Sarajevo

Geneva
Vi enna









Center for European
Integration Strategies



Working Paper Series
No 2 / 2007


Politics from Below and Civil Depolizicization
The Croatian Case



14 March 2007












Center for European Integration Strategies

Working paper Series No 2 / 2007
Geneva
Sarajevo
Vi enna







































Abstract



This paper examines the conditions,
modes, and scope of civic activism in
post-independence Croatia and
assesses the extent to which active
political participation has contributed
to a more vibrant democracy in the
country and stronger legally
guaranteed freedoms. The analysis
rests on the recognition that
knowledge mainly originates from a
participatory observation (or better
still, from an observing participation),
and on the ambition to develop a
civic, participatory impact from
below, to the benefit of democracy,
freedom and social solidarity. The
paper describes the limited space
available to domestic activism in
Croatia and discusses the pervasive
effects of outside assistance, noting
that technocratic agendas have further
limited the space for domestic civic
agents.

Sr!an Dvornik

14 March 2007


Politics from Below and Civil
Depolitization

Civil Political Participation in Croatia
between Empowerment by International
Assistance and the Challenges of Local
Political Engagement




e-mail: sdvornik@hho.hr

CEIS working papers cover the extended discussion on European integration themes as they relate to the entire region of
South-East Europe, including country-specific as well as cross-cutting issues. Any reproduction, publication and reprint in
the form of a different publication, whether printed or produced electronically, in whole or in part, is permitted only with
the explicit written authorization of the CEIS or the author(s). The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect
those of the CEIS. This paper can be downloaded without charge from www.ceis-eu.org.

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
2
March 2007


1. A Place for civic commitment

So, what was at work at the very beginning of the changes toward democracy despite the
undoubted incentives and impacts from the West was a politically initiated action from inside, i.e.
something entirely authentic. On the other hand, however, the concept of civil society as a
description of this internal movement as was noted above was only borrowed from societies
where it had a proper social basis. It is, thus, a nutshell expression for a living, political, active
experience that emerged and was lived someplace else: this new, directly political function was won
by citizens of advanced capitalist societies through movements by which they challenged the power
of interventionist states and big corporations, and the foreseeable disastrous social and ecological
consequences of politics under their dominance. The civic commitment conquered citizenship; the
members of civic society rediscovered their role as members of a polity, a state, but not in a static
sense, having won this role through action as citizens. Just as the state was acquiring a potentially
totalitarian power, just as the big corporations were acquiring a comparably strong political and
social influence, the ordinary people were growing more and more aware that their lives were not
in trustworthy hands.

The spiral of ecological threats, nuclear armament and war (the potential nuclear exchange with the
rival superpower, and the actual wars in many peripheral areas of the struggle for global
dominance) gave warning that democratic procedures and the rule of law were by no means
sufficient any longer as means for the control and limitation of power. Thus, since the mid-1960s
there emerged movements for the contestation of the dominant politics, ideologies and ways of life,
which range from the anti-war movements, through those for the protection of the environment, to
demands for disarmament, and so on.
1
On the part of civic society, which was primarily concerned
with the economic reproduction of the system of needs, and which consummated its political
function by periodic elections, public control of the government and various lobbying influences
through interest groups, a concern with the political process was rediscovered
2
in civic commitment
(i.e. civil society), which challenged the very foundation of politics and the major directions in which
the political-economic complex was leading society (and even the whole of humankind), and tried to
keep the holders of political and economic power socially responsible.


