NICORP vs. De Leon GR No.

176942
FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Decision of the CA finding respondent De Leon as a bona fide
tenant of the subject property. Respondent filed a complaint praying that petitioners Lim and/or NICORP
Management and Devt Corp.be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite
registered to the De Leon sisters, who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit. Respondent
alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land with full knowledge of the owners, who were
her sisters-in-law. Petitioner denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject property and alleged that
respondent is no longer physically capable of tilling the land. Respondent submitted evidences to prove that
she was made a tenant of the land as well as the agricultural activities of respondent and her family. However,
a Decision was rendered dismissing the complaint for failure of resp.to prove by substantial evidence all the
requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship. On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of DARAB stating
that there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition from petitioners Lim and NICORP.
ISSUE: WON occupancy and continued possession of the land makes one a de jure tenant.
HELD: NO. The respondent being allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not mean that
the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with respondent. The principal
factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but is a legal relationship. Thus, the
intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more important.
There is a tenancy relationship if the ff.essential elements concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.


DAR vs. PCPC GR No. 168787
FACTS: In the late 1990s, respondent sought to convert its 280 hectares of its coconut plantation into a special
economic zone. The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands into mixed
residential, commercial and industrial lands. Sometime in 2003, petitioner DAR notified PCPI that a portion of
the Polo estate had been placed under the CARP and would be acquired by the government. PCPI filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA asserting that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo
estate under the CARP. In its Feb. 16, 2005 decision, CA found that Polo estate was no longer agricultural land
when the DAR placed it under CARP. The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate did not place
it beyond the reach of CARP.
ISSUE: WON the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP.
HELD: NO. Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary. He determines whether the tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP. Likewise, questions
regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries must be addressed to him. The DAR Sec.decides to whom lands
placed under CARP shall be distributed.
In another decision rendered by the Court, it was held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the
process of conversion in the DAR before they may be used for other purposes. Since the DAR never approved
the conversion of the Polo estate from agricultural to another use, the land was never placed beyond the
scope of the CARP. The approval of the DAR of the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial estate is a
condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. A proposed ecozone cannot be considered for
Presidential Proclamation unless the landowner first submits to PEZA (Phil.Economic Zone Authority) a land
use conversion clearance certificate from DAR. This PCPCI failed to do.
Manubay v. Hon. Garilao GR No. 140717
FACTS: Petitioners owned a 124-hectare land in Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the property under the comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice and filed an application at the DAR for
conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution
approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from
agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners
requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the
land had been reclassified and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was
denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have been
lifted first either because of retention or exemption. Respondent denied petitioners application for
conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application

ISSUE: WON the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition for certiorari.

HELD: Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of
the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him.
Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP
and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner must
show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public respondent
patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the
public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR

FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27,
1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President.
This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the CARL of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June
10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the
laws effectively, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS]
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through
its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.
As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway
from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520
reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE INCAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application
for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance
of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its
pending application notwithstanding, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the
farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15,
1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application
for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis
of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994 which states that all lands already
classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion
clearance from the DAR.

ISSUE:WON PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.s three
haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

HELD: PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including
Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities
as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted their
use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the
sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct
of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why
the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are.
The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order, the application for CARP exemption
of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific
geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas.
Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the
areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No.
7,Series of 2004,came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that B. Proclamations declaring
general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that
merely:(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands, or peninsulas to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the
task to identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to
coordinate said areas development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the
general area declared as tourist zone and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas
development; could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area
declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation into some
specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec. 20, Local Government
Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan."

Lantican v. CA GR No. 97929
FACTS: Marcos de la Pea died leaving behind him his wife, the private respondent , daughter and his
common law wife, the petitioner. At the time of his death, he was a tenant on a Riceland owned by one Rufina
Lim and was about to be issued a Cert. of Land Transfer. Lim chose the private respondent as the successor to
the land to which the petitioners opposed. However, the DAR ruled that private resp.had the sole right to be
the beneficiary of the Cert. of Land Transfer. Petitioners filed a motion to set aside the above order on the
ground that, not only is it contrary to the actual facts relative to the land in question but it is not supported by
the evidence and the applicable law. This motion was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that DAR has no jurisdiction over the case. Motion was once again denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners having invoked the jurisdiction of the DAR are now stopped from assailing such
lack of jurisdiction
HELD: YES. In a case decided by the Court, it was held that once a party to a case submits to the jurisdiction of
the Court and participates in the trial on the merits of the case, he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment
unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn about and say that the condition precedent of compliances with PD
1508.
Machete v. CA GR No. 109093
FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the RTC of
Tagbilaran City against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are: 1) that parties entered into a leasehold
agreement regarding private respondents landholdings and herein petitioners shall pay a certain amount or
percentage of their harvest; 2) that herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental despite repeated
demands of private respondent; and 3) that petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, arguing that the instant case is an agrarian dispute and therefore
within the jurisdiction of DARAB.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over cases for the collection of black rentals from leasehold tenants.
HELD: The Court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants is within the jurisdiction of DARAB
and the SC defined agrarian dispute as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture , including disputes
concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining ,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial agreements.
The SC further averred that failure to pay back rentals to leasehold contract is an issue which is clearly beyond
the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve the controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Sebastian v. Morales GR No. 141116
FACTS: Private respondents are the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate on June 27, 1986.
During his lifetime, Guillermo owned agricultural landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap Sur,
Cabanatuan City. In addition to the foregoing properties, Guillermo was also the registered owner of a parcel
of agricultural land located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of 4.9993 hectares, which
was tenanted by Manuel Valentin and Wenceslao Peneyra. The tenants tilling the farm lots had already been
issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Private respondents filed an application with the DAR
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, for retention of over five hectares of the late Guillermos
landholdings. Among the lots which private respondents sought to retain under Section 6 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)On June 6, 1997, the DAR Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga granted private respondents application. Petitioner Sebastian moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing order before the DAR Regional Director. The DAR Regional Director found
that the order was contrary to law for violating Section 6 of RA No. 6657 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. He then issued a new order dated October 23, 1997, which instead allowed private respondents
to retain a parcel of land with an area of 4.9993 hectares, covered by TCT No. 143564, located at San Ricardo,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Private respondents then appealed the order of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner Sebastian
then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion was denied by the DAR Secretary. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition is valid and proper.
HELD: NO. Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are
governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial
review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong
mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. Therefore,
we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure
of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal. Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated December 10, 1999, is
AFFIRMED.