Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein Antisystemic Movements 1989

Antisystemic Movements
GIOVANNI ARRIGHI,
TERENCE K. HOPKINS &
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
VERSO
First publ i s hed by Verso 1989
1989 Gi ovanni Arri ghi , Te r e n c e K. Hopki ns & I mma nue l Wal l er st ei n
All ri ght s reserved
Verso
UK: 6 Me a r d St reet , London VV1V 3 HR
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Verso i s t he i mpr i nt of Ne w Left Books
British Li br ar y Cat al ogui ng i n Publ i cat i on Dat a
Arri ghi , Gi ovanni
Ant i syst emi c movement s
1. Economi c condi t i ons. Soci ol ogi cal perspect i ves
I. Ti t l e. II. Hopki ns, Ter ence III. Wal l erst ei n,
I mma n u e l 1930-
306' . 3
I SBN 0-86091-249-3
I SBN 0-86091-964-1 Pbk
Typeset by Leaper & Car d Lt d, Bristol, Engl and
Pri nt ed in Gr eat Britain by Bookcraft (Bat h) Ltd
To our colleagues, in memonam:
Aqui no de Bragan^a
Rut h First
Georges Ha upt
Wal t er Rodney
Contents
Acknowl edgement s ix
I nt r oduct i on 1
1 Ret hi nki ng the Concept s of Class and
St at us- Gr oup in a Worl d-Syst ems Perspective 3
2 Di l emmas of Ant i syst emi c Movement s 29
3 The Li berat i on of Class Struggle? 53
4 1886-1986: Beyond Haymar ket ? 77
5 1968: The Great Rehearsal 97
References 117
Index 119
Acknowledgements
Thi s set of essays is t he fruit of a col l aborat i on of many
years and pri mari l y of our j oi nt participation in t he annual
Int ernat i onal Col l oqui a on t he Wor l d- Economy sponsored
by t he Fer nand Braudel Cent er for t he St udy of Economi es,
Historical Systems, and Civilizations; t he Mai son des
Sciences de L' Homme ; and t he St ar nber ger Institut zur
Erforschung Gl obal en St rukt uren, Ent wi ckl ungen, und
Kri sen. The first four essays were present ed respectively at
t he IVth Col l oqui um, New Delhi, J a nua r y 4 - 6 1982;
t he Vl t h Col l oqui um, Paris, J u n e 4 - 5 1984; t he Vl l t h
Col l oqui um, Dakar, Ma y 20- 22 1985; and t he VHI t h
Col l oqui um, Modena, J u n e 14-16, 1986. The last paper
was given at t he Xl l t h Political Economy of t he Wor l d-
System Conference, held at Emor y University, At l ant a,
Mar ch 24- 26 1988.
All five essays have been previously publ i shed and are
repri nt ed with permi ssi on; Essay 1 - Review, VI 3, Wi nt er
1983; Essay 2 - Social Research, LIII 1, Spri ng 1986; Essay 3
- Review, X 3, Wi nt er 1987; Essay 4 - Review, XI I 2,
Spri ng 1989; Essay 5 - in T. Boswell, ed., Revolution in the
World-System, Gr eenwood Press, West port , CT, 1989.
ix
Introduction
The concept of antisystemic movement s is one whi ch
pr esumes an analytic perspective about a system. Th e
syst em referred to here is t he worl d-syst em of historical
capitalism whi ch, we argue, has given rise to a set of anti-
systemic movement s. It is t he cont ours of this process t hat
we are proposi ng to out l i ne here. We are in search of t he
system-wide st ruct ural processes t hat have produced certain
kinds of movement s and which have si mul t aneousl y f or med
t he constraints within which such movement s have
operat ed.
The movement s have had t hei r own mode of self-
description. Thi s self-description emerged largely out of
categories that were f or mul at ed or crystallized in t he
ni net eent h-cent ury capitalist worl d-economy. Class and
st at us-group were t he two key concepts t hat j ust i fi ed these
movement s, expl ai ned their origins and t hei r objectives,
and i ndeed i ndi cat ed t he boundar i es of t hei r organi zat i onal
networks.
The cont empor ar y di l emmas of t hese movement s are
part and parcel of the same pr obl em as the di l emmas of the
concept s of class and st at us-group. That is why we felt t hat
1
we could not anal yze t he movement s, either historically or
prospectively, wi t hout first ret hi nki ng t hese two concepts
from a world-systems perspective.
We shall not repeat in this i nt roduct i on t he ar gument s
t hat ar e t o be found i n t he articles. We woul d merely like t o
suggest t hat if t he st ruct ural processes t hat gave bi rt h to
these movement s have been world-scale from t he begin-
ning, t he organi zat i onal responses hi t hert o have been
predomi nant l y at t he level of t he various states. It is because
we believe t hat new organi zat i onal responses will begin to
surface t hat will be mor e world-scale t hat we think it
urgent , not only for t heory but for praxis, to reexami ne t he
pat t erns and t he degree of success of t he worl d-syst em' s
ant i syst emi c movement s heretofore.
2
1
Rethinking the Concepts of
Class and Status-Group in a
World-Systems Perspective
In his well-known but oft en neglected concl usi on to Book I
of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smi t h defi ned the interests
of "the t hree great, original and const i t uent orders of every
civilized society," that is, t hose who live by rent, t hose who
live by wages, and those who live by profit (1961: I, 276).
His ar gument was t hat t he interests of t he first t wo orders
coincide with t he general interest of society because,
accordi ng to his analysis, t he real value of bot h rents and
wages rises wi t h t he prosperity and falls wi t h t he economi c
decl i ne of society. Th e interests of profit earners, on t he
ot her hand, ar e different from, and even opposi t e to, such
general social interest, because t o wi den t he mar ket and t o
nar r ow t he compet i t i on are always in t he interest of
mer chant s and manuf act ur er s. And, while t o "wi den t he
market may frequent l y be agreeabl e enough t o t he interest
of t he publ i c; . . . t o nar r ow t he compet i t i on must always be
against it, and can serve only t he dealers, by raising t hei r
profits above what they nat ural l y woul d be, to levy, for t hei r
own benefit, an absur d tax upon t he rest of t hei r fellow-
citizens" (1961:1, 278).
Profit-earners not only have an interest cont rary to t he
3
general one. They also have a better knowl edge of their
interest and a greater power and det er mi nat i on in pur sui ng
i t t han those who live by either r ent or wages. Th e i ndo-
lence of l andowners, "which is the nat ur al effect of the ease
and security of their situation, renders t hem too often, not
only i gnorant , but i ncapabl e of that appl i cat i on of mi nd
whi ch is necessary in order to foresee and under st and the
consequences of any publ i c regul at i on" (1961: I, 276-7). As
for t he wage-earner, "he is i ncapabl e ei t her of compr ehend-
ing the general social interest, or of under st andi ng its
connect i on with his own" (1961: I, 277). Moreover, in the
publ i c deliberations, "his voice is little hear d and less
regarded, except upon some part i cul ar occasions, when his
cl amour is ani mat ed, set on, and suppor t ed by his
empl oyers, not for his, but t hei r own part i cul ar purposes"
(1961: I, 277). Profit-earners, on t he ot her hand, particularly
those who empl oy the largest amount of capital, draw to
themselves by their weal t h t he greatest share of t he publ i c
consi derat i on. Moreover, since dur i ng t hei r whol e lives they
are engaged in plans and projects, they have a mor e acute
under st andi ng of their part i cul ar interest t han the ot her
orders of society.
The Wealth of Nations bei ng a work of legislation, the
pur pose of this "class analysis" was to warn the sovereign
against the dangers involved in following t he advice and
yielding to the pressures of mer chant s and mast er manu-
facturers. As the head of the nat i onal househol d, he shoul d
instead st rengt hen t he rule of t he mar ket over civil society,
thereby achieving the doubl e objective of a mor e efficient
public admi ni st rat i on and a greater well-being of t he
nat i on.
It is not our pur pose here to assess t he soundness of t he
advice given by Smi t h to t he nat i onal househol der or of the
substantive analysis on which it was based. Rat her , we want
to point out those aspects of his analysis t hat can be con-
sidered as paradi gmat i c of political economy and t hat we
4
Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group
can find dupl i cat ed in cont empor ar y class analyses.
First, t he tripartite social order of which he spoke was a
predi cat e of a part i cul ar ki nd of society; t hat defi ned by the
territorial reach of a definite sovereign or state. These were
the states of Eur ope as they had been and were bei ng
formed wi t hi n mut ual l y exclusive domai ns operat i ng wi t hi n
an interstate system.
Second, his social orders (or classes) were defi ned on the
basis of propert y relations. The ownershi p of l and, of capi-
tal, and of l abor-power define his t hree great orders of
society. Among t he propri et ors of capital, what some t oday
woul d call a "fraction" of capital ( mer chant s and mast er
manuf act ur er s) is singled out for special t r eat ment in view
of its pol i t i cal -economi c power, of its greater self-awareness
of its own interests, and of the opposi t i on of its interests to
the general social well-being.
Thi r d, t he interests of each of t he social orders/ cl asses
were identified with its mar ket situation; t hat is, bot h their
competitive opport uni t i es in relation to each ot her as classes
(and of individuals within each class to each other), and the
costs and benefits to each of t hem of monopol y power
within market s, under st ood as restriction of ent ry. In The
Wealth of Nations, Smi t h limited the subjective gr ound of
collective action by a class to t hese market interests.
Monopol y power in the pr oduct as well as in factor market s
was traced back to the creation of t ol erance of restrictions to
entry on t he part of the soverei gn/ st at e.
Four t h, mar ket relations were defi ned within or bet ween
nat i onal economi c spaces. Class conflicts and al i gnment s
were t hus limited to struggles within each state for
i nfl uence/ cont rol over its policies. The uni t of analysis, in
ot her words, was t he nat i on-st at e, whi ch det er mi ned bot h
t he context and the object of class cont radi ct i ons.
Fifth, a "relative aut onomy" of state actions in relation to
class interests and powers was pr esupposed. The enact ment
of laws and regul at i ons by the st at e was cont i nuousl y traced
77
to the powers and influence of part i cul ar classes or
"fractions" thereof. But the sovereign was assumed to be in
a position to di st ance himself from any part i cul ar interest to
pr omot e some form of general interest, reflecting a nd/ or
generat i ng a consensus for this general interest.
If we contrast this analytical framework with t hat asso-
ciated with Kar l Mar x' s critique of political economy (that is,
of Smi t h and ot her classical economists), we notice two
consequent i al shifts of focus: a shift away from state-defined
economi c spaces t o worl d-economi c space on the one hand,
and a shift away from t he market pl ace to t he workpl ace on
the ot her.
The fi rst shift implied t hat t he mar ket was no longer seen
as enclosed within (or "embedded" in) each nat i on-st at e as
an i ndependent economi c space, and t hat the world-
economy was no longer conceived of as an interstate
economy linking discrete nat i onal economi c spaces. Rat her,
nation-states were seen as j uri sdi ct i onal claims in a uni t ary
worl d market . By effecting the socialization of labor on a
world scale, the world market det er mi ned the most general
context of the class cont radi ct i ons and t herefore of the class
struggles of capitalist society, whi ch Mar x defi ned by its
constitutive orders, t he bourgeoisie and t he proletariat:
The moder n history of capital dat es f r om the creat i on in t he
sixteenth cent ury of a wor l d- embr aci ng commer ce and world-
embr aci ng mar ket (1959: 146).
Thi s mar ket has given an i mmens e devel opment t o
commer ce, to navigation, to communi cat i on by l and. This
devel opment has, in its t urn, react ed on t he ext ensi on of
i ndust ry; and i n proport i on as i ndust ry, commer ce, navi-
gation, railways ext ended, i n t he same pr opor t i on t he bour -
geoisie devel oped, i ncreased its capital, and pus hed into t he
backgr ound every class handed down from t he Mi ddl e Ages
(1967: 81).
Thi s was not a mer e mat t er of trade relations bet ween
sovereign states. Rat her, t he developing bourgeoi si e
6
compel s all nations, on pai n of extinction, to adopt t he bour -
geois modes of pr oduct i on; it compel s t hem to i nt r oduce what
it calls civilization into t hei r mi dst , i.e., to become bourgeoi si e
themselves. In one word, it creat es a worl d aft er its own i mage
(1967: 84).
The world so created was charact eri zed by a highly strati-
fied st ruct ure of domi nat i on and had mor e t han mar ket
interests as subjective gr ounds for collective act i on:
Just as it has made t he count ry dependent on t he t owns, so it
has made bar bar i an and semi - bar bar i an count ri es dependent
on the civilized ones, nat i ons of peasant s on nat i ons of bour -
geois, t he East on the West (1967: 84).
The second shift i mpl i ed t hat the ant agoni sm bet ween the
two great classes into which, accordi ng to Mar x, bourgeoi s
society as a whol e t ends to split, the bourgeoi si e and the
proletariat, was no longer traced to relations in the pr oduct
or factor mar ket s but to relations in pr oduct i on. In or der to
defi ne the interests of the nat i on and of its component
classes, Smi t h took leave of t he pin factory whose scenario
opens The Wealth of Nations to follow t he interplay of supply
and demand in the market pl ace, and of class interests in the
nat i onal political arena. Mar x in his critique of political
economy took us in the opposite direction. We take leave
not of the shopfloor but of the noisy sphere of the market -
place (and, we may add, of t he political arena) "where
everything takes place on the surface and in view of all
men, " and follow the owner of the means of pr oduct i on and
the possessor of l abor power "i nt o the hi dden abode of
product i on, on whose t hreshol d t here stares us in the face
' No admi t t ance except on busi ness' " (1959: 176). In this
hi dden abode of product i on, Mar x discovered t wo qui t e
cont radi ct ory tendencies t hat i mpl i ed two quite different
scenarios of class struggle and social t r ansf or mat i on.
Th e first was t he one generally emphasi zed i n Marxi st
77
/
l i t erat ure after Mar x: even if we assume t hat in t he
mar ket pl ace t he rel at i onshi p bet ween t he owners of t he
means of pr oduct i on and t he owners of l abor-power
appears as a rel at i onshi p bet ween equal s, in t he sense that
t he commodi t i es they bri ng t o t he mar ket t end t o exchange
at t hei r full cost of pr oduct i on/ r epr oduct i on (which, of
course, is not always or even normal l y t he case), t he
rel at i onshi p woul d still be a f undament al l y unequal one.
Thi s is so because of t he l onger-run effects of capitalist
pr oduct i on on t he relative value and t he relative bargai ni ng
power of capital and labor. Capitalist pr oduct i on, t hat is, is
seen as a process t hat t ends to r educe t he value of labor-
power (its real costs of reproduct i on) and si mul t aneousl y to
under mi ne t he bargai ni ng power of its possessors, so t hat
t he advant ages of t he reduct i on of labor' s costs of repro-
duct i on tend to accrue entirely to capital.
Thi s t endency obviously poses pr obl ems of realization of
t he growing mass of surpl us l abor t hat capital appropri at es
i n pr oduct i on. Thes e pr obl ems periodically mani fest t hem-
selves in crises of overproduct i on t hat are overcome on t he
one hand
by enforced dest ruct i on of a mass of product i ve forces; on t he
ot her, by conquest of new market s, and by the mor e t hor ough
expl oi t at i on of t he old ones. Tha t is to say, by pavi ng t he way
for mor e dest ruct i ve crises, and by di mi ni shi ng t he means
wher eby crises are prevent ed (1967: 86).
It woul d seem from the above t hat t he unequal relation
bet ween labor and capital, cont i nuousl y r epr oduced and
enhanced in t he workpl ace, leads capital either to self-
dest ruct i on in the mar ket pl ace or to a greater devel opment
of t he worl d-economy, bot h extensively (i ncorporat i ons)
and intensively. Given a finite globe, t he mor e t hor ough this
devel opment , t he greater t he self-destructiveness of capital.
In t hi s scenario l abor plays no role in preci pi t at i ng capi-
talist crises except in a negative sense; it is its growing
8
subordi nat i on i n the workplace, and consequent weakeni ng
of bargai ni ng power in t he market pl ace, t hat are ultimately
responsi bl e for t he out break of t he "epi demi c of over-
product i on, " as Mar x called it. Labor, or its social personifi-
cation, t he proletariat, plays an active role only in
t ransformi ng the self-destructiveness of capital into political
revolution. The increasing precari ousness of worki ng and
living conditions i nduces prol et ari ans to form combi nat i ons
against t he bourgeoisie.
Now and t hen the workers are victorious, but only for a t i me.
The real fruit of their bat t l es lies, not in the i mmedi at e result,
but i n t he ever-expandi ng uni on of t he workers . . . .
Thi s organi zat i on of the prol et ari ans i nt o a class, and conse-
quent l y into a political part y, is cont i nuousl y bei ng upset
agai n by the compet i t i on bet ween the workers themselves. But
i t ever rises up agai n, st ronger, fi rmer, mi ght i er . . . .
Al t oget her collisions bet ween the classes of t he old society
f ur t her , in many ways, the course of devel opment of t he pro-
letariat. The bourgeoi si e finds itself involved in a const ant
bat t l e. At first with the aristocracy; later on, wi t h t hose
port i ons of t he bourgeoi si e itself, whose interests have become
ant agoni st i c to t he progress of i ndust ry; at all times, with t he
bourgeoi si e of foreign count ri es. In all these bat t l es it sees itself
compel l ed to appeal to t he prol et ari at , to ask for its hel p, and
t hus, to dr ag it into the political ar ena (1967: 90).
Al ongsi de this scenario, however, as we i ndi cat ed, Mar x
suggested anot her one, qui t e distinct in its unfol di ng. Bot h
in t he Manifesto and in Capital we ar e told t hat , along with
t he growing mass of misery, oppressi on, and degradat i on,
t he st rengt h of t he worki ng class grows too, not so muc h as
a result of political organi zat i on ai med at count eract i ng its
st ruct ural weakness, but rat her as a result of t he very
process of capitalist product i on.
Al ong wi t h the const ant l y di mi ni shi ng numbe r of t he mag-
nat es of capital . . . grows t he mass of mi sery, oppressi on,
9
slavery, degradat i on, exploitation, but with this too grows the
revolt of t he working-class, a class always i ncreasi ng in
number s , and disciplined, uni t ed, organi zed by, the very
mechani sm of t he process of capitalist pr oduct i on itself (1959:
763).
The essential condi t i on for t he existence, and for t he sway of
t he bour geoi s class, is t he format i on and augment at i on of capi-
tal; the condi t i on for capi t al is wage l abor. Wage l abor rests
exclusively on compet i t i on bet ween t he laborers. The advance
of i ndust ry, whose i nvol unt ary pr omot er is the bourgeoisie,
replaces the isolation of t he laborers, due to compet i t i on, by
t hei r revol ut i onary combi nat i on, due t o association. The
devel opment of Moder n Indust ry, t herefore, cut s f r om under
its feet the very f oundat i on on whi ch t he bourgeoi si e pr oduces
and appr opr i at es pr oduct s (1967: 934).
Here, therefore, the st rengt heni ng of l abor in the workpl ace
is t he cause of t he crisis of capital.
As we know, Ma r x never managed t o reconcile t hese t wo
cont radi ct ory t endenci es t hat he discovered in t he abode of
product i on, let al one to work out fully and systematically all
their implications for t he analysis of class cont radi ct i ons in
capitalist society. Inst ead, Marx, in some of his historical
writings, and many followers in their theoretical writings,
gave up t he cri t i que of political economy and reverted to t he
Smi t hi an par adi gm of class analysis, reviving rat her t han
carrying out t he cri t i que of political economy.
In t he case of Mar x, this retreat is most evident in his
writings on t he class struggle in France, in whi ch class
interests were defi ned in t er ms of a nat i onal pol i t i cal -
economi c space, and what goes on in t he abode of pr oduct i on
simply does not come into t he pi ct ur e at all. Obvi ousl y,
Mar x himself t hought t hat t he shift of focus he was
advanci ng to analyze t he overall, l ong-t erm t endenci es of
capitalist society had a limited relevance for t he concret e
analysis of a concret e i nst ance of class struggle at a relatively
low stage of devel opment of such t endenci es.
10
Moreover, even at the theoretical level, t he shift of focus
away from t he noisy sphere of political economy di d not
imply any bel i t t l ement of t he nat i on-st at e as the mai n locus
of political power, t hat is, of t he monopol y of t he legitimate
use of violence over a given territory. Thi s power embodi ed
in nation-states, whatever its origins, could obviously be
used, and has i ndeed generally been used, si mul t aneousl y
in two directions: as an aggressive/defensive i nst r ument of
intra-capitalist compet i t i on in the worl d-economy, and as
an aggressive/defensive i nst r ument of class struggle in
nat i onal locales. Tr ue, t he growing density and connect ed-
ness of worl d-economi c networks on t he one hand, and t he
di spl acement of class cont radi ct i ons from t he market pl ace
t o t he workpl ace on t he ot her, woul d ultimately make
nation-states "obsolete" from bot h points of view. In out-
lining this t endency, however, Mar x was only defi ni ng
t he situation t hat t he capitalist worl d-economy woul d
asymptotically appr oach i n t he very long r un. Th e fart her
t he class struggle was from t he proj ect ed asympt ot e, t he
mor e it woul d t ake on a pol i t i cal / nat i onal charact er. Even
t he proletariat, t he class which in his view had neither coun-
try nor nationality, had first of all to wage a nat i onal
struggle:
Since the prol et ari at must first of all acqui re political
supr emacy, must rise to be the l eadi ng class of the nat i on,
must const i t ut e itself the nat i on, it is, so far, itself nat i onal ,
t hough not in the bourgeoi s sense of t he word (1967: 102).
Mar x' s empirical retreat into political economy did not,
however, entail a correspondi ng retreat at t he theoretical
level. It simply implied a recognition of t he di st ance
separat i ng t he historical ci rcumst ances of ni net eent h-
cent ury Eur ope from t he asympt ot i c ci rcumst ances
projected in t he Manifesto and in Capital.
Far more t han this was implicit in the retreat into/revival
11
A ntisystemic Movements
of political economy by Marxi st s aft er Mar x, however. Th e
most striking characteristic of t he theories of fi nance and
monopol y capi t al , of i mperi al i sm and of state capitalism,
t hat begi n to develop at t he t ur n of t he cent ury and are later
synthesized in canoni cal f or m by Leni n, is t hat they t ake us
back to t he noisy sphere of political economi c relations.
Thei r mai n concerns are t he forms of capitalist compet i t i on,
and t he class cont radi ct i ons identified are t hose defi ned i n
t erms of market interests and state power. However much
such formul at i ons may or may not be j ust i fi ed in t erms of
t he political strategies of t he time, we are concerned here
with t hei r elevation by epigones into theoretical advances
r at her t han pragmat i c retreats f r om Mar x' s cri t i que of
Smi t hi an political economy.
Thi s theoretical retreat into political economy had some
justification i n t he t endenci es t hat came t o charact eri ze t he
capitalist worl d-economy ar ound t he t ur n of t he cent ury.
The growi ng unity of t he world market presupposed by
Mar x' s par adi gmat i c shift began t o be under mi ned by t he
re-emergence of state prot ect i oni st / mercant i l i st policies.
These policies increasingly transferred world capitalist
compet i t i on f r om t he real m of relations among ent erpri ses
to t he real m of relations among states. As a consequence,
war and nat i onal / i mper i al aut arky came t o t he fore and i n
pr agmat i c t er ms shaped t he scenario of t he worl d-economy.
Connect ed with this t endency, t he high concent rat i on and
centralization of capital, characteristic of most of t he new
l eadi ng/ cor e sectors of economi c activity, led to a resur-
gence of practices, often backed by state power, t hat
restricted compet i t i on wi t hi n t he nat i onal / i mper i al
segment s into which t he worl d-economy was splitting.
States t hus r et ur ned t o t he forefront of worl d-economi c l i fe,
and monopol y i n and t hrough t he sovereign became once
agai n t he cent ral issue ar ound which conflicts and align-
ment s among classes and fractions t hereof revolved. Thi s
situation, whi ch has broadl y charact eri zed t he first half of
12
the twentieth century, undoubtedly warranted a revival of
political economy as the most relevant theoretical frame-
work for the short- or medium-term analysis of class
contradictions and conflicts.
We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that the
conception of class conflicts and alliances advanced by
Lenin fits better theoretically into the Smithian than the
Marxian paradigm: the monopoly power of a "fraction" of
capital (finance capital and large-scale industry, as opposed
to Smith's merchants and master manufacturers employing
large capitals) is singled out as the main determinant of
waste and exploitation as well as of inter-imperialist rivalries
and war (the enmity among nations, in Smithian parlance).
It follows that all "popular classes," including the non-
monopolistic fractions of capital, can be mobilized by the
party of the proletariat (the "new prince," as Gramsci would
have said) to wrest political power from the monopolistic
fractions of capital a prescription analogous to Smith's
suggestion that the enlightened sovereign could count on
the support of all other orders of society in pursuing the
general interest against the particular interest of large
merchants and manufacturers.
This, however, is not all that was involved in the theo-
retical retreat of Marxists back into political economy.
Monopoly capitalism and imperialism were not treated for
what they ultimately turned out to be cyclical resur-
gence of mercantilist policies connected with the crisis of
British world hegemony and with intensifying tendencies
toward overproduction. If they had been treated in this
way, the retreat into political economy would have merely
implied a recognition of the fact that the path leading the
capitalist world-economy to the ideal-typical asymptote
envisaged in Marx's critique of political economy was char-
acterized by cycles and discontinuities that could increase,
even for relatively long periods, the distance separating
historical circumstances from such an asymptote. Instead,
13
monopol y capitalism and i mperi al i sm were t heori zed as t he
highest and final st age of t he capitalist world-system, t hat is,
as themselves represent i ng t he asympt ot e. In this way,
Mar xi sm as canoni zed by Leni n has come to be perversely
identified as (and t herefore with) political economy.
Weber ' s writings on processes of gr oup format i on in t he
moder n world ar e undoubt edl y among t he most extensive
available. For present purposes we limit our at t ent i on to his
highly influential contrast of classes and st at us-groups
(Stande). The cont rast ed categories were at once an
advance over t he class analysis proj ect ed by Mar x and a
retreat from it. They were an advance because of t he j uxt a-
position of st at us-group format i on to class format i on. They
were a ret reat because of t he restriction of t he processes,
and t he resulting el ement al forms of social st ruct ure, to
existent "political communi t i es" (which "under moder n
condi t i ons . . . ar e ' st at es' ") (1968: 904). We requi re in our
work on moder n social change t he kind of j uxt aposi t i on
Weber const ruct ed. But in or der to have it, we need to free
i t from t he assumpt i ons he made. And, i n or der t o do t hat ,
we need t o exami ne those assumpt i ons.
Moder n sociology woul d have us believe t hat Weber
wr ot e an essay on class, status, and part y. He did not hi ng of
the sort. It woul d f ur t her mor e have us believe t hat he j uxt a-
posed class and status-group as two separat e di mensi ons of
somet hi ng called stratification in moder n societies, bot h in
t ur n separat e from t he state (const rued as t he real m of
"parties"), whi ch he also did not do. We t hen must fi rst set
to one side t hese i mposed readi ngs in or der to see what
Weber did do, and so allow ourselves to exami ne t he
assumpt i ons he did make.
Thi s prel i mi nary exercise can fort unat el y be qui t e brief.
In t he Rot h-Wi t t i ch edition of Economy and Society (Weber,
1968), Chapt er IX in Par t Two is entitled "Political
Communi t i es. " Thi s chapt er is provi ded with six sections,
each titled, t he sixth of whi ch is entitled, " The di st ri but i on
14
of power within the political communi t y, " and subtitled,
"class, status, party. " It is this section of this chapt er t hat
appears in Hans Gert h and Wr i ght Mills, Essays from Max
Weber (1946) as itself a "chapt er" (there, Chapt er VII) with
its subtitle, "class, status, party, " as its full title. As someone
once said, much may be lost in translation.
1
For Weber in Chapt er IX of Economy and Society, t her e
wer e t wo and only t wo possible basic ways for t he distri-
but i on of power in political communi t i es (that is, in the
moder n world, states) to be st ruct ured: it can be either class-
st ruct ured or st at us-group-st ruct ured. For "power" (undif-
ferentiated here) to be class-structured, the factual
di st ri but i on of goods and services within t he political
communi t y or state i n quest i on must be market -organi zed.