In order for citizens to establish themselves in this way as active members of the polity (and not only
of society), certain social, economic and cultural conditions are necessary. It is important to state
them clearly if we are to account properly for the applicability of the term civil society to Croatian
society. The first condition could be summarized as a certain degree of development of civic society,
i.e. the sphere of autonomous, private economic players connected by a free market. Although this is
a sphere of private interests, it also includes political functions: the demand for relations to be
regulated by a system of law, rather than arbitrary power; and for legally limited power to be
controlled by democratic procedures and a free public. An additional condition for a far higher
degree of commitment, moreover, and for the appropriation of more concrete and more direct
political functions, is also an awareness of the potentially fatal dangers into which the
overwhelmingly expanded power of states and corporations leads. Having permeated the whole of
human existence, the presence of such dominant states and corporations has showed that citizens
cannot yield themselves uncritically to their power, and that formal democracy and the legal
limitation of government are insufficient means of control; it is necessary instead to win and impose
participatory forms of the democratic making of the political will (as well as control of its executive
implementation). There is finally the relatively minor but nonetheless essential condition that the

1
That many of them ended up in politically impotent advocacy of alternative lifestyles is not relevant for this story. What is
substantial is that they brought onto the political scene the issues that go beyond particular interests.
2
As Ulrich Beck terms this finding in Die Erfindung des Politischen: Zu einer Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung, Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
March 2007
3


citizens of a country should have at their disposal some essential resources for any participatory
engagement: both the non-material potential of participatory political culture, i.e. the will and ability
to take responsibility for what happens within their own social life, and the necessary material
resources: first of all the free time for activism, and also discretionary money to finance the costs of
such actions (either by their own contributions or by widespread private donations).

In the light of these criteria, that passes as "civil society" in Croatia and other post-Yugoslav countries
suffers from obvious deficits. The most striking are the relatively minor material ones: a very small
portion of the population has a significant part of its income at its discretionary disposal, i.e. beyond
the necessary subsistence levels, but even within that small portion, discretionary spending is mostly
directed to consumer pleasures. The situation is similar regarding the availability of free time: most
members of society both the employed and the unemployed use any opportunity to earn additional
income, or for domestic work in order to obtain cheaper commodities and services so as to make ends
meet, or to sustain a satisfactory standard of living according to the prevailing expectations. A
voluntary commitment to civil society activities, let alone a financial contribution, is out of the
question for the vast majority of the citizens.

However, such an engagement cannot be reduced merely to material conditions, which, although
important, are not a sine qua non. The situation is more critical when it comes to conditions directly
related to the will to engage actively for social change. There is no tradition in this society of what is
called a participatory political culture. Not only was the field of the commonly shared occupied by
the communist ideology and regime, but the Yugoslav version of this facilitated and even stimulated a
willing acceptance of such dominance among the population. The evolution of civil society in
Yugoslavia and subsequently in Croatia was decisively shaped by the prevalence of deeply apolitical
attitudes in society.

The relative openness of Yugoslavia under communist rule offered plenty of opportunities for people
to resolve their problems by pursuing private projects, but on one condition not to interfere in
politics, which was a monopoly of the communist elite. There was no insistence on constant
expressions of loyalty to the totalitarian regime; one could practice private entrepreneurship, travel
and work abroad, bring the earnings home and even invest them. Not only did people enjoy more
freedom, but also a higher standard of living in comparison with the countries under Soviet
domination, which made it less obvious that such relative freedom was not guaranteed as a right, and
that there was no political freedom. Thanks to such successful depoliticisation of social and public
life, the overthrow of the communist order did not require such strong, even if short-lived civic
movements like those in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany or Romania, because the communist
leaders themselves decided to allow the introduction of the multi-party system and free (though due
to the lack of many key institutions, from an independent judiciary to independent media still not
democratic) elections.

