to show
that it indeed exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee considering that the
latter was driving without any license when the
accident occurred.

Owners and managers as contemplated in
paragraph 4 of Article 2180 does not include the
manager of a corporation

4. Employers:

For damages caused by
a. Their employees and household helpers
b. Acting within the scope of their assigned tasks
c. Even though they are not engaged in any
business or industry

Illustrative Cases

Cerezo vs Tuazon
GR No. 141538. March 23, 2004

Facts:
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus
Lines passenger bus with collided with a tricycle
bearing along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle
driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband
Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo A.
Foronda.

Issue:
a. Whether or not Cerezo is liable for the
negligence of his employee, Foronda
b. Whether or not the Court needs to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Foronda in order
to make Cerezo liable

Held:
a. Article 2180 states in part: Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. Cerezo is liable as an employer
because Tuazons disability was due to
Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and
imprudence. Furthermore, she is liable for
lack of due care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of her employees, particularly
Foronda.
b. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where
there is a solidary obligation on the part of
debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable
for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is
liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
There is no merger or renunciation of rights,
but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of
the parties is indispensable, and the other is
not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary
as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs.
Cerezo alone.

Filamer Christian Institute vs CA
GR. No. 75112. October 16, 1990

Facts:
Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of
Filamer. Having a drivers license, he requested Masa,
driver and son of school president, to let him drive
them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa yielded
and on the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan,
because Funtecha swerved right to avoid a fast-moving
truck.

Issue:
Whether or not Filamer is liable

Held:
Yes. The clause within the scope of their by
assigned tasks for the purpose of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer includes ANY
ACT DONE BY THE EMPLOYEE, IN FURTHERANCE OF
THE INTERESTS OF THE EMPLOYER OR FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF THE EMPLOYER AT THE TIME OF
THE INFLICTION OF THE INJURY. THAT IS APPLICABLE
EVEN IF THE EMPLOYEE DERIVES SOME BENEFIT
FROM THE ACT. In this case, Funtecha drove the jeep
not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer.
The fact that he was not the school driver is
insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family.

Distinction between Paragraph 4 and
paragraph 5

Paragraph 4 Paragraph 5
Applies to owners and
managers of an
establishment or
enterprise
Applies to employers in
general, whether or not
engaged in any business
or industry
Covers negligent acts of
employees committed
either in the service of the
branches or on the
occasion of their functions
Encompasses negligent
acts of employees acting
within the scope of their
assigned task

The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts
of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged
in a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether
or not engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But
it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show,
to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed (Castilex Industrial
Corporation vs Vasquez, Jr., G.R. No.
132266. December 21, 1999)

Presumption of Negligence

When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family (Viron
Transportation vs de los Santos, November 22, 2000)

When the injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or
the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after
selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee
(Safeguard Security vs Tangco, December 14, 2006)

Illustrative Case

Viron Transportation vs De los Santos
G.R. No. 138296l. November 22, 2000

Facts:
On August 16, 1993, the bus of plaintiff, a public
utility transportation company, was driven by one of its
regular drivers Wilfredo Villanueva from Tarlac going to
Manila. It was following a Forward Cargo truck
proceeding from the same direction being driven by
the defendant Alberto De los Santos. The cargo truck
swerved to the right shoulder of the road and, while
about to be overtaken by the bus, again swerved to
the left to occupy its lane. It was at that instance that
the collision occurred. The left front side of the truck
collided with the right front side of the bus causing the
two vehicles substantial damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the damage
caused by its employee

Held:
When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
Petitioner, through its witnesses, namely, Danilo
Azardon, a shop supervisor and Fernando Mallare, an
administrative officer, failed to rebut such legal
presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, thus, petitioner as the
employer is responsible for damages, the basis of the
liability being the relationship of pater familias or on
the employers own negligence

Nature of Employers Liability

The liability of the employer is primary and solidary
with the employee although the former can recover
from the latter whatever it pays to the plaintiff.

Jurisprudence

An employers liability based on a quasi-delict is
primary and direct, while the employers liability based
on a delict is merely subsidiary (Cerezo vs. Tuazon,
March 23, 2004)

The fact that an employee in a criminal case was
acquitted because his criminal negligence was not
proven cannot be invoked as a defense in an action for
damages against the employer based on Articles 2176
and 2180 because the liability of the employer is
primary and direct, based upon his own negligence and
not that of his employees (Standard Vacuum Oil vs
Tan, 107 Phil. 109)

Neither is the insolvency of the guilty employee or
a prior recourse against him a condition to fasten
liability on the employer (Bantolo vs Bobis, 18 SCRA
690)

Defense of Employer

If an injury or damage is caused by an employee,
it is presumed that the employer was negligent either
in the selection of the employee or in his supervision
over him or both.
The employer can overcome the presumption by a
clear showing that in the selection and supervision he
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family.

