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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO.: 14-22898-ALTONAGA/OSULLIVAN

MARLEN RODRIGUEZ, an individual
Plaintiff,

Vs.

MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
Dba AMC MEDICAL TRANSPORT,
Defendant.
______________________________________

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT,
MEDICAL TRANSPORATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND STAY THIS ACTION PENDING ARBITRATION

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Marlen Rodriguez, by and through the undersigned attorney
of record and submits this memorandum in opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss or in
the alternative to Compel Arbitration and Stay This Action Pending Arbitration.
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND/OR ORAL ARGUMENT
Due to the arguments and issues and law raised by the Plaintiff an evidentiary hearing as to the
enforceability of Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments, the arbitration clause and the jury
waiver is requested.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the arbitration provision attached to the Defendants Motion Dismiss is
unconscionable, unenforceable and/or voidable under applicable state and/or Federal
law is resolving the violations of law as plead in the complaint. (Section I and Section
II of Defendants Motion, D.E #7 )

STATEMENT OF FACTS
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The Plaintiff, Marlen Rodriguez filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2 and Section 760.10, Florida Statutes against
Medical Transportation Management Corporation dba AMC Medical Transport due sexual
harassment and unlawful retaliation for reporting the employment practices violation of sexual
harassment.
Marlen Rodriguez was offered a position of employment by Medical Transportation
Management Corporation AMC on or about January 15, 2012 and was employed in a driver
position on January 20, 2011. Marlen started working on January 24, 2011. (see Exhibit # 1).
Previously to January 21, 2011 The Medical Transportation Management Corporation
AMC employed Mr. Albert Handal and Mr. Francisco Garcia as drivers and/or in supervisory
positions.
On January 21, 2011, supervisor Albert Handal demanded the Plaintiff, Marlen
Rodriguez sign numerous documents as required for employment. (see Exhibit #2). All
documents were in English and were not translated or explained to Marlen the content or
meaning of the documents. (see composite Exhibit #3, PLAINTIFF, MARLEN RODRIGUEZS
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REPONSE IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVE, TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY THIS
ACTION PENDING ARBITRATION).
Defendants alleged arbitration document as attached to the Defendants Motion sub
judice (DE 7-1) is one of the documents contained in composite Exhibit #3. The document is
titled Section 3 Assigned Employee Acknowledgments.
The first mention of a potential arbitration agreement/waiver of jury inconspicuously
contained therein, was disclosed on August 13, 2014, after the attached pre filing demand letter,
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dated May 28, 2014 (Exhibit #4) was served on Defendants counsel and after the original
complaint was removed by the Defendant to Federal Court on August 8, 2014.
On August 13, 2014, Counsel for the Defendant emailed a request to agree to arbitrate
based upon an attached document titled Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments.( Attached
as Exhibit #5)
The attached document, Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments did not state or
reference AMC (as indicated in Defendants Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative to Compel
Arbitration and Stay This Action Pending Arbitration D.E. 7-2 para 4). In response, as a result of
the fact AMC was not identified as party to the agreement and an unknown company, Strategic
Outsourcing, Inc., was the only actual identified entity, Plaintiff immediately requested the
entire/employer agreement before determining the appropriate course of action. ( Exhibit #5)
No additional documents were received nor was the issue clarified by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff had no way to identify the document as a controlling agreement between the
Plaintiff and Defendant.
Section 3 I, Employee Acknowledgments includes an inconspicuous jury waiver
contained within paragraph 4 which is in lower case small font size letters and within the
paragraph dealing with binding arbitration and is predominantly indiscernible as an important
waiver of rights from the entire document.
Marlen Rodriguezs employment with Medical Transportation Management Corporation
AMC was terminated on or about March 5, 2012.
AMC is a large corporation with a high level of sophistication in the operation and
negotiation of business.