Once the ceremony of overthrow was completed, it became evident just how decisive it was that
already under the communist regime, nationalism in a clearly ethnic sense was established as the
dominant basis of non-regime political activity and the mode of articulation of political differences.
The transition to democracy thus was simultaneously the time of the establishment of separate
national, ethnically legitimized states; a process that, due to the particular position of the Yugoslav
Army, was carried out through the war. Thanks to the existence of a real enemy, nationalism was
substantially reinforced not only as the dominant force, but the hegemonic, state-creating
authoritarian attitude toward the state, and it gained complete ascendancy over the liberal-democratic
form of the state, which remained limited to formal constitutional arrangements (this is not even to
mention a pluralism founded in socioeconomic interests). The economy, which had already undergone
a bad period in the 1980s, was further undermined. Therefore, in the newly established formally
democratic Croatia as an independent state, the polity was again occupied by a collectivist this time
nationalist ideology and its authoritarian champions. As an ideology of a pre-political collective ide-

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
4
March 2007


ntity, such an understanding did not leave room for the liberal confrontation of different views and
democratic deliberation about the foundations of the polity. Besides, additional aggravating
circumstances emerged in such conditions: the lack of any communication free from violence, because
the advocates of dissenting views and the few civic organizations, as well as a few independent
media, that challenged the politics that generated mass violations of human rights and the
militarization of society were exposed to threats, pressure and even overt violence.

Nevertheless, it was precisely in opposing the radical consequences of that new order, primarily
owning to the determination of several individuals in small groups, that the first forms of civil society
commitment were conceived: organizations for human rights working against virtually unlimited
power, which primarily swooped down on ethnic minorities (first of all on Serbs, in certain periods on
Bosniaks, and continuously on Roma), anti-war organizations against the militarization of society
beyond the need for legitimate defence against aggression, and organizations for assistance to victims
of war (primarily refugees). There were organizations for gender equality and women's rights
struggling against the traditionalist pressures of the conservative regime; and before the overthrow of
communism, the first groups for the protection of the environment had become active.

Thus, amidst the overall lack of social, economic and cultural conditions for a broader momentum of
civil society, the present scene is extraordinarily advanced in comparison with the first, critical
years, even taking into account the high levels of personal commitment of the groups mentioned, as
well as some others, which indicates that external factors have exercised a decisive impact.


2. Civil society in Croatia

On a manifest level, civil society in Croatia appears in several basic roles. First of all, there is its
state-creating function. This is a function that tends not to be mentioned often, because of a
democratic prejudice that civil society is something that is in itself good and progressive, and favours
freedom, democracy and a good quality of human life. Nevertheless, it has to be included in the
picture, because that is the most prominent symptom of the real state of affairs in the societies of this
region. These societies are not composed of a fabric of autonomous interests and the activities that
realize them, from which specific demands are directed at the state, as well as expectations that the
government should be legally limited and democratically controlled; instead, they are made up of a
relatively amorphous set of people dependent on the ethno-national political community both in an
economic and an ideological sense: they expect protection and security from the state, and at the
same time set the political community as a value above individual freedom and the right to difference.
(A marked consequence of such an attitude is a general deficit in political pluralism, regardless of the
number of political parties.)

Such society is highly politically mobilized, especially in certain periods, so it is right to consider it as
part of the systemic position of civil society, except that this does not involve action by citizens who
want to take over a part of the state power of decision-making and care about benefiting the society as
a whole, or at least to interfere in state affairs; instead, it is more or less a mass movement that sees
itself as a reserve army of the genuine state either against corrupt politicians, or against
politicians not credible enough to play the role of champions of the national cause (which never has
a specific substance) the state that perpetually has to be defended against internal and external
enemies, and whose honour has to be guarded, even including the dignity of the war that
engendered it.

Admittedly, it could also be said that this is not a type of action characteristic of civil society, because
we are not dealing with autonomous action, but instead clearly authoritarian-heteronymous agents and


CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
March 2007
5


action. There is no action here on behalf of autonomously set goals and values, but by self-
understanding on behalf of a hypostatized community (state, nation, even people, though in an
ethnic sense); but in the framework of the incomplete separation of the state and society, these
movements are not externally manipulated either: they are truly authentic. This contradiction is not a
consequence of any confusion, but precisely a good example of the difficulties we encounter when
trying to transfer key concepts (and, consequentially, practices) from one social formation to another,
or at least from a formed complex into one that is still in (trans)formation.

