Iz: Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 2005.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
There is such a thing as responsibility for things one has not done;
one can be held liable for the. !ut there is no such thing as being
or feeling guilty for things that happened "ithout oneself acti#ely
participating in the. This is an iportant point, "orth a$ing
loudly and clearly at a oent "hen so any good "hite liberals
confess to guilt feelings "ith respect to the %egro &uestion. I do
not $no" ho" any precedents there are in history for such isplaced
feelings, but I do $no" that in post"ar 'erany, "here
siilar probles arose "ith respect to "hat had been done by the
Hitler regie to (e"s, the cry )*e are all guilty) that at first hearing
sounded so #ery noble and tepting has actually only ser#ed
to e+culpate to a considerable degree those "ho actually "ere
guilty. *here all are guilty, nobody is. 'uilt, unli$e responsibility,
al"ays singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act,
not to intentions or potentialities. It is only in a etaphorical sense
that "e can say "e feel guilty for the sins of our fathers or our
people or an$ind, in short, for deeds "e ha#e not done, although
the course of e#ents ay "ell a$e us pay for the. And since
sentients of guilt, mens rea or bad conscience, the a"areness of
"rong doing, play such an iportant role in our legal and oral
,udgent, it ay be "ise to refrain fro such etaphorical stateents
-./
"hich, "hen ta$en literally, can only lead into a phony sentientality
in "hich all real issues are obscured.
*e call copassion "hat I feel "hen soebody else suffers;
and this feeling is authentic only so long as I realize that it is, after
all, not I but soebody else "ho suffers. !ut it is true, I thin$, that
)solidarity is a necessary condition) for such eotions; "hich,
in our case of collecti#e guilt feelings "ould ean that the cry
)*e are all guilty) is actually a declaration of solidarity "ith the
"rongdoers.
I do not $no" "hen the ter )collecti#e responsibility) first
ade its appearance, but I a reasonably sure that not only the
ter but also the probles it iplies o"e their rele#ance and general
interest to political predicaents as distinguished fro legal
or oral ones. 0egal and oral standards ha#e one #ery iportant
thing in coon1they al"ays relate to the person and "hat
the person has done; if the person happens to be in#ol#ed in a
coon underta$ing as in the case of organized crie, "hat is to
be ,udged is still this #ery person, the degree of his participation,
his specific role, and so on, and not the group. The fact of his
ebership plays a role only insofar as it a$es his ha#ing coitted
a crie ore probable; and this is in principle not different
fro bad reputation or ha#ing a criinal record. *hether the
defendant "as a eber of the 2afia or a eber of the 33 or
soe other criinal or political organization, assuring us that he
"as a ere cog "ho acted only upon superior orders and did "hat
e#erybody else "ould ha#e done ,ust as "ell, the oent he
appears in a court of ,ustice he appears as a person and is ,udged
according to "hat he did. It is the grandeur of court proceedings
that e#en a cog can becoe a person again. And the sae sees
true to an e#en higher degree for oral ,udgent, for "hich the
e+cuse: 2y only alternati#e "ould ha#e led to suicide, is not as
binding as it is for legal proceedings. It is not a case of responsibility
but of guilt.