If so, or in so far as it is so, t he di st ri but i on of life chances
among t he member s of t he political communi t y (and others
in its territory) is det er mi ned by t hei r relative position
("class situation") in t he organizing compl ex of mar ket
relations, t he basic categories of whi ch are "propert y" and
"lack of propert y. " Alternatively, for "power" to be status-
group-st ruct ured, t he factual di st ri but i on of goods and
services within t he political communi t y or state in quest i on
must be prestige-organized. If so, or in so far it is so, t he
di st ri but i on of life chances among t he member s of t he
political communi t y (and others) is det er mi ned by t hei r
member s hi p ("status situation") in t he organi zi ng compl ex
1. Weber schol ars will know that most headi ngs in the Rot h- Wi t t i ch
edi t i on were provi ded not by Weber but by t he edi t ors of t he writings
combi ned to form Economy and Society. Th e key sent ences f r om t he section
under discussion are for present purposes t wo:
Th e st ruct ure of every legal order directly i nfl uences t he di st ri but i on
of power, economi c or ot herwi se, wi t hi n its respect i ve [political]
communi t y (1968: 926).
Now: "classes", "status groups", and "part i es" are phe nome na of the
di st ri but i on of power within a [political] communi t y (1968: 927).
15
of honorifically r anked c ommuna l groups, t he basic cate-
gories of whi ch are "positively est eemed" and "negatively
est eemed. "
Whi l e depi ct ed as if positively different, a class-structured
di st ri but i on of power wi t hi n a political communi t y differs
f r om a st at us-group-st ruct ured di st ri but i on only in one
governing respect, namel y, whet her t he distribution of
goods and services is effected t hr ough mar ket relations (
"class-structured") or instead t hr ough nonmar ket relations
(= "st at us-group-st ruct ured"), t hat is, residually.
2
The t wo
stated el ement al ways in whi ch a given political communi t y
may be socially st ruct ured, t hen, were for Weber central
categories to use in t raci ng historically t he rise of t he mar ket
t hat is, t he historical di spl acement by mar ket relations of
any and all other kinds of social relations t hr ough which the
"factors" of pr oduct i on are recurrent l y br ought t oget her,
t he resulting pr oduct s are "ci rcul at ed, " t he embodi ed
surpl uses are "realized" a nd appr opr i at ed, and t he mat eri al
means of subsistence are "di st ri but ed. " To t he extent t hat
relations among st at us-groups organize and medi at e t hese
flows, t he mar ket (the compl ex of market relations) does
not , and classes i n his t er ms are unf or med. To t he extent
t hat t he mar ket organi zes t he flows, st at us-group relations
do not, and st at us-groups are unf or med (or better,
"eroded, " since t he historical t r ansf or mat i on from feudal -
ism t o capitalism i n Eur ope under pi ns t he contrast).
Still, even given t he one-di mensi onal i t y of t he distinction,
it ret ai ned in its el aborat i on a mat t er of cent ral i mport ance,
t hat of an sich/fiir sich derived from Mar x. Weber ma de use
of it in a part i cul ar manner . Classes in relation to one
anot her , in a given political communi t y, are an sich by
definition but not t hereby fur sich. Her e he followed qui t e
2. It is not until Polanyi (in The Great Transformation [1957] and
subsequent writings) gave positive content to "non-market forms of inte-
gration" that this residual category began to receive systematic con-
ceptual elaboration.
16
unambi guousl y the pr e- Mar x conventional political eco-
nomy, seeing i mmedi at e class interests as given by mar ket
position and hence as theoretically i ndet er mi nat e, so far as
collective action is concerned, whet her it be directly in
relation to ot her classes or indirectly t hr ough t hei r relation
to t he appar at us of t he political communi t y (state). Theo-
retically, somet hi ng in addi t i on to class interests must be
i nt roduced if one is to account for ( cont i nuous) collective
class action and so t herefore for its absence. In contrast,
st at us-groups i n relation t o one anot her are by definition
groups, definitionally endowed with t he capacity to act
collectively in relation to one anot her and to act on their
respective behalfs in relation to t he state.
The definitional difference was not arbi t rary for Weber .
A political communi t y entails by const ruct i on "value
systems" (1968: 902), in accor dance wi t h whi ch its con-
stituent el ement s have mor e or less legitimacy, prestige, and
so on, in compari son wi t h one anot her , and with reference
to whi ch they have mor e or less pri de, solidarity, or capacity
to act collectively in relation with one anot her. A status-
gr oup st ruct uri ng of t he di st ri but i on of power, because t he
constituent groups are arrayed honorifically by rank,
confers on each mor e or less prestige and pri de, and
t hr ough that, t he solidarity and capacity to act collectively
in relation to one anot her . A class st ruct uri ng of this distri-
but i on of power, in contrast, because of t he mar ket pri n-
ciple whi ch, in its operat i ons for Weber , ei t her el i mi nat es
all consi derat i ons of honor from its relations or is
const rai ned in its worki ng by t hem provides its constitu-
ent classes with no necessary solidarity in t hei r relations
wi t h one anot her , and hence no necessary capacity for
collective action in or on these relations. In short, and to go
a bit beyond Weber in this summar y, st at us-groups are
const i t uent s of and t hereby carriers of a mor al order, in
Dur khei m' s sense. Classes are not ; if t hey become so, it is
by vi rt ue of processes f undament al but di fferent f r om, and
17
not entailed in, those that constitute them as classes in
relation to one another.
3
All of this is subject to the very strict proviso that we are
examining the possible social structurings of the distri-
bution of power within a constituted political community, a
state under modern conditions. Weber himself, however,
earlier opened up the possibility of freeing the contrasted
categories of class and status-group from this highly
constraining premise of their construction. In Section
Three, headed "Power, prestige and the 'Great Powers,'" he
asserted that states in relation to one another "may pretend
to a special 'prestige,' and their pretensions may influence"
the conduct of their relations with one another. "Experience
teaches," he continues,
that claims to prestige have always played into the origins of
wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined
in general, but it is very obvious. The realm of "honor,"
which is comparable to the "status order" within a social struc-
ture, pertains also to the interrelations of political structures
(1968: 911; italics added).
But extending the scope of stratifying processes,
4
so that
3. Weber's one theoretical claim in this section, Section Six of the
Chapter "Political Communities," reads thus:
As to the general economic conditions making for the predominance
of stratification by status, only the following can be said. When the
bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable,
stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion
and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and
pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries
in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are
regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations. And
every slowing down of the change in economic stratification leads, in
due course, to the growth of status structures and makes for resusci-
tation of the important role of social honor (1968: 938).
4. We have departed from Weber's use of "stratification." For a pro-
visional and programmatic formulation of the concept, "stratifying
processes," see Hopkins & Wallerstein (1981).
18
their oper at i on within t he interstate system of t he worl d-
economy is "compar abl e" to t hei r suggest ed operat i on
within one of its uni t s (a political communi t y, whet her
sovereign state or colony), runs into deepl y serious diffi-
culties. An illustration of this cl ai m is all t hat t i me and
space here permi t .
Weber , in a "f r agment " on " The Mar ket " ( Chapt er VII of
Part Two in t he Rot h-Wi t t i ch edition [1968: 635-40]),
di st i ngui shed appropri at el y a nd sharpl y bet ween t wo
f undament al l y different ki nds of "monopol i es" encount er ed
within a given political communi t y. On t he one side are
"the monopol i es of st at us-groups [which] excl uded from
t hei r fi el d of action t he mechani sm of t he market . " On t he
other side are t he "capitalistic monopol i es whi ch are
acqui r ed i n t he mar ket t hr ough t he power of propert y. "
The difference is elliptically specified: " The beneficiary of a
monopol y by a st at us-group restricts, and mai nt ai ns his
power agai nst , t he market , while t he r at i onal - economi c
monopol i st rules t hr ough t he mar ket " (1968: 639). The
general difficulty we al l uded to may be exemplified as
follows. Supposi ng that, among our i nt errel at ed and honor -
oriented states, t he gover nment of one creates a
"monopol y" within its borders for its few local (national)
producers of, say, aut omobi l es, by so raising t he i mport
duties on aut omobi l es pr oduced elsewhere in t he worl d t hat
they are no longer price-competitive. They are, as is said,
"priced out of t he market, " whi ch amount s to saying t hat
the government i n quest i on has restricted, and mai nt ai ned
its power against, t he worl d mar ket for aut omobi l es. Do we
const rue that situation as compar abl e on the world scene to
a st at us-group monopol y within a political communi t y, or
to a cl ass-formed capitalistic monopol y? Or is it a bit of
bot h class-like because of t he rational appropri at i on of
profit opport uni t i es by the aut omobi l e firms who per suaded
t he government t o i nt r oduce t he restrictions; and status-
group-l i ke because of t he sent i ment s of nat i onal pr i de and
19
prest i ge mar s hal l ed i n s uppor t of and gener at ed by t he
policy?
VVe suspect t he latter. But if we ar e right, Weber ' s
sharpl y et ched st ruct ural distinction, bet ween class-
st r uct ur ed a nd st at us- gr oup- st r uct ur ed di st ri but i ons of
power wi t hi n political communi t i es, becomes a fused
concept when put t o use i n t he exami nat i on of processes of
gr oup- f or mat i on i n t he moder n worl d-syst em. And we shall
have t o gr ound anew processes of cl ass-format i on and
processes of st at us- gr oup- f or mat i on, in or der to see t he m on
occasi on as fused and rei nforci ng sets of processes r at her
t han bei ng restricted by t hei r ori gi nal a nd careful f or mu-
lation as necessarily di amet ri cal l y opposed in t hei r
oper at i on.
Th e i nt el l ect ual pressure t o reify gr oups, t o pr es ume
t hei r per manency and longevity, is difficult to resist. For
one t hi ng, most self-conscious gr oups ar gue as par t of t hei r
l egi t i mi zi ng i deol ogy not merel y t hei r pr eemi nence (in one
way or anot her ) but t hei r t empor al pri ori t y over compet i ng
gr oups. Gr oups t hat ar e self-conscious, t hat seem t o act
collectively in si gni fi cant ways, oft en seem very solid and
very resilient. We t oo oft en lose f r om sight t he degr ee t o
whi ch t hi s solidarity, this reality, is itself t he pr oduct of t he
gr oup' s activities in relations with ot hers, activities t hat in
t ur n ar e ma d e possi bl e by a n d have a direct i mpact upon
t he rest of social reality. Th e very activities of gr oups in
rel at i on t o one anot her serve t o change each gr oup subst an-
tially and substantively, and i n par t i cul ar t o change t hei r
respective boundar i es a nd t hei r di st i ngui shi ng and def i ni ng
characteristics.
Per mi t us to suggest an anal ogy. If one has a wheel of
mot t l ed colors, one t hat i ncl udes t he whol e r ange of t he
color spect r um, and if one spi ns t he wheel , it will appear
mor e and mor e like a solid whi t e mass as t he speed
increases. The r e comes a poi nt of speed wher e it is i mpos-
sible t o see t he wheel as ot her t han pur e whi t e. If, however,
20
t he wheel slows down, t he whi t e will dissolve i nt o its
component separat e colors. So it is with groups, even (and
per haps especially) t hose most cent ral of i nst i t ut i onal struc-
t ures of t he moder n worl d-syst em t he states, t he classes,
t he nations, a nd/ or ethnic groups.
5
Seen i n long historical
t i me and br oad world space, they fade i nt o one anot her,
becomi ng only "groups. " Seen i n short historical t i me and
nar r ow world space, t hey become clearly defi ned and so
f or m distinctive "structures. "
The distinction bet ween classes an sich and classes fr sich
is hel pful insofar as it recognizes t hat t he self-consciousness
of classes (and ot her groups) is not a const ant but a variable.
We must , however, dr aw on Mar x and Weber one step
f ur t her and recognize with t hem t hat t he very existence of
part i cul ar historical gr oups in relation to one anot her is not
given but is also a variable. It may be obj ect ed t hat no one
ever assumed t hat a class or an et hni c gr oup always existed,
and t hat everyone knows t hat for every gr oup t her e is of
course a moment of its comi ng into existence (however diffi-
cult this may be to specify). But this is not t he poi nt we are
maki ng.
At some moment of historical t i me t he bourgeoi si e (the
world bourgeoi si e or a local version in a given area, or of a
given people), t he Br ahmi n caste, t he Hungar i an nat i on,
and t he religious communi t y of Buddhi st s all came (or
evolved) i nt o existence. Are we t o assume t hat each j ust con-
t i nued t o exist from t hat poi nt on? We are cont endi ng t hat
t here is a sense in whi ch all t hese gr oups are in fact
const ant l y bei ng recreat ed such t hat over t i me we have
genui nel y new wine i n old bottles, and t hat t he emphasi s on
t he cont i nui t y and pri mordi al i t y of t he gr oup' s existence,
t hough it maybe of consi derabl e ideological value to its
member s as such, is of very little analytic value to us as
observers. The transition from feudalism t o capi t al i sm
5. Thi s t heme is devel oped in Wal l erst ei n (1980).
21
cannot be expl ai ned by t he struggle of classes t hat came
i nt o real current existence only as the result of t hat t ransi t i on.
Civil war in Lebanon cannot be expl ai ned by t he struggle of
religious groups who have come into real current existence
largely as a result of that civil war.
What intelligent analysis t herefore requi res is t hat we
uncover t he processes by whi ch groups (and institutions)
are const ant l y recreat ed, r emoul ded, and el i mi nat ed i n t he
ongoi ng operat i ons of t he capitalist worl d-economy, whi ch
is an actual social system that came into historical existence
Primarily in Eur ope in t he "long" sixteenth cent ury, and
whi ch subsequent l y has been expanded in space so t hat it
now includes all ot her geographical areas of t he globe. The
relational concept and, therefore, t he actual st ruct ures of
classes and et hni c groups have been dependent on t he
creation of t he moder n states. The states are the key politi-
cal units of t he worl d-economy, uni t s t hat have been
defi ned by and ci rcumscri bed by t hei r location in t he inter-
state system. And this system has served as t he evolving
political superst ruct ure of t he worl d-economy.
In t he original loci of t he capitalist worl d-economy, t he
bi rt h of di pl omacy, of so-called i nt ernat i onal law, and of
st at e-bui l di ng ideologies (such as absol ut i sm) all coi nci de
with t he early funct i oni ng of t he worl d-economy. Of course,
t hese states rapidly f ound themselves in a hierarchical
net work of unequal strength. As new areas became incor-
porat ed into this capitalist worl d-economy, t he existing
political st ruct ures of such areas were commonl y r eshaped
in qui t e f undament al ways (i ncl udi ng even t he defi ni t i on of
their territorial and "ethnic" or nat i onal boundari es) so t hat
they coul d play their expected roles in t he relational
net work of t he interstate system. Thes e states had to be too
weak to interfere with t he flow of t he factors of pr oduct i on
across their boundari es, and t herefore with t he peri pheral -
ization of their pr oduct i on processes. Hence, in some cases,
pre-existing political st ruct ures had t o be "weakened. " But
22
t he states also had to be strong enough to ensur e t he very
same flow, t he same peri pheral i zat i on. Hence, i n ot her
cases, pre-existing political st ruct ures had to be "streng-
t hened. " But weakened or st r engt hened, t hese recreat ed or
entirely newly creat ed i ncorporat ed states ended up as state
st ruct ures t hat were weak relative to t he states specializing
i n core pr oduct i on processes within t he worl d-economy.
The classes and t he et hni c/ nat i onal groups or groupi ngs
t hat began to crystallize were crystallized, so to speak, from
t hree directions. They defi ned themselves pri mari l y i n
relation t o t hese st at e st ruct ures t hat c omma nde d t he
largest amount of ar med force and access to economi c
possibilities, either t hr ough t he direct di st ri but i on of ever-
increasing tax i ncome or t hr ough t he creat i on of st ruct ured
possibilities of preferent i al access to t he market (i ncl udi ng
training). They were defi ned by those in t he centers of t hese
st ruct ures (and in t he centers of t he worl d-syst em as a
whole). And they were perceived by compet i t i ve groups in
t hei r relational setting.
Thr ee kinds of groups emer ged in relation to t hese state
st ruct ures class, nat i onal , and et hni c groups. Whi l e
classes an sich developed in t erms of t he relation of house-
hol ds to t he real social economy, whi ch in this case was a
capitalist world-economy, a class fr sich is a gr oup t hat
makes conscious claims of class member shi p, whi ch is a
cl ai m to a place in a part i cul ar political order. Such a class
coul d t herefore only grow up in relation to a given political
entity. Whe n E. P. Thomps on (1964) writes about t he
maki ng of t he English worki ng class, he is writing about t he
condi t i ons under whi ch ur ban prol et ari ans within a j uri s-
diction called "Engl and" came to t hi nk of t hemsel ves as
English workers and to act politically in this capacity. The
class "made" itself, as he emphasi zes, not only by t he evo-
lution of objective economi c and social conditions, but by
t he ways in whi ch some (many) peopl e react ed to t hese
condi t i ons.
23
Of course, t he exent t o whi ch t her e emer ged an English
r at her t han a British worki ng class al ready indicated t hat a
key political choice had been made. The Irish workers, for
example, were t hereby defined as a different group. Thus ,
the const ruct i on of a "class" was ipso facto part of t he
const ruct i on of at least two "nationalities," t he English and
t he Irish. Nor di d this part i cul ar story st op t here. For we are
still seeing t oday t he later consequences of t hese early
devel opment s. Protestant ur ban prol et ari ans i n Nor t her n
Irel and do not t oday t hi nk of themselves as "Irish." Inst ead
they call themselves "Prot est ant s, " or "Ul st er men, " or (least
likely) "Britons, " or even all three. It is clear that, in reality,
to be a "Prot est ant " and to be an "Ul st er man" is in this situ-
ation virtually synonymous; to be a "Catholic" and to be
"Irish" is also synonymous. To be sure, t here are Prot-
estants, and even Jews resident in Dubl i n who t hi nk of
themselves as Irish. Thi s doesn' t mitigate t he meani ng of
t he religious t erms in Nor t her n Irel and.
If now some political organi zat i on comes along and
insists on banni ng t he use of religious t ermi nol ogy in favor,
let us say, of t he exclusive use of class t ermi nol ogy, such a
group is argui ng in favor of a part i cul ar political resolution
of t he conflict. Wer e such a gr oup to succeed, t he reality of
t he religious groups as social entities mi ght rapidly recede
in Nor t her n Ireland, as they have in many ot her areas of t he
worl d. An exampl e woul d be Switzerland, wher e peopl e
primarily identify as member s of linguistic groups and only
in a mi nor way as member s of religious groups.
Is t here an I ndi an bourgeoisie? Thi s is not a quest i on of
essences, but of existential reality. It is a political quest i on
t hat divides I ndi an ent r epr eneur s a mong themselves. To
t he ext ent t hat we can say t hat t her e exists an I ndi an bour -
geoisie, as opposed to merely member s of t he worl d bour -
geoisie who happen to hol d I ndi an passports, it is because
t here is a belief on t he part of t hese bourgeoi s t hat t he
I ndi an state appar at us has or coul d have an i mport ant role
24
In assuring their "class" interests vis-a-vis both workers in
India and bourgeois in other areas of the world.
The whole line between classes as they are constructed
and status-groups of every variety is far more fluid and
blurred than the classic presumption of an antinomy
between class and status-group has indicated. It is in fact
very hard to know when we are dealing primarily with the
one rather than with the other. This is especially true when
political conflict becomes acute, and this is one of the
reasons why the lines between social .movements and
national movements have become increasingly difficult to
disentangle and are perhaps unimportant to discern.
Furthermore, even among traditionally defined status
groups, it is not sure that it is very useful to distinguish
"nations" from other kinds of "ethnic groups." A "nation"
seems to be nothing but a political claim that the boun-
daries of a state should coincide with those of a given
"ethnic group." This is used to justify either secessionist
movements or unification movements. In point of fact, if we
were to use a strict definition of the concept "nation," we
should be hard-pressed to find even one "nation-state" in
the entire world-system. This indicates that "nation" is
more the description of an aspiration, or of a tendency, than
of an existing phenomenon. Whenever the political claim
(and/or definition by others) is less than that of state
sovereignty, we tend to call this group an "ethnic group,"
whatever the basis of the claim, be it common language,
common religion, common skin color, or fictive common
ancestry.
The actual history of the construction (reconstruction,
remolding, destruction) of classes, nations, and ethnic
groups including the pressure both of "external" groups
to create these groups and of the "internal" desire of puta-
tive groups to create themselves is a history of the
constant rise and fall of the intensity of these political claims
in cultural clothing. There is no evidence that, over the
25
several hundr ed years of t he existence of t he capitalist
worl d-economy, one part i cul ar genre of claim has grown at
t he expense of others; each genre seems to have hel d its
own. It woul d seem, therefore, t hat assertions about
pri mordi al i t y are in fact ideological. Thi s is not to say t hat
t here has not been systemic devel opment . For exampl e,
not hi ng herein ar gued is i nconsi st ent with t he proposi t i on
t hat t here has been growing class polarization in t he capi-
talist worl d-economy. But such a proposi t i on woul d be
referri ng to classes an sich, t hat is, at t he level of t he real
social economy, t he capitalist worl d-economy. Rat her, this
analysis shoul d be seen as an ar gument t hat group for-
mat i ons (solidarities) are processes of t he capitalist world-
economy, and are among t he central under l yi ng forms of
t he mor e narrowl y mani fest efforts at political organi zat i on.
In recent years, social scientists of various intellectual
schools have begun to ret urn to Mar x' s cri t i que of political
economy, but in ways t hat go beyond t he mechani cal
usages of class analysis t hat formed t he ideology of t he
Second and Thi r d Int ernat i onal s and beyond the equally
mechani cal concept of pri mordi al st at us-groups t hat
domi nat ed t he developmentalist ideology of US- domi nat ed
world social science in t he 1950s and 1960s.
On t he one hand, i n t he era of US hegemony (roughly
1945-70), t he unity of t he world mar ket analytically pre-
supposed by Mar x (when he observed an era of British
hegemony) and whi ch was t hought to have di sappeared in
t he late ni net eent h cent ury, was in fact progressively recon-
stituted. The so-called t r ans nat i onal sought t o operat e with
mi ni mal constraint by state-political apparat uses. Thought
t he concent rat i on of capital increased even furt her, its trans-
nat i onal expansion out of t he Amer i can core became a
maj or factor in t he intensification of world mar ket com-
petition and in t he consol i dat i on of t he unity of t he world
market . In this context t he role pl ayed by states changed
radically, t hough not everywhere to t he same extent. Par-
26
ticularly outside of t he Communi s t worl d, t he emphasi s in
their action changed from territorial expansi on and restric-
tion of i nt er-ent erpri se compet i t i on wi t hi n and across
nat i onal / i mper i al boundari es, t o st rengt heni ng t he com-
petitive edge of t hei r territories as locales of pr oduct i on and
to sustaining t he t ransnat i onal expansi on of t hei r respective
nat i onal capitals. They t hereby cont ri but ed t o t he enhance-
ment of the density and connect edness of worl d-economi c
net works that, in t urn, under mi ned t hei r ability to
i nfl uence/ cont rol economi c activity even within t hei r own
borders.
On t he ot her hand, t he antisystemic movement s have
mor e and mor e t aken on t he clothing of "nat i onal -
liberation movement s, " cl ai mi ng t he doubl e legitimacy of
nationalist ant i -i mperi al i sm and prol et ari an ant i -
capitalism. Thi s has given t hem great st rengt h as mobi -
lizing movement s. But, insofar as they have come to power
in specific state structures operat i ng wi t hi n t he interstate/
system, they have been caught in t he constraints of this
system t hat has led, among ot her things, to conflicts within?
and among such "post -revol ut i onary" states.
A cogent analysis of existing t rends within t he world-
system requi res bot h a ret urn to basics, in t erms of an
analysis of t he operat i onal mechani sms of capi t al i sm as a
mode of product i on, and a reconcept ual i zat i on of t he oper-
ational mechani sms of t he social groups (that are formed,
are reformed, and of course also di sappear) t hat compet e
and conflict wi t hi n this capitalist worl d-economy, as it con-
t i nues to evolve and to t ransform itself.
77
Dilemmas of Antisystemic
Movements
Opposi t i on to oppressi on is cot ermi nous wi t h t he existence
of hierarchical social-systems. Opposi t i on is per manent , but
f or t he most par t l at ent , The oppressed are t oo weak
politically, economically, and ideologically to mani fest
their opposi t i on const ant l y. However, as we know, when
oppressi on becomes particularly acute, or expect at i ons par-
ticularly deceived, or t he power of t he rul i ng st r at um falters,
peopl e have risen up in an al most spont aneous ma nne r to
cry halt. Thi s has taken t he form of revolts, of riots, of flight.
The mul t i pl e forms of huma n rebellion have for t he most
part been only partially efficacious at best. Somet i mes t hey
have forced t he oppressors t o r educe t he pr essur e or t he
exploitation. But somet i mes they have failed utterly to do
so. However, one cont i nui ng sociological characteristic of
these rebellions of t he oppressed has been their "spont ane-
ous," short -t erm charact er. They have come and t hey have
gone, having such effect as they did. Whe n t he next such
rebellion came, it nor mal l y had little explicit rel at i onshi p
wi t h t he previous one. Indeed, this has been one of t he great
st rengt hs of t he wor l d' s rul i ng strata t hr oughout hi st ory
the noncont i nui t y of rebellion.
29
In t he early history of t he capitalist world-economy, t he
situation remai ned mor e or less the same as it had always
been in this regard. Rebellions were many, scattered,
discrete, moment ary, and only partially efficacious at best.
One of t he contradictions, however, of capitalism as a
system is that t he very integrating tendencies that have been
one of its defining characteristics have had an i mpact on the
form of antisystemic activity.
Somewhere in t he mi ddl e of the ni net eent h century
1848 is as good a symbolic date as any t here came to be a
sociological innovation of profound significance for t he
politics of t he capitalist world-economy. Gr oups of persons
involved in antisystemic activity began to create a new insti-
tution": the cont i nui ng "organization with members, officers,
and specific political objectives (both l ong-run and short-
term).
Such organized antisystemic movement s had never
existed before: One mi ght argue that various religious sects
had performed analogous roles with an anal ogous organ-
ization, but t he long-run objectives of t he religious sects
were by definition otherworldly. The antisystemic organ-
izations that came into existence in t he ni net eent h century
were preeminently" political, not religious that is, they
focused on t he structures of "this world.' '
Social Movements and National Movements
In t he course of t he ni net eent h century, two principal
varieties of antisystemic movement s emerged what came
to be called respectively t he "social movement " and t he
"national movement . " The maj or difference" Between t hem
lay in their definition of t he probl em. The social movement
defined t he oppression as that of employers over wage
earners, the bourgeoisie over t he proletariat. The ideals of.
the French Reyolution liberty, equiality, and fraternity
30
Dilemmas of Antisystemic Movements
could be realized, t hey felt, by repl aci ng capi t al i sm wi t h
socialism. The nat i onal movement , on t he ot her hand,
defi ned t he oppressi on as t hat of one et hno-nat i onal gr oup
over anot her . The ideals coul d be realized by giving t he
oppressed gr oup equal j uri di cal status with t he oppressi ng
gr oup by t he creation of parallel (and usually separate)
st ruct ures.
Ther e has been a long discussion, wi t hi n t he movement s
and among scholars, about t he differences bet ween these
t wo ki nds of movement . No doubt t hey have differed bot h
in t hei r definitions of t he pr obl em and in t he social bases of
their support . In many places and at many times, t he two
varieties of movement felt they were in direct compet i t i on
with each ot her for t he loyalty of popul at i ons. Less
frequent l y i n t he ni net eent h cent ury, but somet i mes, t he
t wo varieties of movement f ound enough tactical con-
gruence to work t oget her politically.
The t radi t i onal emphasi s on t he differences of t he two
varieties of movement has distracted our attention from
some f undament al similarities. Both ki nds of movement ,
after consi derabl e i nt ernal debat e, creat ed formal organ-
izations. As such, these organi zat i ons had to evolve a basic
strategy to t ransform their i mmedi at e world in t he direction
in whi ch they wi shed it to go. In bot h cases, t he analysis was
identical. Th e key political st ruct ure of t he moder n world
they each saw to be t he state. If these movement s were to
change anyt hi ng, they had to cont rol a state appar at us,
which pragmat i cal l y meant "t hei r" state appar at us. Conse-
quent l y, t he pr i ma r y obj ect i ve had t o be obt ai ni ng state
power.