Another prominent role consists of various, already mentioned responses to the grave consequences of
war and authoritarian/militant forms of governance that manifested themselves so powerfully in the
circumstances of war. Here, activities emerged in the range from humanitarian aid, to the defence of
the basic human rights to life, security and home. Already during the war, and especially after it, such
functions gradually separated, so on the one hand there are plenty of organizations that either remain
humanitarian or are transformed into providers of various social services; and on the other, a number
of organizations for human rights remain (including those supporting gender equality and the rights of
ethnic minorities, but also rights such as a healthy environment, or the rights of non-human living
species), including supporters of democratic initiatives, the development of a political culture of
peace, of rights, democracy, etc. In circumstances where the social and economic foundations of
political pluralism do not exist, these organizations, advocating their values through political activity
of some kind, have also often played the role of an otherwise insufficient political opposition;
moreover, such an additional role has already become a part of the usual public expectations of such
agents.

Apart from these, many independent initiatives should be mentioned that do not engage directly in
such legal and political issues, but that, as organizations and institutions of civil society, intervene in
the area of culture, art and education (it is possible that they can be seen as being complementary to
the agents who are directly politically involved, who are also committed to the development of a
corresponding political culture).

Finally, there is the role of certain formal agents of civil society that could be summarized as
technocratic: these are organizations and institutions that deal with other organizations of civil
society that are their customers or users, i.e. they offer services in functional capacity-building,
ranging from direct administrative and accounting to strategic planning functions. The external factors
that contributed to such an elaborate process of institutionalization can be clearly discerned: the
government on the one hand, and foreign or international donor institutions and non-governmental
organizations on the other. The connection between the government, the dominant party during the
1990s (HDZ) and the organizations that emerged from the Homeland War is clearly evident. The
role of foreign donors and non-governmental organizations still requires detailed research.


3. Civil society and international support

As was pointed out earlier, the whole situation makes the role of civil society in a transitional country
contradictory: its meaning should lie in autonomous civic commitment, but we are looking for such
commitment in a society in which no substantial condition for such a commitment is met.
Furthermore, not even a public space of communication free from violence is guaranteed, because
under the hegemony of nationalistic ideology, differences are barely tolerated, while during the war,
violence as a mode of action, as well as the massive presence of weapons and explosives as means of
communication, had become widespread. That is why civil society, which is by basic definition an
autonomous mode of action, not only in private activities, but precisely in relation to the whole of
society, has to proceed with the decisive support of external aid, both in Croatia and in other post-
Yugoslav countries. The most visible kind of such aid is abundant financial support from the more
advanced countries, by way of a rich variety of donors from small activist groups, through private

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
6
March 2007


foundations and non-governmental organizations, to government agencies and intergovernmental
organizations. That support has provided precious resources for action, and has also made it possible
to establish institutional infrastructure spaces for gathering, means of communication, offices and
facilities, professional jobs, etc.

What is much more important, however, is that the aid has been present in a more substantial sense.
For it would be an illusion to speak of a "civil society" that lacks only socioeconomic and political-
cultural conditions, but otherwise has ready-made agents prepared for action. To be sure, there were
such agents, especially those that formed part of the previous dissident commitment, as well as those
coming from the professions (legal, journalism, social science, educational and similar) that were
exposed to authoritarian political purges during the establishment of the post-communist
democratorships. For a considerable number of activists, however, their encounter with social
commitment was also their first encounter with the basic notions of society, with the tasks of detecting
the causes of problems that motivated them to action, and of discovering solutions as programmes
of change, objectives of action and political demands to advocate. Neither in their existing education
nor in the tradition of social action could they find relevant knowledge and experience for such tasks.

The fact that the initial stages of the transition from communism to democracy presented images of the
positive side of the change the new (which the jargon that would emerge later would call vision)
that drew only from the existing forms of democratic governance and capitalist economy developed
in other societies, also pre-determined to some extent the subsequent dependency of many civic
initiatives on external supporters and tutors. That made them more susceptible to the informative-
educational mode of foreign/international assistance, which was entering the country simultaneously
with, and was often tied to, material assistance.

