he Supreme Court on Monday held that 194 coal mining areas, or
blocks, handed out by the government between 1993 and 2010, were illegally allotted. The government has the power to allocate coal blocks to enterprises in specific sectors such as power, and iron and steel in particular. However, the court found that the process by which it did so was casual and breached guidelines, and lacked transparency and, thus, arbitrary and illegal. That the allocations were illegal does not mean that the court has cancelled the allotment of coal blocks; that decision will be tak- en on September 1. This verdict comes two and a half years after the Supreme Court cancelled 2G telecom licences for similar reasons. The court subse- quently clarified, in response to a presidential reference, that resource allo- cation was the prerogative of the executive, and the courts would concern themselves only with criteria of fairness and non-arbitrariness. It is these cri- teria that the Supreme Court found to have been violated in the case of coal allocation. Its verdict on Monday led to considerable uncertainty. Shares in some companies that benefitted from the allocation of coal blocks fell sharply after the courts decision. Banks, which have lent around ~7.7 lakh crore to the coal block-dependent power and iron and steel sectors, are also worried about a sudden and sharp deterioration in already poor asset quality. Unlike the wholesale cancellation of 2G licences, which had thrown the entire sector into a state of limbo for some considerable time, the Supreme Court on this occasion has taken a more granular view, which former coal sec- retary P C Parakh described in these pages as practical. Chief Justice R M Lodha, in fact, said that the court might set up a panel under a retired judge to examine individual cases. This would be a vital step forward to restoring transparency and clarity to the coal and related sectors. It will also be neces- sary to ensure that the ~2 lakh crore that has been invested in the sector is not rendered valueless. Many of the blocks have already been cancelled; others are not yet operational, due to environmental and other concerns, but the linked investments have been made. Around 40 of them are already producing coal between 40 million tonnes and 60 million tonnes a year, about 10 per cent of the total production in India. It is to be hoped that the court-appointed pan- el is able to ensure early removal of the uncertainty over investments made in these coal blocks. The revival of Indias economy, and of its manufacturing sector, depends on the availability of power. There is considerable coal-fired capacity in the power sector, but inventories of coal for these plants are never sufficiently deep. The iron and steel sector, similarly, is basic to industrial growth. That is why it is welcome that the court has decided to be cautious in the actions it takes in response to the illegality it says it has found. It is to be hoped that the panel to which the chief justice referred, and the eventual judgment, will take into account how badly the Indian economy needs clarity and pragma- tism in the coal sector. More than just this and related sectors, the entire economy, and the country as a whole, need to move on from the corruption- related paralysis and uncertainty that has marked the last few years. In this national effort, the Supreme Court has a vital role to play. Moving on Final coal judgment will hopefully end uncertainty T he just-approved Digital India project, seeking to deliver all gov- ernment services electronically in less than four years, has already thrown up object lessons whose implications go far beyond the future of the project itself. The project is vital for the future well- being of every Indian. The information technology industry will be given a boost, too. And it has the benefit of building on an already successful pilot proj- ect, in Gujarat. But the challenges are daunting. In fact, one of its key goals achieving an import-export balance in electronics seems unachievable in the foreseeable future. The backbone of Digital India has to be quite literally the National Optical Fibre Network, or the NOFN, whose cables will carry digital signals across the country. This project, started in 2011, set out to connect 250,000 gram panchayats in 27 months at a cost of ~20,000 crore. The scope has sub- sequently been scaled down to less than half (110,000 gram panchayats), the scheduled completion target is gone, and the project is nowhere near complete. In a revealing article in this newspaper four months ago, Nripendra Misra a former chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India spelt out the numerous hurdles the project encountered and by implication, the lessons that needed to be absorbed. The project had been approved by the Union Cabinet, and