Jurisprudence

Supervision, in proper cases, includes the
promulgation by the employer of suitable rules and the
issuance of suitable instructions for the information
and guidance of his employees designed for the
protection of persons with whom the employer has
relation through his employees (Bahia vs Litonjua, 30
Phil. 624)

Mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything
more, is decidedly not sufficient to rebut the legal
presumption of negligence (Metro Manila Transit
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 538, 223
SCRA 521)

With respect to selection of drivers, the owner of a
vehicle should not be satisfied with the mere
possession of a professional drivers license and/ or
NBR and police clearance but he should carefully
examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record service
(Campo vs Camorote, 100 Phil. 459)

5. State

a. Its public or governmental aspects where it is
liable for the tortuous acts of special agents
only.

Special Agents Defined: One specifically
commissioned to carry out acts complained of outside
of such agents regular duties.

Jurisprudence

The driver of the ambulance of the Philippine
General Hospital is not considered as an agent and the
said hospital is not therefore liable for the negligence
of the ambulant driver (Meritt vs. Government)

Officers of the Emergency Control Administration
did not act as special agents of the government in
storing gasoline in the warehouse of the Emergency
Control Administration. Hence, the government is not
responsible for the damages caused through such a
negligence (Rosette vs. Auditor General)

The Province of Ilocos Norte is not liable for the
acts of the driver of the truck because he was not a
special agent of the government (Palafox vs Province
of Ilocos Norte)

b. Its private or business aspects (as when it
engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

Jurisprudence

The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable for the
death of a member of the zarzuela group when the
stage collapsed, under the principle of respondeat
superior. Holding of a town fiesta managed by the
Municipal Council is a proprietary function (Torio vs.
Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599)

The North Cemetery is a property which the City of
Manila owns in its proprietary capacity. The
maintenance of the cemetery is a proprietary function.
The City of Manila is liable for the tortuous act
committed by its agents who failed to verify the
duration of the contract of lease City of Manila vs. IAC
(179 SCRA 428)

Illustrative Case

Fontanilla vs Maliaman
G.R No. 610- 45. December 1, 1989

Facts: NIA, a government agency, owns and operates
a pick-up, and it is officially driven by Hugo, the one
employed by NIA as its regular driver. Said pick-up
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco, son of
petitioners. Because of the impact, Francisco was
thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, while
Restituto, another passenger, was thrown a little bit
further. Francisco died. The parants of Francisco sued
NIA for damages

Issue: Whether or not NIA can be held civilly liable for
the tortuous acts of Hugo

Held: The NIA is an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions by express provision of
Republic Act 3601. Indubitably, it is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a mere
agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body
performing non- governmental functions, it now
becomes liable for the damages caused by the accident
resulting from the tortuous act of its driver- employee.
In the case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employee and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is
predicated upon the existence of negligence on the
part of NIA. The negligence referred to here is a
negligence of supervision. Evidently, there was
negligence in the supervision of the driver for the
reason that they were travelling at a high speed within
the city limits and yet the supervisors of the group
failed to caution and make the driver observe the
proper and allowed speed within the city.

6. Teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades

For damages cause by:
a. Their pupils and students or apprentices
b. So long as they remain in their custody

Basis of liability

The teachers and heads stand, to a certain extent,
in loco parentis to their pupils and students.

Illustrative Case

Amadora vs CA
G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988

Facts:
While they were in the auditorium of their school
(Colegio de San Jose- Recolectos), Pablito Daffon, a
classmate, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo
Amadora, a prospective graduate, who was only 17
years old. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru
reckless imprudence. Petitioners, Alfredo Amadoras
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 against the school, its Rector, the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher
together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The respondent Court of
Appeals found that Article 2180 was not applicable as
Colegio de San Jose- Recolectos was not a school of
arts and trade but an academic institution of learning.
It also held that the students were not in the custody
of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended.

Issues:
a. Whether or not Article 2180 paragraph 7
applies to an academic institution of learning
b. Whether or not the school was no longer in
custody of the students at the time the crime
was committed

Held:
a. The provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."