The non-material assistance of the foreign donors (mostly from some European Union countries and
the United States) has multiple meanings, because its biggest part was not humanitarian aid as such,
but constituted part of a broader mission of aid to build post-communist democracy. Specifically, this
means that it was partly dedicated to institution-building and partly to political awareness-raising,
training and education. Since the post-communist transformation was mainly conceived in a shortened
version, as a transition or a crossing over from one social, economic and political form to another,
which was already developed as liberal-democratic capitalism in Western countries, it was tacitly
assumed that the aim of such a transition was already known in all of its substantial terms. So, if it is
merely a question of transition, i.e. a crossing from a known (undesirable) condition into another, also
known (but desirable) one, all that is left is the question of the drive and mechanism of such transition.
The main drive the economic one is taken in this ideology of a transition as a given: of course,
the sphere of the economy naturally tends to the free-market form, and all that has to be done is to
liberate it from the political shackles of the communist regime and to equip it with the necessary legal
instruments. This will be taken care of by privatization and the penetration of international capital,
while the holders of political office just need to be instructed about the appropriate legal and
institutional arrangements that are required.

The only thing still left to be done is to turn the communist subjects into democratic citizens. As the
socioeconomic foundations of the interests these citizens were supposed to pursue were left to their
natural assumption of the free-market economy, the only remaining task was to develop in them the
sense of rights, democratic participation, tolerance and/or pluralism, and other values that make up the
democratic political culture. Education is offered as the shortest way of developing such a culture, be
it in the literal sense, or as a public dissemination of democratic values and ways of action (since the
programmes are not based on in-depth research and critical considerations of problems, the shortest
paths are often taken as the best ones). Apart from the huge quantities of training and education, the
influence of such an approach can by reliably confirmed by the fact that, in most areas of the civic
scene in Croatia, it is precisely education that the agents see as the highest meaning and mode of
their operation, as well as the solution to various social problems and even conflicts.

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
March 2007
7


Not only do these educational programmes often come wrapped together with material donations, but
they are carried out by separate organizations: a part of the non-material impact also comes directly
from the donors. More specifically, the fundamental mission of building democracy in these post-
communist, post-war countries also results in particular agendas for the donors. They base their
programmes of support on assessments about strong and weak aspects of the progress of democracy,
the problems that deserve priority and those of peripheral significance, and the most appropriate kind
of civil agents. Furthermore, as the transition (inevitably) takes longer than expected, and certain
natural assumptions have not proved to be realistic, accomplishing the democratization mission
requires getting into more and more specific issues. Therefore, as the donor organizations mature, the
support they offer to civic agents also gets more narrowly specified to fit the more concrete practical
objectives and modes of action that have become the subject of focus. Finally, since there is no direct
feedback, and as the achievement of success in the third sector (unlike the economic and political
sectors, which have their indicators of sales and income, or voters' support) and the process of societal
transformation show an ever-growing complexity, the question of checks on and evaluations of the
success of the programmes becomes more pressing. Not only are the activities of the civic agents
squeezed into the confines of the project-driven approach, which is supposed to yield visible results in
a short period of a few years, they are also implicitly directed toward issues and objectives suitable to
yield such effects for the sake of a positive evaluation.

All in all, the non-material support, as well as the narrower definition of the material support in terms
of programmes, reaches the status of a real process of acculturation: a transfer of entire complexes of
worldview and culture from one social environment to another. This acculturation, however, has
reached and encompassed (and to a great extent shaped) just one part of the society, whose very
existence also depends to a great extent on the same group of sources. In many ways, this puts into
question the development of civil society as a process of autonomous civic participation from below.

