You are on page 1of 6

1

LIZELLE STEPHANIE K. LOPEZ,


Petitioner,

- versus -

RODOLFO C. LOPEZ /
COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents

x-------------------------------------------------x

RESPONDENTS POSITION PAPER

RESPONDENT, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
submits this Position Paper and avers the following:

PREFATORY STATEMENT
The protection of legitimate expectation is required by the
principles of fairness and justice -- as it shed light to citizen whose
legitimate right must be protected over anyone whose right is attained
through estoppel. If the legitimation is irregular, the rights of the
compulsory heir will necessary be prejudiced. Harsh as it is, however, it
is still the law and the quintessence of what the iron barrier is all about.

PARTIES
1. Respondent, RODOLFO C. LOPEZ is a Filipino citizen and of legal
age. He is a legitimate son of Miguel V. Lopez who died without
leaving a will.

2. Petitioner, LIZELLE STEPHANIE LOPEZ, is the child of Arturo Lopez
and Beatriz Kuan out of wedlock. Arturo and Rodolfo are brothers.

NATURE OF THE CASE
3. This position paper is a response to the Petition of Lizelle
Stephanie Lopez regarding her inclusion in the Distribution and Partition
of the Estate of Miguel Lopez.


STATEMENT OF FACTS
4. Miguel V. Lopez (Miguel) has four children namely: Rodolfo C.
Lopez (Rodolfo), Jemina Lopez-Syquico (Jemina), Alhambra Lopez
(Alhambra) and Joseph Lopez (Joseph). He also has a son, named
Arturo Lopez (Arturo), with his first wife. Arturo predeceased Miguel in
January 1978.

5. Miguel died in July 1999 in Davao City without leaving a will.
Respondent Rodolfo subsequently filed a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Miguel, The RTC, however,
appointed Jemina as Administrator of the estate and was issued
Letters of Administration.

2

6. On July 2, 2003 petitioner Lizelle Stephanie Lopez (Lizelle) filed a
Motion to be Included in the Distribution and Partition of the Estate of
Miguel. She was the daughter of Arturo and Beatriz Kuan, out of
wedlock. She claimed that she was treated like a(n) (estopped)
legitimate child despite not having been formally acknowledged
through any of the modes allowed by law. She claimed further that
they were allowed to live with the Lopez family and that Miguel also
provided for her educational and material needs.

7. The RTC, in its April 22, 2005 Order, declared Lizelle as the
acknowledged natural child or legitimated child of Arturo, for purposes
of determining her share in the estate of Miguel.

8. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Rodolfo, but the RTC
denied it in its March 6, 2008 Order. Rodolfo then elevated the case
before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

9. On January 21, 2013 the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
reversing and setting aside the Order of the RTC, stating that RTC erred
in declaring Lizelle as an acknowledged natural or legitimated child of
Arturo.

10. Upset by the decision of the CA, the Petitioner went into this
Honorable Court to seek reconsideration of her being legitimate heir,
which the Respondent strongly disagreed. Hence this case.
1


ISSUE
I. Whether or not Lizelle should be entitled
to the Distribution and Partition of the Estate of
Miguel.

II. Whether or not CA erred in deciding
that Lizelle is an illegitimate child of Arturo.


ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

We respectfully adopt our arguments that the petitioner is
not entitled to the Distribution and Partition of the Estate of Miguel.

Illegitimacy of the Petitioner

11. As a general rule, children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate (Art. 165, FC). The fact that the petitioner is
clearly born out of wedlock is clear and uncontestable.

12. Discontent by the provisions of Art 165, the Petitioner raised the
second paragraph of Art. 172 which states that:


1
Polished statement of facts of the case from Atty. Aguilar.
3

Art. 172. xxx In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(3) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(4) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.

Although the Lizelle assumes herself to legitimate through the
action and estoppel from the Respondents father, We the
Respondent note Art. 175 which clearly bars her from establishing
legitimacy, to wit:

Art. 175. xxx Except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Art. 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parents.

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged
parent. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance
to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be
given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he
or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."

13. The Petitioner based on her contention that she is a legitimate
child of Arturo and Beatriz Kuan, considering that both her parents
were not suffering from any impediment to marry each other at the
time she was conceived.

The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.
And when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
is no room for construction or interpretation only for application. Art.
178, Chapter 4 of the Family Code cites that legitimation shall take
place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents, which in case
of Lizelles parents, does not exist.

