NATO Owes Putin a

Big Thank-You
Russia's aggression in Ukraine is making it
easier for the bloated, aging alliance to
pretend that it still matters.
BY STEPE! ". #$%T&SEPTE"BER ', ()*'
+f +,ere reall- c-nical, +'d suspect some bureaucrats at !$T.
head/uarters in Brussels are secretl- glad about the crisis in Ukraine. #h-0
Because it gi1es the aging alliance something to do. This moti1e ma- also
e2plain ,h- ha,kish Secretar-&3eneral $nders 4ogh Rasmussen seems
eager to defend Ukraine right do,n to the last Ukrainian and ,h- the !$T.
members that lie closest to Russia are both ,orried b- recent e1ents and
pleased that the rest of the alliance is 5nall- pa-ing attention to their
concerns.
+n fairness, !$T.'s sur1i1al after the 6old #ar remains something of an
anomal-. $lliances normall- arise in response to threats, and man- pre1ious
alliances collapsed /uickl- once the e2ternal danger ,as gone. "indful of
this tendenc-, !$T.'s proponents ha1e been searching for a con1incing
rationale for its continued e2istence e1er since the Berlin #all fell. But their
e7orts ha1e been mostl- stillborn8 despite annual summits, earnest
communi/u9s, and a lot of bra1e rhetoric, the alliance's capabilities,
importance, and coherence ha1e been 1isibl- declining for t,o decades.
Things might ha1e been di7erent if the 1arious :out&of&area: missions !$T.
took on had gone s,immingl-, but the- didn't. The Bosnian inter1ention in
*;;<= and the ,ar in >oso1o in *;;; ,ere at best partial successes8 the-
took longer, cost more, and produced more ambiguous results than !$T.'s
defenders like to admit. !$T.'s e7orts in $fghanistan ha1e been mostl- a
failure, and no member of the alliance ,ants to do an-thing like that again.
The %ib-an debacle no, looks like a monument to #estern hubris, e1en
though its architects remain loath to admit ?ust ho, ,rong the- ,ere. The
United States has been tr-ing to :rebalance: to $sia in recent -ears && an
arena ,here !$T. has little roleto pla- && and has been coping ,ith the
aftermath of 3eorge #. Bush's foolish attempt to :transform: the "iddle
East.
Until the Ukraine crisis arose, !$T. looked like a nearl- e2tinct dodo that
had someho, managed to last into the (*st centur-.
Yet !$T. sur1i1ed. This is partl- because the alliance ,as hea1il-
institutionali@ed, and no bureaucrac- goes out of business ,ithout a 5ght.
+ts persistence also ga1e the United States some residual le1erage in
Europe and allo,ed #ashington to pretend that its acti1ities else,here had
broad international support. "ilitar- bases in Europe and a long histor- of
cooperation also facilitated U.S. inter1entions in other areas and didn't
re/uire Europeans to do much in return. 4inall-, liberal internationalists
embraced !$T. Aand EUB e2pansion as a ,a- to spread democratic
institutions and 1alues into the former So1iet empire, to,ard the e1er&
elusi1e goal of :one Europe, united and free.:
But as 3eorge >ennan, "ichael "andelbaum, and other e2perts ,arned in
the *;;)s, !$T. e2pansion turned out to be a fundamental strategic
misstep. +t alienated Russia ,ithout making !$T. stronger8 on the contrar-,
e2pansion in1ol1ed e2tending securit- guarantees to mostl- ,eak countries
that ,ould be the hardest to defend should Russian po,er e1er reco1er.
+nstead of sticking ,ith the earl- *;;)s Partnership for Peace, an initiati1e
that pro1ided man- of the same bene5ts as !$T. e2pansion && including
militar-&to&militar- contacts, securit- dialogue, and support for ci1il societ-
&& but also included Russia, #ashington succumbed to hubris and decided to
add to its defense burdens ,ithout getting much in return.