Firstly, what is left out of this process is the autonomy of agents as the substantial prerequisite, worthy
in its own right. Secondly, it thwarts the development of civil society as a mediator of the social
responsibility of centres of political and economic power: if the civil society itself draws its own
understanding of social problems and goals/solutions from the external sources on which it depends
for its very existence, it cannot be an agent for the social responsibility of states and corporations.
Thirdly, as the sources of the democratic acculturation process do not derive their programmes and
strategies from a scrupulous study of the societies in and upon which they act, but from a mixture of
standard images of democratization and specific priorities that sometimes appear in the form of
international trends that focus on a specific problem (almost like a fashion), the agents of local civil
societies, under such impact, also risk missing or overlooking some real problems.

Such an approach is based on a tacit implication that the transition societies are, after all, similar in
their substantial traits to those from which the support originates. Such an assumption is most easily
made in fundamental terms: first of all, in the economic system, which is (as mentioned above) taken
for granted as being basically that of a free market (if truth be told, it is exposed to corruption, political
pressures, etc., but it is still taken as an autonomous sub-system); then also regarding the political
system, which is taken as being at least basically democratic (although, again, it still has to be built,
improved, tutored...); and finally, regarding the normative system, the state of affairs is perceived in
terms of the rule of law (of course, it also has to be improved, its agents' capacities have to be built
through education, etc.). Just as has been said about civil society, in relation to these three substantial
frameworks of the social order, things are anything but clear.

What is at issue here includes the unfulfilled condition of the autonomy of economic agents, the
questionable nature of a democracy without an independent political articulation of interests or their
socioeconomic foundations, and the problematic nature of law as the mode of regulation within an
order in which political and economic powers are inextricably intermingled. On top of this is the
problem that the fundamental (nationalist) conception of the polity, which was at work when the cons-

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
8
March 2007


titutions and laws were made and the apparatus of government was formed, remains in essence hostile
toward the notion of the equality of citizens, because it is founded directly on the principle of ethnic
community, just as it remains hostile toward liberal democracy, because the principle of ethnic
community is politically manifested in a collectivist and authoritarian way, in the will of the leader
and the leading party (or, in Franjo Tu!man's expression, not just the leading party but the party of
governance).


5. Normalization and depolitization

Therefore, the main effect of the dependence of civil society in a transitional country on the import
of material resources and knowledge is its preventive depoliticization: by assuming that the main
characteristics of the transitional regime are already those of a state with democracy and the rule of
law, in relation to a relatively autonomous society, the very basic constitutive issues of the polity,
which form the most important basis of the citizens' politicization (that is, civil society), are
systematically excluded from the domain of problem-setting and action. This indefinitely postpones
the confrontation with the historical decisions that will determine the character of the newly emerged
states in the long run; it also means that scarce energies are redirected and spent on problems defined
from the perspective of such distorted assumptions. For example, the deficit of democracy is
operationalized as the problem of good governance, or as insufficient decentralization; the lack of
separation of political and economic powers as corruption; the deficit in the rule of law as
inefficiency of the judiciary, and so forth. Tenders and project proposals are publicly invited to deal
with such issues (where the calls for proposals and tenders are more and more similar to orders for
services for purposes already defined), and money and activists commitment are invested, only to
find out later perhaps even through belated research, which had not been done before the strategies
and project tasks were formulated that things are still changing too slowly, if they are changing at
all. Finally, even the degree of development of civil society is seen though its institutional shell, i.e.
the degree of operational and strategic competence of the mostly professional non-governmental
organizations, while the substance, i.e. the civic commitment itself, is most often assessed only as a
readiness for voluntary work for the public benefit.

As opposed to the paranoid view still widespread in Croatia about such an imported notion of civil
society as an undercover political agenda of foreign governments, whereby domestic organizations
act on secret orders for specific political purposes it is indeed a compliment paid to Croatia when
the donors' strategies and agendas assume it to be a basically normalized democracy that applies the
rule of law, and that merely has to be improved in its institutional arrangements, techniques of
governance, etc. What is completely overlooked is the question of why the entire normative and
institutional system exists as a separate world, parallel to the real world of social life, wherein the
relations that really occur correspond to the theoretical requirements only loosely and occasionally.