%o collective responsibility is in#ol#ed in the case of the thousand
e+perienced s"iers, lolling at a public beach and letting a
an dro"n in the sea "ithout coing to his help, because they
"ere no collecti#ity to begin "ith; no collecti#e responsibility is
in#ol#ed in the case of conspiracy to rob a ban$, because here the
fault is not #icarious; "hat is in#ol#ed are #arious degrees of
guilt. And if, as in the case of the postbellu 3outhern social syste,
only the )alienated residents) or the )outcasts) are innocent,
"e ha#e again a clear1cut case of guilt; for all the others ha#e
indeed done soething "hich is by no eans )#icarious.) 4These
three )cases) are ta$en fro the paper to "hich Arendt "as
responding.15d.6
T"o conditions ha#e to be present for collecti#e responsibility:
I ust be held responsible for soething I ha#e not done, and the
reason for y responsibility ust be y ebership in a group
7a collecti#e8 "hich no #oluntary act of ine can dissol#e, that is,
a ebership "hich is utterly unli$e a business partnership "hich
I can dissol#e at "ill. The &uestion of )contributory group fault)
ust be left in abeyance because e#ery participation is already
non#icarious. This $ind of responsibility in y opinion is al"ays
political, "hether it appears in the older for, "hen a "hole counity
ta$es it upon itself to be responsible for "hate#er one of
its ebers has done, or "hether a counity is being held
responsible for "hat has been done in its nae. The latter case is
of course of greater interest for us because it applies, for better
and "orse, to all political counities and not only to representati#e
go#ernent. 5#ery go#ernent assues responsibility for
the deeds and isdeeds of its predecessors and e#ery nation
for the deeds and isdeeds of the past. This is e#en true for re#olutionary
-.9
go#ernents "hich ay deny liability for contractual
agreeents their predecessors ha#e entered into. *hen %apoleon
!onaparte becae the ruler of :rance, he said: I assue responsibility
for e#erything :rance has done fro the tie of ;harleagne
to the terror of <obespierre. In other "ords, he said, all
this "as done in y nae to the e+tent that I a a eber of this
nation and the representati#e of this body politic. In this sense, "e
are al"ays held responsible for the sins of our fathers as "e reap
the re"ards of their erits; but "e are of course not guilty of
their isdeeds, either orally or legally, nor can "e ascribe their
deeds to our o"n erits.
*e can escape this political and strictly collecti#e responsibility
only by lea#ing the counity, and since no an can
li#e "ithout belonging to soe counity, this "ould siply
ean to e+change one counity for another and hence one
$ind of responsibility for another. It is true that the t"entieth century
has created a category of en "ho "ere truly outcasts,
belonging to no internationally recognizable counity "hate#er,
the refugees and stateless people, "ho indeed can not be held
politically responsible for anything. =olitically, regardless of their
group or indi#idual character, they are the absolutely innocent
ones; and it is precisely this absolute innocence that condens
the to a position outside, as it "ere, of an$ind as a "hole. If
there "ere such a thing as collecti#e, naely #icarious guilt, this
"ould be the case of collecti#e, naely, #icarious innocence.
Actually, they are the only totally nonresponsible people; and
"hile "e usually thin$ of responsibility, especially collecti#e
responsibility, as a burden and e#en as a $ind of punishent, I
thin$ it can be sho"n that the price paid for collecti#e nonresponsibility
is considerably higher.
-50
*hat I a dri#ing at here is a sharper di#iding line bet"een
political 7collecti#e8 responsibility, on one side, and oral and>or
legal 7personal8 guilt, on the other, and "hat I ha#e chiefly in
ind are those fre&uent cases in "hich oral and political considerations
and oral and political standards of conduct coe into
conflict. The ain difficulty in discussing these atters sees to
lie in the #ery disturbing abiguity of the "ords "e use in discussions
of these issues, to "it, orality or ethics. !oth "ords ean
originally no ore than custos or anners and then, in an ele#ated
sense, the custos and anners that are ost appropriate
for the citizen. :ro the Nicomachean Ethics to ;icero, ethics or
orals "ere part of politics, that part that dealt not "ith the institutions
but "ith the citizen, and all the #irtues in 'reece or
in <oe are definitely political #irtues. The &uestion is ne#er
"hether an indi#idual is good but "hether his conduct is good for
the "orld he li#es in. In the center of interest is the "orld and not
the self. *hen "e tal$ about oral &uestions, including the &uestion
of conscience, "e ean soething altogether different,
soething, as a atter of fact, for "hich "e don?t ha#e a readyade
"ord. @n the other hand, since "e use these ancient "ords
in our discussions, this #ery old and #ery different connotation is
al"ays present. There is one e+ception "here oral considerations
in our sense can be detected in a classical te+t, and that is the
3ocratic proposition )It is better to suffer "rong than to do
"rong,) "hich I shall ha#e to discuss in a oent. !efore doing
so, I "ould li$e to ention another difficulty "hich coes fro
the opposite side, as it "ere, naely fro the side of religion.