had such high-profile names as Sam Pitroda and Nandan Nilekani on its implementing committee but it suffered from lack of coordination. The need for both hardware and software (local language content) had not been thought through; the maintenance of what was done was not properly provided for; officials, mindful of anti-corruption laws, were unwilling to approve pro- curement tenders as cartels appeared to be at work; there was no revenue mod- el that would be the mainstay of the project once it got going; and the coun- try did not even have enough capacity to manufacture the ducts that would carry the cables. Mr Misra is now principal secretary to the prime minister, and presum- ably has been available to provide guidance about the cardinal need for coor- dination to ensure any kind of progress. Under the current government, there is every hope that coordination will be better and execution swifter. But still is it realistic to set a timeline of under four years for a project many times the size of the NOFN and, to begin with, five times its budget? One key issue cen- tral to any coordinated collection and storage of digital information on citizens privacy appears not to have been addressed. In part, the project is a col- lection and repackaging of existing incomplete projects under a nice-sound- ing label. It is great to launch a vital, grand project, but where is the homework? Imagining Digital India Flagship e-governance project needs more homework If Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos invocations of Asia are taken as some kind of pan-Asian commitment, his eat grass rhetoric must be treated as advocating vegetari- anism. The British diplomat, Sir Morrice James (Lord Saint Brides), who was high commissioner to both India and Pakistan, called him Lucifer and a flawed angel. Farzana Shaikh, his biog- rapher, quotes both terms, but doesnt admit that Bhuttos Asianism was only an attempt to mobilise forces against the arch-enemy he called Greater Bharat. This is not the books only flaw. Chinas rise hardly needs the imprimatur of even someone as eminent as Bertrand Russell. A century before Russells visit to China, with which Ramachandra Guha introduces this misleadingly titled anthology, Napoleon famously called China a sleeping giant who would move the world when she awoke . A collection of the lives of eminent Asians would have raised no cavil, but the attempt to suggest a supra-national framework for 11 ultra-nationalists (10 male and a female) just doesnt work. Despite reservations about Ms Shaikh, this is not a comment on the individual biographies. Potted his- tory is always useful, and Srinath Raghavan on Indira Gandhi is informa- tive, incisive and a pleasure to read. His essay could even be expanded into a full-scale biography to correct some of the factual errors in Katherine Franks hugely acclaimed noveletteish gush- ing. But Mr Raghavan wisely doesnt present his account in terms of the politics before economics dictum that is advanced as the collections rai- sondtre. In fact, Indira Gandhi used economics to further her political aims when initiating at Cancun, even before the July 1982 Washington visit Mr Raghavan mentions, what he calls a long-overdue, if limited, rapproche- ment in US-India relations. As the Introduction says, Lee Kuan Yew is the only subject still liv- ing, albeit frail and ailing. Otherwise, he might have objected to the heresy of being lumped with a bunch of politics before economics politicians. Mr Lee made no secret of his conviction that South Asia, especially India, lagged Southeast and East Asia precisely because politics enjoyed precedence over economics. He had some harsh things to say about P V Narasimha Rao, whom he had previously compared to Deng Xiaoping, for deservedly (as Mr Lee thought) losing the 1996 election by neglecting economics. Mr Lee believes Manmohan Singh wouldnt have done so if Narasimha Rao hadnt thwarted him. But thats like the saying that the now defunct News of the Worldwas the only newspaper in the world to abide by C P Scotts news is sacred, comment is free dictum because it carried no comment and the only news were law court reports of sex and vio- lence cases. Michael Barr deals percep- tively, if a trifle unfairly, with Mr Lee. Not everyone will agree Singapore is still ster- ile, soulless and racist with little respect for ordinary human values, let alone human rights. Even if it is, that must have something to do with the character of the Chinese settlers who are in the overwhelming majority. There is nothing to suggest Goh Keng Swee, whom Mr Barr (like some others) appears to favour as the true author of the Singapore mira- cle, was markedly different. InSophie Quinn-Judge andRana Mitter (takingtwoother contributors at random), HoChi MinhandMaoZedong have foundless censorious chroniclers. One