ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979 (PD NO.

1612)
DEFINITION
Fencing as defined in Sec. 2 of PD No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) is the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows or should be known to him, or to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs.
People, GR 111426, 11 July 94).
BRIEF HISTORY OF PD 1612 OR THE ANTI-FENCING LAW
Presidential Decree No. 1612 or commonly known as the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 was
enacted under the authority of therein President Ferdinand Marcos. The law took effect on
March 2, 1979. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Anti-Fencing Law were
subsequently formulated and it took effect on June 15, 1979.
THE PURPOSE OF ENACTING PD 1612
The Anti-Fencing Law was made to curtail and put an end to the rampant robbery of
government and private properties. With the existence of ready buyers, the business of
robbing and stealing have become profitable. Hence, a law was enacted to also punish those
who buy stolen properties. For if there are no buyers then the malefactors could not profit
from their wrong doings.
WHAT IS FENCING LAW AND HOW IT CAN BE COMMITTED
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. A Fence includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other
organization who/ which commits the act of fencing.
WHO ARE LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF FENCING; AND ITS PENALTIES:
The person liable is the one buying, keeping, concealing and selling the stolen items. If the
fence is a corporation, partnership, association or firm, the one liable is the president or the
manager or the officer who knows or should have know the fact that the offense was
committed.
The law provide for penalty range for persons convicted of the crime of fencing. Their
penalty depends on the value of the goods or items stolen or bought:
A. The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.
B. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12, 000 pesos;
C. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos;
D. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 but not exceeding 200
pesos;
E. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but
not exceeding 50 pesos.
F. The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.
RULES REGARDING BUY AND SELL OF GOODS PARTICULARLY SECOND HAND GOODS
The law requires the establishment engaged in the buy and sell of goods to obtain a
clearance or permit to sell used second hand items, to give effect to the purpose of the
law in putting an end to buying and selling stolen items. Failure of which makes the owner
or manager liable as a fence.
The Implementing Rules provides for the guidelines of issuance of clearances or permits to
sell used or secondhand items. It provided for the definition of the following terms:
Used secondhand article shall refer to any goods, article, items, object or anything of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has
actually or in fact been used.
Unlicensed dealer/supplier shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm, corporation,
association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage
in the business of dealing in or of supplying the articles defined in the preceding paragraph;
Store, establishment or entity shall be construed to include any individual dealing in
the buying and selling used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof;
Buy and Sell refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used secondhand articles for
the purpose of resale to third persons;
Station Commander shall refer to the Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police within the territorial limits of the town or city district where the store,
establishment or entity dealing in the buying and selling of used secondhand
PROCEDURE FOR SECURING PERMIT/CLEARANCE
The Implementing Rules provided for the method of obtaining clearance or permit. No fee
will be charged for the issuance of the clearance/permit. Failure to secure
clearance/permit shall be punished as a fence, that may result to the cancellation of
business license.
1. The Station Commander shall require the owner of a store or the President, manager or
responsible officer in having in stock used secondhand articles, to submit an initial affidavit
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent
affidavits once every fifteen (15) days within five (5) days after the period covered, which
shall contain:
a. complete inventory of such articles including the names and addresses from whom the
articles were acquired.
b. Full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale including the time and place of sale
c. Place where the articles are presently deposited. The Station Commander may, require
the submission of an affidavit accompanied by other documents showing proof of
legitimacy of acquisition.
2. Those who wish to secure the permit/clearance, shall file an application with the Station
Commander concerned, which states:
a. name, address and other pertinent circumstances
b. article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the name and address of the
unlicensed dealer or supplier from whom such article was acquired.
c. Include the receipt or document showing proof of legitimacy of acquisition.
3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the application and
may require the presentation of other additional documents, if necessary, to show
satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article, subject to the following
conditions:
a. if the Station Commander is not satisfied with the proof of legitimacy of acquisition, he
shall cause the publication of the notice, at the expense of the one seeking
clearance/permit, in a newspaper of general circulation for two consecutive days, stating:
articles acquired from unlicensed dealer or supplier
the names and addresses of the persons from whom they were acquired
that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale to the public at the address of the store,
establishment or other entity seeking the clearance/permit.