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MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONs website boasts
the following which highlights the size and sophistication of its corporate management:
American Ambulance Service was founded in 1964 in Hollywood, Florida and was managed
and owned by its founder until March of 1999 when it was acquired by its current ownership.
1999 was also the year that American Ambulance expanded into the Central Florida market
with the acquisition of Pro-Care Ambulance in Seminole County. In 2000, the service area
was expanded to include Orange and Osceola counties.
2000 brought about the expansion of the South Florida division to now include service to Miami
Dade County.
In 2005 American acquired All County Ambulance and began serving the residents and
Healthcare facilities in the Treasure Coast. All County Ambulance serves Martin, St. Lucie,
Indian River, Okeechobee and Hendry Counties.
2010 brought about the expansion of American Ambulance both in Monroe and Polk
Counties. In May American began operations in Polk County Florida. Polk County is larger than
the state of Rhode Island and equal in size to Delaware. The total area of the county is
approximately 2,010 square miles which makes it the fourth largest county in Florida. Monroe
County is the Southernmost County in the United States incorporating one the most favored
tourist destination, the Florida Keys..
American Ambulance Service which serves Miami Dade, Broward and Monroe
Counties provides basic and advanced life support and also provides ventilator and bariatric
services. American Ambulance Service also has contracts with J oe DiMaggio Children's
Hospital and University of Miami Hospital providing branded specialty care ambulances and
staffing for the emergency departments of the hospitals when the staff is not engaged in
providing ambulance transportation.
All County Ambulance serves Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okeechobee and Hendry
Counties. All County provides basic and advanced life support and also provides ventilator and
bariatric services. All County serves the entire Treasure Coast of Floridaand forty miles west
to rural Okeechobee County.
American Ambulance of Central Florida initially began providing service in Seminole County
in 1999 and now also servesOrange, Osceola and Polk Counties encompassing the
greater Orlando area. American provides basic and advanced life support and also provides
ventilator and bariatric services.
All three companies have participated in each Florida hurricane disaster and recovery for the last
ten years and in 2008 twice deployed ambulances to Louisiana to assist hurricane victims. Our
personnel and management have trained through the FEMAprograms to provide Strike Force
Team Leader, Task Force Leader and I ncident Management Teams.
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We coordinate and provide medical transportation throughout the State of Florida and
nationwide. We work closely with providers of air ambulance transportation to move the most
critical of patients and assist their crews in creating seamless movement to their aircraft.
American Ambulance, New England began serving the New England market in January 2011.
American serves the greater Boston, Massachusetts area and looks forward to continued growth
in the New England market (Basic and Advanced life support ambulance service and chair car
service). Specialty services provided include bariatric and ventilator services. The introduction of
critical care transportation will occur in the summer of 2011.
Marlen Rodriguez is a woman that migrated to the United States from Cuba without the
ability to read, write and understand English. The documents she was required to sign were
required to begin working and in English.
Marlen Rodriguez did not possess a level of sophistication or skills to negotiate or
understand Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments.
There exists an immense disparity of sophistication between the Plaintiff and Defendant
which is unconscionable.
Additionally, Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments is a contract of adhesion not
subject to negotiations. (see composite Exhibit #3, PLAINTIFF, MARLEN RODRIGUEZS
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REPONSE IN OPPOSTION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVE, TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY THIS
ACTION PENDING ARBITRATION).


Marlen Rodriguez filed a claim with the EEOC regarding the subject matter of this Claim
(sexual harassment and retaliation), and more than one hundred eighty (180) days has passed
since the filing of said charge of discrimination. The Plaintiff initially timely filed the original
Complaint in state Court which was subsequently transferred to Federal Court on August 8,
2014.
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Marlen Rodriguez, a female, has been subjected to sexual remarks, statements and
advancements and a sexually hostile work environment in her employment with Medical
Transportation Management Corporation.
The sexual harassment of Marlen Rodriguez by t eassistant manager, Mr. Handel,
consisted of: inappropriate text messaging suggesting sexual contact; constant and relentless
pressure to engage in a romantic, sexual relationship; unwanted and unsolicited physical
touching of Marlen Rodriguez; hovering (leaning) over Marlen Rodriguez while she was at
work; unprecedented personal attention and convenient scheduling.
After continuous sexual harassment, the Marlen Rodriguez could no longer live under the
turmoil of being a victim of the sexual harassment; Marlen Rodriguez filed an internal sexual
claim on February 14, 2012 against Mr. Albert Handal and Mr. Francisco Garcia.
The internal claim alleged that Mr. Garcia exposed his genitals to Marlen Rodriguez as
well as showing her condoms, a bottle of Viagra, while in the ambulance they were teamed to
drive.
After Marlen Rodriguez filed the internal sexual harassment claim, Mr. Garcia, as
dispatcher, retaliated against the Marlen Rodriguez by assigning her late night shifts and
reduction in work hours.
On March 5
th
, 2012, Mr. Alberto Handel, Assistant, Manager along with Mr. Argulles,
Chief Operating Officer, personally terminated the Marlen Rodriguez , 19 days after the filing of
the internal sexual harassment charges.
Medical Transportation Management Corporation failed and refused to take appropriate
remedial action after Marlen Rodriguez reported that she was the victim of sexual harassment.
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By failing to discipline the perpetrator of the sexual harassment described herein,
delaying moving Marlen Rodriguez away from the perpetrator, and failing to conduct a timely
and thorough investigation, AMC condoned sexual harassment in the workplace, the nature of
which action violates Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
After the internal claim was filed on February 14, 2012, Marlen Rodriguez was
disciplined on three occasions from February 15, 2012 to February 27, 2012 for filing the sexual
harassment claim in an untimely fashion, calling in sick at the last minute, and for a client claim.
Marlen Rodriguez was terminated on March 5, 2012, by Mr. Handel and Mr. Argulles, Chief
Operating Officer, for absenteeism and customer claim. The Marlen Rodriguez was discharged
nineteen (19) days after she filed the internal sexual harassment claim.