If the teacher of the academic school is to be
held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in
a school of arts and trades? And in the case of
the academic or non- technical school, why not
apply the rule also to the head thereof instead
of imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to
the fact that historically the head of the school
of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the
task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By
contrast, the head of the academic school was
not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers
who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not
be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be
so blamed.
b. It is too tenuous to argue that the student
comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and
thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon
the last day of classes notwithstanding that
there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances
and the like. During such periods, the student
is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its
rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is
in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of
a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.
Note: The Supreme Court, nevertheless, ruled that:
The rector, the high school principal and the dean
of boys cannot be held liable because none of them
was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each
of them was exercising only a general authority over
the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties
does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the
physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the
teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.

Liability Extends to pupils or students beyond
the age of majority

The responsibility under Article 2180 is not limited
to pupils, students or apprentices who are minors.
While there is such limitation in the case of parents
and/ or guardians, no such limitation is provided as to
teachers and school heads.

Summary Table (Article 2180)

Person Liable Nature of
Liability
For Damages
Caused by
Father, or the
Mother, in the
case of death or
incapacity of the
father
Liable for
damages
For the damages
caused by the
minor children
who live in their
company
Guardians Liable for
damages
For damages
caused by the
minors or
incapacitated
persons who are
under their
authority and
live in their
company
Owners and
Managers of
Establishment or
Enterprise
Liable for
damages
For the damages
caused by their
employees
Employers Liable for
damages
For the damages
caused by their
employees and
household
helpers acting
within the scope
of their assigned
task
State Liable for
damages
For the acts of
its special agents
but not when the
damage has
been caused by
the official whom
the task done
properly pertains
in which Article
2176 applies
Teachers and
Heads of
Establishments of
Arts and Trade
Liable for
Damages
For damages
caused by their
pupils and
students or
apprentices so
long as they
remain in their
custody

7. Schools, Teachers and Administrators

Special Parental Authority of Schools,
Teachers and Administrators

The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
shall have special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody (Article 218, Family Code)

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution (Article
218, Family Code)

Liability under Special Parental Authority

School, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
(Article 219, Family Code)

This rule only applies to minors

Subsidiary Liability of Parents, Guardians and
Persons Exercising Substitute Parental
Authority

The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable (Article 219, Family
Code)

Defense Available

The respective liabilities of those mentioned above
shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances (Article 219, Family Code)

Illustrative Case

St. Marys Academy vs. William Carpitanos and
Lucita Carpitanos, Guada Daniel, James Daniel
II, James Daniel, Sr., and Vivencio Villanueva
G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002

Facts:
On February 13 to 20 1995: St. Marys Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrolment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrolment
campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrolees were studying. As a student of St.
Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day,
Sherwin, along with other high school students were
riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way
to Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II, then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident. The RTC and the CA both
ruled the St. Marys Academy is primarily liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos. They likewise ruled that
James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are subsidiarily
liable for the said incident.

Issue:
Whether or not St. Marys Academy is liable for the
death of Sherwin

Held:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following
shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
(1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Furthermore, under Article 219 of the
Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to
show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. In their comment to the
petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that
the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of
the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel
II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva

Defense against vicarious liability

The responsibility imposed by Article 2180 is not
based on respondeat superior. It arises by virtue of a
legal presumption of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible for the tortuous conduct of
another. Such presumption is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure, and may be rebutted by showing that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
The burden of proof devolved upon the persons
mentioned for the reason that in most cases, it is
difficult for any injured party to prove their negligence
or lack of due diligence.

C. JOINT TORTFEASORS

Nature of Liability

Joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for damages.
They are each responsible as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves individually.
The injured party may proceed against any one of
them, or some, or all of them simultaneously so long
as the indemnity has not been fully satisfied.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

A. CONCEPT

1. Definition:

That cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, without which the result would not
have occurred.

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom (Vda. De Bataclan v Medina, October 22,
1957)

Illustrative Cases:

Vda. De Bataclan v Medina
G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957

Facts:
One of front tires of passenger bus burst causing
bus to fall into a canal on the right side of the road and
turn turtle. Rescuers carrying torches fueled by
petroleum arrived and fire started because of the
leaking gasoline. Those trapped in the bus died
because of the fire. Defense of bus: its the fault of the
rescuers.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is
the act of the rescuers

Held:
The proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them,
and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help.