That oral atters concern such a thing as the "ell1being of a
soul rather than that of the "orld is of course part and parcel of
the Hebre"1;hristian heritage. If, for instance1to gi#e the ost
coon e+aple fro 'ree$ anti&uity1in Aeschylus @restes
$ills his other upon the strict coand of Apollo and is then,
-5-
ne#ertheless, haunted by the 5rinyes, it is the order of the "orld
that has t"ice been disturbed and ust be restored. @restes did
the right thing "hen he a#enged the death of his father and $illed
his other; and still he "as guilty because he had #iolated another
)taboo,) as "e "ould say today. The tragedy is that only aIA e#il
deed can pay bac$ the original crie, and the solution, as "e all
$no", is brought about by Athena or rather by the foundation of a
tribunal "hich fro no" on "ill ta$e it upon itself to aintain the
right order and lift the curse of an unending chain of e#ildoing
"hich "as necessary to aintain the order of the "orld. It is the
'ree$ #ersion of the ;hristian insight that e#ery resisting of the
e#il done in the "orld necessarily entails soe iplication in e#il,
and the solution of the predicaent for the indi#idual.
*ith the rise of ;hristianity, the ephasis shifted entirely
fro care for the "orld and the duties connected "ith it, to care
for the soul and its sal#ation. In the early centuries, the polarization
of the t"o "as absolute; the epistles in the %e" Testaent
are full of recoendations to shun public, political in#ol#eent
and to ind one?s o"n, strictly pri#ate business, caring for one?s
soul1until Tertullian sued up this attitude nec ulla magis res
aliena quam publica-"no atter is ore alien to us than "hat
atters publicly.) *hat "e e#en today understand by oral standards
aIB1d prescriptions has this ;hristian bac$ground. In presentday
thin$ing about these atters, the standards of strictness are
ob#iously the highest for oral atters, the lo"est for atters of
custos and anners, "hereas legal standards are soe"here in
bet"een. 2y point here is that orality o"es this high position
in our hierarchy of )#alues) to its religious origin; "hether the
di#ine la" prescribing the rules of huan conduct "as understood
to be directly re#ealed as in the Ten ;oandents or
indirectly as in natural la" notions is of no iportance in this conte+t.
-52
The rules "ere absolute because of their di#ine origin, and
their sanctions consisted in )future re"ards and punishents.) It
is ore than doubtful that these originally religiously rooted rules
of conduct can sur#i#e the loss of faith in their origin and, especially,
the loss of transcendent sanctions. 7(ohn Adas, in a
strangely prophetic "ay, predicted that this loss "ould )a$e
urder as indifferent as shooting plo#er, and the e+terination of
the <ohilla nation as innocent as the s"allo"ing of ites on a
orsel of cheese.)8 As far as I can see, there are but t"o of the
Ten ;oandents to "hich "e still feel orally bound, the
)Thou shalt not $ill) and the )Thou shalt not bear false "itness);
and these t"o ha#e recently been &uite successfully challenged by
Hitler and 3talin, respecti#ely.
In the center of oral considerations of huan conduct stands
the self; in the center of political considerations of conduct stands
the "orld. If "e strip oral iperati#es of their religious connotations
and origins, "e are left "ith the 3ocratic proposition "It
is better to suffer "rong than to do "rong,) and its strange substantiation,
):or it is better for e to be at odds "ith the "hole
"orld than, being one, to be at odds "ith yself.) Ho"e#er "e
ay interpret this in#ocation of the a+io of noncontradiction in
oral atters, as though the one and the sae iperati#e, )Thou
shalt not contradict yourself,) is a+ioatic for logic and ethics
7"hich incidentally is still Cant?s chief arguent for the categorical
iperati#e8, one thing sees clear: the presupposition is that I
li#e together not only "ith others but also "ith y self, and that
this togetherness, as it "ere, has precedence o#er all others. The
political ans"er to the 3ocratic proposition "ould be )*hat is
iportant in the "orld is that there be no "rong; suffering "rong
and doing "rong are e&ually bad.) %e#er ind "ho suffers it;
your duty is to pre#ent it. @r, to in#o$e for bre#ity?s sa$e another
-5D
faous saying, this tie of 2achia#elli "ho precisely for this reason
"anted to teach princes )ho" not to be good): "riting about
:lorentine patriots "ho had dared to defy the pope, he praised
the because they had sho"n )ho" uch higher they placed their
city than their souls.) *here religious language spea$s of the soul,
secular language spea$s of the self.