4. If there are no newspapers in general circulation, the party seeking the clearance/permit
shall, post a notice daily for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the
town where the store, firm, establishment or entity is located or, in the case of an
individual, where the articles in his possession are to be sold or offered for sale.
5. If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the notice, no claim is
made to any of the articles enumerated in the notice, the Station Commander shall issue the
clearance or permit sought.
6. If before expiration of the same period for the publication of the notice or its posting, it
shall appear that any of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station Commander
shall hold the article in restraint as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed.
Articles held in restraint shall kept and disposed of as the circumstances of each case
permit. In any case it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to
advise/notify the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with such procedure as may
be proper under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.
7. The Station Commander shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the
application, act thereon by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying the
same. Denial of an application shall be in writing and shall state in brief the reason/s
thereof.
8. Any party not satisfied with the decision of the Station Commander may appeal the same
within 10 days to the proper INP (now PNP) District Superintendent and further to the INP
(now PNP) Director. The decision of the Director can still be appealed top the Director-
General, within 10 days, whose decision may be appealed with the Minister (now
Secretary) of National Defense, within 15 days, which decision is final.
PRESUMPTION
Mere possession of any good, article, item, object or anything fo value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery, shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
ELEMENTS
A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, or object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.(Dizon-
Pamintuan vs People, GR 111426, 11 July 94)
As regards the first element, the crime of robbery or theft should have been committed
before crime of fencing can be committed. The person committing the crime of robbery or
theft, may or may not be the same person committing the crime of fencing. As in the case of
D.M. Consunji, Inc., vs. Esguerra, quantities of phelonic plywood were stolen and the Court
held that qualified theft had been committed. In People vs. Lucero there was first a
snatching incident, where the bag of Mrs. Maripaz Bernard Ramolete was snatch in the
public market of Carbon, Cebu City, where she lost a Chinese Gold Necklace and pendant
worth some P4,000.00 to snatchers Manuel Elardo and Zacarias Pateras. The snatchers sold
the items to Manuel Lucero. Consequently, Lucero was charged with violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. However, in this case, no eyewitness pointed to Lucero as the perpetrator and
the evidence of the prosecution was not strong enough to convict him.
The second element speaks of the overt act of keeping, buying, receiving, possessing,
acquiring, concealing, selling or disposing or in any manner deals with stolen items. It is
thus illustrated in the case of Lim vs. Court of Appeals, where the accused, Juanito Lim
stored and kept in his bodega and subsequently bought or disposed of the nine (9) pieces of
stolen tires with rims owned by Loui Anton Bond.
The accused known or should have known that the goods were stolen. As pointed out in the
case of People vs. Adriatico, the court in convicting Norma Adriatico, stated that it was
impossible for her to know that the jewelry were stolen because of the fact that Crisilita
was willing to part with a considerable number of jewelry at measly sum, and this should
have apprised Norma of the possibility that they were stolen goods. The approximate total
value of the jewelry were held to be at P20,000.00, and Norma having bought it from
Crisilita for only P2,700. The court also considered the fact that Norma engage in the
business of buying and selling gold and silver, which business is very well exposed to the
practice of fencing. This requires more than ordinary case and caution in dealing with
customers. As noted by the trial court:
. . . the Court is not inclined to accept the accuseds theory of buying in good faith and
disclaimer of ever seeing, much more, buying the other articles. Human experience belies
her allegations as no businessman or woman at that, would let go of such opportunities for
a clean profit at the expense of innocent owners.
The Court in convicting Ernesto Dunlao Sr., noted that the stolen articles composed of
farrowing crates and G.I. pipes were found displayed on petitioners shelves inside his
compound. (Dunalao, Sr. v. CA, 08/22/96)
In the case of People v. Muere (G.R.12902, 10/18/94), the third element was not proven.
This case involves the selling of alleged stolen Kenwood Stereo Unit in the store Danvir
Trading, owned by the spouses Muere. The store is engaged in buying and selling of second
hand merchandise located at Pasay Road, Makati. The said stereo was bought from Wynns
Audio, an existing establishment. The court held that there is no proof that the spouses
Muere, had knowledge of the fact that the stereo was stolen. The spouses Muere purchased
the stereo from a known merchant and the unit is displayed for sale in their store. These
actions are not indicative of a conduct of a guilty person.