14. The State protects marriage as an inviolable social institution,
which is the foundation of the family (Sec. 2 Art XV, Const). The
sacredness of marriage cures any defect from illegitimacy. Lizelle,
having been born out of wedlock, is barred from protection of the
State in the case of Distribution and Partition of the said estate ab
intestato.

Distribution of Estate Ab Intestato

15. While the law as it now stands gives illegitimate children certain
successional rights, one provision continues to bar them from the full
right to succeed. This is Article 992, which provides that an illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Article 992
4

creates a so-called iron curtain between the legitimate and
illegitimate families.

16. Article 992 prohibits succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother. This means that Lizelle, clearly being illegitimate child
cannot inherit by right of representation from the legitimate relatives of
his illegitimate parent, and vice versa. Thus, an illegitimate child of one
who is himself a legitimate child cannot represent the latter in the
inheritance to his legitimate descendants (e.g. the illegitimate childs
legitimate half-sister) or other legitimate relatives (e.g. grandparents).
In the same manner, these legitimate relatives are prohibited from
succeeding intestate the illegitimate child.

17. This principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family applies only ab intestato, that is, in
intestate succession, where the decedent leaves no will. In the case at
bar, it is very well noted that Miguel Lopez died without leaving a last
will. In such a case, the law follows the presumed will of the
decedent. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. III,
Sixteenth Ed., 2008, pp. 456-457). Since the rule is predicated on the
presumed will of the decedent, it has no application on testamentary
dispositions, that is, where a person leaves a will.

18. The prohibition was applied in several cases, among them:
Anuran vs. Aquino[1918], Grey vs. Fabie[1939], Reose vs. Rabe[1941],
all holding that the illegitimate child cannot succeed to the estate of a
legitimate relative of the illegitimate parent. In Cacho vs. Udan [1965]
and Corpus vs. Corpus [1978], the reverse was true, that the legitimate
relatives of the parent cannot succeed the illegitimate child. This ruling
was applied even as to grandparents (Leonardo vs. CA, [1983],Diaz vs.
IAC [1990])

19. Ironically, the illegitimate child of an illegitimate parent is not so
barred. In Diaz vs. IAC, it was clarified that the determining factor is
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the
person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the
person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants
cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate
descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the
barrier imposed in Article 992.

20. Rationale for the Rule of Iron Curtain was explained thus: They
(the illegitimate child on the one hand), and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of the said illegitimate child on the
other) may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
5

condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground
of resentment. (Diaz vs. AC, citing 7 Manresa 110).

Sentiment abounds that this prohibition is unfair to the illegitimate
child, who is after all blameless for his status. Harsh as it is, however, it is
still the law. Dura lexsedlex.

21. This same law was also cited by the Supreme Court in the case
of Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890, 1983, in ruling that an
illegitimate child cannot inherit from his great grandparent for being an
illegitimate child.

22. Petitioner may argue Art. 970 of the NCC which states that: . . .
a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and degree of the person represented, and
acquires the right, which the latter would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited.

However this rule applies only to legitimate children. And since it
is established from the facts given that the Petitioner is an illegitimate
child, the law prohibiting illegitimate children to represent their fathers
share in the inheritance from his relatives shall apply.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed
that judgment be rendered against the petitioner declaring the
Petitioner as illegitimate child of Arturo and therefore should not be
included in distribution and partition of the estate of Miguel Lopez.

Quezon City, Philippines. 15 August 2014.
















6


New Era University JD Program
I JD B Group I
Diliman, Quezon City

By:

Florano, Rey Harold A. Torres, Mark Anthony A.
Main, Jessa O. Presbitero Jr., Josue C.
Tresmaria, Rosalie Francisco, Marissa
Concha Jr., Romulo V. Dulay, Decky Joy M.
Obnamia, Cithy Sarmiento, Elizabeth F.
Bulayungan Jr., Robert Frederick Kin Fajiculay M.
Baytic, Norie Sanchez, Gina C.
Aspili, Nery B. Obinay, Muhammedan L.
Dela Pea, Richard Gubalane Jr., Henry J.
Manuel, Sarah V. Roldan, Roland Raymond
Sabungan, Ryan






Copy Furnished:
LIZELLE LOPEZS GROUP II COUNSEL
ATTY. KATLYN ANNE C. AGUILLAR

You might also like