For t he social movement , this meant t hat , despite t he
i nt ernat i onal i sm of t hei r ideology "workers of t he world,
uni t e!" t he organi zat i ons t hey creat ed had to be nat i onal
in st ruct ure. And t he objective of these organi zat i ons had to
be t he comi ng to power of t he movement in that state.
Similarly, for t he nat i onal movement , t he objective came to
31
be state power in a part i cul ar state. To be sure, t he j uri s-
diction of this state was by definition what t he nat i onal
movement was about . Somet i mes such a movement sought
t he creat i on of an entirely new state, ei t her by secession or
by merger, but i n ot her cases this "new state" mi ght have
already existed in t he f or m of a colonial or a regi onal
admi ni st rat i ve entity.
The fact t hat t he two varieties of movement defi ned t he
same strategic objective account s for t hei r sense of rivalry
with each' ot f t er , particularly when a workers' movement
sought to obt ai n power in an entity out of whi ch a given
nat i onal movement was seeking to det ach a zone in order to
creat e a new state.
The parallel objectives obt ai ni ng state power led to
a parallel internal debat e on t he mode of obt ai ni ng state
power, whi ch mi ght be defined in polar t er ms as t he legal
pat h of political persuasi on versus t he illegal pat h of i nsur-
rect i onary force. Thi s has often been called, reform .versus i
revolution, but t hese two t erms have bec0m&~50"0verlaid 1
wi t h pol emi c and confusi on t hat today they obscur e mor e
t han they aid analysis.
It shoul d be not ed t hat in t he case of t he social move-
ment , this i nt ernal debat e cul mi nat ed dur i ng t he peri od
bet ween t he First and Second Wor l d War s i n t he existence
of two rival and fiercely competitive Int ernat i onal s, t he
Second and t he Thi r d, also known as t he conflict bet ween
Social Democr at s and Communi st s. Though bot h t he
Second and Thi r d Int ernat i onal s assert ed t hat they had t he
same objective of socialism, t hat t hey were movement s
based in t he worki ng class and on t he left, and even (at least
for a while) t hat they assumed t he same Marxi st heritage,
they rapidly became vehemently opposed one t o t he other,
to t he extent t hat t hei r subsequent occasional political
convergences (the "popul ar fronts") have seemed at best
tactical and moment ar y. In some sense, this has r emai ned
t r ue right up t o t he present .
32
Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements
If one looks at t he geography of t he movement s, one
quickly notices a historical correlation. Social-democratic
movement s have become politically strong and have "come
to power" (by electoral means, to be sure, and t hen in alter-
nation with more conservative parties) almost only in t he
core states of t he world-economy, but in virtually all of
t hem. Communi st parties, by contrast, have become poli-
tically st rong primarily in a certain range of semi peri pheral
and peri pheral zones, and have come t o power (sometimes
by insurrection, but somet i mes as a result of military occu-
pation by t he USSR) only in these zones. The only West ern
countries in which Communi st parties have been relatively
st rong for a long peri od of t i me are France, Italy, and Spain,
and it should be not ed that Italy and Spain might well be
considered semiperipheral. In any case, t he parties in these
three states have long since shed any insurrectionary inclin-
ations.
We are therefore in the 1980s faced with t he following
political history of t he moder n world. Social-democratic
parties have in fact achieved their pri mary political objec-
tive, comi ng to power in a relatively large number of core
states. Communi st parties have in fact come to power in a
significant number of semiperipheral and peripheral coun-
tries concent rat ed geographically in a band that runs
from Eastern Eur ope to East and Southeast Asia. And in
t he rest of the world, in many of t he countries, nationalist
somet i mes even "radical nationalist" or "national liber-
ation" movement s have come to power. In short, seen
from t he vantage point of 1848, t he success of t he anti-
systemic movement s has been very impressive i ndeed.
The Unfulfilled Revolution
How are we to appreciate t he consequences? In gross terms,
we can see two consequences that have moved in very
33
different directions. On t he one hand, t hese movement s,
taken collectively as a sort of "family" of movement s, have
become an increasingly consequent i al el ement in t he politics
of t he world-system and have built upon t hei r achievements.
Lat er movement s have profited from t he successes of earlier
movement s by moral encouragement , exampl e, lessons in
political tactics, and direct assistance. Many concessions
have been wrested from t he worl d' s rul i ng strata.
On t he ot her hand, t he comi ng to state power of all t hese
movement s has resulted in a very wi despread sense of
unfulfilled revolution. The quest i ons have r un like this.
Have social-democratic parties achieved anyt hi ng mor e
t han some redistribution to what are in fact "mi ddl e" strata
located in core countries? Have Communi s t parties
achieved anyt hi ng mor e t han some economi c devel opment
for their count ri es? And even t hen, how much? And
furt hermore, has this not been pri mari l y to benefit t he so-
called new class of a bureaucrat i c elite? Have nationalist
movement s achieved anyt hi ng mor e t han allowing t he so-
called compr ador class a slightly larger slice of t he worl d
pie?
These are per haps not t he quest i ons t hat ought t o be
asked, or t he ma nne r i n whi ch t he issues shoul d be posed.
But in fact t hese are t he quest i ons t hat have been asked,
and very widely. Ther e is little doubt t hat t he resulting
skepticism has made deep i nroads in t he ranks of potential
and even active support ers of the worl d' s ant i syst emi c
movement s. As this skepticism began to take hol d, t here
were a numbe r of ways in whi ch it began to express itself in
ideological and organizational t erms.
The period after t he Second Wor l d Wa r was a peri od of
great success for t he historic ant i syst emi c movement s.
Social democracy became firmly ensconced in t he West . It
is less t hat the social-democratic parties came to be seen as
one of t he alternating groups whi ch coul d legitimately
govern t han t hat the mai n pr ogr am of t he social democrat s,
34
t he wel fare state, came t o be accept ed by even t he con-
servative parties, if no doubt begrudgi ngl y. Aft er all, even
Ri char d Ni xon sai d: " We are all Keynesi ans now. "
Communi s t parties, of course, came to power in a whol e
series of states. And t he post-1945 peri od saw one long
process of decolonization, punct uat ed by some dramat i c,
politically i mpor t ant ar med struggles, such as Vi et nam,
Algeria, and Ni caragua.
Nonetheless, by t he 1960s, and even mor e by t he 1970s,
t here began to occur a "break with t he past" with t he rise of
a new kind of antisystemic movement (or movement s
within t he movement s) in worl d-regi onal locales as diverse
as Nor t h Ameri ca, J apan, Europe, Chi na, and Mexi co. The
st udent , Black, and ant i war movement s i n t he Uni t ed
States; t he st udent movement s i n J apan and Mexi co; t he
l abor and st udent movement s i n Europe; t he Cul t ural
Revolution in Chi na; and as of t he 1970s t he women' s
movement s; did not have identical roots or even common
effects. Each one was located in political and economi c
processes shaped by the part i cul ar and different histories,
and by t he different positions in t he world-system of t he
locales in whi ch they arose and worked themselves out. Yet,
by world-historical st andards, t hey occurred i n t he same
period and, moreover, they shared some common ideo-
logical t hemes t hat clearly set t hem apart from earlier
varieties of antisystemic movement s.
Thei r al most si mul t aneous occurrence can largely be
traced to t he fact t hat t he movement s of t he late 1960s were
preci pi t at ed by a common catalyst: t he escalation of t he
anti-imperialist war in Vi et nam. Thi s escalation posed an
i mmedi at e t hreat to t he established patterns of life, and to
t he very lives not only of t he Vi et namese but of Amer i can
yout h as well, and t he war posed a clear t hreat to t he
security of t he Chi nese people. As for Eur opean yout h and
workers, while no i mmedi at e t hreat was posed to t hei r lives
and security, t he indirect effects of t he escalation (world
35
monet ar y crisis, intensification of mar ket compet i t i on, and
so on) and t he ideological spill-overs f r om t he movement s in
t he Uni t ed States, from t he Cul t ural Revol ut i on i n Chi na,
and from t he struggle of t he Vi et namese peopl e soon
provided enough reasons and rationalizations for rebellion.
Taken together, all these movement s and their Viet-
namese epicenter were i mpor t ant in disclosing a basic
asymmet ry in t he power of systemic and ant i syst emi c forces
on a world scale. The asymmet ry was most dramat i cal l y
exemplified on t he battlefields themselves. Following t he
precedent of t he Chi nese war of national liberation, t he
Vi et namese showed how a nat i onal -l i berat i on movement
could, by shifting the confront at i on with convent i onal
armi es ont o nonconvent i onal terrains (as in guerrilla
warfare), erode and eventually di si nt egrat e t he social,
political, and military position of cumber s ome i mperi al
forces. Fr om this point of view, t he ot her movement s (par-
ticularly t he US ant i war movement ) were part and parcel of
this asymmet ri cal relation: to different degrees and in dif-
ferent ways, t hey showed how t he shift of t he confront at i on
bet ween systemic and antisystemic forces ont o non-
convent i onal t errai n was st rengt heni ng t he latter and
hamper i ng/ par al yzi ng t he former.
The out come and implications of t he combi ned and
uneven devel opment of t he antisystemic movement s of t he
1960s and 1970s must be assessed at different levels.
Locally, t he Vi et nam war had a very "convent i onal "
out come: t he comi ng to state power of a "classical" anti-
systemic movement , and t he subsequent st rengt heni ng of
t he bur eaucr at i c st ruct ure of t hi s state. Assessed f r om this
angle, at t he nat i onal level t he out come of t he Vi et namese
nat i onal -l i berat i on movement di d not differ significantly
from t he earlier kinds of antisystemic movement s (national
and social). Globally, however, t he Vi et nam war was a t urn-
ing poi nt in disclosing t he limits of military actions in
coercing t he peri phery into a hierarchical world order.
36
Thes e limits and t hei r recogni t i on were t he out come not
only of t he confront at i on on t he battlefields but also, and
possibly to a greater degree, of t he movement s unl eashed
elsewhere in t he world-system. It was t he nat ur e of t hese
ot her movement s t hat most clearly mar ked a depar t ur e
from, and a count erposi t i on to, earlier pat t erns of anti-
systemic movement s. To varying degrees, t he Cul t ural Revo-
lution i n Chi na, t he st udent movement s i n t he West, J apan,
and Mexi co, and t he "aut onomi st " workers' movement s i n
Eur ope t ook as one of t hei r t hemes t he limits and dangers of
t he est abl i shment and consolidation of bur eaucr at i c struc-
t ures by t he movement s themselves, and this was new.
The Cul t ural Revolution was largely directed against t he
bureaucrat i c power of t he Communi s t Party and, whatever
its failures from ot her poi nt s of view, its mai n achi evement
has been precisely to have prevent ed, or at least slowed
down, t he consol i dat i on of part y bur eaucr at i c power in
Chi na. The st udent and yout h movement s t hat cr opped up
in t he most diverse contexts wer e generally directed not
only against t he various bur eaucr at i c powers t hat tried t o
cur b and repress t he m (states, universities, parties) but also
against all at t empt s t o channel t hem t oward t he format i on
of new, and t he st rengt heni ng of old, bur eaucr at i c organ-
izations. Al t hough t he new workers' movement s generally
ended up by st rengt heni ng bur eaucr at i c organi zat i ons
(mostly unions), nonetheless t he prot agoni st s of t hese "new"
movement s showed an unpr ecedent ed awareness of t he fact
t hat bur eaucr at i c organizations such as uni ons were bound
to develop interests of t hei r own t hat mi ght differ in
i mpor t ant respects f r om t hose of t he workers t hey claimed
t o represent . What this meant , concretely, was t hat t he
i nst rument al at t i t ude of uni ons and parties vis-a-vis t he
movement was mat ched and count ered t o an unpre-
cedent ed extent by an i nst rument al at t i t ude on t he part of
t he movement vis-a-vis uni ons and parties.
Th e ant i -bureaucrat i c t hrust of t he movement s of t he
37
1960s and early 1970s can be t raced to t hree mai n ten-
dencies: t he t r emendous wi deni ng and deepeni ng of the
power of bureaucrat i c organi zat i ons as a result of t he pre-
vious wave of antisystemic movement s; the decreasi ng
capabilities of such organi zat i ons to fulfill the expect at i ons
on whi ch t hei r emer gence and expansi on had been based;
and the increasing efficacy of direct forms of action, that is,
forms unmedi at ed by bureaucrat i c organi zat i ons. On t he
fi rst t wo tendencies, not hi ng needs t o be added t o what has
al ready been said concerni ng t he successes a nd limits of t he
earlier movement s, except t o point out t hat t he reactivation
of mar ket compet i t i on under US hegemony since the
Second Wor l d Wa r had furt her t i ght ened t he worl d-
economy constraints within whi ch states acted.
As for the increasing efficacy of direct forms of action, t he
t endency concerns mai nl y t he l abor movement a nd was
rooted in the joint i mpact of two key t rends of the worl d-
economy: the t rend t oward an increasing commodi fi cat i on
of l abor power and the t r end t owar d increasing division of
l abor and mechani zat i on. In t he previous stage, l abor
movement s came t o rely on per manent bur eaucr at i c organ-
izations ai mi ng at the seizure or control of state power for
two mai n reasons. First, these l abor movement s were
largely at the begi nni ng the expression of artisans and craft
workers who had been or were about t o be prol et ari ani zed
but whose bargai ni ng power vis-a-vis empl oyers still
depended on t hei r craft skills. As a consequence, t hese
wor ker s had an overwhel mi ng interest i n restricting t he
suppl y of, and expandi ng t he de ma nd for, their skills. Thi s,
i n t ur n, requi red t rade-uni on organi zat i ons ori ent ed t o t he
preservation of craft-work roles in t he l abor process on t he
one hand, and to control over t he acquisition of craft skills
on t he ot her. Like all organi zat i ons t hat at t empt to repro-
duce "artificially" (that is, in opposi t i on to historical ten-
dencies) a scarcity t hat affords monopol i st i c quasi -rent s,
these craft or craft-oriented uni ons ultimately depended for
38
their success on t he ability to use state power to restrain
empl oyer s from profi t i ng from t he operat i ons of the market .
The artificial (that is, nonmar ket ) restraints were twofold:
state rules about workers' pay and condi t i ons; state legiti-
mat i on of uni oni zat i on a nd collective bargai ni ng.
The second and mor e i mpor t ant reason for the previous
reliance of l abor movement s on per manent bur eaucr at i c
organi zat i ons aiming at state power was related to t he
quest i on of alliances and hegemony. In most nat i onal
locales, the struggle bet ween l abor and capital took pl ace in
a context characterized by the existence of wide strata of
peasant s and mi ddl e classes which coul d be mobi l i zed
politically to support ant i -l abor st at e policies, and eco-
nomi cal l y to enhance compet i t i on within t he ranks of labor.
Under t hese ci rcumst ances l abor could obtain l ong-t erm
victories only by neut ral i zi ng or wi nni ng over to its side
significant fractions of these strata. And this coul d not be
achieved t hr ough spont aneous a nd di rect action, whi ch
of t en had t he effect of alienating t he strata in quest i on.
Rat her , it requi red a political pl at form t hat woul d appeal to
peasant s and the mi ddl e strata, and an organization t hat
woul d el aborat e and pr opagandi ze t hat pl at form.
By the 1960s radical changes had occurred from bot h
poi nt s of view, in core regions and in many semi peri pheral
countries. Th e great advances in the technical division of
l abor and in mechani zat i on of the i nt erwar and post war
years had destroyed or peri pheral i zed in the l abor process
the craft skills on whi ch l abor' s organi zed power had pre-
viously rested. At the same time, t hese very advances had
endowed l abor with a new power: the power to inflict large
losses on capital by di srupt i ng a highly integrated and
mechani zed l abor process. In exercising this power, l abor
was far less dependent on an organi zat i on external to t he
workpl ace (as t r ade uni ons generally were), since what really
mat t er ed was the capacity to exploit the i nt erdependenci es
and net works creat ed by capital itself in the workpl ace.
39
Moreover, t he increased commodi fi cat i on of l abor had
depl et ed t he locally available st rat a of peasant s t hat coul d
be effectively and competitively mobi l i zed t o under mi ne t he
political and economi c power of labor. As for t he mi ddl e
strata, t he unpr ecedent ed spread and radicalism of t he
st udent movement s were sympt oms of t he deepeni ng
commodi f i cat i on of t he l abor power of t hese strata, and of
t he greater difficulties of mobi l i zi ng t hem against t he l abor
movement . (Thi s process was reflected in an extensive liter-
at ur e of t he 1960s on t he "new worki ng class.") It follows
t hat t he pr obl em of alliances and hegemony was less cent ral
t han in t he past and that, as a consequence, l abor' s depen-
dence on per manent bur eaucr at i c organi zat i ons for t he
success of its struggles was f ur t her r educed.
As we have seen, for many persons t he concl usi on to be
dr awn f r om this analysis is t hat t he ant i syst emi c movement s
have "failed" or, even worse, were "co-opted. " Th e change
from "capitalist state" to "socialist state, " for many who
t hi nk i n t hese t erms, has not had t he t r ansf or mi ng effects on
worl d history t he reconst i t ut i ng of t raj ect ori es of growt h
t hat t hey had believed it woul d have. And t he change
f r om colony to state, whet her by revolution or by nego-~
tiation, has lacked not only t he world-historical effects but
also, in most instances, even t he i nt ernal redi st ri but i on of
wel l -bei ng so pr omi nent in t he pr ogr ams of t hese move-
ment s. Social democracy has succeeded no bet t er. Every-
wher e it finds its occupancy of state power merel y a
medi at i ng presence one const rai ned by t he processes of
accumul at i on on a worl d scale and by t he twin requi re-
ment s of government s: bur yi ng t he dead and cari ng for t he
wounded, whet her peopl e or propert y. To t he chagri n of
some, t he appl ause of others, t he one coordi nat ed effort
t owar d a worl d revolution, t he Comi nt er n/ Comi nf or m,
col l apsed compl et el y under t he di si nt egrat i ng weight of
cont i nui ng state f or mat i on at all t he l ocat i ons of its oper-
at i ons its historical cent er, its loci of s ubs equent success,
40
its other national arenas of strength, its poi nt s of margi nal
presence. Wi t hout exception, all current Communi st
parties are concerned first with domest i c conditions and
only secondarily if at all with world revolution.
The Transformed Historical Ground
We, on the ot her hand, contend, as we said, t hat from t he
vantage poi nt of 1848 the success of t he ant i syst emi c move-
ment s has been very impressive i ndeed. Moreover, that
success does not di m in t he least when viewed from t he
vantage point of today. Rat her t he opposite. For without
such an appreciation, one cannot underst and where t he
nonconventional terrain opened up by t he most recent
forms of antisystemic movement has come from historically
and where therefore the movement s seem likely to go in t he
historical future.
At the same time, however, t he antisystemic movement s
are of course not the only agencies to have altered t he
ground on which and t hrough which current and fut ure
movement s must continually form and operate. Those they
would destroy the organizing agencies of t he accumu-
lationjorocess have also been at work, owing partly to an
"i nner logic," partly to t he very successes of t he movement s
and hence to the continually t ransformed historical ground
which t hat "logic" has as its field of operation and contra-
diction. Above all, the ongoing structural t ransformat i on of
the capitalist worl d-economy has in effect opened up t he
locations in its overall operation where t he process of class
struggle is proving formative of the sides of conflict, and
polarizing in the relations so formed.
In t he course of t he twentieth century, i ndeed defining it,
a massive sea-change has been occurri ng in the social
relations of accumul at i on. In a sentence, t he relational
networks forming the t runk lines of t he circuits of capital
41
have been so structurally t r ansf or med t hat the very work-
ings of t he accumul at i on process appear to be historically
altered. It is this ongoi ng t ransformat i on t hat has cont i nu-
ally r emade t he relational condi t i ons bot h of the organizing
agencies of accumul at i on (by definition) and of those in
f undament al struggle with t hem, t he antisystemic move-
ment s; and so have continually r emade as well t he
relational charact er of t he struggle itself and hence t he
nat ur e of the movement s defi ned by it. To retrace the steps:
the life cycles of t he various movement s have been a part of
and have hel ped t o f or m t he st ruct ural shift; hence t he
relational struggles defi ni ng t he movement s as antisystemic;
hence t he movement s themselves and the trajectories t hat
make t hem antisystemic. We depict t he ongoi ng t rans-
format i on here by out l i ni ng t hree of its faces in t he form of
structural t rends.
In one guise t he t ransformat i on appears as si mul t a-
neously an increasing "stateness" of t he worl d' s peoples (the
number of "sovereign states" having mor e t han tripled
dur i ng t he twentieth cent ury) and an increasingly dense
organi zat i on of the interstate system. Today virtually t he
whol e of t he globe' s nearly five billion peopl e are politically
part i t i oned into t he subject popul at i ons of t he hundr ed-
and-sixty or so states of an interstate system, whi ch cont ai ns
a large numbe r of formal i nt erst at e organi zat i ons. Thi s
mi ght be called t he wi deni ng of stateness. The deepeni ng of
stateness is anot her mat t er. Her e essentially we have in
mi nd t he growi ng "st rengt h" of state agenci es vis-a-vis local
bodi es (within or intersecting with the state' s j uri sdi ct i on).
Measur es of this are of many sorts, f r om t he vol umi nous
expansi on of laws and of agencies to enforce t hem, t hr ough
cent ral -government taxes as growi ng proport i ons of
measur ed domest i c or nat i onal product , t o t he st ruct ural
expansi on of kinds of state agency, t he geographi cal spread
of their locations of operat i on, and t he growi ng proport i on
of t he l abor force formed by their empl oyees. Moreover, like"
42
i nt ernat i onal airports ar ound t he world, and for anal ogous
if deeper reasons, t he organi zat i onal f or m of stateness (the
compl ex array of hierarchies formi ng t he appar at us of
admi ni st rat i on) has everywhere virtually t he same anat omy,
t he differences f r om place to place bei ng of t he order of vari-
ations on a t heme. They are variations t hat no doubt mat t er
a great deal to t he subjects of state power, but , world-
historically, they are nonet hel ess only variations and not
qualitative depar t ur es in form.
One f i nal poi nt shoul d per haps be not ed here. Muc h has
been made of t he extent to which, following t he accessions
to power of social a nd/ or nat i onal antisystemic movement s,
a mar ked increase in t he st ruct ural "cent ral i zat i on" of t he
state has occurred, t hat is, a mar ked increase in what we' re
calling here t he deepeni ng of stateness. And, exami ni ng t he
t rends in state format i on within t he j uri sdi ct i ons severally,
one at a time, one does see that. However, wat chi ng the
overall t rend in state format i on in the moder n world as a
singular historical system over t he course of t he t went i et h
cent ury, one woul d be har d put t o at t ri but e t he overall
t rend to any such "i nt ernal " processes or, for t hat mat t er,
even to t he interrelated successes of t he part i cul ar social and
nat i onal movement s const rued collectively as but part i cul ar
emanat i ons of a si ngul ar compl ex historical process of t he
moder n world-system. For even in locations where, seen in
t hat way, t he world-historical process has been manifestly
weakest (the movement s least apparent l y successful), t he
structural t rend in state format i on is no less appar ent t han
elsewhere.
Of even mor e i mport ance here, in some ways, is t he still
far great er growth in the density of t he interstate system.
J us t using t he simplest of assumpt i ons, and reasoning
purely formally from t he fourfold increase in t he number of
states, t here is a sixteenfold increase in their relations with
one anot her. But t hat of course barely scratches the surface.
The kinds of specialized relations among t he states of t he
43
interstate system have expanded nearly as muc h as the
ki nds of internal state agency. Added to this t here are over a
dozen specialized Uni t ed Nat i ons agencies (in each of
whi ch most states are related as member s) and a very large
numbe r of regional i nt ernat i onal organi zat i ons (such as
OECD, OPEC, ASEAN, COMECON, NATO, OAU, and
so on). If one goes beyond t he existence of t he vol umi nous
set of interstate relations to the frequency with whi ch
t hey' re activated, via meet i ngs, postal mail, cable, tele-
phone, and now, increasingly, electronic mail, the density
of t he interstate system' s relational net work t oday is
probabl y several times great er t han t he compar abl e density
of t he official intrastate relational net work of t he most
advanced and centrally admi ni st er ed count ry of a cent ury
ago (say, France).
One result is an enmeshi ng within each state' s operat i ons
of t he "internal" and "external" relational webs and
processes to such an extent t hat t he distinction itself, except
per haps for bor der crossings of peopl e and goods, begins to
lose substantive force (in cont radi ct i on to its nomi nal force,
whi ch is i ncreased with every treaty signed, every package
assessed for dut y by cust oms, every post age st amp issued).
Hence, to a degree and extent never envisioned by t he
successful social and nat i onal movement s when they
eventually gai ned state power, bot h what agencies of a state
admi ni st er internally, and how they do this, is increasingly
det er mi ned, to use a Weber pairing, not aut onomousl y (as
befits sovereignty) but het eronomousl y (as befits what?).
A second result, and one of no less i mpor t ance to our
subject the current and fut ure t errai n on, t hrough, and
against whi ch present and fut ure ant i syst emi c movement s
are and will be operat i ng is the degree to whi ch virtually
all i nt errel at i ons among peoples in different state j uri s-
dictions have become di mensi ons of t hei r respective states'
relations with one anot her . Thi s is not j ust a mat t er of
travelers obt ai ni ng passport s and visas and passing t hr ough
44
emi grat i on and i mmi grat i on aut hori t i es, or of packages
having to be sent with export and i mport permi t s and be
dul y processed, and so fort h. These i nt erst at e procedures,
whi ch daily r e- announce t he borders of t he respective j uri s-
dictions of each const i t uent state, are but medi at i ons of t he
movement of people, goods, and capital, and have been
pract i ced for a r at her long t i me.
The "openness" or "closure" of a state' s borders to such
movement s, however we not e parent het i cal l y in passing
has always been less a mat t er of t hat state' s policies
"t oward t he world" t han of its location in t he hierarchical
orderi ng i nherent in the capitalist worl d-economy' s inter-
state system. Thi s location is det er mi ned not merely by
academi ci ans but by demonst r at ed or credi bl e relational
strengths, practical condi t i ons effected by rul i ng classes.
Rat her it is a mat t er of t he interstate system' s appropri at i ng
all manner of direct and circuitous relations among peopl e
of different count ri es (state j uri sdi ct i ons) whet her
religious, scientific, commerci al , artistic, financial, lin-
guistic, civilizational, educat i onal , literary, productive,
probl em-focused, historical, philosophical, ad infinitum
such t hat they all become, at t he very least, medi at ed, mor e
oft en actually organi zed, by t he count er par t agencies of
different states t hr ough t hei r est abl i shed or newly f or med
relations with one anot her . The effect is to subor di nat e t he
interrelations among the worl d' s peopl es not to raisons
d'etat, a practice wi t h whi ch all of us are all too familiar, but
to raisons du systeme d'etats, a practice with whi ch most of us
are all too unfami l i ar.
Ther e is, we shoul d briefly note, a set of consequent i al
historical cont radi ct i ons bei ng f or med t hr ough this recre-
ation of all varieties of social relations into net works within
either inter- or intrastate frameworks. Many kinds of
communi t y in the sense of communi t i es of believers/
pract i t i oners form in a way "worl ds" of t hei r own in
relation to, in distinction from, and oft en in conflict with all
45
others; that is, those who are not of t hei r communi t y, who
ar e nonbelievers or nonpractitioners, hence nonmember s.
These are often large, encompassi ng worlds: the Islamic
world; t he scientific world; t he African worl d (or, in t he
Uni t ed States today, t he Black world); t he women' s world;
the workers" or proletarian world; and so forth. It is far from
evident t hat such communi t i es of consciousness can even
persist, much less grow, within the structurally developing
inter- and intrastate framework. Th e kind of contradiction
not ed here marks to an even greater extent t he popul ar
peace and environmental movement s, but t hat is because
they ar e perforce, in today' s world, state-oriented; whereas
the communi t i es of consciousness we have in mi nd elab-
orat e themselves i ndependent l y of stateness (hence,
however, in contradiction to it and to interstateness, rat her
t han t hrough t hem).