On the same vein, the third element did not exist in the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc.(Consunji
v. Esguerra, 07/30/96) where the subject of the court action are the alleged stolen phelonic
plywood owned by D.M. Consunji, Inc., later found to be in the premises of MC Industrial
Sales and Seato trading Company, owned respectively by Eduardo Ching and the spouses
Sy. Respondents presented sales receipts covering their purchase of the items from
Paramount Industrial, which is a known hardware store in Caloocan, thus they had no
reason to suspect that the said items were products of theft.
The last element is that there is intent to gain for himself or for another. However, intent to
gain need not be proven in crimes punishable by a special law such as the Anti-Fencing
Law. The crimes punishable by special laws are called acts mala prohibita. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is that, has the law been violated? (in
Gatdner v. People, as cited in US v. Go Chico, 14 Phils. 134) When the act is prohibited by
law, intent is immaterial.
Likewise, dolo or deceit is immaterial in crimes punishable by special statute like the Anti-
Fencing Law. It is the act itself which constitutes the offense and not the motive or intent.
Intent to gain is a mental state, the existence if which is demonstrated by the overt acts of
the person. The mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. (Dunlao
v. CA) again, intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the
overt acts of person, as the keeping of stolen items for subsequent selling.
A FENCE MAY BE PROSECUTED UNDER THE RPC OR PD 1612
The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or PD NO. 1612 although
the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is amalum
prohibitum, and PD No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property. (supra)
MERE POSSESSION OF STOLEN ARTICLE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF FENCING
Since Sec. 5 of PD NO. 1612 expressly provides that mere possession of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing it follows that the accused is presumed to have knowledge
of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The
presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental
law.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FENCING AND ROBBERY
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participation in the criminal
design to commit or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of
fencing in order that it can be consummated. (People v De Guzman, GR 77368).
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
On the other hand, fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or shall be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
FENCING AS A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
In violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that
property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which by their very nature
are crimes of moral turpitude. (Dela Torre v. COMELEC 07/05/96)
Moral turpitude can be derived from the third element accused knows or should have
known that the items were stolen. Participation of each felon, one being the robber or the
thief or the actual perpetrators, and the other as the fence, differs in point in time and
degree but both invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain. (Supra) Both crimes negated the
principle of each persons duty to his fellowmen not to appropriate things that they do not
own or return something acquired by mistake or with malice. This signifies moral
turpitude with moral unfitness.
In the case of Dela Torre, he was declared disqualified from running the position of Mayor
in Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections because of the fact of the
disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, of persons running for
elective position -Sec. 40 Disqualifications (a) Those sentenced by final judgement for an
offense involving moral turpitude
Dela Torre was disqualified because of his prior conviction of the crime of fencing wherein
he admitted all the elements of the crime of fencing.
ESSENCE OF VIOLATION OF PD 1612, SEC. 2 OR ANTI-FENCING
PD 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then
sells or disposes of any object of value which he knows or should he known to him to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (Caoili v CA; GR 128369,
12/22/97)
PROOF OF PURCHASE WHEN GOODS ARE IN POSSESSION OF OFFENDER NOT NECESSARY
IN ANTI-FENCING
The law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and
convincing evidence. (Caoili v. CA; GR 128369, 12/22/97)


MALACAANG
M a n i l a
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery
and thievery of government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless
elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties;
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the
fact and punished lightly;
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of
the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of
the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft.
(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of fencing.
Sec. 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000
pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but thetotal penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding
200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos
but not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.
Sec. 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm,
corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows
or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable.
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing.
Sec. 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object
of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store,
establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated
National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section
or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
Sec. 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-nine.
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF Sec. 6 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING LAW.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law, the
following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the issuance of
clearances/permits to sell used secondhand articles obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof:
I. Definition of Terms
1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or anything of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has
actually or in fact been used.
2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm, corporation,
association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage
in the business of dealing in or of supplying the articles defined in the preceding paragraph.
3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be construed to include any individual dealing
in the buying and selling used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof.
4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used secondhand articles
for the purpose of resale to third persons.