canimagine the Great Helmsman chucklingover Mr Mitter saddlinghim withultimate responsibilityfor Deng Xiaopings revolution. It is temptingtogo onfor the life stories are interestingand enlighteningevenfor those whodont agree withCarlyle that the historyof the worldis but the biographyof great men. But so far as the land mass from the Mediterranean to the Pacific is con- cerned, Gandhi, for all his monumental stature in Indian eyes, is not especially relevant. Singapores Straits Times news- paper didnt even include India in Asia until the Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh reforms promised a profitable bilateral relationship. Many Japanese, Chinese and even Americans still incline to a similar chopsticks definition of Asia. Other concepts vary from Hegels lands that had never known freedom to Japans Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere to Ananda Coomaraswamys uni- ty fragmented by centuries of colonial- ism. If the purpose were to present a pan-Asian panorama, Kemal Ataturk, Jose Rizal, Rabindranath Tagore, the Japanese art historian Okakura Tenshin, Sun Yat Sen, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Meiji Emperor and his advisers, Mujibur Rahman, perhaps even Attila the Hun, might have been included. Some of them were makers of Asia in a more vital sense than politicians who served only their country. The old does Asia exist? question cropped up again as late as 2012 when a Melbourne University professor, Antonia Finnane, responded to Michael Wesleys keynote address at an academic confer- ence with historically, Asia has served as a catch-all phrase for societies that were literate but not Christian: hence, its application to places from Turkey in the west to the Philippines in the east. It may be approaching its use-by date. The Asian values debate and the Asian century dream (it was already old when Jawaharlal Nehru wrote The Discoveryof India) reflect the same controversy. A deeper unity does lie in some of the val- ues listed in Confuciuss analects (fluctu- ating though their fortunes have been) that are common to most Asian societies. But race is probably the strongest bond. Although its not politically correct to mention it, the brown, yellow and off- white nations cheered when Japan sank the Russian fleet in 1905. Colour remains the most visible manifestation of Asias identity. No attempt is made here to jus- tify the books catchy title by analysing any of these factors or discuss how far they apply to the subjects. Potted histories of some eminent Asians I s thenewsystemof appointingsen- ior judges through the National Judicial Appointments Comm- ission an improvement on the one pre- vailing since the 1990s, under which only judges appointed judges? The alacrity with which the two Bills to introduce the new system were passed in double-quick time, and unani- mously indicates that the political class unitedtoget its hands onasystem that had eluded it. The level of integrity that the polit- ical class, across the spectrum, has dis- played in recent decades does not cre- ate any hope that the new system will be a better one. For all its faults high- lighted by former judge Markandey Katjuthroughwell-timedinterventions the system that has just ended gave the country and its people some relief through judicial activism and forth- right decisions when the political sys- tem had seriously abdicated. The fact that two out of the five members of the commission say, the law minister and one of the two emi- nent persons can veto a name will mean that all judges to be appointed henceforth will be those in whom the political class sees no danger for itself. A lawyer or judge who has shown he has a mind of his own and so cannot be takenfor grantedwill havelittlechance to join the bench. This will promote mediocrity and advantage those who have networked well among both judges and politicians. Take the case of Gopal Subraman- iam, who has both considerable intel- lectual calibre and a reputation for integrity. By all accounts, he was per- suaded by the chief justice of the Supreme Court to agree to become a judge at great personal pecuniary loss (saying goodbye to a thriving practice) but his name was returned as, in Mr Subramaniams own words, his inde- pendence as a lawyer is causing appre- hensions that I will not toe the line of the government. His role as amicus curiae in the Sohrabuddin Sheikh fake encounter case had embarrassed the NarendraModi government of Gujarat. How will the two eminent persons on the commission be appointed? The chief justice of the Supreme Court, the prime minister and the leader of the opposition will select them. As there is nomentionof aveto, it is tobeassumed that if theprimeminister andtheoppo- sition leader join hands to bring in a politically acceptable person, then he gets through. An