There are any "ays in "hich political and oral standards of
conduct can coe into conflict "ith each other, and in political
theory they are usually dealt "ith in connection "ith the reasonof1
state doctrine and its so1called double standard of orality.
*e are here concerned "ith only one special case, "ith the case
of collecti#e and #icarious responsibility in "hich the eber of
a counity is held responsible for things he did not participate
in but "hich "ere done in his nae. 3uch nonparticipation can
ha#e any causes: the for of go#ernent of the country ay
be such that its inhabitants, or large strata of the, are not aditted
to the public real at all so that nonparticipation is not a atter
of choice. @r, on the contrary, in free countries a certain group
of citizens ay not "ant to participate, to ha#e anything to do
"ith politics, but not for oral reasons but siply because they
ha#e chosen to ta$e ad#antage of one of our liberties, the one usually
not entioned "hen "e count our freedos because it is
so uch ta$en for granted, and that is freedo fro politics. This
freedo "as un$no"n in anti&uity, and it has been &uite effecti#ely
abolished in a nuber of t"entieth1century dictatorships,
especially of course in the totalitarian #ariety. In contrast to absolutis
and other fors of tyranny, "here nonparticipation "as
a atter of course and not of choice, "e deal here "ith a situation
"here participation, and that as "e $no" can ean coplicity
in criinal acti#ities, is a atter of course, and nonparticipation
a atter of decision. And "e ha#e finally the case in free countries
-5.
"here nonparticipation is actually a for of resistance1as in the
case of those "ho refuse to be drafted into the "ar in Eietna.
This resistance is often argued on oral grounds; but so long
as there is freedo of association and "ith it the hope that resistance
in the for of refusal to participate "ill bring about a change
of policy, it is essentially political. *hat is in the center of consideration
is not the self1I don?t go because I don?t "ant to dirty y
hands, "hich, of course, ay also be a #alid arguent1but the
fate of the nation and its conduct to"ard other nations in the
"orld.
%onparticipation in the political affairs of the "orld has al"ays
been open to the reproach of irresponsibility, of shir$ing one?s
duties to"ard the "orld "e share "ith one another and the counity
"e belong to. And this reproach is by no eans successfully
countered if nonparticipation is argued on oral grounds.
*e $no" fro recent e+periences that acti#e and soeties
heroic resistance to e#il go#ernents coes uch rather fro
en and "oen "ho participated in the than fro outsiders
"ho "ere innocent of any guilt. This is true, as a rule "ith e+ceptions,
for the 'eran resistance against Hitler and is e#en truer
for the fe" cases of rebellion against counist regies. Hungary
and ;zechoslo#a$ia are cases in point. @tto Circhheier,
discussing these atters fro a legal #ie"point 7in his Political
Justice), rightly stressed that for the &uestion of legal or oral
innocence, naely absence of any coplicity in cries coitted
by a regie, )acti#e resistance) "ould be an )illusory yardstic$,
"ithdra"al fro significant participation in public life, ...
"illingness to disappear into obli#ion) and obscurity )is a standard
"hich ay be rightfully iposed by those sitting in ,udgeent)
7pp. DD- f8. !y the sae to$en, though, he soeho" ,ustifies those
defendants "ho said that their sense for responsibility did not perit
-55
the to choose this "ay; that they ser#ed in order to pre#ent
"orse, etc.1arguents, "hich, to be sure, in the case of the
Hitler regie sounded rather absurd and indeed usually "ere not
uch ore than hypocritical rationalizations of an ardent desire
to pursue one?s career, but that is another atter. *hat is true is
that the nonparticipants "ere not resisters and that they did not
belie#e that their attitude had any political conse&uences.