Division of Labor, Centralization of Capital
We have dwelt at length on but one face of t he ongoing
structural transformation of t he capitalist worl d-economy;
that seen t hrough a focus on t he pl ane of t he interstate
system and its constituent units, the states, and their
relations with one anot her. We have done so for two
reasons. One is t he seemingly endur i ng disposition, on t he
part of historical social scientists, to carry forward all
evidence to the contrary not wi t hst andi ng t he liberal
ideological distinction between "state" and "economy, " or
"state" and "market " in some versions, as if t hese were
f undament al theoretical categories. The ot her is t he equally
prevalent, al t hough apparent l y less i mpermeabl e, dispo-
sition to imagine again, all evidence, to t he contrary
not wi t hst andi ng that the capitalist worl d-economy has
evolved rather as an onion grows, from a core of small and
local beginnings t hrough successively larger rings until t he
46
out er peri pheral skin is formed, all by virtue of, in this view,
t he self-expansion of capital t hr ough its increasing sub-
ordi nat i on of labor.
We t urn now t o much briefer observat i ons on t wo mor e
faces of this t ransformat i on. A second face is in the organ-
ization of t he structuring of anot her pl ane of t he capitalist
worl d-economy' s operat i on, t he axial division of l abor. Thi s
is t he compl ex of i nt errel at ed pr oduct i on/ t r anspor t at i on
processes t hat is so ordered t hat t he surpl us-val ue created in
t he course of product i on a nd t ransport at i on is, historically,
di sproport i onat el y appropri at ed at t he organi zi ng cent ers of
t he mul t i pl e and more-or-less lengthy chains or net works of
dependent product i on processes. Th e relational pat t erns
this orderi ng entails are t hereby r epr oduced and, for
addi t i onal reasons, t hei r reproduct i on has cyclically deep-
ened t he differences in product i ve capacity bet ween t he
organi zi ng cent er or core port i ons of t he axial division of
l abor and its increasingly peri pheral i zed port i ons. In t he
t went i et h cent ury, t he under l yi ng t ransformat i on has
effected some truly massive al t erat i ons in t he const i t uent
relations of t he compl ex coreperiphery axis and hence in
t he mappi ng of their respective global zones, t he results of
whi ch generally rendered as if t he result of state policies
ar e broadl y known. Of mor e i mmedi at e interest is t he
ext raordi nary growt h in recent decades of a l ong-st andi ng
agency of t he organi zi ng cent er or core of t he socialization
of product i on (hence of l abor) on a worl d scale; namel y,
what is currently called t he mul t i nat i onal or t ransnat i onal
firm. In a sentence, many relations among materially
dependent product i on processes t hat had been exchange
relations or, if newly formed, coul d have been under
ot her condi t i ons (and so of, or potentially of, market -
organi zed net works of commodi t y flows) became t rans-
formed into (or, if new, formed as) i nt rafi rm relations. Th e
el ement al ar r angement centralizations of capital, in t he
form of firms, ent repreneuri al l y organi zi ng geographically
47
extensive and technically compl ex (for t he t i me) chai ns of
related pr oduct i on operat i ons is hardl y new. It was, after
all, what di st i ngui shed t he chart ered mer chant (sic!)
compani es of the seventeenth and ei ght eent h cent uri es f r om
ot her capitalized operat i ons. But in recent decades this "ele-
ment al ar r angement " of t he capitalist wor l d- economy has
been increasingly const i t ut ed on a scale, and in a form of
bot h organi zat i on and product i on, t hat is historically orig-
inal. The t ransnat i onal corporat i ons' reconst ruct i on of t he
world-scale division and integration of l abor processes
f undament al l y alters the historical possibilities of what are
still referred to, and not yet even nostalgically, as "nat i onal
economi es. "
A third face of t he ongoi ng st ruct ural t r ansf or mat i on we
are sketchily addressi ng here shows itself, so to speak, in t he
massive centralization of capital of t he post war decades.
Slowly, haltingly, but mor e and mor e definitely, t he cent ral
agency of capitalist accumul at i on on a worl d scale, a worl d
ruling class in format i on, is organizing a relational st ruct ure
for cont i nual l y resolving t he massive cont radi ct i ons,
increasingly appar ent bet ween the t ransnat i onal corpor-
at i ons' control over, and hence responsibility for, t he inter-
relations among product i ve processes and t he mul t i pl e
states' cont rol over, and hence responsibility for, t he l abor
forces these pr oduct i on processes engage, mor e or less
sporadically.
Thi s st ruct ure bei ng organi zed is basically a sort of
repl acement , at a "hi gher level" of course, for t he late-
l ament ed colonial empi res, whose demi se t he nat i onal
movement s sought and t he new hegemoni c power, t he
Uni t ed States, r equi r ed. Thr ough t hose ar r angement s, and
such cousi ns of t hem as t he Chi nese concessi ons and t he
Ot t oma n capi t ul at i ons, t he axial division of l abor had been
furt hered and, subj ect to the very syst em' s st ruct ural cycles,
assured. The twentieth cent ury' s thirty-years' war (1914
45), insofar as it was about those ar r angement s, resolved t he
48
quest i on of hegemoni c power (a Uni t ed States versus
Ger many fight, it was t hen underst ood) but left for invention
the means of its exercise and, with t hat , t he per pet uat i on of
bot h the axial division of l abor and t he necessary mul t i pl e
sovereignties, t hr ough whi ch t he interstate system and
hence t he relations of hegemony operat ed.
The invention was a long t i me in comi ng and seems to
have emerged fully only, as we said earlier, aft er t he narrow-
ness of t he limits of great -power military force had finally
been established by t he Vi et namese for all to see. Cr udel y
put, what seems to have been going on, by way of a struc-
tural repl acement of t he colonial empi res, has been t he
si mul t aneous growt h in massive cent ral i zat i ons of capital
and a sort of deconcent rat i on of capital (called dei ndust ri al -
ization in present core areas of t he axial division of labor).
Th e massive centralization has as its agencies qui t e small ad
hoc steering commi t t ees of consortia, each composed of
several hundr ed banks worki ng in close relations bot h with
central banks and with i nt ernat i onal agencies, not abl y t he
I BRD, and IMF, and t he BIS. Th e centralization here i s at
t he money poi nt in the circuit of capital, and t he borrowers
are not directly capitalist ent r epr eneur s but are instead
states, whi ch in t urn use t he more-or-less encumber ed
credits to work with t ransnat i onal s, operat i ng with undi s-
t ri but ed surpl uses in various "devel opment " projects,
whi ch, as they are realized materially, amount to what is
called by some "Thi r d Wor l d i ndust ri al i zat i on" and result
in precisely the "dei ndust ri al i zat i on" of previously core
areas.
Thi s face of t he t ransformat i on does suggest reconsider-
ing the theoretically pr esumed concat enat i on of central-
ization and concent rat i on of capital. But even mor e it
suggests reconcept ual i zi ng t he fundamental nat ur e of t he
accumul at i on process as it is f r amed t hr ough t he i dea of t he
circuits of capital. For when t he i ndebt ed states r un into
t roubl e, one of t he agencies of this ar r angement , t he I MF,
49
steps forward with austerity plans, the gist and subst ance of
which amount to lowering the costs, now internationally
reckoned, of the daily and generat i onal reproduct i on of t he
l abor forces of (within?) each of t he count ri es.
The ar r angement is not per se historically new one
t hi nks of the Ot t oman capitulations, for exampl e but it is
far mor e massive and, as a st ruct ural array of processes of
t he world-system, far mor e frequent i n occurrence and tell-
ing in its implications for the st ruct uri ng of t he accumu-
lation process as such.
Toget her these three facets of the ongoi ng st ruct ural
t ransformat i on of the moder n world-system, all of whi ch
reveal, to a greater or lesser extent, t he st ruct ural sur r ound
of t he state power seized or occupi ed by ant i syst emi c move-
ment s in the course of the twentieth cent ury, and indicate
the degree and kind of reconstitution of t errai n with whi ch
present a nd fut ure movement s of a like sort have to
cont end. They indicate as well t hough this is not here a
central concern of ours the anachr oni sm of the cont ent s
we give to the concepts with which we commonl y work.
The di l emmas of the antisystemic movement s are thus in
some measur e the uni nt ended pr oduct of a sort of false
consciousness on the part, not of toadies nor even of hair-
splitters, but of the most engaged of the intelligentsia.
Ther e remai ns a mat t er to end on here to raise as a
sort of coda for not hi ng before has directly prefigured it.
Thi s is t he ongoing t ransformat i on of communi cat i ons
networks. The Communist Manifesto observes: "And t hat
uni on, to attain whi ch the bur gher s of the Mi ddl e Ages,
with their mi serabl e highways, requi red centuries, the
moder n proletarians, t hanks to railways, achieve in a few
years. " It is now nearl y a cent ur y and a half since t hat was
written. That sent ence has lost none of its force. But it must
be under st ood cont emporari l y. In the Uni t ed States, in t he
1960s, what effected t he interrelation of the hundr ed- and-
fifty or so Black demonst rat i ons and the even mor e numer -
50
Dilemmas of Antisystemic Movements
ous publ i c forms of t he ant i war movement was television,
which is why the commandi ng officer of the Gr enada oper-
at i on ( Gr enada: less t han half the size in territory and
people of an upst at e New York count y) correctly, from the
US government ' s poi nt of view, decreed t here was to be no
accompanyi ng news coverage of t he invasion. The kind of
concern flagged in the Manifesto, t he mat eri al means of
unity among those geographically separate, remai ns
central. The means themselves, and the very form of t hei r
materiality, have been f undament al l y t r ansf or med. Mor e
a nd mor e ant i syst emi c movement s will find t hei r own cohe-
sion a nd coherence forged a nd dest royed by the newest of
t he means of medi at i ng social relations.
Wher e t hen are we? We are massively, seriously in
urgent need of reconst ruct i ng the strategy, perhaps the
ideology, per haps the organizational st ruct ure of the family
of worl d antisystemic movement s; if we are to cope effec-
tively with the real di l emmas before which we are placed, as
the "stateness" of states and the "capitalist" nat ur e of capi-
talism grow at an incredible pace. We know this creates
objective cont radi ct i ons for the system as such and for the
manager s of the status quo. But it creates di l emmas for t he
antisystemic movement s al most as grave. Th u s we cannot
count on the "aut omat i ci t y" of progress; t hus we cannot
abandon critical analysis of our real historical alternatives.
51
The Liberation of Class
Struggle?
Over the past few decades the rel at i onshi p bet ween nat i onal
liberation and class conflict bet ween nat i onal -l i berat i on
struggles and prol et ari an-l i berat i on struggles has been
present ed in three broadly differing ways. The national
struggle has been seen as a form, or even the form, of the
class struggle on a world scale. Th e nat i onal struggle has
been t hought of as anal ogous to the class struggle because a
revolutionary movement may organi ze the oppressed in
each case and, with victory, effect f undament al changes in
the world-scale social st ruct uri ng of t he accumul at i on
process. The nat i onal struggle and the class struggle have
also been seen as rel at ed historically, and so theoretically,
but as different in ki nd because their historical trajectories
differ, the one t oward r epr oduci ng the capitalist worl d-
economy by ext endi ng and deepeni ng its interstate pl ane of
operations, t he ot her t oward el i mi nat i ng t he capitalist
worl d-economy by el i mi nat i ng its defi ni ng bour geoi s -
prol et ari an relation. The first we think of as t he ideological
concept i on of t he relation (bet ween t he nat i onal struggle
and the class struggle); the second, as t he political con-
cept i on; the t hi rd, as t he hi st ori cal -t heoret i cal concept i on.
53
We seek below to explicate t hese prefat ory remarks in
t hree ways. First, we shall sketch t he rise and subsi dence or
qui escence of national liberation as a world-historical
organi zi ng or better, reorgani zi ng force. Second, we
shall seek to clarify t he differences bet ween, on t he one
hand t he "vertical" relation and class categories formed by
t he class struggle, and on t he ot her hand t he "hori zont al "
relations of compet i t i on among and bet ween "political"
leaderships and "economi c" l eadershi ps t hat are often
conf ounded with t he "vertical" relations, bot h practically
and theoretically. Thi r d, we shall briefly out l i ne t he
devel opment al processes that make t he class struggle an
increasingly overt and rami fyi ng force for t he t rans-
format i on of t he moder n worl d-syst em, while at t he same
t i me operat i ng in cont radi ct i on to its objectives by confi ni ng
excessively its expression to changes in t he relational struc-
tures of t he interstate system.
Th e struggle for nat i onal liberation as we have come t o
know it has a long history. Nat i onal liberation from what ?
Obviously, t he answer is nat i onal liberation f r om t he
unequal relations among di fferent zones of t he moder n
world-system. Thi s system has taken, as we know, t he form
of a capitalist worl d-economy, whi ch has expanded in space
over time, i ncorporat ed zones previously external to it,
subordi nat ed t hem (economically, politically, and cul-
turally), and held t hem tightly within an i nt egrat ed whole.
On e of t he f undament al ideological t hemes of all moder n
nationalism has been t he struggle for equal i t y bot h t he
hypothetical equality of all member s of t he "nat i on" and t he
demand for equal i t y with "out si de" oppressor st at es/
groups. (Of course, this was only one of t he t hemes. Ther e
has also been t he t heme of "uni queness" whi ch, under
certain conditions, could be t ransl at ed into a j ust i fi cat i on
for t he oppressi on of others.)
Egal i t ari an demands in t he guise of nat i onal i sm are
al ready in evidence in the ni net eent h, even the late
54
The Liberation of Class Struggle?
ei ght eent h, centuries. Th e struggle of Whi t e colonists for
i ndependence i n t he Ameri cas, t he Hai t i an revolution, t he
Spani sh resistance to Napol eon, Mehemet Ali' s effort to
"moder ni ze" Egypt , the "Spri ngt i me of the Nat i ons" in 1848,
Gari bal di and Kossut h, t he foundi ng o f t h e I ndi an Nat i onal
Congress wer e all reflections of this global t hrust .
But it is only in t he t went i et h cent ury t hat we can see
nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s as a maj or organi zat i onal
phenomenon of t he worl d-syst em. Even before t he First
Worl d War , t he political "revolutions" in Mexi co, the Ot t o-
man Empi r e, Persia, and Chi na ma de i t clear t hat , no
sooner had t he "expansi on of Eur ope" reached its apogee
(the last two decades of t he ni net eent h century), t han t he
count erpressures i mmedi at el y began t o be significant.
Th e Russi an Revol ut i on of Oct ober 1917 was no doubt a
t ur ni ng point in the political history of t he moder n world-
system. Th e Bolsheviks present ed themselves as t he pro-
tagonist of t he working-class st ruggl e for Communi s m, t he
out growt h o f t h e ni net eent h-cent ury "social movement " (at
t hat t i me largely a Eur opean movement ) of t he prol et ari at
against t he bourgeoisie. Thi s was no doubt t he case. But
from t he outset, everyone r emar ked on t he fact t hat this
"first prol et ari an revolution" had t aken place not in t he
most "advanced" capitalist count ry or count ri es (where t he
t heory had predicted it woul d happen) but in a relatively
"backwar d" zone.
Al t hough much of t he suppor t for t he revolution came
from "prol et ari ans" struggling against "bourgeoi s, " surely
one el ement of support for t he Bolsheviks took t he form of a
drive for "nat i onal liberation. " That this latter "nat i onal i st "
el ement was involved and was not always compat i bl e with
t he ot her "class" el ement i n t he Bolshevik agenda was most
poi gnant l y and significantly reflected i n t he st or my career
and eventual el i mi nat i on of Sul t an Galiev who called upon
Bolshevik leaders to redirect t hei r strategy f r om a concen-
t rat i on on Eur ope to a concent rat i on on t he "East . " Leni n
55
himself did try to bri ng t oget her the worl d' s "socialist"
movement s and the world' s "nat i onal -l i berat i on" move-
ment s in t he Congress of Baku. Ever since, the cohabi t at i on
of these two "ant i syst emi c" forces has r emai ned bot h very
real and very uneasy. In t he last fifty years it has become
mor e and mor e difficult t o separat e t he two rhetorics
(socialism and nat i onal liberation), and even t o keep t hem
organizationally separat e (as t he political histories of Chi na
and Vi et nam bot h illustrate very well). Thi s combi nat i on
has been very efficacious. Nonet hel ess, t he cohabi t at i on of
these two rhetorics, t endenci es, forces, has been at best
uneasy, at worst deepl y obscuri ng of social reality.
At one level, si nce 1945, nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s
have been magnificently successful. Almost all part s of t he
world t hat in 1945 were colonies of "met r opol i t an" states are
t oday i ndependent sovereign states, equal member s of the
Uni t ed Nat i ons. The process by whi ch this occurred was
t hreefol d. On t he one hand, in a cert ai n numbe r of states,
t here was a significant amount of organi zed ar med struggle,
which cul mi nat ed in t he comi ng to political power in the
state of t he movement that had led this ar med struggle. In
ot her states, merel y t he potential for such ar med struggle by
a movement , given t he world context of t he many ar med
struggles going on elsewhere, was enough t o enabl e t he
movement t o achieve power (usual l y by "electoral" means).
Finally, in a third set of states, precisely in or der to head off
such movement s, t he met ropol i t an power ar r anged a t rans-
fer to power of some so-called moder at e i ndi genous gr oup
(what the French called an " independance octroyee").
No doubt t her e ar e many i nst ances i n whi ch t he story
falls in t he interstices of this model . And no doubt , too, a
few such struggles for t he "t ransfer of power" are still going
on, particularly in states t hat are already "sovereign" (Sout h
Africa, various part s of Cent r al Amer i ca, and so on).
However, t he bulk of t he struggles for what mi ght be called
"formal " nat i onal liberation are now over. We ar e now abl e
56
t o look back upon what they have accompl i shed.
On t he one hand, these struggles have accompl i shed very
much. The arrogant and self-confident global racism
involved in colonialism has di sappeared or at least gone
under gr ound. Th e role of i ndi genous persons in t he politi-
cal decisions affecting the less powerful states of t he worl d is
consi derabl y great er today t han it was in 1945. The act ual
state policies of such countries have t ended to reflect this
"i ndi geni zat i on" of political deci si on-maki ng.
On the ot her hand, t he changes certainly have not been
as great as t he national-liberation movement s had anti-
cipated as of, say, 1945. Ther e are t wo ki nds of expl anat i on
for this. On e is t hat t he cont rol of t he state machi ner y of a
state (any state) in t he interstate system affords less real
power i n practice t han i t does i n t heory. Th e second i s t hat
t here ar e i nt ernal class struggles goi ng on i n t he states who
have already known "nat i onal liberation. " These two factors
are linked, but it woul d be clearer to begin t he analysis by
provisionally keepi ng t hem analytically separate.
Th e analytical quest i on: "How muc h power does one
have when one has state power?" is relatively simple to
explicate, once one distinguishes ideology f r om reality. On e
of t he ideological pri nci pl es of t he moder n i nt erst at e system
is t he totality of sovereignty. Sovereignty, or t he inde-
pendent j uri di cal status of a "state" as recognized by t he
ot her state member s of t he interstate system, means in
t heory the right of t he government of t hat state to make laws
and admi ni st er its "i nt ernal " affairs wi t hout any const rai nt s
ot her t han those t hat are self-imposed by t he state' s consti-
t ut i onal st ruct ure. In pl ai n English, every gover nment is
supposed to be abl e to do what ever it deems wise wi t hi n its
borders. However, this is in fact not t he case, even for such
powerful states as the Uni t ed States or the USSR, and a
fortiori it is not t rue for the weaker states of Asia, Africa, and
Lat i n Ameri ca.
The restraints on t he power of sovereign states are many.
57
First, t her e are those restraints t hat exist but are "illegitim-
ate." For exampl e, one restraint is t he de facto power of
outside forces to subvert openl y or to seek to modi fy sub rosa
t he policies of a given state by some form of "interference"
in t hat state' s "i nt ernal " affairs. Thi s is a familiar story. Ulti-
mat el y, such an activity can involve act ual military i nt ru-
sion. Al t hough i n some formal sense such practices are
"illegitimate" in t erms of "i nt ernat i onal law," t hey are in
fact engaged in with such frequency t hat any government
must take cogni zance of t hese possibilities if it i nt ends to
remai n in power. Hence t he threat of such illegitimate
i nt erference in practice compel s a certain "pr udence" on
sovereign states.
Since t he interstate system is normal l y t he ar ena of
known rivalries (for exampl e, at t he present time, t hat
bet ween t he Uni t ed States and t he USSR) , it is often
t hought t hat a sovereign state can "escape" t he t hreat of
i nt erference by one st rong state if it links itself politically
with t hat state' s pri nci pal rival. Thi s is to some extent t rue,
of course. To be sure, it t hen risks "i nt erference" by t he
state to whi ch it has l i nked itself, but it may consi der this
prospect less i mmedi at e and less t hreat eni ng. Th e real
quest i on is not in this prospect. Th e real quest i on lies in t he
real m of what mi ght be called t he "legitimate" const rai nt s
on t he powers of sovereign states.
What are t hese "legitimate" const rai nt s? They are t hose
t hat all t he maj or powers of t he i nt erst at e system agree de
facto to i mpose not only on t he weaker states but on t hem-
selves. They are those t hat mai nt ai n t he existence of an
interstate system. Thes e const rai nt s are mor e numer ous
t han we ordi nari l y recognize, pri mari l y because they are
sel dom codified and are somewhat amor phous and variable
in t hei r details. They i ncl ude what is somet i mes called
"civilized behavi or" among states. For exampl e, di pl omat i c
i mmuni t y is a qui t e sacred principle, rarely violated. Th e
social pr essur e to mai nt ai n this system is so st rong t hat
58
states often restrain themselves on mat t ers about whi ch they
feel very strongly in order to fulfill t hei r obligations under
this principle.
A second i mposed restraint has to do with trans-state
propert y rights. The de facto principle is t hat all states may
exercise emi nent domai n on foreign-owned propert y within
their frontiers up to a point. That point is somewhat uncl ear.
But it has not been historically t rue t hat any state coul d in
fact nat i onal i ze without any compensat i on. Many have
tried, but the count erpressures have been such that they
have all retreated in part . A rapi d look at t he practices of t he
government of t he USSR vis-a-vis forei gn-propert y rights
will make this emi nent l y clear. (We single out t he USSR
onl y to indicate t hat even a state wi t h its military mi ght and
ideology conforms to this constraint. )
A t hi rd i mposed restraint has to do with t he suppor t of
opposi t i onal movement s in other count ri es. All states (or
almost all states) engage in such support i ve actions. Some-
times t hey do it intensively. Yet they all do it only up to a
point. Ther e seems regularly to i nt r ude some limit to
comradel y assistance. Onc e agai n t he limit is uncl ear. But
t he reality is there.
If one asks how t hese i mposed "legitimate" restraints on
sovereignty really operat e, oft en even in war t i me, t he
answer has to be t hat t her e are i mpl i ed t hreat s of force
agai nst t he violators of t he nor ms, whi ch are efficacious
because they are suppor t ed by an exceptionally st rong
consensus o f t h e worl d' s states. Regi mes t hat fl aunt such a
strong consensus rarely survive very long. When, therefore,
in t he early years of a "revolutionary" government , after t he
comi ng to power of a "nat i onal -l i berat i on movement " t her e
is a faction talking about "realism, " what this faction is
ar gui ng is t he need to t ake cogni zance of t hese mechani sms
of t he interstate system. When some ot her movement
accuses a regi me t hat has deci ded to be "realistic" of bei ng
"revisionist," the accusat i on rings t rue. But t he "revision-
59
i sm" is st ruct ural , not volitional. Let us be very clear. We
are not pr eachi ng t he virtues of "real i sm" or "revisionism. "
We are merel y trying t o explain its repeat ed occurrence i n
states wher e nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s have come t o
power.
But this is of course not t he whol e story. The r e is also t he
factor of t he class struggle. As long as we live in a capitalist
worl d-economy, t here is class struggle, and it cont i nues to
exist wi t hi n all states l ocat ed wi t hi n t he worl d-syst em, no
mat t er what its political coloration. St at ement s of regi mes
t hat t here does not exist, or t her e no l onger exists, a class
struggle within t he boundar i es of t hei r state, are ideological
st at ement s devoid of analytical subst ance. Th e underl yi ng
social reality of t he class struggle cont i nues within all exist-
ing states, i ncl udi ng those where nat i onal -l i berat i on move-
ment s have come to power. The quest i on is, what is t he role
of this nat i onal -l i berat i on movement in relation to this class
struggle in t he peri od after it has come to power, or per haps
we shoul d invert t he quest i on and ask what is t he role of
class struggle in relation to ot her ki nds of st ruggl e t hat
typically charact eri ze t he capitalist worl d-economy, t he
struggle bet ween compet i ng "elites," t hat is, i nt ra-bourgeoi s
struggles.
Ther e are t wo varieties of such i nt ra-bourgeoi s struggles.
On e is t he struggle for state power or political command. Its
prot agoni st s compet e with each ot her (within and out si de of
parl i ament s, parties, state bureaucraci es, and so on) in an
at t empt to seize t he "commandi ng hei ght s" of state appar -
atuses (that al ready exist or are bei ng created ex novo) and,
once in control, to enforce t he sovereignty of t he st at e. Thi s
enf or cement involves struggles against ot her states (as
emphasi zed i n t he previous pages) but also struggle against
the state' s own subjects.
Th e out comes of t he struggle among such compet i ng
political elites for state power on t hese t hr ee front s (control
over t he state appar at us, sovereignty in t he i nt erst at e
60
system, and aut hori t y over t he state' s subjects) are
obviously closely interrelated. In t urn they are strongly
i nfl uenced by t he ot her ki nd of intra-elite struggle t hat must
also be clearly di st i ngui shed f r om t he class struggle: t he
struggle for t he appropri at i on of weal t h or economi c
c omma nd.
Th e prot agoni st s of this economi c struggle compet e with
each ot her (within and out si de of market s and economi c
organizations) to obt ai n as large a share as possible of t he
wealth pr oduced i n t he worl d-economy. The larger t he
share actually obt ai ned, t he larger t he resources t hat can be
mobilized in fut ure struggles. Since "weal t h" can be
accumul at ed mor e easily t han "state power, " economi c
c omma nd has a cumul at i ve charact er t hat is want i ng in
political command. We shall later discuss t he i mpl i cat i ons
of this difference. For now let us not e t hat t he di fference is
one of degree and t hat t he r epr oduct i on of economi c
c omma nd also involves a per manent struggle on ma ny
fronts.
At t he global level, t he essential characteristic of t he
economi c struggle is t hat each act or (normal l y but not
necessarily a capitalist enterprise) tries to force compet i t i on
upon t he ot her actors whi l e si mul t aneousl y creating for
itself a relatively prot ect ed ni che f r om whi ch a rent or a
quasi -rent (natural, positional, technological, organi zat i onal ,
and so on) can be reaped. Thi s struggle cont i nual l y struc-
t ures and rest ruct ures economi c activities i nt o core activities
(those t hat afford t he appropri at i on of a rent or a quasi -rent )
and peri pheral activities (those t hat afford no such appro-
priation). Cor e ni ches are never secure for long. As soon as
t hey are created, they invite t he direct or indirect count er-
attack of ot her economi c elites t hat have been forced by t hat
very creat i on into less competitive niches. And as t he
count erat t ack unfolds, previously core activities are
peri pheral i zed and with i t t he locales and t he organi zat i ons
t hat hang on t o t hem.
61
It follows t hat mobi l i t y (as a mo n g activities, locales,
or gani zat i onal f or ms, and so on) i s an essential r equi r ement
for t he sur vi val / r epr oduct i on of economi c elites, a nd t hi s
r equi r ement oft en t ends t o br i ng t he m i nt o conflict wi t h
political elites; despi t e t he fact t hat , at t he i ndi vi dual level,
ma ny per sons move back and fort h bet ween a political role
and an economi c one. To be sur e, t he i nt erest s of political
and economi c elites overl ap on ma ny gr ounds. Th e very
r epr oduct i on of economi c elites r equi r es t he backi ng of
political c omma nd, i f for no ot her r eason t ha n t o enforce
pr oper t y rights and cont r act ual obl i gat i ons; and whenever
t hey can, economi c elites are all t oo keen to exploit or use
political c o mma n d t o back up or creat e for t hemsel ves rent
and quasi - r ent posi t i ons.
Conversely, political elites cannot succeed in t hei r mul t i -
facet ed st ruggl e for st at e power wi t hout t he backi ng of t he
economi c c o mma n d wi el ded by economi c elites. Thi s i s
part i cul arl y t r ue in view of t he fact ment i oned earlier t hat
weal t h or economi c c o mma n d accumul at es mor e easily
t han political c omma nd. Th e i mpl i cat i on of this di fference
is t hat success a nd failure in t he st ruggl e for st at e power is
i ncreasi ngl y related t o t he act ors' capabi l i t y t o br i ng ( cumu-
lating) economi c c o mma n d t o bear upon ( noncumul at i ng)
political c omma nd.