unholy alliance between politicians of all hues cannot be ruled out. Or else, why should elec- toral reform, such as the inclusion of what a party spends on the election of a candidate into the calculation of his election expenses, not see the light of day? Or, why do political parties man- agetokeepout of theambit of theRight to Information Act? There is also something intrinsical- ly wrong in the chief justice being a member of acommissionandalsoplay- ing a role in the selection of two others the eminent persons. One who has come in with the chief justices support canbeinclinedtobesupportiveof him. IntheUnitedKingdom, fiveverysenior judges are members of the Judicial Appointments Commission but not the lord chief justice, who is part of the panel that selects the lay members of the commission. Thecardinal issueis, weneedjudges with high intellectual calibre and integrity, who together represent the diversity of Indias polity. The earlier system was certainly flawed; but under it the country saw some great forth- rightness, courage and outstanding judgments, and decisions. Judicial intervention has done the country proud from forcing all public trans- port in Delhi to go on compressed nat- ural gas, to ending the loot of iron ore andensuringthat itsminingisresumed in a safe and legitimate manner. Our senior judges arenot angels andhaveat times fallen down but overall, they have filled a vacuum. In figuring out how a better system can be devised, we can look at Britain with its 15-member Judicial Appointments Commission. It has six lay members, one of whom is the chair- person. These six and a lay justice member are selected by a committee comprising the chief justice, the chair- person of the commission and a lay member who has never been a judge, lawyer, civil servant, member of the commission or its staff. There are five judicial members and one each from among barristers, solicitors, justices of peace and tribunal members. Now see the commissions trans- parent selection process based solely on merit. Vacancies are advertised, application forms and information packs issued, applications received checked against requirements men- tioned in the information pack, and an assessment made of good character through financial, criminal and pro- fessional background checks. Applications are then shortlisted throughonlinetests or paper sift, which includes written evidence, self-assess- ment andreferences. Thenthoseshort- listed go through interview, role play and situational questioning. Phew! subirkroy@gmail.com OPINION 11 > STAY INFORMED THROUGH THE DAY @ WWW.BUSINESS-STANDARD.COM. Volume XIX Number 12 MUMBAI | WEDNESDAY, 27 AUGUST 2014 The poor politicians felt left out G oodgovernancefallsinthemotherhoodand apple pie category. Who could argue against less corruption in the bureaucracy, fewer inspections by pesky factory inspectors and an end to the sifarish-firman raj that politicians have ruled over? However, given the fetish for good governance in the current political discourse, a question worth answering is, what difference does governance make to growth? Economists have been examining this for decades. Most mainstreamresearchersagreethat good governance is a necessary condition for growth. This, byextension, means that differences ingrowthacross countries can be explained at least partly by differ- ences in the quality of governance. But first things first. What exactly is this gover- nance? Daniel Kauffman (in Growth without gover- nance, a World Bank discussion paper from 2002) defines ameasureof governancethat considers abas- ket of six things: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and con- trol of corruption. This has emerged as the gold stan- dard of governance measures, and most researchers use a variant of this. While there appears to be a con- sensus in the mainstream, there are notable voices of dissent on the necessity of governance for growth. JeffreySachsandhiscollaborators(inEndingAfricas growthtrap, aBrookingspaper from2004) arguethat differencesingrowthacrossAfricahavenothingtodo with governance. Instead, they can be explained by levelsof old-fashionedaid-financedinvestments. The least governed states have actually produced spec- tacular growth rates. Recent work on India throws up some interesting results. Maitreesh Ghataks and Sanchari Roys some- what controversial articleintheEconomicandPolitical Weekly (Did Gujarats growth rate accelerate under Modi? in April 2014) does not find any significant acceleration in Gujarats growth rate (relative to the national average; this is important) for the 2000s decade (the Modi years) compared to the 1990s. If I weretoassume(andI amsurethat manywouldagree) that the regime quickly ushered in a substantially improvedgovernancestructure, thenoneclear impli- cation is that the growth-governance link is