Undertaken, like the old British Empire, in a :5t of absentmindedness,:
!$T. e2pansion rested on the assumption that these 1arious guarantees
,ould ne1er need to be honored. +t ,as not until the brief Russo&3eorgian
,ar of ())C that a fe, #ashingtonians Aand a larger number of EuropeansB
begin to recogni@e that these commitments might actuall- in1ol1e some
cost and risk. But b- then it ,as too late, because an- challenge in Eastern
Europe ,ould be seen as a test of U.S. credibilit- and !$T.'s resol1e.
!eedless to sa-, this is precisel- ho, most people && including President
Barack .bama, ,ho has called the Ukraine crisis a :moment of
testing: -- are no, interpreting the tussle o1er Ukraine.
Yet e1en the current crisis cannot full- reconcile !$T.'s fundamental
strategic problems. E1en if one adopts a ,orst&case 1ie, of Russian
intentions, toda-'s Russia is no,here near as threatening as the old So1iet
Union. The USSR ,as a continent&si@ed superpo,er ,ith a larger population
than the United States and an econom- roughl- half as large8 toda-'s
Russia is smaller and less populous, and its econom- is roughl- one&5fth the
si@e of $merica's. The USSR outspent the United States on defense during
most of the 6old #ar, but Russia toda- is a pips/ueak b- comparison. +ts
onl- appealing products are oil, natural gas, and ra, materials, and it no
longer boasts an ideolog- that can rall- supporters ,orld,ide. +t can be a
regional spoiler and a local troublemaker, but it is not and ,ill ne1er again
be a true peer competitor.
These realities also mean that Russia does not threaten the 1ital interests of
most of Europe or the United States. +t is a genuine threat to Ukraine's ,ell&
being, and it is also a potential problem for the small Baltic states, but
Europe no longer has to ,orr- about ;)&plus di1isions massing on the inter&
3erman border. That's a 1er- good thing, but the lack of a serious strategic
threat is also ,h- !$T. has trouble marshaling the le1el of coherence and
commitment that it did during the 6old #ar.
+n fact Aand in sharp contrast to the post&#orld #ar ++ periodB, Europe no,
has the latent ,here,ithal to deal ,ith the Russian bear all b- itself, if onl-
it could get its act together. !$T.'s European members are notoriousl-
reluctant to spend mone- on defense or create e7ecti1e militar- forces, but
it's not because the- lack the basic resources. E1en toda-, !$T. Europe
spends four times more on defense each year than Russia does. +f these
states ,ere reall- ,orried, -ou'd think the- ,ould coordinate their acti1ities
more e7ecti1el-, de1ote more mone- to the problem, and spend the
e2isting amounts more eDcientl-, instead of maintaining militaries that are
long on creature comforts and short on 5ghting capacit-
The real challenge !$T. faces is the classic dilemma of collecti1e action,
made all the ,orse b- the modest nature of the threat to ,hich !$T. is
no, tr-ing to respond. This problem is ,h- !$T.'s ne, members are
,orking o1ertime to con1ince others && and especiall- $mericans o1er in the
#estern emisphere && that Russian President Eladimir Putin is istor-'s
3reatest Aor %atestB "onster. +f -ou're Estonian, %at1ian, %ithuanian, or e1en
Polish, -ou don't ,ant to rel- on British or 4rench or Spanish help if trouble
arises ,ith "osco,. You ,ant to make sure the #hite ouse is on -our side,
and -ou ,ant hotheads like Foe Biden and Fohn "c6ain calling for the United
States to do e1er-thing it can. So these states Aand countries like 3eorgiaB
spend a lot on lobb-ing politicians in #ashington in order to con1ince
$mericans to care as much about their homelands as the- do.
Unfortunatel-, the histor- of the past <) -ears tells us that the more
securit- Uncle Sam pro1ides to others, the less the recipients ,ill do for
themsel1es. 6on5rmed $tlanticists like the late Richard olbrooke liked to
sa- that the United States ,as a :European po,er,: but a momentar-
glance at the globe sho,s -ou that this is nonsense.