Economi c and political elites are t hus unde r consi der abl e
pr essur e t o s har e/ exchange t he economi c a n d political
c o mma n d t hey respectively wield. As we shall see present l y,
t he pr essur e t o do so ori gi nat es not only i n t he compet i t i ve
struggles for st at e power and weal t h, but also and especially
in t he class struggle. Whe n all is said and done, however, it
r emai ns t rue, fi rst , t hat t he logic of t he st ruggl e for political
c o mma n d i s di fferent f r om t hat of t he st ruggl e for economi c
c o mma n d ; and, second, t hat this di fference is a sour ce of
conflict and struggle bet ween (as well as among) political
and economi c elites.
For one t hi ng, conflicts ar e bound t o ari se over t he
62
"t erms of exchange" bet ween political and economi c
command. The fact t hat bot h types of elite benefit f r om t he
exchange does not in and of itself det er mi ne t he t er ms at
whi ch t he two parties will agree to carry out t he exchange.
A mor e or less wi de zone of i ndet ermi nacy remai ns, and
bot h types of elite will be under t he pressure of t hei r respec-
tive competitive struggles to strike t he best possible bargai n
and, if pressed too hard, to t ransform t he bargai ni ng
process into open conflict.
What makes this t ransformat i on likely is t he fact that
political command is typically "territorial" (in t he sense t hat
it is bound to a given territory) while economi c command is
very often, and particularly for maj or actors, " t r a ns t e nt -
orial" (in t he sense t hat it operates across territories). In this
case too, t he difference bet ween t he two types of c omma nd
is one of degree. Yet is is real enough, and it leads to a
per manent struggle bet ween political and economi c elites
over t he "transterritoriality" of t he latter, t hat is, t hei r ability
to move in and out of state j uri sdi ct i ons rat her t han bei ng
per manent l y and completely subj ect ed to any one of t hem.
All t hese inter- and intra-elite struggles are often con-
fusingly discussed as t hough they were part of t he class
struggle. In our view, it is mor e useful to restrict t he concept
of class struggle to vertical conflicts t hat count er pose gr oups
and individuals in situations differently related to t he means
of pr oduct i on. Int er- and intra-elite conflicts, in cont rast ,
are typically horizontal conflicts t hat count er pose groups
and individuals related in similar ways to t he means of
pr oduct i on or to t he means of legitimate violence. As such,
they are bet t er referred to as compet i t i ve struggles and
labeled as either economi c or political intra-elite struggles
dependi ng on whet her t he pr i mar y object of t he com-
petition is wealth or state power.
Strictly speaki ng, in order to be able to speak of t he exist-
ence of class struggle, t hree condi t i ons must be fulfilled.
First, t her e is an identifiable pat t ern of collective or general-
63
ized protest. Second, t he objectives or t he f or ms of t he
protest are such t hat t he struggle is t raceabl e to a class situ-
ation (that is, a given rel at i onshi p to t he means of pro-
duct i on) of t he part i ci pant s in t he protest. Thi r d, t he
struggle derives from, or creates a count erposi t i on bet ween,
groups differently related to t he means of pr oduct i on.
Accor di ng t o t hese criteria some st ruggl es (strikes and
ot her forms of collective or generalized workpl ace prot est by
wage workers, t he wi t hol di ng of agri cul t ural surpl uses or
t he cut t i ng down of cultivation by peasant s or farmers, t he
seizure of l and by landless peasants, food riots by t he ur ban
unempl oyed, and so on) have a strong likelihood of quali-
fying as episodes of class struggle. In ot her cases ( demon-
strations, ur ban and rural guerrilla warfare, acts of
t errori sm, and so on), whet her or not t he acts of protest
qualify as episodes of t he class struggle depends, among
ot her things, on their context, protagonists, objectives, and
so on. Th e pr obl em i n t hese latter i nst ances i s t hat t he form
of st ruggl e is mor e frequent l y associated with a competitive
struggle among political elites t han it is wi t h a class struggle
in t he sense we have defi ned it.
Th e two types of struggle can of course intersect and
overlap, and t hey nor mal l y do. Qui t e oft en, t he class
st ruggl e generat es demands for l eader shi p and organi zat i on
t hat are suppl i ed ei t her by new political elites t hat emer ge
out of t he class struggle itself or by previously existing elites.
In ei t her case t he class struggle "flows out " into a compe-
titive struggle for state power. As this occurs, t he political
elites t hat provide social classes wi t h l eadershi p and organ-
ization (even if they sincerely consi der themselves "i nst ru-
ment s" of t he class struggle) usually fi nd t hat they have to
play by t he rules of t hat compet i t i on and t herefore must
at t empt t o subor di nat e t he class struggle t o t hose rules i n
order to survive as compet i t ors for st at e power. Conversely,
it oft en happens t hat t he inter- and intra-elite struggles over
political and economi c c omma nd wittingly or unwi t t i ngl y
64
stir up t he class struggle. In this case, a part i cul ar class
struggle t hat emerges initially as an "i nst r ument " of intra-
and inter-elite compet i t i on may very well subsequent l y
develop its own mome nt um. In bot h i nst ances t he class
struggle intersects and overlaps with t he st ruggl e over politi-
cal c omma nd but remai ns or becomes a distinct process.
Mutatis mutandis, t he same could be said of t he rel at i onshi p
bet ween t he class struggle and t he struggle over economi c
command.
Th e Russi an Revol ut i on of 1917 was t he out come of a
very special conj unct ur e of t hese t hr ee types of struggle,
namel y t he convergence and fusion of part i cul arl y acut e
hori zont al and vertical conflicts over worl d political and
economi c c omma nd wi t hi n and across nat i onal locales.
Th e Bolsheviks, skillfully exploiting this conj unct ur e, seized
t he commandi ng hei ght s of t he Russi an Empi r e i n t he
na me of t he worki ng class. They were t hereby faced wi t h
t he di l emma of whet her to use this newl y- conquer ed power
t o sust ai n t he class st ruggl e within and out si de t hei r st at e
boundar i es or to consolidate t hei r power wi t hi n a restruc-
t ur ed but tendentially stable interstate system. Al t hough
t he eventual solution of t he di l emma in t he direction of t he
second vector was already foreshadowed at Kronst adt , t he
out come was t he result of long inter- and intra-elite
struggles in whi ch t he rhetorical identification of t he politi-
cal interest of t he Bolshevik Party and t he state wi t h t he
class interests of world l abor pl ayed a maj or role in influ-
enci ng and const rai ni ng t he behavi or of all involved.
Thi s subor di nat i on of t he class struggle in t he USSR to
ot her consi derat i ons has had two consequences. It has
t ended to de-legitimize t he class struggle when waged
against t he interests of t he Soviet political l eadershi p and its
mor e or less t empor ar y allies. And it has pr omot ed an ideo-
logical polarization in the interstate system t hat could be,
and has been, exploited by nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s
and t he political elites t hat have emer ged out of t hem. The
65
combi ned effect of these two t endenci es has been t he
cont i nui ng ambi guous relationship bet ween t he political
leadership of nat i onal liberation movement s and t he class
struggle.
In the phase of act ual struggle for nat i onal liberation,
that is; in the process of format i on of new formally sover-
eign states, the political elites leading the struggles have
used a doubl e st andar d t oward the class struggle. The
legitimacy of genui ne episodes of class struggle, as defi ned
above, was uphel d or deni ed accordi ng to whet her they
st rengt hened or weakened t he elites' hand in t he pursui t of
the Political Ki ngdom. For exampl e, whet her a strike was
suppor t ed/ or gani zed or not oft en depended on whet her it
was directed against the colonial aut hori t i es and sectors of
capital hostile to i ndependence, or against sectors of capital
favorable t o i ndependence. Thi s doubl e st andar d was mor e
strictly enforced when the leaderships of nat i onal -l i berat i on
movement s depicted themselves as i nst r ument s or agent s of
the class struggle in the interstate system.
Onc e national i ndependence was at t ai ned, the use of this
doubl e st andard meant a f ur t her nar r owi ng of t he
legitimacy of t he class struggle in t he new nat i onal locales.
Thi s t endency has two qui t e distinct roots. On t he one
hand, we have regi mes t hat have at t empt ed to consol i dat e
their power t hr ough an alliance with t he political and eco-
nomi c elites of core zones. In this case, the class struggle
was de-legitimized as part of the political exchange bet ween
core and peripheral elites, whereby the f or mer respect /
protect the formal sovereignty of the latter in exchange for
t he latter' s creat i on within their nat i onal boundar i es of an
envi r onment favorable t o core capital. On t he ot her hand,
we have regi mes that have at t empt ed to consol i dat e their
power t hrough t he opposi t e rout e of struggle against core
elites. In this case, t he class struggle within the count ry was
de-legitimized as an obstacle to t he former struggle, whi ch
was itself defi ned as class struggle at a hi gher level.
66
The fact t hat opposite strategies of consol i dat i on of
power led to si mi l ar out comes from t he poi nt of view of t he
legitimacy of class struggle in t he Thi r d Wor l d can only be
under st ood in t he light of t he peri pheral posi t i on of most
Thi r d Wor l d states. Thi s position implies little or no
c omma nd over world surplus, and this, i n t urn, has t wo
i mpl i cat i ons for t he class struggle: (1) from the poi nt of view
of its protagonists (social classes) t her e is not much to be
gai ned from it, so that actual episodes of class struggle are
likely to engender frustration rather t han class conscious-
ness; (2) under these ci rcumst ances, peri pheral elites
compet i ng for political command do not normal l y find
social classes upon which to const i t ut e reliable bases of
power and hence have resorted to one of t he two strategies
ment i oned above.
Ou r concept i on of class struggle as the pivotal process of
the capitalist worl d-economy is t hus unr emar kabl y con-
ventional. As struggle, it is conceived to be a struggle over
t he devel opment and organi zat i on of product i ve forces;
hence over the directional control of means of pr oduct i on
and means of livelihood; hence over the social relations
factually effecting that control. As historical process, it is
conceived to be a process t hat cont i nual l y forms and
reforms t he relational classes it joins in conflict. In t ur n, of
course, their st ruct uri ng, consciousness, organi zat i on, and
devel opment vary i mmensel y, among and wi t hi n the t i me -
space st ruct ural zones of t he world-scale accumul at i on
process, owing, as was said in anot her context, to a "histori-
cal and moral el ement . " As a result, the process of class
struggle and t he relational charact er of t he classes f or med
t herei n cont i nual l y occur historically in culturally, organ-
izationally, and civilizationally distinctive versions, each as
it were with its ownaut hent i ci t y and originality, whi ch
mar k t he scope of its historical presence. Moreover, t he
ongoi ng changes whi ch t he class struggle effects in t he
social st ruct uri ng of t he accumul at i on process themselves
67
t ransform in locationally distinctive ways the ci rcumst ances
in and t hr ough whi ch the class struggle as historical process
operates. It is as if t he game and t he players t here are no
spectators were always t he same but t he rules, officials,
and boundar i es of t he pl ayi ng field were novel on each and
every occasion and not at all t hat knowabl e unt i l seen in
retrospect.
We know f r om t he sketch in Part I of t he Communist
Manifesto how Mar x a nd Engel s saw t hat class struggle
f or med t he two great classes dur i ng t he peri od when t he
ramifying social division of labor t hat mar ked industrial-
ization of t he core at t hat t i me was occurri ng. We know too
f r om t he Eur opean writers of t he i nt erwar period
Gramsci , Lukacs, Reich, Korsch, for exampl e how
deepl y state encapsul at i on of t he proj ect ed devel opment of
the prol et ari at cont radi ct ed t he uni t i ng of t he workers of t he
world. It deflected the formative revolutionary t endenci es
into nat i onal and i nt ernat i onal organs, t hat is, into organs
t hat work t hrough, and so reinforce and depend upon, one
of t he f undament al st ruct ures and pl anes of operat i on of t he
capitalist economy, namel y, t he relational net work we call
its i nt erst at e system. And we know t he count er par t move-
ment : in t he phrasi ng of E. H. Carr,
Whe n t he cause of revolution, havi ng proved bar r en in t he
west, fl ouri shed in the fertile soil of Asia, t he shape of t hi ngs to
come radically changed . . . . The [Russi an] revolution coul d
now be seen not onl y as a revolt agai nst bourgeoi s capi t al i sm
in t he most backwar d west ern count ry, but as a revolt against
west ern i mperi al i sm i n t he most advanced east ern count r y
(1969: 30-31).
Thi s we discussed earlier. Sami r Ami n dr ew t he necessary
i nference for theoretical work, i n r emar ki ng on t he amazi ng
power of Eurocent ri sm. "The vision of t he ' advanced' pro
letariat of t he West bri ngi ng socialism as a ' gift' to t he ' back-
war d' masses of t he per i pher y is not ' i nt ol erabl e' it is
merel y refut ed by history" (1974: 603),
68
Wi t h t he reest abl i shment of hegemony in t he worl d-
system under t he aegis of t he Uni t ed States as hegemoni c
power, t here devel oped in t hought East ern and West ern,
Nor t her n and Sout her n an effort to br i ng class st ruggl e
and nat i onal liberation, as concept i ons of t ransformat i on,
into mor e defi ni t e theoretical (not merel y historical) relations.
We pass over here t he ki nds of effort we earlier called ideo-
logical in charact er, t hose where t he l eadershi p of nat i onal -
liberation struggles was seen as acting in t he cause of, and
by some in t he na me of, t he worl d prol et ari at ' s historical
mission. Not many st udent s of t he capitalist worl d-
economy t oday work with this sort of version, or vision, of
t he relation bet ween t he two const ruct s.
What we called t he political form of t he relation, however
in whi ch t he common el ement of struggle for state power
provides t he gr ound for consi deri ng t he two, t he nat i onal
struggle and t he class struggle, as historically alternative
precursors to socialist revolution does r equi r e brief
comment . Ma ny of us have moved theoretically i n this
direction if not embr aci ng t he formul at i on explicitly. An
influential st at ement of t he theoretical devel opment was by
Lin Biao in "The Int ernat i onal Significance of Comr a de
Ma o Tse- t ung' s Theor y of People' s War. " The r e i t will be
recalled he fi rst not es t hat "t he prol et ari an revolutionary
movement [i.e., class struggle] has for various reasons been
t emporari l y hel d back i n t he Nor t h Amer i can and West
Eur opean capitalist count ri es . . ." He subsequent l y asserts
t hat t he "nat i onal -democrat i c revolution is t he necessary
preparat i on for t he socialist revolution, and t he socialist
revolution is t he inevitable sequel to t he nat i onal -
democrat i c revolution. " Th e nat i onal -democrat i c struggle
has of course t he form of a uni t ed front: "The revolution
embr aces in its ranks not only t he workers, peasant s, and
t he ur ban petty bourgeoisie, but also t he nat i onal bour -
geoisie and ot her patriotic and ant i -i mperi al i st democr at s"
(1967: 352- 3 [emphasi s added]).
69
Thi s is not a theoretical under st andi ng of t he relations
bet ween nat i onal liberation and class struggle with whi ch
we can concur, as our reflections above probabl y suggest.
Ther e may i ndeed be theoretical virtue, when arrayi ng the
historical alternatives (here, fut ures) to whi ch nat i onal -
l i berat i on struggles coul d lead (might have led, mi ght yet
lead), i n the dr awi ng of an anal ogy bet ween t hem and t he
world-historical class struggle and t he revolutionary t rans-
format i on t he concept i on entails. Ther e is, however, no
theoretical virtue in, and much confusi on pr oduced by, t he
drawi ng of an analogy bet ween, (1) nat i onal -l i berat i on
struggles and t he historical alternatives t hei r at t ai nment s
defi ne and, (2) class struggle on a world scale and the his-
torical alternatives it concept ual l y entails. Nat i onal liber-
ation in segment s of t he capitalist worl d-economy, and t he
t ransformat i ons it has effected in relations of rule and other
social relations, have altered t he social st ruct uri ng of t he
world-historical accumul at i on process. That much is his-
torically evident and therefore theoretically to be taken into
account . But it has not el i mi nat ed t he relational condi t i ons
t hr ough whi ch t he accumul at i on process operat es. And
precisely t hat world-historical elimination, of t he relational
condi t i ons t hr ough whi ch accumul at i on of capital occurs, is
what is entailed in the idea of the class struggle as t he
pivotal process in t he t ransformat i on o f t h e capitalist world-
economy into a socialist world order.
Nor theoretically, in our view, coul d nat i onal -l i berat i on
movement s, any mor e t han core-zone soci al -democrat i c
movement s given their common historical focus on
securing and exercising power within t he interstate system
have effected much more by way of change t han they
have done. If, however, we cease to accord strategic pri macy
to acqui ri ng such state power within t he interstate system,
far mor e becomes historically possible and t hereby, within
t he domai n of historically realistic alternatives, theoretically
possible. It woul d seem a dubi ous theoretical tenet to assert
70
t hat nat i onal liberation, in its successive occurrences, is in
any way a necessary condi t i on of t he revolutionary trans-
format i on of t he wor l d- economy. It is surely i ndefensi bl e to
claim it as a sufficient condi t i on.
The st ruct uri ng and rest ruct uri ng of t he worl d-economy
in the period of US hegemony has been effected in large
part by the successes of t he nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s,
successes t hat have hi nged in part on t he Uni t ed States'
becomi ng hegemoni c, and have in t ur n up to a point actu-
ally furt hered that hegemony, Cuba and Vi et nam t o t he
seemi ng cont rary not wi t hst andi ng. Thr ee aspects of t hat
cont i nui ng change largely delimit at present bot h t he
spaces into whi ch t he class struggle as world-scale organ-
izing process is moving, and the enclosing, f r agment i ng
count erprocesses t hat have worked to prevent any "uni t i ng"
of t he workers of the worl d.
Fundament al to the formi ng of t he world labor-force
or in Leni n' s sense, to t he socialization of product i on, hence
of t he proletariat of the worl d is of course t he rapidly
growing world-scale technical division of labor, t hr ough t he
ar r angement s constitutive of the operat i ons of t ransnat i onal
corporat i ons and integral, as well, to those of socially
related state and interstate agencies. Frobel, Hei nri chs, and
Kreye have called this "t he new i nt ernat i onal division of
l abor" (1980). It is not to us so obviously "new, " al t hough
that is as muc h an empi ri cal as a concept ual mat t er. But it
surely is not centrally "i nt ernat i onal " in t he usual sense of
t hat t erm. It is, rat her, centrally "world-scale" however
consequent i al the interstate system may be in laying and
mai nt ai ni ng t he gr ounds for t he i nt rafi rm i nt egrat i ons of
discrete l abor processes, and the parallel st ruct uri ng of
accumul at i on, t hat these world-scale t echni cal divisions of
l abor entail.
These cont i nui ng extensions of technical divisions of
l abor of l abor processes integrated authoritatively
t hr ough a capitalist fi rm' s pl anni ng and control st ruct ure,
76
r at her t han t hr ough mar ket processes pr esuppose of
course ext raordi nary cent ral i zat i ons of (so-called) pro-
ductive capital. Theor y tells us t hat cent ral i zat i ons of capital
of this sort are to be expect ed and are likely to cont i nue, and
not hi ng in recent history suggests t hat t he t heory is in need
of revision on this score. Thi s growi ng "t echni cal " inter-
rel at i on of l abor processes, t hr ough this movement of capi-
tal, interrelates as well of course t he workers so associated,
pl us t hose at one remove as it were, t hat is, those whose
productive talents are put to use in provi di ng t hose directly
engaged in world-scale pr oduct i on with means of well-
bei ng (via "the home market "). (World-scale pr oduct i on
increasingly displaces "home- mar ket " pr oduct i on of course,
but we leave t hat aside here.) It is these l i gament s of capi-
talist ent erpri se on a worl d scale t hat , j oi ni ng ever l arger
segment s of the worl d' s workers, provi de one of t he r ami -
fying rel at i onal net works t hr ough whi ch class struggle is
formi ng t he classes it j oi ns together.
The devel opment al t endenci es cont radi ct i ng this pl ane of
potential prol et ari an uni on are several. Thos e at t he level of
capi t al proper, opposi ng this ki nd of centralization, seem
relatively weak (local capital, t he state bourgeoisie, and so
on). Thos e at t he level of l abor, on t he ot her hand, seem
st rong, not abl y of course state policies, sent i ment s of
nat i onal i sm/ pat r i ot i sm, and t he like. We r et ur n t o this
briefly bel ow.
A second of t he aspect s (of t he ongoi ng reorgani zi ng of
t he moder n world-system) is relationally very different. It
has t o do with t he cont i nui ng cent ral i zat i on of (so-called)
financial capital, and concerns t he relational net works of
increasing governmental i ndebt edness. ( Whet her some of
t hese rel at i ons of i ndebt edness concer n "capi t al " at all, but
r at her concer n appropri at i ons f r om real i zed surpl us
[revenue] for nonpr oduct i ve operat i ons, is an i mpor t ant
quest i on but not one we can address here.) These relations
f or m t he (rat her intricately dr awn) debt or - cr edi t or lines of
T)
st ruggl e i n t he capitalist wor l d- economy, and so do not
directly entail cl ass-formi ng effects {pace Weber ) . Th e
evolving rel at i onal net wor k seems, however, t o be movi ng
i ncreasi ngl y, via t he i nt erst at e syst em, t o f or m hi ghl y medi -
at ed but defi ni t e connect i ons bet ween very l arge gr oupi ngs
of debt or s and very smal l gr oupi ngs of credi t ors, wi t h t he
gr oupi ngs bei ng part i al l y paral l el i n t hei r f or mat i on t o t he
classes bei ng f or med by class st ruggl e as it is moved (by
capi t al ) out al ong t he ent er pr i se- or gani zed worl d-scal e
division of l abor.
Th e medi at i ons mat t er . For t he appear ance i s t hat of t he
creat i on of offical debt or a nd cr edi t or "states, " as condi t i on
of t hei r exi st ence as states. And officially classified debt or
st at es are r equi r ed, on pai n of losing t hei r credi t abi l i t y as
states ( and hence of losing, i n t oday' s wor l d, t hei r very
"stateness"), t o r educe t he cost of t hei r export s by r educi ng
t he costs t o capital, di rect a nd i ndi rect , of l abor wi t hi n t hei r
bor der s. Popul ar demonst r at i ons agai nst such officially
const r uct ed aust eri t y pl ans are r epor t ed al most daily. Thi s
world-level, or gani zed pr essur e t o depr ess t he living con-
di t i ons of t he wor l d' s mor e a nd less pr ol et ar i ani zed workers
is ha r d to const r ue as ot her t han a st rat egi c escal at i on (by
capi t al ) of class st ruggl e. It is, however, an escal at i on (a new
scale) t hat is not all t hat easy to anal yze. It occurs via r at her
ori gi nal mechani sms, concer ni ng an area of class st ruggl e
t hat i s poorl y under s t ood t heoret i cal l y, namel y, t he
compl ex lines del i mi t i ng t he spher es of necessary l abor,
relative sur pl us value, a nd levels of livelihood (or, nor -
mat i vel y, s t andar ds of well-being). An d it is a sort of
pressure, part i cul arl y given t he compl exi t y of t he rel at i onal
medi at i ons t hat di vi des peopl es i nt o over l appi ng r at her
t han pol ar i zi ng gr oupi ngs. Whet her , t hen, t he gr oupi ngs
t hat i n fact f or m, as t he pr essur e deepens and spr eads, will
rei nforce or weaken t he el ement al cl ass-formi ng process i s
still t o be det er mi ned.
On e can specul at e, however, t hat t he mor e t hese popul ar
73
struggles focus in each nat i onal setting on what ever regi me
is in office, and so become focused on who speaks in t he
na me of t hat national people as a whol e, the mor e will such
struggles weaken t he workings of t he world-scale class-
formi ng process and st rengt hen the interstate system. The
more, on t he ot her hand, t he popul ar movement s j oi n
forces across borders (and cont i nent s) to have t hei r respec-
tive state officials abrogat e those relations of the interstate
system t hr ough whi ch the pressure is conveyed, the less
likely they are to weaken, and the mor e likely they are to
st rengt hen, the pivotal class-forming process of the world-
economy. It seems unlikely, to assess the third historical
alternative, t hat such popul ar struggles woul d directly
become integral to, and in this way reinforce, the central
area(s) of class struggle, except incidentally, here and there,
owing to local condi t i ons or local organizing acumen.
World-historically, then, these local or regional struggles
integral to t he debt or - cr edi t or relation of the world-
economy of the sort we have been talking about may keep
some relations of accumul at i on uncertain, but probabl y will
not in themselves prove to be a step or stage in the elimin-
ating of the accumul at i on process as central organizing
force of the moder n world-system.
The third aspect of the ongoi ng changes in the organ-
izations and st ruct ures of the capitalist worl d-economy is
the relational t endenci es suggested by the "electronic
village" not i on. Nei t her of the kinds of centralization of
capital previously remarked, let al one the relational struc-
t ures of domi nat i on in virtue of whi ch they coul d occur and
operat e, is theoretically conceivable wi t hout the kind of
material condi t i ons for the exercise of power that "electroni-
fication" provides. The relational net works bei ng formed in
addi t i on t o the one t hat we are talking about are truly
extraordinarily compl ex. We who woul d st udy t hem, are
often baffled by their reach as well as by their operat i on;
but so too are those responsible for and to t hem, whet her in
74
"commandi ng" or only "local" positions. On the ot her
hand, these means of communi cat i on const ruct ed for
i nformat i on t o move i nward, commands t o move out war d
are in place and rapidly growing. They are integral to t he
expandi ng centralizations of product i ve capital a nd its
corollary, the ext endi ng technical divisions of l abor. And
they are even mor e integral to the expandi ng centralizations
of financial capital and its corollary, the expandi ng official
debt or - cr edi t or relational networks. These devel opment al
condi t i ons and t endenci es are not i n doubt .
And again, as Mar x and Engels observed in Part I of t he
Communist Manifesto', "t hat uni on, to attain whi ch t he bur -
ghers of t he Mi ddl e Ages, with t hei r mi serabl e highways,
requi red centuries, the moder n proletarians, t hanks to rail-
ways, achieve in a few years" (1976: VI, 493). The met aphor of
railways seems to be given more weight here t han it can bear.
But the general poi nt is as clear as it is central to the way they
conceive of class struggle as class formi ng: t he means the
bourgeoisie successively expand, in or der to f or m and inte-
grate discrete l abor processes (both the technical and t he
social divisions of labor), t hereby bri ng into relation, as well,
the laborers whose activities are bei ng i nt errel at ed.
Beyond the essentially admi ni st rat i ve depl oyment of
electronic means of communi cat i on is t he capitalization of
it as an historically increasing component of ordi nary well-
being, a process increasingly in direct conflict (not neces-
sarily cont radi ct i on) with efforts by government s, in virtue
of the workings of the interstate system, to defi ne and filter
for those territorially subject to t hei r rule what is and is not
i nformat i on, ent ert ai nment , comment ar y, and so on. Just
as one direction of electronification, as world-historical
process, bears integrally on t he cent ral cl ass-formi ng
process by i nt egrat i ng t he technical divisions of labor, so the
ot her r emar ked on here bears integrally on popul ar
consciousness of condi t i ons of existence of what is and is
not tolerable, of what is and is not desirable and hence
75
on t he abst ruse mat t ers of "necessary l abor " and "relative
surpl us value."
As with t he debt or - cr edi t or relational st ruct ures, so (but
even mor e so) with this second di mensi on of world-scale
"electronification": We collectively lack as yet t he theo-
retical ideas to gauge t he di rect i onal i mpet us t hat this on-
going devel opment will give to popul ar struggles and, a
fortiori, to gauge t he array of effects they may have on social
movement s formi ng t hr ough t he structurally shifting loci of
class struggle. Such theoretical under st andi ng is t herefore
an ur gent priority at this t i me if we wish to f ur t her t he class
st ruggl e in this new peri od before us when t he initial wave
of nat i onal -l i berat i on movement s have mor e or less success-
fully compl et ed t he initial t asks they set themselves.
76
1886-1986: Beyond Hay market?