weak. Analysisof state-level databySudiptoMundleand his colleagues at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (The quality of governance: how have Indian states performed? in July 2012) finds a positive but statistically weak relationship between the quality of governance (again gauged by Kauffman-type measures). This perhaps is a rigorous way of stating the obvious that a whole lot of things other thangovernancedeterminegrowth. However, it is worth highlighting in the current political context. Theresearchongovernanceis not just about these somewhat sterilestatistical links. Therearemanyoth- er insights that our policymakers who think about governancecouldtakecuesfrom. Apaper byRafael La Porta and three co-authors (The quality of govern- ment, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998) analysestheexperienceof alargesampleof economies over a long period and arrives at a number of power- ful insights. Of particular interest to India is their assertion that government intervention and efficien- cy are not mirror images. Let me quote them: We have consistently found that better performing gov- ernmentsarealsolarger andcollect larger taxes. Poorly performinggovernments, incontrast, aresmaller and collect fewer taxes.Theauthorsarequicktopoint out that this is not an endorsement of bigger government of anyquality. Instead, theyassert that identifyingbig government with bad government can be highly mis- leading. Thismight giveusreasontorethinktheless government, more governance mantra that is so much in vogue these days. The proposition that big government is not neces- sarily a bad thing is linked to the question of what governments should be doing in the first place. Traditionally, the role of governments was to address market failure through non-market institutions, and thisdrovethegovernanceagendainbetweenthe1950s andthe1980s. Themost extremeformof thisnon-mar- ket intervention was central planning that relied on mechanisms such as industrial licensing. India, like others, botched this up completely; the result was a combinationof severemacroeconomicproblems and theproliferationof rent-seekingactivitiesandrampant corruption. In short, market failure was replaced by government failure. Thebacklashagainst thefailureof thismodel came from mainstream economists whose prescriptions were administered by agencies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank touting a model of market enhancing governance that would jettison the planning approach and instead replicate the con- ditions of an efficient market. This would be imple- mentedthroughacombinationof things: stableprop- ertyrights; lowtransactioncosts; andminimisingrent seeking and corruption. An extreme but popular view was that since government intervention breeds cor- ruption and rent seeking, an obvious solution would be to have a small government. What this agenda misses is the entire business of state capacity. Government intervention failed because the government simply did not have the capacity to do the things it was trying to do. Mushtaq Khan, aneconomist at LondonsSchool of Oriental and African Studies (in Governance, development and economic growth since the 1960s, a working paper from 2007) argues that while one cannot argue with theobjectiveof creatingefficient markets, developing countriesmight not havethecapacitytodothiseither. Marketsindevelopingcountries, heargues, areinher- entlyinefficient andthekindof improvement instate capacity required is difficult to achieve. The second proposition that Mr Khan and others make is that recent history shows that efforts to enhance marketshavent quite paid off (take Latin America in the 1990s, for instance) .What appears to have worked very well, instead, has been the kind of governance structures growth enhancing gover- nance he calls it that led to a boom in East Asia. These experiments the creation of the chaebols in South Korea using public resources; the setting up of the town and village Enterprises in China and their subsequent privatisation; the channelling of credit in South Korea to priority industries all made a sub- stantial contribution to contribution. Some of them appear to go against the principle of the market enhancing school since they involve state interven- tion to correct for market failure. Be that as it may, the bottom line is that they have worked well. India has learnt to look East in many domains of our eco- nomicandinternational relationsstrategy. Perhapswe shouldlookEast whenit comes todecidingonamod- el of governance as well. Thewriteris withtheICRIER. Theseviews arehis own ILLUSTRATION BY BINAY SINHA More government, more growth? Abheek Barua asks: how much growth can good governance get us? BOOK REVIEW SUNANDA K DATTA-RAY MAKERS OF MODERN ASIA Edited by Ramachandra Guha Belknap/Harvard $29.95 VALUE FOR MONEY SUBIR ROY