Dy Teban Trading vs Jose Ching

Facts:
Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was
driving a Nissan van. A passenger bus was cruising on
the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two
vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer,
owned by private respondent. The night before, at
around 10:00 p.m., the prime mover with trailer
suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent,
parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway, on the lane of the
passenger bus. The prime mover was not equipped
with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates. As
substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves
on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to
warn incoming motorists. To avoid hitting the parked
prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming
passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of
the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and
glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus.
He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to
avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the
rear of the prime mover.

Issue:
What is the proximate cause of the mishap

Held:
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the
proximate cause of the collision.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and
Limbaga are liable for all damages that resulted from
the skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability
includes those damages resulting from precautionary
measures taken by other motorist in trying to avoid
collision with the parked prime mover.
Ortiz obviously would not have swerved if not for
the passenger bus abruptly occupying his vans lane.
The passenger bus, in turn, would not have swerved to
the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime mover
improperly parked on its lane. The skewed parking is
the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.

Calimutan vs People

Facts:
From a videoke bar, the victim and a friend
proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but
along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim
Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao.
Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly
punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre
and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked
up a stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at
victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the
latters house, and on the way, victim Cantre
complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit
by the stone.
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother of the
stoning incident involving petitioner Calimutan. He
complained of backache and also of stomachache, and
was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. His family
would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they
had no vehicle. The following day, 05 February 1996,
he vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he
complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly
thereafter, he died.

Issue:
What is the proximate cause of the victims death

Held:
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution
was able to establish that the proximate cause of the
death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been
defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latters death, despite being
done with reckless imprudence rather than with
malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly
liable for such death.

Jurisprudence

Where a rail road company allowed sparks to
escape from its locomotive engine, by means whereof
fire destroyed a house near its track, the owner of a
house thus burned cannot be said guilty of
contributory negligence in relation to such fire which
was the proximate cause merely because his house
was built partly on land of the railroad company,
especially where the house was already built prior to
the laying of the rail road track (Rodriquez vs Manila
Railroad Co., 42 Phil. 351)

Where the driver of a dump truck parked it
improperly at night near his residence and it was
bumped by the driver of a car, who suffered damages,
the proximate cause of the accident was the improper
parking of the dump truck (Phoenix Construction vs
Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353)

2. Distinguished from Immediate Cause

An immediate cause is the last event in a
chain of events though not necessarily the
proximate cause of what follows.


3. Distinguished from Intervening Cause

One which comes into active operation in
producing the result after the actors negligent act or
omission has occurred.
The defendant ordinarily will not be relieved of
liability by an intervening cause which could
reasonably have been foreseen, nor by one which is a
normal incident of the risk created.

4. Distinguished from Remote Cause

That cause which some independent force merely
took advantage of to accomplish something not the
natural effect thereof

Illustrative Case

Manila Electric Company vs Remoquillo
G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956

Facts:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-
story house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a
media agua said to be in a leaking condition. The
media agua was just below the window of the third
story. Standing on said media agua, Magno received
from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and
in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company strung parallel to the edge of the media
agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by
electrocution.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the Magnos
death was the electric wire hanging near his
stepbrothers house

Held:
The principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire
to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latters length of 6 feet.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of
the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.

5. Distinguished from Concurrent Cause

Intervening cause which merely cooperated with
the primary cause and which did not break the chain of
causation.

Illustrative Cases

Far Eastern Shipping vs CA
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998

Facts:
A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron of
the pier. Kavankov was the master of the vessel.
Gavino was the compulsory pilot.

Issue:
Who was negligent: Gavino or Kvankov?

Held:
Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov
(master of the vessel) were concurrently negligent.
Gavino was negligent for failing to react on time;
Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking
procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to
a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage

Sabido vs Custodio
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966

Facts:
Custodio, a passenger of a bus, was hanging onto
its left side. While the bus was negotiating a sharp
curve of a bumpy and downward slope, a speeding
truck going in the opposite direction side-swiped
Custodio, who died as a result thereof.

Issue:
Who was negligent and what is the extent of liability?

Held:
Both the carrier and its driver were negligent for
allowing Custodio to hang by the side of the bus. The
truck driver was also negligent for speeding through
the middle portion of the road. Although the
negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent,
in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver
and its owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of Custodios death.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tortfeasor.