The central fact of the historical sociology of late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe has been
the emergence of powerful social movements which
implicitly or explicitly challenged the achievements of
triumphant capitalism. These movements generated organ-
izations (parties, unions, mass organizations) that survived
long after the early mobilization stage; long enough to
become in turn one of the targets of the new social move-
ments of the late twentieth century. It is our contention that
the earlier movements were shaped by the social structure
of the nineteenth century, one that has been thoroughly
transformed in the course of the twentieth century, and that
the later movements are precisely the expression of this
transformation. Whether and how the old organizations can
survive in the new social context largely depends on their
capacity to come to terms with the contradictions posed by
the dissolution of their social base.
The social movements of the late nineteenth century
were rooted in the intensification of the processes of capi-
talist centralization, and rationalization of economic activi-
ties. A large variety of social groups (servants and peasants,
77
craft smen and low-status professionals, small t raders and
shopkeepers), whi ch had up to t hen coped mor e or less with
t he spread of mar ket compet i t i on, suddenl y found t hei r
established pat t erns of life and work t hr eat ened by wi den-
ing and deepeni ng prol et ari ani zat i on, and reacted t o t he
t hreat t hrough a wi de variety of struggles. The s e struggles
owed their pr omi nence and effectiveness to t he very
processes they were directed against: the capitalist central-
ization and rationalization of economi c activities.
In earlier peri ods, food riots and similar forms of protest
resulted merel y in localized di srupt i ons of law and order
which at most cont ri but ed to sudden accelerations in t he
"circulation of elites." The few struggles at t he point of
pr oduct i on in i ndust ry or in agri cul t ure could most of
the t i me be isolated and repressed or absor bed into t he
nor mal processes of capitalist compet i t i on. The y r emai ned,
t hat is, t he "private busi ness" of t he gr oups opposed in t he
struggle. The mor e product i on was socialized, however, t he
mor e t he strife bet ween l abor and capital became a social
pr obl em: t he very size and di st ri but i on of the social pr oduct
were affected by t hem, with repercussi ons t hr oughout t he
social and political system.
Th e mai n weakness of t he Eur opean l abor movement i n
t he period under consi derat i on lay precisely i n t he fact t hat
t he processes of capitalist centralization and rationalization
had not gone far enough. By and large, capitalist pro-
duct i on was still embedded in a social st ruct ure in whi ch
wage-l abor played a limited role. As l at e as t he begi nni ng of
t he t went i et h cent ury, wage workers account ed for a
maj ori t y of t he active l abor force in only a few states
(definitely in t he UK, probabl y in Ger many, and possibly
in France). In all states except t he UK there were large
number s of "peasants' " a differentiated and stratified
ensembl e of low-status agri cul t ural cultivators with some
kind of access to the means of pr oduci ng a subsistence.
In all states, f ur t her mor e, t her e wer e smaller but
78
Beyond Haymarket?
nonet hel ess relatively large groups of self-employed
artisans, petty bur eaucr at s and professionals, small t raders
and shopkeepers, and domest i c servants. Th e social weight
of these ot her groups was far greater t han their numbe r s
i ndi cat ed, because a good proport i on of the wage-l abor
force itself retained organic links with t hem a nd/ or had
strong cultural affinities with t hem. Or gani c links bet ween
wage workers and non-wage workers were pri mari l y due t o
the practice of pooling i ncomes in househol ds f r om dif-
ferent sources. Many wage-earners were not full-lifetime
prol et ari ans but member s of non-prol et ari an househol ds
who sold t hei r labor power on a mor e or less t empor ar y
basis. Thi s practice was particularly wi despread among
peasant househol ds which hired out t he l abor power of
some of t hei r member s precisely in or der to preserve t hei r
own viability as peasant househol ds. Since t hese workers
were generally in low-pay and low-status j obs, they had a
strong incentive to retain t hei r links with t he peasant house-
hol ds as a form of unempl oyment , sickness, and old-age
i nsur ance as well as a source of self-fulfillment.
If t he l ower layers of the wage-l abor force were popul at ed
by peasant workers and ot her part -l i fet i me prol et ari ans who
were t he bear er s of non-prol et ari an cultures, the upper
layers wer e popul at ed by full-lifetime prol et ari ans some of
whom nonet hel ess also cont i nued t o reproduce, f r om one
generat i on t o anot her, non-prol et ari an cul t ures. Th e t wo
most i mpor t ant instances were white-collar workers and
skilled blue-collar workers. The f or mer carried out sub-
or di nat e ent repreneuri al funct i ons such as keepi ng
account s, buyi ng and selling, servicing t he ent r epr eneur ,
and supervising t he l abor process. The y wer e recrui t ed
among t he l ower st rat a of t he professional groups, and,
not wi t hst andi ng (or because of) their full-lifetime prole-
t ari an status, they t ended to show an exaggerat ed at t ach-
ment to t he lifestyle symbol s of such elites. Thi s at t achment
was generally accompani ed by st rong sent i ment s of loyalty
79
t owards t he capitalist empl oyer, with whom they worked i n
close cont act , and of whom t hey were living extensions.
Skilled blue-collar workers were t he bearers of a qui t e
different cul t ure. They were craft smen who wielded
compl ex skills (partly manual , partly intellectual) on whi ch
pr oduct i on processes were highly dependent and on whi ch
t he i ncome, status, and power of t he craft smen, bot h in t he
workpl ace and i n t he househol d, rested. Consequent l y,
t hei r greatest preoccupat i on was t he preservation of t hei r
monopol i st i c control over pr oduct i on know-how. Thi s
preoccupat i on identified their interests wi t h t hose of self-
empl oyed craft smen, ma de t hem suspi ci ous of unskilled
workers, and was a cont i nuous source of ant agoni sm
t owards t he at t empt s of t he capitalist empl oyers to break
t he monopol i st i c practices of t hese craft smen t hr ough de-
skilling innovations.
Thi s ant agoni sm of craft workers t owards de-skilling
i nnovat i ons was probabl y t he most i mpor t ant single factor
sust ai ni ng and shapi ng t he devel opment of t he Eur opean
l abor movement at t he t ur n of t he cent ury. Whi t e-col l ar
workers generally played a secondary and ambi guous role,
whi l e unskilled blue-collar workers generat ed great but
shortlived out burst s of conflict. General l y speaki ng t he
movement was nei t her based on, nor di d it generat e motu
proprio, t he uni t y of wage-l abor against capital. Th e protest
of t he various sectors was sparked by t he same processes of
capitalist devel opment , but as t he protest unf ol ded each
segment and st r at um of t he wage-l abor force t ended to go
in its own direction, often in open or latent conflict with t he
direction t aken by ot her segment s.
The fact t hat wage workers const i t ut ed ei t her a mi nori t y
or a small maj ori t y of t he total l abor force and that, in any
event, t he maj ori t y of t he wage workers themselves still bore
t he st i gmat a of t hei r non-prol et ari an origin, created serious
di l emmas for t he l eadershi p of t he movement . The first
di l emma concerned t he extent t o whi ch t he rank-and-fi l e of
80
Beyond Haymarket?
t he movement could be relied upon spont aneousl y t o
pr oduce realistic objectives a nd adequat e f or ms of organ-
ization. Th e alternative, obviously, was t hat such objectives
and organi zat i on be br ought t o t he movement from t he
"out si de, " t hat is, by professional politicians const i t ut ed in
per manent organi zat i ons. The Marxists, who ar gued t he
necessity of t he latter solution, were in conflict wi t h t he
anarchi st s and syndicalists in t he early stages of t he move-
ment , even t hough wi t hi n Mar xi sm itself anar cho-
syndicalist t endenci es survived t hr oughout t he period. The
mai n weakness of t he anarcho-syndi cal i st position (and a
key reason for its political defeat) lay in t he fact that, given
t he social context sket ched above, t he spont aneous ten-
denci es of t he l abor movement could only be self-defeating,
as they not only hei ght ened t he i nt ernal divisions of t he
wage-l abor force but also were powerless in t he face of t he
economi c and political mobilization of t he non wage-l abor
force against t he movement .
In a situation of this kind, t he different and partly
cont radi ct ory objectives of t he movement could only be
attained t hrough political medi at i on and, ul t i mat el y,
t hr ough control of state power. Political medi at i on and t he
gaining of state power in t ur n presupposed a centralized
direction of t he movement ; and hence t he creat i on of
per manent organi zat i ons capable, on t he one hand, of
i mpart i ng such direction, and on t he ot her, of operat i ng
professionally in t he political arena.
Agr eement on this poi nt , however, posed a second
di l emma concerni ng t he t i me schedul e and t he means of
gai ni ng st at e power. Two alternatives present ed themselves.
On t he one hand, t he centralized di rect i on of t he movement
could take a gradual i st and democrat i c road, as advocat ed
by t he reformist wing of t he Second Int ernat i onal . Th e
rat i onal e of this position was t hat t he mi nori t y status of t he
wage-l abor force, as well as its i nt ernal divisions, were
t empor ar y pr obl ems whi ch woul d i n due course be t aken
81
care of by t he furt her cent ral i zat i on/ rat i onal i zat i on of eco-
nomi c activities i mmanent i n capitalist accumul at i on.
Hence t he task of t he l eadershi p was to establish organi c
links with t he movement , and fi ght t he democrat i c bat t l e for
parl i ament ary power wi t hout any part i cul ar sense of
ur gency. On t he ot her hand, t he centralized direction of t he
movement coul d take a revolutionary and i nsurrect i onary
road, as advocated by t he current s t hat were eventually to
creat e t he Thi r d Int ernat i onal . Accor di ng t o this position
t here was no guarant ee t hat capitalist devel opment woul d
create mor e favorable condi t i ons for a gradual accession to
state power by working-class organi zat i ons. Qui t e apart
from t he fact t hat t he representatives of t he bourgeoisie and
its allies could not be expected to yield their power peace-
fully, capitalism had entered a new stage of hegemoni c
rivalries and mercantilist struggles (the so-called stage of
i mperi al i sm) whi ch was bound t o frust rat e t he expectations
of t he reformists, whi l e however creat i ng opport uni t i es for
the seizure of power by revolutionary vanguards.
Onc e in power, as happened in t he i nt erwar period to a
revolutionary party in Russi a and to a reformist party in
Sweden, f ur t her di l emmas arose concerni ng what socialists
coul d or shoul d do with state power in a capitalist world-
economy. These ot her di l emmas fall beyond our present
concern, whi ch is to poi nt out t hat t he social st ruct ure t hat
generat ed t he social movement s, political di l emmas, and
organi zat i ons of t he late ni net eent h and early t went i et h
cent uri es was t horoughl y t ransformed in t he course of t he
Second Worl d War and t he subsequent post war phase of
rapi d economi c expansi on.
By t he late 1960s, peasant s had dwi ndl ed into insignifi-
cance in most of Eur ope. Th e numbe r of shopkeepers,
small traders, and artisans had also been significantly
reduced. The numbe r of professionals had i ncreased but
not sufficiently to make a great difference in t he overall
picture. The overall pi ct ure was now t hat bet ween 60 and
82
Beyond Haymarket?
90 per cent (dependi ng on t he count ry) of t he Eur opean
l abor force had come to depend on wages or salaries for its
subsi st ence. On the basis of this purel y formal criterion, t he
Eur opean l abor force had become as fully "prol et ari ani zed"
as it possibly coul d.
However, i n this case sheer number s are deceptive. Thi s
"prol et ari ani zed" l abor force in fact had a numbe r of rela-
tively di scret e sections. Th e numbe r of salaried professionals
was large and growing, in most cases over 15 per cent of t he
popul at i on i n t he 1980s. Thos e i n t hi s gr oup normal l y ha d
a university educat i on, reflecting t he hi gh percent age of t he
popul at i on at t endi ng t he university (see Tabl e I). Th e
percent age of women i n t hi s cat egory had been growing,
al t hough men still pr edomi nat ed. Thi s gr oup was well-paid
of course, but lived primarily on its i ncome.
The manuf act ur i ng sector of Eur opean count ri es
empl oyed 30 to 40 per cent of the popul at i on in t he 1980s.
Thi s was t rue even i n those few count ri es wher e t he agri-
cul t ural popul at i on was still over 10 per cent (see Tabl e II).
However, t he manuf act ur i ng sector was divided with
i ncreasi ng clarity on et hni c lines. The bet t er-pai d, mor e
skilled workers were largely mal e and native to t he count ry,
wher eas t he less well-paid, less skilled workers were di spro-
portionately dr awn from radi cal minorities, i mmi gr ant s,
guest workers, and so on, many of whom were not citizens
(t hough this may t ur n out to be a t ransi t i onal
phenomenon) . Of course, et hni c stratification of t he work-
force had no doubt a long history, but pri or to 1945 t he
ethnic "mi nori t y" was largely dr awn from wi t hi n a state' s
boundar i es (Irish in Great Britain, Bret ons in France)
whi ch had different citizenship and voting consequences.
The expandi ng clerical and service sector was in t he process
of increasing feminization with a concomi t ant loss of rela-
tive status and i ncome level.
Thi s sociological t ransformat i on has been going on for a
long time. Its i mpact on t he st ruct ure of social movement s
83
Table I No. of university-level students per 100,000 in 1983
Western & Northern Europe
Aust ri a 2,058
Bel gi um 2,285
Denmar k (1982) 2,159
Fi nl and 2,485
Fr ance 2,253
Ge r ma n Federal Republ i c (1982) 2,289
Icel and 2,197
Irel and (1981) 1,731
Luxembour g 270
Net her l ands (1982) 2,645
Norway (1982) 2,151
Sweden 2,701
Swi t zerl and 1,515
Uni t ed Ki ngdom (1982) 1,572
Southern Europe
Gr eece( 1980) 1,250
Italy 1,981
Port ugal (1981) 964
Spai n (1982) 1,919
Other countries with over 1,500 students per 100,000
Ar gent i na 1,962
Aust ral i a (1982) 2,237
Bar bados 1,966
Ca na da 4,169
Ecuador (1981) 3,192
Ge r ma n Democr at i c Republ i c (1982) 2,420
Israel 2,746
J a pa n 2,033
J o r d a n (1982) 1,570
Korea, Republ i c of 2,951
Lebanon (1982) 2,715
Mongol i a (1981) 2,235
New Zeal and 2,612
Panama 2,212
Per u (1982) 2,001
Phi l i ppi nes (1981) 2,694
Qat ar 1,678
84
Beyond Haymarket?
USSR ] 947
USA (1982)
5
;
3
55
Uruguay 1,686
Yugoslavia 1
6 4 7
Source: UNE S CO Statistical Year book, 1985, Tabl e 3,10
has been pr of ound. The l abor movement and t he socialist
parties had originally been const ruct ed ar ound (male)
workers in the manuf act ur i ng sector whose number s, it had
been assumed, woul d be ever growing. But the ma nu-
fact uri ng sector levelled off in number s and percent age in
the 1960s and began a process of shri nkage. Faced with a
sharpl y decl i ni ng percent age of t he labor force in agri-
cul t ure and a levelling-off (and pot ent i al decl i ne) in t he
manuf act ur i ng sectors, t he t ert i ary sect or has necessarily
become ever mor e central. However, this sector in t ur n
became ever mor e pol ari zed into a salaried professional
st r at um and a lower-paid st r at um worki ng under increas-
ingly "factory-like" condi t i ons.
As t he "i nt ernal " reserve labor force (peasantry, small
artisans, wives and daught ers of i ndust ri al workers) dis-
appear ed by virtue of actual i ncorporat i on i nt o t he ur ban,
proletarianized l abor force, the only "reserve" available
became one "ext ernal " t o the state' s boundar i es. Her e,
however, one mus t t ake i nt o account t he historical trans-
format i on of the capitalist worl d-economy as a whole. The
devel opment of nat i onal liberation forces in Asia, Africa,
and Lat i n Ameri ca had changed t he wor l d political rapport
de forces, and above all t he ideological at mospher e within
which Eur opean social devel opment occurred.
In t he period 1945-60 it coul d be said that the social-
democrat i c parties of West ern Eur ope achieved a large
numbe r of t hei r i nt ermedi at e objectives: full organi zat i on of
t he industrial worki ng class and a significant rise in t hei r
85
Table II Percentage of economically active population by occupation
Prof. * Manas,. Clerical Sales Service Agnc. Manuf.
Year 0/1 2 ' 3 4 5 7-9 Other
Western & Northern Europe
Aus t r i a
Be l g i u m
De n ma r k
F i n l a n d
F r a n c e
G e r ma n Fe d e r a l Re p u b l i c
I r e l a n d
L u x e mb o u r g
Ne t h e r l a n d s
No r wa y
Swi t z e r l a n d
S we d e n
Un i t e d Ki n g d o m
Southern Europe
Gr e e c e
I t al y
Po r t u g a l
S p a i n
1984 13. 0 5. 2 15. 6 9. 2 10. 8 9. 1 36. 9 0. 2
1970 11. 1 4. 6 12. 8 10. 2 6. 7 4. 5 45. 2 4. 9
1983 17. 0 3. 1 13. 9 6. 0 12. 6 2. 1 29. 4 15. 9
1980 17. 0 3. 0 11. 9 7. 3 11. 6 12. 5 34. 8 2. 1
1982 14. 1 0. 3 17. 1 7. 8 10. 7 7. 6 30. 9 11.5
1984 13. 9 3. 5 17. 3 8. 6 10. 8 5. 0 31. 8 9. 1
1983 14. 2 2. 8 14. 1 8. 6 8. 6 14. 9 30. 3 6. 5
1981 11. 9 1. 0 20. 3 8. 8 12. 9 5. 3 36. 3 3. 5
1979 17. 3 2. 3 17. 6 9. 6 10. 1 5. 6 30. 0 7. 5
1980 18. 2 4. 6 9. 6 9. 0 12. 0 7. 1 31. 9 7. 6
1980 15.1 2. 4 20. 2 8. 2 11. 3 6. 5 34. 4 1. 9
1984 27. 3 2. 3 11. 9 8. 0 13. 7 5. 0 28. 7 3. 1
1971 11. 1 3. 7 17. 9 9. 0 11. 7 3. 0 40. 0 3. 6
1983 9. 7 1. 7 8. 7 9. 3 8. 0 27. 8 30. 0 4. 8
1981 11. 5 16. 0 9. 6 11. 1 11. 1 9. 3 20. 7 10. 2
1982 5. 9 0. 8 10. 2 8. 1 9. 1 23. 0 37. 3 5. 5
1984 6. 9 1. 4 9. 7 9. 0 12. 9 15. 6 35. 4 9. 1
Other countries for comparison
Hu n g a r y
1980 14. 7 0. 7
P o l a n d 1978 11. 0 1.5
US A 1984 14. 7 10. 3
Ve n e z u e l a
1983 10. 2 4. 0
El Sa l v a d o r 1980 4. 2 0. 6
Eg y p t 1982 10. 5 1. 9
I n d i a
1980 3. 0 0. 1
Mali
1976 1.5

12. 0 4. 9 7. 1 10. 0 50. 6

13. 9 2. 8 3. 2 26. 7 37. 4 3. 5
15. 3 11. 5 13. 5 3. 4 28. 8 2. 5
11. 2 12. 7 13. 3 14. 1 32. 2 2. 3
5. 4 14. 1 8. 1 37. 5 26. 4 1.7
8. 2 6. 2 8. 5 36. 1 23. 1 5. 5
3. 7 12. 6 4. 6 53. 7 18. 4 3. 9
0. 6 1. 9 1. 0 82. 0 6. 9 6. 1
Source: I LO Year book of Labor Statistics 1985, Table 2B (except Fi nl and f r om 1984; Net her l ands, Hungar y, El
Sal vador, Mali from 1983; Bel gi um a nd t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom f r om 1977).
*Full headi ngs as follows: 0/ 1 - Professi onal , t echni cal , and skilled workers; 2 - Admi ni st r at i ve a nd manager i al workers;
3 - Cl eri cal and related workers; 4 - Sales workers; 5 - Service workers; 6 - Agri cul t ural , ani mal hus ba ndr y a nd forestry,
f i sher man and hunt er s; 7 - 9 - Pr oduct i on and rel at ed workers, t r anspor t equi pment , oper at or s and l aborers; Ot he r -
May i ncl ude (varying with count ry): (a) Wor ker s not classified by occupat i ons; (b) Ar me d forces; (c) Une mpl oye d
workers; (d) Unempl oyed wor ker s not previously regul arl y empl oyed.
st andar d of living, plus accession to a place in t he state
political structure. But they f ound themselves to a sig-
nificant degree locked into reflecting this t radi t i onal central
core of t he worki ng class whose number s were no l onger
growing. They f ound it far mor e difficult to appeal poli-
tically to t he t hree growing segment s of the wage-l abor
force: t he salaried professionals, the "femi ni zed" service-
sector employees, and the "et hni ci zed" unskilled or semi-
skilled l abor force.
It seems therefore no accident t hat the t hree maj or
varieties of "new" social movement have t hei r social bases in
these ot her groups: the peace/ ecol ogy/ al t ernat i ve lifestyle
movement s; the women' s movement s; t he "mi nori t y",
r i ght s/ "Thi r d Wor l d within" movement s. In different ways,
each of these movement s was expressing its di scomfort not
merel y with t he socio-economic st ruct ures t hat governed
their lives but with the historical political strategy of t he
soci al -democrat i c (and Communi st ) parties in pur sui ng t he
need for change.
The basic compl ai nt of t he "new" social movement s
about t he "old" social movement s was t hat t he social-
democrat i c movement s had lost their "opposi t i onal " quality
precisely as a result of their successes in achieving partial
state power. It was ar gued that: (1) they suppor t ed bot h
state policy and mul t i nat i onal policy vis-a-vis t he Thi r d
Wor l d and t he socialist worl d; and (2) they made no effort
to represent the interests of t he lowest-paid and most
exploited strata of the work force. In short, t he charge was
t hat l abor and social-democratic movement s were no longer;
antisystemic, or at least no longer sufficiently ant i syst emi c.
Th e initial response of t he "old" social movement was to
dismiss t he charges of one segment of t he "new" movement s
as comi ng from middle-class el ement s (that is, salaried
professionals) who wer e using ant i -i ndust ri al -worker ar gu-
ment s. As for t he criticisms of ot her "new" movement s
(women, minorities), the "old" movement s accused t hem of
88
Beyond Haymarket?
bei ng "divisive" (the traditional ni net eent h- cent ur y view of
the l abor movement ).
Th e rel at i onshi p of t he t wo sets of movement s t he old
and t he new has gone t hr ough t wo phases t hus far. The
first phase runs from about 1960 to 1975. Thi s phase was
one of det eri orat i ng relations bet ween t he two sets. The
si mmeri ng bad relations expl oded in 1968 and t he tensions
strongly reinforced a peri od of acut e ideological struggle in
t he Thi r d Wor l d t he Vi et nam war, t he Chi nese Cul t ur al
Revol ut i on, the many guerilla struggles in Latin Ameri ca.
Several factors ent ered to bri ng this phase to an end. Th e
fraction of the new social movement s t hat became most
"radicalized" t aki ng the various forms of Maoi st parties,
aut onomi st movement s, ur ban t errori sm failed poli-
tically. Thi s was partly because of repression, partly
because of exhaustion and a thin social base, and partly
because of changes in t he ideological tone of struggles in t he
Thi r d Wor l d (end of the Cul t ural Revolution in Chi na,
socialist wars in Indochi na, end of "focoism" in Latin
America).
The new conjoncture of t he worl d-economy also had its
i mpact . Th e growing unempl oyment i n Eur ope al ong wi t h
the partial di smant l i ng of the t radi t i onal heavy-i ndust ry
sectors began to reopen for the l abor-soci al i st movement s
many ideological questions t hat had been undi scussi bl e in
the per i od 1945-65. Thus t he social democr at s started t o
reassess t hei r view of t he new social movement s j ust at t he
moment when t he new social movement s began t o have
some i nner doubt s about t he validity of t he "new left"
tactics evolved in t he 1960s.
The peri od since 1975 has been one of an uncert ai n
mi nuet in old l ef t - new left relations in West er n Eur ope.
Th e case of t he Greens and t he SPD i n t he Federal
Republ i c of Ger many illustrates this perfectly. Bot h parties
are constantly in the mi dst of a medi um- deci bel i nt ernal
debat e about their relations with each other, abl e nei t her t o
89
move closer t oget her nor to move furt her apart . Both sets of
movement s have however been mor e concerned with t hei r
relations to each ot her t han to t he ot her kinds of move-
ment s found i n t he socialist count ri es or t he Thi r d Wor l d.
We may r esume what we have said t hus: (1) t he ci rcum-
stances giving rise to t he drive and partially successful
organi zat i onal forms of t he Eur opean left have been totally
eroded by t he very processes, those of capitalist develop-
ment , they were creat ed to supersede historically; (2) pot en-
tially serious (antisystemic) t endenci es instead now come
increasingly from social locales not central to t he t radi t i onal
organi zed forms of t he Eur opean left. What , from our angl e
of vision, woul d seem to lie ahead?
Th e principal directional t endency of capital is its
centralization on a world scale in t wo forms; financial pools,
and technically divided and integrated l abor processes. The
first is effected t hrough extraordinarily large-scale banki ng
consortia managi ng "publ i c" and "private" f unds alike and
medi at ed by such organs of t he worl d' s bourgeoi si e as t he
I MF, t he I BRD, and t he BIS. Th e second is effected of
course t hr ough t he mul t i pl yi ng t ransnat i onal i zat i on of
pr oduct i on under t he aegis of t he t ransnat i onal corporat i on.
Thi s det ermi ni ng direction of capital on a world scale
oddly enough, not one t hat depart s greatly from t hat
proj ect ed in "t he absol ut e general law of capitalist accumu-
lation" entails for ant i syst emi c forces at least t hree br oad
consequent i al subor di nat e directional t endenci es.
First, and in t he present context per haps foremost , is t he
ongoi ng relocation of l abor-usi ng manuf act ur i ng processes
to t he semi peri phery and hence t he shift t here of t he epi-
cent er of "classically" framed and conduct ed class conflict
direct, organi zed, large-scale capi t al - l abor struggles.
Tha t epicenter, and so its historical t raj ect ory, will hence
increasingly be formed within t he j uri sdi ct i ons of t he states
of t hat zone, and their politics i ndeed increasingly reflect
t he t ransformat i on.
90
Beyond Haymarket?
Second is the de-nat i onal i zat i on, in effect, of domest i c
("national") l abor forces. Th e worl d' s workers, increasingly
made into laborers under t he aegis of capital, move as they
always have in order to be in relation to capital, a move-
ment sharply furt hered in speed and extent by develop-
ment s i n communi cat i ons and t ransport at i on. Mar x and
Engels saw t he railroad as short eni ng to a cent ury, for
nat i onal proletariats, t he t i me needed t o achieve t he degree
of class organi zat i on it took nat i onal bourgeoisies, with their
mi serabl e roads, five cent uri es to at t ai n. Ship, air, and elec-
tronics have for decades now been anal ogousl y formi ng the
possibility of an organized world prol et ari at within
"nat i onal " locales. The possibility is at once el i mi nat ed,
however, so long as we t hi nk with the st at e-formed
consciousness that t here are "nat i onal s" and t here ar e
"i mmi grant s, " and in that way r epr oduce t he varieties of
racism t hese historically formed categories inevitably entail.
"Nat i onal " and "i mmi gr ant " are categories of t he capitalist
worl d-economy' s interstate system; they have no place
(except as phenomenol ogi cal l y real condi t i ons to be over-
come) in the l anguage of world-scale workers' movement s.
And t hi r d is t he "official pauper i sm" sketched in t he
general law, whi ch, t o est i mat e from recent t rends i n t he US
and West ern Eur ope, has two pri nci pal overl appi ng social
locales, t he young and t he aged (both men and women) and
women (of all ages). Thes e were, it will be recalled, t he first
"officially prot ect ed" social segment s of l abor, in count ry
after count ry, in t he decade or so t hat "Haymar ket " sig-
nifies. "Welfare, " too, has its cont radi ct i ons. It seems likely
t hat t he "nat i onal ' V' i mmi gr ant " categorization deepens the
bur dens of current capitalist devel opment carri ed by the
young, t he old, and women, but it is only a deepeni ng of
t he dest ruct i on of dignity, well-being, and hope t hat their
pauperi zat i on perse entails.