5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police within the territorial limits of the town or city district where the store,
establishment or entity dealing in the buying and selling of used secondhand articles is
located.
II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit
1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the public any used secondhand article as defined
herein without first securing a clearance or permit for the purpose from the proper Station
Commander of the Integrated National Police.
2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit is a partnership, firm, corporation, or
association or group of individuals, the clearance or permit shall be obtained by or in the
name of the president, manager or other responsible officer-in-charge thereof.
3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other establishment or entity has
a branch or subsidiary and the used secondhand article is acquired by such branch or
subsidiary for sale to the public, the said branch or subsidiary shall secure the required
clearance or permit.
4. Any goods, article, item, or object or anything of value acquired from any source for
which no receipt or equivalent document evidencing the legality of its acquisition could be
presented by the present possessor or holder thereof, or the covering receipt, or equivalent
document, of which is fake, falsified or irregularly obtained, shall be presumed as having
been acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder thereof
must secure the required clearance or permit before the same can be sold or offered for
sale to the public.
III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or Permits
1. The Station Commanders concerned shall require the owner of a store or the president,
manager or responsible officer-in-charge of a firm, establishment or other entity located
within their respective jurisdictions and in possession of or having in stock used
secondhand articles as defined herein, to submit an initial affidavit within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen
(15) days within five (5) days after the period covered, which shall contain:
(a) A complete inventory of such articles acquired daily from whatever source and the
names and addresses of the persons from whom such articles were acquired.
(b) A full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale as well as the place where the date
when the sale or offer for sale shall commence.
(c) The place where the articles are presently deposited or kept in stock.
The Station Commander may, at his discretion when the circumstances of each case
warrant, require that the affidavit submitted be accompanied by other documents showing
proof of legitimacy of the acquisition of the articles.
2. A party required to secure a clearance or permit under these rules and regulations shall
file an application therefor with the Station Commander concerned. The application shall
state:
(a) The name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the persons, in case of an
individual or, in the case of a firm, corporation, association, partnership or other entity, the
name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the president, manager or officer-in-
charge.
(b) The article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the name and address of the
unlicensed dealer or supplier from whom such article was acquired.
In support of the application, there shall be attached to it the corresponding receipt or
other equivalent document to show proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article.
3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the application and
may require the presentation of other additional documents, if necessary, to show
satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any article from an unlicensed source cannot be
satisfactorily established by the documents presented, the Station Commander shall, upon
approval of the INP Superintendent in the district and at the expense of the party seeking
the clearance/permit, cause the publication of a notice in a newspaper of general
circulation for two (2) successive days enumerating therein the articles acquired from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier, the names and addresses of the persons from whom they
were acquired and shall state that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale to the
public at the address of the store, establishment or other entity seeking the
clearance/permit. In places where no newspapers are in general circulation, the party
seeking the clearance or permit shall, instead, post a notice daily for one week on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of the town where the store, firm, establishment or
entity concerned is located or, in the case of an individual, where the articles in his
possession are to be sold or offered for sale.
(b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the notice referred to
in the preceding paragraph, no claim is made with respect to any of the articles enumerated
in the notice, the Station Commander shall issue the clearance or permit sought.
(c) If, before expiration of the same period for publication of the notice or its posting, it
shall appear that any of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station Commander
shall hold the article in restraint as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed. Articles
held in restraint shall be kept and disposed of as the circumstances of each case permit,
taking into account all considerations of right and justice in the case. In any case where any
article is held in restraint, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to
advise/notify the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with such procedure as may
be proper under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.
4. The Station Commander concerned shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the application, act thereon by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying
the same. Denial of an application shall be in writing and shall state in brief the reason/s
therefor.
5. The application, clearance/permit or the denial thereof, including such other documents
as may be pertinent in the implementation of Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms
prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" hereof, which are made integral parts of
these rules and regulations.
6. For the issuance of clearances/permit required under Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1612, no fee shall
be charged.