The question really is how to set up the state as a limited power if the society does not have an
autonomous, pluralist counter-power; and the still unresolved question of whether this state ever left
behind the basis on which it was established as the expression of an ethnic (Croat) community. To set
such questions on the public agenda, or to question the present-day answers to such questions,
would mean genuine political action on the part of civil society. In contrast, the understanding of
social relations and the problems to be solved is in most cases under the influence of a newly
composed ideology by which the society consists of three sectors (the public non-profit, the private
for profit, and the third one the private non-profit, which is tacitly substituted for civil society),
among which there is, or should be, a sort of social contract, so the main job is reduced to
establishing the nature of the partnership relationships among them.



CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
March 2007
9


The fact that the social problems (the focus of a possible civic commitment) are interpreted in such
false or incorrectly transferred patterns is not anything new or fatal in itself. In any case, social
learning amidst profound changes can hardly proceed without a process of trial and error through
testing the solutions offered from experiences of other societies. What seriously puts into question the
significance of the broad network of non-governmental organizations as the alleged embodiment or
institutional expression of civil society is the double shift of responsibility. The substantial (and not
just financial, as shown above) dependence on external support also means that there is a
responsibility to the donors, an imperative for the desired action to fit into goals determined by the
programmes of support, followed by the endless writing of project proposals, budgets and reports, and
accounting for expenses. Furthermore, a great portion of those working for these non-governmental
organizations are professional activists, and only a few are voluntarily committed, which results in
another shift, consisting of an almost inevitable intermingling of the self-interest of such people and
the supposedly disinterested commitment of the organization to particular projects and values.

Therefore, the kind of social responsibility that essentially defines civil society a self-imposed
responsibility to initiate and, within limits, carry out a process of social change remains in the
shadow of all those shifted ways of setting goals. Such a deficit is most obvious in how late ambitions
for achieving political impact have developed in public activities (political impact in the broadest
sense, from street demonstrations to a direct lobbying for concrete solutions to problems), which is
different from a mere expression of one's status by means of alternative identities. When one speaks of
social change, in the short run (in a situation in which a year, three years, or thirteen years in the active
life of a civic organization remain as short term in the context of the whole post-communist
transformation) such change practically appears as a change of some regulation, institutional
arrangement, policy, social attitudes toward a particular problem in question, or at least as a change in
the conduct of the competent (though not always responsible) authorities. All these practical changes
have politics as their common denominator. When the fundamental terms according to which the
polity functions are tacitly assumed as unquestionable, and the only job to be done is to deliver social
services or constructive initiatives within the allegedly normal framework, the impact of
depoliticization continues even when the number of public actions grows.

Finally, the best illustration of this point is an instance that is no longer new, but is often taken as a
confirmation of a pronounced, even successful political commitment of civil society, due to the
multitude of participants and the size of the changes that ensued. It was the action of a large number of
organizations (around 150) in 1999 that campaigned to stimulate active voting, which probably made a
significant contribution to the high turnout at the elections at the beginning of 2000, and perhaps even
to their outcome. The initiating idea was certainly inspired by the example of Slovakia in the previous
year, mediated by the decision of the major donors to direct most of their budgets for civil society in
1999 precisely to activities that were similar to the Slovak model. The domestic organizations that
accepted this commitment spent a lot of time defining the substance and meaning of such an action, as
well as the structures, coordination, formal versus informal networking and, of course, the
distribution of money. There was hardly any debate about political agendas, as though these were the
exclusive domain of political parties, and as if the agents of civil society, dealing with all kinds of
social problems on a daily basis, had no demands for those aspiring to power (and who were at their
most vulnerable to such demands just before elections). Eventually, the whole content of the campaign
was reduced to a propaganda campaign to encourage people to get out and vote, and to prevent
election fraud by monitoring the process. (In addition, under the influence of certain donors, the
organization that specialized in such activity, having already become independent from the group of
organizations that had jointly established such a monitoring process, separated from the Glas 99
coalition, allegedly for the sake of impartiality; which was an implicit admission of the partiality of
the coalition, despite the fact that its position was politically neutral, since its only real political
position was one advocating a change in the team that made up the government.) The winners of the
elections of early 2000 could perhaps have thanked the commitment of these non-governmental
organizations for their success, but these organizations certainly did not burden them with any concre-