*hat the oral arguent, "hich I &uoted in the for of the
3ocratic proposition, actually says is the follo"ing: If I "ould do
"hat is no" deanded of e as the price of participation, either
as ere conforis or e#en as the only chance of e#entually successful
resistance, I could no longer li#e "ith yself; y life
"ould cease to be "orth"hile for e. Hence, I uch rather suffer
"rong no", and e#en pay the price of a death penalty in case I a
forced to participate, than do "rong and then ha#e to li#e together
"ith such a "rongdoer. If it is a &uestion of $illing, the arguent
"ould not be that the "orld "ould be better off "ithout the urder
being done, but the un"illingness to li#e "ith an assassin.
This arguent, it sees to e, is unans"erable fro e#en the
strictest political point of #ie", but it is clearly an arguent "hich
can be #alid only in e+tree, that is, in arginal situations. It is
often such situations "hich are ost apt to bring clarification into
other"ise rather obscure and e&ui#ocal atters. The arginal
situation in "hich oral propositions becoe absolutely #alid in
the real of politics is ipotence. =o"erlessness "hich al"ays
presupposes isolation is a #alid e+cuse for doing nothing. The
trouble "ith this arguent is of course that it is entirely sub,ecti#e;
its authenticity can be deonstrated only by the "illingness
to suffer. There are no general rules, as in legal proceedings,
"hich could be applied and "hich "ould be #alid for all. !ut this,
I a afraid, "ill be the bane of all oral ,udgents "hich are not
-5F
supported by or deri#ed fro religious coands. 3ocrates, as "e
$no", "as ne#er able to pro#e his proposition; and Cant?s categorical
iperati#e, the only copetitor as a strictly nonreligious
and nonpolitical oral prescription, cannot be pro#ed either. The
e#en deeper trouble "ith the arguent is that it is applicable only
to people "ho are used to li#ing e+plicitly "ith thesel#es, "hich
is only another "ay of saying that its #alidity "ill be plausible
only to en "ho ha#e a conscience; and, the pre,udices of ,urisprudence
that so often in perple+ity appeal to conscience as soething
e#ery sane an ust ha#e not"ithstanding, the e#idence
is that &uite a nuber of en ha#e it, but by no eans all, and
that those "ho ha#e it can be found in all "al$s of life and, ore
specifically, "ith all degrees of education and noneducation. %o
ob,ecti#e sign of social or educational standing can assure its presence
or absence.
The only acti#ity that sees to correspond to these secular
oral propositions and to #alidate the is the acti#ity of thin$ing,
"hich in its ost general, entirely nonspecialized sense can be
defined "ith =lato as the silent dialogue bet"een e and yself.
If applied to atters of conduct, the faculty of iagination "ould
be in#ol#ed in such thought to a high degree, that is, the ability
to represent, to a$e present to yself "hat is still absent any
conteplated deed. To "hat e+tent this faculty of thought,
"hich is e+ercised in solitude, e+tends into the strictly political
sphere, "here I a al"ays together "ith others, is another &uestion.
-5/
!ut "hate#er our ans"er to this &uestion, "hich "e hope
"ill be ans"ered by political philosophy, ight turn out to be, no
oral, indi#idual and personal, standards of conduct "ill e#er
be able to e+cuse us fro collecti#e responsibility. This #icarious
responsibility for things "e ha#e not done, this ta$ing upon
oursel#es the conse&uences for things "e are entirely innocent of,
is the price "e pay for the fact that "e li#e our li#es not by oursel#es
but aong our fello" en, and that the faculty of action,
"hich, after all, is the political faculty par e+cellence, can be actualized
only in one of the any and anifold fors of huan
counity.