Th e growing contradiction(s) bet ween relations of rul e
and relations of product i on entail anot her trio of sub-
95
or di nat e t endent i al or "di rect i onal " changes. Per haps fore-
most here will be the growing cont radi ct i on of "stateness" in
core-area countries, bet ween formi ng and reformi ng t he
requi si t e frameworks of "capitalist devel opment " of capital,
on t he one hand; and addressi ng and re-addressi ng t he
endl ess constituencies of "welfare" t hat t hat devel opment
cont i nues t o pr omot e, on t he ot her. Th e cont radi ct i on has
been cent ral to "stateness, " of course, t hr oughout t he inter-
state syst em' s historical el aborat i on; in our t i mes it has
been particularly evident i n t he peri pheral i zed and semi-
peri pheral i zed zones t hat ar e continually r epr oduced by t he
f undament al worl d-formi ng polarization entailed in t he
capitalist devel opment of capital. In t he state regi mes of t he
core zone, government s have been largely spared t he
politics f r amed by t he cont radi ct i on, essentially because
coreness dur i ng US hegemony entailed a kind and degree
of "revenue" flow t hat allowed "redi st ri but i on" wi t hout (all
t hat much) pai n. Tha t has become, and will cont i nue t o
become, less and less so. "Austerity" is t he or der of t he day
not only in Haiti, and in Argent i na, but in Fr ance . . .
We must r emar k here i n passing what this cont radi ct i on,
in this form, implies for t hose of us who subscri be to t he
theoretical not i on t hat relations of rul e oper at e by virtue of a
condi t i on of consci ousness known, since Weber , as t hei r
"legitimacy. " Namel y, it implies increasingly corrosive
effects on t he very "right" of t he appar at uses of states to
compel compl i ance wi t h st at e-promul gat ed rules ("laws").
This sort of "legitimacy" crisis endemi c wher e "stateness"
has been a historically i mposed form of relations of rul e (for
exampl e, via overrule) seems likely to have initial occur-
rence in the ideologically distorted form of "nat i onal s"
versus "i mmi gr ant s, " with the rhetorical core bei ng a
mat t er of "pat ri ot i sm" t he one defi ned domai n of
consci ousness specifically formed to "l egi t i mat e" stateness,
as every schoolchild, everywhere, knows wi t hout knowi ng.
However, t he st ruct ured incapacity of states to take care of
92
Beyond Haymarket?
their own, as it were, could so help shift modes of under -
st andi ng and compr ehensi on t hat t he specifically legiti-
mat i ng domai n of "pat ri ot i sm" becomes secondary but
t o what ?
Second is t he seemingly cont radi ct ory growt h
cont radi ct ory to t he capitalist devel opment of capital of
" huma n rights" as an organi zi ng concern of growi ng
number s of intellectuals and popul ar leaders, of various
persuasi ons, t hr oughout t he worl d. To a large ext ent
f r amed, as t he issue has been, almost solely in t er ms of
relations of rule (its i mmedi at e locus of course, as "issue")
t he compr ehensi on of its emer gence as reflecting t he
cont radi ct i ons bet ween relations of rule and relations of
pr oduct i on (i ncl udi ng relations of appr opr i at i on) has been
slow to form. Th e rights of workers in t he end under pi n all
others. Wi t hout t he former, such "rights" as ot hers may
have are but certificates issued; annul l abl e by t he part i cul ar
appar at us of "stateness" t hat forms t he confront at i onal
relation. As elsewhere in our condi t i ons of existence, so here
too does t he capi t al - l abor relation organi ze t he terrain of
confront at i on and discourse.
A third t endent i al devel opment is t he growi ng "anti-
West erni sm" of t he peoples of t he peri pheral i zed and
semi peri pheral i zed zone of t he wor l d- economy' s oper-
ations. Primarily channel l ed in and t hr ough t he interstate
system, the i mpet us for t he sent i ment lies not in mer e "anti-
imperialist" (positively put , "nationalist") movement s but
r at her in el ement al chal l enges to t he "West erni sm, " as
encompassi ng civilization, t hat t he capitalist devel opment
of t he moder n worl d as historical social syst em has ent ai l ed.
Thi s is a domai n of i nqui ry f r aught with difficulties, both
theoretical and historical, for t he once colonized and the
once colonizing alike (specifically pr esumi ng good faith on
the- art of each, however cent ral t he historical divide
perforce remai ns).
Th e t endency shows mor e f undament al l y, if less clearly
93
theoretically, in the question of how relations of rule relate to
relations of product i on. We reach her e mat t ers of very
consi derabl e civilizational dept h, wher e even t he distinction
whi ch we have been worki ng with di sappears. For t he chal-
lenge, in process of realization, is to t he "West erni sm" of
our ways of t hi nki ng and, to short-circuit much to our
ways of conceiving of t he "socialism" of a socialist worl d-
system and so derivatively to our ways of identifying what is
or is not "progressive."
In brief, in quest i on is assumi ng we' re collectively
and actively concerned with furt heri ng t he t ransformat i on
of the capitalist world-system into a socialist worl d-syst em
"whose" socialism? That , it seems to us, is t he query
posed by t he growing if still mut ed "ant i -West erni sm. " It
addresses directly t he assumpt i on that the comi ng socialist
worl d-syst em is of West ern manuf act ur e, so to speak.
Per haps t he central quest i on is this: how, and to what
extent, can t he well-organized ar ms of progressive move-
ment s in West ern Eur ope, f r amed as they are by t hei r
current forms and i mmedi at e concerns, r ecompose t hem-
selves into agencies, not of nat i onal realization but of worl d-
historical t ransformat i on? Thi s recomposi t i on woul d mean
they became in t he f ut ur e as subversive of t he interstate
system per se as they have in t he past been its product s and
pr oponent s.
Th e centralization of capital per se can be nei t her factually
nor strategically a legitimate concern of movement s, it as
process being for t hem formative merel y of t errai n, not of
objective. Th e f ur t her processes it entails, however, pr oduce
t he very politics of movement format i on and growt h. Th e
first observation above, about t he relocating of t he epi cent er
of overt "classical" class struggle, implies merely a refocus-
ing of West ern Eur opean movement s. Th e second and
t hi rd, in contrast, entail t he redefinition of trajectories. For
the de-nat i onal i zat i on of domest i c labor forces suggests a
f undament al change, on the part of the left, as to what
94
Beyond Haymarket?
"nat i onal " means (thus leaving to t he right t he systemically
formed residues of "pri mordi al " sent i ment s). To accom-
plish t he reconcept i on will entail a degree and kind of
subst ant i ve and rhetorical inventiveness not presently in
ascendance within pr omi nent movement s. And t he t hi rd,
t he increasing salience of t he gender quest i on, entails; (1)
t he el i mi nat i on from t he movement s of yet anot her (and in
a different sense) "pri mordi al " sent i ment , and (2) t he worl d-
scale generality o f hence organi zat i onal subordi nat i on t o
what is essentially a reformi ng movement ("capitalism"
bei ng qui t e abl e "to develop" under condi t i ons of legal and
subst ant i ve gender equality). It is t he f ur t her generalization,
from t he pauperi zat i on of women to t he pauperi zat i on of
peopl e on a world scale, that is precisely the change in
consciousness t he very effectiveness of t he organi zat i ons in
core zones may hel p to br i ng about , as part of world-scale
movement s t hat bypass and so subvert i nt erst at e arrange-
ment s. The growing cont radi ct i ons bet ween relations of
rule and relations of product i on will in all likelihood occa-
sion a pl et hora of radi cal nationalist expressions and "move-
ment s. " But world-scale movement s, with emanat i ons in
various nat i onal arenas, may prove worl d historically even
mor e consequent i al . At least, this is t he maj or positive
direction in which to move.
95
1968: The Great Rehearsal
What Was 1968 About?
There have only been two world revolutions. One took place
in 1848. The second took place in 1968. Both were historic
failures. Both transformed the world. The fact that both
were unplanned and therefore in a profound sense spon-
taneous explains both facts the fact that they failed, and
the fact that they transformed the world. We celebrate
today July 14, 1789, or at least some people do. We cele-
brate November 7, 1917, or at least some people do. We do
not celebrate 1848 or 1968. And yet the case can be made
that these dates are as significant, perhaps even more sig-
nificant, than the two that attract so much attention.
1848 was a revolution for popular sovereignty both
within the nation (down with autocracy) and of the nations
(self-determination, the Vlkerfrhling). 1848 was the revo-
lution against the counterrevolution of 1815 (the Restor-
ation, the Concert of Europe). It was a revolution "born at
least as much of hopes as of discontents" (Namier: 1944, 4).
It was certainly not the French Revolution the second time
around. It represented rather an attempt both to fulfill its
97
original hopes and to overcome its limitations. 1848 was, in
a Hegel i an sense, t he subl at i on (Auf hebung) of 1789.
The same was t rue of 1968. It too was born of hopes at
least as muc h as di scont ent s. It too was a revolution against
t he count errevol ut i on represent ed by t he US organi zat i on
of its worl d hegemony as of 1945. It t oo was an at t empt to
fulfill t he original goals of t he Russi an Revol ut i on, while
very muc h an effort to overcome t he limitations of t hat revo-
l ut i on. It too t herefore was a subl at i on, a subl at i on this t i me
of 1917.
Th e parallel goes furt her. 1848 was a failure a failure
in France, a failure in t he rest of Europe. So too was 1968.
In bot h cases t he bubbl e of popul ar ent husi asm and radical
innovation was burst within a relatively short peri od. In
bot h cases, however, t he political ground-rul es of t he world-
system were pr of oundl y and irrevocably changed as a result
of t he revolution. It was 1848 whi ch institutionalized t he old
left (using this t er m broadl y). And it was 1968 t hat insti-
t ut i onal i zed t he new social movement s. Looki ng forward,
1848 was in this sense t he great rehearsal for t he Paris
Co mmu n e and t he Russi an Revol ut i on, for t he Baku
Congress and Bandoeng. 1968 was t he rehearsal for what?
Th e lesson t hat oppressed groups l earned f r om 1848 was
t hat i t woul d not be easy t o t ransform t he syst em, and t hat
t he likelihood t hat "spont aneous" upri si ngs woul d i n fact be
abl e to accompl i sh such a t r ansf or mat i on was rat her small.
Two t hi ngs seemed clear as a result. Th e states were suf-
ficiently bureaucrat i zed and appropri at el y organi zed t o
funct i on well as machi neri es t o put down rebellions. Occa-
sionally, because of wars or i nt ernal political divisions
among powerful strata, their repressive machi ner y mi ght
buckl e and a "revolution" seem t o be possible. But t he
machi ner i es could usually be pul l ed t oget her quickly
enough t o put down t he put at i ve or abort i ve revolution.
Secondly, t he states coul d easily be cont rol l ed by t he
powerful strata t hr ough a combi nat i on of t he latter' s eco-
98
The Great Rehearsal
nomi c st rengt h, t hei r political organi zat i on, and t hei r cul-
t ural hegemony (to use Gr amsci ' s t er m of a later period).
Since t he states coul d control t he masses and t he power-
ful strata coul d control t he states, it was clear t hat a serious
effort of social t ransformat i on woul d requi re count er-
organi zat i on bot h politically and culturally. It is this
percept i on t hat led to t he format i on for t he first t i me of
bureaucrat i cal l y organi zed ant i syst emi c movement s wi t h
relatively clear mi ddl e- t er m objectives. Thes e movement s,
in their two great variants of t he social and t he nat i onal
movement , began t o appear on t he scene after 1848, and their
number s, geographic spread, and organi zat i onal efficiency
grew steady in t he cent ury t hat followed.
What 1848 accompl i shed t herefore was t he historic t urn-
ing of ant i syst emi c forces t owards a f undament al political
strategy t hat of seeking t he i nt ermedi at e goal of obt ai n-
ing state power (one way or anot her) as t he i ndi spensabl e
way-station on t he road t o t r ansf or mi ng society and t he
world. To be sure, many ar gued against this strategy, but
they were defeated i n t he debat es. Over t he following
cent ury, t he opponent s of this strategy grew weaker as t he
pr oponent s of t he strategy grew stronger.
1917 became such a bi g symbol because it was t he first
dr amat i c victory of t he pr oponent s of t he st at e-power
strategy (and in its revolutionary, as opposed to its evo-
lutionary, variant). 1917 proved it coul d be done. And this
t i me, unl i ke in 1848, t he revolutionary government was
nei t her subor ned nor overt urned. It survived. 1917 may
have been t he most dr amat i c i nst ance but it was not of
cour se t he only instance of successes, at least partial, of this
strategy. The Mexi can Revol ut i on begi nni ng i n 1910 and t he
Chi nese Revol ut i on of 1911 cul mi nat i ng in 1949 also
seemed to demonst rat e t he worth of t he strategy, for
exampl e.
By 1945, or per haps mor e accurat el y by t he 1950s, t he
strategy seemed t o be bear i ng fruit ar ound t he world. All
99
t hree maj or variants of t he historic "old left" ant i syst emi c
movement s t he Thi r d Int ernat i onal Communi st s, t he
Second Int ernat i onal Social Democr at s, and t he nationalist
movement s (especially those outside Eur ope) coul d poi nt
t o not abl e successes: t he ar med struggle of t he Communi s t
parties in Yugoslavia and Chi na, t he massive 1945 electoral
victory of t he Labour Party in Great Britain, nationalist
t r i umphs in I ndi a and Indonesi a. It seemed but a mat t er of
decades unt i l t he goals of 1848 woul d be realized in every
corner of t he globe. Thi s wi despread opt i mi sm of t he anti-
systemic forces was nonet hel ess qui t e exaggerat ed, for two
reasons.
One, t he institutionalization of US hegemony i n t he
worl d-syst em as of 1945 ma de possible a generalized coun-
t errevol ut i onary t hrust to slow down t he pace of t he grow-
ing political st rengt h of t he ant i syst emi c movement s. The
US sought t o "cont ai n" t he bloc of Communi s t states led by
t he USSR. And i n Greece, i n West er n Eur ope, i n Korea,
they succeeded i n such "cont ai nment . " Th e US govern-
ment sought t o "defang" t he West er n l abor and social-
democr at i c parties by rigidifying historic differences
bet ween t he Second a nd Thi r d Int ernat i onal s and by erect-
ing "ant i - Communi s m" as an ideological carapace. Thi s
at t empt too was largely successful, wi t hi n t he US itself and
el sewhere. Th e US sought t o slow down, dilute, a nd/ or
coopt t he political expressions of Thi r d Wor l d nat i onal i sm
and, wi t h some not abl e exceptions like Vi et nam, this effort
t oo was largely successful.
Wer e t he count errevol ut i on all t hat had occurred poli-
tically, however, its effect woul d have been moment ar y at
most . A second t hi ng occurred t o da mpe n t he opt i mi sm of
t he ant i syst emi c forces. Th e movement s i n power
per f or med less well t han had been expect ed; far less well.
Al ready in t he i nt erwar peri od, t he Soviet experi ence of t he
1930s t he terrors and t he errors had shaken t he
world' s ant i syst emi c movement s. But in a sense Hi t l er and
100
The Great Rehearsal
t he long struggle of t he Second Wor l d Wa r washed away
muc h of t he di smay. However, t he terrors and t he errors
repeat ed themselves aft er 1945 in one Communi s t state
after anot her . Nor di d t he social-democratic government s
look t hat good, engaged as they were in colonial repression.
And, as one Thi r d Wor l d nationalist movement after
anot her created regi mes t hat seemed t o have t hei r own fair
share of terrors and errors, t he opt i mi sm of t he ant i syst emi c
forces began to be eroded.
Whi l e t he US, and mor e generally t he upper st rat a of t he
worl d-syst em, at t acked t he ant i syst emi c movement s exo-
genousl y as it were, t he movement s wer e si mul t aneousl y
suffering ai l ment s endogenous t o t hem, ai l ment s whi ch
increasingly seemed to be themselves "part of t he pr obl em. "
It is in reaction to this doubl e (exogenous a nd endo-
genous) difficulty of t he t radi t i onal old left movement s t hat
the new social movement s emerged, mor e or less in t he
1960s. These new movement s were concerned with t he
st rengt h and survivability of t he forces t hat domi nat ed t he
worl d-syst em. But they were also concer ned with what t hey
felt was the poor performance, even t he negative per-
formance, of t he worl d' s old left movement s. In t he begi n-
ni ng of t he 1960s, t he concern with t he power and t he evil of
t he pr oponent s of t he status quo was still upper most in t he
mi nds of t he emergent new movement s, and t hei r concern
with t he inefficacies of t he old left opposi t i on was still a
secondary consi derat i on. But as t he decade went on, t he
emphasi s began t o shift, as t he new movement s began t o be
mor e and mor e critical of t he old movement s. At first t he
new el ement s sought to be "reformi st " of t he tactics of t he
old ant i syst emi c movement s. Lat er, t hey often br oke
out ri ght with t hem and even at t acked t hem frontally. We
cannot under st and 1968 unless we see it as si mul t aneousl y
a cri de coeur against t he evils of t he world-system and a fun-
dament al quest i oni ng of t he strategy of t he old left oppo-
sition t o t he worl d-syst em.
101
At its hei ght , and when it had reached the highest level of
screeching, the new left accused the old left of live sins:
weakness, corrupt i on, conni vance, neglect, and arrogance.
Th e weakness was said to be t he inefficacy of t he old anti-
systemic movement s (the Social Democr at s i n t he West , t he
Communi s t s in t he East, t he nationalist government s in t he
Sout h) i n const rai ni ng t he mi l i t ari sm, t he exploitation, t he
i mperi al i sm, t he racism, of t he domi nant forces in t he
worl d-syst em. The at t i t ude t owar ds t he war i n Vi et nam
became a t ouchst one on this issue. Th e corrupt i on was said
to be t he fact t hat certain strata had, t hr ough t he efforts of
past ant i syst emi c action, achieved certain mat eri al con-
cessions and allowed t hei r mi l i t ance t o be softened by this
fact. Th e conni vance was t he charge of corrupt i on t aken
one step furt her. It was said to be t he willingness of certain
strata worl dwi de actually to profit by t he exploitation in t he
system, albeit at a lower level t han t hat of t he domi nant
strata. Th e neglect was said to be t he obt useness about , if
not consci ous ignoring of, t he interests of t he truly dis-
possessed, the real lower strata of t he worl d-syst em (the
subprol et ari ans, t he et hni c and racial minorities, and of
course t he women). The ar r ogance was said t o be t he
cont empt of t he l eadershi p of t he old movement s for t he
real pr obl ems of t he l ower strata, and t hei r ideological self-
assurance.
Thes e were heady charges and t hey were not ma de all at
once, or from the outset. It was an evolution f r om the mi l d
quest i oni ng of t he Port Hur on f oundi ng st at ement of SDS
in 1962 to t he Weat her men in 1969 and after, or f r om t he
convent i onal views (if militantly i mpl ement ed) of SNCC in
t he early 1960s to t hose of t he Black Power movement s of
t he late 1960s. It was an evolution from t he Jeunesse
Et udi ant e Communi s t e in Fr ance in t he early 1960s who
dared to be "pro-Italian, " to t he barri cades of May 1968 in
Paris (and t he virtually open br eak with t he CGT and PCF).
It was an evolution f r om t he Pr ague Spri ng whi ch emer ged
102
The Great Rehearsal
in late 1967 to the foundi ng of Solidarnosc in 1980.
When 1968 exploded in Col umbi a University, in
Paris, in Prague, in Mexico City and Tokyo, in t he Italian
Oct ober it was an explosion. Ther e was no central
direction, no calculated tactical pl anni ng. The explosion
was in a sense as much of a surpri se to t he participants as to
those against whom it was directed. The most surprised
were t he old left movement s who could not under st and how
they could be attacked from what seemed to t hem so unfai r
and so politically dangerous a perspective.
But t he explosion was very powerful, shattering many
authority relations, and shattering above all t he Cold War
consensus on bot h sides. Ideological hegemoni es were chal-
lenged everywhere and t he retreat, bot h of t he powerful
strata of the world-system and of t he leadership of the old
left antisystemic movement s, was real. As we have already
said, t he retreat t urned out to be t emporary and t he new
movement s were checked everywhere. But t he changes in
power relations effected by t he movement s were not
reversed.
The Legacies of 1968
Four mai n changes can be distinguished. First, while t he
bal ance of military power bet ween West and East has not
changed appreciably since 1968, t he capabilities of either
t he West or t he East to police t he Sout h have become
limited. Th e Tet Offensive of early 1968 has remai ned to
this day a symbol of t he i mpot ence of capital-intensive
warfare in curbi ng t he intelligence and will of Thi r d Worl d
peoples. Within live years of t he offensive, t he USA was
forced to wi t hdraw from Vi et nam, and a new era in Nor t h-
South relations began.
The most dramat i c expression of this new era has been
t he frustration of t he US government ' s multifarious
103
at t empt s to br i ng t he I r ani an peopl e back to "reason. " It is
no exaggerat i on to say t hat events in Iran since t he late
1970s have had far great er i nl l uence on t he i nt ernal affairs
of t he USA (notably on t he rise and demi se of Reagani sm)
t han events i n t he USA have had on t he i nt ernal affairs of
Iran. Thi s frust rat i on i s not t he s ympt om of some pecul i ar
weakness of the Uni t ed States as worl d power, or excep-
tional st rengt h of t he I r ani an state as an ant i syst emi c force.
Rat her , it is a sympt om of t he i ncreased nat i onal sover-
eignty enj oyed by Thi r d Wor l d peoples i n general since t he
wi t hdrawal of t he US f r om Vi et nam. The close parallel
bet ween t he recent experi ence of t he USSR i n Afghani st an
and t hat of t he US i n Vi et nam provides f ur t her evidence
t hat t he unpr ecedent ed accumul at i on of means of violence
in t he hands of t he two superpowers simply r epr oduces t he
bal ance of t error bet ween t he two, but adds not hi ng to t hei r
capabilities to police t he world, least of all its peri pheral
regions.
Secondl y, t he changes i n power relations bet ween status-
gr oups such as age-groups, genders, and "ethnicities, " a
maj or consequence of the 1968 revolution, have also proved
t o be far mor e lasting t han t he movement s whi ch br ought
t he m t o worl d at t ent i on. Thes e changes are registered
pri mari l y in t he hi dden abodes of everyday life and as such
ar e less easy t o di scern t han changes i n i nt erst at e power
relations. Nevertheless, we can say with some confi dence
t hat even after 1973 ( when most movement s had subsi ded),
t he c omma nds of domi nant st at us-groups (such as older
generat i ons, males, "majorities") cont i nued in general to
become less likely to be obeyed by subor di nat e status-
groups (younger generat i ons, females, "minorities") t han
they ever were before 1968. Thi s di mi ni shed power of
domi nant st at us-groups is particularly evident in core coun-
tries but may be observed to varying degrees in semi peri -
pheral and per i pher al count ri es as well.
Thi r dl y, and closely related t o t he above, pre-1968 power
104
The Great Rehearsal
relations bet ween capital and l abor have never been
restored. In this connect i on, we should not be deceived by
t he experi ence of part i cul ar nat i onal segment s of t he
capitallabor rel at i on or by t he short -t erm vicissitudes of
t he overall relation. What must be assessed is t he likelihood
t hat t he commands of t he funct i onari es of capi t al be obeyed
by their subordi nat es over t he ent i re spatial domai n of t he
capitalist worl d-economy, and over a peri od of t i me long
enough t o allow for t he i nt erpl ay of c omma nds and
responses to affect t he relations of pr oduct i on and t he
di st ri but i on of resources. Fr om this poi nt of view, t he
cent ral fact of t he 1970s and 1980s has been t he growing
frust rat i on experi enced by t he funct i onari es of capital in
t hei r global search for safe havens of l abor discipline. Ma ny
of t he locales t hat in t he early 1970s seemed to provide
capitalist pr oduct i on wi t h a viable alternative to t he restive
labor envi ronment s of t he core zone have themselves
t ur ned, one after anot her , into loci of l abor unrest
Port ugal , Spain, Brazil, Iran, Sout h Africa, and, most
recently, Sout h Korea. We may well say t hat since 1968 t he
funct i onari es of capital have been "on t he run. " And while
this hei ght ened geographi cal mobility has t ended to
da mpe n the unrul i ness of l abor in the places f r om whi ch
t he funct i onari es of capi t al have lied, it has t ended to have
t he opposi t e effect in t he places in whi ch they have settled.
Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s, civil society at large has
been far less responsive to t he commands of t he bear er s (or
woul d- be bearers) of st at e power t han it had been before
1968. Al t hough a general phenomenon, this di mi ni shed
power of states over civil society has been most evident in
t he semi peri phery, wher e it has t aken t he form of a crisis of
"bourgeoi s" and "prol et ari an" di ct at orshi ps alike. Since
1973, "bourgeoi s" di ct at orshi ps have been di spl aced by
democr at i c regimes i n sout hern Eur ope (Portugal, Greece,
Spain), East Asia (Philippines, South Korea), and in Lat i n
Ameri ca (most not abl y Brazil and Argentina).
105
Al ongsi de this crisis, i ndeed precedi ng and following it,
has developed the crisis of t he so-called di ct at orshi ps of t he
proletariat. Not wi t hst andi ng t he many and real differences
t hat set t he Pr ague Spri ng and t he Chi nese Cul t ural Revo-
lution apart , t he two movement s had one t hi ng i n common:
they were assaults on t he di ct at orshi p of t he officials (pri-
marily but not exclusively on t he di ct at orshi p of t he
Communi s t Part y' s officials) dressed up as a di ct at orshi p of
t he proletariat. In Chi na, t he assault was so violent and
unr est r ai ned as to deal a fatal blow to t hat dictatorship.
Subsequent l y, part y rul e coul d be re-established (as it has
been) only by accommodat i ng demands for greater grass-
roots democracy and economi c decent ral i zat i on. In
Czechosl ovaki a, a nonviolent and rest rai ned assaul t was put
down speedily t hr ough Soviet military i nt ervent i on. Yet,
bet ween 1970 and 1980 t he chal l enge re-emerged in a mor e
formi dabl e fashion in Pol and, eventually shaki ng t he Soviet
l eadershi p' s confi dence in t he possibility of pat chi ng up a
cr umbl i ng hegemony indefinitely by means of repression
and purel y cosmetic changes i n party di ct at orshi p.
Fr om all t hese points of view, 1968 is alive and well in t he
sense t hat its objective of altering t he "balance of power in
t he worl d social system in favor of subor di nat e groups has
been highly successful. Yet, this success has been accom-
pani ed by an equal l y r emar kabl e failure t o i mprove t he
mat eri al welfare of these subor di nat e groups. To be sure,
some mat eri al benefits di d accr ue to subor di nat e groups as
a whol e from t he change in t he bal ance of power. But most
of these benefits have accrued to only a minority within
each group, leaving t he maj ori t y wi t hout any net gain,
per haps even with a net loss.
Thi s t endency has been most evident among Thi r d
Wor l d states. The oi l -produci ng states wer e abl e t o t ake
advant age of t he new bal ance of power in t he i nt erst at e
system by char gi ng after 1973 a much hi gher rent for t he
use of t hei r nat ur al resources t han they were ever abl e to do
106
The Great Rehearsal
before 1968. Thi s advant age lasted about ten years. A few
ot her Thi r d Wor l d states have been abl e t o step up their
own i ndust ri al i zat i on by taking advant age of t he relocation
of industrial activities from core count ri es. How much of a
gain this will const i t ut e by t he 1990s remai ns to be seen.
But most Thi r d Worl d states, caught bet ween hi gher prices
for energy resources and stiffer compet i t i on from newly
i ndust ri al i zi ng countries, have experi enced even greater
i mpoveri shment and under devel opment t han t hey di d
before 1968.
Similar consi derat i ons appl y t o t he ot her subor di nat e
groups. Thus , over t he last fifteen years t he progressive
br eakdown of generational, gender, and et hni c barri ers to
t he circulation of elites (which has benefi t t ed qui t e a few
member s of each group) has been accompani ed by yout h
unempl oyment , doubl e exploitation of women, and t he
i mmi serat i on of "minorities" pn an unpr ecedent ed scale. As
for t he change in t he bal ance of power bet ween l abor and
capital its benefits have accrued mostly to workers engaged
in st eppi ng up t he aut omat i on of l abor processes, or in
servicing t he expanded market s for elites, or in r unni ng t he
relocated pl ant s in t hei r new locations. For t he rest, t he
gains of t he late 1960s and early 1970s have been eroded, at
first by t he great inflation of t he 1970s and t hen by t he
unempl oyment of t he 1980s. It is pr obabl y too early to
assess who is benefi t t i ng and who is losing in mat eri al t er ms
from t he crisis of dictatorships. But her e too t he prel i mi nary
record seems to i ndi cat e t hat t he mat eri al benefits of great er
democr acy have accr ued only to a small fraction of t he
popul at i on.