.
The acts alleged in this Claim constitute a violation of Section 760.10(7), Florida
Statutes, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice
under this section, or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this section.
Additionally, the actions described constitute a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2, regarding unlawful employment practices.
42 U.S.C. Section 2000 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employerto
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individualssex..
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On or about February 10, 2014 the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination in regard to
Marlen Rodriguezs charge of discrimination and retaliation against AMC, finding "reasonable
cause to believe that a violation of the statute(s) has occurred." On or about February 10, 2014,
the EEOC issued to Marlen Rodriguez a Notice of Right to Sue.
On May 5
th
, 2014 four count Complaint for Damages was filed by Marlen in the Circuit
Court of Miami-Dade, Florida; Case Number: 2014 11976 CA 01. A copy of the Complaint is
attached to Defendants Motion for Removal dated August 8, 2014 ( D.E. #1) Rodriguez against
AMC.
The Complaint alleges four counts:
Count I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT - STATE CLAIM, pursuant to Section 760.10,
Florida Statutes;
Count II. RETALIATION - STATE CLAIM, pursuant to Section 760.10, Florida
Statutes;
Count III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT FEDERAL CLAIM, pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2; and
Count IV. RETALIATION FEDERAL CLAIM pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3.
Both the State of Florida Statutes and Federal Statutes provide the opportunity to trial by
jury, which the Plaintiff demanded at the time of filing the initial complaint.