B. TESTS

1. Cause- in- fact test

In all cases where proximate cause is in issue, a
cause in fact relation must exist between defendants
conduct and plaintiffs injury before liability may arise

STEP: Determine whether the defendants conduct in
point of fact was a factor in causing plaintiffs damage.
If the injury as to causes, in fact shows that the
defendants conduct, in point of fact, was not a factor
in causing plaintiffs damage, the matter ends there,
but if be shown that his conduct was a factor in
causing such damage, then the further would not have
been sustained if the defendant had not been
negligent.


Two hunters negligently fired while the plaintiff
stood in the line fire. A shotgun pellet hit the plaintiffs
eyes, but it was impossible to establish which hunter
had fired the pellet. However, neither defendant was
innocent- each having breached a duty of care to the
plaintiff- and the cause of the injury was necessarily
the responsibility of one of them. Under these
circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove that they were not the cause of the
injury. Failure to do so would make them liable as joint
tortfeasors.

2. But for Test

Defendants conduct is the cause of the injury
which would not have been sustained if the defendant
had not been negligent. Conversely, defendants
conduct cannot be said to be the proximate cause of
the accident unless the accident could have been
avoided without such negligent acts.

This test is frequently referred to as the sine qua
non rule

STEP: Plaintiff must establish that but for the
defendants culpable conduct or activity, the plaintiff
would not have been injured.


If X negligently fails to keep a life preserver aboard
his ship and Y, a passenger, would have been saved
but for the absence of the life preserver, then Xs
negligence is a but for cause of Ys drowning. If,
however, Y would have drowned or been consumed by
a shark despite Xs culpable conduct in not keeping a
life preserver aboard, then Xs negligence is not a but
for cause

3. Substantial Factor Test

If the actors conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which in occurred,
does not prevent him from being liable

In order to be a substantial factor in producing the
harm, the causes set in motion by the defendant must
continue until the moment of the damage or at least
down the setting in motion of the final active injurious
force which immediately produced or preceded the
damage.

The substantial factor test is used by many courts
as a supplement for but for test when redundant
multiple causes would preclude liability under the but
for analysis

STEP: Determine if the causes set in motion by the
defendant must continue until the moment of the
damage or at least down the setting in motion of the
final active injurious force which immediately produced
or preceded the damage.


X starts a fire on the left side of Ys house and Z
starts a fire on the right side, and both fires merge
concurrently and destroy Ys house. Neither fire is the
but for cause of the destruction. In the absence of
either fire, Ys house would have been destroyed at the
same time by the remaining fire. Because both causes
are redundant, neither is a but for cause, a result
that potentially precludes the plaintiffs recovery
against either defendant. In order to avoid this
inequitable result, many courts utilize substantial
factor test which simply requires that the defendant
materially contributed to the plaintiffs injury.

4. Foreseeability Test

If the defendant could not reasonably foresee any
injury as a result of his act, or if his conduct was
reasonable in the light of what he could anticipate,
there is no negligence, there is no liability.

Under this test, the defendant is not liable for
injurious consequences which could not have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated under all the facts
as they existed. Liability is limited to the original risk
he has created

The forceability test is limited with the additional
requirement that there be a superseding intervening
force. Intervening forces are new forces which join
with the defendants negligence to injure the plaintiff.

5. Natural and Probable Consequence Test

Where this test is used, it must appear that the
injury was not only the natural but also the probable
consequence of the conduct as distinguished from the
consequences that are merely possible.

C. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

New and independent act which itself is a
proximate cause of an injury and which breaks the
causal connection between the original wrong and the
injury

New, independent force intervening between a
defendant's negligent act and a plaintiff's injury by the
negligence of a third person who had full control of the
situation, whose negligence the defendant could not
anticipate or contemplate, and whose negligence
resulted directly in the plaintiff's injury.

There is no efficient intervening cause if the force
created by the negligent act or omission have either:
a. Remained active itself, or
b. Created another force which remained
active until it directly caused the result, or
c. Created a new active risk of being acted
upon by the active force that caused the
result

It must be:
a. New
b. Independent or one not under the control of
the official wrongdoer
c. One which by the exercise of reasonable
foresight and diligence, he should have
anticipated and guarded against it
d. It must break the continuity of causal
connection between the original negligent act
or omission and the injury so that the former
cannot be said to have been the efficient cause
of the latter

Illustrative Case:

Teague v Fernandez
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973

Facts:
A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had
only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance
requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby
store and the students panicked and caused a
stampede. Four students died.