$merica is located in the #estern emisphere, folks, and the e2tent of its
interests in Europe depend on circumstances. #hen a peer competitor
emerges and threatens to dominate the continent, then $merica's 1ital
interests are full- engaged. #hen no such ri1al e2ists Aor ,hen potential
peer competitors are located else,hereB, U.S. interests are much reduced.
E1er-bod- kno,s or suspects this, of course, no matter ho, fer1entl- U.S.
oDcials proclaim their und-ing support for areas ,here fe, 1ital interests
reside.
So ,hat ,ill !$T. do at this ,eek's summit0 +t has alread- announced
plans for a ne, rapid&reaction force, and .bama has deli1ered a t-picall-
stirring speech pledging U.S. support for all the countries that managed to
get themsel1es into the alliance before an-one thought too hard about the
,isdom of this step. There ,ill be the usuall- pious declarations about
enhancing defense capabilities, and a ne, set of e2ercises ,ill be planned,
pro1ided the- don't cost too much. But e1entuall- the ,ar fe1er ,ill break,
and !$T. Europe ,ill return to its enfeebled militar- condition and
diplomatic disarra-.
"ean,hile, ,hat about Ukraine0 +n theor-, !$T. could make a real
contribution b- forming a united front in fa1or of genuine diplomac-,
something 3erman- seems especiall- eager to pursue. B- :diplomac-,: +
mean a process of principled but Ge2ible bargaining ,hose goal is to
resol1e the current crisis in a ,a- that gi1es the 1arious parties ,hat the-
most need, instead of tr-ing to obtain e1er-thing the- might occasionall-
dream about. That process has to begin b- recogni@ing that *B Russia sees
Ukraine's political alignment as a 1ital interest, (B it has 1arious cards to
pla- to ad1ance its goals, and HB it is ,illing to ,reck the countr- to pre1ent
it from ?oining the #est. You don't ha1e to like those facts && ,ho ,ould0 &&
but e7ecti1e statecraft must begin b- ackno,ledging unpleasant realities.
$s ,ith most diplomatic e7orts, the United States and Europe aren't going
to get e1er-thing the- ,ant and should concentrate instead on getting
,hat is most important.
$s +'1e said before, the best possible outcome here is an agreement that
reaDrms Ukraine's independence and so1ereignt-, ends the 5ghting,
remo1es an- Russian troops on Ukraine's territor-, and guarantees
Ukraine's status as a neutral bu7er state. The status of 6rimea is trickier,
and + fear it ,on't be possible to get Russia to disgorge it. #e ma- ha1e to
accept that change as the price Ukraine and the #est must pa- for ourprior
carelessness. To ad1ance the ball, !$T.'s leaders should support Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko ,hile simultaneousl- discouraging him from
upping his demands. +n particular, the- should make it clear that their
support is conditional on Ukraine cutting a reasonable deal. +t's a bit like the
conditional support the United States pro1ides to Tai,anI The United States
,ill defend that countr- if its independence is threatened b- e2ternal
militar- action, but all bets are o7 if Tai,an pro1okes trouble b- crossing
Bei?ing's :red lines.:
+s this a perfect result0 ardl-. But it is a lot better than prolonging the
crisis, ,hich ,ill damage the still&fragile EU econom-, poison East&#est
relations e1en further, and do further harm to Ukraine itself. + see little
e1idence that U.S. oDcials are thinking along these lines, but perhaps some
of $merica's European partners can con1ince them other,ise. +sn't that
,hat summit meetings are for0
*Correction, Sept. 5, 2014: NATOs inter!ention in "osnia happened in
1##5. An earlier !ersion o$ this article said the year %as 1##&. '(et)rn to
readin*.+
Photo b- $%$+! F.6$RJK$4PK3ett- +mages
Posted by Thavam