ARGUMENT
Whether the arbitration provision attached to the Defendants Motion Dismiss is
unconscionable, unenforceable and/or voidable under applicable state and/or Federal law
is resolving the violations of law as plead in the complaint. ( Section I and Section II of
Defendants Motion, D.E #7 )
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Courts consider three elements under the Florida Arbitration Act and federal statutory
provisions when ruling on a motion to compel arbitration: (1) whether a valid written agreement
to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration
was waived. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Terminix
Int'l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5
th
DCA 1997)). The present case implicates only
the first elementwhether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists.
In Roberto Basulto, et al. v. Hialeah Automotive, etc., et al., No. SC09-2358, 2014 WL
1057334 (March 20, 2014) a 5-2 majority of the Florida Supreme Court held that arbitration
clauses contained in various agreements signed by the Spanish-speaking petitioners relating to
their purchase of a Dodge Caravan from a car dealership were unenforceable. The Florida
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that the arbitration clauses could not be enforced
because they were conflicting and unconscionable. In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court
quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's (DCA) opinion in Hialeah Auto., LLC v. Basulto,
22 So.3d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), because the appellate court failed to apply the proper standard
enunciated by the court in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1999) when ruling on
a motion to compel arbitration.
The Basultos a married couple from Cuba who did not speak English purchased a
2005 Dodge Caravan from Hialeah Automotive in 2004. When they purchased the vehicle, they
signed various agreements all of which were in English. A dispute arose between the parties
when the Basultos attempted to return the vehicle to Hialeah Automotive. The Basultos later
filed an action against Hialeah Automotive in Miami-Dade Circuit Court asserting claims for
fraud in the inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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In response, Hialeah Automotive moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses
contained in the agreements signed by the Basultos.
An evidentiary hearing was held in which the trial court heard testimony from various
witnesses, including the Basultos and certain sales representatives of Hialeah Automotive who
were directly involved in the sale of the vehicle. Following the hearing, the trial court concluded
that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. In support of its decision, the trial court noted that
there were several inconsistencies between the agreements signed by the Basultos. For example,
one agreement called for arbitration by a single arbitrator while another required arbitration by a
panel of three arbitrators. Additionally, the agreements contained jury waiver clauses, which
implied a right to litigate disputes in court. The trial court also found that the sales
representatives did not understand the arbitration process and therefore could not have been able
to adequately explain arbitration to the Basultos nor the rights that they were waiving by signing
the agreements, such as their waiver of the right to seek punitive damages or class action status.
The trial court also found that the agreements were unenforceable because they were
unconscionable.
On appeal, the Third District affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court's
decision. The Third District affirmed the trial court's decision to compel arbitration of the
Basultos' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but held that arbitration was mandated for
their claims for monetary relief under one of the agreements.
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Third District's decision and remanded the case
with instructions to reinstate the trial court's judgment based on controlling precedent.
Specifically, the Court found that the Third District failed to properly apply the following
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elements set forth in Seifert that courts must consider when ruling on a motion to compel
arbitration: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) whether an arbitrable issue
exists, and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived. The Florida Supreme Court held that
the Third District failed to address the first prong of the Seifert test, which the trial court
considered and found was lacking because the subject arbitration clauses were unenforceable for
the reasons explained above.
The Florida Supreme Court also exercised its discretionary authority to clarify the
unconscionability defense to prevent the enforcement of an otherwise binding arbitration
agreement. The Court held that procedural unconscionability (which is concerned with the
manner in which a contract is entered into) and substantive uncionscionability (which focuses on
the fairness of a contract's terms) must be established to prevail on the defense. However,
procedural and substantive unconscionability do not need to be present to the same degree in
order to prevail on the defense. Rather, the Court agreed with the balancing test adopted by
several Florida appellate courts under which both components of unconscionability must be
evaluated interdependently "allowing one prong to outweigh another provided there is at least a
modicum of the weaker prong." Basulto, 2014 WL 1057334 at * 18 (citing VoiceStream Wireless
Corp. v. U.S. Commc'ns, Inc., 912 So.2d 34, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).
The applicable provision of the Florida Arbitration (1) A party to an agreement or
provision for arbitration subject to this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party
thereto to comply therewith may make application to the court for an order directing the parties
to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof. If the court is satisfied that no
substantial issue exists as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall grant the
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application. If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the
agreement or provision, it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its
determination, shall grant or deny the application Act.
In the present case the arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable and substantively
unconscionable.
The doctrine of unconscionability is ordinarily a common law principle applicable to all
contracts, the FAA will not operate to preempt an unconscionability argument made in
opposition to an arbitration agreement. Thus, a party may challenge the validity of an arbitration
provision by arguing that the provision is unconscionable under applicable state law. For
example, in Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir.
2004).the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld two arbitration clauses but struck down a third,
finding the arbitration provision unconscionable under Louisiana law because it completely
exempted the drafter from arbitration, but did not similarly exempt the consumer. In so ruling,
the Fifth Circuit found that Louisiana law concerning unconscionability applied with equal force
to all contracts and therefore was not preempted by the FAA.
To understand when an arbitration agreement will be held unconscionable, it is important
to first understand what courts look for to determine unconscionability. Before finding an
agreement to be unconscionable, courts usually require that there be both procedural and
substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL
5351042, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2008) (noting that test for determining unconscionability
under Michigan and Texas state law is the same; a plaintiff must prove both procedure and
substantive unconscionability); La Torre v. BFS Retail and Comm. Operations, LLC, No. 08-
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22046-CIV, 2008 WL 5156301, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2008) (Under Florida law, in order for
a contract provision to be deemed unconscionable, it must be shown that the provision is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.).
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the disparate bargaining power of the parties,
including whether one party was more sophisticated than the other, and whether the contract was
one of adhesion Blacks Law Dictionary 318-19 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term adhesion
contract). i.e., a standard form contract drafted solely by one party and to be signed by the
party in the weaker position (typically the consumer). Substantive unconscionability measures
whether the provisions of the agreement itself are unfair as to one party. See, e.g., Adler, 2008
WL 5351042.
There is no bright line that can be drawn between an arbitration agreement that is merely
unequal, but nevertheless valid, and one that is so one-sided it will be deemed
unconscionable. Courts that have considered this issue generally deem arbitration provisions
unconscionable where carve-outs exempt the drafter from the obligation to arbitrate, but bind the
non-drafting party to the arbitral forum. See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 170;
see also Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 549-50 & n. 56 (Wis. 2006)
A more difficult question arises when the agreement contains carve-outs for specific remedies,
which are likely to be sought by the drafter, but does not contain similar carve-outs for remedies
that the non-drafting party would likely pursue. For example, in Ferguson v. Countrywide
Credit Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration provision in an employment
contract was unconscionable because it expressly included claims that the employee might seek
breach of contract, discrimination, and harassment but exempted remedies that the employer
would likely pursue injunctive relief for intellectual property violations, unfair competition,
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and use or disclosure of trade secrets. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F. 3d
778, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th
638, 664-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding provision in employment contract requiring parties to
arbitrate all claims except those related to trade secrets, confidential information and other
intellectual property lacking mutuality and thus substantively unconscionable).