Issue:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause

Held:
No. The violation of a stature or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended
to prevent.
In the present case, the violation was a continuing
violation in that the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent the specific situation of undue
crowding in case of evacuation.

D. CAUSE AND CONDITION

Many courts have sought to distinguish the active
cause of the harm and the existing conditions upon
which the cause operated. If the defendant has created
only a passive static condition which made the
damages possible, the defendant is not liable. But so
far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense
of necessary antecedents which has played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariable
the case, the latter are the result of other active forces
which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a condition, but
the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire.
When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring the fire as the spark; and
since that is the very risk which the defendant's
created, the defendant will not escape liability. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which the
condition remains static will not necessarily affect
liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward.
Cause and condition still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of cases where the forces set in
motion by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new forces
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between cause and condition which is
important but the nature of the risk and the character
of the intervening cause (Professor Prosser and
Keeton, as cited bv Sangco; Phoenix Construction vs
IAC, March 10, 1987)

E. LAST CLEAR CHANCE

When both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable
interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the party.

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in a suit
between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It
does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations.

Illustrative Cases

Picart vs Smith
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

Facts:
In December 1912, Picart was riding his horse and
while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he
saw Smiths car approaching. Smith blew his horn
thrice while he was still at a distance away because
Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart
did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he
moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith
continued driving towards Picart without slowing down
and when he was already so near the horse he
swerved to the other lane. But the horse got scared so
it turned its body across the bridge; the horse struck
the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries
which requiredseveral days of medical attention while
the horse eventually died.

Issue:
Whether or not Smith is liable

Held:
The negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the
law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.

Bustamante vs CA
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991

Facts:
A collision between a truck and a bus occurred
when the bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. The bus
saw that the trucks wheels were wiggling and that
truck was heading towards his lane. Still, the bus
driver did not mind and instead applied more speed.
Thus, many were killed and injured. Victims heirs filed
this case to claim damages from bus and truck

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of last chance is applicable
in the present case

Held:
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a
negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the
plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should
have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident
In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the
Court ruled that the principle of "last clear chance"
applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence."
All premises considered, the Court is convinced
that the respondent Court committed an error of law in
applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between
the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit
between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers
of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent
court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the
cargo truck from liability.

LBC Air Cargo vs. CA
G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995

Facts:
Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling
on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on
the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van
of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant
Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board
were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air
Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When
Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road
entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against
each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped
his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to
pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility
extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to
settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards
the airport road. When he was about to reach the
center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by
Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and
smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC
van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he
sustained. A civil suit was instituted by the heirs of
deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando
Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of
damages. The trial court dismissed the case on the
ground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was
the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC ruling rendering LBC Air
Cargo, Tano and Yu.

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable in the case

Held:
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear
chance". The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the
other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof.
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.
The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable
time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to
his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not all
that free from negligence in evidently speeding too
closely behind the vehicle he was following. We,
therefore, agree with the appellate court that there
indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part
that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability
for damages.

Pantranco vs Baesa
GR. Nos. 79050-51 November 14, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Baesa, their four children, the Ico
spouses, their son and seven other people boarded a
passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in
Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of
the Baesa spouses.
While they were proceeding towards Malalam
River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding Pantraco
bus from Aparri, en route to Manila, encroached on the
jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered
from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian
filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-
delict against Pantranco. Pantranco wants the court to
apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance against the
jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had the
last clear chance in avoiding the collision.

Issue:
Whether or not doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable in the case

Held:
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked
for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim for damages.
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly has
the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of
the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of
due care, have been aware of it
In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the
impending danger because he must have assumed that
the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing
the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.
The court said that the doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered

LEGAL INJURY

Any harm or injury resulting from a violation of a
legal right

Cases where there is damage but no legal injury is
caused

1. Volenti Non Fit Injuria

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury)
refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury
which precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.

Illustrative Case

Nikko Hotel vs Reyes
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005

Facts:
On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes, while
having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel, was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years
back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to
join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff
agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and
carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He lined up
at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim,
Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by the people around
them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All
these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame
and humiliation.

Issue:
Whether or not Mr. Reyes may recover damages

Held:
The Supreme Court held that petitioners did not
act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on
the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel
industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how
to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be
held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.

2. Damnum Absque Injuria

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.

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NOTES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES

Atitiw, Angeles, Banasen, Nagpala, Pablito

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