IV. Appeals
Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the Station Commander may elevate the
decision taken in the case to the proper INP District Superintendent and, if he is still
dissatisfied therewith may take the same on appeal to the INP Director. The decision of the
INP Director may also be appealed to the INP Director-General whose decision may
likewise be appealed to the Minister of National Defense. The decision of the Minister of
National Defense on the case shall be final. The appeal against the decision taken by a
Commander lower than the INP Director-General should be filed to the next higher
Commander within ten (10) days from receipt of notice of the decision. The decision of the
INP Director-General should be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of
the decision.
V. Penalties
1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by Sec. 6 of P.D. 1612 or
who violates any of the provisions of these rules and regulations shall upon conviction be
punished as a fence.
2. The INP Director-General shall recommend to the proper authority the cancellation of
the business license of the erring individual, store, establishment or the entity concerned.
3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources for sale or offered for sale without prior
compliance with the provisions of Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and with these rules and
regulations shall be held in restraint until satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of acquisition
has been established.
4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of legitimacy of acquisition is established and
which are found to be stolen property shall likewise be held under restraint and shall,
furthermore, be subject to confiscation as evidence in the appropriate case to be filed. If,
upon termination of the case, the same is not claimed by their legitimate owners, the
article/s shall be forfeited in favor of the government and made subject to disposition as
the circumstances warrant in accordance with applicable existing laws, rules and
regulations. The Commission on Audit shall, in all cases, be notified.
5. Any personnel of the Integrated National Police found violating the provisions of Sec. 6 of
P.D. No. 1612 or any of its implementing rules and regulations or who, in any manner
whatsoever, connives with or through his negligence or inaction makes possible the
commission of such violations by any party required to comply with the law and its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be prosecuted criminally without prejudice to
the imposition of administrative penalties.
VI. Visitorial Power
It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the president, manager or responsible
officer-in-charge of any firm, establishment or other entity or of an individual having in his
premises articles to be sold or offered for sale to the public to allow the Station Commander
or his authorized representative to exercise visitorial powers. For this purpose, however,
the power to conduct visitations shall be exercise only during office or business hours and
upon authority in writing from and by the INP Superintendent in the district and for the
sole purpose of determining whether articles are kept in possession or stock contrary to
the intents of Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and of these rules and regulations.
VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders and INP District Superintendent and
Directors Following Action on Applications for Clearances or Permits
1. At the end of each month, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to:
(a) Make and maintain a file in his office of all clearances/permit issued by him.
(b) Submit a full report to the INP District Superintendent on the number of applications
for clearances or permits processed by his office, indicating therein the number of
clearances/permits issued and the number of applications denied. The report shall state
the reasons for denial of an application and the corresponding follow-up actions taken and
shall be accompanied by an inventory of the articles to be sold or offered for sale in his
jurisdiction.
2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the basis of the reports submitted by the
Station Commander, in turn submit quarterly reports to the appropriate INP Director
containing a consolidation of the information stated in the reports of Station Commanders
in his jurisdiction.
3. Reports from INP District Superintendent shall serve as basis for a consolidated report to
be submitted semi-annually by INP Directors to the Director-General, Integrated National
Police.
4. In all cases, reports emanating from the different levels of the Integrated National Police
shall be accompanied with full and accurate inventories of the articles acquired from
unlicensed dealers or suppliers and proposed to be sold or offered for sale in the
jurisdictions covered by the report.
These implementing rules and regulations, having been published in a newspaper of
national circulation, shall take effect on June 15, 1979.
FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INP:

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134298. August 26, 1999]
RAMON C. TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals* affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19,** convicting
petitioner of the crime of fencing.
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose
Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or
spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her.
Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company.
Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts,
such as bronze and stainless propellers andbrass screws were missing. She conducted an
inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less,
were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of
the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that
he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat
spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez
asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who
bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and
Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against
Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him
with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) committed as follows:
That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive,
keep, acquire and possess several spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at
P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged and waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of complainant Rosita Lim, Victor Sy and the
confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez.
On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile
witnesses and petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were summarized by
the trial court in its decision, as follows:
ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in
the business of manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits
A, A-1, and B). That sometime in February 1991, after one of her employees left the
company, she discovered that some of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so that
on February 19, 1991, an inventory was conducted and it was found that some welding
rods and propellers, among others, worth P48,000.00 were missing. Thereafter, she went
to Victor Sy, the person who recommended Mr. Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr. Mendez
was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his having stolen the
missing spare parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who denied
having bought the same.