CEIS
Working Paper Series No 2
10
March 2007


te demands that could be subsequently used to pressure the government for not fulfilling its promises.

Civil society, both by the way it sustains itself and by what it does, and by the basic terms of
understanding of its own role and the objects of its action, is a result of a minority awareness about
problems and commitment from inside, and of a rich variety of acculturation impacts from outside.
Those impacts are by their nature exactly the opposite of the stereotypes of external political
influences, because it is precisely what should lie at the core of a political commitment the
disputable but fundamental terms of democracy, the rule of law and pluralism that is left in the
shadow as a given, by a consensus of the external partners like the EU, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, and others, and the domestic authorities. As a result of the technocratic
agenda of improvements, fine-tuning, and additional training and education, the fragile autonomy of
the domestic civic social agents will be limited even more. Perhaps the only chance for such agents is
to be left on their own, without crutches and reliance on the allegedly already achieved forms of
action of a developed civil society, to carve out their own areas of action and influence for themselves.

















This working paper presents Sr!an Dvorniks contribution to the volume he co-edited with Christophe Solioz: Next Steps
in Croatias Transition Process. Problems and Possibilities (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007).
Sr!an Dvornik is Executive Director of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. Born in 1953 in "ibenik, he
completed undergraduate studies in philosophy and sociology, and received his MA degree in political science at the
University of Zagreb. Has taught at high schools and the University of Zagreb, edited books on philosophy and social and
political sciences, and served as the Managing Director and Civil Society Programme Deputy Director at the Open Society
Institute Croatia and as the head of the Zagreb Office of the Heinrich Bll Stiftung. Voluntary commitments include co-
founding and active membership in civic organizations for human rights and democratic initiatives such as the Association
for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (1989), the Anti-War Campaign (1991), the Civic Initiative for Freedom of Public
Speech (1992), the Civic Committee for Human Rights (1992), the independent anti-war magazine ArkZin, Transition to
Democracy (ToD), etc. Publishes articles, gives lectures and conducts educational workshops on the issues of democratic
transition, human rights, green politics and the development of civil society.




Center for European Integrati on Strategi es


Secretary-general
christophe.solioz@ceis-eu.org


Di rector Sarajevo Offi ce
senad.slatina@ceis-eu.org

Seni or edi tor
toby.vogel@ceis-eu.org
Di rector Vi enna offi ce
Vedran.dzihic@ceis-eu.org








































The publication of this working paper series was financially
supported by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF). The opinions expressed in this
brief do not necessarily reflect the official views of DCAF.










The core mission of the Center for European Integration Strategies (CEIS) is to
monitor, analyze, and advise on processes of state-building, democratization, regional
cooperation, and European integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the countries of
the Western Balkans. In its work CEIS will rely on a network of academics, analysts,
and journalists established and fostered in past years by its predecessor organization.
Their professional expertise is reflected and further developed through the future
activities of the CEIS.

CEIS activities include, but are not limited to:

- Publishing analytical and investigative briefings on political, economic, social,
human rights and other trend-setting issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
wider region;
- Fostering public dialogue through round tables, conferences, and other public
debates on important developments in the society;
- Training political analysts, especially those involved in local government and
on European integration issues;
- Supporting the work of emerging voices in the region in CEIS areas of
interest;
- Promoting local ownership in policy processes and policy research in the
region.

Visit us at www.ceis-eu.org