In all directions we ar e faced with t he appar ent par adox
t hat a favorable change in t he bal ance of power has br ought
little or no change in mat eri al benefit to t he maj ori t y of each
subor di nat e group. Thi s appar ent par adox has t he si mpl e
expl anat i on t hat t he reproduct i on of mat eri al wel fare in a
capitalist wor l d- economy is condi t i onal upon t he political
107
and social subor di nat i on of the act ual and potential l abor-
ing masses. To the ext ent t hat this subor di nat i on is less-
ened, t he propensi t y of t he capitalist worl d-economy to
r epr oduce and expand material welfare is lessened too.
Th e history of t he capitalist wor l d- economy since 1973
has been t he history of its adj us t ment to t he social
upheaval s of t he previous five years. Th e adj us t ment has
been probl emat i c, l eadi ng some to speak of a general crisis
of capitalism, because of t he scope, suddenness, and si mul -
taneity of t he changes in power relations ushered in by t he
social upheaval s. Whe n changes i n power relations are
limited and pi ecemeal , as they usually are, the capitalist
wor l d- economy can accommodat e wi t hout difficulty i mper-
ceptible changes in t he overall allocation of resources and
di st ri but i on of rewards. But when t he changes are numer -
ous, significant, and si mul t aneous, as they were in t he
peri od 1968-1973, t hei r accommodat i on involves long and
seri ous di srupt i ons in established pat t erns of social and
economi c life.
The i nadequat e access to me a ns of pr oduct i on, of
exchange, and of prot ect i on t hat characterizes subor di nat e
gr oups makes t he latter particularly vul nerabl e t o t hese
di srupt i ons. We shoul d not be surpri sed, t herefore, i f most
member s of t he subor di nat e groups have experi enced little
or no i mpr ovement over the last fifteen years in t hei r
mat er i al welfare, not wi t hst andi ng, nay even because of, t he
i mpr ovement i n t hei r power position. One may wonder ,
however, whet her this failure of a mor e favorable bal ance of
power t o deliver welfare mi ght not be swinging t he bal ance
of power back in favor of domi nant groups.
The cul t ural and political backl ash of t he late 1970s and
of t he 1980s against everything t hat 1968 stood for seems to
suggest that this is i ndeed what is happeni ng. Whi l e still
payi ng lip-service t o Thi r d Wor l d solidarity, Thi r d Wor l d
states have been engaged i n wi despread feudi ng and i nt ense
economi c compet i t i on a mong themselves. Th e younger
112
The Great Rehearsal
generat i ons, t he women, t he "mi nori t i es" have all switched,
albeit to different degrees, f r om collective to individual
concerns, while class solidarity and unity of political
pur pose among workers are i n most places at an historical
low. And in t he epicenters of the struggle for political
democr acy, the desire for mor e and greater f r eedoms is
oft en paral yzed by fears of economi c di srupt i on.
Ther e is no denyi ng t hat f r om all t hese poi nt s of view
1968 is dead and bur i ed and cannot be revived by t he
t hought s and actions of the nostalgic few. Gr ant ed this, we
must nonet hel ess distinguish carefully bet ween the move-
ment s and ideologies of 1968 and t he under l yi ng st ruct ural
t ransformat i ons t hat preceded and outlived those move-
ment s and ideologies. These st ruct ural t ransformat i ons are
the out come of secular t rends of the capitalist worl d-
economy, and as such cannot be reversed by any unfavor-
able conj unct ur e t hat mi ght ensue f r om their open
mani fest at i on.
Thus , Adam Smi t h (1961: II, 213-31) long ago poi nt ed
out the negative l ong-t erm i mpact of an ever wi deni ng and
deepeni ng division of l abor on t he mart i al qualities of t he
peopl es t hat ar e most directly involved in it. The great er
specialization and mechani zat i on of war activities t hem-
selves could count er this negative i mpact , but only up to a
poi nt . At t he begi nni ng of our cent ury, J os eph Schumpet er
made a similar point in support of his ar gument t hat capi-
talist devel opment under mi nes t he capabilities (as opposed
to t he propensities) of states to engage in imperialist wars:
The competitive system absorbs the full energies of most of the
people at all economic levels. Constant application, attention,
and concentration of energy are the conditions of survival
within it, primarily in the specifically economic professions,
but also in other activities organized on their model . . . . In a
purely capitalist world, what was once energy for war becomes
simply energy for labor of every kind (1955: 69).
109
To this we need only to add that the spatial unevenness of
capitalist devel opment has t ended t o under mi ne t he mart i al
qualities of peoples precisely in t hose states wher e it has
t ended to concent rat e weal t h. Up to a poi nt , core states
have been abl e to count er t he ensui ng change in bal ance of
power implicit in this t endency t hr ough an ever-increasing
capi t al intensity of war. But at a cert ai n point as t he
experi ence of t he US in Vi et nam and of t he USSR in
Afghani st an have shown in exempl ary fashion f ur t her
increases in t he capital intensity of war bri ng rapidly
decreasi ng ret urns, particularly when it comes to policing
t he peri phery of t he worl d-economy.
Th e same processes t hat under mi ne t he power of core
states over peri pheral states over t he longue duree of t he capi-
talist worl d-syst em also under mi ne t he power of capital
over l abor, of domi nant over subor di nat e st at us-groups, of
states over civil society. An ever wi deni ng and deepeni ng
division of l abor makes capital increasingly vul nerabl e to
workpl ace acts of protest and passive resistance on t he part
of subor di nat e workers, regardless of t he level of class
consci ousness and organi zat i on expressed by those acts
(see, in part i cul ar, chapt er 1 above; and Arrighi & Silver,
1984). In order to reproduce, or re-establish, t he c omma nd
of capi t al over l abor in t he workpl ace, t he funct i onari es of
capital ar e i nduced t o mobi l i ze an ever-growing pr opor t i on
of t he l abor force in wage activities but by so doing they
revolutionize power relations bet ween t he genders and
among age-groups and "ethnicities." Last but not least, t he
growing complexity of t he division of l abor wi t hi n and
across political j uri sdi ct i ons makes t he exercise of state
power over civil society increasingly probl emat i c.
Thes e are t he ki nds of process t hat pr epar ed t he gr ound
for, and eventually gave rise to, t he movement s of 1968.
Bei ng processes of t he longue duree, t hei r unfol di ng spans t he
entire lifetime of t he capitalist worl d-economy. Th e explo-
sions of 1968 and their af t er mat h can be i nt erpret ed as
110
The Great Rehearsal
sympt om of the fact that t he system is approachi ng its
historical asymptote. 1968, with its successes and failures,
was t hus a prel ude, better, a rehearsal, of things to come.
1968: A Rehearsal of What?
If 1968 is anal ogous to 1848 as a failed world-scale revo-
lution and as a world-historical great rehearsal, for what
sort of world-revolution may it be t he great rehearsal? Can
we on analogy project today' s underl yi ng secular trends,
specify what was new about yesterday' s new social move-
ment s, and thereby sketch in advance likely trajectories of
the confront at i ons and progressive social changes they
suggest? As we move chronologically towards t he 1990s and
t he 2000s, our historical social system, t he capitalist world-
economy, continues to be faced with difficulties in four
principal arenas.
First, t he interstate system is marked by a military stand-
off between the US and t he USSR and t he evident inability
of either to control mat t ers of consequence in states of the
peri phery. Hegemony is giving way to its concept ual
count erpoi nt , t he condition of rivalry. The possible realign-
ment s of alliances between the live maj or actors t he US,
t he USSR, West ern Europe, Japan, and Chi na are only
now begi nni ng. And everyone is approachi ng such realign-
ment s most gingerly and most fearfully. Hence, US
hegemony is bei ng eroded wi t hout any clear, and therefore
reassuring, world order to replace it. Meanwhi l e, market s of
all sorts capital, capital goods, labor, wage-goods (ord-
inary), wage-goods ("durable") are evolving at a rapid
pace. They are becomi ng less and less regulated social
mechani sms of t he circuits of capital and mor e and mor e
loci of speculation (what liberals call "market forces") and
increasingly show (as on 19 Oct ober 1987 in equity prices)
t he kind of j agged price movement s which are at once their
777
hal l mar k and t he reason for their always and everywhere
bei ng objects of regulation.
Possibly t he Gr oup of Seven (with t he I BRD, I MF, and
BIS) can i mpose renewed order. Possibly t he trans-
nationals' ingestion of market s t hr ough vertical integration
(and t he anal ogous organi zat i on of t hei r count er par t s in
count ri es of existing socialism) is sufficient for t hem to
absor b and so t o dampen t he price movement s. Whet her ,
in this sense, the world-scale centralizing of capital is his-
torically far enough advanced (as suggested by "the abso-
lute general law") to replace t he interstate syst em' s
market -regul at i on via hegemony, we shall all see.
Second, the cont radi ct i on bet ween l abor and capital,
given bot h t he increasing centralization of capital and t he
increasing margi nal i zat i on of large sectors of t he l abor
force, will remai n el ement al . The new social movement s
have i ncreased t he worl dwi de pressure for hi gher wage-
levels with world capital seeking ever mor e to respond to
this pressure by reduci ng the size of l abor i nput . As a result,
t here has perforce been a rising level of mat eri al well-being
for a significant sector of workers and a deepeni ng relative
i mmi serat i on of many others, hence an absol ut e and rela-
tive increase in t he inequalities of well-being among t he
worl d' s workers. Ther e has been t hus a wi deni ng scope for
t he mechani sm of unequal exchange in world-scale
accumul at i on.
At t he same time, capital' s increasing search for safe
havens f r om organi zed l abor unrest carries with it of course
a growi ng relocation of industrial prol et ari ani zat i on and
hence of collective efforts to cont rol t hat process a n d / o r to
amel i orat e its effects. The net result may well be an increas-
ingly class-conscious focus t o t he nat i onal i st sent i ment t hat
pervades t he zones out si de the core, part i cul arl y in semi-
peri pheral states (see chapt er 3 above). Similar phenomena
are increasingly occurri ng is socialist states, not abl y (but
certainly not only) in Pol and.
112
The Great Rehearsal
Thi r d, t he ability of states to control t hei r civil societies is
di mi ni shi ng. Historically, it is t hr ough t he const i t ut i on of
civil society, and its subsequent extension not abl y,
t hr ough t he 1848-engendered "i ncorporat i on of t he worki ng
classes into society" of t he late ni net eent h and early t wen-
tieth cent uri es t hat one traces t he successive trans-
format i ons of t he monar chi es and patriciates of t he nascent
capitalist worl d-economy into its const i t uent and still evol-
ving states. The organizing cont radi ct i on f r om t he i ncept i on
of stateness, state power versus civil rights and liberties,
r emai ns cent ral to t he statecivil society relation. Over t i me,
of course, t he scope of each has greatly expanded, t hus
shar peni ng t he struggle, whi ch t he post-1968 world-scale
" human rights" movement s profoundl y reflect. The not i on
t hat rul i ng strata seek to legitimate t hei r rul e so t hat they
are as moral l y obligated to command as those they cl ai m to
rule are moral l y obligated to compl y is bot h very old and
very wi despread.
Weber ' s central theoretical claim (1968: I, 212-307)
t hat certain beliefs in popul ar consci ousness are an indis-
pensabl e condi t i on of rout i ne compl i ance and so of t he
"stability" of t he relational net work admi ni st er i ng t he rules
remai ns plausible. However, t he very i ncrease in t he
efficiency of t he ways in whi ch each state controls its civil
society, t he expansi on of an i nst r ument al bur eaucr acy, itself
creates t he limits of its efficacy by generat i ng an ever mor e
wi despread skepticism among those whom t he bur eaucr acy
is admi ni st eri ng. The reach of aut hori t y has come to be
mor e and mor e deni ed, as bot h t he US and USSR govern-
ment s among others, have increasingly discovered. 1968
symbol i zed the out burst of such skepticism. For a while, t he
comi ng to state power of old social movement s l i mi t ed this
corrosion of aut hori t y. But these new regi mes were qui ckl y
swept up in t he increasingly "ant i -st at e" consci ousness of
t he mass of t he popul at i on.
Thi s process has been spectacularly abet t ed by t he
113
i mpact of new technology on t he ability of states to cont rol
their space. Electronification is physically different f r om
electrification and does not so muc h abri dge t he space of
social relations as abri dge t he capacity to cont rol social
relations t hr ough controlling their space. Th e i mpl i cat i ons
for stateness remai n to be explicated and experi enced.
But t he cont rol of popul at i ons t hr ough cont rol l i ng t he
space t hey and their relations with one anot her occupy
as citizenry, as communi t i es, as individuals is in t he
process of being f undament al l y under mi ned in t he two key
di rect i ons formed by t he moder n worl d-syst em' s spatial
j uri sdi ct i ons; within states and bet ween states.
Four t h, t he demands of t he di sadvant aged st at us-groups
of gender, of generat i on, of ethnicity, of race, of sexuality
will get ever st ronger. We must hear Gal l audet here and
add t he physically handi capped, who compr i se t he t r ue
pari ah st r at um of historical capitalism. All six st at us-group
relations are deeply different one f r om anot her , and even
mor e so in their specificities in t he worl d' s social structures,
but they share t hree features. Each was a gr ound of a new
left r epr oach of t he old left. Each in a very real sense is as
much a cont radi ct i on among t he people as an el ement of
t he capi t al - l abor or state-civil society cont radi ct i on. And
t he oppressed of each explicitly seek not t he t ur ni ng of t he
tables but social equality, not only st ruct ural l y but ideo-
logically as well (in the sense of the el i mi nat i on f r om social
consci ousness of presumptions of superi ori t y/ i nferi ori t y in
relations of gender , generat i on, ethnicity, race, sexuality,
abl e-bodi edness).
We t herefore proj ect pr obabl e r eal i gnment s i n t he alli-
ance systems of t he interstate syst em al ong wi t h i ncreased
shar p economi c fluctuations, a shar pened (and in part i cul ar
a geographically wi dened) class struggle, an i ncreasi ng
inability of states to cont rol their civil societies, and a
persistent rei nforcement of the claims to equality by all t he
di sadvant aged st at us-groups. It is very uncl ear, in t he
114
The Great Rehearsal
nat ur e of things, wher e this will lead. After 1848, the worl d' s
old left were sure t hat 1917 woul d occur. They ar gued
about how and where and when. But t he mi ddl e- r ange
objective of popul ar sovereignty was clear. Aft er 1968, t he
worl d' s antisystemic movement s t he old and t he new
ones t oget her showed r at her less clarity about t he
mi ddl e- r ange objective. They have t ended t herefore t o
concent rat e on short -range ones. Ther e is clearly a danger
t hat if organi zat i ons concent rat e on short -range objectives,
even in the na me of l ong-range ideals, they may sacrifice
mi ddl e- r ange success or even mi ddl e- r un survival.
We have no answer to the quest i on: 1968, rehearsal for
what ? In a sense, t he answers depend on t he ways in whi ch
t he wor l dwi de family of ant i syst emi c movement s will
ret hi nk its mi ddl e- r un strategy in t he t en or twenty years to
come. 1917, for good or ill, was t he result of an enor mous
a mount of collective and consci ous effort by t he worl d' s old
left in t he years following 1848. No doubt it was also t he
result of st ruct ural devel opment s in t he capitalist worl d-
economy. But i t woul d not have happened wi t hout huma n
organi zat i on and revolutionary pr ogr ams.
Th e risks of drifting are very clear. Th e t enant s of t he
status quo have not given up, however much their position
is weakened structurally and ideologically. They still have
enor mous power and are using it to reconst ruct a new
inegalitarian world order. They coul d succeed. Or t he
world coul d disintegrate, f r om a nucl ear or an ecological
cat ast rophe. Or it could be reconst ruct ed in t he ways in
whi ch peopl e hoped, in 1848, in 1968.
115
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Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich (1967). The Communist
Manifesto. Harmondsworth: Penguin/NLR.
Marx, Karl (1959). Capital. Vol. I. Moscow: Foreign Langu-
ages Publishing House.
Namier, Sir Lewis (1944). 1848: The Revolution of the Intel-
lectuals, The Raleigh Lecture in History, British
Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Polanyi, Karl (1957). The Great Transformation. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph (1955). Imperialism and Social Classes.
New York: Meridian Books.
Smith, Adam (1961). The Wealth of Nations. 2 volumes.
London: Methuen.
Thompson, E.P. (1964). The Making of the English Working
Class. New York: Pantheon.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1980). "The States in the Insti-
tutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy," Inter-
national Social Science Journal, XXXII, 4, 743-81.
Weber, Max (1946). Essays from Max Weber, ed. H. Gerth &
C.W. Mills. Oxford & New York: Oxford University
Press.
Weber, Max (1968). Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth & C.
Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press.
118
Index
accumul at i on, social relations of
41- 2, 70
Afghani st an, Soviet Uni on and
104, 110
Ami n, Sami r 68
anarcho-syndi cal i sm 81
ant i syst emi c movement s
concept of 1
count errevol ut i on 100-01
f ut ur e of 115
nat i onal -l i berat i on 27, 30- 32
ol d swept out by new 102-3
organi ze agai nst st at e 37- 8,
99
perceived to have failed 40
rebellion and revolution
29- 30
r ecent 35
social movement s 30- 33
state power and 50
Vi et nam as epi cent er ol
as ymmet r y 36
see also 1968; revolutions
a nd rebel l i ons
ant i war movement s 35
Ar gent i na 105
aristocracy 9
Baku, Congr ess of 56, 98
Bandoeng 98
banks see under capital
BIS (Bank for I nt er nat ' l
Set t l ement s) 49, 90, 112
Black Power 102
Bolsheviks 55- 6, 65
Bonapar t e, Napol eon 55
bourgeoi si e 6- 7, 9- 10
Brazil 105
bureaucracy, ant i syst emi c
movement s and 37- 8
Capital (Marx) 9, 11
capi t al
banks and banki ng 49- 50, 90
capitalist devel opment of 91- 3
debt or and credi t or states
7 2 - 4
propri et ors of 4 - 5
war f ar e and 103, 109-10
capi t al i sm
cent ral i zat i on of 48- 50, 72,
77- 8, 94- 5, 112
devel opment of capi t al 91- 3
monopol i st i c 12-14, 19
77 9
Index
mul t i nat i onal fi rms 478,
71- 72, 90- 91
new rel at i onshi p with l abor
91, 105, 107, 112
ni net eent h- cent ur y 1
r api d evol ut i on of 111-12
see als o economy; pr oduct i on
Car r , E, H, 68
Chi na 48, 100, 111
Cul t ur al Revol ut i on 36, 37,
89, 106
nat i onal i sm 56
r evol ut i onof 1911 99
Vi et nam and 35
ci t i zenshi p 83
civil ri ght s 113
class 1
an sich/ftir sich 16-17, 21, 23, 26
historical anal ysi s of 25- 7
Mar x' s anal ysi s of 6 - 1 0
Smi t h' s anal ysi s of 3- 6, 10
Weber on 14- 20
see also st at us gr oups
class st ruggl e
condi t i ons for exi st ence of
63- 5
distinct from st ruggl e for
weal t h 61- 3
gover nment i ndebt edness a nd
73- 4
historical processes 67- 8
nat i onal i st l i berat i on and
53- 4, 66- 7, 69
within a st at e 60- 61
colonialism 57
communi cat i on 74- 6, 91
television' s power 50- 51
Communist Manifesto ( Mar x &
Engel s) 9, 11^50, 51, 68, 75
Communi s t part i es 37, 100
achi evement s of 3 4 - 5
new movement s reject 88, 102
pr esent concer ns of 40- 41
st rengt h of 33
t errors a nd er r or s of 100-01,
106
communi t y, vs state 45- 6
Czechosl ovaki a, Pr ague Spri ng
102-3, 106
dei ndust ri al i zat i on 49
East er n Eur ope, Communi s t
par t i esof 33
Economy and Soaety (Weber)
14-15
economy
class and 26, 67
effect of 1968 on 107-8
g r o u p s a n d 2 2 - 3
intra-elite st ruggl es 61 - 3
Mar x on 11
nat i onal -l i berat i on and 70- 71
separ at i on f r om state 46- 7
st r uct ur al t r ansf or mat i on of
18, 46- 51
t ranst erri t ori al 63
see also capital; capi t al i sm
educat i on 83, 84-5
egal i t ari ani sm 54- 5
Egypt 55
1848
clarity of expect at i ons from
115
effects of 98- 101
origin of ant i syst emi c
movement s 30
revolution of popul ar
sovereignty 97- 8
el ect roni c village 74- 5
Engels, Fr i edr i ch91
a n d K. Ma r x , Communist
Manifestos, 11, 50, 51, 68,
lb
et hni c gr oups 21, 23, 25, 104, 107
in workforce 83, 88
Eur ocent r i sm 68
Eur ope 111
Fr ance 33, 78, 97, 102
Ma r x on cl ass in 10
Frobel , Fol ker 71
120
Index
Gaiiev, Sul t an 55
Gal l audet , Th o ma s H. 114
Gar i bal di , Gi us eppe 55
Ge r ma ny 78, 89
Ger t h, Ha ns 15
Gr amsci , Ant oni o 13
The Great Transformation (Polanyi)
16n
Gr eece 100, 105
Gr een Party ( Ger many) 89
Gr enada, US invasion of 51
Hai t i , revolution 55
Hei nri chs, Ji i r gen 71
historical process, class st ruggl e
67- 8
Hi t l er, Adolf 100-01
h u ma n ri ght s 93
I BRD ( I nt er nat ' l Bank for
Reconst ruct i on a nd
Devel opment ) 49, 90, 112
I MF (Int ernat ' l Monet ar y Fund)
49- 50, 90, 112
i mmi gr ant workers 91
i mperi al i sm 13-14, 102
I ndi a 55, 100
bour geoi si e of 24- 5
I ndonesi a 100
I r an 104, 105
Irel and, workers in Britain 24
Italy, Communi s t Part y of 33
J a p a n 37, 111
J eunes s e Et udi ant e Communi s t e
102
Keynesi ani sm 35
Korea, Sout h 100, 105
Kossut h, Laj os 55
Kreye, Ot t o 71
l abor 5, 7- 8, 83, 110
Adam Smi t h on 4, 109
bur eaucr at i c organi zat i on
37- 40
change in composi t i on of
82- 3, 85
commodi f i cat i on of 38- 9, 40
divisions of 47- 8, 68, 71- 2
new rel at i onshi p with capi t al
91,105, 107, 112
occupat i ons of 86-7
pol ari zat i on of 85
st rengt h a nd weakness of
9 - 1 0 , 7 8 - 8 0
l andowner s 4, 5
Latin Amer i ca 89, 105
Leni n, V.I.
nat i onal vs class l i berat i on
55- 6
' political economy and 12-14
Li n Bi ao69
Maoi sm 89
mar ket rel at i ons 5, 6, 16, 19-20
Mar x, Karl
and F. Engel s, Communist
Manifesto 9, 11, 50, 51. 68,
75
Capital 9, 11
class a nd 6- 10, 91
cri t i que of political economy
6-12,26
historical gr oups a n d 21
ret reat t o Smi t hi an par adi gm
10
Mar xi s m
l abor movement a nd 81
political economy a nd 12-14
Mexi co 37, 99
Mills, C. Wri ght 15
nat i onal -l i berat i on
achi evement s of 56- 7
class st ruggl e and 53- 4, 66- 7,
69
economy and 70- 71
ideological t hemes of 27, 54- 6
real i sm vs revisionism 5960
st at e sovereignty and 57- 60
727
Index
nat i onal i sm 93
ant i syst emi c movement s
30- 32
gr oupi ngs 23, 25
1968
conf usi on about objectives 115
cry agai nst evils 98, 101- 3
legacies of 103-11
out come of ? 111-15
Ni xon, Ri char d M. 35
Nor t her n Irel and, l abel s for
peopl e 24
oil, effect on nat i onal powers
106- 7
Paris Co mmu n e 98
pauper i sm, official 91, 95
peasant s 79
Phi l i ppi nes 105
Pol and 103, 106
Pol anyi , Kar l , The Great
Transformation 16n
political economy
Mar x' s cri t i que o f 6 - 1 2
Mar xi s m a n d 12-14
politics
intra-elite st ruggl es 6 2 - 3
l abor movement and 81- 2
r es hapi ng of st r uct ur e 22- 3
Port ugal 105
power
ant i syst emi c movement s gain
31- 3
Weber on 15
product i on,
class struggle 64, 67
cont rol of 7- 8, -108
over- 8, 13
see also capi t al ; capi t al i sm
prol et ari at 13, 79
di ct at or shi p of 106
Mar x on 6- 7, 9- 10
suffers from gover nment
i ndebt ednes s 73- 4
propert y 15, 59
raci sm 57, 102
movement against 35
reform, vs revolution 32
revi si oni sm 59- 60
revolutions and rebellions
Cul t ur al 36, 37, 89, 106
noncont i nui t y of 29- 30
r ef or m vs 32
state machi ner y to cont rol
98- 9
unful fi l l ed 33- 41
wor l d 97
Russi an Revol ut i on 55-6, 65, 68,
98, 99
see also Soviet Uni on
Schumpet er , J os eph 109-10
SDS ( St udent s for a Democr at i c
Society) 102
Second I nt er nat i onal 32, 81, 100
Smi t h, Ad a m 10, 13
on division of l abor 109
Wealth of Nations 3 - 6 , 7
SNCC ( St udent Non- Vi ol ent
Co- or di nat i ng Commi t t ee)
102
social democr at i c part i es 89- 90,
100, 101
achi evement s of 33, 34- 5, 40,
85, 88
new movement s reject 88, 102
social movement s 77- 82, 95
effect of l 968 104, 107, 114
react agai nst old left 88- 90
socialism 94
Soi i darnosc 103
Sout h Afri ca 105
Soviet Uni on
Af ghani st an and 104, 110
class st ruggl e 65- 6
repressi on by 106, 113
revolution in power 82
seealsoCommunist part i es;
Russi an Revolution
Spai n 33, 55, 105
722
Index
state
capital vs welfare 92- 3
civil society and obedi ence 98,
105, 113-14, 115
class struggles wi t hi n 15-20,
60- 61, 64
comi ng t o power 31- 3
vs communi t y 45- 6
cont rol of economi cs 5
debt or s and creditors 72- 4
illegitimate i nt erference 58
i nt erst at e system of 42- 4
i nt rast at e net wor k 44
l abor seeks power i n 81- 2
obsol escence of 11
pr oper t y 59
r eshapi ng of political
st ruct ure 22- 3
rest rai nt s on sovereignty of
57- 60
wi deni ng and deepeni ng of
42- 5, 51
st at us gr oups 1, 104, 114
cont rast wi t h class 14-20
monopol i es 19
nat i onal i st 25
reification of 20- 22
i ^aZf oet hni c gr oups
s t uden^CS, 37
Sweden, reformi st s i n power 82
Swi t zerl and, gr oups wi t hi n 24
technology, t r ansf or mat i on of
economy 18
Thi r d I nt er nat i onal 32, 82, 100
Thi r d Worl d 100
class st ruggl e a nd 67
effect of l 968 106-7
f eudi ng amongst nat i ons 109
nat i onal sovereignty of 104
new social movement s and
8 8 - 9
Thomps on, E.P, 23
Turkey 48, 50
uni ons, bur eaucr acy of 37- 8
Uni t ed Ki ngdom
La bour Party 100
wor ki ng class 234, 78
Uni t ed Nat i ons 44
Uni t ed States
economi c hegemony 26- 7,
48- 9, 71
erosi on of hegemony 111-12
political hegemony 69, 100,
103-4
state vs society 113
st udent movement 37
televised social movement s
50- 51
Vi et nam and 35- 6, 103, 104,
110
War for I ndependence 55
val ue-syst ems 17
Vi et nam
epi cent er of forces 356, 49,
89, 100, 102, 103
nat i onal -l i berat i on movement
56
US and 35- 6, 103, 104, 110
Wealth of Nations (Smi t h) 3- 6, 7
Weat her men 102
Weber, Max 14, 113
Economy and Society 14-15
wel fare 91- 2
West erni sm, ant i - 93- 4
women 104, 107
l abor and 83, 88
world economy . ^ e c o n o my
Yugoslavia 100
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Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein Antisystemic Movements 1989

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