Another potential obstacle to arbitration provisions arises when an agreement to arbitrate
necessarily involves waiving the right to have ones case heard by a jury. In most states, the
right to a jury trial is waivable, but in general, courts only enforce predispute jury waivers that
are entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv.,
Inc., 303 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002); Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835 (10th
Cir. 1988); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Natl Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977). The exceptions to this rule are California
and Georgia where those states courts have interpreted their respective constitutions to forbid
predispute jury waivers. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005);
Bank South N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994). Federal courts, however, will apply
federal law to determine whether a jury waiver is valid, even where the federal court has
jurisdiction only by way of diversity.
There is no standard test applied by courts to determine whether a partys waiver of the
right to a jury was made knowingly and voluntarily. Rather, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances to decide whether a particular waiver should be enforced. Federal courts
frequently begin the analysis with the maxim that there is a presumption against denying a jury
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trial based on a waiver. That presumption, however, is not strictly enforced, and federal courts
generally uphold contractual jury waivers.
Although there is no universal test that courts apply, they frequently consider some or all
of the following factors in examining the totality of the circumstances: 1) whether the contract is
a standardized form or newly drafted; 2) whether the waiver is in fine print or large print; 3)
whether the waiver is distinct in some way based on the print type; 4) whether the waiver is set
apart in its own paragraph; 5) whether the contract is one of adhesion; 6) whether the contract
was negotiated at arms length; 7) the length of the contract and the placement of the waiver
within it; 8) whether there was disparate bargaining power between the parties; 9) whether both
parties waived the right to a jury; 10) whether the parties were sophisticated; 11) whether the
parties were represented by counsel; and 12) whether the parties had an opportunity to review the
waiver. Med. Air Tech. Corp., 303 F.3d at 19 n.4 (noting that [i]n analogous situations we have
looked to the totality of circumstances, including factors such as the waiving partys education
and business experience, the respective roles of the parties in determining the terms of the
waiver, the clarity of the agreement, the amount of time the waiving party had to consider the
waiver, whether the waiving party was represented by counsel, and the consideration offered for
the waiver, to determine if the waiver was knowing and voluntary); Telum, Inc., 859 F.2d at 837
(listing inconspicuous fine print or a gross disparity in bargaining power as factors weighing in
favor of invalidating a jury waiver provision); K.M.C. Co., Inc., 757 F.2d at 757; Natl Equip.
Rental, Ltd., 565 F.2d at 258.
CONCLUSION
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In conclusion, the document titled Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments which
contains an arbitration clause is not enforceable due to an invalid jury waiver, the failure to
include the name of the Defendant leaving the document vague, the substantive and procedural
unconscionability of the agreement and the totality of the circumstances as set forth above.
In the event the Court should determine Section 3 i Employee Acknowledgments as a
valid binding agreement it would be unjust to dismiss this cause of action due to the statute of
limitations having expired.
The appropriate alternative is to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Marlen Rodriguez, respectfully requests this Court
deny the Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Order the Defendant file a response within fourteen
days. If the Court grants the relief requested by the Defendant the Court should compel
arbitration and stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration process.
Dated: September 4, 2014
The Martinez Law Center, P.A.
7855 NW 12th Street - Suite 218
Doral, FL 33126
TEL: 305-456-9377
FAX: 305-397-0900

By: /s/ Edward A. Martinez
Edward A. Martinez, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 618195
ed@themartinezlawcenter.com




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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 4, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the
Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this
day on all counsel of record identified on the Service List in the manner specified, either via
transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized
manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of
Electronic Filing system:
By: /s/ Edward A. Martinez
Edward A. Martinez, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 618195
ed@themartinezlawcenter.com
Counsel for Plaintiff, Marlen Rodriguez.

SERVICE LIST

Richard Greiffenstien, Esq.
Roig, Tutan, Rosenberg, Martin,
Stroller, Zumpano & Bellido
Attorney for Defendant
500 South Dixie Highway, Suite 302
Coral Gables, Florida 33146
Email: rgreiffenstein@roiglawyers.com




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