When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their stocks were bought under the
name of Asia Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and stated
further that whether the stocks are bought under the name of the said corporation or
under the name of William Tan, her husband, all of these items were actually delivered to
the store at 3012-3014 Jose Abad Santos Street and all paid by her husband.
That for about one (1) year, there existed a business relationship between her husband and
Mr. Tan. Mr. Tan used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they likewise bought
from the former brass woods, and that there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame
up Mr. Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at Bueno Metal Industries from
November 1990 up to February 1991. That sometime in the third week of February 1991,
together with Gaudencio Dayop, his co-employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita
Lim some boat spare parts, such as bronze andstainless propellers, brass screws, etc. They
delivered said stolen items to Ramon Tan, who paid for them in cash in the amount of
P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half (1/2) of the amount), he went home directly to
the province. When he received a letter from his uncle, Victor Sy, he decided to return to
Manila. He was then accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs. Lim, from whom he begged for
forgiveness on April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, he executed an affidavit prepared by a
certain Perlas, a CIS personnel, subscribed to before a Notary Public (Exhibits C and C-1).
VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the
former being the nephew of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in
February 1991, his auntie called up and informed him about the spare parts stolen from the
warehouse by Manuelito Mendez. So that he sent his son to Cebu and requested his
kumpadre, a police officer of Sta. Catalina, Negros Occidental, to arrest and bring Mendez
back to Manila. When Mr. Mendez was brought to Manila, together with Supt. Perlas of the
WPDC, they fetched Mr. Mendez from the pier after which they proceeded to the house of
his auntie. Mr. Mendez admitted to him having stolen the missing items and sold to Mr.
Ramon Tan in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta. Cruz where he
pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer, but when confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same.
ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness, narrated that she owns Bueno
Metal Industries located at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2) days
after Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop left, her husband, William Tan, conducted an
inventory and discovered that some of the spare parts worth P48,000.00 were missing.
Some of the missing items were under the name of Asia Pacific and William Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as a hostile witness, stated that he
received a subpoena in the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a policeman
of Buliloan, Cebu on April 8, 1991. That he consented to come to Manila to
ask forgiveness from Rosita Lim. That in connection with this case, he executed an affidavit
on April 12, 1991, prepared by a certain Atty. Perlas, a CIS personnel, and the contents
thereof were explained to him by Rosita Lim before he signed the same before Atty. Jose
Tayo, a Notary Public, at Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila (Exhibits C and C-1).
That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted the items delivered to Ramon
Hardware. Further, he stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were placed in a
sack and he talked to Mr. Tan first over the phone before he delivered the spare parts. It
was Mr. Tan himself who accepted the stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00
oclock and paid P13,000.00 for them.
RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman engaged in selling
hardware (marine spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor
met Manuelito Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts presented by
Mrs. Lim are not under her name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan,
the husband, all in all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to
the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-g).
He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the
delivery of the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for
everytime (sic) goods are delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It
is not possible for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the morning,
because he usually reported to his office at 9:00 oclock. In connection with this case, he
executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).[1]
On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as
Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify
Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996.
(s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA
Judge
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered decision finding
no error in the judgment appealed from, and affirming the same intoto.
In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration;
however, on June 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the
elements of fencing as against petitioner.[2]
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.[3]
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things.[4]
The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things.[5]
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal
design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of
robbery or theft.[6]
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an
accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that
prescribed for the principal.[7]
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects
of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and
theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a
principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the
one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses.[8] The State may
thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing
is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing[9] and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.[10]
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the
crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.[11]
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the
existence of all the elements of the crime charged. [12]
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential
elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.[13] It is an ancient
principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9).[14]
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez
confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito
Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave
him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or
even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant
Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a
crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness
Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered
from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt
of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or
confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the
assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against
the person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not
given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may
such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.[17] There must be
corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Corpus
delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the
fact that the crime has been actually committed.[19] The essential elements of theft are
(1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).[20] In theft, corpus
delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that
it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of
her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that
he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to
petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known
that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular
fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the
existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a
mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such
knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible
states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains
the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of
fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and
thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of
the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-
Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused,
with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires
worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One
(1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive
portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established
the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory
penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the
RTCs finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August
2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as
T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private
complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1,
Sucat, Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the
warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January
1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all
thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly
opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private
complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned
and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model
T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.
Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized
as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial
number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in
stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store
and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police
District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation on appellant'sstore in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members,
led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private
complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the
Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived
thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store
while the rest of the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he
had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately
produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked
appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were
brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they
were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private
complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the
tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went
inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of
the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own
lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with
the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-
bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by
poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from
his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged
in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he
had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred
that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone
truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the
tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with
the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his
bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for
more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires,
arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires
found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed
to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings with modification by reducing the minimum
penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft
has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose
testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where
the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been
committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires
through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory
List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong
Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he
never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The
facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of
robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his
possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those
found in Ongs possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of
Gold Link in the total amount of 45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The
words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go
approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof
of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have
given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first
time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the
object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord
with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the
fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies
the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . .,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for
no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand
tires.1wphi1 Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in
the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained
from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit
from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where
that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public.
In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his
duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by
Go.1wphi1 Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or
receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of
fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of
the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its
address were fictitious.24Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut
the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object
or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each
tire recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased
forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary
course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the
regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we
do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's
conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed
by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS GUZMAN
"Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Is the crime of fencing a
continuing offense of the crime of robbery or theft as to allow the filing of a complaint or information for its commission in the place
where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property unlawfully taken is found to have been acquired?
This is the issue resolved in this case the spouses Rudy and Ludy.


The case stemmed from the robbery committed in Quezon City on September 9, 2004 in the house of Mr. Ortega where various
pieces of precious jewelry allegedly worth millions of pesos, were taken. On September 30, 1981 after police sleuthing, the suspects
were identified and charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101. Follow up investigation led to the
recovery of the stolen pieces of jewelry from Rudy and Ludy who were found to have possession of them in Antipolo, Rizal. So on
October 22, 1985 an Information for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612) was filed against Rudy and Ludy also before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93.


Rudy and Ludy filed a motion to quash the information filed against them in the RTC of Quezon City. The argued that the Court has
no jurisdiction to try the offense charged because as per police investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. So, the
spouses claimed that the charge should have been filed with the Antipolo RTC within whose jurisdiction the alleged fencing took
place. They reasoned out that fencing is an independent crime separate and distinct from that of Robbery.


The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash, alleging among others that there is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of a
case of fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the principal offense of robbery was committed. He theorizes that fencing is a
"continuing offense" and the Anti-Fencing Law was enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on persons
who profit from the effects of the crime of roberry or theft, no longer as mere accessories but as principals equally guilty with the
perpetrators of the robbery or theft.


But the RTC of Quezon City agreed with the spouses and quashed the Information filed against them. The RTC said that since the
alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and considering that
all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense took place, it has no
jurisdiction over the case.


Was the RTC of Quezon City correct?


Yes.



Fencing is not a continuing offense where the commission of robbery or theft is
an essential element. A continuing crime is a single crime consisting of a series
of acts arising from a single criminal resolution orintent not susceptible of
division. For it to exist, there should be plurality of acts performed separately
during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; unity
of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.


The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly two distinct offenses. Robbery is defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code
(Art.293) as the "taking of the property belonging to another with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything" Fencing is defined and penalized by a special law (PD 1612, Anti-Fencing Law). The law on
fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in
the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to defend on an act of fencing in order
that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or
theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential.


Thus RTC of Quezon City does not have jurisdiction over the fencing case allegedly committed by Rudy and Ludy in Antipolo Rizal.
And there are no compelling circumstances or serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the RTC in Antipolo would not
result in a fair and impartial trial and would lead to a miscarriage of justice. Neither does the interest of truth and justice demand a
change of venue from Antipolo to Quezon City. So the RTC of QC did not gravely abuse its discretion in quashing the fencing case
without prejudice to the filing of the corresponding action against Rudy and Ludy in the Court having proper jurisdiction. (People vs.
De Guzman, G.R. 77368, October 5, 1993)